MOTS Phantom for the RN?

Say the 57 review concludes that a longer range, multi-role fighter is required (as historically discussed). The UK firms don't have anything on the books that can fulfill this need, or even an OR developed for them to tender against. As a stop gap then UK jumps onboard with Phantom from the begining - maybe ticely tieing into the UK-US rapprochement around nuclear tech around this time period. Lightning is left as the F.1 procurement (or abandoned entirely) as an even more gap fill until F-4Bs arrive in 62 and Bloodhound II in 64.
Basically what Ive been saying, starting in 1956.
Meanwhile an OR for a "multi role combat aircraft" is derived that wraps up a longer range multi role fighter, possibly with TSR2, Buccaneer S.2 aims, and maybe P.1154RN into a single package for competition amongst a streamlined UK Industry who've had more time to merge. Maybe something like Vickers 580 series or DH.127 (CTOL). Or maybe it's all too hard and UK simply ends up buying later Phantom variants.
Again, close to what I've suggested.
 
I'd expect the carrot to UK industry would be a new UK (only probably) multi role aircraft to pick up, but with good fall back option of more Phantoms if this doesn't pan out. Choices of whether to split up into multiple projects for land/sea based strike/recce/fighter or make requirement compromises to allow a single base type.
I see no reason in this particular departure from history in buying a stock Phantom does not mean P.1154, HS.681 and TSR.2 don't die.
The only ointment then is whether the RAF whines the J79 is no good for its FGR.2s (I don't see why they would but.....well.... if they can beef to not have the same toys as the Navy, they will!).

With the P.1154 and TSR.2 sagas ongoing at that time I'm not sure there are many carrots to dangle, especially post-Plowden. Maybe the Navy gets stock Phantoms and the RAF gets stock Mirage Gs?
 
Because its better and available, never mind the cost side. There was plenty of precedent at this period of UK procuring US aircraft when UK industry couldn't deliver. e.g. B-29 Washingtons, F-86 Sabres or Skybolt / Polaris

Say the 57 review concludes that a longer range, multi-role fighter is required (as historically discussed). The UK firms don't have anything on the books that can fulfill this need, or even an OR developed for them to tender against. As a stop gap then UK jumps onboard with Phantom from the begining - maybe ticely tieing into the UK-US rapprochement around nuclear tech around this time period. Lightning is left as the F.1 procurement (or abandoned entirely) as an even more gap fill until F-4Bs arrive in 62 and Bloodhound II in 64.

Meanwhile an OR for a "multi role combat aircraft" is derived that wraps up a longer range multi role fighter, possibly with TSR2, Buccaneer S.2 aims, and maybe P.1154RN into a single package for competition amongst a streamlined UK Industry who've had more time to merge. Maybe something like Vickers 580 series or DH.127 (CTOL). Or maybe it's all too hard and UK simply ends up buying later Phantom variants.

Yes, apparently Macmillan was quoted twice by the aviation press in 1956 saying something to the effect that the RAF Fighter Command was not fit for purpose, its short range interceptors were unsuitable and a different type of fighter might be required for EoS duties. The of course is the urgent Venom replacement of 1958 that resulted in the Hunter FGA/FR conversions.

However, at the same time Britain was experiencing a balance of payments crunch and the US stopped MWADP funding that paid for the Sabres and a good part of the Javelins and Valiants. So simply buying US is not a good solution, leaving aside that the F4B wasn't in production until 1961 and may not have been available for export.

The answer is that by early 1958 BAC has completed detailed design for improved, flexible Lightning. This included the kinked and cambered wing first tested from 1957, a much bigger (than 250 gal) fully area-ruled ventral tank, fuel in flaps, jettisonable tanks above wings and wide range of attack or recce stores in place of fuel in the ventral fairing. This resulted in 40% more range than the F1 with no impact on performance.
 
I see no reason in this particular departure from history in buying a stock Phantom does not mean P.1154, HS.681 and TSR.2 don't die.

It's a chicken and egg thing. In this scenario previous RAF procurements mean that they are not in the market for a large fleet of supersonic fighter-bombers in 1962 when NBMR-3a and 4 were at their peak. On the other hand, the RAF is in the market for a small fleet of VTOL attack aircraft along the lines of NBMR-3b which could be met by the P1127.
 
