Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 Hollowed out the US Air Force by Bill Sweetman

[Bruno Anthony]

Swedes either the second or third most significant contributor

Aside from the warhead design what was the Swedish design proposal?

 

[DWG]

Circa 2000, the expectation was to build the F-16/F-18 succcessor by taking the F-22, making some reasonable compromises, scaling down capablities to a reasonable degree and focusing on more pedestrian metrics like affordablity, availability etc.

You need to go back to at least 1992 for the relevant set of decisions. Not sure when MRF (F-16 replacement) stood up, but prior to CALF/ASTOVL (Harrier II replacement) in 1992, which was then merged into MRF 1993/4 to create JAST and then JSF. Also part and parcel of this decision chain are the cancellation of A-X (A-6 replacement) in 1990 or 1991, and the start up of A/F-X (A-6/F-14 replacement) as a replacement for A-X in 1991/2, which then gets cancelled in the Bottom-Up Review in favour of JAST/JSF in the longer term and Super Hornet in the shorter.

 

[DWG]

Aside from the warhead design what was the Swedish design proposal?

I got the sequence slightly wrong, the SAAB/BAE collaboration predates S225X, and what the Swedes brought to the table was Rb 73DL - a winged, ramjet-powered data-linked missile with their active seeker technology originally developed for Rb 71 Skyflash 90.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

I got the sequence slightly wrong, the SAAB/BAE collaboration predates S225X, and what the Swedes brought to the table was Rb 73DL - a winged, ramjet-powered data-linked missile with their active seeker technology originally developed for Rb 71 Skyflash 90.

From this source or another?

Gibson, Chris; Buttler, Tony (2007). British Secret Projects: Hypersonics, Ramjets and Missiles. Midland Publishing. pp. 47–53

 

[DWG]

From this source or another?

Gibson, Chris; Buttler, Tony (2007). British Secret Projects: Hypersonics, Ramjets and Missiles. Midland Publishing. pp. 47–53

I just checked the wiki Meteor article to confirm my memory from the time and things read subsequently was in the right ballpark.

 

[apparition13]

You need to go back to at least 1992 for the relevant set of decisions. Not sure when MRF (F-16 replacement) stood up, but prior to CALF/ASTOVL (Harrier II replacement) in 1992, which was then merged into MRF 1993/4 to create JAST and then JSF. Also part and parcel of this decision chain are the cancellation of A-X (A-6 replacement) in 1990 or 1991, and the start up of A/F-X (A-6/F-14 replacement) as a replacement for A-X in 1991/2, which then gets cancelled in the Bottom-Up Review in favour of JAST/JSF in the longer term and Super Hornet in the shorter.

Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) 1983-1994

www.globalsecurity.org

1983 - ATA Adv Tactical Aircraft
1983 - ASTOVL Advanced STOVL
1987 - SSF STOVL Strike Fighter
1988 - NATF Naval ATF
1990 - MRF Multi-Role Fighter
1992 - A-X / A/F-X
1993 - JAF Joint Attack Fighter
1993 - CALF
1994 - JAST Joint Adv Strike Tech

Which becomes JSF.

ATF requirements were 1984, RFP was 1985.

MRF and A/F-X are both cancelled September 1, 1993.

ASTOVL is essentially a STOVL F-18, SSF adds stealth. JAF/CALF is MRF + SSF, as USAF and USMC figure out that other than STOVL they have the same requirements, which means you can get to the USAF design by building the STOVL and then deleting the VL. The F-16 is slightly smaller than the F-35, so fitting an F-16 replacement to the lifts on Tarawa/Wasp class ships must not have seemed like much of a constraint at the time.

The USAF and Marines (and other partners) would have (and should have) had what they wanted several years ago if not for Lockheed's (mis)management of the program. Which has been an issue all along, as it's one of the reasons for Kelly Johnson setting up Skunk Works 80+ years ago.

The Navy still needs something like A/F-X, since the F-35C (and I'd argue the F-18, in any guise) can't do what it really needs to in order to take full advantage of the carriers.

 

[FighterJock]

My view is that back in the 1990s the US Navy should never have cancled the A/F-X program and that they should have continued with it no matter what, especially to replace the F-14. The Navy would have got the fighter that they were looking for.

