The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[Lauge]

I realize there haven't been new tailhook designs since LBJ was in office, but for crying out loud, how hard is it to design a piece of steel with a bent end?

At the risk of being nominated for this year's Mister Bleedin'-Obvious Award, it should perhaps be pointed out that the problem is not just designing the tailhook, but also very much the attachment of same to the aircraft. Your tailhook may catch, and even hang on to, the wire, but if it then departs company with the rest of the airframe it will do very little to slow you down.

Regards & all,

Thomas L. Nielsen
Luxembourg

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

TT, well, it's pretty screwed up that the overseeing organism did not catch the problem at CDR. I realize there haven't been new tailhook designs since LBJ was in office, but for crying out loud, how hard is it to design a piece of steel with a bent end? We have got worse problems than just the -C model not catching wires if we can't design a tailhook.
Surely if we can spend millions of hours doing CFD, thousands of hours in a wind tunnel, FEA-the bejezus out of the F-35, you can also do some dynamic analysis that tells you if you're going to catch a wire.

With respect there is nothing easy about landing on an aircraft carrier or designing an aircraft to do such a thing. There is a reason most countries don't even bother with conventional carrier aircraft. Even with well proven aircraft accidents happen, hooks skip, aircraft bolter, or outright fail. It has happened, the RA-5 was notorious for having a terrible hook. If you think "its just a piece of steel with a bent end" You really need to do some homework and take a look at all the factors that go into tail hook design.

GTX, I mentioned this before - not having a perfect picture of the situation is still not an excuse for blowing estimates. If you can't estimate something you allocate a margin of error. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the margin. As your analysis improves, you can decrease the margin.
If you eat up all the margin, then you failed to evaluate the risk properly. And even the unknown unknowns get an allocation.
At least that's how we do weight estimation and track weight at my company. So if you blow estimates it's either poor engineering or you have gambled that everything will turn out as lightweight as it can, and we know how often that happens.

What happens when you think you have a sound design approved by the best in the business all the way back in 2007, and then you build the multimillion dollar aircraft and when you actually try it, the tailhook fails. Is that engineering, the Navy, or Murphy's law?

The bit about human nature and making rosy predictions, well, the whole point of engineering is to be as rigorous as possible, use the best, verified, methods available, and then trust your numbers (including the aforementioned margins). If we decide that instead we go with whatever makes you look good, then there is no point in performing all the analysis, and what's more, you are lying to yourself. In nature, F=m.a uses the real m, not what management says it should be.

Did lockheed ever say the tailhook was so right on that they didn't need to verify because management said they didn't have to? Or did they do everything you just said right down to testing the hook in real life? Again they thought they had a sound design and then testing proved otherwise, thats why we have testing. No aircaft engineer in human history got it right the first time, didn't bother to test, and put an aircraft into full production. Anyone ever make a mistake at your job that cost money? Happened to me once or twice. Ever been given approval on something that turned out to be a bad idea? Ever been given a bad order? LM and the military are unfortunately made up of humans.

If its that easy, or if you are that good, you need not be here, you need to be designing aircraft. If you have a way of cutting down cost and getting it right the first time, every time, you can have your pick of multimillion dollar aviation engineering jobs anywhere you choose.

As far as how the VSTOL version "ruined" the other two, the commonality requirements have subtle but pervasive cascading effects. Just to name one, the fact that the -C model can't catch a wire is the -B's fault. For elucidation of this piece of trivia, i recommend reading Tailspin Turtle's link posted previously.

Not really. even without the B the Tailhook would still be unsatisfactory, since once again it was approved when it should not have been by the people who should know best. Lockheed had they been told in 2007, would have redesigned the hook then, as they are doing now. The man in charge of the F-35 is a Vice Admiral so he is pretty commited to the naval version, and it is slated to land on a carrier by 2013. Its a Mulligan, they redesign the hook and get back on it. We know it can already get shot off a carrier, If the hook is the worst thing that the F-35C encounters on its way to service that's not bad at all. Super Hornet had/has much nastier problems-- Still does... Toed out, drag inducing pylons? I blame the F-18C for that LOL

The F-35 isn't encountering out of the ordinary problems for a new military aircraft. Its the sheer scale of the program and thus the amount of money involved and public attention that makes things all out of proportion. The problems pale in comparison to smaller, cheaper, programs that were in far more dire straights, and as of right now, an F-35 still hasn't crashed.

LO can respond when he goes back to not having a life again.

 

[AeroFranz]

At the risk of being nominated for this year's Mister Bleedin'-Obvious Award, it should perhaps be pointed out that the problem is not just designing the tailhook, but also very much the attachment of same to the aircraft. Your tailhook may catch, and even hang on to, the wire, but if it then departs company with the rest of the airframe it will do very little to slow you down.

Yes, you must also transfer the loads. I believe LM must have one or two people stashed away who have completed strength of materials and aircraft structures I and II courses in college and who are aware of these facts. The poor performance of the tailhook is directly attributable to its attachment point, dictated by the location of a suitably strong bulkhead required to transfer the loads. My point is: how is this a surprise for anyone?

