Ok, I have been largely out of the picture for the last week or two. Reading over all the responses since I asked my original question, it appears the following are the key issues raised:
The F-35 is too expensive.
Is the F-35 expensive? Well yes. However, is it vastly any different from other equivalent weapons programs? I would say no. Moreover, I would also challenge anyone to point out an equivalent program that is not expensive. It comes part and parcel with the development of these complex systems. You might also be surprised to find out what some other platforms such as the Super Hornet, Rafale or Typhoon actually cost.
In part, one could say that this is a result of the risk-adverse nature of the customers (i.e. the Governments involved) and by default the developers (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Pratt & Whitney and their multiple suppliers - please remember that this is not a one company job!). Any program such as this is going to be complicated. Because of this, an inordinate focus is expended upon ‘getting it right’. This results in ever increased development costs. Certainly when so many are ready to ‘tear you down at ever stumble’! Is this a fault of the Western acquisition system… quite possibly; however I would point out that I don’t see any other regions producing equally complex weapons systems for low costs and in large numbers quickly.
Another aspect here and one that leads directly to the perception that costs have been increasing is that those same customers are driven by price right from the start. Like it or not, but typically the best (i.e. lowest) price is always selected. Sure we may use terms like “best value” but in my experience something like 95% of the time this always equates to lowest price. As a result, companies are effectively forced to ‘low ball’ price (and often schedule) estimates. If you don’t, you don’t win the work - simple! Now this might be acceptable on an off the shelf fully developed product where there are very few, if any unknowns, however to do so for a developmental program is ridiculous - there are simply too many unknowns (in fact there are even unknown unknowns!). That said though, it does unfortunately happen usually because that is how the ‘game is played’ – as I said, if you don’t then you won’t win any work at all!. BTW, this is not a case of business development staff (those bloody marketers) or company managers (their evil bosses) setting out to deliberately mislead or to “sell things that can't be built at all, let alone for any known amount of time and money”, it is just a case of trying to do your job!
Yet another aspect that causes apparent price rises is the fact that the numbers of aircraft ordered LRIP to LRIP, year to year is being kept low. This automatically results in higher prices because you are automatically buying items (right down to individual piece parts) in the upper ends of price curves. For those who don’t understand what I mean, a price curve (also called a demand curve - see diagram below) is generated by the connection between production numbers and price – usually, the more of a certain item you order at one go, the better the individual price able to be achieved. This is a real issue too: larger numbers allow investment in more effecient production techniques, better amortisation of non-recurring costs such as tooling, programming etc, better buying power with suppliers and the like. However, when you are only dealing with single year buys of small numbers, companies are unable to take advantage of any of these aspects and as such the prices remain high. For example, the slowing of LRIP production numbers from the originally planned 100 per yr to something between 30 – 40 per yr results in the lower production quantity aircraft costing something in the vicinity of an extra $10M per aircraft. This is because the program’s planned economies of scale are not able to be realised.
BTW, another aspect that has been getting a lot of press time this last year, though which I note interestingly has not been raised recently, has been the much vaunted bogey man of “concurrency risk”. To explain, concurrency risk refers largely to the cost of retro-fitting/modifying early production aircraft to the same standard as latter production aircraft. This is especially of concern when those modifications are for major aspects that cost significant money and time to implement. It should also be understood that such a risk is inherent in all programs where development is occurring concurrent to production. In the case of the F-35 though, the reporting of this risk and the cost supposedly involved has been blown out of proportion. Why do I say this? Well for one, the way these items have been costed does not reflect the way things happen in the real world. In much of the reporting the costs used for this are based upon each issue being corrected individually as a stand-alone event. In the real world though, you try to resolve as many issues as possible at the same time and often where possible at scheduled maintenance downtime. Think of it as though you were taking your car in to be serviced and at the same time wanted them to fix some minor squeaks and rotate and align the tyres. Where possible you try to get all of these things done at once. You certainly don’t have the car serviced on one day, schedule another session for the tyres on another day and lastly schedule each squeak/repair to be done on a separate day(s) yet again. However, with the concurrency costs reported to date for the F-35, that is just what people are expecting to happen!
