Could TSR2 have been made to work?

[uk 75]

It is worth mentioning that apart from Australia noone bought the F111 either. The market for theatre nuclear strike aircraft is limited. The F15 Strike Eagle (a US Tornado or UKVG) has been much more successful.

The US could afford long and medium range nuclear strike aircraft in some numbers. Only the Soviet Union could try to do the same.

Polaris blurred the role of the medium bomber in NATO. It made US B47s and USN Vigilantes in Europe unnrcessary as well as RAF V bombers.

The 50 machines for SACEUR were eventually replaced in the post Cold War UK by low yield warheads for Trident.

 

[red admiral]

Similarly the financial aspects are at best smoke and mirrors given none of the possible replacements came in on time and on budget.

This really isn't smoke and mirrors. There is a fixed budget per year and it isn't possible to soend more than that. This is "affordability" rather than cost. Saying that spending less in the mid 70s means you can spend more in the mid 60s, just isn't correct. There was a pretty severe government wide budget crunch in the mid 60s so TSR2 was simply not affordable. Nor was F-111K as it turned out.

Arguably Jaguar and Tornado succeeded in spite of the RAF and BAC/BAe. Had they been UK national programmes they would have gone the way of TSR2 and P1154.

It is also no accident that the one really successful British military jet of the 70s, the Hawk, is a simple, functional airframe with no bells and whistles to inflate its cost and delay production.

Hawk was fixed price as well!

I think I'd say that Jaguar and Tornado were successful as well, but not the stand out export success of Hawk. But still, 42% share of a 1,000 aircraft programme gives much better returns than 100% of 50 (or zero) aircraft programme.

Here's a question, how late could the STOL aspects be loosened but not dropped? If for whatever reasons the RAF/British didn't buy into the whole vulnerable airfields, disperse operations NBMR3 vibe in 1962-64 is that too late for the TSR2? Or as the realities of reaching the in-air performance firm up is it possible to relax some of the STOL/dispersal requirements?

They were being relaxed anyway given that the real TSR2 being built didn't meet them; e.g. 600yd take off requirement relaxed to 1,100 yds (the normal take off condition would also be significantly worse). And this is without deleting any systems from the aircraft or making it easier to design. You're still left with a high sweep, very high wing loading aircraft that needs extra assistance for take off and landing.

I think you're really talking about changes to GOR.339 leading to different aircraft concepts to have a significant impact. But EE is already pretty locked into the P.17 configuration by this time.

 

[Rule of cool]

They were being relaxed anyway given that the real TSR2 being built didn't meet them; e.g. 600yd take off requirement relaxed to 1,100 yds (the normal take off condition would also be significantly worse). And this is without deleting any systems from the aircraft or making it easier to design. You're still left with a high sweep, very high wing loading aircraft that needs extra assistance for take off and landing.

I think you're really talking about changes to GOR.339 leading to different aircraft concepts to have a significant impact. But EE is already pretty locked into the P.17 configuration by this time.

Do you know when that was changed? Was it in those frantic last days before cancellation?

1100 yards is still pretty short, I'd think that in a pinch such a takeoff distance would allow operation from a runway less than 6,000'.

I was thinking about changes after detail design was done and metal being cut but before first flight. Perhaps not bothered with the big, soft field wheels, or the extendable nose gear oleo or whatever. I'm not overly fussed about the blown flaps, they were getting pretty common by the early-mid 60s and I doubt its worse than swing wings.

 

[kaiserd]

It is worth mentioning that apart from Australia noone bought the F111 either. The market for theatre nuclear strike aircraft is limited. The F15 Strike Eagle (a US Tornado or UKVG) has been much more successful.

The US could afford long and medium range nuclear strike aircraft in some numbers. Only the Soviet Union could try to do the same.

Polaris blurred the role of the medium bomber in NATO. It made US B47s and USN Vigilantes in Europe unnrcessary as well as RAF V bombers.

