Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 Hollowed out the US Air Force by Bill Sweetman

[Jackonicko]

By your account, no one can write anything about aircraft programs. By your account, all books written about aircraft are by amateurs. I suggest not condemning an author before his book is released. Bill Sweetman contributed to Jane's, which is not an amateur operation.

The West is suffering under a biased media. All outlets just repeat all outlets. Actual 'investigative journalism' is fading. Perhaps it's considered too expensive in the eyes of the owners of media companies.

Bill is an investigative reporter, an analyst, a product of Flight's golden era (when it was all about understanding the technical, engineering and operational), with a long association with all of the most credible aerospace media outlets. One thing he isn't is an amateur. He is too modest for his own good, however, so let me observe that Northrop-Grumman don't head hunt journalists for serious (non media) jobs, and yet...

 

[Jackonicko]

I have enjoyed Bill Gunston's books. He flew de Haviland Vampires before retiring. Does that count?

Probably not. Bill's RAF experience may have been exaggerated. His innate and incisive technical grasp and formidable ability as an educator and story teller are probably the best explanation for his success.
And, as someone who counted him as a good friend, I'd say that the fact that he (like Bill) is a thoroughly nice bloke, also helped.

 

[Jackonicko]

It’s a self published book clearly slating a project the author has had a hive of bees in his bonnet about for decades. An author with a track record of zero experience in any actual military or project. An author with zero responsibility for ever deciding or delivering anything.

As I said, the book is an ego trip of self indulgence.

You really should make sure you are properly informed before slinging mud. In the rest of this post, you demonstrate considerable ignorance, but it's the ill-informed baseless malice and spite above that really exercises me today.

 

[Jackonicko]

Tom Burbage's book is awful. Reads like his PA wrote it. Not sure I trust your judgement;

There's probably a reason for that...

 

[Jackonicko]

Oh please. Give it a rest, will you? Are you here just to rag on Bill Sweetman or are you going to be a good expert and actually read the book? Fair means fair.

Or merely have the stones to unmask, say who you are, outline your own experience, and allow the rest of us to judge whether your credibility matches your unpleasantness?

 

[Jackonicko]

It must be hard not to have expertise, but I wouldn’t know.

You're being modest, you clearly know only too well.

 

[Jackonicko]

You get everything like that from a conventional publisher. I approved a book layout a few days ago and was asked for input about a book cover design yesterday. If people don't like an offer from a "conventional" publisher then they can publish a book themselves just like they could 40 years ago.

I think people forget that the reputation of a conventional publisher matters. If I see a new book from a publisher that I know produces quality then I will consider that book before I consider a book produced by someone I've not heard of or a self-published book.

I have written more than 30 books. But it's my living, so it has to make some kind of sense. Writing aviation books for conventional aviation publishers no longer does, so I haven't written one for years.

I strongly suspect that Bill's name has more recognition among his potential readers than any likely publisher.

 

[Jackonicko]

Is there something, anything, in that report that is going to refute what I said? No?

You said: "The best fighter in production on the planet." I'll astonish you by agreeing, overall.

The report won't contradict that statement. But it will show that it is a very incomplete view. Because what is now the best fighter out there has been a disastrous programme. Support, sustainment, and availability have been terrible. It has been afflicted by delays and failures, and the latest upgrade has been a complete clusterfuck.

And yet, if you wanted to go and put two small PGMs through somebody's roof and then return to base undetected and unmolested, you'd want to do it in an F-35A. If you wanted to quarterback a force of 4th Gen fighters then your SA would be invaluable.

Today and tomorrow, at least.

But next week? In a dynamically changing threat environment, in an increasingly contested environment, and perhaps having to carry those weapons much further? Those who know say that the F-35A will be inadequate, and that's why NGAD, SCAF and GCAP are being pursued with such urgency.

 

[DWG]

@DWG Enlightening. I will have to let sink in which role this kind of compartmentalisation in development might have played in the developing the troubled flight control system of the 737 MAX.

If it has any, I think it would be more on the side of the expertise in redundancy being on our side of the fence. I just found the whole lack of redundancy in MCAS mind-boggling, ditto the attempt to argue the pilot contributed a level of redundancy. Equally I would have expected the engineers at Rockwell Collins charged with implementing the software for the design to ring alarm bells when they saw it.

 

[Jackonicko]

NATF was a bloated monster.
What's worse than an eye-watering expensive F-22 ? a naval, eye watering expensive F-22.
What's worse than a naval, eye watering expensive F-22 ?
- a VG-wing, naval, eye-watering expensive F-22.

