A slightly odd take from CDR Salamander there; South Korea has basically built its own triad, the only thing that's missing is a nuclear warhead. While undeniably "conventional" ballistic missiles do go "boom" their utility is still debatable at best and, as stated above, in certain contexts (none more so than the Korean peninsula) disambiguation is a huge issue. Also, the Nork leadership in its bid to secure their power is quite obviously building a nuclear arsenal to be used from day one of an unrestricted conflict, probably to deny external lines of supply and enforcements initially.
They seem to be betting that the U.S. in such a case might hesitate to escalate. The calculation might be different if South Korea had more sovereign options when faced with such dire circumstances. Not that I'd be happy with proliferation but the policy of striving for a "nuclear free Korean peninsula" is delusional, the only context in which the Kim dynasty refers to that prospect is in the U.S. withdrawing all its forces and not providing any kind of security guarantees anymore.
Interesting post is interesting. You do seem to have a North Korean focus; challenging subject as reliable information is hard to come by.
Anyway, in the "signaling capabilities by testing" competition South Korea seems to be quite reliably ahead in the category of SLBMs, designing and producing the necessary submarines themselves. Quite an impressive streak of successes in fact once they became convinced that they should set their minds at that; while these efforts are perhaps focused more on a singular threat than other democratic states in the area, I can't help but think what they could contribute to projects such as Australia's new attack submarines under the new auspices of AUKUS. The rather vague (apart from transfer of HEU reactor tech) designs could profit from South Korea's experience in expediting time sensitive defense projects.
Plenty of non-nuclear ballistic missiles out there, every GMLRS for a start, Scuds, any Frogs still in inventory, Tochka, Iskander etc. And they've been used in the Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years. North Korea has 600+ Scud derivatives (Hwasong 5 to 9) and the Tochka derivative Hwasong 11 , so in any hostilities on the Korean peninsula there will be plenty of ballistic missiles flying.
It's when you get up to MRBM/IRBM range they start to become a bit rarer, and optionally nuclear, but there's the Israeli Jericho II, Saudi DF-3s, the Iranian Shahabs, the longer ranged bits of the North Korean Hwasong series, and the Chinese DF-3 and DF-26.
Hyunmoo 4 is supposedly a development of Hyunmoo 2C, which at 800km range falls into the SRBM category. Reportedly any limits on missile development agreed with the US were dropped when Trump visited in 2017. While North Korea might believe it could neutralise land-based Hyunmoo 2s with conventional or special forces attacks, it's much more difficult to do that if they're at sea, or under it. And of course South Korea believes it could become a nuclear power with about six months worth of development, and the platform will already be there, which has to give Kim Jong-Un something to think about.
Ah yes of course. In the case of South Korea vs North, the distances are so small, the missiles can only be tactical - Pershing / Pluton / Hades: 200 to 400 miles range at most.
The "rule" I mentionned mostly applies to IRBM / ICBM and 500 miles range+
No risk a major nuclear power mistake a non-nuclear, tactical missile for an nuclear-loaded-ICBM.
Interesting post is interesting. You do seem to have a North Korean focus; challenging subject as reliable information is hard to come by.
Anyway, in the "signaling capabilities by testing" competition South Korea seems to be quite reliably ahead in the category of SLBMs, designing and producing the necessary submarines themselves. Quite an impressive streak of successes in fact once they became convinced that they should set their minds at that; while these efforts are perhaps focused more on a singular threat than other democratic states in the area, I can't help but think what they could contribute to projects such as Australia's new attack submarines under the new auspices of AUKUS. The rather vague (apart from transfer of HEU reactor tech) designs could profit from South Korea's experience in expediting time sensitive defense projects.
Because Australia switched from France to the United States, instead of 2030 they will get new submarines in 2040 because Australia wants to be one of big boys while Americans effectively undermined their relationship with France and rest of European democracies when they look at treatment of a fellow European country they in union with.
I would not assert that South Korea as being ahead in SLBMs when launch process is similar to Indian K-13 and size and range of the missile being much shorter than first SLBM that North Korea tested all the way back in 2016.
Interesting post is interesting. You do seem to have a North Korean focus; challenging subject as reliable information is hard to come by.