"With respect there is nothing easy about landing on an aircraft carrier or designing an aircraft to do such a thing. There is a reason most countries don't even bother with conventional carrier aircraft. Even with well proven aircraft accidents happen, hooks skip, aircraft bolter, or outright fail. It has happened, the RA-5 was notorious for having a terrible hook. If you think "its just a piece of steel with a bent end" You really need to do some homework and take a look at all the factors that go into tail hook design. "

Most countries does not include the US. How does 100 years worth of naval aviation experience sound as far as comfort level for building hook-equipped aircraft? The dynamics and analysis involved in landing a Panther sixty years ago are no different than the ones involved here. I'll grant you Grumman had people with far more experience, who could design hooks between breakfast and lunch. I don't know if LM has any of the old dudes from the S-3 days.
Regarding the factors going into designing the tailhook and needing to do my homework, funny, the governing MIL-SPEC is on my desktop (MIL-A-18717 Arresting Hook Installation, Aircraft). I think there may be a sister document, but it's not very big at all. You can get it 80% right by drawing a sketch in a side view and making sure you stay within the recommended dimensional values. Hell, you can design it by analogy looking at the myriad other naval aircraft sporting tricycle gear and designed to engage the very same wires.Seriously, I can understand having problems in areas where you are breaking new ground, but compared to designing a shaft-driven lift fan, an assembly consisting of an actuator and two moving parts does not seem daunting. If we have problems with a tailhook, maybe we should just give up on the whole building aircraft business. Just too damn hard.

"What happens when you think you have a sound design approved by the best in the business all the way back in 2007, and then you build the multimillion dollar aircraft and when you actually try it, the tailhook fails. Is that engineering, the Navy, or Murphy's law?"

Combination of the three. LM's design was flawed. The overseeing organism did not catch it. Testing showed the reality.

"Did lockheed ever say the tailhook was so right on that they didn't need to verify because management said they didn't have to? Or did they do everything you just said right down to testing the hook in real life? "

I have NO idea of how they tested, but whatever they did, they either looked the other way (I don't think so) or their methods failed them, or else we wouldn't be here. I can tell you you could build a rig consisting of just landing gear units and hook attached to a suitably rigid frame, and drag it over a set of wires and perform the test. You might even be able to perform a dynamically scaled test on a smaller scale. You could have done this at the preliminary design stage, as soon as you had determined your weight and landing gear geometry. Let's high-ball it and say the test costs you two million dollars. It's peanuts compared to what fixing the problem is going to cost now.
Errare humanum est, but I don't think designing a tailhook is nearly as hard as everything else that went into this airplane.

"If its that easy, or if you are that good, you need not be here, you need to be designing aircraft. If you have a way of cutting down cost and getting it right the first time, every time, you can have your pick of multimillion dollar aviation engineering jobs anywhere you choose."

Thank you for the vote of confidence. Sadly I'm not that good. I can only point out to embarrassing engineering fails after the fact. Plus the most I've seen technical fellow engineers make is well under the "multimillion dollar" level, so it's just not worth it.

 

[shedofdread]

Just out of interest, was it -
a/ the hook itself that failed
b/ the attachement point
c/ the structure that the hook attaches to.

If 'a' or 'b' then it's plain old human error; someone got their maths a bit wrong. If 'c' then that's a more complex issue. Yes, over the years a great many aircraft have landed on quite successfully but did they feature a structure that had so many demands on it?

All those of us who work in any form of high-performance engineering know that if you break new ground, there WILL be failures along the way. How you put them right is the important thing...

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Thank you for the vote of confidence. Sadly I'm not that good. I can only point out to embarrassing engineering fails after the fact. Plus the most I've seen technical fellow engineers make is well under the "multimillion dollar" level, so it's just not worth it.[/font]

 

[GTX]

Just out of interest, was it -
a/ the hook itself that failed
b/ the attachement point
c/ the structure that the hook attaches to.

If 'a' or 'b' then it's plain old human error; someone got their maths a bit wrong. If 'c' then that's a more complex issue.

Actually none of the above and certainly nothing as dramatic as some commentators would have you believe. I will have to dig out some of my records, but as far as I recall it was very much as Tommy H. Thomason has described:

"Basically, the landing gear wheels mash down (trample is the term of art used in the report) the cross-deck pendant and it doesn't rebound high enough and quickly enough so that the current hook point (which was based on the proven F-18 design) can get under it."

In other words, when the aircraft's wheels travel over the arrestor wire, they set up a 'bounce' (for want of a better word) of the wire. The hook is having trouble catching the wire due to this.

As Tommy also goes on to say "The proposed fixes are to revise the shape of the hook point and modify the damping of the hook so that it is less likely to skip over all the wires." Once agin, hardly groundbreaking redesign issues...though once again to listen to some people, you would think that the entire aircraft need to be redesigned because of this. :

 

[GTX]

By the way, enough with the childish 'name calling'. Using derogatory terms such as "Dave" or referring to the F-35 as a "super F-117 with moving target/in weather capability and self-defense" is pathetic. If you want to resort to this sort of argument, I could just as easily refer to the Rafale as an ultra-Mirage, the Gripen as a revamped Viggen, the F/A-18 as a updated F-5 and so forth...however, these are all grossly inaccurate representations, just as your references to the F-35 are.

Moreover, as I have said before, your childish comments are a gross insult to the many thousands of people who have dedicated themselves to developing this aircraft...regardless if you don't agree with what they have developed.

 

[Thorvic]

Just out of interest, was it -
a/ the hook itself that failed
b/ the attachement point
c/ the structure that the hook attaches to.

If 'a' or 'b' then it's plain old human error; someone got their maths a bit wrong. If 'c' then that's a more complex issue.

