The A5 Vigilante linear bomb bay never worked and was fundamentally flawed. The weapon upon release was trapped in the wake turbulence aft off the aircraft. If AB was selected then the weapon got toasted.
It was put back into production to replace combat loses.
The A5 Vigilante linear bomb bay never worked and was fundamentally flawed. The weapon upon release was trapped in the wake turbulence aft off the aircraft. If AB was selected then the weapon got toasted.
It was put back into production to replace combat loses.
The RAAF wasn't going to use the linear bomb bay for nuclear weapons, it was going to use conventional weapons on wing pylons.
If the plane itself was a dud then the USN wouldn't have put it back into production, after all the USMC bought some 46 RF4Bs that were carrier capable so the USN could have done the same. Instead they put an expensive, small-fleet, deck-space-hog plane back into production to cover combat losses. That says something very significant about the Vigilante's value.
E.g. there's the story about Lord Mountbatten walking around with one photograph of a TSR.2 and five photographs of a Buccaneer saying "For the cost of one of those we can have five of these!" Maybe the CAS should have put three of the Buccaneer photographs in the nearest waste paper bin and replied "And two of those re needed to do the work of one of these!"
Worth noting that only one Tornado was lost on a JP233 sortie, and that was on egress after weapons release. Lumbering across airfields at low altitude and constant airspeed might not be the most brilliant plan for survival, but it wasn't quite the suicide mission sometimes claimed.
The published accounts of the GW1 Tornado and F111 crews that flew the low level missions indicates they went all the way at low level when over Ira, sometimes 800nM. After the SEAD became effective they went all the way at 20-30kft. The RAF persistence at going low level after the F111 had demonstrated successfully high level operations resulted in losses. This was due to a lack of high level capability in their weapon systems.
I can’t find a single example of the high level to low level mission described in OR343.
I guess it makes no sense to fly in SAM infested airspace which ever altitude it happened to be. Furthermore in the late fifties the degree of SAM coverage the Warsaw Pack was going to deploy was a matter of speculation. So the assumption was lots of locally defended areas. So a supersonic dash through the gaps to create confusion and minimise target area preparation times.
In reality the WP supersized the SAM coverage so the gaps more or less disappeared. Hence the utility of the supersonic dash went with it. In GW1 the SEAD worked well on the longer range systems but not the low level stuff.
Also my guess is that by the mid seventies the SAM map over the WP didn’t have many gaps, so the RAF decided to ditch the supersonic approach and just go for long duration low level. So they never foresaw any need for a medium level weapon delivery.
The Tornados had to go low to use JP.233, it wasn't a medium altitude weapon.
The RAF knew in advance that the low level stuff wouldn't work and they also had all the EW and SEAD capabilities of the USAF behind them and were confident of the SAM threat being contained. The Jaguars switched to medium level just before operations began and never had any issues (except that they couldn't use BL.755 because it was a low-altitude weapon too).
The only other group to attempt low-level on the first day were the French Jaguar pilots and after being sieved by small arms fire decided to follow everyone else.
The Tornados had to go low to use JP.233, it wasn't a medium altitude weapon.
The RAF knew in advance that the low level stuff wouldn't work and they also had all the EW and SEAD capabilities of the USAF behind them and were confident of the SAM threat being contained. The Jaguars switched to medium level just before operations began and never had any issues (except that they couldn't use BL.755 because it was a low-altitude weapon too).
The only other group to attempt low-level on the first day were the French Jaguar pilots and after being sieved by small arms fire decided to follow everyone else.
Le 17 Janvier 1991 une patrouille de 12 Jaguar attaquait la base de Al Jaber en Irak, réalisant ainsi la première mission française de la campagne aérienne de la Guerre du Golfe. A l’époque, j’étais en stage de ski à Val d’Isère et le 16, comme tous les soirs après manger, on s'était retrouvés
Il est 11 heures du soir ce 16 janvier 1991 ; il m'est difficile de trouver le sommeil et je ne crois pas que le ronronnement des groupes électrogène qui tourne H 24 soit responsable de cet état de fait. Cela fait 24 heures que l'ultimatum posé par la coalition à Saddam Hussein a expiré
www-pilote--chasse--11ec-com.translate.goog
One Jaguar ate a SA-7 right into one Adour engine, but managed to limp back to Saudi Arabia.
Another Jaguar took a bullet in the cockpit, grazing a pilot helmet - the man managed to stay in control and made it back alive.
Fun fact: the Jaguar that ate a SA-7 was serial A91 and... it still exists. It was dismantled and brought back to France in a Transall transport.
Then it was put in storage and used a spare hulk
This for twenty years until... it made its way to Le Bourget aviation museum, and presently is an exhibit there (I'll check that)
I red that Jaguars (French and British) were more adaptable from low to medium level because the man in the cockpit was doing more job than the Tornado with its avionics, which were a bit at loss about the altitude change.
What are your workings for that? It doesn't sound right to me.
I think it's two Buccaneers can do the work of one TSR.2 at 40% of the price using Mountbatten's claim that the cost one Buccaneer was 20% of the cost of one TSR.2.
In any case that's the purchase cost. There's also the operating cost.
Did the TSR.2 require twice the aircrew? Both has a crew of two. Therefore, no.
Did the TSR.2 require twice the ground crew? I don't know, but think not. My guess is that TSR.2 required more ground crew than Buccaneer, but nowhere near twice as many.