Best thing the USN could have afforded would have been a KF-21 Boramae lookalike. I will die on that hill. Mini naval F-22 shape; for the F-35C role; with the Superbug engines.

Right.
But a bit bigger so you could have proper internal bays, right?
And with proper LO coatings?
And with a carrier capable landing gear?
And maybe slightly more wing for the approach case, and because you've added to the weight.
You now have a jet with less thrust to weight than a Gripen. With no commonality with F-35A and F-35B. Operating from a vulnerable target which can't get you close enough to penetrate the enemy's A2/AD envelope.
Smart move.

 

[Jackonicko]

Its Sensors... only the very newest fighters still in RnD are better and they lose that once Lockmart gets the newest block working.

There we really disagree.

 

[quellish]

And yet, if you wanted to go and put two small PGMs through somebody's roof and then return to base undetected and unmolested, you'd want to do it in an F-35A.

Well no, I’d want one of the Boeing UCAVs (X-45B/C, X-46).

Better LO by far, no pilot to risk, no need for deep CSAR, limited basing and tanking needs, lower cost to operate

But those were killed to protect the F-35, so….

 

[Jackonicko]

Well no, I’d want one of the Boeing UCAVs (X-45B/C, X-46).

Better LO by far, no pilot to risk, no need for deep CSAR, limited basing and tanking needs, lower cost to operate

But those were killed to protect the F-35, so….

Good points, but I meant of the asets available today. I'm not sure that X-45 or X-46 would have had the degree of autonomy, or capability required, just yet, even had they gone ahead. But you make a compelling case, thank you!

This is exactly why the US needs CCAs, and, asap, NGAD and F/A-XX

 

[Jackonicko]

The

If it has any, I think it would be more on the side of the expertise in redundancy being on our side of the fence. I just found the whole lack of redundancy in MCAS mind-boggling, ditto the attempt to argue the pilot contributed a level of redundancy. Equally I would have expected the engineers at Rockwell Collins charged with implementing the software for the design to ring alarm bells when they saw it.

The issue with 737MAX is surely more fundamental? If you set your mind against full FBW, don't then design an aircraft so aerodynamically challenged that it needs it. As soon as you look at a Max, the engine location looks slightly 'off'. I dread the day I have to fly on one.

 

[Archibald]

Smart move.

Still better than Superbug, which was my point. Trying to get the best of F-22 (the overall shape) the Superbug (twin powerplant) and F-35C (the present Navy stealth fighter, compromised by F-35B VSTOL requirements: Harrier successor).

NATF was to be a) twin engine, b) naval, c) stealth. Exploring a combination of the three in a reasonable package.

 

[Jackonicko]

Still better than Superbug, which was my point. Trying to get the best of F-22 (the overall shape) the Superbug (twin powerplant) and F-35C (the present Navy stealth fighter, compromised by F-35B VSTOL requirements: Harrier successor).

NATF was to be a) twin engine, b) naval, c) stealth. Exploring a combination of the three in a reasonable package.

Surely the main reason NATF failed was that there wasn't the budget for any more than a variant of F-35? That an entirely new naval fighter (flowing from a new and separate develpment programme) was unaffordable?

But since we're dealing with 'What ifs' and imaginary aircraft, how about a stretched F-35C with bigger bays, bigger intakes, and twin F-135 engines?

 

[DWG]

The issue with 737MAX is surely more fundamental? If you set your mind against full FBW, don't then design an aircraft so aerodynamically challenged that it needs it. As soon as you look at a Max, the engine location looks slightly 'off'. I dread the day I have to fly on one.

AIUI, the Max flies fine without MCAS, it just doesn't fly enough like a 737-NG for the regulators to ignore the differences.

Personally I'd go for a slightly redirected don't certificate an aircraft without full redundancy in its air data sensors and flight controls - which would also snare the 737-NG, Turkish Air Flight 1951 was lost because the active radar altimeter, which had failed, and obviously failed, wasn't being compared with the alternate which hadn't, even though the system was capable of that comparison.

Or an even more fundamental just don't grandfather aircraft that don't meet current certification standards.

 

[sferrin]

You said: "The best fighter in production on the planet." I'll astonish you by agreeing, overall.

