Canberras are an interesting missed opportunity… their slow speed made them extremely vulnerable to both ship defenses and fighters. Really not suited to dropping iron bombs.
So how to use them better? Well imagine them instead as an antiship platform with a pair of AS30 missiles (similar to some RAF Canberras).
Canberras would have been perfect for low level stand-off attacks from 5-6nm, especially with a basic ECM jammer.
Fighter escort would have been required, and that’s where the relatively large internal fuel capacity comes in (17,300lbs of fuel including bomb bay tank), as they could have buddy fueled a pair of A-4s flying close escort (armed with 2 Aim-9 Sidewinders - though personally I would prefer them rewired for Magic 1s). Or alternatively the A-4s could have stopped at Port Stanley to refuel (being lightly loaded, they would be able to use the 1,200m runway if equipped with a brake parachute from a Mirage, even in wet conditions) and then you wouldn’t even need buddy refueling.
So imagine 2 pairs of Canberras (8x AS-30 missiles), each pair escorted by 2 fighters, going in low against the more vulnerable outer escort layer (Type 42s) or the T21s doing shore bombardment. In the first 2 weeks the results would have likely been quite lethal, especially if used to open up a channel for Exocet armed Super Etendards to reach the carriers.
So no big structural modifications at the airframe, just add two drogues at the end of the wings. And then you can put also some colapsible ferry tanks inside the cabin.
You don't just add drogues to an aircraft, they a somewhat sophisticated piece of kit that requires a fair bit of work to integrate into the host aircraft's systems.
As for the suitability of the Learjet in particular, the Argentine Air Force had 2 x B707 and 6 x Fokker F28 and the Navy had another 3 x F28s that would make more suitable tankers. The state owned airline might have been another source of aircraft for tanker conversions, they were certainly used to create the very impressive air bridge to Port Stanley prior to the war. These large aircraft can more readily bear the weight of the HDUs themselves as well as a vastly larger offload fuel load than the tiny Learjet.
You don't just add drogues to an aircraft, they a somewhat sophisticated piece of kit that requires a fair bit of work to integrate into the host aircraft's systems.
As for the suitability of the Learjet in particular, the Argentine Air Force had 2 x B707 and 6 x Fokker F28 and the Navy had another 3 x F28s that would make more suitable tankers. The state owned airline might have been another source of aircraft for tanker conversions, they were certainly used to create the very impressive air bridge to Port Stanley prior to the war. These large aircraft can more readily bear the weight of the HDUs themselves as well as a vastly larger offload fuel load than the tiny Learjet.
You don't just add drogues to an aircraft, they a somewhat sophisticated piece of kit that requires a fair bit of work to integrate into the host aircraft's systems.
If you already have the fuel plumbing in place and the container of the fuel tank where you can put the mechanism your job is greatly simplified. After all, the buddy refueling stores are based on standard external tansk.
If you already have the fuel plumbing in place and the container of the fuel tank where you can put the mechanism your job is greatly simplified. After all, the buddy refueling stores are based on standard external tansk.
Firstly, those are RAN Skyhawks, I saw them do this trick in NZ service at an airshow in the early 90s.
Secondly, yes, a tactical aircraft can easily attach a buddy IFR store, they already have the hardpoint to attach the pylon to and the connections to fuel, compressed air and electricity that the buddy pod needs.
Thirdly, it isn't particularly difficult to turn an airliner or even bomber into an inflight tanker, by 1982 it had been done dozens if not over 100 times by various firms around the world. However, it is not a job Argentina could undertake within 2 or 3 months in a crisis.
The Argentinian Navy had at least one Sargent Fletcher "buddy" refuelling pod in 1982.
When the 25th de Mayo was preparing to strike the British TF on 2 May, one of the 8 A4Q Skyhawks (serial 3-A-302) was held at readiness with such a pod in case the strikers needed a top up to get them home. The mission was scrubbed due to unseasonally low winds.
"Wings of the Malvinas" by Santiago Rivas.
I'm afraid this is a myth, but one that has been around for so long its repeated everywhere.
The reason the Mirage III were withdrawn was because without AAR capability they were of very limited utility, their limited fuel meant they had no real chance to escort strikes or engage in combat, particularly as the Argentines had a tiny stockpile of compatible supersonic drop tanks (the 2 Mirage III dropping theirs in the first 'combat' with SHAR, which were mistaken as missiles by the SHAR pilots, was a big proportion of the available tanks...). As a result they were to all intents useless and were withdrawn to northern bases to free up ramp space at the southern bases for fighter bombers. A couple did loiter around to provide local air defence for the airfields but that was it.
To understand why ramp space was so important just go and have a look at the airfields the Argentinian's flew strikes from on satellite images on Google Earth. Even with 40 years of extra work on some strips they barely warrant the title of regional airstrip...let alone airbase.
The official history by the FAA actually contradicts this, they originally said some Mirage III were withdrawn in order to defend the capital from a feared Vulcan attack. However, the effect was somewhat watered down when British officials in the MOD stated categorically that the UK wouldn't attack the mainland.