Or many other alternatives that are better than trying to hand wave Lightning into something it isn't
 
The potential departure points for the Navy to take a different path to a new aircraft for the 1960s and 1970s for use from CTOL carriers are probably the following:

1. The original NA.47 requirement proceeds and produces a new aircraft (Link)
2. The Navy somehow manages to continue development of the P.177RN - IMO an unattractive prospect
3. The original OR.346 type moves forward producing a large VG airframe with an internal weapons bay (an evolution of the Type 581) that is delivered in strike and fighter variants as envisaged by the RN and included in their own programme in 1960 (Link 1, Link 2)
4. NBMR.3, once this becomes a factor in determining the next generation of joint aircraft it goes the RN way and they get their preferred type 584 variant (Link)
5. Eric Brown, then Deputy Director Naval Air Warfare, gets his way and the Navy extricates itself from the P.1154RN/NBMR.3 and pursues the Vickers Type 583 he advocated for
6. As actually happened, but it could have happened earlier, the Navy adopts the F4H

There are plenty of real world departure points. For 1961 onwards, Naval Air Division despised the P.1154 from the outset. It had never wanted it, Director Naval Air Warfare had rejected VTOL in 1956, it only became the Navy's future aircraft because Ministers decreed it in a flawed effort to rationalise the aircraft programme. The irony being that the Navy's own idea, a VG aircraft, would have been a much better candidate. The Type 581 reworked with a Type 583 planform instead of the trim engines, coupled with the Navy loosening its 80 knot landing speed requirement, could have produced an aircraft that satisfied the strike and fighter requirements of both services. The challenge would have been the RAF who would have detested having a common aircraft with the Royal Navy, especially one they perceived as validating aircraft carriers - OR.355 was written to undermine the case for carriers.
 
Or many other alternatives that are better than trying to hand wave Lightning into something it isn't

I don't do that. I only refer to the minimum change proposals that were put forward (and into service in many cases) rather than the likes of the P.6 or P.8 or VG proposals.
 
1. NA.47 could have resolved into a jet only fighter requirement had certain factors been fully grasped at the time. This could well have led to either a domestic effort of adopting whatever the USN chose.
But from the UK perspective the F8U-III fits better. Frankly this explains why Vought was asked about it.
Though it could just lead to F4 and in fact F4 before it got J79.....

2. F.177 could only rationally proceed by evolutionary changes. Essentially becoming a low supersonic Light Fighter/Attack using jet only.
Think inferior F8 or superior Etendard.
Although..... Dassault's missing Supersonic Etendard (with reheat and AI set) could have ridden to the rescue here.

3. It seems plausible Type 581 would further evolve as per history into something much more like Type 589/590.
Essentially the 50,000lb max weight twin Spey VG multirole aircraft.....potentially superior in performance terms to Tornado....without being F111.

4. Type 584/585 in theory will meet NMBR.3 and in revised versions sans VTOL features could continue and meet requirements. This could form the basis of Anglo-French collaboration considering the Mirage G and AN ambitions....it also fits as a Starfighter successor.....

However this is where HSA missed a trick and should have already set Brough on the P.141 to P.146 blown wing concepts path, in parallel with HS VTOL studies that led to P.1154. Essentially having Brough's designs Ready to go when NMBR.3 fails.

5. Type 583 meets all requirements and could provide RAF with a reasonable MRI platform. Effectively UKVG only five years earlier, or Tornado but earlier and all British.

6. See 1.
 
1. NA.47 could have resolved into a jet only fighter requirement had certain factors been fully grasped at the time. This could well have led to either a domestic effort of adopting whatever the USN chose.
But from the UK perspective the F8U-III fits better. Frankly this explains why Vought was asked about it.
Though it could just lead to F4 and in fact F4 before it got J79.....

2. F.177 could only rationally proceed by evolutionary changes. Essentially becoming a low supersonic Light Fighter/Attack using jet only.
Think inferior F8 or superior Etendard.
Although..... Dassault's missing Supersonic Etendard (with reheat and AI set) could have ridden to the rescue here.

3. It seems plausible Type 581 would further evolve as per history into something much more like Type 589/590.
Essentially the 50,000lb max weight twin Spey VG multirole aircraft.....potentially superior in performance terms to Tornado....without being F111.

4. Type 584/585 in theory will meet NMBR.3 and in revised versions sans VTOL features could continue and meet requirements. This could form the basis of Anglo-French collaboration considering the Mirage G and AN ambitions....it also fits as a Starfighter successor.....

However this is where HSA missed a trick and should have already set Brough on the P.141 to P.146 blown wing concepts path, in parallel with HS VTOL studies that led to P.1154. Essentially having Brough's designs Ready to go when NMBR.3 fails.

5. Type 583 meets all requirements and could provide RAF with a reasonable MRI platform. Effectively UKVG only five years earlier, or Tornado but earlier and all British.

