Could TSR2 have been made to work?

[Rule of cool]

As has been pointed out before, but it doesn't seem to sink in.

It is a wild card, a pain the the rear from planning purposes.

Would France rejoin and allow NATO forces on her soil in the weeks preceding the ostensible start of WW3 as an effort to enhance deterrence? Or would she try to preserve her illusion independence, like the British in WW1, and hold off on rejoining NATO until after the shooting started? The former allows all sorts of deployment options while the latter robs NATO of flexibility and raw muscle.

 

[Arjen]

I agree about the planning headaches caused.
The statement 'France left NATO' is plain wrong, though.

 

[uk 75]

The rough field requirement for a short range close support aircraft like 1154 makes some sense but TSR2 was a theatre nuclear delivery asset for which fixed infrastructure existed in the UK, Cyprus and Singapore.
Even the 1154 only needed robust STOL characteristics. (use the vectored thrust but not for full vtol?).
A wider flatter TSR2 with side by side cockpit and F111 style undercart but no VG would have been a decent, affordable 1 for 2 replacement for Canberra.

 

[Rule of cool]

Here's a question, could the TSR2 operate from Port Stanley's 4,100' runway?

 

[uk 75]

How would it get there? The Vulcan took all the RAF's available tanker fleet to do the journey.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I heard that what really stopped DeGaul's complete withdrawal from NATO was some 60,000 dead Americans.

POTUS was not wanting to go there, but DeGaul pissed him off demanding the removal of all American soldiers from French territory. POTUS snapped and said, "we will start with the 60,000 American soldiers in the graveyards." DeGaul shut up hard at that point, never made the demand again.

 

[Rule of cool]

How would it get there? The Vulcan took all the RAF's available tanker fleet to do the journey.

It will likely take less tankers because the TSR2 will take less fuel so a Victor might be able to do multiple tankings. They'd only be able to ferry 1 per day.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Here's a question, could the TSR2 operate from Port Stanley's 4,100' runway?

OR343 required “emergency” operation from runways of 1500 yards (4500ft)

Most sources seem to state the unextended runway length as 3013ft. Even when PSP was used to temporarily extend the runway for Phantom, it could only operate with a HRAG. An arrester hook was proposed for TSR2 but not funded. TSR2 did have braking parachute for flight trials but it’s unclear if this was going on operational aircraft.

OR343 requires an LCN of 20 but I can’t find a 1982 LCG for Port Stanley. OR343 had no requirement for operating off PSP which was used to increase the LCG. Also I’m unsure if a braking parachute is compatible with PSP.

From the available information I’d say no.

 

[Rule of cool]

There was a runway 4100 ft long and 150 ft wide designed to load classification number (LCN) 16 although, in places, it could be as high as LCN 30.

This dude cites this paper. If this is correct the TSR2 can't do it, so there's no flying one down there at short notice as a deterrent.

 

[Yellow Palace]

OR343 required “emergency” operation from runways of 1500 yards (4500ft)

It's actually worse than that in design terms. OR.343 required normal operation from a 1,300 yard runway at ISA + 30 degrees Celsius, and emergency operation from a 1,000 yard runway at the same temperature - or just 600 yards for the 450 nautical mile sortie. All with a target LCN of 20.

That would allow operation from Stanley in terms of length, but not necessarily in weight, though the shorter sortie presumably involved less fuel and therefore lighter weights. I've no idea how much lighter, or what the relationship is between weight and LCN.

Realistically, TSR.2 was never going to disperse to the kind of random abandoned WW2 airfields this implied. The high temperature requirement feels a bit extreme too, but I've not got a good feel on that.

It would be perfectly reasonable to assume that it would only ever fly from established airfields. This would allow accepting 2,000 yard runways - actually stated in OR.343 as normal - and a maximum LCN of 40. This is still a slight improvement on the Buccaneer (LCN 45) and was what was specified in OR.339!

That doesn't ease the avionics problem any, but it does mean that the solution space for the aerodynamics, structural, and propulsion design is a lot less constrained.