Who is more likely the aggressor? if some one comes to your house and says your kitchen in mine, who is attacking and who is the aggressor?
Who owned the Islands in 1832?
No war is justified, but the facts are Both sides have not solved the issue.
Was Argentina justified in 1982? no, the 1982 war was a Mistake, but the UK is not saint, that is History and if you want to understand History see both sides.
The UK had reasons and pressure by NATO to keep the Islands and true some British political sides wanted to return the Islands, in Politics even in England there were sides who wanted to return the islands and those who did not
So a thread about basing fighters at Port Stanley and widened into other practical issues concerning the war somehow related to the morality of the first 1/3 of the 1800s?
This thread was far more interesting when I was thinking about how much PSP or heavy construction it would take to turn port Stanley into a useful military airfield.
So a thread about basing fighters at Port Stanley and widened into other practical issues concerning the war somehow related to the morality of the first 1/3 of the 1800s?
This thread was far more interesting when I was thinking about how much PSP or heavy construction it would take to turn port Stanley into a useful military airfield.
From the alternative point of view we can talk about, just as a hypothetical case, I am not against it, I m just saying we do not need to get into politically charged nationalism by denying the Argentine historical point of view.
This game in which we are engaged, is enriched by analyzing different factors that can help us to understand how could the FAA could have beaten the harrier.
I am of the opinion, the main mistake of Argentina was trust the USA, but the USA also made a Terrible mistake by supplying AIM-9L to the UK.
Argentina basically lost because they could not defend their aircraft carrier from Submarine attack, this reduced the range of their air force and the embargo cut the weapons supply they needed.
I am of the idea a well armed A-4 could had beaten a Harrier if they have had AIM-9Ls and had operated from the aircraft carrier.
The Argentine Pilot says it was the AIM-9L what gave the victory to England but it was the AIM-9L not the Harrier it self what gave the victory
But in the Americas there is unwritten agreement, the USA should not attack us specially south america in order for us not to develop nuclear weapons.
Th war of 1982 imposed in the UK the Prohibition of not using nukes on Argentina, Argentina knew the UK could not invade the main continental land of Argentina, they were not going to be capable of doing it.
So the war was for who was going to keep the Islands.
So the USA decided helping a quick victory for the UK was better.
The USA has paid that with the rejection of the free trade of the Americas, the creation of Mercosur, the Brazilian Nuclear submarine project and the inclusion of Brazil in BRICS.
Here's a picture I found of Argentine Navy MB339 at Port Stanley. Notice how it's backed onto a strip of PSP just wide enough for the undercarriage. I've also seen a picture of an S2 Tracker at Port Stanley backed onto 3 strips of PSP wide enough for each individual wheel.
Here is the loop at one end of the Aluminium 'Sids Strip' at San Carlos. I think Argentina should have made something like this at Port Stanley of they extended the strip with PSP, it allows combat aircraft to take off in pairs or flights.
you did not answer the questions then you avoid the facts. in the last two hundreds years Argentina even as part of the Spanish empire has not been involved in as many wars as the UK and Argentina until now has never attacked London, we can not say that about the UK that has attacked Buenos Aires or the Argentine main land facts are facts, official British History might tell you the reason the UK is justified and good in whatever policy they took as a government, however it does not mean the other side agrees.
If you never listen the other side that amounts to propaganda in History, so if you really want to be objective you have to listen both sides, Historians draw conclusions, and many times they have their subjectivity in what they write, they have censorship too.
And in History there are different accounts, people accept what they think many times is the most acceptable depending in their values, objective History in reality does not exist because Historians are always arranging facts upon what politicians tell them. In few words History is written upon political views, it happens every where, is like you want to force your political view upon other countries, you can not sorry we have to live to disagree and agree to disagree in the most respectful way.
I didn't answer the question, quite deliberately, because there wasn't a question to answer. You simply made a statement that was illogical. This is a forum about aircraft, if you want to prosletise about the history of the Falkland Islands I suggest you find somewhere else.
Ironically you accuse others of not listening, when that is precisely what you were doing. Frankly, you're making an idiot of yourself trying to argue that the invasions of BA in 1806/7 have any relevance for the Falklands War of 1982. Also, if you want to indulge in the ludicrous conspiracy theories of the likes of El Malvinense that the UK/US tricked the Argentines into invading you're killing what otherwise might be an interesting discussion for others.
Here is the loop at one end of the Aluminium 'Sids Strip' at San Carlos. I think Argentina should have made something like this at Port Stanley of they extended the strip with PSP, it allows combat aircraft to take off in pairs or flights.
In the 1970s, the Argentine Corps of Engineers built a temporary strip at Hooker's Point in the Falklands using pierced Aluminium planking. This was in advance of the construction of the concrete runway by the British. It operated as the main runway until almost inevitably a strong wind blew it to pieces. LADE gathered what was still serviceable and stored it in a warehouse locally.
So there was already some materiel in the Falklands that rather foolishly the British had allowed to be pre-positioned by the Argentines. They also had planned to send out the plant and additional materiel to extend the strip but in a combination of inter-service rivarly/incompetence army stores were given priority (much of which was still unpacked dockside in June 1982).