One last point: Anyone who thinks the companies involved with the F-35 program aren’t under considerable pressure to reduce costs has obviously never spoken to any of those involved in the program. The price targets expected are extremely difficult to meet and are only becoming increasingly so. There is no-one from the lowest hardware provider right up to the likes of Lockheed Martin having an easy time of it and/or making a huge profit on this program.
The F-35 has taken too long.
Has the F-35 taken longer to enter full service then originally desired? Well, once again possibly yes. Is this entirely the fault of the companies developing it? Once again I would have to say no. Just look at the history of the program, especially these last few years. The majority of the delays to production numbers (which after all, ultimately drive when squadrons and the like can stand up) have been driven by the customers, especially in terms of sliding production schedule. If you don’t buy enough aircraft, then you can’t enter service fast enough. Trust me, all of the companies involved would very much like to see larger production orders sooner – it does no-one’s balance sheet good to have orders only growing slowly.
There have certainly been no major delays caused by aircraft technical issues (despite what some in the popular press would have you believe!). For instance, there have been no crashes - something that if you look at historic programs (including the F-22) should have occurred by now from just a statistical point of view. That in itself should stand testament to the success with which this program has been run to date. Sure, some of you will point to some of the various reports that have been released highlighting various technical concerns, however, how many of you have actually even fully read those reports or investigated what the issues are? For one, they were identified when they should have been identified (in development and testing) and in virtually every case, there was already a technical solution at hand. Hardly a cause for concern or for significant delays. And let’s just take a closer look at just one of those supposed technical problems – the tail hook issue. From what I understand, one of the problems was that the design team tried to re-use the hook design from the Super Hornet with minimal change but have discovered during testing that it requires more specialised designing. If anything, these people should be praised for trying to reduce costs and not "reinvent the wheel". Unfortunately, during testing (which is why you test!!!) they found that sometimes one has to...
Another aspect here that shouldn’t be overlooked, and one that links directly to schedule, has been the extraordinary time taken these last few years to agree each LRIP contract. LRIP4 took almost a year to negotiate and agree a contract. LRIP 5 something similar. LRIP 6 still hasn’t been agreed. Delays such as this flow directly into the production delays – no-one will produce a single aircraft without an agreed order or price for it.
BTW, looking beyond the USA aircraft, many of the apparent delays to partner nation aircraft have been because the partner nations have consistently/collectively not wanted to get ahead of the USA when it comes to introducing these aircraft into service. As a result, whenever the USA slides purchase orders (and thus operational service) the partner nations tend to also automatically slide their service entries and thus aircraft buys. The end result is that the apparent schedule delays are not necessarily the result of the aircraft developers but rather the customers yet again...
Also when looking at development timeframes one needs to keep in mind that the F-35 is not alone in taking a long time. Just look at the development timeframes for some of its contemporaries (using a simple first flight to service entry measure – note however that this is an admittedly crude measure that excludes pre-first flight development which in most cases is considerable):
- Typhoon: 9 years, 4 months, 8 days
- F-22: 8 years, 3 months, 8 days
- Rafale: 14 years, 5 months
- JAS-39 Gripen: 8 years, 10 months, 23 days
Now given that the F-35 carried out its first flight on 15 December 2006 and it is, as of today, only some 5 years, 7 months, 29 days down the track, I hardly think criticising on schedule is fair! But maybe that’s just me… :
Finally, another aspect not to be over looked in all this is the overall effect of the Global Financial Crisis (and related). This cannot be ignored, and IMHO has added a lot of additional scrutiny to the program. If nothing else, because countries’ budgets are hurting and because democratic governments’ policies are often driven by short term populist considerations, programs such as the F-35 are easy targets. What does this mean? Well, to use Australia as an example (something I am very familiar with), the government is facing a very high likelihood of being voted out at the next election (for a variety of reasons). One way they hope to avoid this situation is to be able to paint themselves as good economic managers at the next election. Part of their strategy to do this is to be able to have their budget back in surplus at the next election. And a part of their way of doing this has been to delay the purchase of many of the first RAAF F-35s by a couple of years. This saves them from paying for these aircraft in the short term and thus they are able to exclude this outlay from their budget. However, this delay has nothing what-so-ever to do with the performance of the F-35 itself or even of the ability of the aircraft to be produced to schedule.