 

[zen]

That doesn't ease the avionics problem any, but it does mean that the solution space for the aerodynamics, structural, and propulsion design is a lot less constrained

This.
TSR.2 get fixed as a solution at a time when the assumptions behind it's requirements are changing.

The French 'leaving NATO' (yes I know but it's a shorthand for something a lot more complicated), which aldo covers the changes in perception of what could be achieved for dispersal....or not.

Avionics shrinking.

The studies into VG and what the tradeoffs be.

Even the arrival of better turbofans.

F111 sits the other side of most of these changes. As does Tornado.

 

[Rule of cool]

All the short field stuff is window dressing, the most important thing is the the payload-range and speed performance. This is pretty much the same as the P1154, which grew from something practical that could do VTOL (and variations) into something impractical to get the required performance in the air.

Who cares that the TSR2 couldn't operate from abandoned WW2 airfields, or grass, or whatever. Western Europe had dozens of airfields with 5000-6000' runways that could take a flight of TSR2 in a pinch, and the RAF is only going to have ~11 sqns of them so there's a limit to their dispersal requirement anyway.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

It's actually worse than that in design terms. OR.343 required normal operation from a 1,300 yard runway at ISA + 30 degrees Celsius, and emergency operation from a 1,000 yard runway at the same temperature - or just 600 yards for the 450 nautical mile sortie. All with a target LCN of 20.

That would allow operation from Stanley in terms of length, but not necessarily in weight, though the shorter sortie presumably involved less fuel and therefore lighter weights. I've no idea how much lighter, or what the relationship is between weight and LCN.

Realistically, TSR.2 was never going to disperse to the kind of random abandoned WW2 airfields this implied. The high temperature requirement feels a bit extreme too, but I've not got a good feel on that.

It would be perfectly reasonable to assume that it would only ever fly from established airfields. This would allow accepting 2,000 yard runways - actually stated in OR.343 as normal - and a maximum LCN of 40. This is still a slight improvement on the Buccaneer (LCN 45) and was what was specified in OR.339!

That doesn't ease the avionics problem any, but it does mean that the solution space for the aerodynamics, structural, and propulsion design is a lot less constrained.

Yellow
You’re getting minimum operational runway performance and operation under emergency conditions a bit confused.

Minimum operational runway is a balanced field condition, whereby a takeoff can be safely (or at least maybe) rejected, or a landing threshold missed due to poor weather or a low mu surface (say snow). 1500 yards is given as the minimum length.

The “operations under emergency or dispersal conditions” only specifies a takeoff 600-1000yards … my guess is there’s no airfield left to land on.

LCN/LCG are board indications of runway capacity for long term operations of an aircraft type. Therefore there’s not really an adjustment made for AC operating mass per operation. An AC of LCN 45 can operate on an LCG 20 rated surface but it’ll do a lot of damage to the surface. Quite quickly the runway/taxiway surface will become too rutted for safe operation. It’s a very strategic decision to bin a perfectly good airfield like this. Furthermore if the mismatch is too high the AC runs the risks of its tyres just sinking through the runway or taxiway surface.

 

[Yellow Palace]

You’re getting minimum operational runway performance and operation under emergency conditions a bit confused.

Ah, this is where it becomes obvious that I'm accustomed to dealing with floaty things. It's quite hard to get confused about whether you're running out of sea. Not that people don't manage to do it on occasion.

 

[red admiral]

That doesn't ease the avionics problem any, but it does mean that the solution space for the aerodynamics, structural, and propulsion design is a lot less constrained

I'm not really sure that the short field performance really drove the design that much

Still need high thrust for low altitude and high altitude Mach requirements

Still need small wing and high wing loading for ride quality

Maybe could say that the LCN forced double main wheel undercarriage. But if higher ground pressure from a single wheel is acceptable, this is a much bigger single wheel (see F-111). I don't see that it'd actually fit in the airframe. Probably need a big bulge which increases drag.