Actually none of the above and certainly nothing as dramatic as some commentators would have you believe. I will have to dig out some of my records, but as far as I recall it was very much as Tommy H. Thomason has described:

"Basically, the landing gear wheels mash down (trample is the term of art used in the report) the cross-deck pendant and it doesn't rebound high enough and quickly enough so that the current hook point (which was based on the proven F-18 design) can get under it."

In other words, when the aircraft's wheels travel over the arrestor wire, they set up a 'bounce' (for want of a better word) of the wire. The hook is having trouble catching the wire due to this.

As Tommy also goes on to say "The proposed fixes are to revise the shape of the hook point and modify the damping of the hook so that it is less likely to skip over all the wires." Once agin, hardly groundbreaking redesign issues...though once again to listen to some people, you would think that the entire aircraft need to be redesigned because of this. :

Spoken like a true corporate spin doctor, downplay the issue completely once denial is no longer an option and ignore the fundamental design flaw. ITS MOUNTED TOO CLOSE TO THE MAIN GEAR !!! - The Hook design is sound works fine on the F-18 because its 6 ft aft of the gear, rather than being bolted to the same bulkhead. They were too concerned with the stealth and hiding it than actually working out where the pivot point was and how arrestor wires actually work. They relied on a computer and didn't factor everything when they should have really built a test rig.

So they have fudged the hook to bring the jaws closer to the deck and stiffened the damper so the hook stays down and scraped the deck to pull the wire off the deck and into the jaws. Its worked on rolling tests but has still to be proven in arrested landings on shore and then on ship. The USN then have to determine if the fixed hook design will meet acceptable arrested landings and if they are willing to compromise or a shorter hook life and the effect of the hook being dragged along the flight deck and the effects it will have on the new AAG which uses three wires rather than four.

If its doesn't meet acceptable levels then they will have to redesign the rear fuselage, but probably only in terms of putting a bracket in to move the pivot point further aft and thus creating a larger hook housing that would have a little impact on to its Stealth profile.

That's why the program is so frustrating, as you can't get an honest answer these days, the whole JSF program has so much media management and a policy of denial and discredit that's its virtually impossible to get a genuine honest response these days. It makes Alistair Campbell and the rest of Tony Blairs New labour spin doctors look like rank amatuers.

It would be nice to see someone be honest for once, tell the whole story, not the edited bits to either follow the party line or use the ingnored bits to prove a conspiracy.

Yeap its a bit of a FUBAR, no it won't be the dogs danglies when it finally enters front line operational service at the end of the decade, but it should still be a damn fine aircraft, providing alot of new capability to air arms around the world, without the used car salesman BS we get.

 

[jsport]

Of course we want to see the F-35 succeed. As TT exclaimed it hasn't crashed, becasue if one does in the approaching political climate it might well be the end of the F-35 and Western aviation dominance.

It may well be past the time Majors can be Lead System Integrators as you, GTX, make clear majors may no longer can afford the build risk let alone 's-curve development risk'. S-Curve risk needs to go the next level if we are to stay ahead as is the real importance in maintaining the mostly small business aviaition industrial base the gov'n most likely will have assume the role. A completely new incentivized gov'n design force maybe the only answer.. Competetion can be introduced into this environment and the majors can finally be poised to be restructured into sub component providing competetive fora rather that uninspired, undriven, atrophied nomenklatura they have largely become.

Majors CEO pay above big bank CEO pay and gold inlaid furniture in the exec jets of at least one Major's would be fine if those thousands of technical jobs and our aviation dominance were not at risk.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

the whole JSF program has so much media management and a policy of denial and discredit that's its virtually impossible to get a genuine honest response these days.

Are we talking about Bill Sweetman or Lockheed?

 

[AeroFranz]

Moreover, as I have said before, your childish comments are a gross insult to the many thousands of people who have dedicated themselves to developing this aircraft...regardless if you don't agree with what they have developed.

GTX, the fact that I (along with some 311M+change US taxpayers) are footing the bill gives me EVERY right to bitch and moan if I am not getting my money's worth. It's a matter of something only vaguely remembered, or so it seems, these days: accountability. And just for the record, some of the people working on F-35 are the same I crammed with before tests and drank cheap beer and ate oily pizza with through college. They are good guys and girls and I respect the hell out of them. The ones I know have excellent training and ethics, but they're not the ones calling the shots.

 

[GTX]

GTX, I mentioned this before - not having a perfect picture of the situation is still not an excuse for blowing estimates. If you can't estimate something you allocate a margin of error. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the margin. As your analysis improves, you can decrease the margin.
If you eat up all the margin, then you failed to evaluate the risk properly. And even the unknown unknowns get an allocation.
At least that's how we do weight estimation and track weight at my company. So if you blow estimates it's either poor engineering or you have gambled that everything will turn out as lightweight as it can, and we know how often that happens.

Warning: fantasy bubble needing to be burst! As I stated above already, it seems obvious to me that a number of people have no grasp of how the world of defence procurements/tendering and indeed complex project development really works and instead seem to be clinging to some idealistic fantasy world that they like to think exists.