Anyway, in the "signaling capabilities by testing" competition South Korea seems to be quite reliably ahead in the category of SLBMs, designing and producing the necessary submarines themselves. Quite an impressive streak of successes in fact once they became convinced that they should set their minds at that; while these efforts are perhaps focused more on a singular threat than other democratic states in the area, I can't help but think what they could contribute to projects such as Australia's new attack submarines under the new auspices of AUKUS. The rather vague (apart from transfer of HEU reactor tech) designs could profit from South Korea's experience in expediting time sensitive defense projects.
Because Australia switched from France to the United States, instead of 2030 they will get new submarines in 2040 because Australia wants to be one of big boys while Americans effectively undermined their relationship with France and rest of European democracies when they look at treatment of a fellow European country they in union with.
I would not assert that South Korea as being ahead in SLBMs when launch process is similar to Indian K-13 and size and range of the missile being much shorter than first SLBM that North Korea tested all the way back in 2016.
Most European countries are exasperated with France in the current submarine hoopla, not with Australia. If France's response had been more measured, maybe that would have been different, but as it stands now there's a feeling that France was behaving a bit like a toddler.
Also LOL at expecting the Short-Fin Barracuda in 2030. The way the program was going 2030 would be when the drawings were finalized...
Most European countries are exasperated with France in the current submarine hoopla, not with Australia. If France's response had been more measured, maybe that would have been different, but as it stands now there's a feeling that France was behaving a bit like a toddler.
Also LOL at expecting the Short-Fin Barracuda in 2030. The way the program was going 2030 would be when the drawings were finalized...
Remember that Australia repeteadly changed parameters for specifications and capabilities of submarine they want hence delays and slow progress while France reactions is justifiable as deal is a deal as just outright changing mind without any negotiations and formal cancellation is actually childish behavior simply because someone else offered something more potent.
Australia could have asked France for nuclear power if they were made aware that United States is willing to provide and for France to provide counteroffer.
Most European countries are exasperated with France in the current submarine hoopla, not with Australia. If France's response had been more measured, maybe that would have been different, but as it stands now there's a feeling that France was behaving a bit like a toddler.
Also LOL at expecting the Short-Fin Barracuda in 2030. The way the program was going 2030 would be when the drawings were finalized...
Remember that Australia repeteadly changed parameters for specifications and capabilities of submarine they want hence delays and slow progress while France reactions is justifiable as deal is a deal as just outright changing mind without any negotiations and formal cancellation is actually childish behavior simply because someone else offered something more potent.
Australia could have asked France for nuclear power if they were made aware that United States is willing to provide and for France to provide counteroffer.
In how far Australia is to blame for the delays there can be argument. What's not up for debate is the notion that they could ask France for nuke subs.
The answer is no. Well, technically yes, but the practicalities make it a non-starter.
French nuke subs must be refueled repeatedly during their lifetime. This means that Australia would either have to develop it's own nuclear industry to produce enriched uranium, or it would have to regularly send it's subs to France for fuel.
There is no political will or desire in Australia to start a nuclear industry, and to rely on another nation for refueling your SSNs is strategically untenable.
The US and the UK, however, build reactor cores which will last the life of the submarine.
Australia does not have any notable arms industry, it already relies on others and this excuse of them having to send nuclear submarine to France if they choose to stay with France and have LEU reactors is just utterly disingenuous nonsense that justifies absolutely nothing.
I cannot stop thinking of the utility of what the South Korean navy is building here. A relatively large, modern SSK with 6 and soon 10 launch tubes for large cruise or ballistic missiles. Via Naval News, just look at this beautiful beast; If the day of assuming any SLBM launch being nuclear is...
The South Korean sub is basically a smaller conventional Virginia. That is no where near a valid argument for more Columbias. Now if you want to use it to argue for more Virginias or a non-nuclear Virginia, then sure. The US already has a non-nuclear "SLBM" in the works with the sub launched HGV program.
I cannot stop thinking of the utility of what the South Korean navy is building here. A relatively large, modern SSK with 6 and soon 10 launch tubes for large cruise or ballistic missiles. Via Naval News, just look at this beautiful beast; If the day of assuming any SLBM launch being nuclear is...