 

[LowObservable]

The origin story is complicated. Part of it is that US Navy aviation leadership self-decapitated at a crucial point through the Tailhook scandal. The F-117 record in Desert Storm suggested that 2 x 2k PGMs should be as effective as a much larger mass of unguided bombs. But the overarching issue was: who was the enemy?

 

[edwest4]

The origin story is complicated. Part of it is that US Navy aviation leadership self-decapitated at a crucial point through the Tailhook scandal. The F-117 record in Desert Storm suggested that 2 x 2k PGMs should be as effective as a much larger mass of unguided bombs. But the overarching issue was: who was the enemy?

Can you expand on your "who was the enemy?" comment. If not, that's fine.

 

[aim9xray]

Well, since no one else has (yet), I hereby submit my Book Report for the term.

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck – by Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman’s new overview of the troubled F-35 program is a concise 80-page review of F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter” programmatic events from 1984 to date and his recommendations in ten chapters. Mr. Sweetman has been in the industry as a reporter, author and analyst long enough to personally view many of these events and has had the scope and overview to present a synoptic report.

To expert readers of SPF and industry publications, the facts recounted are both familiar and indisputable. Here, they are damningly collected in one place. One suspects that this thin tome will find space on the reader’s bookshelf between A. Earnest Fitzgerald’s The High Priests of Waste and James Perry Stevenson’s Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding. If so, the reader will have done much to make the conceptual and intellectual jump in understanding from fighter fanboi to industry observer. (Or as Obi-wan said, "taken the first step into a larger world".)

I will not provide a detailed overview here, one can critically read the many hundreds (thousands) of posts here on SPF as well as following their links to source data on the internet.

I should mention that Mr. Sweetman presents prescriptive bureaucratic remedies to Prevent This From Ever Happening Again. 24 hours have not been enough for this writer to game out how these new bureaucratic remedies will interact with the last 60 years of bureaucratic remedies that were to prevent procurement malpractice and to Prevent This From Ever Happening Again.

Random Tidbits
Despite the lack of technical depth to support the synoptic overview (which is not possible in 80 pages), several random interesting points were noted that bear further discussion.

Two/Three-Level Maintenance: Has there been any demonstrable overall cost savings attributable to the revolutionary shift to two-level (Operational and Depot) maintenance? To one example, has the decision to sacrifice engine life to support emergent avionics and systems cooling requirements (thus increasing engine overhauls) negated these notional savings? Is this action tossing a bone to Pratt & Whitney, who struggled mightily to defy congressional intent to have an alternate engine available for the F-35? (One can’t criticize P&W too much; they are approaching Boeing-sized losses on their commercial Geared Turbo Fan program and desperately need the money. Will owner RTX’s Board of Directors emulate the generosity and tolerance of failure that Boeing’s exhibits?)

ALIS Logistics System/Software. Lockheed’s famously misfunctional system received scant mention (it is logistics after all); primarily that it was being replaced by a new system (ODIN) to be created by Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors. However, Mr. Sweetman reports that the Air Force, through its newly created organic software factories had quickly and efficiently rewritten several modules to near to full intended functionality. (this reportedly was accomplished by the Kessel Run activity in less than 14 Parsecs months.) One wonders if Lockheed Martin was incapable, lacked competent SMEs/coders (assigned to OFS code/val/ver) or was unwilling to do so over a period of ten years. Could it be that the profits generated by the creation of ODIN as a replacement and by the small army of contractor personnel “crutching” ALIS in the field would far exceed those by fixing ALIS in the first place?

Electro Hydraulic Actuators (EHA). Sweetman mentions that the F-35 cooling system extends to the EHAs. So, does this mean that we have just replaced the complicated centralized (motive flow) hydraulic system with a complicated centralized (cooling flow) hydraulic system? So, what was the benefit again? In retrospect, couldn’t that increment of cooling capacity have been better applied to the avionics with a different actuation architecture? Was such a trade study ever done?

Subsystem Recompetes. Have these saved any money? Or have these raised cost and complexity by requiring the creation of new supply chains and support activities while the old ones must be continued? (A Swiftian question - has the DOD forced Lockheed Martin to improve their performance by threatening to re-compete the F-35 contract? What's good for the goose...?)