You seem to be thinking that risk management (something that I am extremely experienced with) is not occurring here. People have made allowances for things not going to plan. However, in the real world one needs to make compromises. This is not a case of poor engineering or deliberate desires to mislead or lie. Rather it is how the real world works. Would people like to wait until they have all information? Would they like infinite time and resources to fully design items/programs that will be 100% perfect? Would they like to know exactly all of the possible permutations in customer (and in this case economic) plans well in advance? Obviously the answer to all of these is yes. Unfortunately, in the real world that does not happen. Companies/programs/people have to work to deadlines. They don’t have all the resources they would like. They don’t have all the information. They are working in a competitive environment. As I said above, they do the best they can. Moreover, sometimes (quite often actually) you are faced with conflicting priorities/demands (e.g. strong, robust structure vs desire for light weight or exquisite, superlative capability vs cost). In these circumstances you are forced to make compromises. Sometimes these compromises favour one thing over another. However, doing this does not mean that people are being devious. No, rather they are simply trying to chart the best course they can.

Oh and another thing. People sometimes make mistakes. Sometimes they think that one thing will happen and another does. I know this might seem hard to grasp by some of the apparent Über Engineers/Program Managers here but the rest of us mere mortals aren’t perfect. Unfortunately, these same god-like beings amongst us (who interestingly never seem to have offered their superlative skills to the rest of us in these programs) don’t seem willing to acknowledge any of this.

The bit about human nature and making rosy predictions, well, the whole point of engineering is to be as rigorous as possible, use the best, verified, methods available, and then trust your numbers (including the aforementioned margins). If we decide that instead we go with whatever makes you look good, then there is no point in performing all the analysis, and what's more, you are lying to yourself. In nature, F=m.a uses the real m, not what management says it should be.

Once again, please don’t fall into the fallacy of thinking that that evil management or business development (or what ever other "bogey man" you want to blame) creature is coming in dictating to those nice, innocent engineers what the “correct answers” are. That is not how things work in the real world. If you don’t understand that then you need to.

 

[GTX]

Spoken like a true corporate spin doctor, downplay the issue completely once denial is no longer an option and ignore the fundamental design flaw. ITS MOUNTED TOO CLOSE TO THE MAIN GEAR !!!

So we are now name calling individuals are we? Mature! : Mind you, I have to ask a clarifying question: Is it me or Tommy H. Thomason that you are calling a “corporate spin doctor”? After all, all that I did was use Tommy’s description of the issue.

Now as to the issue itself and the supposed fixes, I am so glad that you can grace us with your analysis. I am somewhat surprised though that you did so here. Would have been far better to sell your expert opinion and solution to Lockheed Martin or BAE systems or Northrop Grumman or similar. Those poor misguided fools have been just stumped trying to solve this without the benefit your expertise!

As I said above (though which some here can’t seem to grasp the concept of), programs such as this (or indeed most things in life for us mere mortals) involves compromises. These are done with the best knowledge available and with the best intentions and within the constraints imposed. However at the end of the day, compromises are still made.

That's why the program is so frustrating, as you can't get an honest answer these days, the whole JSF program has so much media management and a policy of denial and discredit that's its virtually impossible to get a genuine honest response these days. It makes Alistair Campbell and the rest of Tony Blairs New labour spin doctors look like rank amatuers.

It would be nice to see someone be honest for once, tell the whole story, not the edited bits to either follow the party line or use the ingnored bits to prove a conspiracy.

And yes, this program is frustrating and it would be nice to see someone be honest for once or to tell the whole story. I doubt any of the F-35 detractors will be starting to do this any time soon though since that might deflate some of their wild assertions…

 

[GTX]

GTX, the fact that I (along with some 311M+change US taxpayers) are footing the bill gives me EVERY right to bitch and moan if I am not getting my money's worth.

Please remember that whilst the US Govt has paid by far the most, they are not the only contributor here. Other partner nations have contributed as well!

I am curious as to what you believe is actually your “money’s worth”. What is that actual answer? Do try to be specific.

 

[sferrin]

Moreover, as I have said before, your childish comments are a gross insult to the many thousands of people who have dedicated themselves to developing this aircraft...regardless if you don't agree with what they have developed.

GTX, the fact that I (along with some 311M+change US taxpayers) are footing the bill gives me EVERY right to bitch and moan if I am not getting my money's worth.

Whether you're getting your money's worth? You have yet to give an alternative that would meet all the requirements at less cost. One can't help but wonder why you're in such a huff when you can't even come up with a better solution. If there were a demonstratively better alternative you might be on to something. As it is now all you and "LowObservable" can come up with are some hand waving and theoretical future varients who's cost and utility are dubious even compared to the current generation.

 

[AeroFranz]

"Warning: fantasy bubble needing to be burst! As I stated above already, it seems obvious to me that a number of people have no grasp of how the world of defence procurements/tendering and indeed complex project development really works and instead seem to be clinging to some idealistic fantasy world that they like to think exists."

And the way you are describing, the "real" way, has served us well? Forgive me for believing that we can do better than that.
GTX, if you think there is nothing wrong with how things are going, and that mistakes with a fundamental and at the same time fairly simple piece of equipment are only detected at this stage of development, then you might have drunk some corporate cool aid.

"You seem to be thinking that risk management (something that I am extremely experienced with) is not occurring here. People have made allowances for things not going to plan. "

Which is why we're late and overweight? seems like, by definition, we needed a bit more allowance.