6. See 1.

I think the pre 57 DWP proposals depend on the RN having a 6-carrier fleet. Once the RN goes from 6 to 4 carriers the number of fighters drops to a number so low that the production run cannot amortise the development costs over a large enough number of aircraft. Added to this is that by the late 50s there is no getting around the long list of non-negotiable capabilities that the aircraft cannot help but being expensive; Mach 2, good around the carrier, all-weather guided-missile weapons system etc.

I don't deny there are a lot of interesting proposals for the requirement, but they will all run up against an expensive development cost and low production numbers with a high(ish) unit cost.
 
I think the pre 57 DWP proposals depend on the RN having a 6-carrier fleet. Once the RN goes from 6 to 4 carriers the number of fighters drops to a number so low that the production run cannot amortise the development costs over a large enough number of aircraft. Added to this is that by the late 50s there is no getting around the long list of non-negotiable capabilities that the aircraft cannot help but being expensive; Mach 2, good around the carrier, all-weather guided-missile weapons system etc.

I don't deny there are a lot of interesting proposals for the requirement, but they will all run up against an expensive development cost and low production numbers with a high(ish) unit cost.
I think you mean on 1.
So my answer is if NA.47 can be fulfilled by a jet only aircraft, this pulls the rug out of F.155.....unless the the rolls get reversed and the RAF has to take the same aircraft.

On 2. Again revised Saro P.177 gets to interim MRI delivery. Which is quite plausible.

On 3. This is where you have a point.

On.4 this is the RAF MRI platform, navalised. So we're talking 140 FAA and 170 RAF. Similarly about 70 AN and however many F2 was desired by the AdlA.

On 5. Essentially it could only go forward with the RAF onboard.
 
Both the RAF and RN only buy aircraft to meet operational requirements.
They do not buy aircraft just to please industry or aviation enthusiasts.
Off the shelf Phantoms could not operate from.existing RN carriers and only one CVA01 ship could be built by 1974. Industry persuaded the RN that Spey F4s could operate from existing ships. In the end only Ark could do so after conversion and with limited payloads. By the time a CVA02 could enter service in the early 80s the F4s would need a F111B equivalent.
The RAF realised it needed a theatre strike aircraft to deliver freefall nukes (Red Beard then WE177) from survivable airfields in UK, Cyprus and Singapore. On paper TSR2 could do this. By 1964 it was not clear that it could within reasonable predictable costs and the F111 had appeared as a credible alternative.
In a world where the RAF's job was to get nuclear payloads to targets with a limited conventional war role, P1154 looked ideal on paper. By 1964 the plane was late and fiendishly expensive and complicated. The Spey F4 already on order for the RN (and likely to be ordered as a Lightning replacement) offered a cheaper aircraft earlier.
The complicated VG designs offered to the RAF and RN (583 and 584) seem to me to be just as likely as F4K/M, P1154 and TSR2 to be fiendishly expensive and difficult.
It took another twenty years to get a similar VG design (MRCA) into service with German money and a lot of US know-how.
 
You mean the German licence of the F111 vg wing?
 
I think you mean on 1.
So my answer is if NA.47 can be fulfilled by a jet only aircraft, this pulls the rug out of F.155.....unless the the rolls get reversed and the RAF has to take the same aircraft.

On 2. Again revised Saro P.177 gets to interim MRI delivery. Which is quite plausible.

On 3. This is where you have a point.

On.4 this is the RAF MRI platform, navalised. So we're talking 140 FAA and 170 RAF. Similarly about 70 AN and however many F2 was desired by the AdlA.

On 5. Essentially it could only go forward with the RAF onboard.

The Saro 177 was a victim of both the drastic reduction in Fighter Command and the carrier fleet in the 57 DWP. With West Germany involvement it was a 3-legged stool and with the RAF pulling out its prospects waned to virtually beyond saving. Maybe if Japan showed its belated interest earlier it might have lingered on.

If the RAF has no requirement for NBMR3a & 4 then the RN is still left high and dry. A UKVG analogue in the early 60s has the same issue, if the RAF is good for a big fleet tactical fighters the RN is left high and dry.
 
Both the RAF and RN only buy aircraft to meet operational requirements.
They do not buy aircraft just to please industry ........

The RAF and RN must take into consideration industry (and a bunch of other stuff) when buying aircraft, not doing so it a reason why certain decisions are taken over others.

Sure, the Government and Services want to defend Britain and her interests, but that's not going to happen if the RAF and RN insist on buying kit that isn't politically palatable in other areas. Defence is dead money and its an important political objective to minimise the cost and impact, and if that means buying British in Sterling and propping up British employment to get the 2nd best bit of kit then that's better than being rejected for the best foreign kit and getting nothing.
 