A-4Q of the ARA also did some testing of the use of the runway but in truth it was half-hearted. They concluded that the facilities weren't suitable for operating fast jets citing the lack of suitable maintenance facilities. There was some evidence that they made a token attempt to extend the runway in April 1982 but made little progress. What would have made a difference was installing arrestor gear.
They did operator Trackers from the strip, which could have been used later to find the British fleet.
In my personal opinion, failing to make tactical use of the runway was one of the biggest blunders of the war. They could have extended the runway to make it suitable for fast jets, they had the time, materiel and expertise to do so. Having had such a facility forward to simply refuel would have transformed the tactical situation, they could have increased the attrition rate of the Sea Harriers significantly and it would have meant the Mirage III could have operated as interceptors with sufficient loiter time to make the Sea Harriers ineffective. Operating Trackers from the strip would have increased their situational awareness.
So why didn't they do it? They simply never expected the British to respond, they assumed the British were bluffing and being in a far superior position initially believed they couldn't lose. Once the British took the initiative they were always on the back foot.
From the alternative point of view we can talk about, just as a hypothetical case, I am not against it, I m just saying we do not need to get into politically charged nationalism by denying the Argentine historical point of view.
This game in which we are engaged, is enriched by analyzing different factors that can help us to understand how could the FAA could have beaten the harrier.
I am of the opinion, the main mistake of Argentina was trust the USA, but the USA also made a Terrible mistake by supplying AIM-9L to the UK.
Argentina basically lost because they could not defend their aircraft carrier from Submarine attack, this reduced the range of their air force and the embargo cut the weapons supply they needed.
I am of the idea a well armed A-4 could had beaten a Harrier if they have had AIM-9Ls and had operated from the aircraft carrier.
The Argentine Pilot says it was the AIM-9L what gave the victory to England but it was the AIM-9L not the Harrier it self what gave the victory
But in the Americas there is unwritten agreement, the USA should not attack us specially south america in order for us not to develop nuclear weapons.
Th war of 1982 imposed in the UK the Prohibition of not using nukes on Argentina, Argentina knew the UK could not invade the main continental land of Argentina, they were not going to be capable of doing it.
So the war was for who was going to keep the Islands.
So the USA decided helping a quick victory for the UK was better.
The USA has paid that with the rejection of the free trade of the Americas, the creation of Mercosur, the Brazilian Nuclear submarine project and the inclusion of Brazil in BRICS.
From the alternative point of view we can talk about, just as a hypothetical case, I am not against it, I m just saying we do not need to get into politically charged nationalism by denying the Argentine historical point of view.
This game in which we are engaged, is enriched by analyzing different factors that can help us to understand how could the FAA could have beaten the harrier.
I am of the opinion, the main mistake of Argentina was trust the USA, but the USA also made a Terrible mistake by supplying AIM-9L to the UK.
Argentina basically lost because they could not defend their aircraft carrier from Submarine attack, this reduced the range of their air force and the embargo cut the weapons supply they needed.
I am of the idea a well armed A-4 could had beaten a Harrier if they have had AIM-9Ls and had operated from the aircraft carrier.
The Argentine Pilot says it was the AIM-9L what gave the victory to England but it was the AIM-9L not the Harrier it self what gave the victory
But in the Americas there is unwritten agreement, the USA should not attack us specially south america in order for us not to develop nuclear weapons.
Th war of 1982 imposed in the UK the Prohibition of not using nukes on Argentina, Argentina knew the UK could not invade the main continental land of Argentina, they were not going to be capable of doing it.
So the war was for who was going to keep the Islands.
So the USA decided helping a quick victory for the UK was better.
The USA has paid that with the rejection of the free trade of the Americas, the creation of Mercosur, the Brazilian Nuclear submarine project and the inclusion of Brazil in BRICS.
The influence of the AIM-9L has been consistently over stated. All of the Sea Harrier engagements were in the rear 30° cone where the AIM-9L didn't have a significant advantage over the AIM-9G that the British also used. The Lima had a slighter better warhead but even that wouldn't have made much difference.
In the 1970s, the Argentine Corps of Engineers built a temporary strip at Hooker's Point in the Falklands using pierced Aluminium planking. This was in advance of the construction of the concrete runway by the British. It operated as the main runway until almost inevitably a strong wind blew it to pieces. LADE gathered what was still serviceable and stored it in a warehouse locally.
So there was already some materiel in the Falklands that rather foolishly the British had allowed to be pre-positioned by the Argentines. They also had planned to send out the plant and additional materiel to extend the strip but in a combination of inter-service rivarly/incompetence army stores were given priority (much of which was still unpacked dockside in June 1982).
A-4Q of the ARA also did some testing of the use of the runway but in truth it was half-hearted. They concluded that the facilities weren't suitable for operating fast jets citing the lack of suitable maintenance facilities. There was some evidence that they made a token attempt to extend the runway in April 1982 but made little progress. What would have made a difference was installing arrestor gear.