"However, in the real world one needs to make compromises. This is not a case of poor engineering or deliberate desires to mislead or lie. Rather it is how the real world works. Would people like to wait until they have all information? Would they like infinite time and resources to fully design items/programs that will be 100% perfect? Would they like to know exactly all of the possible permutations in customer (and in this case economic) plans well in advance? Obviously the answer to all of these is yes. Unfortunately, in the real world that does not happen. Companies/programs/people have to work to deadlines. They don’t have all the resources they would like. They don’t have all the information. As I said above, they do the best they can. Moreover, sometimes (quite often actually) you are faced with conflicting priorities/demands (e.g. strong, robust structure vs desire for light weight or exquisite, superlative capability vs cost). In these circumstances you are forced to make compromises. Sometimes these compromises favour one thing over another. However, doing this does not mean that people are being devious. No, rather they are simply trying to chart the best course they can."

Lockheed has been in the aircraft business for how long? 80-odd years? scarcity of resources, changing requirements, uncertainty...What's new in all of this? If you don't think you can execute on a contract, because you don't have the resources or expertise, then don't bid on it.
Once you sign a contract saying you engage yourself to do something behind retribution, and all parties respect the clauses, how is that not your responsibility to fulfill the contract in its entirety?

"Please remember that whilst the US Govt has paid by far the most, they are not the only contributor here. Other partner nations have contributed as well!
I am curious as to what you believe is actually your “money’s worth”. What is that actual answer? Do try to be specific.
"

I am a citizen of the US and a level two partner...I have twice the reason to bitch! As for specificity, I only wanted what was promised in 2001, an affordable fighter bomber for the same cost as an F-16.

"One can't help but wonder why you're in such a huff when you can't even come up with a better solution. "

Dude, the ghost of Kelly Johnson can't fix F-35. The fate of it was sealed when overambitious requirements were set. I just don't like to sing along with the rest of the people in the car, pretending nothing's wrong while we're driving off a cliff.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Dude, the ghost of Kelly Johnson can't fix F-35. The fate of it was sealed when overambitious requirements were set. I just don't like to sing along with the rest of the people in the car, pretending nothing's wrong while we're driving off a cliff.

I wonder why the military is singing along too. You would think they would be screaming at the top of their longs that its a pig, but instead they are showering it with praise. odd strategy. In the meantime the F-35 keeps flying and setting new milestones. the navy is saying the C will be landing on CVNs by next year, the USMC stands up VMFA-121 before 2012 is over. The base at Eglin is training more people by the day. The F-35 is getting more and more momentum and I can't wait to see where it is in 12 months. probably make your head spin.

I can honestly say I would pay more attention to the naysayers if I didn't hear the same thing for every weapon system in recent memory. Eventually you cry "wolf!" so much that even you can't really remember what one looks like, so everything becomes a wolf.

So the Abrams sucks, (Fuel pig, russian tanks are better)
the Tomcat sucks, (11 of 12 prototypes crashed in testing, Aim-54 was a cheap parlor trick)
the Super Hornet Sucks, (could never replace the Tomcat, no range, doesn't even exceed mach 2?!)
the original F-18 Sucks, (Less range than an A-7, multi role? hybrid? Never work)
The V-22 sucks, (Killed people)
The F-15 sucks, (overly complex, lousy engines, build something like the F-16!)
the F-16 sucks, (Lawn dart! single engined death trap, not complex enough! Throw a bunch of junk on there!)
the Bradley sucks. (Explodes on reflex)
F-111 utterly sucks (F-111B anyone? Atrocious record in its first vietnam deployment, overly complex hunk of junk)
F-117 sucks (Got shot down ONCE means rest of combat record is invalid)
F-22s suck (oh god yes, still want more of them for the US and allies though, only crashed a couple times, poisons pilots, Gold plated)
B-1B (how long did that take to get right?)
B-2, (It $uck$, wish we had more of them)
cruise missiles suck (that'll never work)
Apaches suck (hanger queens, loved to crash all over europe, Shoulda upgraded the cobra, which the marines did-- but it sucks now)
AV-8B (Airshow trick/widowmaker)

They all suck, I think they fight and win wars based solely on luck. The US is the worlds luckiest weapons designer. A ferocious stampede of expensive, complex, white elephants. These are just the cliffs notes you can research the development problems, groundings, congressional hearings, military dislike/like, delays, additional expenses, etc all you want. But its probably best to forget that, and pretend your pick of the litter sprang from Zeus's head perfect as you remember it

 

[AeroFranz]

Have I personally criticized any of the above?
But sure, I'll play along.
Yes, F-111B was a victim of overambitious requirements. But at least it did not entail as many compromises on the other version, which worked fine.
Not a fan of V-22 because of marginal payload, but it has a fighting chance.
The rest...fine by me.

 

[GTX]

I wonder why the military is singing along too. You would think they would be screaming at the top of their longs that its a pig, but instead they are showering it with praise. odd strategy.

Further emphasising this, let’s once again hear from one of those service people who will be operating the F-35 or quite possibly taking it into combat (or are they bias too?).

33rd FW commander Col Andrew Toth, an F-15C Weapons School grad and former commander of the 57th Adversary Tactics Group at Nellis AFB, Nevada, recently had his first flight in the F-35A on 8 August. Having countless hours in the Boeing F-15C Eagle and Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon (or Viper), Toth shares his impressions of that first ride:

Getting to fly the F-35 for the first time was quite an experience, the aircraft was easy to fly and felt very solid. In my opinion, the aircraft flies like a cross between an Eagle and a Viper on steroids … the HMD [helmet-mounted display] worked well … additionally, when the power is pushed up the response time from the Pratt and Whitney F135 motor was immediate …

Hardly sounds like a failure does it? But then again, what would he know? Probably paid by LM to say that...