A problem which is never addressed in these threads.
Let us assume CVA01 gets ordered in 1963 rather than kicked down the road to 1966.. She enters service in 1970 with an F4B and Buccaneer airgroup. CVA02 is laid fown in 1970 and completed in the late 1970s.
The incoming Thatcher government in 1979 inherits a decent but costly carrier force.
But its aicraft will need replacing (probably by F18s) by 1990.
In a gas turbine powered surface fleet CVA01 and 2 require specialist steam turbine crews.
A midlife SLEP US style in the 80s could re-engine both ships and keep them in service into the 90s but they will need replacing with new ships designed and built in the 90s.
Unfortunately this coincides with the peak build of the V class Trident submarines.
 
The RAF and RN must take into consideration industry (and a bunch of other stuff) when buying aircraft, not doing so it a reason why certain decisions are taken over others.

Sure, the Government and Services want to defend Britain and her interests, but that's not going to happen if the RAF and RN insist on buying kit that isn't politically palatable in other areas. Defence is dead money and its an important political objective to minimise the cost and impact, and if that means buying British in Sterling and propping up British employment to get the 2nd best bit of kit then that's better than being rejected for the best foreign kit and getting nothing.
That would make an "interesting" submission to Cabinet.
Apart from F111 (which died with East of Suez )the RAF did get something: the F4 and the C130. Both were better than anything built by UK industry (Lightning and Belfast).
 
That would make an "interesting" submission to Cabinet.
Apart from F111 (which died with East of Suez )the RAF did get something: the F4 and the C130. Both were better than anything built by UK industry (Lightning and Belfast).

The F4 would want to be better than the Lightning, it entered RAF a decade later and at a huge cost.

The Hercules is not better than the Belfast at lifting 78,000lb or 12' x 12' cross section loads or 150 passengers.
 
I wouldn't be convinced about this given the precedent at the time e.g. at this point then the RAF is using Thor missiles from US for their nuclear deterrent as a more critical role

But that was in a new field, where the UK had no hardware on the horizon for at least 5 years (or more).

Planes aren’t a new field for UK industry, they’re prestigious, and we’re quite capable of designing and building them.
 
The nub of the argument is flawed.
The UK has been forced by high labour costs and a small domestic market to abandon a purely national aerospace industry.
On the military side Jaguar, AV8, Tornado, Typhoon and F35 have all succeeded in giving the RAF decent equipment that has survived domestic political turbulence.
Civil aircraft manufacture has contracted but UK design and components continue to play a key part.
 
But that was in a new field, where the UK had no hardware on the horizon for at least 5 years (or more).

Planes aren’t a new field for UK industry, they’re prestigious, and we’re quite capable of designing and building them.
Must be why the UK bought Sabre, Washingtons, Phantoms, Hercules etc. historically

Civil aircraft manufacture has contracted but UK design and components continue to play a key part.
It has actually massively expanded, its simply that the UK became more specialised and around design, manufacture and support of key parts of the aircraft like engines and wings, rather than the "easy" but visible bit of bolting pieces of structure together.
 
The nub of the argument is flawed.
The UK has been forced by high labour costs and a small domestic market to abandon a purely national aerospace industry.
On the military side Jaguar, AV8, Tornado, Typhoon and F35 have all succeeded in giving the RAF decent equipment that has survived domestic political turbulence.
Civil aircraft manufacture has contracted but UK design and components continue to play a key part.

France managed to retain its own independent military aviation industry and Sweden did too apart from the engines. France isn't known for its great political stability.
 
Must be why the UK bought Sabre, Washingtons, Phantoms, Hercules etc. historically

The Sabre and Washingtons were stop gaps, Phantoms were necessities due to government trying to make the P1154 “all singing, all dancing”, and the Hercules came in with swingeing cuts of 1965.
 
I think the pre 57 DWP proposals depend on the RN having a 6-carrier fleet. Once the RN goes from 6 to 4 carriers the number of fighters drops to a number so low that the production run cannot amortise the development costs over a large enough number of aircraft. Added to this is that by the late 50s there is no getting around the long list of non-negotiable capabilities that the aircraft cannot help but being expensive; Mach 2, good around the carrier, all-weather guided-missile weapons system etc.

I don't deny there are a lot of interesting proposals for the requirement, but they will all run up against an expensive development cost and low production numbers with a high(ish) unit cost.
This is why the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, mandated in 1961 that all future fast jets should be joint RAF/RN developments.
That was fine and dandy on paper but when NMBR.3 looked like being the next big thing, everything was staked on it and the RAF was on board. Nobody asked the RN if they wanted VTOL. They didn't but had no choice but to buy whatever the RAF wanted - P.1154. NMBR.3 ended up a busted flush anyway, but the RAF was adamant it wanted V/STOL.
When the politicians finally wised up that mashing two different roles into one aircraft wouldn't work, the RN got Phantoms but as a consequence, when the RAF lost P.1154 in 1965, they were automatically obliged to buy Phantoms - which were not suited to ground attack and which led to Jaguar being purchased just the year after.