The South Korean sub is basically a smaller conventional Virginia. That is no where near a valid argument for more Columbias. Now if you want to use it to argue for more Virginias or a non-nuclear Virginia, then sure. The US already has a non-nuclear "SLBM" in the works with the sub launched HGV program.
Australia does not have any notable arms industry, it already relies on others and this excuse of them having to send nuclear submarine to France if they choose to stay with France and have LEU reactors is just utterly disingenuous nonsense that justifies absolutely nothing.
Not quoting someone when you reply to them is... Impolite. Yes, let's go with impolite.
Furthermore, we ARE talking about the Australia which build it's previous submarines, it's latest destroyers, it's LPD, and the coming frigates? Which has an electronics industry capable enough for good radars?
Yes, they're going about it back-asswards, but they ARE trying to become less dependant on others as far as arms go.
And your little rant about the LEU reactors assumes that the relation with France would stay hunky-dory for decades. As we have just seen, international relations can freeze and thaw in days. Meanwhile with a UK/US boat, refueling will never be a worry.
You might not like it, but that's a serious strategic consideration.
Not quoting someone when you reply to them is... Impolite. Yes, let's go with impolite.
Furthermore, we ARE talking about the Australia which build it's previous submarines, it's latest destroyers, it's LPD, and the coming frigates? Which has an electronics industry capable enough for good radars?
Yes, they're going about it back-asswards, but they ARE trying to become less dependant on others as far as arms go.
And your little rant about the LEU reactors assumes that the relation with France would stay hunky-dory for decades. As we have just seen, international relations can freeze and thaw in days. Meanwhile with a UK/US boat, refueling will never be a worry.
You might not like it, but that's a serious strategic consideration.
Do not talk about assuming when you're doing it and I don't care that I didn't quote you as my reply was prompt along I dislike that quote of a quote is being quoted endlessly that are pointless unless it was to be quoted in some other thread as reference point of some debate.
It doesn't change fact that Australia relies on others as it seeks others to design submarines and technology for those and what there is something of note in Australia, it is always owned by a foreign company or if something domestic, it is licensing with limitations on it.
Remember that Australia repeteadly changed parameters for specifications and capabilities of submarine they want hence delays and slow progress while France reactions is justifiable as deal is a deal
1) Show me a major defence project that didn't include multiple changes in specifications. My experience is that getting the final specs before the original delivery date is basically unheard of.
2) Deals with contracted exit options are still deals, even when you invoke the exit option.
1) Show me a major defence project that didn't include multiple changes in specifications. My experience is that getting the final specs before the original delivery date is basically unheard of.
2) Deals with contracted exit options are still deals, even when you invoke the exit option.
Anyway, while the operational requirements and environments between the Shortfin Barracuda and KSS-III are obviously somewhat different they are not too dissimilar as far as basics go.
KSS-III understandably somewhat smaller (certainly not definite numbers, correct if wrong but 3358 vs 4500 t, 83.5 vs 97 m long, 8.8 vs 9.6 m beam, both diesel electric but lead acid batteries vs lithium ion, both at least 20 kn submerged, 18 000 vs 10 000 NM range, 80 vs 50 day missions, 60 vs 50 complement). I can't imagine South Korea having many conflicts of interests here with Australia/AUKUS and presumably now as the KSS-III program is fairly mature program some of the design and production talent might be available with some very up to date knowledge.
Hasn't anyone posted H I Sutton's chat on the KSS-III yet (hi there, covert_shores)? Sorry if this is a repost.
Nuclear submarines offer significant advantages over non-nuclear ones. South Korea as been looking to acquire them for many years and now has the industry to do it.
www.navalnews.com
Nice work on the image too from our very own HI Sutton
Nope. Germans got there first and smaller, launching ballistic missiles from the deck of a Type IXC U-Boat way back in 1942. These weren't *much* as ballistic missiles go... but that's what they were. The Soviet Zulu class boats were 2387 tons submerged, the German Type IXC were 1232. Wouldn't surprise me if someone launched similar craptacular rockets from even smaller subs.