 

[LowObservable]

By the way, enough with the childish 'name calling'. Using derogatory terms such as "Dave" or referring to the F-35 as a "super F-117 with moving target/in weather capability and self-defense" is pathetic.

Moreover, as I have said before, your childish comments are a gross insult to the many thousands of people who have dedicated themselves to developing this aircraft...regardless if you don't agree with what they have developed.

You may not like the name "Dave" (don't use it a lot myself) but I think it is humorous rather than derogatory, so take it up with Pprune, at the risk of being told to grow up. And I stand by my description of the USAF's going-in position to the JSF requirement. and your attempt to parse any criticism as "gross insult" to everyone who worked on the program sounds defensive and means nothing.

So we are now name calling individuals are we?

No idea, sunshine - are you a "corporate spin doctor"? You seem to assume that most people here know (or worry about knowing) what your job is.

TT - Some of those criticized programs had real problems. Some of them got better. Were those criticisms invalid at the time? Were all those programs the best and most efficient way to deliver the results they did?

Sferrin - You have yet to give an alternative that would meet all the requirements at less cost.

Absolutely wrong and illogical. Sometimes (indeed, all too often) the "requirements" can't be met at a reasonable cost, because they were written and agreed on with unrealistic predictions, and consequently they have to be changed to match reality.

Rather than whingeing and inventing personal slights, you'd all be better off advancing real arguments about how the JSF has lived up to its promises and delivered capability on time and on budget.

 

[Magoodotcom]

Hardly sounds like a failure does it? But then again, what would he know? Probably paid by LM to say that...

I think ELP recently inferred JUST that!

 

[sferrin]

Have I personally criticized any of the above?
But sure, I'll play along.
Yes, F-111B was a victim of overambitious requirements. But at least it did not entail as many compromises on the other version, which worked fine.

As I recall, the Navy hated the F-111B so bad they axed it and bought the Tomcat. What are they saying about the F-35?

 

[sferrin]

Absolutely wrong and illogical. Sometimes (indeed, all too often) the "requirements" can't be met at a reasonable cost, because they were written and agreed on with unrealistic predictions, and consequently they have to be changed to match reality.

Rather than whingeing and inventing personal slights, you'd all be better off advancing real arguments about how the JSF has lived up to its promises and delivered capability on time and on budget.

Well at least you've finally admitted that there isn't a equivalent substitute for the F-35. That's a start anyway.

 

[RyanC]

In the end, what kills the JSF program in it's current state will be it's price.

A few hundred will be built, but it won't reach the fever dreams of the early projections calling for 2,400~ F-35 for the USAF/USN/USMC.

Remember, back in 1996-98ish they were talking about unit costs for the F-35 being only $29 to $34 million per plane. ($38.8 to $45.58m in 2010 USD).

By 2001, the program estimates for JSF flyaway costs had grown to

$37m for F-35A ($45.56m in 2010)
$46m for F-35B ($56.64m in 2010)
$48m for F-35C ($59.10m in 2010)

Costs had grown a bit since the start of the program, but they were still within limits and controllable; as we all know that unexpected things get discovered, etc etc.

Also, at this point, the F-35 was quite competitive with the existing stable of legacy aircraft upgraded to modern standards:

South Korea spent $4.2 billion in 2002 to acquire 40 x F-15K Slam Eagles. That's roughly $105m per plane ($127.27m in 2010 USD).

Poland tendered about $3.5 billion in 2002 to acquire 48 x F-16C/D of the Block 52+ variant, which had a APG-68v9 radar (mechanically scanned). That's about $72.9 m per plane ($88.36 m in 2010 USD).

Mass production for the USAF would knock a bit off the price tag for these advanced F-15/16 variants, but even with a 40% reduction in price, it would have broken down as:

$43.74m in 2002 dollars for F-16
$63m in 2002 dollars for F-15
$37.58m in 2002 dollars for F-35A

Even if we factored in a 40% Cost Explosion Event (CEE) for the F-35A, it would still have ended up costing only $52.6 million in 2002 dollars; making it still very competitive; because for the same amount of money that you paid for a legacy jet, you would get a stealthy jet with AESA radar, advanced avonics integration, etc etc.

That was the cost structure that the F-35 program was founded on.

Too bad it's come apart the last decade.

As of March 2010; the Average Unit Production Cost (APUC) for the F-35 is now predicted to be $112 million.

We still have a lot of time for further cost explosion events (CEE) until the Milestone C Full Rate Production decision is made around April 2016.

I am confident in predicting we will see a CEE and PIE (Program Implosion Event) for the F-35 between now and Milestone C, leading to the curtailment I mentioned in my opening paragraph.

Right now, there are no current consequences for program management failure whether in DOD (F-35 going from four of them for price of one F-22 to just 1.2 per F-22) or NASA (JWST going from $4.5B in 2005 to $8.7B in 2011).

When the consequences set in, it won't be pretty.

 

[LowObservable]

Well at least you've finally admitted that there isn't a equivalent substitute for the F-35.

No, there is not. And that's just as well, because the requirement was undoable at any affordable cost, and also does not meet the needs of 2020 and beyond.