They did operator Trackers from the strip, which could have been used later to find the British fleet.
In my personal opinion, failing to make tactical use of the runway was one of the biggest blunders of the war. They could have extended the runway to make it suitable for fast jets, they had the time, materiel and expertise to do so. Having had such a facility forward to simply refuel would have transformed the tactical situation, they could have increased the attrition rate of the Sea Harriers significantly and it would have meant the Mirage III could have operated as interceptors with sufficient loiter time to make the Sea Harriers ineffective. Operating Trackers from the strip would have increased their situational awareness.
So why didn't they do it? They simply never expected the British to respond, they assumed the British were bluffing and being in a far superior position initially believed they couldn't lose. Once the British took the initiative they were always on the back foot.
I think I've read that the PSP that was used for aircraft parking was in part taken from Hookers Point, and I've also read that some effort was taken to extend the runway but not really pursued. Given the huge effort the British undertook to extend the runway by 2,000' (25,000t of crushed rock and 4,600t of aluminium AM2 planks) I could imagine that the Argentines saw what it was going to take to extend the runway by a paltry 500' and thought that it wasn't worth the effort. Add in the politics and rushed nature of the war from the Argentine perspective and its not really surprising they decided that Port Stanley wasn't useful.
An interesting thought exercise could be if instead of the scrap metal induced Op Rosario rush job they invaded on one of the later dates, maybe May 25 or in June or even later. If the Argentines had a large garrison on the islands that was doing not much in a 'phoney war' for several months where Britian couldn't launch a counter offensive due to the southern winter would they extend the runway with whatever equipment they had just to keep troops and equipment busy? They might increase hardstand and extend the runway by a bit and a few other odd jobs that could change the minds of the combat aircraft sqns, if not to make Port Stanley an operational base at least into a satellite airfield.
The key question is, I think, why do the Argentinians have MiGs? If Argentina is in a political situation where it's purchasing arms from the USSR, the whole Falklands situation will be looked at in a very different light.
Regardless of who is the US president at the time, an attempted invasion of the Falklands by a pro-USSR Argentina would find the US actively involved against Argentinian forces. Indeed, it's unlikely the US would permit a pro-USSR (or even one vaguely, even mistakenly, perceived as pro-USSR) government in Argentina to survive long enough to mount an invasion of an ally's territory.
Fine If my opinions are unwanted then I do not post in this thread, In democracies opinions enrich, opine within yourselves and say the same things you will say, any way you already have your script, so no point talking then
Fine If my opinions are unwanted then I do not post in this thread, In democracies opinions enrich, opine within yourselves and say the same things you will say, any way you already have your script, so no point talking then
Since my reasonable analyses of the UK's options and its attitude to the Falkland Islanders as well as how Argentina could have gained control peacefully have been removed, I do not see why this thread should become an uncontested lament that Argentina failed to win a war of aggression in the South Atlantic.
Technical discussion of how it could have countered Sea Harrier and other UK weapons more effectively is the only sensible use of this thread.
Since my reasonable analyses of the UK's options and its attitude to the Falkland Islanders as well as how Argentina could have gained control peacefully have been removed, I do not see why this thread should become an uncontested lament that Argentina failed to win a war of aggression in the South Atlantic.
Technical discussion of how it could have countered Sea Harrier and other UK weapons more effectively is the only sensible use of this thread.
I will be honest, this thread is European and has many British users, Latin american users are not many, so I know there is due to the fact this is an English speaking forum, there is already a line, I can not be stressed in what can I write or not? or what Spanish speaking sources bring? since that line already has been established, then is no point to Argue since there are accepted Historical opinions here and other sources are not deemed reliable , it is too stressful for me to opine since I have been polite, I am not interested in the political aspects but the Historians in South America have their opinions.
So in order for me to avoid post deleted or get into arguments about whose version is the more reliable? it is too blur because already exist a line of thought due to the users main ethnic origins (It happens everywhere).
Then respectfully is better for me not opine, I m not in an Spanish Speaking forum where most users are from South America or Latin American and will share my opinions without not so much disagreement.
So then let us leave here and keep peace, much better than have arguments and posts deleted.
You have just given very good reasons not to make political/historical points here (there are plenty of other sites where this can be done).
Let us stick to the much more interesting technical discussion.
You have just given very good reasons not to make political/historical points here (there are plenty of other sites where this can be done).
Let us stick to the much more interesting technical discussion.
The technical aspects are fine but remember each historian will consider different points of view, the Argentine pilot for example in that video claims the AIM-9L was the reason the Harrier was better., but he said If the FAA A-4s would have been using AIM-9Ls then the A-4s would have been equally successful.
That is his opinion
I posted 3 videos but I have watched videos of A-4 pilots who have flown versus Sea harriers said they lost.
The flight simulation shows a time when the A-4s did win, are the flight simulators using manuals? perhaps, if they are accurate then the A-4 can handle the Sea harrier.
But remember this is alternative History so I ask you do you need to use history?
I mean how can you do alternative history without Historians?