The 50 machines for SACEUR were eventually replaced in the post Cold War UK by low yield warheads for Trident.

I’m not saying you are wrong but the “medium bomber” role for the US, plus numbers deployed to Euro, was tied up with far more than the fielding of Polaris.

In practice SACs theatre based B-47s were primarily replaced by US based B-52s (with their longer range and expanded tanker support they weren’t nearly as dependent on local basing). Additionally in the 60’s the US ICBM force massively expanded, plus the US Polaris sub fleet also expanded, again all impacting the role and focus of the US’s nuclear armed bombers and strike aircraft.

Hence while it’s also true that US nuclear armed tactical fighters and strike aircraft were in this period getting larger and longer ranged in this period (leading to the F-111) to somewhat converge with theatre bombers it’s probably mistaken to see them as direct replacements for B-47s.
It’s more that the tactical fighter-bomber (F-105, say) converged with the tactical bomber (B-57, say) and that with the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons they converged with the medium strategic bomber (say, B-47). Something similar seen with UK and UK-multi-national aircraft.

The F-111 was a tactical strike aircraft evolving into a theatre bomber primarily operated by TAC, the B-47 was a medium bomber that evolved into a strategic bomber that was almost exclusively operated by SAC. The B-47 was primarily a strategic system primarily replaced by other strategic systems (US based B-52s, US based ICBMs, sub based Polaris missiles).
The FB-111 variant is a bit of an outlier (essentially a tactical bomber tasked with a strategic role?).

And I haven’t even gone into the complications of US and NATO land based nuclear tipped medium range missiles of this period and their impact re: nuclear armed strike aircraft.

There may well be similarities with the V-bombers and B-47 in that late in their careers they were given more theatre rather than strategic focused roles and target listings as a byproduct of “loosing” their strategic roles to other systems. However NATO tasked Lakenheath based F-111s were very much TAC birds and not SAC FB-111s with their different targeting priorities etc.

The TSR2 evolved in a direction of getting closer to being a theatre bomber but was never intended to be the pinnacle of the UKs nuclear deterrent (which was supposed to be V-bomber then V-bomber armed with Skybolt and ended up being Polaris armed SSBNs). The fact that the last Vulcans ended up in a tactical role, and that the TSR2 at various stages was considered for somewhat improvised interim quasi-strategic roles (for example as a gap filler after Skybolt cancelation) does cause confusion, potentially including some in the RAF and governmental/ political levels. But the TSR2 wasn’t ever really intended to replace the V-bombers and it’s the Vulcan that ended up being a partial interim replacement for the TSR2. And UK Polaris (or Trident) subs didn’t really replace the TSR2 (or those last NATO/ tactical tasked Vulcans); it was a whole series and combinations of various aircraft that did.

 

[red admiral]

Do you know when that was changed? Was it in those frantic last days before cancellation?

Feb 1965 in spec issue 2

BAC's internal summary had the dispersed TO performance at 1,403yds at this point, and combat radius 816nm. Max Mach wanting to be limited to 1.5 due to fin issues. But performance had been rapidly dropping and costs spiralling a long time before this point.

I was thinking about changes after detail design was done and metal being cut but before first flight. Perhaps not bothered with the big, soft field wheels, or the extendable nose gear oleo or whatever. I'm not overly fussed about the blown flaps, they were getting pretty common by the early-mid 60s and I doubt its worse than swing wings.

Quite, the blown flaps were pretty widespread at this time. It's too late for much impact from those other changes though e.g. smaller, higher pressure tyres just means more space in the wheel bays.

The extending nose oleo was going to be deleted from production aircraft anyway as it was found to not make much difference to performance. The tailplanes providing sufficient rotation rate.

 

[alertken]

What is challenging is how 50xTSR.2, then F-111K were unaffordable, '65-68, yet UK would operate 385 Tornadoes. Just taking the 230xIDS, none to meet EoS Missions...where did this extra budget come from? The Production orders were by Labour Ministers, '74-79.
Defence Budget expressed as % of National Wealth did not so increase (i.e: 50: 230).