Missile Forces of the Republic of KoreaDecker Eveleth 7/16/2021Cite as:Decker Eveleth. "Missile Forces of the Republic of Korea." A Boy and His Blog, June 16th 2021. DOWNLOAD THE KML FILE Introduction North Korea’s missile forces, for obvious reasons, have attracted quite a bit of attention...
Hyunmoo 4 is supposedly a development of Hyunmoo 2C, which at 800km range falls into the SRBM category. Reportedly any limits on missile development agreed with the US were dropped when Trump visited in 2017.
Details about Hyunmoo IV series ballistic missiles are severely lacking but one thing for sure is that Hyunmoo IV-1 is not related to Hyunmoo II-C. More on it on the next post.
The Korea-US Missile Range Guideline was officially abolished in 2021, although as you've noted, there were substantial changes to the Guideline (no more payload limit) meant it was basically nominal after that point. After 2017, a more important aspect of the Guideline was that it limited the use of SRBs on South Korean space LVs. This was changed after 2020 revision which stated that solid rockets could from that point on be freely used for purposes not related to the military. in 2021 it was completely abolished all together.
Now's a good time to provide some overview about SoKor ballistic missiles. There are two kinds of missiles (including cruise missiles) in use by SoKor: One are those operated and controlled by the individual units of the respective services. These are for example the AGM-84K SLAM-ER and the KEP-350K Taurus in use by the ROKAF, SSM-750K in use by the ROKN and ATACMS and KTSSM in use by the ROKA. The other are the missiles that are either operated or controlled by the Army Missile Strategic Command. These are Hyunmoo series missiles, both ballistic and cruise. Even the Hyunmoo III series cruise missiles (called Haesong II and III by the navy) and the newer SLBMs launched from the ROKN ships are controlled by the AMSC. The difference between the missiles operated by individual services and AMSC stems from its intended target's nature, as well as restructuring of the Army Missile Command (found in 2006) into the AMSC (2022). For example, the ATACMS and M270A1s were operated by AMC before it was reassigned to Army Fires Brigade under Ground Operations Command.
logos of AMSC and Fires Brigade respectively.
So firstly, KTSSM. KTSSM is a ATACMS replacement (although ATACMS will continue to serve for years to come even after KTSSMs are fielded in numbers) in development and fielding within ROKA Fires Brigade. There are two versions of it: KTSSM-I and KTSSM-II. KTSSM-I is a SRBM operated from fixed launchers fielded on Fires Brigade batter sites. They are equipped with penetration-thermobaric warheads and are intended to neutralize North Korean forward artillery bases which are heavily fortified and are often connected via tunnels under mountainous terrains. KTSSM-II is a mobile version of KTSSM-I intended to be used from K-239 MRL in form of a cannister. It is still under development and is projected to be fielded in around 2 years' time. KTSSM-II again has 2 versions, one armed with the same penetration-thermobaric warhead as the KTSSM-I and another armed with unitary HE. They are named Block-I and II respectively.
Next are the Hyunmoo missiles operated by AMSC. In terms of official naming, there are 3 different types of Hyunmoo ballistic missiles in use by ROKA: Hyunmoo II series, IV series and a yet unnamed high-penetration Hyunmoo.
Though, classifying Hyunmoo ballistic missiles based on its official naming is seriously misleading and I'll classify them otherwise: 1) Hyunmoo IIA and B 2) Hyunmoo IIC and a newer, unnamed 2-ton penetration warhead variant 3) Hyunmoo IV-1 4) Hyunmoo IV-2 and 4 5) Unnamed new Hyunmoo with a 8-ton penetration warhead.
1) are the Iskander-esque missiles that are well known. Development of IIA started after the first revision of Korea-US Missile Range Guidelines. It allowed a development of solid motor rockets with a payload of up to 500kg with a range of 300km. Fielding of these missiles are known to have been started in late 2000s, although its existence was only officially confirmed and revealed in early 2010s. Similarly, IIB was developed following the second revision to the guideline in 2012. A new guideline extended the range restrictions to 800km. Range and payload were able to be offset which meant a solid rocket with heavier payload was also permitted should the range reduce accordingly. As a result, IIB has a range of 500km and a warhead heavier than 500kg, some speculating it to be around a ton.