The F-35 is too complicated.
By this, I mean the issues raised such as “the X-32 solution would have been better” or “what we really need was the modern day equivalent of the F-5 or MiG-21” type argument.
In responding to these I would first of all point out that this really is a feature of what I will call “The Western Way of Warfare”. By this I mean, the fact that for at least the last 70 odd years, those countries such as the USA, UK, Western Europe, Canada , Australia etc (i.e. those we tentatively refer to as “The West”), have tended to place greater emphasis upon quality rather then quantity when it comes to weapon systems. As a result, platforms such as the F-35 (and F-22 before that …and F-15, F-14, F-111, F-4, Typhoon, Rafale etc, etc) have sacrificed quantity in favour of quality. The F-16 in its original form was an attempt to reverse/change this philosophy, but in service, it too has fallen lock step into the same mould. The result is that you end up with smaller quantities of more complex, though arguably more capable platforms rather then large quantities of relatively simple platforms. Reversing this pattern/philosophy is not something anyone will do in one program. Nor is it even necessarily desirable. Go ask any soldier, sailor or airman/women whether they would be happy with a weapon equal to that of their potential competitors. I think you will find that almost unanimously, they will say that they always want something better! Even if you did want to go head-to-head with the enemy using large numbers of low cost, simple weapons systems, all you are doing is potentially heading for a war of attrition along the likes of WW1…does anyone here really think that is a smart idea?! Really?!!
As such, the concept of developing a modern day equivalent to the F-5 or MiG-21 that is simple, inexpensive, does away with the modern sensors etc (probably the only way to achieve the former) and is able to be procured in huge numbers as a result is simply not going to happen. If you think it is, you need to wake up now!
Now looking at some of the other specific simplicity issues/proposed (implicit or otherwise) solutions to this apparent problem:
- The Boeing X-32 would have been a better solution since it only had the single engine providing lift & propulsion for the STOVL mission rather then the lift fan + engine from the X-35/F-35. First up, I think this perception only exists because people know it worked for the Harrier family. However just as equally, just because it worked there does not mean it is the only or indeed the best solution. Moreover, don’t you think that all the parties involved (Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas if you look wider) would have taken as a starting point the Harrier solution? These people are not idiots after all (despite what some here might like to imply). The lift fan+engine solution of the F-35 was only decided upon after a lot of careful consideration and analysis. This included fly-off tests using the X-32 and X-35 which the X-32 lost… or is that somehow forgotten.
Moreover, regardless of the actual technical solution, what makes anyone think that any of the supposed delays afflicting the F-35 wouldn’t have also afflicted a mythical F-32? After all, just look at Boeing’s development of the 787 airliner over roughly the same period – it isn’t as though Boeing have had this proceed smoothly with no delays or technical issues…
- The cause of all the problems is the STOVL variant (also known as the “Blame the USMC solution…though one might cautiously like to point out that the RN FAA have also wanted the STOVL variant for just as long…). Either way, this solution postulates that the F-35 would be proceeding without any problems and would be cheaper, better etc if only the design wasn’t encumbered by the need to also accommodate the STOVL mission. This is a difficult issue to prove one way or another…without a time machine that is. In attempting to do so though, I would ask people to point out exactly what aspect(s) of the STOVL variant has driven inordinate cost or schedule or performance compromises. After all, the avionics in all three variants are identical. The cockpits are the same. Wouldn’t the strengthened structure for the CV version be just as compromising on the CTOL version? Sure the engine for the STOVL mission has a greater thrust allowance, but when it comes to the other two variants this can be traded for increased performance and/or lower lifecycle operating costs. It’s not as though the STOVL birds are blocking up the production system or delaying testing. Really, I would like someone to point out where the STOVL is causing these supposed compromises.