That is what I was saying obviously Argentina has a history of weapons manufacture, wars that lead to 1982, and an alternative history will need I go to historical facts, that is when the things get blur what Historian use and that is what I said, there is a line here already.
The technical aspects are fine but remember each historian will consider different points of view, the Argentine pilot for example in that video claims the AIM-9L was the reason the Harrier was better., but he said If the FAA A-4s would have been using AIM-9Ls then the A-4s would have been equally successful.
That is his opinion
I posted 3 videos but I have watched videos of A-4 pilots who have flown versus Sea harriers said they lost.
The flight simulation shows a time when the A-4s did win, are the flight simulators using manuals? perhaps, if the accurate then the A-4 can handle the Sea harrier.
But remember this is alternative History so I ask you do you need to use history?
I mean how can you do alternative history without Historians?
That is what I was saying obviously Argentina has a history of weapons manufacture, wars that lead to 1982, and an alternative history will need I go to historical facts, that is when the things get blur what Historian use and that is what I said, there is a line here already.
The big thing about the Aim9l us that it worked ~78% of the time, compared to Aim9 versions a mere decade earlier that were lucky to work 20% of the time.
Even with Aim9l the Argentine A4s were operating at the extreme edge of their range even with in-flight refuelling. They would have struggled to engage in air to air combat without running out of fuel on the way home. This is where Port Stanley airport could have been so useful as an emergency airstrip.
The big thing about the Aim9l us that it worked ~78% of the time, compared to Aim9 versions a mere decade earlier that were lucky to work 20% of the time.
Even with Aim9l the Argentine A4s were operating at the extreme edge of their range even with in-flight refuelling. They would have struggled to engage in air to air combat without running out of fuel on the way home. This is where Port Stanley airport could have been so useful as an emergency airstrip.
I agree, If they were limited due to the fact Argentina did not have a good sub hunter so the 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier was simply unable to launch their A-4s, yes you are right the use of airstrips of port Stanley would have been useful. But here I would say if the USA would not have embargo Argentina.
The war was already lost I doubt In Brazil or Washington they wanted a longer war.
So If I am honest it was a brief and short war, because the UK could have not invaded Argentina, their Navy was unable to conquest Argentina, so the only option was air attacks and in the last resort a nuclear attack.
That was out of the question, since that would had accelerated a Brazilian nuclear weapons program or even Argentina trying to get one.
So even the Galtieri knew the war needed to be short; otherwise the risk of further escalation was not good to any one.
Canberras are an interesting missed opportunity… their slow speed made them extremely vulnerable to both ship defenses and fighters. Really not suited to dropping iron bombs.
So how to use them better? Well imagine them instead as an antiship platform with a pair of AS30 missiles (similar to some RAF Canberras).
Canberras would have been perfect for low level stand-off attacks from 5-6nm, especially with a basic ECM jammer.
Fighter escort would have been required, and that’s where the relatively large internal fuel capacity comes in (17,300lbs of fuel including bomb bay tank), as they could have buddy fueled a pair of A-4s flying close escort (armed with 2 Aim-9 Sidewinders - though personally I would prefer them rewired for Magic 1s). Or alternatively the A-4s could have stopped at Port Stanley to refuel (being lightly loaded, they would be able to use the 1,200m runway if equipped with a brake parachute from a Mirage, even in wet conditions) and then you wouldn’t even need buddy refueling.
So imagine 2 pairs of Canberras (8x AS-30 missiles), each pair escorted by 2 fighters, going in low against the more vulnerable outer escort layer (Type 42s) or the T21s doing shore bombardment. In the first 2 weeks the results would have likely been quite lethal, especially if used to open up a channel for Exocet armed Super Etendards to reach the carriers.
Well, if I even defended the MB-326 for the mission, as a plane that doesn't change many timelines, the Canberra is another that in greater quantity or used differently could have good results.
Here the hypothesis of using the AS30 was discussed. But I remember that rockets would also have great results.
Rockets were not used by Argentines due to the enormous drag they cause and consequent fuel consumption. Launch pods travel to and from the mission. Which made the A-4, Mirages and Dagger unfeasible. But the Canberra could be equipped without any problems with the range.
It is imperative to remember that the ships were in a canal 3-5 km from each bank. This was the scenario. So any plane between 350 knots or 500 knots was at risk for just 10 to 20 seconds before launch... The Canberra would do this without any problems, whether with the AS30, rockets and bombs... the curious thing is that none of this was done...
Don't argue that it was slow, because according to the scenario illustrated above, this was the exact attack profile of the A-4s that hid in the relief and descended from the islands' ravines towards the ships...
while they were under the islands, the ships' radars lost the radar horizon, while they were descending from the cliffs, the radars were unable to track the image of the islands in the background... the Harrier Caps did not have pulse dopler radar to identify flying planes low...identification was visual or just radar for high flying targets...The Canberra would work. It wasn't expensive, it was already part of the inventory and could replicate the same Argentine attack profile carried out successfully in these missions...