There are allegations circling Hyunmoo IIA and B, that Korea didn't abide the range guidelines and that Hyunmoo IIA had a performance exceeding the restrictions. This seems to be reinforced by the similarities between IIA and B as well as the newer information disclosed concerning IIC (explained below). According to this speculation, the difference between IIA and B are essentially only their warheads, the former being cluster munition and the latter unitary penetration, as revealed.
There are speculations of Hyunmoo IIA and Bs being developed with the assistance from the Russians due to its similar looks to the Iskander, though no concrete connections or evidence exists. They are both launched from a 4X4 TEL and primarily replaced Hyunmoo I.
(impact footage of IIA[from 0:8 to 0:17] and IIB[0:20 to 0:25] respectively, showing their cluster munition warhead and unitary penetration warhead)
The importance of Hyunmoo IIA and B are that they were the first modern ballistic missile systems fielded by the ROKA alongside ATACMS that were capable of precision targeting. They were and are primarily used against TSTs, most notably the North Korean TELs and underground facilities.
2) are pretty much different missiles from the original IIA and B missiles although their designs are partially based on IIA and B.
IIC was first confirmed to have been in development ever since the second revision to the agreement and was first revealed in 2017 just a few months before the 3rd revision to the guideline. Since it was developed following new guidelines of 2012, it was said to have 800km range, although in 2022 it was reported that the missile was way more capable and had a longer range (around 1000km) and a heavier payload than what was agreed upon in the second revision. Although these are not official disclosures (just like any other information regarding any of the Hyunmoo missiles), it was reported by accountable reporters that enter MoD and are in line with previous allegations and leaks.
Unlike IIA and B, IIC's warhead is a separating MaRV. There's a development of this warhead equipped with a radar seeker, akin to Pershing-2 which is said to be intended for ASBM purposes but like everything else, its intended purposes were never disclosed. Clear image of RV in standalone was never revealed, although there's a footage of its reentry into the sea during the revealed test-fire.
Due to longer range and heavier payload, 2) are much larger in size and are transported on newer 5X5 TEL that looks similar to HEMMT. It is rumored that the L-SAM launch vehicle as well as the MFR mount are also to use the same vehicle.
(you could clearly see the size difference of the TEL as well as the missile canisters compared to the previous IIA/B TEL [nicknamed "feelers" in Korean forums since the side-view mirrors look like feelers of an insect] and canisters.)
A newer version of Hyunmoo II equipped with 2-ton penetrator warhead revealed last year is yet to be officially named, albeit there is a separate naming system within the DoD/AMSC for their missiles (meaning, "Hyunmoo-#X" is only a public name), which means this new missile obviously would have its own name, just not disclosed. This new missile seems to have a similar booster section to the IIC. It will still need a different guidance system to the IIC since unlike the IIC this newer missile is unitary.
3) again is a much larger missile compared to both the IIC and the 2-ton penetrator. Hyunmoo IV-1 retains the range of over 800km all the while armed with a penetrator warhead in excess of 2 tons (reports regarding the mass of the penetrator ranges from 2 tons to 4 tons). Not a single footage, picture and data has been revealed regarding this missile and it is therefore unknown which TEL this missile is fired from (or if it's fired from a TEL or silo in a first place.). Although the namesake points towards commonalities to other Hyunmoo IV series ballistic missiles, it is believed that they are physically not related to one another. It was test fired and flew 400km on a lofted trajectory.
4) are naval ballistic missiles, IV-2 ship-launched and IV-4 submarine launched respectively. The South Korean SLBM which became quite famous when it was revealed last year is the IV-4. Information regarding IV-2 is even more scarce, although I've arbitrarily grouped them since both are naval ballistic missiles and it is heavily likely that a ship launched IV-2 is based on Hyunmoo IV-4 SLBM. Existence of IV-3 is unknown, although some speculate that the name is reserved for air-launched ballistic missile for the KF-21.
Although some speculate that Hyunmoo IV-4 is based on IIB, such as the English Wikipedia article, there are no evidence supporting this speculation. Other speculation suggests that it is a development of IIC, shrinked in scale, but this view again has no evidence to support. Combining the information leaked since the reveal, it rather seems like a new development than wholly based on existing designs. There is no information regarding its size, mass, range or payload.