 

[AeroFranz]

Have I personally criticized any of the above?
But sure, I'll play along.
Yes, F-111B was a victim of overambitious requirements. But at least it did not entail as many compromises on the other version, which worked fine.

As I recall, the Navy hated the F-111B so bad they axed it and bought the Tomcat. What are they saying about the F-35?

Yes, that story entailed my favorite airplane quote of all times - "There isn't enough power in all Christendom to make that airplane what we want". That was famously said in a congressional hearing by Vice Admiral Tom Connolly, who thus guaranteed that his career would advance no further. Not everybody has got the brass cojones to do that. A lot of Navy careers depend on F-35C too, although lately you can read stories about the CNO starting to question putting all your eggs in the stealth basket. The link's somewhere in Sean Meade's frago of last week.


At any rate, the Navy doesn't have as much riding on JSF as they have X-47B and a competent (not perfect) plane in the bug. Hell, maybe they can do an Ultrabug. Scale everything up another 25% and call it a developmental program (being sarcastic here).

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Have I personally criticized any of the above?
But sure, I'll play along.
Yes, F-111B was a victim of overambitious requirements. But at least it did not entail as many compromises on the other version, which worked fine.

As I recall, the Navy hated the F-111B so bad they axed it and bought the Tomcat. What are they saying about the F-35?

Yes, that story entailed my favorite airplane quote of all times - "There isn't enough power in all Christendom to make that airplane what we want". That was famously said in a congressional hearing by Vice Admiral Tom Connolly, who thus guaranteed that his career would advance no further. Not everybody has got the brass cojones to do that. A lot of Navy careers depend on F-35C too, although lately you can read stories about the CNO starting to question putting all your eggs in the stealth basket. The link's somewhere in Sean Meade's frago of last week.


At any rate, the Navy doesn't have as much riding on JSF as they have X-47B and a competent (not perfect) plane in the bug. Hell, maybe they can do an Ultrabug. Scale everything up another 25% and call it a developmental program (being sarcastic here).

I guess its all a matter of perspective, because I keep thinking "All the money in the christendom won't make the Super Hornet a fifth generation jet" capable of survival in the 2020s. No idea where the navy brass cojones went, but I'm pretty sure they are there just far away at stand off ranges. There is a also that boldly oblique comment by the "gutsy" CNO who then recanted whatever the hell he was talking about and reiterated support for the F-35. Daring.

The Marines have been very ballsy and vocal about the F-35 right down to the Marine General who when asked what the Marines planed to do for plan B if the F-35 failed "Sir, our plan B is: try harder"

 

[GTX]

I think ELP recently inferred JUST that!

That lot make me laugh myself silly... ;D

 

[GTX]

No idea, sunshine - are you a "corporate spin doctor"? You seem to assume that most people here know (or worry about knowing) what your job is.

Sunshine is it now...you getting a little rattled there are you? ??? As for the rest of your comment there well, I hardly care what people think of me or my job...I do know that I do more then just write articles for magazines though...my team and I actually create real things...some even go on the F-35. I am hardly a spin doctor though. I am just someone who gets tired of ready BS from people who don't know what they are talking about and feels a need to stand up to point out what crap it is.

Rather than whingeing and inventing personal slights, you'd all be better off advancing real arguments about how the JSF has lived up to its promises and delivered capability on time and on budget.

Yes, we'll leave the personal slight inventing to you guys...you're so much more experienced with that sort of thing... :

 

[Magoodotcom]

That lot make me laugh myself silly... ;D

Me too...they think you're someone you're not! :

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I wonder why the military is singing along too. You would think they would be screaming at the top of their longs that its a pig, but instead they are showering it with praise. odd strategy.

Further emphasising this, let’s once again hear from one of those service people who will be operating the F-35 or quite possibly taking it into combat (or are they bias too?).

33rd FW commander Col Andrew Toth, an F-15C Weapons School grad and former commander of the 57th Adversary Tactics Group at Nellis AFB, Nevada, recently had his first flight in the F-35A on 8 August. Having countless hours in the Boeing F-15C Eagle and Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon (or Viper), Toth shares his impressions of that first ride:

Getting to fly the F-35 for the first time was quite an experience, the aircraft was easy to fly and felt very solid. In my opinion, the aircraft flies like a cross between an Eagle and a Viper on steroids … the HMD [helmet-mounted display] worked well … additionally, when the power is pushed up the response time from the Pratt and Whitney F135 motor was immediate …

Hardly sounds like a failure does it? But then again, what would he know? Probably paid by LM to say that...

It probably will be an awesome plane. I've never cast any doubt on its likely abilities.

It was also miss its cost target by miles, which is what I personally always expected given the requirements.

Will it be *awesome enough* to justify its pricetag? Maybe. Could it have made cheaper? Yes, by relaxing certain requirements.

Would this necessarily have impacted its ability to do its job? Maybe. I'm not informed enough to judge that.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Its a pretty long running habit that a new US fighter costs 2-3 times what it replaces. By that standard the cost of the F-35 is right about what it should be given that F-16s were going for around 28 million in the early 90s when the project got rolling and now goes for over 50 million in the block 60 configuration. Jet fighters in the early 60s cost several million dollars, while the F-15 was over ten million and now is more like 100 million for latest versions. A 1940 fighter cost perhaps 75,000 while a 1960 one could be two or three million, talk about an increase.

 

[LowObservable]

SS - But that has to go along with either an ever increasing defense budget or an ever shrinking force, neither of which is sustainable.