Fourteen F-35 Configurations (and three designations). A thing is conceptually bounded by what you call it. Everybody knows there are just three types of F-35 (just as everybody knows there is no such thing as a vampire). Except that there aren’t; Mr. Sweetman reports that there are at least 14 configurations. To be minimally descriptive, there should have been at least, (and not counting F-35I and the Norwegian versions):

YF-35A/B/C (Block 0/1 flight sciences)
F-35A/B/C (Block “2”/”3”)
F-35D/E/F (Block 4/TR3) (New mission computer, new radar, new vision system)

After all, new avionics generally caused a designation change in the past on other programs (hence the many B-52, A-7, F-100, F-4, F-14, F-15 and A-10 variants to mention a few). However, doing the right thing in today’s environment would have caused reallocation of costs (previous production cost going lower, and future production costs going higher – defeating the perverted block accounting method championed by the excellent financial engineers at Boeing) leading to yet another Nunn-McCurdy breach (which was meant to provide oversight and accountability and Prevent Bad Things from Ever Happening Again).

Other Comments
Trillion Dollar Trainwreck bears some unintentional parallels to its subject. Selling for $35, the 80-page book[let] has an unconscionably high APPUC (Average Page Price/Unit Cost) particularly for a trade paperback-sized design envelope. My copy was printed by Amazon’s MOD (Make-On-Demand) center in Las Vegas NV and was delivered in three days. It reflects this technology’s continuing limitations in reproducing half-tone images.

Other nits included hard to follow footnotes (including some web link aliases appear to be presented instead of the actual link.) Table of Contents and Chapter formatting and layout also seemed a bit weak. An author overview is jammed into the end of the Table of Contents while four pages in the last signature (fold) in the book are blank.

These small issues reflect the disintermediated nature of self-publishing today where the author takes on all the functions that would normally be performed by the professionals employed by a full-service publisher. In other words, the author is diverted from his best purpose (research and content creation) to mundane “O&M” operations tasks. The author has noted that this book[let] was a bit of an experiment; one hopes that lessons learned will be incorporated if the book[let] transitions from Dem/Val to full rate production and the multi-hundreds of pages that the subject demands.

Edit: speeling

 

[quellish]

But the overarching issue was: who was the enemy?

The Air Force.

 

[CJGibson]

Absolutely, a friend's book is due out soon, it went through pitch, acquisition, writing and editing under one title, it will appear under a completely different one because when marketing got a look at it they decided they didn't like the title.

Been there. I had to rename my recent works to Google/Amazon search-friendly, and therefore very Ronseal, titles. I have to admit to taking the piss with the last one knowing it would be changed to something boringly Ronsealian

Which set me wondering. If you could name a book 'Not a book about TSR.2, Vulcan or Spitfire but Airborne Early Warning' would it appear at the top of the hit list?

Chris

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I read a prerelease copy of the book.

Its not a history of the F-35. Its a book about how the F-35 was procured, and the knock-on effects to funding other programs, particularly for the US Air Force. Sweetman's argument is that F-35 procurement ate up too much of the budget and stopped other really important programs from proceeding. Hence the subtitle.

Sweetman restricts himself largely to the way the program was run, as opposed to the merits of the actual airplane, and identifies most of the less optimal decisions made by the program very well. Most of Bill Sweetman's arguments are difficult to refute. You might argue that hindsight is a wonderful thing, but I think most of the questionable decisions were questioned by Sweetman and others at the time, and were proved out to be correct.

His proposed remedies to the way future programs should be run seem sensible, but as aim9xray said, every procurement disaster results in a "never again" attitude but somehow, things usually don't get better.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Been there. I had to rename my recent works to Google/Amazon search-friendly, and therefore very Ronseal, titles. I have to admit to taking the piss with the last one knowing it would be changed to something boringly Ronsealian

Which set me wondering. If you could name a book 'Not a book about TSR.2, Vulcan or Spitfire but Airborne Early Warning' would it appear at the top of the hit list?

Chris

"Spitfire to TSR.2 and Vulcan: 60 years of Airborne Early Warning and the planes that could have benefited from it"

 

[timmymagic]

While I’m not a f-35 fan I’m immune to Gripenitis.

Meteor AAM: “UK 39.6% and Germany 16%. France is funding 12.4%, Italy 12%, and Sweden and Spain 10% each”
Full partner?

Think Defence's article on Meteor is the definitive resource out there. The UK's 40% share of the missile doesn't really tell the full story...it was a UK requirement, UK competition and UK backing and pushing it that got it over the line. The rest are really just along for the ride....and you could argue given French and Italian opposition to JNAAM are now holding it back...