Was the TSR.2's fuel consumption double the Buccaneer's? I don't know. For all I know it could have been more than twice as much.
I think the 'TSR2 as a V bomber' replacement is overblown. Sure the TSR2 will replace the 3 sqns of Valiants assigned to SACEUR, but they were also planned to replace Canberra sqns based in Germany, Near East and Far East.
For what it's worth the Valiant tactical bomber force can be regarded as a Canberra replacement because they replaced four Canberra squadrons assigned to SACEUR. Therefore, the TSR.2s that were to replace the TBF Valiants were the replacement for the Canberra replacement.
For what it's worth the Valiant tactical bomber force can be regarded as a Canberra replacement because they replaced four Canberra squadrons assigned to SACEUR. Therefore, the TSR.2s that were to replace the TBF Valiants were the replacement for the Canberra replacement.
Some questions about the TSR.2 v the Buccaneer in the maritime strike role.
The Buccaneer S.2 could carry 16,000lb of stores which consisted of 4,000lb internally & 12,000lb externally (four pylons each rated at 3,000lb) and as far as I know the TSR.2 was designed to carry 30,000lb of stores which consisted of 6,000lb internally & 24,000lb externally (four pylons each rated at 6,000lb). The Buccaneer carried four Martels or four Sea Eagles when operating in the martime strike role.
May questions are?
If my "AFAIK" about the TSR.2 is correct, does that mean it could have carried eight Martels or eight Sea Eagles or four of the heavier anti-ship Tomahawks?
Does the extra speed of the TSR.2 help it penetrate the Soviet Fleet's air defences so more aircraft reach firing positions?
Would the TSR.2's extra range have been on any use when operating in the maritime strike role?
What are your workings for that? It doesn't sound right to me.
I think it's two Buccaneers can do the work of one TSR.2 at 40% of the price using Mountbatten's claim that the cost one Buccaneer was 20% of the cost of one TSR.2.
If one TSR.2 can do the work of two Buccaneers, you need two Buccaneers to do the work of one TSR.2. Therefore, four Buccaneers can do the work of two TSR.2s, at 80% of the purchase price of one TSR.2.
Operating cost is another matter of course. My guess is that
TSR.2 crew costs are slightly higher - still two of them, but probably more expensive to train on a more complex aircraft
TSR.2 maintenance costs are likely considerably higher, though how much higher is anybody's guess. Unless they have figures. Then they just know.
The avionics are certainly considerably more complex. How much maintenance is that? I have no idea.
Engine maintenance is probably comparable between the two, except for the addition of reheat on the TSR.2. That's relatively simple compared to the rest of a gas turbine, and I doubt the maintenance scales that much with engine size.
Airframe maintenance is, naively, probably proportionate to the empty weight of the aircraft. So about 85% more for TSR.2.
TSR.2 fuel costs are probably at least 50% higher, potentially more, depending on how much you use reheat.
If my "AFAIK" about the TSR.2 is correct, does that mean it could have carried eight Martels or eight Sea Eagles or four of the heavier anti-ship Tomahawks?
The generally accepted figure for TSR.2 is, as far as I know, 4,000 lbs on the inner pylons, and 1,000 lbs on the outer pylons, which would only allow carriage of two Martels or Sea Eagles, without wing strengthening. Even with strengthening, I doubt whether it could have carried more anti-ship missiles, unless you can contrive a way to put them under the fuselage.
For what it's worth the 4 Canberra squadrons had a UE of 64 aircraft and the 3 Valiant squadrons had a UE of 24 aircraft. According to Wynn that was because one Valiant cost as much to operate as three Buccaneers (64 ÷ 3 = 21⅓).
Unfortunately, he didn't say why that was the case, for example whether one Valiant needed three times the ground crew required by one Canberra. My guess is that with four Avon engines instead of two it needed twice the fuel of a Canberra and twice as many ground crew to maintain them. As far as I know it had more avionics than the Canberra, which if correct means ground crew would have been needed to maintain them, but several to many times more? The airframe was bigger, but did the number of aircrew increase in proportion with the size of the aircraft?
Regarding aircrew 24 Valiants aught to have been cheaper to operate than 64 Canberras. This was because the former had a crew of 5 and the latter had a crew of 3. 24 x 5 = 120 and 64 x 3 = 198.
On that score the TSR.2 (with a crew of 2) aught to have been cheaper to operate than the Valiant and the Canberra. E.g. the 24 TBF Valiants were to have been replaced one-for-one by TSR.2s reducing the number of aircrew required from 120 to 48. And the 48 Canberra bombers in Germany were to have been replaced one-for-one by TSR.2s reducing the number of aircrew required from 216 to 144.
My guess (and I stress that it's only a guess) is that the total operating cost of the TSR.2 would have been the same or less than the Valiant and its operating cost would have been greater (but not excessively greater) than the Canberra. However, the operating costs of TSR.2s aircrew would have been less because it needed a smaller crew than both aircraft.
If one TSR.2 can do the work of two Buccaneers, you need two Buccaneers to do the work of one TSR.2. Therefore, four Buccaneers can do the work of two TSR.2s, at 80% of the purchase price of one TSR.2.
I think it's two Buccaneers can do the work of one TSR.2 at 40% of the price using Mountbatten's claim that the cost one Buccaneer was 20% of the cost of one TSR.2.
Some questions about the TSR.2 v the Buccaneer in the maritime strike role.