The report won't contradict that statement. But it will show that it is a very incomplete view. Because what is now the best fighter out there has been a disastrous programme. Support, sustainment, and availability have been terrible. It has been afflicted by delays and failures, and the latest upgrade has been a complete clusterfuck.

What makes you think it would be any different if it were three different programs? In fact, I'd wager it would probably be worse. STOVL would have been cancelled by now. And you'd STILL have people trying to merge the USAF and USN requirements together.

Today and tomorrow, at least.

That's what we're buying them for.

But next week? In a dynamically changing threat environment, in an increasingly contested environment, and perhaps having to carry those weapons much further? Those who know say that the F-35A will be inadequate, and that's why NGAD, SCAF and GCAP are being pursued with such urgency.

By that measure we should never start another program. NGAD and F/A-XX should be cancelled immediately because "next week" they won't be up to snuff.

 

[sferrin]

Well no, I’d want one of the Boeing UCAVs (X-45B/C, X-46).

Better LO by far, no pilot to risk, no need for deep CSAR, limited basing and tanking needs, lower cost to operate

But those were killed to protect the F-35, so….

When the choice is a manned multirole fighter or an unmanned, single-mission, low payload, aircraft the choice is clear. if there was any chance they could have got both don't you think they would have?

 

[Jackonicko]

What makes you think it would be any different if it were three different programs? In fact, I'd wager it would probably be worse. STOVL would have been cancelled by now. And you'd STILL have people trying to merge the USAF and USN requirements together.



That's what we're buying them for.



By that measure we should never start another program. NGAD and F/A-XX should be cancelled immediately because "next week" they won't be up to snuff.

To be clear: By today and tomorrow I mean the immediate future - out to ten years away max. By next week, I mean from 2034 out. F-35 has a shockingly narrow window of real relevance, and one that may be further shortened depending on how truncated the 'reimagined' Block 4 really is.

 

[Jackonicko]

What makes you think it would be any different if it were three different programs? In fact, I'd wager it would probably be worse. STOVL would have been cancelled by now. And you'd STILL have people trying to merge the USAF and USN requirements together.



That's what we're buying them for.



By that measure we should never start another program. NGAD and F/A-XX should be cancelled immediately because "next week" they won't be up to snuff.

Moreover, the advances offered by NGAD/GCAP/SCAF et al are underpinned by open architectures, flexibility and upgradeability that were NEVER part of the closed and vendor-locked F-35.

 

[LowObservable]

More here:

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman believes something is very wrong with the F-35. The F-35 used to have a largely negative public perception, but this seems to have changed with a media offensive in the 2010s, with ma…

hushkit.net

 

[Bruno Anthony]

More here:

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman believes something is very wrong with the F-35. The F-35 used to have a largely negative public perception, but this seems to have changed with a media offensive in the 2010s, with ma…

hushkit.net

“Gripen E is very close and less costly to operate (so I can field more of them), and may be better in some ways if that Mongo EW system does what it says on the tin.”

How many of these have been built to the same “fully combat capable” standard that f-35 is held to?

I’m not a fan of the f-35 program but I don’t understand the fascination with the Battle of Stockholm plane/AF?

 

[HoHun]

Hi,

AIUI, the Max flies fine without MCAS, it just doesn't fly enough like a 737-NG for the regulators to ignore the differences.

That appears to be the Boeing line of defense, which relies on downplaying the importance of MCAS, but from what I've read, the aerodynamics of the nacelles are actually capable of inducing an abnormal pitch-up at high angles of attack, which is not acceptable in absolute terms, according to CFR 25.203:

No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls.

14 CFR § 25.203 - Stall characteristics.

www.law.cornell.edu

If I understood it correctly, pilot remedial action on entering a stall without MCAS would have to be a instantaneous and radical stick forward movement. Or looking at it in another way, without MCAS, once a certain angle-of-attack is exceeded, the aircraft in the absence of pilot input may pitch up uncommandedly, suddenly, and with the pitch-up tendency increasing with pitch angle.

I guess without MCAS, the aircraft also would not show "acceptable indications of a stall" as per CFR 25.201 Stall Demonstration. (Acceptable would be nose-down of the aicraft, severe buffeting, or no further pitch-up possible with the pitch control fully back.)

However, I'm not an expert in any of this, I've just been following the news, keeping an eye out for the occasional technical bits.

I wholeheartedly agree with everything you wrote, though

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[sferrin]

“Gripen E is very close and less costly to operate (so I can field more of them), and may be better in some ways if that Mongo EW system does what it says on the tin.”