The only reason Gripen got it first was because it was the only aircraft free to run testing at the time, the Typhoon test fleet was busy on other things...not really Saab's doing....and you could make a good argument that Gripen C can not use Meteor anywhere close to its potential..

 

[LowObservable]

The Air Force.

The answer: there wasn't one. The Soviets were out for the count. China was bootlegging 1950s MiGs. Iraq, the model of a major regional power, had been squashed like a bug in GW1. Indeed, as Mike Loh suggested, Super F-16 and Super F-15 would have answered any reasonably projected need quite well for the USAF. Which may explain (had not thought of this before) why JAST/JSF was driven to promise a major reduction in operating cost.

 

[LowObservable]

Well, since no one else has (yet), I hereby submit my Book Report for the term.

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck – by Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman’s new overview of the troubled F-35 program is a concise 80-page review of F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter” programmatic events from 1984 to date and his recommendations in ten chapters. Mr. Sweetman has been in the industry as a reporter, author and analyst long enough to personally view many of these events and has had the scope and overview to present a synoptic report.

To expert readers of SPF and industry publications, the facts recounted are both familiar and indisputable. Here, they are damningly collected in one place. One suspects that this thin tome will find space on the reader’s bookshelf between A. Earnest Fitzgerald’s The High Priests of Waste and James Perry Stevenson’s Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding. If so, the reader will have done much to make the conceptual and intellectual jump in understanding from fighter fanboi to industry observer. (Or as Obi-wan said, "taken the first step into a larger world".)

I will not provide a detailed overview here, one can critically read the many hundreds (thousands) of posts here on SPF as well as following their links to source data on the internet.

I should mention that Mr. Sweetman presents prescriptive bureaucratic remedies to Prevent This From Ever Happening Again. 24 hours have not been enough for this writer to game out how these new bureaucratic remedies will interact with the last 60 years of bureaucratic remedies that were to prevent procurement malpractice and to Prevent This From Ever Happening Again.

Random Tidbits
Despite the lack of technical depth to support the synoptic overview (which is not possible in 80 pages), several random interesting points were noted that bear further discussion.

Two/Three-Level Maintenance: Has there been any demonstrable overall cost savings attributable to the revolutionary shift to two-level (Operational and Depot) maintenance? To one example, has the decision to sacrifice engine life to support emergent avionics and systems cooling requirements (thus increasing engine overhauls) negated these notional savings? Is this action tossing a bone to Pratt & Whitney, who struggled mightily to defy congressional intent to have an alternate engine available for the F-35? (One can’t criticize P&W too much; they are approaching Boeing-sized losses on their commercial Geared Turbo Fan program and desperately need the money. Will owner RTX’s Board of Directors emulate the generosity and tolerance of failure that Boeing’s exhibits?)

ALIS Logistics System/Software. Lockheed’s famously misfunctional system received scant mention (it is logistics after all); primarily that it was being replaced by a new system (ODIN) to be created by Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors. However, Mr. Sweetman reports that the Air Force, through its newly created organic software factories had quickly and efficiently rewritten several modules to near to full intended functionality. (this reportedly was accomplished by the Kessel Run activity in less than 14 Parsecs months.) One wonders if Lockheed Martin was incapable, lacked competent SMEs/coders (assigned to OFS code/val/ver) or was unwilling to do so over a period of ten years. Could it be that the profits generated by the creation of ODIN as a replacement and by the small army of contractor personnel “crutching” ALIS in the field would far exceed those by fixing ALIS in the first place?

Electro Hydraulic Actuators (EHA). Sweetman mentions that the F-35 cooling system extends to the EHAs. So, does this mean that we have just replaced the complicated centralized (motive flow) hydraulic system with a complicated centralized (cooling flow) hydraulic system? So, what was the benefit again? In retrospect, couldn’t that increment of cooling capacity have been better applied to the avionics with a different actuation architecture? Was such a trade study ever done?

Subsystem Recompetes. Have these saved any money? Or have these raised cost and complexity by requiring the creation of new supply chains and support activities while the old ones must be continued? (A Swiftian question - has the DOD forced Lockheed Martin to improve their performance by threatening to re-compete the F-35 contract? What's good for the goose...?)