Here are some interesting numbers on Argentine combat capability during the war, taken from "Air Power in the Falklands Conflict : An Operational Level Insight Into Air Warfare in the South Atlantic". This is a great piece of analytical work which uses Argentine sources (Rivas mainly) to look at why Argentina's FAA and COAN failed to interdict British forces.
1) First, Argentina had ~60 attack aircraft available on most days, all the way to the end. This is a large force which outnumbered Harriers by 2-3x (20 Harriers available initially, later reinforced to 28-30 for the San Carlos landings). So a lack of fast jets wasn't really the issue.
2) Argentina flew 536 combat air sorties over 44 days, including 485 sorties by attack aircraft (if I exclude the 51 Mirage III sorties). On the peak day during the San Carlos landings (May 21st), Argentina's 66 attack aircraft were able to fly 66 combat sorties - exactly 1 sortie per aircraft. On the first day of the war, 76 attack aircraft flew 50 combat sorties - a sortie rate of 0.65 per aircraft.
The problem is that the other 42 days of the war, only 363 sorties were flown... a sortie rate of only 9 per day or less than 0.15 per aircraft.
This low sortie rate was the root cause of Argentina's failure... driven by a mix of poor weather (14 out of 44 days) and most of all lack of targets due to insufficient intelligence (maritime patrol capability) and operating at max range.
3) Looking at those 485 attack aircraft sorties, the biggest issue was also a lack of success finding targets. Once you exclude the 17% of mission aborts due to technical issues (overall serviceability was actually quite good), almost 40% of missions failed to find targets or where cancelled due to weather and/or lack of targets or navigation errors.
Only about 40% missions found their targets, typically resulting in bombs missing their target (23% of missions) or aircraft being driven away by British defenses (11% soft kills). Only 4% of missions hit their targets and only 2% were shot down, with only 1.5% of attack missions were successfully intercepted by Sea Harriers.
A couple of takeaways from all this, according to the book and with which I concur:
1) Sea Harrier's effectiveness (including AIM-9L) was much exaggerated
2) The biggest missed opportunities for Argentina were better target intelligence and reducing the range (which would have increased the odds of finding targets and eliminated mainland weather as a factor)... this is where the Port Stanley runway could have played a major role if able to host S-2 Trackers and attack aircraft (or refuel them on the return leg)
3) Next biggest opportunity was a more effective weapon than dumb bombs... hence my focus on AS-30 missiles which could have been launched by Canberras & (Super) Etendards. Heavy rockets such as 100mm SNEBs or 5 inch Zunis might also have been useful.
4) Finally, given the very small number of Sea Harriers available, a small fighter component at Port Stanley could have served a useful (but secondary) role to drive away Sea Harrier CAPs and drive up Sea Harrier attrition... without complete air dominance, this might have been enough to give British leaders second thoughts about going ahead with the San Carlos landings
First, I think any aircraft from the USSR or PRC is out; a government with good relations with either would be anathema to any US administration.
Countries that built fighters included the US, France, Sweden, and the UK. Italy built F-104s under license, but if one is worried about runways in the Falklands, the F-104 would probably not be the best option.
The US "Century" series is, I think, right out. The only two exported to any extent were the F-100 and F-104 (F-101 only to Canada; the F-102 only to Turkey). The F-100 was already pretty long in the tooth, and, during its twilight in USAF service, suffering from some pretty serious structural issues. The F-104 had no real chance of operating from the Falklands. USN fighters may have a better chance at being functional. I see three possibilities: the F11F Tiger, the F8U Crusader, and the F4F Phantom II.
The Tiger was never exported, but it could have been. A better engine would have been nice (afterburning J52?). The Crusader was barely exported (France and the Philippines), but also could have been, although both it and the F11F were getting long in the tooth by the late 1970s. The Phantom is an interesting "could have been." It would easily be the most modern warplane in South America, and would probably have had the payload/range characteristics to permit it to operate over the Falklands from mainland bases.
France had the Mirages. I think the Mirage F1 -- the swept wing variant -- was better than the deltas is about any way. I don't know if it was enough better than the deltas to make a difference.
The UK only had the Lightning. This would be interesting, but the Lightning certainly didn't have a reputation for great range or endurance.
Sweden had two very interesting aircraft, both with design features for operation off improvised and short runways: the Draken and the Viggen. I don't know what Sweden's expert laws were like, but when Argentina wasn't being run by dictatorial thugs, Argentina may have been able to get arms from Sweden.
First, I think any aircraft from the USSR or PRC is out; a government with good relations with either would be anathema to any US administration.
Countries that built fighters included the US, France, Sweden, and the UK. Italy built F-104s under license, but if one is worried about runways in the Falklands, the F-104 would probably not be the best option.
The US "Century" series is, I think, right out. The only two exported to any extent were the F-100 and F-104 (F-101 only to Canada; the F-102 only to Turkey). The F-100 was already pretty long in the tooth, and, during its twilight in USAF service, suffering from some pretty serious structural issues. The F-104 had no real chance of operating from the Falklands. USN fighters may have a better chance at being functional. I see three possibilities: the F11F Tiger, the F8U Crusader, and the F4F Phantom II.