I have toyed with manpower - TSR.2 maintenance man-hours p flight hour had not been a Design Case; and with hourly operating cost: also not a Reqt in 1959, but so in 1970; and with multi-role flexibility...but both a/c were of such pain to generate that neither would have been exposed to attrition on iron LO-VALU targets, so narrowing 2nd-sortie AW strength.

 

[red admiral]

What is challenging is how 50xTSR.2, then F-111K were unaffordable, '65-68, yet UK would operate 385 Tornadoes. Just taking the 230xIDS, none to meet EoS Missions...where did this extra budget come from?

No extra budget required from my understanding: UK is no longer paying 100% of development costs that are spiralling upwards, and non recurring production cost is spread across more airframes.

 

[Archibald]

Some numbers
- 41 for freedom submarines, each one with 16 tubes, total 656 Polaris (and later 1968 nukes, although not true MIRVs).
- McNamara capped the number of Minutemans to 1000
- More than 1000 B-47s were retired in a few months in the year 1965-66. Direction Davis Monthan, then melted aluminum into tin cans.

 

[Rule of cool]

This really isn't smoke and mirrors. There is a fixed budget per year and it isn't possible to soend more than that. This is "affordability" rather than cost. Saying that spending less in the mid 70s means you can spend more in the mid 60s, just isn't correct. There was a pretty severe government wide budget crunch in the mid 60s so TSR2 was simply not affordable. Nor was F-111K as it turned out.

The RAFs need to spend heaps of money didn't go away with TSR2 cancellation, it merely transferred to the F111K, AFVG, UKVG and 42% of Tornado development. I'm not sold on the budget crunch when Labour campaigned on attacking the British aviation industry.

 

[uk 75]

Tornado ends up doing both the P1154 role (8 sqns but in Germany not scattered around the world) and the TSR2 role (3sqns in UK and Germany rather than just UK) replacing Buccaneers, Jaguars and Vulcans.

I continue to argue that if the 1964 Labour government had found TSR2, P1154, and HS681 all flying and getting ready for service by 1968 they would have let the RAF go ahead with them.

 

[Rule of cool]

continue to argue that if the 1964 Labour government had found TSR2, P1154, and HS681 all flying and getting ready for service by 1968 they would have let the RAF go ahead with them.

I agree 100%, but I also think there are other scenarios where the TSR2 survives. Firstly if the P1154 and HS681 are not on the menu due to previous decisions, especially if it is appreciated that it will be a generally beneficial leap forward for the nation. Secondly if some 8655 votes across 20 seats were different in 1964 the Labour majority of 5 becomes a Tory majority of 17, that would save the TSR2 but likely not the P1154 and HS681.

 

[uk 75]

Both Macmillan and Home had asked about the cost and other TSR2 problems. I do nor think a Home government would have acted differently in substance to Wilson.

Yes, TSR2 was more unpopular ideologically with the Left in Britain. But the records show that BAC was given every chance to come up with a costed proposal for TSR2. We also know that the RAF were looking for a way out.

In opposition the Tories were of course critical of the government but that was politics.

 

[Rule of cool]

Both Macmillan and Home had asked about the cost and other TSR2 problems. I do nor think a Home government would have acted differently in substance to Wilson.

Yes, TSR2 was more unpopular ideologically with the Left in Britain. But the records show that BAC was given every chance to come up with a costed proposal for TSR2. We also know that the RAF were looking for a way out.

In opposition the Tories were of course critical of the government but that was politics.

No doubt there would be questions if the Tories won. However without an ideology against it time would pass and the 2nd and 3rd aircraft would fly and the pre production aircraft would move towards completion. Its much harder to cancel an aircraft that has 3 flying and 6 more coming off the line than it is a single prototype that has flown twice. BAC knew this, which is why they flew the first prototype before it was safe to create momentum.