Fourteen F-35 Configurations (and three designations). A thing is conceptually bounded by what you call it. Everybody knows there are just three types of F-35 (just as everybody knows there is no such thing as a vampire). Except that there aren’t; Mr. Sweetman reports that there are at least 14 configurations. To be minimally descriptive, there should have been at least, (and not counting F-35I and the Norwegian versions):

YF-35A/B/C (Block 0/1 flight sciences)
F-35A/B/C (Block “2”/”3”)
F-35D/E/F (Block 4/TR3) (New mission computer, new radar, new vision system)

After all, new avionics generally caused a designation change in the past on other programs (hence the many B-52, A-7, F-100, F-4, F-14, F-15 and A-10 variants to mention a few). However, doing the right thing in today’s environment would have caused reallocation of costs (previous production cost going lower, and future production costs going higher – defeating the perverted block accounting method championed by the excellent financial engineers at Boeing) leading to yet another Nunn-McCurdy breach (which was meant to provide oversight and accountability and Prevent Bad Things from Even Happening Again).

Other Comments
Trillion Dollar Trainwreck bears some unintentional parallels to its subject. Selling for $35, the 80-page book[let] has an unconscionably high APPUC (Average Page Price/Unit Cost) particularly for a trade paperback-sized design envelope. My copy was printed by Amazon’s MOD (Make-On-Demand) center in Las Vegas NV and was delivered in three days. It reflects this technology’s continuing limitations in reproducing half-tone images.

Other nits included hard to follow footnotes (including some web link aliases appear to be presented instead of the actual link.) Table of Contents and Chapter formatting and layout also seemed a bit weak. An author overview is jammed into the end of the Table of Contents while four pages in the last signature (fold) in the book are blank.

These small issues reflect the disintermediated nature of self-publishing today where the author takes on all the functions that would normally be performed by the professionals employed by a full-service publisher. In other words, the author is diverted from his best purpose (research and content creation) to mundane “O&M” operations tasks. The author has noted that this book[let] was a bit of an experiment; one hopes that lessons learned will be incorporated if the book[let] transitions from Dem/Val to full rate production and the multi-hundreds of pages that the subject demands.

Edit: speeling

Thanks!

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Other Comments

Oof. That’s a lot of $bang for not even full sized pages. Yes, I understand if we bite the bullet now, Bill will then use the proceeds for fuller stories. Is that a promise?

Does it get into how the f-35 became a one size fits all?

 

[sferrin]

The Air Force.

Why the USAF? I would have thought it the USMC. Without the STOVL model the aircraft would have been much less contrained in proportion (and never mind the cost of STOVL being shoe-horned in).

 

[DWG]

The only reason Gripen got it first was because it was the only aircraft free to run testing at the time, the Typhoon test fleet was busy on other things...

When the Typhoon test fleet isn't able to support testing of its primary AAM, you really have to worry about the under-investment in the test fleet. IMO it's extremely likely Typhoon has lost multiple sales because the partner nations just didn't fund the overall development programme (ie weapons integration in general, not just Meteor) at the appropriate level.

 

[timmymagic]

When the Typhoon test fleet isn't able to support testing of its primary AAM, you really have to worry about the under-investment in the test fleet. IMO it's extremely likely Typhoon has lost multiple sales because the partner nations just didn't fund the overall development programme (ie weapons integration in general, not just Meteor) at the appropriate level.

It was for the missiles tests. Meant Saab got a headstart on integration. But in practice meant little. Gripen got Meteor in 2016, Typhoon in 2018. There was a lot of other weapon integration work on for Typhoon at the time inclucing Brimstone and Storm Shadow...not so much for Gripen.
We're not talking F-35 delays here though...

 

[sublight_]

Well, since no one else has (yet), I hereby submit my Book Report for the term.

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck – by Bill Sweetman

Don't forget to mention that cover, its beautiful!!!!!

 

[edwest4]

Been there. I had to rename my recent works to Google/Amazon search-friendly, and therefore very Ronseal, titles. I have to admit to taking the piss with the last one knowing it would be changed to something boringly Ronsealian

Which set me wondering. If you could name a book 'Not a book about TSR.2, Vulcan or Spitfire but Airborne Early Warning' would it appear at the top of the hit list?

Chris

If I may: No. It would be sacked, the author would be sacked, and so on...