- “Jointness” is bad. This flows on from the point above and postulates that the problem with the F-35 JSF is all because of that (J)oint part. If only the services were all allowed to go their own way and develop separate CTOL fighters, separate STOVL fighters and separate CV fighters with no commonality or linkages between any of them. Adherents to this philosophy often like to point to the F-111 as justification for their case. Once again, I would like to challenge this assumption. Given the majority of the costs with any combat aircraft these days is with the subsystems, sensors, engines etc all of which are essentially identical in the case of the F-35, taking the Joint approach is actually extremely beneficial for the F-35, especially in terms of cost. This goes back to the Cost Curve argument raised above. If you are buying the same systems for all three platforms you are getting to higher production numbers faster which in turn mean that the costs come down faster. Simple! Moreover, I fail to see how the requirements from any one service or mission is driving the requirements for the other services/missions in any adverse direction. After all, it’s not like the sensor suite for the CTOL is not also wanted by the CV/STOVL operators. As stated above, the increased propulsion demand driven by the STOVL can have beneficial results for the CTOL/CV versions. Likewise, structural weight considerations driven by the STOVL also benefit the CV/CTOL. Even the increased structural strength driven by the CV requirement could be viewed as increasing the strength/fatigue life of the other version.
The F-35 will be outdated (especially in terms of Stealth) by the time it enters service and that somehow its enemies will have already developed perfect countermeasures for it.
This argument line ties into the delayed service entry one above and also tries to argue that by the time it enters service, much of its capabilities will be easily countered by the Russians, Chinese or someone else. Often, the aspect given most focus here is its Stealth/Low Observability (LO) features. Often proponents of this line of thought go so far as to try to argue that the Stealth/LO aspects will be totally negated and thus aren’t needed now. I find this line of argument especially amusing since on one hand it shows that the proponents don’t really understand why these features are valued and on the other hand are easily discounted by the fact that the likes of Russia (with T-50) or China (with the J-20) are also seemingly wanting to include these aspects (what do they say about Imitation being the sincerest form of flattery) or maybe they are also misguided…poor fools.
Now let’s look at the Stealth/LO aspect a bit more. First up, no-one within the industry has ever claimed stealth technologies make an aircraft completely undetectable. It is usually only the general media that claims that. Moreover, the combination of features generally thought of as 'stealth' is intended to make detection as difficult as possible. In one sense this is no different to the various camouflage techniques used for decades now. If the enemy can't see you or if they are not able to fully discern which way you are headed or whether you are friend or foe until it is too late then that could provide the few extra minutes or even seconds necessary to get in a first shot. The OODA Loop (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop) is what it is really all about here - see more below on this!
Now some here might like to point to examples such as the Serbian shooting down of a USAF F-117 to justify their position that Stealth technology has had its day. However, people need to understand that this example was not so much a failing of the Stealth technology (30 odd yr old in that case) or of the concept behind stealth, but rather the failing of bad operational tactics. Flying the same route, at the same time night after night against well trained, intelligent enemies is plain stupid!
BTW, when one considers the issue of Stealth, one needs to do it in conjunction with the capability of the Sensor Suite available and also the way the output from those sensors is processed and presented to the
Pilot Mission System Manager (far more accurate term for the F-35!). This is an area that hasn't often been discussed in the general media. It is however, IMHO, the area where the F-35 truly outshines all it's rivals, including the much vaunted F-22 (in fact, as already mentioned, there are hopes to try to retro-fit some the F-35 capability to the F-22 to bring it closer to the state of the art!). The F-35 has it's own AN/APG-81 AESA-radar along with the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) mounted under the nose. These are complimented by 6 additional passive infrared sensors distributed over the aircraft as part of Northrop Grumman's AN/AAQ-37 distributed aperture system (DAS). When combined with the EW System and also the data linking capability (which brings all sorts of additional sensors/information sources to the mix) and more importantly, the onboard processing/sensor fusion/data presentation tools (led by the Helmet Mounted Display - remember the F-35 does not have a HUD but rather all relevant information is constantly right in front of the pilot's eyes), this puts the F-35 pilot at a distinct advantage over his/her rivals. This once again goes back to the OODA loop - the F-35 pilot not only is able to
Observe the enemy first, they are able to
Orientate themselves without being seen and then
Decide (supported by more information) faster before finally
Acting - all faster then their enemy. It is this ‘speed’ which puts the F-35 at a real advantage in a fight.