 

[uk 75]

I think we have to agree to differ on this one. The key it seems to me is the RAF senior officers bought into the US solutions (Hercules, Phantom, F111).

Given the slow progress and difficulties with the UK projects it is hard to disagree with them. I think a few years earlier flights of the three aircraft might have saved them.

Phantom rather than F111 is the game changer. The RAF put it into service in the Hunter and Canberra replacement roles with Air Support Command and RAF Germany by 1969.

Hercules is the other success story. It allows the RAF to replace its obsolete Hastings and Beverley transports by 1969 and radically changes RAF capabilities.

P1127RAF is a more useful VSTOL aircraft in its niche than P1154. It is able to operate in places like Belize and the Falklands without much preparation.

TSR2's absence does not hurt either BAC or the RAF as much as its fans like to think. BAC gets Jaguar and then Tornado which are ordered in large numbers. The RAF has no operations between 1970 and 1990 where TSR2 would have made a difference.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Spey Phantom suffered a huge cost blowout, a not insignificant time delay and a degradation in high end performance. It's hardly a panacea.

The C130 worked out well, but more Belfasts and buying into the C160 Transall project would have worked just as well operationally and probably politically and industrially they would have been better for Britian.l.

The F111K was cancelled after massive cost and time blowouts, so I can't see going US was a solution to Britain's problems. Indeed the looming cost blowouts of these US aircraft, coupled with the devaluation was a key driver of the British withdrawing from EoS.

 

[Apophenia]

...The C130 worked out well, but more Belfasts and buying into the C160 Transall project would have worked just as well operationally and probably politically and industrially they would have been better for Britian...

OT, I know, but had the UK joined the Transporter Allianz consortium early enough, an RAF 'C.160B' Transall could have been available in the same timeframe as the RW C-130K (prototype Oct 1966; service entry 1967).

 

[uk 75]

I am sorry but the Spey Phantom was a sop to British industry. Fact remains the Phantom was a far more useful aircraft to the RAF than either TSR2 or P1154.

Transall Vs Herc needs a thread of its own. Choice was 681 or Herc. Herc won.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I am sorry but the Spey Phantom was a sop to British industry. Fact remains the Phantom was a far more useful aircraft to the RAF than either TSR2 or P1154.

In that the Phantom was actually delivered, yes.

Phantom did not have anywhere near the capabilities of TSR2 in terms of low level penetration (at least in bad weather).

The real bonus for Phantom was that it could be shuffled from ground attack to interceptor with trivial work.

Transall Vs Herc needs a thread of its own. Choice was 681 or Herc. Herc won.

681 had about the same overall cargo capacity as the Herc, right?

 

[Rule of cool]

In that the Phantom was actually delivered, yes.

Phantom did not have anywhere near the capabilities of TSR2 in terms of low level penetration (at least in bad weather).

The real bonus for Phantom was that it could be shuffled from ground attack to interceptor with trivial work.



681 had about the same overall cargo capacity as the Herc, right?

In 1963 the RAAF looked at the F4C and TSR2 amongst others. In the strike role the F4C had a combat radius of about 630 miles, being the only 1 of the 5 that didn't meet the 1000 mile range requirement.

The whole point of equipping a military force is to give a government options in the foreign policy area. The fact of the matter is that equipping the RAFs strike sqns with TSR2s would give Britain more foreign policy options than when they were equipped with Spey Phantoms.

 

[uk 75]

The trouble is that Phantom and Herc were real aircraft in service. TSR2 was a one off prototype. P1154 and AW681 never even flew.

The government had no choice but to go with real hardware not unicorns.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The trouble is that Phantom and Herc were real aircraft in service. TSR2 was a one off prototype. P1154 and AW681 never even flew.

The government had no choice but to go with real hardware not unicorns.

Calling TSR.2 a one-off prototype is incorrect as two had been completed before it was cancelled and another 17 were in various stages of construction. Therefore, it was, at the very least a two-off at at the most a nineteen-off.