How many of these have been built to the same “fully combat capable” standard that f-35 is held to?

I’m not a fan of the f-35 program but I don’t understand the fascination with the Battle of Stockholm plane/AF?

The mythical "6th Gen" Gripen. How many of those have they sold?

 

[F119Doctor]

Hi,



That appears to be the Boeing line of defense, which relies on downplaying the importance of MCAS, but from what I've read, the aerodynamics of the nacelles are actually capable of inducing an abnormal pitch-up at high angles of attack, which is not acceptable in absolute terms, according to CFR 25.203:

14 CFR § 25.203 - Stall characteristics.

www.law.cornell.edu

If I understood it correctly, pilot remedial action on entering a stall without MCAS would have to be a instantaneous and radical stick forward movement. Or looking at it in another way, without MCAS, once a certain angle-of-attack is exceeded, the aircraft in the absence of pilot input may pitch up uncommandedly, suddenly, and with the pitch-up tendency increasing with pitch angle.

I guess without MCAS, the aircraft also would not show "acceptable indications of a stall" as per CFR 25.201 Stall Demonstration. (Acceptable would be nose-down of the aicraft, severe buffeting, or no further pitch-up possible with the pitch control fully back.)

However, I'm not an expert in any of this, I've just been following the news, keeping an eye out for the occasional technical bits.

I wholeheartedly agree with everything you wrote, though

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

When I read that MCAS had that level of control authority with just a single AOA sensor input, I was astonished. It should have had both AOA sensors as inputs, along with a weight / airspeed / load factor AOA calculation as a referee when the AOA sensors disagreed to determine which sensor was bad. All of the necessary hardware was already there, just the decision to implement a fail operational MCAS wasn’t made.

 

[quellish]

if there was any chance they could have got both don't you think they would have?

No. They could easily have done both at the time.

And as another example, they could have kept the F-117 for much longer but it too was a threat to the F-35

 

[sferrin]

No. They could easily have done both at the time.

And as another example, they could have kept the F-117 for much longer but it too was a threat to the F-35

Maybe they weren't convinced. Would be way too easy for politician X to say, "it would be cheaper to cut the numbers in half and use the money "saved" to buy X-46/7s...in my district". Then the cost of individual F-35s go up (because you're buying fewer) and politician Y comes along complaining about "F-35 costs are spiraling out of control. We need to cut back." Safer to not even go near that scenario, sadly.

 

[LowObservable]

When I read that MCAS had that level of control authority with just a single AOA sensor input, I was astonished. It should have had both AOA sensors as inputs, along with a weight / airspeed / load factor AOA calculation as a referee when the AOA sensors disagreed to determine which sensor was bad. All of the necessary hardware was already there, just the decision to implement a fail operational MCAS wasn’t made.

Major thread drift but I entirely agree. All it took was for the AoA sensor hooked to MCAS (it switched from one to the other at power off/on) to be reading high by a large enough margin. You can't see an AoA error until you're rolling, nothing happens until flaps-up, and then BANG the most powerful effector on the airplane is trying to stoof you in.

 

[Shoes31]

More here:

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman believes something is very wrong with the F-35. The F-35 used to have a largely negative public perception, but this seems to have changed with a media offensive in the 2010s, with ma…

hushkit.net

"1Some say the lower availability rates of the F-35 are offset by its superior potency, thoughts on this?

If the airplane was really as good, 1-v-1, as the fans say it is, the USAF would have stayed with the adaptive engine vs. revised F135."


That seems backwards to me, if the airplane was not good 1 vs 1, the USAF would have prioritized the adaptive engine to establish the F-35s superiority. In addition it would need the best engine upgrade possible to still be relevant for 20 more years, cost notwithstanding.

Going forward with the revised F135 is an indication that the airplane is plenty capable as is, and that its all the upgrade needed to keep it relevant for 20 more years cost notwithstanding.

 

[LowObservable]

The mythical "6th Gen" Gripen. How many of those have they sold?

I hint at my response to that question in my interview with Hush-Kit.

The most basic point is that if you think it doesn’t matter where a nation shops for its largest military procurement, you’re being (to put it kindly) a little naïve at the best of times, and these are not the best of times.

Besides, it is the privilege of an analyst to have his own favorites, like the legendary LJK Setright with Bristol cars.

As for the 6th-Gen comment (which was apparently a good choice since people are still mad about it ten years later) you might want to recall one reason that I made that point.