The Buccaneer S.2 could carry 16,000lb of stores which consisted of 4,000lb internally & 12,000lb externally (four pylons each rated at 3,000lb) and as far as I know the TSR.2 was designed to carry 30,000lb of stores which consisted of 6,000lb internally & 24,000lb externally (four pylons each rated at 6,000lb). The Buccaneer carried four Martels or four Sea Eagles when operating in the martime strike role.
May questions are?
If my "AFAIK" about the TSR.2 is correct, does that mean it could have carried eight Martels or eight Sea Eagles or four of the heavier anti-ship Tomahawks?
Does the extra speed of the TSR.2 help it penetrate the Soviet Fleet's air defences so more aircraft reach firing positions?
Would the TSR.2's extra range have been on any use when operating in the maritime strike role?
I don't believe that it could have physically carried 2x Martel/Sea Eagles per pylon due to the non-folding fins in the way. So you're looking at TSR2 carrying the same payload as a Buc for maritime strike.
TSR2 isn't enough faster to get into the air defenses and firing positions, assuming low level attack runs. Even at M1.2 you're ~30sec away from the target when you crest the horizon.
Now that TSR2 has been the subject of a conference of current experts on the subject, I am asking the BIG question.
Could TSR2 have been made to work? By which I mean could it have been designed and developed in such a way as to let the RAF take delivery of say 50 machines by 1970?
All options are open, provided you come with information and arguments backed up by facts or at least reasonable guesswork.
What's the Point of Departure (POD) for this? Is it when TSR.2 was cancelled or when the project began?
If it's the latter is better management of the project allowed?
And if it is, do the people here that are qualified to comment, think that it would have significantly altered the state-of-play of the project in 1965. That is enough to prevent its cancellation.
Would more aircraft have been flying?
Would its development have been proceeding closer to schedule?
And most of important of all.
Would it have reduced the estimated cost of completing the project?
Or at least.
Would the estimated cost of completing the project been accurate? I.e. no further increases apart from inflation.
Re more aircraft flying in April 1965 and its development proceeding closer to schedule.
At cancellation one aircraft was flying, one aircraft was ready to fly, the third was expected to fly in-mid-May 1965 and IIRC the next six were scheduled to make their first flights at two-month intervals between July 1965 and May 1966 when nine aircraft (less any that had been written off) would have been flying. We don't know whether that schedule would have been met. However, if we bring it forward by one year the first development aircraft would have flown in September 1963 and eight would have been flying by April 1965.
If eight aircraft were flying in April 1965 a lot of the development flying would have been done and TSR.2's projected in service date would have been earlier.
That would have made it harder to cancel the project, because more progress had been made and the money saved by cancellation would have been reduced as more money would have been spent so less money would have been required to complete the R&D programme.
The figures that @Rule of cool that came (via me) from Gardner's history of BAC include an estimated R&D cost in 1965 of £270 million (including 9 development aircraft) of which £125 million (46%) had been spent.
If better management meant that more of the R&D programme had been completed by April 1965 more money would have been paid to the contractors. Say a total of £195 million (72%) had been spent (with the extra £70 million covered by the OTL cancellation payments) so a further £75 million (28% of the total) would have been required to complete the R&D programme instead of £145 million (54%).
According to Wood 16 TSR.2s (6 development & 10 pre-production) were under construction when the project was cancelled. More than 16 might have been under construction in April 1965 ITTL due to the project being more advanced so the cancellation charges might have been more than £70 million ITTL.
So to summarise if better management of the project meant that more aircraft were flying in April 1965 and TSR.2 was a year closer to entering service then it might have reached the point where it couldn't have been cancelled outright and "only" been built in smaller numbers than originally planned.
Re the estimated cost of the project.
The figures that @Rule of cool that came (via me) from Gardner's history of BAC are £270 million for the R&D (including 9 development aircraft) with each production aircraft costing £3.4 million.
Therefore, IOTL the estimated total costs at April 1965 were:
£440 million for 50 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £170 million production).
£610 million for 100 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £340 million production).
£780 million for 150 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £510 million production)..
And.
£950 million for 200 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £680 million production).
Gardner wrote that the cost of 150 aircraft would have been some £750 million due to the longer production run.
So maybe we could say that the cost of 200 production aircraft would have been a few tens of millions less than £900 million.
But I'm not going to because he didn't give costs of for the production of 50 aircraft (the figures for 50 aircraft above are extrapolation of his figures by me) and for all I know the unit cost might have been more than £3.4 million for a production run of 50 aircraft.
£125 million had actually been spent and the cancellation charges were £70 million for a total of £195 million so (at 1965 prices) anywhere between £245 and £755 million was "saved" by cancelling TSR.2. That is assuming that there was no further increase in the cost.
At 1965 (according to Gardner) the cost of 50 F-111s was £125 million (£2.5 million each) which is clearly better than £245 million for 50 TSR.2s (£440 million less the £125 million already spent and the £70 million cancellation charges).
Is it reasonable to say that ITTL better management led to the R&D cost being kept to the £270 million estimated in 1965 and the estimated production cost in 1965 being reduced from £3.4 million to £3.0 million per aircraft? This is in combination with the project being a year ahead of OTL so £195 million had been spent instead of £125 million.
If it is the estimated costs in 1965 are reduced to.
£420 million for 50 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £150 million production).
£570 million for 100 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £300 million production).
£720 million for 150 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £450 million production).
And.
£870 million for 200 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £600 million production).
Of which.