Loads of this is locked in from even the very early P.17 configuration pre requirement issue

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I'm not really sure that the short field performance really drove the design that much

Still need high thrust for low altitude and high altitude Mach requirements

Still need small wing and high wing loading for ride quality

Maybe could say that the LCN forced double main wheel undercarriage. But if higher ground pressure from a single wheel is acceptable, this is a much bigger single wheel (see F-111). I don't see that it'd actually fit in the airframe. Probably need a big bulge which increases drag.

The short field requirement would drive the high lift system and the extendable nose landing gear. The high lift system on TSR2 was blown, so that drives the engine size because of the air bleed requirement.ie the engine needs a bigger compressor to provide both take off thrust and air bleed. Furthermore bleed is also required for landing so the engine is now at a higher n1 so produces too much residual thrust, so that drives the size of the airbrake. The slats flaps, airbrake and extending NLG all drive the size of the hydraulic system and indeed its redundancy;- how many systems required. The extending NLG has a much larger moment arm so drives the size and weight of the forward fuselage, not to mention the nose wheel steering system. And all that mass upfront needs more HTP area and hydraulics to lift it.

Now for the high floatation landing gears (low LCN);- large low pressure tyres have to be stowed in large bays which due to the Center bomb bay (the need for cg insensitivity means it’s positions centrally) must fit either side of the fuselage. Wing tiny wings where’s the space for the necessary fuel? forward and aft of the landing gear bay, not good a saddle tank around the engine*? That squashed the MLG alongside the fuselage which is poor for lateral stability hence the 14deg angled oleo (loads of sliding friction hence the touchdown vibration) and bicycle bogie. Loads more hydraulics due again the large length and inherent massive lever arms. Poor outboard structural support of the MLG to boot, again contributing to the touch down vibration/resonance issues.

These requirements also drive a surprising amount.

* never really mentioned but surrounding an engine with fuel is not a good scheme. Rarely done and when tried alway problematic.

Of course the F111 order meant the RAF wasn’t that fussed about the LCN.

Former Warton Head of Systems “D Alison” once told me “Tornado looked like it did because we learned not to do a lot of things on TSR2” BTW he started on AFVG before TSR2 was cancelled.

 

[Rule of cool]

That sounds like a long list, but I can't help but think it's mostly single digit percentage changes. I wouldn't think anything (or even everything) on there was the straw that broke the camels back.

 

[uk 75]

To get TSR2 into service you have to fly the prototypes in 1963 or even 1962 so that by 1964 the machines are flying in some numbers and are displayed at Farnborough.
Most of the technical problems would then be under control and the OCU would be forming in 1965.
Delay was fatal and emphasised the high cost of the programme.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

That sounds like a long list, but I can't help but think it's mostly single digit percentage changes. I wouldn't think anything (or even everything) on there was the straw that broke the camels back.

It is a long list and No, …not single digit.

These requirements fundamentally shape the products architecture.

 

[Scott Kenny]

To get TSR2 into service you have to fly the prototypes in 1963 or even 1962 so that by 1964 the machines are flying in some numbers and are displayed at Farnborough.
Most of the technical problems would then be under control and the OCU would be forming in 1965.
Delay was fatal and emphasised the high cost of the programme.

It was the electronics that was the major hold-up, right? So it at least would have been possible to get aircraft flying even if the avionics were replaced with concrete ballast?

 

[Yellow Palace]

It is a long list and No not single digit.

These requirements fundamentally shape the products architecture.

On a project with such a demanding requirement set, anything you can ease up will make everything much easier.

By removing the short field requirement, you can delete the high lift system, reducing weight and complexity. One less thing that can impact everything else the design team is working on. You might also be able to reduce thrust requirements, depending on whether takeoff performance or maximum speed drove them. Likewise with removing the high-flotation landing gear requirement; it starts having knock-on effects in all sorts of places. One effect of both of those is that weight is slightly less critical - you still need the thing to fly, but maybe you don't have to shave the margins on everything and use bleeding-edge materials.