Much of the technology of 1995, let alone 1985, has a Flintstones look from today’s perspective. (My 1985 computer boasted 310 kB of storage and communicated at a screaming 300 bits per second.) Software is no longer what makes machines work; an iPhone is hardware that is valued because of the apps that it supports. This technology is characterized by development and deployment cycles measured in months. In aerospace, the lead in materials and manufacturing has gone to the commercial side.

The conundrum facing fighter planners is that, however smart your engineering, these aircraft are expensive to design and build, and have a cradle-to-grave product life that is far beyond either the political or technological horizon.

The reason that the JAS 39E may earn a Gen 6 tag is that it has been designed with these issues in mind. Software comes first: the new hardware runs Mission System 21 software, the latest roughly-biennial release in the series that started with the JAS 39A/B.

Now read the latest from GAO...

 

[LowObservable]

"1Some say the lower availability rates of the F-35 are offset by its superior potency, thoughts on this?

If the airplane was really as good, 1-v-1, as the fans say it is, the USAF would have stayed with the adaptive engine vs. revised F135."


That seems backwards to me, if the airplane was not good 1 vs 1, the USAF would have prioritized the adaptive engine to establish the F-35s superiority. In addition it would need the best engine upgrade possible to still be relevant for 20 more years, cost notwithstanding.

Going forward with the revised F135 is an indication that the airplane is plenty capable as is, and that its all the upgrade needed to keep it relevant for 20 more years cost notwithstanding.

If that had been the case, the USAF would not have constrained its TR-2 orders. Also, the adaptive engine's single biggest advantage is range, and in case you had not noticed, that may have become a bigger issue since the JORD was written.

 

[sferrin]

I hint at my response to that question in my interview with Hush-Kit.

The most basic point is that if you think it doesn’t matter where a nation shops for its largest military procurement, you’re being (to put it kindly) a little naïve at the best of times, and these are not the best of times.

Besides, it is the privilege of an analyst to have his own favorites, like the legendary LJK Setright with Bristol cars.

As for the 6th-Gen comment (which was apparently a good choice since people are still mad about it ten years later) you might want to recall one reason that I made that point.*

Much of the technology of 1995, let alone 1985, has a Flintstones look from today’s perspective. (My 1985 computer boasted 310 kB of storage and communicated at a screaming 300 bits per second.) Software is no longer what makes machines work; an iPhone is hardware that is valued because of the apps that it supports. This technology is characterized by development and deployment cycles measured in months. In aerospace, the lead in materials and manufacturing has gone to the commercial side.

The conundrum facing fighter planners is that, however smart your engineering, these aircraft are expensive to design and build, and have a cradle-to-grave product life that is far beyond either the political or technological horizon.

The reason that the JAS 39E may earn a Gen 6 tag is that it has been designed with these issues in mind. Software comes first: the new hardware runs Mission System 21 software, the latest roughly-biennial release in the series that started with the JAS 39A/B.

Now read the latest from GAO...

Does make one wonder if they could separate the software out. A "fighter OS" as it were, that runs the hardware, and is portable between fighters. Of course that sets you up to have all your fighters grounded if there's a problem with the OS. And who gets to write it? A consortium, like ULA, to "save" money? And then we get to see the hardware guys point the finger at software (and vice versa) when it comes time to blame someone for problems.

*- Touche

 

[edwest4]

More here:

Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How The F-35 Hollowed Out The U.S. Air Force – interview with author Bill Sweetman

Bill Sweetman believes something is very wrong with the F-35. The F-35 used to have a largely negative public perception, but this seems to have changed with a media offensive in the 2010s, with ma…

hushkit.net

Thank you, sir. Across all industries, U.S. investors are seeking ways to cut costs and line their own pockets. Monopoly control has always been the goal. Since the Kennedy administration took control of new fighter aircraft procurement, which created headaches for investors who sought to add their influence to purely technical matters, it is worrying to see the pressure increasing globally. The current threat environment is ambiguous. The Russians are bogged down with Ukraine, but there is no way to get an accurate assessment of what is really going on. China has rattled their saber over Taiwan for quite a while but the development of new military equipment has been relatively slow. The pandemic allowed those same investors to use their influence, and the fear that occurred, to complete more mergers and acquisitions, further strengthening their position. The current threat environment appears to be quite low globally. That is not the same as saying that "old" equipment should continue to be produced. Even investors have a vague awareness that letting people go at aerospace companies to "save" costs and to provide them with more money, has limits. The new, younger group coming in may have the skill but certainly not the experience. Someone needs to be able to wield a strong hand and work for the future, free of investor constraints, but politicians rely on those people to assist at election time.