£195 million had been spent (instead of £125 million) cutting the cost of 50 TSR.2s by nearly half to £225 million, 100 aircraft to £375 million, £150 aircraft to £525 million and 200 aircraft to £675 million.
These are still substantial sums, but it reduces the difference between the estimated costs of 50 TSR.2s considerably and possibly to the point where its better to buy them instead of F-111s.
It still costs more (£225 million v £125 million) to by 50 TSR.2s instead of 50 F-111s.
However, HM Treasury saves $350 million that (1.0 GBP = 2.8 USD).
And.
HM Treasury would get some of the £225 million that 50 TSR.2s were estimated to cost back in taxes and wouldn't get any of the £125 million that 50 F-111s were estimated to cost back in taxes.
Before anyone says, yes I know it's a fantasy, all alternative history is a fantasy, so no change there.
I don't believe that it could have physically carried 2x Martel/Sea Eagles per pylon due to the non-folding fins in the way. So you're looking at TSR2 carrying the same payload as a Buc for maritime strike.
TSR2 isn't enough faster to get into the air defenses and firing positions, assuming low level attack runs. Even at M1.2 you're ~30sec away from the target when you crest the horizon.
One of the limiting factors was the engine development e.g. being cleared for single flight at a time between inspections. I don't see how "better management" really improves the engine development programme given the technical issues experienced (like the engine blowing up).
Maybe the simplest thing would have been to build more engines at more cost, so that the development aircraft would have a larger pool? I've no idea whether this was really the limiting factor though.
Or to remove this problem then use a more mature engine for early flying (Gyron? But this is still in development too); but then you need to redesign later and add more cost.
I remember reading a quote from Sir Sydney Camm; "All aircraft have four dimensions, length, height, wingspan and politics; TSR2 simply got the first three right"
Although my memory is fading, the Tornado unit I was on in the 80's was around 120+ groundcrew/support personal for 25 aircraft. (two shifts including groundcrew, management etc)
Maybe the simplest thing would have been to build more engines at more cost, so that the development aircraft would have a larger pool? I've no idea whether this was really the limiting factor though.
One does wonder whether starting the engine development earlier, and on somebody else's budget, would help here. Thinking about projects that called for an Olympus with reheat, the obvious one is the P.1121 as a Hunter/Lightning replacement, though that's barely any earlier than TSR.2.
One does wonder whether starting the engine development earlier, and on somebody else's budget, would help here. Thinking about projects that called for an Olympus with reheat, the obvious one is the P.1121 as a Hunter/Lightning replacement, though that's barely any earlier than TSR.2.
One of the aircraft that I've suggested before is the thin-wing Javelin and Gunston in "Back To The Drawing Board, Aircraft That Flew, But Never Took Off!" wrote that the Bristol 188 should have had the Olympus.
Prototypes often flew with different engines than the production aircraft to get them flying sooner. E.g. the Victor and Vulcan. Would fitting the first few prototypes with none-reheat Olympus engines used by the Vulcan or reheated Avons used by the Lightning to get them in the air sooner be feasible? That would be helpful for publicity purposes if it was. Would it have helped the development programme too?
Edit 13.02.24
I was ninja'd by @red admiral in the last paragraph of Post 138.
Or to remove this problem then use a more mature engine for early flying (Gyron? But this is still in development too); but then you need to redesign later and add more cost.
I think the only Olympus available earlier is the 201 as a dry only version? So it'd be down on thrust by about 40% compared to the Mk320. I'm not sure there's that much useful envelope expansion that could be done with that. Avon 301 is similarly down on thrust. I think Gyron is about the only thing available in the thrust class but is bigger.
The relevant portions of "Squadron Patterns Plan P" dated 6th March 1964
From National Archives File AIR 20/11708/68770
As far as I know the 21 Victors (all Mk 2s) in 3 squadrons in the Medium Bomber & Strategic Reconnaissance forces at 31.03.75 were retained as conventional bombers to be used in counter insurgency wars and as strategic nuclear bombers to deter China.
The 99 Hunters in 9 squadrons at 31.03.64 consisted of.
79 FGA.9s in 7 squadrons
24 in 2 squadrons in Transport Command.
36 in 3 squadrons in AFME.
19 in 2 squadrons in FEAF, but one of them was No. 28 in Hong Kong with 3 aircraft and the other squadron had 16 aircraft.
20 FR.10s in 2 squadrons of 8 aircraft in Germany and an independent flight of 4 aircraft in AFME. The latter had more aircraft than the FGA.9 squadron in Hong Kong.
162 P.1154s were required and although none were on requisition they were to be delivered between 01.04.70 and 31.03.75. Each and every of the 8 squadrons of P.1154s projected for 31.03.75 was to have 12 aircraft.
So the front line of 174 Medium Bombers (Tactical), Light Bombers & Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft in 19 squadrons on 31.03.64 was to be reduced to 116 strike/reconnaissance & tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 12 squadrons on 31.03.75.
At 06.03.64 a total of 11 pre-production aircraft were on requisition and limited approval had been given for the production of 30 aircraft against a total requirement for 193 TSR.2s (including the pre-production aircraft which were to be converted to production standard). The 193 aircraft were to be delivered between 1st April 1967 and 31st March 1972. However, 6 pre-production aircraft were to have been delivered in the 1966-67 financial year which were to be returned for modification to production standard and were included in the total of 193.
TSR2 isn't enough faster to get into the air defenses and firing positions, assuming low level attack runs. Even at M1.2 you're ~30sec away from the target when you crest the horizon.