According to your logic, the F-111 was one-of and a unicorn. As far as I know only 2 were flying when TSR.2 was cancelled. These were 63-9766 which flew on 21.12.64 and 63-6767 on 25.02.65. Incidentally, TSR.2 beat F-111 into the sky by nearly 3 months as XR219 made its first flight on 27.09.64.

 

[uk 75]

Stand corrected on the detail.
But Phantom rather than F111 was what got the RAF through the years into the early 70s when Jaguar re-equipped the RAFG and UK strike squadrons.
I agree that F111K was a poor alternative to TSR2 and all things being equal TSR2 would have been a good replacement for the Marham Valiant wing. That said, the Vulcans in the same role from 1970 to 1983 had a greater bomb load and range but could not match the TSR2 dash.
I contend that the US replaced the Vulcans with the Lakenheath F111 wing and Cruise missiles so TSR2 was not missed by NATO.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Vulcans had a low-level top speed of 350 knots, they were hideously vulnerable almost to the point of uselessness in the NATO context.

 

[kaiserd]

In 1963 the RAAF looked at the F4C and TSR2 amongst others. In the strike role the F4C had a combat radius of about 630 miles, being the only 1 of the 5 that didn't meet the 1000 mile range requirement.

The whole point of equipping a military force is to give a government options in the foreign policy area. The fact of the matter is that equipping the RAFs strike sqns with TSR2s would give Britain more foreign policy options than when they were equipped with Spey Phantoms.

But what actual “options in the foreign policy area” did the UK actually loose by not going forward with the TSR2? Not aware of any real world scenarios where the RAF ended up worse off for ditching the TSR2 versus the alternatives actually adopted and put into service.

And given that the inevitable significantly reduced force structure (numbers etc.) necessitated by theoretically going forward with the TSR2 would have definitely reduced actual “options in the foreign policy area”, the more salient question is if these inevitable reductions would have been to an acceptable or unacceptable level.

So, for, example, would RAF presence in Germany been completely denuded, and what would the wider (probably quite negative) ramifications of that been?
And the Tornado project that ended up as a TSR2 successor had a significant beneficial impact on the actual foreign relations of the UK and on the UK military aviation industry (certainly more the TSR2 could ever have had). What about the net-negative if that never happens?

 

[MadRat]

TSR2 was likely much more affordable than the other V bombers. But it added nothing to security of the Falklands.

 

[Rule of cool]

Calling TSR.2 a one-off prototype is incorrect as two had been completed before it was cancelled and another 17 were in various stages of construction. Therefore, it was, at the very least a two-off at at the most a nineteen-off.

According to your logic, the F-111 was one-of and a unicorn. As far as I know only 2 were flying when TSR.2 was cancelled. These were 63-9766 which flew on 21.12.64 and 63-6767 on 25.02.65. Incidentally, TSR.2 beat F-111 into the sky by nearly 3 months as XR219 made its first flight on 27.09.64.

I thought the TSR2 status was XR219 was flying, XR220 would have flown but had an accident on it's delivery journey so it's flight was delayed and XR221 was complete and would have flown within a couple of months. XR222 and XR223 were partially complete aircraft, XR224-5-6 were complete airframes and XR227 was an incomplete airframe. I don't know about engines but IIUC there were 9 radar sets in production.

This is where timing becomes really important, its much harder to cancel a project with 3 aircraft flying and more on the way than it is with 1 that's having trouble.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I thought the TSR2 status was XR219 was flying, XR220 would have flown but had an accident on it's delivery journey so it's flight was delayed and XR221 was complete and would have flown within a couple of months. XR222 and XR223 were partially complete aircraft, XR224-5-6 were complete airframes and XR227 was an incomplete airframe. I don't know about engines but IIUC there were 9 radar sets in production.

For what it's worth I was going by "TSR.2 Production Status at 07.04.65, the day following announcement of cancellation" on Page 165 of "Project Cancelled".