It might only be twenty changes overall, and each of those changes might only reduce the cost of the aircraft by 1%. But apply that 1% twenty times, and you've reduced the cost by 20%. You've probably also reduced the design & manufacture timeline - not by the same amount, but say half as much. And you're probably looking at more changes with bigger impact than that.

The 10% reduction in time gets the aircraft flying in March 1964, and the second aircraft probably at the end of August or early September. That might just let it be shown (probably static) at Farnborough that year. You'd expect to be forming the development squadron on June 1966, and the first operational squadron in January 1968.

When the Cabinet is looking at the F-111 as an alternative in 1965, they're dealing with a TSR.2 that's a bit better proven, a reasonable amount cheaper, and - because the project is further advanced - there's less of that cost still to be paid. All of that gives an improved chance of getting the thing into service.

It was the electronics that was the major hold-up, right? So it at least would have been possible to get aircraft flying even if the avionics were replaced with concrete ballast?

There were two major issues - the airframe was in a death spiral of weight and performance, and the nav/attack systems were right out on the bleeding edge of technology.

 

[Scott Kenny]

There were two major issues - the airframe was in a death spiral of weight and performance, and the nav/attack systems were right out on the bleeding edge of technology.

Oh, ewwww, didn't realize the airframe was in that rough a spot!

Since F-111 was acceptable, the short field and high-float landing gear "requirements" can probably be relaxed a bit, and that will save a lot of weight (no blown flaps so all that ducting comes out, and smaller/lighter/simpler landing gear).

I don't think that the engine thrust was caused by the takeoff requirements, so you still need pretty high end engines.

And obviously the nav-attack systems were ... "troubled" to put it nicely.

Would it have been possible to buy the nav-attack systems used on the A-5 for an interim version, while British industries workout out their presumably-better version?

 

[zen]

Would it have been possible to buy the nav-attack systems used on the A-5

Errr that was the plan, the A5 system with a few changes repackaged into a UK aircraft

 

[Scott Kenny]

Errr that was the plan, the A5 system with a few changes repackaged into a UK aircraft

So how did the avionics get so far behind? The A5 set was pretty good overall.

 

[zen]

So how did the avionics get so far behind? The A5 set was pretty good overall.

Well we demanded more of the system, especially the computer and that led to....(drumroll).....virtual memory (oh the horror!!)

Imagine a tape based memory system having to cycle back and forth to store and retrieve data, because you computer memory is too small.
On a plane
Flying at speed
At low level

And if your read head misses the right location....like say a bit of a bump or two jogs it at the wrong moment....you retrieve the wrong data and the software......goes a bit wrong.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well we demanded more of the system, especially the computer and that led to....(drumroll).....virtual memory (oh the horror!!)

Imagine a tape based memory system having to cycle back and forth to store and retrieve data, because you computer memory is too small.
On a plane
Flying at speed
At low level

And if your read head misses the right location....like say a bit of a bump or two jogs it at the wrong moment....you retrieve the wrong data and the software......goes a bit wrong.

*facepalm*

"Boss, the tech just isn't there yet. We might be able to make it happen in 5-10 years, but we just can't implement that NOW."
"So we are stuck with the Vigilante system as-is?"
"For now."

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC the computer had 4000 'words' of memory, the developers knew they were up against it for memory space but had no choice as the VERDAN was the only ruggedised digital computer in the world in the early 60s. A double sided VERDAN was about to become available, it was installed in HMS Resolution, that would have doubled memory space and solved that most pressing problem.

 

[zen]

But the realisation was an Elliott computer I think for the A7...... that was the ideal if memory (ha!) serves

 

[Rule of cool]

As I understand it the TSR2 had 2 VERDANs, an attack-nav and a nav-attack each generally handling 1 role but could fail gracefully so a mission wouldn't fail if a VERDAN failed. Thisis a good concept, the US adopted it for the FB111, but I think it locks the TSR2 into VERDANs without a major change of the electronics.

I think so anyway.