Funnily enough 30 seconds was the reaction time of the Tartar SAM system, compared to the later Sea Dart's 12 seconds.
The Buccaneer in the same circumstance would be ~40 seconds away from the target, which is why the RAF, USAF, AdlA and RAAF wanted supersonic dash capability. They wanted to be able to cover that time when SAMs can't be avoided in as little time as possible to minimise the ability of point defences to react.
"Desired" is the wording used in GOR.339 with M0.95 specced
OR.343 updates to M0.9 with "and ability to make a short burst at supersonic speed provided that this can be done without affecting the design of the weapon system"
So it's a very tradeable requirement, but the desire is there for minimising exposure time.
It's pretty unclear how this really translates to survivability beyond a general faster = better. Main threat at low altitude is AAA at this point, early SAMs are more for higher altitudes rather than below 1,000ft. AAA killed plenty of similar speed F-105s in Vietnam...
So the front line of 174 Medium Bombers (Tactical), Light Bombers & Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft in 19 squadrons on 31.03.64 was to be reduced to 116 strike/reconnaissance & tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 12 squadrons on 31.03.75.
This is what the Spottswood Report of January 1964 had to say about the TSR.2.
Strike/Reconnaissance Forces
16. In 1966 our total long range strike and reconnaissance force will consist of 270 aircraft (200 for strike and 70 specifically for reconnaissance). This force will be required to meet:-
(a) Our contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent;
(b) Our contribution to NATO and CENTO;
(c) Our contribution to the deterrence of China;
(d) The necessary availability for purely national purposes.
The strike element will, in addition to its nuclear capability, have a 1,400 ton lift of H.E. in the conventional role.
17. However, the following decade will show a marked change in these capabilities. Under current plans as reflected in Defence Review Costings, and unless normal peacetime wastage is provided for later, by 1976 our long range strike/reconnaissance capability will consist of only 92 TSR2s for both functions, the total conventional lift of which will only be a fraction of the 1966 potential (perhaps 280 tons).
18. These figures demonstrate the effect, however indirect, of the United Kingdom's ability to deter aggression, in whatever form or wherever this might be threatened, of the decision to base our strategic deterrent on Polaris submarines which, however effective they may be in posing a degree of strategic nuclear deterrence, have no limited war potential. Improvements in accuracy will make the bomb-lift of the 1970s more effective, weight for weight; but it clearly cannot make up for the startling diminution in the number of aircraft the Royal Air Force could deploy and the striking power that could be developed under limited war operations.
19. All this is particularly important in relation to:-
(a) NATO, to which at present 225 strike/reconnaissance aircraft are assigned, and to which we must continue to play a major role;
(b) the growing need to contain China. This is to be recognised by the retention of 3 V-bomber squadrons for this purpose after the introduction of Polaris. However, in the Seventies, these will become a less credible deterrent and the role must be taken over by the TSR2 force.
Necessary Modification to Present Plan for Long Range Strike/Reconnaissance Force
20. The TSR2 Strike/Reconnaissance force planned at present is:-
All these aircraft will have a strike and limited reconnaissance capability. One third of them will also have full reconnaissance capability. The build-up of this force is planned to begin in 1968 and be complete by 1972.
21. The strength and distribution of the TSR2 force is planned is neither in consonance with the circumstances outlined at the beginning of this paper nor with the commitments the force will have to meet.
22. NATO. So far as the strength of the NATO-assigned TSR2 force is concerned, it must be appreciated that this force, plus the FGA/R aircraft also required, has effectively to replace 137 V-bombers, 88 Canberras, and 16 Hunters. In view both of the operational task and of the need to maintain influence in the Alliance, its is considered that at least 72 TSR2s must be assigned to SACEUR, in addition to the FGA/R aircraft considered in para. 43 below. As to the disposition of this force, the advent of the TSR2 introduces new possibilities of combining operational, organisational and economic advantages without losing tactical advantage or political influence. Hitherto it has been necessary to deploy on the Continent all those air forces assigned to Allied Command, Europe, with the exception of the V-Force and Fighter Command; this has been due to the nature (range etc.) of the available aircraft and the consequent need to base them forward for tactical and political reasons. Now, however, it is not only feasible but desirable to consider deployment of the Strike/Reconnaissance Force in the United Kingdom, for the following reasons:-
23. Its long range and ubiquity makes it unnecessary to base it forward, at least permanently.
(a) By basing such aircraft in the United Kingdom instead of in Germany, their vulnerability to surprise attack (a matter of great concern to SACEUR) will be considerably reduced. Indeed, no attack by the Russians upon aircraft in the United Kingdom bases could possibly be construed as an act of "limited war", and this resultant immunity of the force in such conditions would in itself reduce still further the possibility of limited aggression in Central Europe.
(b) Deployment on the Home bases will ease the maintenance problems of a complex weapon system, as well as reducing considerably expenditure of foreign exchange.
(c) Full advantage can be taken of the complex of communications, bases, and dispersal airfields built up for Bomber Command.
(d) Political kudos could be gained by the obvious implication (already made by the assignment of Bomber and Fighter Commands) that the United Kingdom was very much part of the A.C.E. by the deployment of the assigned element in the United Kingdom (a tenable argument with such an aircraft). However, this would not obviate the need in any event for the deployment on the Continent of shorter range aircraft required to balance the ground forces there, and to provide "presence".