The Tiger was never exported, but it could have been. A better engine would have been nice (afterburning J52?). The Crusader was barely exported (France and the Philippines), but also could have been, although both it and the F11F were getting long in the tooth by the late 1970s. The Phantom is an interesting "could have been." It would easily be the most modern warplane in South America, and would probably have had the payload/range characteristics to permit it to operate over the Falklands from mainland bases.
France had the Mirages. I think the Mirage F1 -- the swept wing variant -- was better than the deltas is about any way. I don't know if it was enough better than the deltas to make a difference.
The UK only had the Lightning. This would be interesting, but the Lightning certainly didn't have a reputation for great range or endurance.
Sweden had two very interesting aircraft, both with design features for operation off improvised and short runways: the Draken and the Viggen. I don't know what Sweden's expert laws were like, but when Argentina wasn't being run by dictatorial thugs, Argentina may have been able to get arms from Sweden.
Argentina was anti-communist, and Galtieri Leopoldo was helping the USA in central America against Nicaragua.
However the USA never has sold very advanced aircraft to Latin America.
The only country that has send and sell good aircraft is France, and to lesser extend Israel.
I will give you a source about the History of A-4s in the FAA A-4B with the first scheme, which includes flag and large cockades, used only while they were with metallic scheme. The A-4C Skyhawk
The third major event in 1975 was the purchase of 25 Douglas A-4Cs to replace the veteran F-86 Sabres, which would continue to fly until 1986. These aircraft, which were in storage at Davis Mountain, were delivered without any inspection or modernization, and many of them had participated in the Vietnam War, both from aircraft carriers and from land bases. The aircraft differed from the A-4B in having five underwing mounts, had been delivered without the AN/AJB-3 low-altitude bombing system, while the AN/APG-53A radar was replaced in 1980 by a VLF/Omega Litton LTN-211 program 2700 complemented by a Thompson-CSF AHV611 radio altimeter replacing the AN/APN-141 and IFF 2720 TACAN ARN-21, installed in 1979. They also incorporated an autopilot, gyroscopic system and an improved bombing system.
Baptism of fire
Since 1973, the activity of the communist guerrillas that ravaged the country had increased notably due to the inability of the governments of Héctor Cámpora, Juan D. Perón and his widow, María Estela Martínez, to control the subversives, reaching the point that in 1975 the self-proclaimed People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) began activities to develop rural guerrilla warfare in the southwestern area of the province of Tucumán, a mountainous and jungle region, very difficult to access. Its intention was to create a liberated zone as an independent country, to fight against the Argentine Armed Forces and security forces and in this way, to have control over a territory and try to obtain international recognition as a belligerent force and thus obtain support in its fight to overthrow the constitutional order and take over the entire country. Faced with this critical situation, on February 5, 1975, the president signed secret decree 261 ordering the Armed and Security Forces to annihilate the actions of subversive elements operating in the province of Tucumán through Operation "Independence." To support the Army's actions, the Air Force mounted Operation "Torión", which consisted of support missions. To evaluate the way of operating, on November 6 a squadron of A-4Bs dropped fragmentation bombs and attacked guerrilla groups that were fighting with army troops with cannons. On the 18th the operation began, with the A-4Bs carrying out fourteen close air support missions with bombs and cannons, guided in several cases by Mentor aircraft from the Military Aviation School, which fired smoke rockets at the target. The new Pucará, BAC Canberra and Morane Saulnier also participated in these actions, in which the unit flew. Explosion and column of fire from bombs dropped by an A-4B during the bombing of Morón Base.
Shortly after, on December 19, the A-4Bs entered combat again, this time to suppress a military uprising by the Air Force, which under the command of Commodore Jesús Capellini had occupied the Jorge Newbery Airpark, located in the center of the City of Buenos Aires, and the VII Air Brigade in Morón. In the afternoon of that day, a section of planes, deployed in the VIII BA of José C. Paz, bombed the Morón base, destroying, according to some sources, a Beech B-45 Mentor that was there, which convinced the rebels to abandon their attitude.
In mid-1978, in view of the possibility of a border conflict with Chile, the A-4Cs were equipped with short-range, infrared-guided Rafael Shafrir missiles, fine-tuned by Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Shlomo Shapira, who also provided training in close air combat with the A-4. The unit had 26 launchers, although only seven aircraft were equipped in this way. In addition, to maintain the pilots' qualifications, the "Firepower" exercise was carried out with the A-4Bs, where they dropped ANM65 bombs, 5" Zunni rockets in 16-round bursts and fired 20mm cannons over Las Lajas. It was followed by the "Effects" operation, dropping general purpose bombs (PG) and 2.75" FFAR rockets from LAU 61 rocket launchers.
El Douglas A-4 Skyhawk significó para la Fuerza Aérea Argentina el principal avión de combate de su historia. Desde la incorporación hasta Malvinas.
deyseg.com
This part of the story begins when, during his interrogation for the Report, on April 19, 1983, he is asked why his “government” was “surprised” by the pro-British attitude of the United States.