 

[LowObservable]

Does make one wonder if they could separate the software out

On the architecture: The first thing I heard about partitioning was a Gripen NG brief in 2007. The most recent:

The most important feature of the (B-21) avionics, however, is an open mission systems architecture: Young compares older systems with adding peripherals to a computer in the early PC age, where “you had to go through a whole rigmarole to make it work”, but the B-21 has standard interfaces and a partitioned system where changes to the mission systems cannot affect flight-critical functions.

 

[quellish]

Maybe they weren't convinced. Would be way too easy for politician X to say, "it would be cheaper to cut the numbers in half and use the money "saved" to buy X-46/7s...in my district". Then the cost of individual F-35s go up (because you're buying fewer) and politician Y comes along complaining about "F-35 costs are spiraling out of control. We need to cut back." Safer to not even go near that scenario, sadly.

As far as the UCAV programs, it was paid for (development) and had political support. Boeing also put a lot of their own money in.

As for the F-117, the program had already been set to run for a number of years longer. Major fleet upgrades had just taken place, etc.

And then there is the SDB...

But you do seem to be making a case that these programs threatened the F-35 and therefor had to be shut down to preserve the F-35 program, unless I am misinterpreting what you are saying

 

[Shoes31]

If that had been the case, the USAF would not have constrained its TR-2 orders. Also, the adaptive engine's single biggest advantage is range, and in case you had not noticed, that may have become a bigger issue since the JORD was written.

Or, USAF constrained its TR-2 orders because Lockheed was saying TR-3 would be complete in a year or two. If you have a sufficient fighter force right now, it may make sense to limit orders to a product that is going to be upgraded in a few years - thus limiting how much you have to spend in existing fleet upgrades (especially because you already have around 300 such airframes and plan for a total of 1,763). Especially if you have a bunch of other funding needs as well - might make sense to put funds for an F-35 TR-2 to B-21 program or Sentinel until TR-3 is ready. The TR-3 upgrade of course has taken much longer than quoted, which is a major problem. As is the fact that the first TR-3 jets will not be combat coded. Both of those issues are major, but I think you've drawn the wrong conclusions.

The adaptive engines best feature is the extra range, which would be extremely useful no doubt. But pushing that upgrade path means less commonality between frames, new production lines, new logistics setup across the world, and a huge upfront cost. Its hard to point at the USAF saying no the AETP engine and say see that's why the F-35 is bad when there are so many other factors that go into that decision. But if the jet wasn't a good performer, wouldn't you choose the option to get the best increase in performance? And only choose the option that has the best cost to performance ratio if it was already sufficient or near sufficient?

 

[sferrin]

As far as the UCAV programs, it was paid for (development) and had political support. Boeing also put a lot of their own money in.

As for the F-117, the program had already been set to run for a number of years longer. Major fleet upgrades had just taken place, etc.

And then there is the SDB...

But you do seem to be making a case that these programs threatened the F-35 and therefor had to be shut down to preserve the F-35 program, unless I am misinterpreting what you are saying

I'm saying maybe that was the perception. God knows politicians don't mind screwing things up if it gets them the limelight.

 

[red admiral]

On the architecture: The first thing I heard about partitioning was a Gripen NG brief in 2007.

Pretty sure its been a thing since the mid 90s, and not just in Sweden. There are pros and cons to federated, integrated, and hybrid computing approaches. It's also possible to change architecture on existing aircraft if desired hard enough e.g. as has been done on U-2 and Gripen E

We'll see how the open architectures work out in practice. Feels much more like things will splinter into multiple, vendor-specific "open" architectures; there's already at least 4 in the Western air forces... And even different USAF and USN/Army ones... I'm not convinced the "App store" analogy will really work out when you only have one supplier in the market - unless the government wants to spend double the money on software development in 2+ companies. It's more about pay once, use multiple times - but then Industry needs to charge more up front for that business model to work. We'll see.

 

[Jackonicko]

For those who have been dismissive of Bill's credibility and reputation... He is again a finalist in the hardest fought category of the Aerospace Media Awards.

I suspect that Bill's shelves are positively groaning with AJOYAs, DMAs and AMAs.

(I'm also a finalist in two categories, which is... gratifying).