24. NEAF. While, within the financial limitations that must be imposed on defence expenditure, the small number of aircraft planned to support CENTO should be accepted, it is for consideration, for technical and economic reasons, that the force should be deployed on a rotational basis. The nature of the aircraft lends itself to such an arrangement.
25. FEAF. A contribution to the deterrence of China, and Indonesia, of only 10 TSR2s backed by forces assigned to other theatres is unrealistic in the time period particularly as, in terms of numbers, these potential reinforcing elements themselves fall short of the respective Treaty force goals. Moreover, should war break out in South-East Asia (particularly in a SEATO context) the resultant tension in NATO and CENTO is virtually certain to be as such that reinforcement of the Far East from such sources would be opposed most strongly even if we, ourselves, thought it possible. The resident force should be at least doubled if it is to provide the necessary military and political influence but similar arguments apply for rotation of units to those given in para. 24.
26. Strategic Reserve. It is apparent from the foregoing that the TSR2 force is planned at present is too small either to meet the commitments for it or to provide the necessary flexibility to meet reinforcement needs for allied or national purposes. A strategic reserve must be provided under national control (although some agreed formula for "earmarking" this reserve to NATO might well gain us additional political influence without restricting our freedom of action) to meet the needs of reinforcement in the Far East, the Middle East, and other possible areas of tension where swift reinforcement by an obviously potent force could, in the event, prevent the outbreak of limited wars with all the possibilities they have for escalation.
27. Revised Requirement. The force required is, therefore:-
This force should start to build up as planned at present and be complete by 1972.
28. For the reasons previously agreed (COS 126/63) by the Chiefs of Staff, the TSR2 is essential if the full operational requirements of our strategy in all the theatres win which we have commitments are to be met. If will therefore be necessary to arm the whole Strike/Reconnaissance force with the aircraft. The additional cost of the force proposed above, in comparison to that planned at present, will be offset, particularly in terms of foreign exchange expenditure, by the major deployment being in the United Kingdom, and by the additional political and military influence it can bring to bear on events, however these may arise.
29. Moreover, and without regard to the need for reserves, which are considered in [blank space], this force must be maintained at this minimum strength throughout the period (at present it is planned as a wasting asset virtually from the outset).
It does pay to encompass the totality here.
By the early 60’s, Orange Nell was already giving way to SIGS, PT.428 was briefly vying for funding against US Mauler, PX.430 was emerging. The Italians and Swiss were working on Indigo and France on it's own close range SAM systems.
All this was feeding in as the potential for Soviet parallel systems that would be quick reaction low level SAM Systems design to down just such aircraft as the TSR2.
And these would obviously be deployed first in the European theatre.
At the same time efforts in AMTI for Look-down shoot-down radar missile combinations was already underway.
Quite, SA-6, 7, 8 and 9 were on the way and proved quite effective against Israeli aircraft in Yom Kippur war, and are still in use and can be effective today. Then in the 80s came the switch to ECM. I'd imagine we'd also see a Sky Shadow Pod on TSR2 wing pylon by this point.
Given the evolution of fighter and SAM capabilities how then should Britain equip the RAF?
Physics is fixed and therefore reliable whereas other stuff like ECM and stand-off weapons are a moveable feast. I'd suggest that as the Cold War ticks on a mixture of physics in terms of raw performance as well as ECM and SOW would be the best way forward, indeed I'd think they compliment each other and could all be used in a single mission.
On a related note I think it's important to differentiate between a low-medium intensity air campaign like Vietnam of the 90s Balkans and a high intensity like the 67 & 73 Arab-Israeli Wars and the Falklands. The 1991 PGW and 1982 Lebanon conflict went from the 2nd to the 1st after some highly intensive S/DEAD.
In the above the total of 541 combat aircraft in 54 squadrons at 31.03.64 was to reduce to 353 combat aircraft in 33 squadrons on 31.03.75.
The RAF actually had 33 squadrons on 31.03.75 although the aircraft in those squadrons and their roles was considerably different than planned 11 years earlier. I don't know the number of aircraft, but if the average per squadron was 10 aircraft the total would have been 330, 23 less than planned in March 1964.
There were 9 fighter squadrons (one less than planned in March 1964) except it was actually two less than planned, because it included one maritime fighter squadron. The 9 squadrons consisted of 7 in the UK (including the maritime squadron) and 2 in Germany. There were 6 Lightning squadrons (4 in the UK & 2 in Germany) and 3 Phantom squadrons (all in the UK & including the maritime squadron). The Phantoms being displaced by the Jaguar in the GA & FR squadrons were being transferred to the fighter squadrons and by April 1977 there would be 7 Phantom squadrons (5 UK and 2 in Germany) and 2 Lightning squadrons (both in the UK).
There were 24 medium bomber, light bomber, strategic reconnaissance & tactical reconnaissance squadrons on 31.03.75, which was one more than the 23 planned in March 1964, except it wasn't because one of them was a maritime strike squadron, so the total number of squadrons was the same as planned 11 years earlier and that was the only thing that was the same.
Under Plan P there should have been one Canberra, 8 P.1154, 11 TSR.2 & 3 Victor squadrons.
The actual composition was 2 Canberra, 4 Buccaneer (including one maritime strike), 4 Harrier, 2 Jaguar, 5 Phantom & 7 Vulcan squadrons.
Due to the completion of the East of Suez withdrawal in early 1972 and the recent withdrawal of most British forces from the Mediterranean as part of the recent Mason Defence Review the distribution of the forces was different too.
RAF Strike Command.