“America for the Americans,” Galtieri begins by saying. “The American Monroe Doctrine, the existing treaties,” he specifies. “Yes, I thought that – despite this information – the attitude of the United States should be more balanced and distant.” It is worth remembering that Galtieri also thought that Washington’s support would compensate for the sending of Argentine officials to Central America to support the dirty war against communism that the United States was waging there.
En su declaración dijo estar convencido de que Reagan no iba a apoyar a Londres.
www.clarin.com
In 1980, the Argentine Navy acquired 14 new Dassault Super Etendard aircraft from France, destined for the Second Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron. An initial batch of five units arrived in 1981. The Falklands War interrupted shipments, which were completed after the war.
En medios nacionales se habló de una polémica compra realizada durante la gestión del ex presidente Mauricio Macri, , Dessault Super Etendard M
deyseg.com
The dictatorship imposed in 1976 by the Armed Forces with civilian support had several phases and went through tensions between different visions of the economy and the State. Unlike dictatorships such as that of Chile, in Argentina the Armed Forces exercised collegial power among the three branches of government. Forty years after the restoration of democracy, it is still important to review the objectives of the coup, its regressive economic and social dimensions and its repressive technologies, and the links between society and the military regime.
La dictadura impuesta en 1976 por las Fuerzas Armadas con apoyo civil tuvo varias fases y atravesó tensiones entre diversas visiones sobre la economía y el Estado. A diferencia de dictaduras como la chilena, en Argentina las Fuerzas Armadas ejercieron un poder colegiado entre las tres armas. A...
www.nuso.org
Argentina bought aircraft from the west during the dictatorship, so the only available aircraft were western.
So there is no possibility of MiG-21 or MiG-23 unless communism would had triumphed but the A-4s were used to kill communists in Argentina
The only possible alternative outcome in my opinion was more Air to air missiles for A-4s and maybe a good air strip in the Islands.
The British attack on the ARA 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier (nuclear submarine HMS Splendid) "Falklands War"
Two submarines almost sunk in 15 minutes
On May 23, the nuclear submarine HMS Valiant was submerged at periscope depth, sailing between the islands and the mainland. Its mission was to prevent Argentine ships from approaching British forces, who were at that time consolidating the beachhead in San Carlos, as well as to warn about Argentine planes heading to the islands.
It was a boring afternoon and part of the crew was watching the German film “Das Boot” (The Boat), which is about a submarine in World War II. The sonar announced that there were no close contacts and the periscope and the rest of the antennas did not protrude from the water, so no one could detect them from the sky.
But, out of nowhere, increasingly stronger explosions began to be felt. The fifth and last one “was strong enough to shake the submarine (and its crew) considerably,” according to Tom LeMarchand, its commander.
The alarm was raised and the submarine, considering itself attacked, began evasive manoeuvres, while the crew ran to their posts.
What had happened?
A flight of Argentine Air Force fighter planes, possibly Dagger fighters based in San Julian, returning from the islands without finding any targets, had dropped their bombs in the middle of the sea (landing with bombs is extremely dangerous), almost hitting the Valiant.
This may seem like a one-in-a-million coincidence… but it was not the last time it happened in the war. And it ended with a British submarine with damage, even if minor.
A IAI Dagger plane loaded with bombs, in a photo after the war. It is very dangerous to land with bombs, so it was normal procedure to drop them in the sea if they were not to be dropped. The Valiant was almost sunk by one of these bombs (Argentine Air Force)
That same day, May 23, the nuclear submarine HMS Splendid, one of the most modern in the Royal Navy, was patrolling north of the Isla de los Estados and near the naval air base of Rio Grande. Again, as happened to the Valiant, suddenly loud explosions were heard nearby, four in this case.
The commander of the ship, Roger Lane-Nott was in his cabin and when he heard the explosions, he ran to the bridge and took the periscope, which was already raised.
“I took the periscope and scanned the surface: nothing and then the sky. And then I saw a Skyhawk fighter crossing the sky at a lateral distance of about 1,000 meters, and clearly heading for its base. While I was reporting to the rest of the control room what I was seeing, I saw a large bomb coming out of the belly of the plane and falling towards the sea.”
The commander himself says that they suffered “very slight superficial damage” from the explosions, but in any case, they are damages. Something unprecedented, since on no other occasion in history (before or after) has a nuclear submarine suffered damage in a war situation.
As Paul Slemon, one of the submarine's crew members, pointed out: “How ironic it would have been if they had accidentally sunk a nuclear submarine that was in their flight path.”
Certainly, the Argentine air force, inadvertently, on May 23, 1982 and in the span of 15 minutes, almost sank not one, but two enemy nuclear submarines, causing damage to the Splendid.
La Marina Real Británica envió cinco submarinos nucleares y uno convencional al conflicto del Atlántico Sur. En cuatro ocasiones, sus tripulaciones sintieron que la muerte los rondaba por la aparición de aviones argentinos
This site uses cookies to help personalise content, tailor your experience and to keep you logged in if you register.
By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our use of cookies.