:0

 

[apparition13]

Why the USAF? I would have thought it the USMC. Without the STOVL model the aircraft would have been much less contrained in proportion (and never mind the cost of STOVL being shoe-horned in).

JSF evolved out of STOVL, not the other way around. First comes STOVL, then stealthy STOVL, then MRF, then CALF/JAST merging the two efforts since the airborne performance requirements are so similar. It's the navy version that gets shoehorned into the program with the cancellation of A/F-X. It's not as bad as the F-111 trying to merge a high altitude subsonic loitering missile shooter with a low level supersonic bomb dropper, but you're never going to get the "low" (F-35) end of a high/low mix to be able to do the extremes of the high (F-22, NATF, A-12, A/F-X) end aircraft.

And USAF because the Navy and Marines have a mutually beneficial relationship. But not the USAF, since the A/F-X decision was based on the strategic situation of the time, not a concern with what the world could be like 20-30 years later. Typical short-sighted "the world of the future will be just like today", nevermind that today (in 1993, when A/F-X is cancelled) is radically different from a few dozen months ago. It's the same reason Sweden and Germany and the rest of Europe find themselves in the situation they do now - believing the strategic situation of the early to mid-90s would continue indefinitely, which led them to hollow out their militaries.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

My view is that back in the 1990s the US Navy should never have cancled the A/F-X program and that they should have continued with it no matter what, especially to replace the F-14. The Navy would have got the fighter that they were looking for.

My concern is that I'm not even sure that the Navy knew what they wanted out of A/F-X. From what we know of what was on offer there were some pretty vast differences among the designs. It was also first and foremost designed to be an attack aircraft. The Lockheed/Boeing AFX-635 seems like it would have had the most speed/agility out of the known A/F-X designs, some of which may have been purely subsonic like the A-12. Yet even that design wasn't the same as NATF. I don't think it would be any better than the F-35 or F/A-18 in regard to raw ''fighter' (air-to-air) performance characteristics. That level of performance isn't really bad but I'm still of the opinion that for the role of a 'fleet defender' you want a bit more. Ideally something that can genuinely supercruise or when in full afterburner hit Mach 2+ for an interception mission.

Even now 30 years later I don't think the Navy knows what they want from F/A-XX judging from some comments and funding-related decisions.

So, at the time I can see why it might have made sense to many people to just tell the Navy "You're getting a JSF variant, deal with it" after the disaster of the A-12 program and the recent cancellation of NATF. To make JSF compatible with CATOBAR operation Lockheed had to switch from the layout used by their current CALF design to a more-conventional wing and tail configuration. Normally that wouldn't be an issue, but to my understanding because the overall length of the JSF was limited by the dimensions of an LHA/LHD elevator there was some negative performance impact with that change. Carrier consideration also meant that at a later date Boeing also switched their JSF design to a more conventional layout. Although in their case I'm not sure what effects that change would have besides for improved low speed handling.

I know at some point the idea of a plug to extend the fuselage of the CTOL and CV variants was considered by Lockheed but rejected. I wonder how well that would have worked out.

 

[CJGibson]

If I may: No. It would be sacked, the author would be sacked, and so on...

:0

As if I would sack myself!

Chris

 

[edwest4]

As if I would sack myself!

Chris

Just kidding...

 

[F119Doctor]

Aim9xray said:

“Two/Three-Level Maintenance: Has there been any demonstrable overall cost savings attributable to the revolutionary shift to two-level (Operational and Depot) maintenance? To one example, has the decision to sacrifice engine life to support emergent avionics and systems cooling requirements (thus increasing engine overhauls) negated these notional savings? Is this action tossing a bone to Pratt & Whitney, who struggled mightily to defy congressional intent to have an alternate engine available for the F-35?”

I don’t know if this was Bill Sweetman talking or the reviewer (haven’t read the book), but I don’t believe that P&W was behind 2 level maintenance for the F135. The USAF tried it with the F100 in the early 1990s (where it failed miserably), and the Navy has always wanted to get heavy maintenance off the carrier. I believe that 2 level maintenance was a JSF program requirement right from the beginning.