 

[sferrin]

Well at least you've finally admitted that there isn't a equivalent substitute for the F-35.

No, there is not. And that's just as well, because the requirement was undoable at any affordable cost, and also does not meet the needs of 2020 and beyond.

If it doesn't meet the needs how can you claim a 4th gen will with a straight face? :

 

[LowObservable]

If it doesn't meet the needs how can you claim a 4th gen will with a straight face?

What is this "4th gen" of which you speak? I don't recall the designers of the F-16 and F-15 calling them "fourth generation" back in the 1970s.

In any case, it depends what you think "the needs" are. A lot of people are tending to write the 2020+ scenarios around the intended characteristics of the F-35, as if the plan for what's basically an all-one-type tacair force is optimal - which (as the current price and schedule issues show to those who can read and count) it clearly is not.

In fact, the post-2020 world will pose a variety of challenges and no one platform will be optimal against all of them. The world of 2030 will still include many multi-role fighters, readily adaptable to changing missions, alongside platforms and weapons that trade performance and adaptability for lower signatures.

 

[sferrin]

If it doesn't meet the needs how can you claim a 4th gen will with a straight face?

What is this "4th gen" of which you speak? I don't recall the designers of the F-16 and F-15 calling them "fourth generation" back in the 1970s.

I've got lots of books from the 80s that do. Now if an all-aspect stealth aircraft isn't going to cut it in 2020 how do you figure a non-stealth aircraft will?

 

[LowObservable]

Lots of books from the 80s? Specifically, which ones?

Because the 4th/5th Gen construct starts appearing (according to most sources) in the late 1990s, the Russians being first to use it in public (Tass story from 1997). RAND has a couple of mentions in the late 1990s.

The idea that everyone agrees and has always agreed on the definition of 4/5gen - rather than it being a marketing slogan for two LockMart products - is a powerful pro-JSF meme.

 

[sferrin]

Lots of books from the 80s? Specifically, which ones?

Because the 4th/5th Gen construct starts appearing (according to most sources) in the late 1990s, the Russians being first to use it in public (Tass story from 1997). RAND has a couple of mentions in the late 1990s.

The idea that everyone agrees and has always agreed on the definition of 4/5gen - rather than it being a marketing slogan for two LockMart products - is a powerful pro-JSF meme.

Jesus, I don't know, they're all boxed up out in the shed. That's beside the point anyway. Now, to the point, if an all-aspect stealth aircraft isn't going to cut it in 2020 how do you figure a non-stealth aircraft will?

 

[AeroFranz]

Jesus, I don't know, they're all boxed up out in the shed. That's beside the point anyway.

wait, didn't you bring this up in the first place?

Now, to the point, if an all-aspect stealth aircraft isn't going to cut it in 2020 how do you figure a non-stealth aircraft will?

Reduced RCS is useful, but not sufficient in itself. Personally I believe we have already achieved 80% of what is possible in terms of RCS reduction, the remaining 20% would require sacrifices in other areas of design that compromise the vehicle's effectiveness. For example, the Hopeless Diamond was ideal from an RCS stadpoint, but you still need something flyable, so a more realistic vehicle was found in the F-117. The B-2 may be the ideal penetrator, but no one has the nerve to propose the flying wing shape for a maneuvering fighter.
We have probably approached the asymptotic part of the S-curve of the technology, with better RAM materials and computing power/modeling giving you only marginally better results over time. But how often and how deeply you can re-design/update the mold line and the materials of an aircraft? Once, twice, in the 30-year life-span of the system?
Contrast with IADS, which can count on newer and better signal processing techniques and faster processors every year, with fewer limitations as far as power and size. Those guys are riding the steep part of the S-curve of a bunch of technologies.
I'm not saying low RCS through shaping and RAM is bad, it's just that it's only a part of your arsenal and that betting all on it, and implicitly accepting its considerable constraints, is a losing proposition.
Rather, I'd try to achieve low RCS at an affordable cost, and fight electrons with electrons. I'm talking EW and anything that has to do with manipulating waveforms. Eventually, active cancellation/spoofing/network infiltration. Yes, it's crazy, but so was the concept of Stealth in the seventies. And guess what, the US is better than anyone at this game!
Your limitations in terms of installed power and aperture size can be overcome by increased stadoff range, this way you let physics and the radar range equation work in your favor. Nothing wrong with standoff, after all isn't that the natural progression of warfare? You start with sticks, then axes, bows, longbows, guns, artillery, and then you end up with ICBMs. Ok, getting off the soap box now.

 

[LowObservable]

"Jesus, I don't know, they're all boxed up out in the shed."

Are you sure the dog didn't eat them?

AFAIK the term originated in Russia with reference to the Sukhoi Berkut and MiG 1.42/1.44. It can be found in a couple of RAND reports in the late 1990s.

One of the first Western media references is here, early 2002:

http://web02.aviationweek.com/shownews/02asia1/topsto08.htm

One of LockMart's first references is here, in 2004:

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2004/december/LOCKHEEDMARTINNAMESNEWEXECUTIVEVICE.html

Interestingly, it says: "As the world’s only fifth-generation fighter, the F/A-22 Raptor is, and will remain, unprecedented in its total integration of stealth and advanced avionics."

Only in late 2005 does the company include the F-35:

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2005/october/LOCKHEEDMARTINF35FIFTHGENERATIONCAP.html

An interesting example of mythmaking...