OR.346 was fantastic on paper, but once OR.356 came along shortly after to replace Sea Vixen, the strike aspects were emphasised as a Buccaneer replacement the RAF of course already had TSR.2 in development so it automatically pushed OR.346 back to the late 1970s as a tentative TSR.2 replacement, making it no good for the RN and having to devise new Bucc upgrades.
Now of course, when TSR.2 died the RAF was not forced to buy Buccaneers - they got F-111K over Bucc 3 (until of course F-111K was cancelled and then there was no alternative but to accept stock RN Buccs).

AFVG was meant to be dual Service but of course that died quickly and of course with the carriers earmarked for the scrappies in 1975 it made little sense then to develop a naval AFVG.

So the whole policy was a mish-mash of confusion with no real operational analysis of what either Service wanted. The RAF backed the wrong horse with V/STOL. Had they preserved with OR.346 for a VG-winged Type 583 it would have saved a lot of hassle. Yes it would have been expensive to develop but it could have replaced Sea Vixen, Buccaneer, Hunter, Javelin. It might even have killed TSR.2 earlier in the development path. The money saved would have been pretty useful all round. Production would be at least 300 aircraft, probably a little higher.
F-111K may still have been sought as a bigger strike aircraft, it might have emerged as a rival had the 583 series R&D costs been too high.
Probably means no Harrier - but hey I can live with that quite honestly.
Also means no AFVG (Dassault gets to play with its Mirage G without interference) and also means no MRCA, at least as we know it, although its highly likely that by the mid-70s the RAF and RN would have been looking at a successor for the early 80s and this probably would have been a European collaborative effort. Probably something like EFA but a little earlier and with a two-seat option.
 
France managed to retain its own independent military aviation industry and Sweden did too apart from the engines. France isn't known for its great political stability.

Before 1958 the 4th republic was crazily unstable : 12 years, 25 governements. Post 1958 however the 5th republic was extremely stable: the right by large stuck in power all the way to 1981.
 
This is why the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, mandated in 1961 that all future fast jets should be joint RAF/RN developments.
That was fine and dandy on paper but when NMBR.3 looked like being the next big thing, everything was staked on it and the RAF was on board. Nobody asked the RN if they wanted VTOL. They didn't but had no choice but to buy whatever the RAF wanted - P.1154. NMBR.3 ended up a busted flush anyway, but the RAF was adamant it wanted V/STOL.
When the politicians finally wised up that mashing two different roles into one aircraft wouldn't work, the RN got Phantoms but as a consequence, when the RAF lost P.1154 in 1965, they were automatically obliged to buy Phantoms - which were not suited to ground attack and which led to Jaguar being purchased just the year after.

OR.346 was fantastic on paper, but once OR.356 came along shortly after to replace Sea Vixen, the strike aspects were emphasised as a Buccaneer replacement the RAF of course already had TSR.2 in development so it automatically pushed OR.346 back to the late 1970s as a tentative TSR.2 replacement, making it no good for the RN and having to devise new Bucc upgrades.
Now of course, when TSR.2 died the RAF was not forced to buy Buccaneers - they got F-111K over Bucc 3 (until of course F-111K was cancelled and then there was no alternative but to accept stock RN Buccs).

AFVG was meant to be dual Service but of course that died quickly and of course with the carriers earmarked for the scrappies in 1975 it made little sense then to develop a naval AFVG.

So the whole policy was a mish-mash of confusion with no real operational analysis of what either Service wanted. The RAF backed the wrong horse with V/STOL. Had they preserved with OR.346 for a VG-winged Type 583 it would have saved a lot of hassle. Yes it would have been expensive to develop but it could have replaced Sea Vixen, Buccaneer, Hunter, Javelin. It might even have killed TSR.2 earlier in the development path. The money saved would have been pretty useful all round. Production would be at least 300 aircraft, probably a little higher.
F-111K may still have been sought as a bigger strike aircraft, it might have emerged as a rival had the 583 series R&D costs been too high.
Probably means no Harrier - but hey I can live with that quite honestly.
Also means no AFVG (Dassault gets to play with its Mirage G without interference) and also means no MRCA, at least as we know it, although its highly likely that by the mid-70s the RAF and RN would have been looking at a successor for the early 80s and this probably would have been a European collaborative effort. Probably something like EFA but a little earlier and with a two-seat option.