But the criticism is valid. The reduced turbine life due to the beyond specification bleed air extraction and operation in the Saudi unique high calcium low melting point sand environment drives the F135 power module back to depot (OCALC) for turbine blade replacement, not an overhaul. But the nature of 2 level power module maintenance at depot drives a work load and timeline well beyond the scope of the actual maintenance. If this was an F119 with Full Intermediate Maintenance and test cell for a run-in and functional test, this maintenance would take less that 2 weeks before the engine was returned to service, vs many months before the 2 level power module is returned to base level.

In addition, in the F-35, the F135 engine is treated as an LRU, with impacts measured at the aircraft level. It is OK if no more than 5% of the F-35 fleet is down for engines. In legacy engine programs, the engine fleet health was measured against serviceable spare engine availability, with the expectation that there would be zero engine holes and a minimum level of War Readiness Engines (WRE) maintained at Intermediate level. Combined with the low level of spare engines procured for the program, I am impressed that F-35 NMC-Supply for engines has been reduced to below 2%

P&W does have a F135 support contract to provide spare parts and manage the engine maintenance at OCALC. But the USAF provides all touch labor and back shop repair and inspection at depot, so P&W is not getting rich off the 2 level maintenance concept, which would have been the same whether the F136 was fielded (with twice the depot impact) or not.

 

[edwest4]

I read a prerelease copy of the book.

Its not a history of the F-35. Its a book about how the F-35 was procured, and the knock-on effects to funding other programs, particularly for the US Air Force. Sweetman's argument is that F-35 procurement ate up too much of the budget and stopped other really important programs from proceeding. Hence the subtitle.

Sweetman restricts himself largely to the way the program was run, as opposed to the merits of the actual airplane, and identifies most of the less optimal decisions made by the program very well. Most of Bill Sweetman's arguments are difficult to refute. You might argue that hindsight is a wonderful thing, but I think most of the questionable decisions were questioned by Sweetman and others at the time, and were proved out to be correct.

His proposed remedies to the way future programs should be run seem sensible, but as aim9xray said, every procurement disaster results in a "never again" attitude but somehow, things usually don't get better.

I think all of this revolves around investors. For example, Raytheon and United Technologies merges. What happens to middle management? In a lot of mergers, somebody is let go. Then what? Do they feel bitter? Can they find other work? How does that affect the remaining employees? What about company loyalty? If I feel like a replaceable part, and always wondering when the other shoe will drop, how does that affect my performance? Sure, I'll do my best but can I really plan for a future there? As the workers get older and a younger group comes in, how are they treated? Are they paid less? Recently, so-called "activist investors" have appeared. They think they can get on company boards and wring out more profits - referred to by the purposely vague term: "return greater shareholder value." Meaning more money.

During closed door sessions with certain government committees, projections are required. What will Russia or China be doing 5 or 10 years from now? How much are they spending on defense right now? What do the current trends indicate about the future? Of course, various caveats are added, like "if they get into a war somewhere," followed by likely scenarios. This may be 'rocket science' but it's been done before.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

"the world of the future will be just like today"

Similar to how GPS guidance will solve all guidance problems.

 

[MrTopaz]

which would have been the same whether the F136 was fielded (with twice the depot impact) or not.

Apologies for the dumb question, but is that twice the depot impact because in that scenario both the F135 and F136 are being fielded (literally twice the engine models, therefore twice the impact), or was the F136 somehow substantially more troublesome than the F135?

 

[F119Doctor]

Both would have been 2 level maintenance with their modules sent to depot for repair or overhaul. Depot would have had to set up two maintenance facilities with different tooling, different inspection and repair requirements, and different trained trained personnel for each engine - twice the impact.

There may have been some savings because of lower volume for each engine model, but you would also lose any economies of scale.

 

[F119Doctor]

Apologies for the dumb question, but is that twice the depot impact because in that scenario both the F135 and F136 are being fielded (literally twice the engine models, therefore twice the impact), or was the F136 somehow substantially more troublesome than the F135?

You could argue that the F136 would have been more durable in field usage, requiring fewer depot repair visits for the power module, but this is complete speculation since the engines were developed to the same requirements. You never know for sure until development is complete ( the F136 never made that milestone) and you have real life operational experience to validate the engine performance, reliability, and durability.

 

[aim9xray]

Aim9xray said:

“Two/Three-Level Maintenance: Has there been any demonstrable overall cost savings attributable to the revolutionary shift to two-level (Operational and Depot) maintenance? To one example, has the decision to sacrifice engine life to support emergent avionics and systems cooling requirements (thus increasing engine overhauls) negated these notional savings? Is this action tossing a bone to Pratt & Whitney, who struggled mightily to defy congressional intent to have an alternate engine available for the F-35?”