No. 1 (Bomber) Group, formerly Bomber Command.
On 31.03.64 it had 144 aircraft in 19 squadrons.
104 medium bombers (strategic) in 14 squadrons.
32 Victors in 5 squadrons.
72 Vulcans in 9 squadrons
24 Valiant medium bombers (tactical) in 3 squadrons.
8 Valiant strategic reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron.
8 Canberra tactical reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron.
Under Plan P the strength on 31.03.75 was to have been 53 aircraft in 6 squadrons.
21 Victor B.2s in 3 squadrons (two bomber and one strategic reconnaissance).
They were to be all that remained of the 112 medium bombers (strategic) and tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 15 squadrons that existed on 31.03.64.
According to the Spottswood Report they were retained to contain China.
However, I think they were also wanted for conventional bombing in counter insurgency wars.
That's because the Victor B.2 could carry 35,000lb of HE and the more numerous Vulcan B.2s (which were to be discarded by March 1973) could carry 21,000lbs of HE.
24 TSR.2s strike aircraft in 2 squadrons.
8 TSR.2 reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron.
The actual strength on 31.03.75 was 10 squadrons. I don't know the number of aircraft, but if the average was 10 aircraft per squadron the total would have been 100 aircraft.
6 Vulcan medium bombers (tactical) including 2 recently returned from Cyprus.
They became tactical bombers after Polaris became operational in mid-1969.
1 Vulcan strategic reconnaissance squadron.
Except it was a Maritime Radar Reconnaissance (MRR) squadron and was part of the TASMO force.
2 Buccaneer strike squadrons.
1 overland strike.
1 maritime strike and part of the TASMO force.
Under current plans a second maritime strike squadron was to be formed in 1979 with the Buccaneers from Ark Royal's strike squadron.
It was formed, but its existence was short, because it disbanded in 1980, when the number of Buccaneer squadrons was reduced from 5 to 4 due to its metal fatigue problems.
It's place was taken buy the overland strike squadron which became a maritime strike squadron in 1982.
Under Plan P the strength on 31.03.75 was to have been 60 aircraft in 5 squadrons.
60 Lighting fighters in 5 squadrons.
The actual strength on 31.03.75 was 7 squadrons. I don't know the number of aircraft, but if the average per squadron was 10 aircraft the total would have been 70 aircraft.
4 Lightning squadrons, including one recently returned from Cyprus.
2 of the above would convert to Phantoms by April 1977.
3 Phantom squadrons.
This included one Phantom maritime fighter squadron (formed in 1969 with the F-4Ks ordered for Eagle's Phantom squadron) which was part of the TASMO force.
Under current plans a second Phantom maritime squadron was to be formed in 1979 with the F-4Ks in Ark Royal's Phantom squadron.
However, it wasn't and instead one of the existing F-4M squadrons was transferred to that role.
No. 38 (Tactical) Group, which in March 1964 was part of Transport Command.
On 31.03.64 it had 24 combat aircraft in 2 squadrons.
24 Hunter FGA.9 in 2 squadrons.
Under Plan P the strength on 31.03.75 was to have been 24 aircraft in 2 squadrons.
24 P.1154 ground attack aircraft in 2 squadrons.
The actual strength on 31.03.75 was 4 squadrons, but I don't know the number of aircraft, but if the average per squadron was 10 aircraft the total would have been 40 aircraft.
1 Harrier squadron.
2 Jaguar ground attack squadrons, which had recently converted from Phantoms.
1 Phantom fighter reconnaissance squadron, which would convert to Jaguars by April 1977.
RAF Germany.
On 31.03.64 it had 126 combat aircraft in 11 squadrons.
32 Javelin fighters in 2squadrons.
48 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons.
30 Canberra tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 3 squadrons.
16 Hunter FR.10s in 2 squadrons.
Under Plan P the strength on 31.03.75 was to have been 88 combat aircraft in 12 squadrons.
24 Lighting fighter in 2 squadrons.
24 TSR.2 strike aircraft in 2 squadrons.
16 TSR.2 tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 2 squadrons.
24 P.1154 fighter reconnaissance aircraft in 2 squadrons.
It actually had 11 combat squadrons. I don't know the number of aircraft, but if the average per squadron was 10 aircraft the total would have been 110 aircraft.
2 Lighting fighter squadrons which were to convert the Phantoms by the April 1977.
2 Buccaneer strike squadrons.
3 Harrier ground attack squadrons.
3 Phantom ground attack squadrons.
1 Phantom reconnaissance squadron.
RAF was in the process of re-equipping with new aircraft and by April 1977.
The 4 Phantom squadrons would have converted to the Jaguar.
No. 20 squadron would have converted to the Jaguar, except it didn't.
The existing No. 20 squadron was disbanded.
Half of its aircraft & personnel were transferred to No. 3 Squadron.
Half of its aircraft & personnel were transferred to No. 4 Squadron.
A new No. 20 Squadron was formed on Jaguars.
So the number of Harriers in Germany was unchanged, but the total number of aircraft in Germany was increased from 110 in 11 squadrons to 120 in 11 squadrons, that is assuming the average had been 10 aircraft per squadron before this was done.
The 2 Lighting squadrons would have converted to Phantoms by April 1977.
Near East Air Force.
On 31.03.64 it had 62 combat aircraft in 7 squadrons.
12 Javelin fighters in one squadron in Cyprus.
32 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons in Cyprus.