 

[Scott Kenny]

But the realisation was an Elliott computer I think for the A7...... that was the ideal if memory (ha!) serves

A-7 was a generation or so later in terms of electronics.

 

[Yellow Palace]

*facepalm*

"Boss, the tech just isn't there yet. We might be able to make it happen in 5-10 years, but we just can't implement that NOW."
"So we are stuck with the Vigilante system as-is?"
"For now."

Yup, it really needed the grown-ups to realise they could have a 50% chance of having 100% of the capability working on any given day, or guarantee that a specified 50% of it would be working. The RAF insisted on having 100% of the capability, which just couldn't be done reliably.

Phased development of the avionics, and ease the requirements on the airframe, and you've got a chance of getting a TSR.2 Mark 2 in the early 1970s that actually does everything it says on the tin.

 

[uk 75]

What stands out in the various political accounts of TSR2 is that the politicians were both awed and confused by the plane.
The big ticket programme of the 60s was Polaris. It was easy to understand why it was so expensive because it involved then still relatively rare nuclear subs firing missiles at an enemy city from underwater and so being the ultimate deterrent.
But TSR2 was expensive but just another warplane to most politicians. In the shadow of Polaris it seemed a costly way of trying to deliver a nuclear weapon. After the Cuban Missile crisis even Conservative politicians were not as keen as they used to be on nuclear weapons and the new Labour government had been elected on a pledge to get rid of or at least reduce them.
Concorde was another problem for TSR2. It too was complex and costly but like Polaris there was a good reason for the layman- beating the US to the next generation in the lucrative transatlantic airliner market. It was also protected by France wording the agreement to build it.
The RAF did not make it any easier. Calling TSR2 a "Canberra replacement" underscored how expensive it was. By 1964 Canberras looked pretty dull and routine. TSR2 was larger, more dramatic, but above all threatened to eat the RAF budget.
So perhaps you can see why there was not much appetite for trying to keep it going

 

[Rule of cool]

What stands out in the various political accounts of TSR2 is that the politicians were both awed and confused by the plane.
The big ticket programme of the 60s was Polaris. It was easy to understand why it was so expensive because it involved then still relatively rare nuclear subs firing missiles at an enemy city from underwater and so being the ultimate deterrent.
But TSR2 was expensive but just another warplane to most politicians.

Yes, the TSR2's problem was one of perception amongst the people who were paying for it. I believe that if it was seen as a keystone to Britain's defence for the next 30 years as well as for the aviation industry to take the steps into the future, and that there was no cheap and easy way to replicate these then it would have seen service.

Of course perception is the easiest and hardest thing to change. If you put a compelling argument to Cabinet they're likely to listen and support, but wherever there's doubt they'll waver.

 

[uk 75]

In that case BAC and the RAF rightly deserve more blame than the politicians from Macmillan on who asked understandable questions like how much is it going to cost or will it ever enter service?

BAC had no real strategy for TSR2 beyond trying to get the RAF to buy more than 50.
Same was true of Lightning their only other new combat aircraft.

Jaguar was a much easier aircraft for them to develop and sell (despite Dassault). I cannot imagine 1970s India buying TSR2 like they did Jaguar.

The RAF are the real culprit. Having turned a Canberra replacement into a new V bomber they then let it be known even before the 1964 election that it was eating up their budget.

 

[kaiserd]

Yes, the TSR2's problem was one of perception amongst the people who were paying for it. I believe that if it was seen as a keystone to Britain's defence for the next 30 years as well as for the aviation industry to take the steps into the future, and that there was no cheap and easy way to replicate these then it would have seen service.

Of course perception is the easiest and hardest thing to change. If you put a compelling argument to Cabinet they're likely to listen and support, but wherever there's doubt they'll waver.

The TSR2’s problem or problems weren’t perception or primarily perceptional in nature. They were financial, systematic and technical in nature and they were very real and they were ultimately fatal to the program.

Arguably the longer term perception, the popular legend, of the TSR2 is actually far too positive and very much out of whack with the realities of the aircraft and the program. This halo-effect and the accompanying stab-in-the-back myths have had a long life and have a lot in common with other myths of grievance and of the aggrieved tied up with this general period of UK history.