Now, even if you don’t believe/accept the points I have detailed above, let’s just look at some of the possible alternative solutions proposed:
The entire F-35 program outright! The dream scenario for some here I am sure. Let’s assume that this suddenly happened. To begin with let’s focus upon the US Armed Forces requirement since they are by far the greatest user of the F-35 (and have the greatest need for a replacement with aircraft average ages getting well up there). What would the US be left to do then:
USAF:
- Buy more F-22s? - Well that will go down nicely for the budget! Anyway, the F-22 is actually a less capable platform than the F-35 when it comes to the full spectrum of roles as well as un-refuelled range.
- Keep existing or even buy more F-15s/F-16s? - sure that will go down well. Whilst everyone else is getting 4+ and 5th gen platforms, they have 30+ yr old aircraft design!
- Super Hornets? - yeah, like hell the USAF will ever by another pure Navy jet unless they are forced to. Anyone who thinks that has never experienced USAF/USN rivalry!
- Buy Typhoons or Rafales? - again, like hell that will happen outside the realm of whiffing!
- Start a new 5th or even 6th Gen Fighter program (maybe even with UCAS)? - What, reset the JSF clock to Day 1? Well that makes sense...NOT!!! What makes anyone think the same supposed delays that have impacted the F-35 won't raise themselves again? What's more, you just pushed back the in-service date another 10 - 15yrs at least. Smart!!!
USN:
- Keep with the Super Hornet? Whilst a possible, the USN would fight this due to it almost making them a second rate player (only last year, the USN publicly stated they were looking at the F-35 to actually replace the Super Hornet), and would start to therefore put their precious carriers at risk from budget cuts etc.
- Start a new 5th Gen Fighter program? - Again, not a sensible move!
USMC:
- Keep the Harriers and Classic Hornets going? - Same issue as the USAF with F15s/F-16s. In fact, possibly even worse given the platforms' capabilities and the fact that neither is in production anymore.
- Accept Super Hornets - possible, but an extreme compromise that is totally at odds with years of tactics/concepts of operation and extremely limiting. I would also hasten to add that this would risk seeing the USMC Air Wings simply being re-absorbed into the USN.
- Start a new 5th Gen, VTOL Fighter program? - Again, not a sensible move and one unlikely to ever get support.
Now let’s also look at the non-US partners (and existing/future FMS operators – Israel, Japan, Spain, Singapore, South Korea etc.). Well to begin with, for the US Govt to try to cancel the F-35 (and it would take nothing less then the US Govt) means pissing off a lot of their allies (not to mention their own domestic industries - hundreds of which, employing tens of thousands of staff, would be impacted – great thing to do to your high-tech industry in the middle of the GFC!). These would then mostly go to the Non-US competitors: Typhoon, Rafale etc. Boeing might pick up a couple with Super Hornet, but most would be too pissed off with the USA to give them anything.
Cancel the STOVL Version!
It has been suggested that the solution to the supposed problem is to cancel the STOVL variant. However, quite apart from the counters to it even being a problem that I have already provided above, if this were cancelled not only are the USMC left wanting, so to are the RN FAA (especially given the debacle of the on again/off again variant switch already gone through) as well as the Marina Militare and eventually most likey the Arma Aerea de la Armada Espanola. Without the F-35B on the cards, there are going to be a lot of current Harrier users getting quite nervous about their long term prospects.
I could go on, but that would just be reiterating the points raised above already... :
BTW, as for comments such as “Why don't you acknowledge that critics have been right about cost and schedule so far”, let’s just say that you critics really need to focus your efforts on selling your services to the companies involved, the Governments and military services and most of all the treasuries of the world. It would be nice to always be correct and to be able to refer to your crystal balls. Those mere mortals amongst us simply have to make do with using prior experience, best and educated guesses, careful planning and forecasting… :