18 Canberra tactical reconnaissance aircraft in 2 squadrons.
One with 8 aircraft in Cyprus.
One with 10 aircraft in Malta and was to reinforce RAF Germany in wartime.
Under Plan P the strength on 31.03.75 was to have been 46 combat aircraft in 5 squadrons.
12 Lightings in one fighter squadron in Cyprus.
16 TSR.2 strike aircraft in 2 squadrons in Cyprus.
8 TSR.2 tactical reconnaissance aircraft in Cyprus.
10 Canberra tactical reconnaissance aircraft in Malta.
It actually had 4 squadrons with (I think) 38 combat aircraft before the Mason Defence Review.
12 Lightning fighters in one squadron in Cyprus, but this was withdrawn to the UK in January 1975.
16 Vulcan medium bombers in 2 squadrons in Cyprus (which replaced the 4 Canberra squadrons in 1969), but they were withdrawn to the UK at the end of 1974.
10 Canberra tactical reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron in Malta. It was withdrawn in the UK in 1979
NEAF was disbanded in April 1976 and replaced by AHQ Cyprus which was part of Strike Command.
I'm not doing Air Forces Middle East and Far East Air Force because they had ceased to exist by March 1975.
Strangely enough for all the effort put into withdrawing from 'Out of Area' deployments in 1975 the British began a permament Army and RAF deployment to Belize, in 1980 the RN began the 20 year Armilla Patrol in the Gulf and of course there was the Falklands after that war in 1982.
I think the only Olympus available earlier is the 201 as a dry only version? So it'd be down on thrust by about 40% compared to the Mk320. I'm not sure there's that much useful envelope expansion that could be done with that. Avon 301 is similarly down on thrust. I think Gyron is about the only thing available in the thrust class but is bigger.
So use non-afterburning Olympus in the first birds and prove out the initial, low speed flights. Even the early A-12 Blackbirds flew on J75s instead of J58s, so it's not a big deal to have prototypes fly on a lesser engine than the final product. "Minister, it is far more important to prove out the low speed flight characteristics of the aircraft than it is to wait for the final engines to be ready to fly."
And actually, J75s might be a viable backup engine while the Olympus bugs get ironed out. Not sure about weight difference between the two (the examples in wiki are a non-afterburning JT4 at 5000lbs weight and the Olympus 593 from Concorde at 7000lbs), but they're close enough to the same diameter.
Or maybe keep going on the Orenda Iroquis, if buying a half-dozen or dozen engines from the US is that hard on the balance of payments.
That's also not a particularly intuitive thing, you pretty much need to have built a bunch of models with Sea Eagles on them to have a feeling for how much space the fins take up.
Of course having funded 20 Gyron Junior sets for S1 Buccaneer and a tiny number for T.188.
It would be curiously helpful for HSA P.1121 had a limited number of full size Gyron been produced for early TSR.2 development work......
Strangely enough for all the effort put into withdrawing from 'Out of Area' deployments in 1975 the British began a permanent Army and RAF deployment to Belize, in 1980 the RN began the 20 year Armilla Patrol in the Gulf and of course there was the Falklands after that war in 1982.
One of the limiting factors was the engine development e.g. being cleared for single flight at a time between inspections. I don't see how "better management" really improves the engine development programme given the technical issues experienced (like the engine blowing up).
Is that a reference to the one that destroyed a test-bed Vulcan (fortunately on the ground) when the shaft broke?
My source for that is Page 49 of "Modern Civil Aircraft: 2 Concorde" by Philip Birtles. He wrote that the cause was had been a difference in temperature in the shaft as the engine cooled after shut-down, leaving the top warmer than the bottom. When the engine was restarted and the power increased, the additional strain on the shaft that caused it to break. He wrote that the simple solution for Concorde's engines was a slow rotation to even out the temperatures before restarting.
Is that a reference to the one that destroyed a test-bed Vulcan (fortunately on the ground) when the shaft broke?
My source for that is Page 49 of "Modern Civil Aircraft: 2 Concorde" by Philip Birtles. He wrote that the cause was had been a difference in temperature in the shaft as the engine cooled after shut-down, leaving the top warmer than the bottom. When the engine was restarted and the power increased, the additional strain on the shaft that caused it to break. He wrote that the simple solution for Concorde's engines was a low rotation to even out the temperatures before restarting.
I found that while looking for something else that I thought was in the book.
That is, I thought it said the cancellation Olympus 320 for TSR.2 delayed the development of Olympus 593 for Concorde and increased the R&D cost of the latter. Birtles didn't explain how. I think he meant the the engines were similar and therefore the cost of developing the 320 had to be added to the cost of developing the 593. Which, if correct means that the money required to compete the development of the Olympus 320 was spent on the development of the Olympus 593 anyway.
If correct, not cancelling TSR.2 in 1964 may have led to Concorde flying sooner and entering service sooner. At the very least the R&D cost would have been reduced because some of the R&D cost of its engines was included in the R&D cost of TSR.2.
20 Concordes were built IOTL and as each aircraft had four engines at least 80 Olympus 593 engines must have been built. How much did the 593 have in common with the Olympus 320? Because if they had a lot in common the production and operating costs of both would have been reduced if TSR.2 hadn't been cancelled and the more TSR.2s built the greater the reduction.
Combine the R&D cost borne on the R&D of TSR.2 with the reduction in production & operating costs created by a larger production run and non-aviation enthusiasts may have seen Concorde as merely a huge waste of money instead of a colossal waste of money.
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