There are essentially 2 TSR2s, the essential world-leading technical marvel in which the whole future of the UK military aviation sector depends on, versus the over ambitious, far too expensive, technically challenged and poorly managed program. That 1st TSR2 helped dig the grave for the 2nd and it is the ghost of that 1st TSR2 that primarily survives to this day. The reality that the RAF and the UK defence industries ended up better off than if the real TSR2 program had continued is conveniently forgotten as it doesn’t suit the legend (or the underlying purpose of the legend and why people want to believe it).

 

[uk 75]

Or to put it in plain English by 1965 noone wanted it. The RAF realised it couldn't give them a decent air force by 1970. BAC realised it was not going to get any long term business or profits out of it. It fell to the politicians to put them out of their misery.

We have become all too familiar with unicorns in the modern world but TSR2 the white war machine making its few flights from Boscombe Down had the same near mystical quality to those of us alive in England at the time. Our friends abroad can mock this but ...

 

[Rule of cool]

The TSR2’s problem or problems weren’t perception or primarily perceptional in nature. They were financial, systematic and technical in nature

The technical aspects have already been addressed in this thread.

is there any piece of critical kit in the TSR2 that cannot be made to function?

This.
A lot easier to improve on a solid airframe and fixed wing.
A lot easier to jam in new avionics, when they have actually shrunk in size.
Anyone actually think Bristol couldn't solve problems with Olympus Ol.22?

Not the the TSR2 didn't have technical problems, but it appears that none of them were show stoppers. Even the F111 wing carry through box was solved 8n time.

Similarly the financial aspects are at best smoke and mirrors given none of the possible replacements came in on time and on budget.

If by systemic you mean the British establishment couldn't organise a booze up at a brewery, you'll get no argument from me. However that's not unique to the TSR2, it impacted the supposedly cheaper and better American aircraft and the Anglo-French were cancelled and morphed beyond recognition.

 

[uk 75]

Arguably Jaguar and Tornado succeeded in spite of the RAF and BAC/BAe. Had they been UK national programmes they would have gone the way of TSR2 and P1154.

It is also no accident that the one really successful British military jet of the 70s, the Hawk, is a simple, functional airframe with no bells and whistles to inflate its cost and delay production.

 

[Rule of cool]

Here's a question, how late could the STOL aspects be loosened but not dropped? If for whatever reasons the RAF/British didn't buy into the whole vulnerable airfields, disperse operations NBMR3 vibe in 1962-64 is that too late for the TSR2? Or as the realities of reaching the in-air performance firm up is it possible to relax some of the STOL/dispersal requirements?

If it's not too late what sorts of airfields could the TSR2 operate from if the easiest short field things things to remove were loosened? Is 4-5,000' practical or is 6,000' a realistic minimum?

FWIW currently there are some 35 x 5-7,000' runways in England alone compared to 38 x 7-10,000' runways, so having the TSR2 being able to operate from 5,000' runways basically doubles their available basing options.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Here's a question, how late could the STOL aspects be loosened but not dropped? If for whatever reasons the RAF/British didn't buy into the whole vulnerable airfields, disperse operations NBMR3 vibe in 1962-64 is that too late for the TSR2? Or as the realities of reaching the in-air performance firm up is it possible to relax some of the STOL/dispersal requirements?

You could probably drop the blown wing requirements very late in the program and only hear some profanity about having designed the things and build the prototypes with them already. First several flights would be without blown flaps, just to make sure the basic airframe is sound.

If it's not too late what sorts of airfields could the TSR2 operate from if the easiest short field things things to remove were loosened? Is 4-5,000' practical or is 6,000' a realistic minimum?

FWIW currently there are some 35 x 5-7,000' runways in England alone compared to 38 x 7-10,000' runways, so having the TSR2 being able to operate from 5,000' runways basically doubles their available basing options.

I'd say 6000ft is the realistic minimum.