ADVANCEDBOY said:
Actually, I find X-32 to be very professionally designed. It doesn`t have any amateur signature in it. Shapes are well thought out and balanced. What is a bit puzzling is that visual mass( my own invention which is based on observations in nature how species evaluate each others genetical health via visual porportions of visual mass.) in front part of the airplane seems to be slightly too much forward. I would probably pull the nose part slightly forward and move the visual bulk of the fuse slightly backwards, relieving the tension in air intake area.
And I think The Air force should have gone for procurement of both airplanes simultaneously, keeping both involved companies hostages to each others competition. In this scenario noone of the companies could be able to jack up prices, abusing the lack of competing alternatives. My 0.2 inflation affected cents.
The X-32 has the compact brawn of a Wildcat or a Bearcat, particularly the STOVL variant is not far off the dimensions of the A-4 or Harrier. So something punchy and brawny yet small like Badger, Lynx, Bobcat or Wolverine comes to mind for me.
Relieving the tension as you put it is about destroying what little Area Rule it has, while also ignoring the certainty that that fan has to be right where it's at for the liftscreen to operate effectively. And the weapons bays have to fold around or behind that.
This is the Achilles Heel of the X-32/F-32 in that, to get the kind of IRT power needed for STOVL, you had to have a mass flow which could only be satisfied by a fan closer to the F101 than the F100 in diameter.
That fan is running off a core which has to also have enough kick to punch the jet through the Mach and the resultant stochiometrics push you up towards a TSFC on the order of 1.
This made the X-32 a fantastic transonics performer (52,000lbf vs. 40,000 on the X-35), by all accounts dwarfing the F-35s up and away capabilities. But it also meant that the jet was always going to be shortlegged. A fact which likely got worse when the '1,500lbs of structural weight savings' on the PWSC came out of 20-25% chord reduction at the wingroot.
The Marines should have remembered that they had A-4s long before -and after- they had AV-8A-C and the F/A-18A-D, long after they switched to the AV-8B.
The problem is that STOVL is a political tool as much as a tactical one and thus it 'never occurred to them' that a 300 knot escort for a 200 knot V-22 (same margin as AH-1 had over UH-1 in Vietnam) could be something other than a Harrier could justify a _hull change_ in their thru deck helo cruisers with an idea more akin to a dual tramway CVL/SCS type ship.
So that they could continue to support the USN with proper CATOBAR (F-35B is totally incompatible with angle-deck anything) aircraft while having the option to '12 per side' support a real squadron deployment _with support missions_ like the E-2D, KA-18E and EA-18G right out of the gate. Or maintained a helo-side for traditional Marine hurry up coastal interventions.
If they had gone with such a 'radical' idea, the entire F119-PW-614 would have been tossed in favor of something like the F414 or even an F124 class engine, along with canards and ESTOL FLCS effectors.
Engine in the back means inlet duct over rather that between weapons bays and so you get something a lot closer to what the Boeing ATF concept looked like, only cleaner.
The thing is, Lockheed's performance in the demonstrations was so totally dominant, there's no way they could justify selecting both. They demonstrated everything they promised and then some. Boeing's design while innovative suffered from the situation that among other things they were going to have to do an extensive redesign from the X-32 in any developmental version. They were in effect espousing the Microsoft philosophy, "Don't worry, we'll fix it in the next release" (as opposed to Apple's "You didn't need to do that anyway").
IMO, given the huge industry/service test experience base and the laughable 45-50 million dollars PAUC mumbled by Roche at the 2001 contract announcement, it was impossible for the Government or LM _not_ to have known from the outset that this was an unbuildable concurrency problem.
Hence LMs major push to get the F-35A into production by 2012 'for export' as a profit base while they turned their limited SDD team to the next variant.
The USAF performed a hostile takeover on DARPA for J-UCAS and then cancelled it so the notion that we couldn't afford a two jet program on 'the eve of a major war in SWA' is ludicrous, not least because the UCAV would have been the better operational choice (loiter + loiter + CPFH) anyway.
Where you have upwards of a third (ATF) the program costs dedicated to electronics architectures anyway, the notion that iron bird X-jets that don't even structurally represent the production models can somehow be used as one stop shopping justification for downselect on a ONE TRILLION dollar program (keeping in mind it was only supposed to be 220 billion in 1997) when everyone from the CRS to the CBO are screaming the technology base just isn't there is also ludicrous.
Since we were already collapsing multiple (F/A-18, AV-8B, F-16, A-10) programs into half as many follow-ons, there was no shame in deciding that it would be two individual program competitors. One for the nightmare of STOVL and one for the CTOL/CVTOL mission.
Such might has even kept the program on schedule if not budget.
The real key here is numbers. The USAF didn't, in 2001 when O'Hanlon did his study and certainly does not now, need 2,400 or 1,763 or even 1,200 jets. It needs 500. Tops. The USN and Marines need 700, between them. Add 500 more from foreign sales and you have a believable neckdown of all the Gen-3/4 (MiG-21, F-4 and F-5 as well as Teeners) platforms as the world transition to a post Cold War existence with half as many platforms.
That is where you scale your production and the level of technology insert on things like STOVL and Cyber and Stealth. Do this properly and you can afford to both support the industrial base (Boeing has nothing now that the McDonnell properties are aging out and nobody wants a retread 60s Eagle or 70s Hornet) and provide competitive honesty with dual programs funded to the tune of maybe TEN, not One Hundred, SDD airframes.
Everything we have been told about the JSF program has largely been based on carefully worded prevarications.
The sad part being that The Services got themselves well and truly stuck-in (Fox to Tar Baby) on the concept of having another big acquisition program with no foe worthy of it's cost in sight. They thought that they could fix as they flew without Congress daring to suspend the effort because...'Everybody or Nobody' it was so important to the recap of all.
But they didn't count on real engineering issues (and particularly PDR/CDR weights) to become a program stopper with one name for three airframes.
As the saying goes: "Sales sells the lie, Marketing believes it." Marketing in this case being overhyped customers.
That is why we need to make sure that not only is there never a 'sole source' solution involved that so fixates on justifying itself as to _generate the crisis_ which puts all other major Tacair alternative options (like CAPES and F-22 and Golden Eagle).
By instituting a two-tier, limited commitment, X-Plane and PWSC evaluation system.
But also that the _acquisition agency_ responsible for writing the specs and evaluating their achieved execution has absolutely no confirmation bias attendant upon user service or industrial influence. It must be totally separate, upon pain of brutally long prison terms. Something like the DSAC mixed with NASA Ames and DARPA might work.
The Customer may be the victim of believing the market hype. But we are the ones with Buyer's Remorse.