Which bring us back to the crux of this thread; the RN's 60s fighter needs cannot alone be met by British industry, the fleet is too small and the development cost for a State of the Art carrier fighter is too high. The RNs fighter fleet either needs to do a joint development programme with the RAF or with a foreign supplier.

If the RAF is all good for tactical fighters then going foreign is the RNs only choice, and the F8 isn't good enough so the the F4 it is!
 
Before 1958 the 4th republic was crazily unstable : 12 years, 25 governements. Post 1958 however the 5th republic was extremely stable: the right by large stuck in power all the way to 1981.

In Britain the Conservatives were in power from 1951 to 1964 and still made a dogs breakfast of procurement policy. Labour were in power for most of the period 1964 to 1979 and were likely worse.
 
Les 30 glorieuses helped a lot. Until the first oil shock hit France like a ton of bricks. Force de frappe however ate a large chunk of the budget from 1960.
 
Les 30 glorieuses helped a lot. Until the first oil shock hit France like a ton of bricks. Force de frappe however ate a large chunk of the budget from 1960.

I usually have France in the back of my mind in these British scenarios. France did cancel some cool stuff that I like, most notably the carrier Verdun and the Mirage F2/3, but they tended to have a decent Plan B and backed what they built by buying it in numbers.

Britain had its own version of the postwar economic boom; the economy grew every year from 1945 to 1973 and in 5 years this growth exceeded 5%. Mac was able to campaign on the slogan 'You've never had it so good', despite the need to take care of the balance of payments and foreign currency reserves. It was not broke when everyone else was rich.

On a bit of a France, Force de Frappe and Britain tangent. I once read, I think in Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective, that the US offered Polaris to France when they offered it to the UK secure in the knowledge that France couldn't build the submarines for it. This for me said something fundamental about Britain in the period, it could do things that other European countries couldn't. The VC10 is another example, for all its faults and failings it was the only non-Superpower transatlantic airliner, something no other single non-Superpower even attempted. Hence my constant probing for that breakthrough Britain needed.
 
Yes the Midways weren't super carriers and MOTS Phantoms could fly from them. But they couldn't fly from Centaur, Hermes & Victorious and I can't remember if its been established whether MOTS Phantoms could have flown from Ark Royal & Eagle after Ark Royal had gone through her OTL major Phantomisation refit & Eagle had gone through her projected Phantomisation refit.

Yes the the aircraft carriers had in the early 1960s didn't need expensive and time consuming refits to operate Crusaders, because they could fly off Crusaders in their existing condition.

Unfortunately, this isn't the RN buys Crusaders instead of Phantoms thread. Instead it's what the final paragraph of the Opening Post says.
If you want that to happen, the RN needs to buy/build bigger damn carriers in WW2, like the Malta-class.

That's how you make a MOTS Phantom buy work.


In any case why would the RAF buy the F4 when it's the task of each nation to prepare for its own defence and the British have their own Mach 2 fighter in production.
Because the F4 is a decade newer than the RAF Mach 2 interceptor?



The answer is that by early 1958 BAC has completed detailed design for improved, flexible Lightning. This included the kinked and cambered wing first tested from 1957, a much bigger (than 250 gal) fully area-ruled ventral tank, fuel in flaps, jettisonable tanks above wings and wide range of attack or recce stores in place of fuel in the ventral fairing. This resulted in 40% more range than the F1 with no impact on performance.
And was this built, even in prototype, to show RAF/Ministers that an almost-adequately-improved Lightning was possible?

Note that it's still missing capable missiles.



The RAF and RN must take into consideration industry (and a bunch of other stuff) when buying aircraft, not doing so it a reason why certain decisions are taken over others.

Sure, the Government and Services want to defend Britain and her interests, but that's not going to happen if the RAF and RN insist on buying kit that isn't politically palatable in other areas. Defence is dead money and its an important political objective to minimise the cost and impact, and if that means buying British in Sterling and propping up British employment to get the 2nd best bit of kit then that's better than being rejected for the best foreign kit and getting nothing.
Exactly.

For defense items, you really need to lean on internal production as much as possible.

But when your proposed total airframe buy for a mach 2 all weather carrier based fighter is ~140, it's no longer cost effective to have one developed in house. It'll cost way to much to develop, you need a run of at least double that if not ~400 to be worth developing in house.