To summarise.

XR219 - Flying.​

XR220 - Ready to fly.​

XR221 - Electronic testing 90% complete. Due at Wisley 11th April for flight mid-May.​

XR222 to XR225 (4 aircraft) - Structurally complete.​

XR226 - Structure 95% complete.​

XR227 - Structure 90% complete.​

XS660 to XR 669 (10 aircraft) - at various stages of construction.​

​

All components becoming available to produce structures a one per month. Fins and other components available to programme.​

​

That's all 9 development aircraft and 10 out of 11 pre-production aircraft.

This is where timing becomes really important, its much harder to cancel a project with 3 aircraft flying and more on the way than it is with 1 that's having trouble.

I agree.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

This is where timing becomes really important, its much harder to cancel a project with 3 aircraft flying and more on the way than it is with 1 that's having trouble.

Didn’t stop the cancellation of YB49, Avro Arrow or Nimrod MRA4 or Martin P6M Sea Master

 

[red admiral]

TSR2 was likely much more affordable than the other V bombers. But it added nothing to security of the Falklands.

Why do you say that?

The existing V bombers are already purchased by this point whereas you need to pay for TSR2 development and production costs.

For operational costs, then it was estimated that TSR2 would require more maintenance man hours than Vulcan, which is a large driver of costs. It would have burnt a bit less fuel and oil but these are really small portions of whole life cost for combat aircraft. And a few less crew, but again this is a relatively small cost driver. So unlikely to see any savings here.

 

[Rule of cool]

Didn’t stop the cancellation of YB49, Avro Arrow or Nimrod MRA4 or Martin P6M Sea Master

It stopped the cancellation of the Lightning, which is more relevant to this topic. Besides, I said it made it harder not impossible.

 

[Rule of cool]

But what actual “options in the foreign policy area” did the UK actually loose by not going forward with the TSR2? Not aware of any real world scenarios where the RAF ended up worse off for ditching the TSR2 versus the alternatives actually adopted and put into service.

And given that the inevitable significantly reduced force structure (numbers etc.) necessitated by theoretically going forward with the TSR2 would have definitely reduced actual “options in the foreign policy area”, the more salient question is if these inevitable reductions would have been to an acceptable or unacceptable level.

So, for, example, would RAF presence in Germany been completely denuded, and what would the wider (probably quite negative) ramifications of that been?
And the Tornado project that ended up as a TSR2 successor had a significant beneficial impact on the actual foreign relations of the UK and on the UK military aviation industry (certainly more the TSR2 could ever have had). What about the net-negative if that never happens?

Literally every international issue that has even an indirect military connection was affected by the TSR2 cancellation, although it must be admitted that it was 1 part of a larger issue that also included CVA01 and the earlier 57 DWP. By 1966 Britain was seen as an unreliable ally and a wasteful country, which undoubtedly cost it exports.

As for NATO/RAFG in particular, by not getting the TSR2 and relying on the obsolete Vulcan and less capable Buccaneer the Cold War was likely prolonged.

 

[uk 75]

The reverse is true.
By strengthening our forces in Europe and disengaging from outdated colonial fantasies Britain moved closer to the EEC and reinforced RAF Germany and the RN's crucial nuclear submarines and ASW forces.
BAC was able to play a leading role in the largest European collaborative defence project: MRCA(Tornado). Hawker Siddeley developed the Hawk, a simple beautiful airframe in the Camm tradition.

TSR2 would have been like the BR decision to cling on to steam and diesel locos in the 50s rather than electrifying major lines as they did in W Europe.

 

[red admiral]

From re reading Burke's chapter on TSR2 cancellation, it doesn't seem to have been some sort of difficult decision, and more aircraft flying would have made no impact.