I don’t know if this was Bill Sweetman talking or the reviewer (haven’t read the book), but I don’t believe that P&W was behind 2 level maintenance for the F135.

It was the reviewer speaking and I take responsibility for those words. These were nuggets in the text leading to points of departure that I found interesting.

You are correct - IIRC, two-level was one of those concepts baked into the program conops long before the JSF downselect along with "autonomic logistics" based on Prognostics and Health Monitoring (PHM) that were supposed to wring substantial program cost savings.

But no plan survives first contact with the enemy - in this case, reality.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

There was initially some debate as to whether an all-stealth fighter fleet was even desirable. Something like the delta wing F-16U with F119 could have been a low-cost conventional option.

The all-stealth fleet was a consequence of the way the JSF program was sold. The pitch was if one built enough of them, at very high rates, the unit cost would decrease to acceptable levels no matter how complex it was. This required all possible alternatives to be squashed. The Air Force did. The Navy didn't play ball and kept building F-18Es.

 

[Archibald]

Just like the Space Shuttle. To make some hypothetical savings it had to prevail over every legacy expendable rockets.

 

[Hood]

It's the same reason Sweden and Germany and the rest of Europe find themselves in the situation they do now - believing the strategic situation of the early to mid-90s would continue indefinitely, which led them to hollow out their militaries.

To be fair the Cold War mindset from 1946 was pretty static and while there were evolutions in strategic thought and planning during 1946-90, that stability probably lulled politicians and military staffs into a false sense of security.
But saying that, the fact that things destabilised rapidly from 1990 in the Gulf and Balkans should have been a wake up call - but then the pattern of military deployments has been relatively low key, emphasis on "surgical" strikes with minimal assets, special forces, air mobility, and deployments as parts of multinational coalitions. Nobody within NATO ever really considered that they might have to fight "mano a mano" with a peer but could get away with contributing a squadron of fighters, a few battalions and maybe a couple of frigates. Plus the quality over quantity argument reduces buys.

Both of these feed into F-35, everyone is buying them because it buys in to US-led coalitions (you scratch my back - I base my F-35Bs on your carrier) so the Czechs can send a couple of F-35s to Farawaystan alongside other NATO F-35s - looks impressive on the flight line but costs less than send a dozen Gripens plus full ground crew and support with a few Herks in support.
F-35 is sold as the cutting-edge all-singing all-dancing warplane of this era, so of course everyone wants it and can argue that they don't need one-for-one F-16 replacements. It comes billed as survivable - so less chance of embarrassing shoot downs and captured pilots - and advanced for strike - less chance of embarrassing collateral damage.

The pitch was if one built enough of them, at very high rates, the unit cost would decrease to acceptable levels no matter how complex it was.

Was there actually any sound economic evidence of this ever being achieved in any previous aircraft production programme? Unit costs tend to generally fall of course, but to say that it could be done at the bleeding edge seems highly ambitious - especially when the US track record of super-advanced buys (SR-71/F-12, B-2 etc.) would seem to indicate the opposite happened with smaller than forecast buys due to the cost.

 

[sferrin]

Was there actually any sound economic evidence of this ever being achieved in any previous aircraft production programme? Unit costs tend to generally fall of course, but to say that it could be done at the bleeding edge seems highly ambitious - especially when the US track record of super-advanced buys (SR-71/F-12, B-2 etc.) would seem to indicate the opposite happened with smaller than forecast buys due to the cost.

F-4 Phantom.

 

[GTX]

P&W does have a F135 support contract to provide spare parts and manage the engine maintenance at OCALC. But the USAF provides all touch labor and back shop repair and inspection at depot,

At OC-ALC only.

 

[aim9xray]

Has there not been a very longstanding high-level 50-50 workshare split between USG depot and contractor, mandated by the congress critters with those contractors in their districts? I think this goes back to before WWII.

(I suspect that if there is anything less interesting to the aviation fan on this forum than logistics, it must be industrial policy. But this largely intangible concept is much like the Force: "The Force is what gives a Jedi his power. It's an energy field created by all living things. It surrounds us and penetrates us. It binds the galaxy together.")