5) is the newest, biggest and heaviest variant of Hyunmoo. Some calls it the Hyunmoo V but just like the 2-ton penetrator, its name has not yet been revealed. Although it is the newest, it has more information revealed (during parliamentary National Defense Committee Audit) than both 3) and 4). It was first tested in 2021 and was fired towards the sea south of Jeju Isle., demonstrating a CEP of 3m on a high sea-state condition and has a whopping 8-ton warhead and weighs 36 tons in total. Most of the warhead mass are the penetrator casing, while the explosive mass is minimal in comparison.
With its precision, reentry speed and penetrator mass, I don't think there's any North Korean underground facility this thing will not be able to penetrate into. Basically, unless NK fields their own ABM capabilities, it could replace MOP/NGP's role on the Korean theatre.
What was the most surprising for me was the fact that this missile is also launched from a TEL platform. For such reason it is cold-launched unlike most of the previous Hyunmoo ballistic missiles (bar the Hyunmoo IV-4 SLBM).
(the new missile has what seems to be base-thrusters for divert control after launch. Its fins are folded inside the canister, which some suggests point towards possible development as SLBM but I am very much doubtful considering its size)
As you can see, most of the South Korean ballistic missiles, especially the newer ones are armed with penetration warhead and are growing in warhead mass/size and penetration depth. I personally think that this reflects the newer South Korean military doctrine that shifted from defence and counter-offensive to preemptive-strike and "Massive Punishment and Retaliation". This is very evident by the later OPLANs like OPLAN 5027 and its successors. Since preemptive strike is the new norm, instead of ballistic missile assets that targets NK tactical ground targets, they should now focus on eliminating NK higher ups, including their ruling class and leadership, their ballistic missile silos and TEL bases. Their extensive bunker and underground facility network are well-known and ballistic missiles with high penetrating capability are essential to clearing those out.
Also to note is their plan to shift towards Strategic Command from their current AMSC structure that only controls surface based strike assets. This is an initiative introduced by current administration which plans to integrate offensive as well as defensive missile assets with retaliatory strike capabilities and put them under one unified structure. This means an integration of AMSC with Air Force's Air & Missile Defense Command alongside a few other assets like military surveillance satellites (project 425) and F-35s, as well as the KTSSMs. If a new integrated Strategic Command is actually found, it will control all assets related to the "Three-Axis" strategy ("Kill Chain", "Air-Missile Defense" and "Massive Punishment and Retaliation"). To summarize, from the viewpoint based on the Three-Axis strategy, earlier Korean ballistic missiles like Hyunmoo IIA or the newer tactical BMs like KTSSM (and also possibly Hyunmoo IV-4) focuses on expanding Kill Chain assets with quick striking capabilities against mobile TSTs like TELs, whereas the newer models are focused in MPR, meaning their targets are hardened immobile structures.
This was a brief summary of current SoKor ballistic missile assets and their operational doctrines and structures, and I hope that it answers some question like "what does SoKor intend to do with all those non-nuclear ballistic missiles?".
Hello @overscan (PaulMM), sorry to bother you yet again, but shouldn't this thread be elsewhere than The Bar or Discussion and Speculation section? I mean the thread sure is full of speculations since there are very few confirmed information, but the topic itself isn't "off-topic, alternate history and what-if" isn't it?
Hello @overscan (PaulMM), sorry to bother you yet again, but shouldn't this thread be elsewhere than The Bar or Discussion and Speculation section? I mean the thread sure is full of speculations since there are very few confirmed information, but the topic itself isn't "off-topic, alternate history and what-if" isn't it?
In the official video distributed by the Ministry of National Defense of South Korea on October 1, 2022, dedicated to the traditionally celebrated October 1 Day of the Armed Forces of South Korea, a new and previously unknown South Korean Hyunmoo 5 (V) ballistic missile "with the largest warhead...
Seoul (AFP) June 16, 2023 - South Korea's military said Friday it had successfully retrieved a large chunk of a crashed North Korean space rocket from the sea bed after 15 days of complex salvage operations.
This site uses cookies to help personalise content, tailor your experience and to keep you logged in if you register.
By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our use of cookies.