In 1963, estimated costs had risen to £175-200m, with a 6x increase in development cost estimates. In Jan 1964 the estimated costs had increased by £130m. Expected total costs were above £500m. By late 64 then costs estimated to be up to £750m - £1,000m but BAC were now refusing to provide estimates

Julian Amery, MP for Preston - "We are now reaching a position where, to put it brutally, the British aircraft industry is destroying our military air power"

CAS - "we are in no doubt that the aircraft is unacceptable at this price"

Oct 64: RAF OR writes "Short Comings of the TSR-2" paper. "The outstanding and all-pervading shortcoming of the TSR2 is its high cost", and then goes on the lambast many capability shortfalls. Turns out that the world had changed in the last 7 years since GOR.339 and RAF had specified the wrong aircraft for what was actually needed. They started actively pushing for alternatives - as long as it wasn't Buccaneer.

Cancellation press conference summary - "The basic facts are that TSR2 was too expensive and that it should have been stopped long ago" this is the quote that should be remembered rather than Camm's pithy but incredibly naive one about it getting the politics wrong.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is Derek Wood's plan for TSR.2 in his Scenario 1964.

Finally, the thorny problem of the TSR.2 is resolved. So much money has been spent and so much effort put in, it is obvious that the project must go on. Sixty TSR2s are ordered, but initially with less sophisticated equipment than originally envisaged. The weapons system package is built up gradually, allowing for an easier flight test programme. TSR2 becomes the most potent strike/recce aircraft in the NATO armoury. A further 25 are ordered and Australia, thoroughly disenchanted with delays and price rises on the F-111 cancels its order for that type and turns to TSR2, with major sub-contracts being placed with Australian companies.

In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.

In order not to waste all the variable geometry know-how accumulated in Britain, an experimental TSR2 is flown with VG incorporated and research is kept up. At the same time negotiations are begun with a group of European nations, including West Germany, for a variable-geometry fighter/ground attack aircraft to be the ultimate successor to the F-104.

I count a total of 135 production aircraft comprising the 60 strike/reconnaissance aircraft, the 50 air defence versions and the 25 sold to Australia.

A question for @Rule of cool because you're our resident expert on Australian military procurement. Is there a cat in hell's chance of Australia doing that if the TSR.2 wasn't cancelled?

 

[zen]

People are forgetting that the cancellation of TSR.2, P1154 and HS.681 and adoption of F111, F4 and C130 was on terms of a new US loan negotiated by the Wilson Government. The US made it clear, it was to dictate what the monies were spent on.
It was made clear TSR.2 wasn't something that this loan could be used for and it's reasonable to assume that applied to the other domestic efforts.

So funding any one of these platforms to service would have to come from UK finances and even if the loan is still agreed, those monies would be still be spent on US military products.

To continue with the TSR.2 really requires a view of this being a rolling programme. The aim of which would be to progressively extend performance and reduce maintenance hours.
But to think like this (which they did not) means no splurge of production, rather a steady slow pace. Any profits from which could only be envisioned many years into the future.

And here is were we hit the problem of perception. Things having advanced so fast from 1950 to 1960, it wasn't within politicians eyes impossible that ten years hence the future would contain aircraft of even more astoundingly high performance.
Only the more rational and experimental technically minded might think things were hitting a wall in raw performance terms.

And ironically it's the avionics side that would bring the next revolution in performance.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

People are forgetting that the cancellation of TSR.2, P1154 and HS.681 and adoption of F111, F4 and C130 was on terms of a new US loan negotiated by the Wilson Government. The US made it clear, it was to dictate what the monies were spent on.

My guess is that most of us couldn't forget that because we (and that includes me) didn't know that in the first place.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In 1963, estimated costs had risen to £175-200m, with a 6x increase in development cost estimates. In Jan 1964 the estimated costs had increased by £130m. Expected total costs were above £500m. By late 64 then costs estimated to be up to £750m - £1,000m but BAC were now refusing to provide estimates

FWIW my source (which is Gardner's history of BAC) says the original estimate for the R&D cost (which included the 9 development aircraft) was £80-90 million with Controller Aircraft (CA) release in 1966. That was in December 1959. This had risen to to £240-270 million with CA release in mid-1969 in January 1964. That's 3 times the original estimate not 6 and about £60-65 million less than the £305-330 million in January 1964.