A problem which is never addressed in these threads.
Let us assume CVA01 gets ordered in 1963 rather than kicked down the road to 1966.. She enters service in 1970 with an F4B and Buccaneer airgroup. CVA02 is laid fown in 1970 and completed in the late 1970s.
The incoming Thatcher government in 1979 inherits a decent but costly carrier force.
But its aicraft will need replacing (probably by F18s) by 1990.
In a gas turbine powered surface fleet CVA01 and 2 require specialist steam turbine crews.
It's a bit of a side shot, but remember that nuclear power still means steam turbines. So the UK was still training people on steam hardware for the subs. You'd just need a specific "how to run a naval boiler" school. I'm sure they could keep a couple of the steam frigates around for that purpose.


A midlife SLEP US style in the 80s could re-engine both ships and keep them in service into the 90s but they will need replacing with new ships designed and built in the 90s.

Unfortunately this coincides with the peak build of the V class Trident submarines.
While in hindsight it'd be better to NOT SLEP the carriers and build replacements, I'm not sure the folks in the 70s or 80s would have the foresight to see the Trident subs coming.

If they did have the planning/foresight to see the Trident shipbuilding costs coming in the 1990s, they absolutely should build new carriers in the 1980s, before the Tridents eat the entire shipbuilding budget.



When the politicians finally wised up that mashing two different roles into one aircraft wouldn't work, the RN got Phantoms but as a consequence, when the RAF lost P.1154 in 1965, they were automatically obliged to buy Phantoms - which were not suited to ground attack and which led to Jaguar being purchased just the year after.
:rolleyes:

Phantom, not suited to ground attack? The plane that can carry some 16,000lbs of bombs plus the full air-to-air loadout?

Pass whatever you're smoking, my dude, I need a hit of that!


Les 30 glorieuses helped a lot. Until the first oil shock hit France like a ton of bricks. Force de frappe however ate a large chunk of the budget from 1960.
More like FdFrappe was a black hole, ingesting any and all budget that got anywhere near it.



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One thing that comes to mind about the UK aviation industry is that they never had someone act like Dassault: Look at the government's requirements and say, "there's no way in hell that they'll be willing to pay for what that would cost, so I'm going to use private funds to develop something that meets about 80% of what they ask for that will cost maybe 20% of what the full requirements would cost."

That would have greatly helped the UK maintain their aviation industry and not keep throwing money away on projects that were developed and never fielded!
 
Because the F4 is a decade newer than the RAF Mach 2 interceptor?

The RAF needs a Mach 2 fighter in 1959 when the Lightning is available, not maybe 5 years later when an export Phantom might arrive.

And was this built, even in prototype, to show RAF/Ministers that an almost-adequately-improved Lightning was possible?

Note that it's still missing capable missiles

Of course not, the blinkered but strong-willed Minister of Defence had declared manned fighters obsolescent and would only be procuring interim types like the Lightning as the point defence interceptor and the Hunter FGA/FR conversions until missiles took over.

However, all or almost all of the things proposed eventually went into production Lightnings long after Sandys had left the MoD, so are perfectly feasible from a technical perspective.

Sandys mindset is the problem, not the inability of the Lightning to adequately perform the roles if given the development.
Exactly.

For defense items, you really need to lean on internal production as much as possible.

But when your proposed total airframe buy for a mach 2 all weather carrier based fighter is ~140, it's no longer cost effective to have one developed in house. It'll cost way to much to develop, you need a run of at least double that if not ~400 to be worth developing in house.

Hence the selection of the Phantom for the RN after the ludicrous joint P1154, hooking into the USN/USMC's huge programme. France was in the same position and bought F8s rather than develop their own naval fighter and later looked at a naval variant of the Jaguar with the AdA and RAF.

It's a bit of a side shot, but remember that nuclear power still means steam turbines. So the UK was still training people on steam hardware for the subs. You'd just need a specific "how to run a naval boiler" school. I'm sure they could keep a couple of the steam frigates around for that purpose.

The Counties, Leanders, Fearless' and Bristols were all to have conventional steam powerplants. CVA01 & 02 wouldn't be 'steam orphans' for decades after they entered service, so it's a non-issue.
 
For defense items, you really need to lean on internal production as much as possible.

But when your proposed total airframe buy for a mach 2 all weather carrier based fighter is ~140, it's no longer cost effective to have one developed in house. It'll cost way to much to develop, you need a run of at least double that if not ~400 to be worth developing in house.

A sensible OR with the RAF would go a long way to solving that problem - and perhaps a little international collaboration too.

Of course, sensible was in short supply…

The thing that comes to mind about the UK aviation industry is that they never had someone act like Dassault: Look at the government's requirements and say, "there's no way in hell that they'll be willing to pay for what that would cost, so I'm going to use private funds to develop something that meets about 80% of what they ask for that will cost maybe 20% of what the full requirements would cost."

