Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche

I was somewhat involved in the Comanche program, mostly in LO analysis. Early on, the Army dictated that it use a conventional configuration (this is about when the tilt rotor concept began to be taken very seriously). There were a lot of other configuration issues bruited about, which I don't feel particularly comfortable discussing because a) they were about 40 years ago and b) I don't know what may still be classified or proprietary.

Other than being a much more attractive aircraft than the AH-64, a helicopter than was not only hit by an ugly stick but beaten severely, the RAH-64 was probably, overall, more capable in most things other than raw weapons load.
 
I spent a lot of time working with the RAH-66. Much of it with simulation work. The cockpit and MEP was by far the most advanced for a rotorcraft. While I did not fly the Comanche I knew many of the Army aviators who did work the actual aircraft. It was a good flying bird, even with it being very overweight.

The Army did make the right decision to cancel the program. The funding from Comanche will now allow for ~300 ARH(Bell 407), ~300 LUH(BK 117), 40 JCA(C-27J), new CH-47F, new UH-60M, new ASE and other kit. While the money does not buy all of the airframes I mention, you can get an idea of how much money was tied into one program.

Before I get on a dissertation of the impact of Comanche on the US rotorcraft technology sector, I think buried somewhere on my hard drive at work, I have a three view of the EMD/LRIP aircraft configuration. If memory serves me, the most outstanding visible differences had to do with the canopy layout and the addition of increased air inlet size (immediately below the engine inlet) to provide more ambient air to the IR suppression.

Edit: found the three view for EMD/LRIP. Hope this is what you are looking for...

I just picked up a helicopter sim yesterday from an auction. It's a Comanche Portable Cockpit....it might be the one you worked on several years back. It was in Huntsville, AL. View attachment 675021
That's awesome! What plans do you have for the portable sim. I see that it was used by the University of Alabama's RSESC program.
 
I was somewhat involved in the Comanche program, mostly in LO analysis. Early on, the Army dictated that it use a conventional configuration (this is about when the tilt rotor concept began to be taken very seriously). There were a lot of other configuration issues bruited about, which I don't feel particularly comfortable discussing because a) they were about 40 years ago and b) I don't know what may still be classified or proprietary.

Other than being a much more attractive aircraft than the AH-64, a helicopter than was not only hit by an ugly stick but beaten severely, the RAH-64 was probably, overall, more capable in most things other than raw weapons load.
The RAH-66 was the best fit for the Australian ARH requirement won by the tiger but wasn't really an option due to the time scales involved. RAH would have been good and likely the best option today had it not been cancelled.
 
And the winner is ... I worked in GIAT at this time when they studied the gunnery for Comanche. The team was very disapointed when the program was scrapped. But all the work was not entirely lost ...



800px-Australian_Army_Tiger_ARH_Helicopter_%28IMG7146%29.jpg
 
SK you are correct and I think Bell will sell the 360 as well (to someone and possibly the USMC?).
 
SK you are correct and I think Bell will sell the 360 as well (to someone and possibly the USMC?).

It's nowhere close to fast enough for the Marines. They need to escort Ospreys, which means they really need another tiltrotor.
 
With everyone other than those who have done the mission having decided that UAS is the way to do aero scouting, the aero scouts don't get to vote. The U.S. Army has taken to launching drones off of UH-60, likely AH-64 will be next. So most of the financially savvy will tell you that that the aero scout will sit in an air conditioned box someplace "safe".
The wastage of people and equipment doing the mission today in the European conflict remains exceedingly high.

Bell will not build Invictus for anyone. No production infrastructure was put down (very expensive in itself), no one will rationalize the expense. Well, maybe China.

As @TomS said, the USMC has clearly stated that the H1 replacement must be able to keep up with MV-22B.
 
So according to the attachment the Comanche was to have carried the Longbow radar as an option had it entered service. That would have made it a stealthy Kiowa Warrior, at least mission wise.
 