Gardner (who was biased because he would be portraying TSR.2 and BAC in the most favourable light) wrote that the estimated costs at cancellation were £270 million for the R&D (including 9 development aircraft) and the estimated production cost was £3.4 million each on a run of 100 aircraft.

• Therefore, IOTL the estimated total costs at April 1965 were:
  • £610 million for 100 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £340 million production).
  • £780 million for 150 production aircraft (£270 million R&D plus £510 million production)..
• Except that Gardner wrote that the cost of 150 aircraft would have been some £750 million due to the longer production run which reduces the production cost to £480 million and the unit cost to £3.2 million.

According to him £125 million had actually been spent and the cancellation charges were £70 million for a total of £195 million.

The accuracy of those estimates is another matter. However, he concluded the last of 3 chapters on TSR.2 with a paragraph on the R&D cost of the Spey Phantom.

• £25.3 million in February 1964 including £12.4 million for the Spey engine.
• £45.8 million in May 1965 including £28.7 million for the Spey engine.

I've read elsewhere that the R&D cost of the Spey-Phantom ended up being in the region of £100 million.

 

[Rule of cool]

A question for @Rule of cool because you're our resident expert on Australian military procurement. Is there a cat in hell's chance of Australia doing that if the TSR.2 wasn't cancelled?

No, the decision to reject the RAAFs recommendation of the A5 and go with the F111 was announced on 24 October 1963, before the November election. Mountbatten, in his role as Chief of Defence Staff, advised us not to buy it and as we know he was pushing the Buccaneer.

The F111s were delivered to storage in 1968, so there isn't much of a window of opportunity to change the F111 decision in favour of the TSR2 once it was made. Again this is another example of the sunk cost argument, once Australia was committed to the F111 its hard to get out.

 

[Rule of cool]

People are forgetting that the cancellation of TSR.2, P1154 and HS.681 and adoption of F111, F4 and C130 was on terms of a new US loan negotiated by the Wilson Government. The US made it clear, it was to dictate what the monies were spent on.
It was made clear TSR.2 wasn't something that this loan could be used for and it's reasonable to assume that applied to the other domestic efforts.

So funding any one of these platforms to service would have to come from UK finances and even if the loan is still agreed, those monies would be still be spent on US military products.

To continue with the TSR.2 really requires a view of this being a rolling programme. The aim of which would be to progressively extend performance and reduce maintenance hours.
But to think like this (which they did not) means no splurge of production, rather a steady slow pace. Any profits from which could only be envisioned many years into the future.

And here is were we hit the problem of perception. Things having advanced so fast from 1950 to 1960, it wasn't within politicians eyes impossible that ten years hence the future would contain aircraft of even more astoundingly high performance.
Only the more rational and experimental technically minded might think things were hitting a wall in raw performance terms.

And ironically it's the avionics side that would bring the next revolution in performance.

How much of this loan was tied up with the party-political requirement for Labour to not be the 'party of devaluation'?

Would the Tories have devalued or done something else instead of a loan with such onerous caveats if they'd won?

 

[kaiserd]

Literally every international issue that has even an indirect military connection was affected by the TSR2 cancellation, although it must be admitted that it was 1 part of a larger issue that also included CVA01 and the earlier 57 DWP. By 1966 Britain was seen as an unreliable ally and a wasteful country, which undoubtedly cost it exports.

As for NATO/RAFG in particular, by not getting the TSR2 and relying on the obsolete Vulcan and less capable Buccaneer the Cold War was likely prolonged.

It appears that you are seriously arguing that cancelling the TSR2 “likely prolonged” the Cold War. I need someone to explain that apparent rationale to me as otherwise that just sounds like an utterly ridiculous non-factual argument to make.