That would have greatly helped the UK maintain their aviation industry and not keep throwing money away on projects that were developed and never fielded!

Dassault was aided by the fact that the French aviation industry was devastated by WW2. Lots of starting from scratch, and here comes Dassault - making planes that are up-to-date, and that other countries want to buy.

An aviation rock star - and that gives a lot of push.

The UK had a continuous, functioning aviation sector - bureaucratic arrangements to support and ‘lead’ it where the politicians wished, and a dislike of those who rocked the boat. Look at what happened to Handley-Page.

Perhaps if Camm’s P1121 had been a bit smaller, and the HSA board a bit more adventurous, something Dassault-like could have occured. But the way the dice fell in reality - snake eyes.
 
The UK had a continuous, functioning aviation sector - bureaucratic arrangements to support and ‘lead’ it where the politicians wished, and a dislike of those who rocked the boat. Look at what happened to Handley-Page.

Perhaps if Camm’s P1121 had been a bit smaller, and the HSA board a bit more adventurous, something Dassault-like could have occured. But the way the dice fell in reality - snake eyes.
So the UK needed someone on the bureaucratic side to reality-check the "requirements" versus cost of development, like how Dassault always hedged his bets with a less expensive, doesn't quite meet the requirements but does all the actually important things the plane needed to.
 
So the UK needed someone on the bureaucratic side to reality-check the "requirements" versus cost of development,
Insert that and get to specifying a machine 2 jet only fighter by 1956 if not '55.

Which means eyes on the USN competition between F8U-III and F4.

But it also means domestic proposals. Priced in pounds.
 
Insert that and get to specifying a machine 2 jet only fighter by 1956 if not '55.

Which means eyes on the USN competition between F8U-III and F4.

But it also means domestic proposals. Priced in pounds.
Such as the P1121, which my brain is still parsing more as the "British Thunderchief" or "British Crusader" than "British Phantom"
 
While in hindsight it'd be better to NOT SLEP the carriers and build replacements, I'm not sure the folks in the 70s or 80s would have the foresight to see the Trident subs coming.
Given that there were white papers recommending Trident submarines as a replacement for Polaris as early as 1978, anyone who didn't see them coming was either not paying attention or actively ignoring them.
The Counties, Leanders, Fearless' and Bristols were all to have conventional steam powerplants. CVA01 & 02 wouldn't be 'steam orphans' for decades after they entered service, so it's a non-issue.
FEARLESS stuck around until 2002; if CVA-01 enters service in 1973, that gives it about a decade of being a 'steam orphan'. Not ideal, but manageable - especially if there's a CVA-02 entering service around 1978.
 
Phantom, not suited to ground attack? The plane that can carry some 16,000lbs of bombs plus the full air-to-air loadout?

Pass whatever you're smoking, my dude, I need a hit of that!
I'll give you a few puffs.

The Phantom could carry a hefty load of bombs, but it wasn't a CAS aircraft. It had a podded cannon that was very temperamental and having two aircrew was expensive for the CAS role. It didn't have LRMTS either.
Jaguar was a much better fit for the ground support role. The FGR.2s were much better suited as a swing-role interceptor/interdictor and in these roles was superior to P.1154.
 
If you want that to happen, the RN needs to buy/build bigger damn carriers in WW2, like the Malta-class.

That's how you make a MOTS Phantom buy work.
It's @Rule of cool that wants that to happen. Not me. I have my own ideas.

It's been covered a few pages back.
For all of the talk of other carriers to ease the RNs problems, CVA01 is the only one that is in any way realistic.
  • Audacious class; 2 completed, 1 re-ordered as Malta in 1944, 1 cancelled 26% complete in 1946.
  • Malta class; 3 ordered in 1943 before design finalised, 1 Audacious re-ordered as Malta in 1944, Vickers told to stop ordering materials for 'Gibraltar' April 1944, all 4 cancelled before drawings delivered to builders Oct-Nov 1945.
  • 1952 carrier; studies (and design work?) undertaken in 1952-53, no order for long lead items or ship placed.
  • CVA01; approved in 1963, some 3.5 million pounds (almost USD$10m) in long lead items ordered at cancellation in Feb 1966.
There is little to no chance the RN gets anything better than the Eagle and Ark prior to CVA01, Maltas and 1952 carriers are never going to get built under the prevailing economic and strategic circumstances.

I'm afraid that the Eagle and Ark are the only pre CVA01 carriers available and suitable for prolonged service, and their 151' BA5 cats require the Spey Phantom rather than the standard F4J with the extended nose oleo and dropped ailerons.
 
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