IIRC, it was not so much the Army as Dick Cheney as SecDef.
The SecDef left it up to the Army to decide. The Chief of Staff left it to the Deputy Chief of Staff to make the final call. The Deputy CoS was none other than (then) LTG Dick Cody. With the probability that major combat against a peer was waning and Jihadist were a vexing problem, the RAH-66 was redundant and many needed upgrades to the existing fleet needed to be done. The real surprise is that all of the money meant to go into Comanche was kept in the aviation portfolio and used to fix a significant number of upgrades to the existing fleet.
To be sure the Deputy was aware that his leaders felt it best to cancel, but they were willing to give him an opportunity to make a case to continue to the SecDef. Cody was a proponent of Comanche. It was a very tough decision. Most ultimately felt it the right one.
 
At the time reports were that one of the strikes against RAH-66 was a severe case of "my imprint-itis".

That being the disease that infects projects when senior members of the design/development program (most often the active-duty military members) are changed frequently, and each new one coming in has to "make his mark on the project", resulting in regular changes in mission/equipment/etc,etc........... and a "final, no further changes allowed, start building them" state is always just out of reach.
 
I have to correct myself. LTG Cody was the G3 (Operations) officer for the U.S. Army at the time of the decision.

There is an excellent book from AIAA on the Comanche program that I highlighted earlier in this thread.
 
The SecDef left it up to the Army to decide. The Chief of Staff left it to the Deputy Chief of Staff to make the final call. The Deputy CoS was none other than (then) LTG Dick Cody. With the probability that major combat against a peer was waning and Jihadist were a vexing problem, the RAH-66 was redundant and many needed upgrades to the existing fleet needed to be done. The real surprise is that all of the money meant to go into Comanche was kept in the aviation portfolio and used to fix a significant number of upgrades to the existing fleet.
To be sure the Deputy was aware that his leaders felt it best to cancel, but they were willing to give him an opportunity to make a case to continue to the SecDef. Cody was a proponent of Comanche. It was a very tough decision. Most ultimately felt it the right one.
Absolutely!

There is no way in normal times that the powers that be would let Army keep the budget if it wasn't going to be spent on the Comanche!
 
From Army Aviation 2000/11.
 

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Thanks for the article Hesham. So is the radar on the RAH-66 prototype that is at the US Army Aviation museum just the aerodummy test model, or did the whole effort get further than that? I thought I read somewhere that they were looking into ways to further reduce the profile of the radar, but I can't remember where.

The SecDef left it up to the Army to decide. The Chief of Staff left it to the Deputy Chief of Staff to make the final call. The Deputy CoS was none other than (then) LTG Dick Cody. With the probability that major combat against a peer was waning and Jihadist were a vexing problem, the RAH-66 was redundant and many needed upgrades to the existing fleet needed to be done. The real surprise is that all of the money meant to go into Comanche was kept in the aviation portfolio and used to fix a significant number of upgrades to the existing fleet.
To be sure the Deputy was aware that his leaders felt it best to cancel, but they were willing to give him an opportunity to make a case to continue to the SecDef. Cody was a proponent of Comanche. It was a very tough decision. Most ultimately felt it the right one.
I suppose I can't blame Cheney for cancelling *every* impressive procurement program in the early 2000s. I can't fault the logic of the Deputy CoS but it just seems a shame to me for so much of that work to have gone to waste. I can't help but feel that perhaps there should have been more of a "wartime" attitude at that point in history to where more money could be provided to upgrade the existing CH-47, UH-60, and AH-64 fleet and procure the RAH-66. In the 20 years since that time US Army aviation circled around to FARA only for it to be cancelled too, 20 years to the same month the Comanche was. A decision using much of the same logic to justify it, but this time with the community of Army aircrew seemingly having little input in all of it.
 
The Army's timing on their scout programs was always poor. They have also relied on mathematicians at their Analysis Center to do the analysis and the math never added up, mathematically. There was also pressure, to absolve the mathematicians of some of the blame, to find the most financially beneficial results. Four times then mathematicians found against the manned platforms on financial rational.
 

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