MOTS Phantom for the RN?

I'm still confused as to why the UK didn't build/rebuild a big drydock during or after WW2.
They got hold of land on the Northern shore by Devonport and had plans for upto 4 drydocks of over 1,000ft to 1 500ft length there. This part of the WWII effort if memory serves and likely connected to Malta and docking USN carriers.

Everything stopped in 1945.
Everything.
By 1948 the UK stood on the precipice as it was running out of money, facing a potential famine and planning to cut the populations calorific intake by 500 or more in rationing.
Only then did the US relent on it's demands as it faced the prospect of loosing Greece if we withdrew from fighting the Communists there and frankly loosing around the world if the British Empire collapsed.
The RN was virtually all at anchor or alongside.
Virtually all of it.

It's not for nothing Orwell wrote 1984 in 1948.
 
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Which were designed to operate from super carriers and British companies made their own series of naval jets too.

Dassault designed a supersonic fighter (Mirage G) that could operate from the Clemeneau class. Breguet designed the Br.120 to meet the same specification, which was to be powered by a pair of Speys, but as it was a paper plane we'll never know if it would have met the specification.
Phantoms were just fine flying off the Midways, too big to fly off Essexes. Crusader was just fine flying off Essexes.

The Crusader means a plane that can fly off any of the British carriers, unmodified in terms of flight characteristics.
 
Mirage G flew with a touchdown speed of about 105kts.

Almost perfect for existing arrestor systems on RN and French carriers.

TO with 151ft stroke mk4 and reheat on results in lofting a huge load. Essentially providing for CAP in excess of over 3...maybe 4 hours at 100nm.
That's OR.346 territory in a platform that fits on existing lifts and individual aircraft deck weight limits.
 
Mirage G flew with a touchdown speed of about 105kts.

Almost perfect for existing arrestor systems on RN and French carriers.

TO with 151ft stroke mk4 and reheat on results in lofting a huge load. Essentially providing for CAP in excess of over 3...maybe 4 hours at 100nm.
That's OR.346 territory in a platform that fits on existing lifts and individual aircraft deck weight limits.
Crusader has a touchdown speed under 100 miles an hour. That's about 83 knots.
 
They got hold of land on the Northern shore by Devonport and had plans for upto 4 drydocks of over 1,000ft to 1 500ft length there. This part of the WWII effort if memory serves and likely connected to Malta and docking USN carriers.

Everything stopped in 1945.
Everything.
By 1948 the UK stood on the precipice as it was running out of money, facing a potential famine and plsnning to cut populatios calorific intake by 500 or more in rationing.
Only then did the US relent on it's demands as it faced the prospect of loosing Greece if we withdrew from fighting the Communists there and frankly loosing around the world if the British Empire collapsed.
The RN was virtually all at anchor or alongside.
Virtually all of it.

It's not for nothing Orwell wrote 1984 in 1948.

The naval threat simply wasn't there, the Government pushed back at demands the RN be bigger than it was in 1939 to face a Soviet navy consisting purely of submarines, of a type which were now obsolescent.

This is why I don't dabble in the Alternate History of the immediate postwar era, things took a decade to take shape.
 
The carriers were intimately tied into the colonial commitments and international policing.

It was....it frankly is ...cheaper to move the airfield where you want it than build airfield after airfield as need arised.
From Africa to Southeast Asia the RN might be called on to exert force in scale with the Army and Airforce.

And rapidly it was from Korea to Malaysia to a host of imperial commitments.

Which is why despite the stringent times, the RN got back into operations.
 
"The best is the enemy of the good". Fair enough. On that basis, is the RAF forced to buy the Buccaneer instead of TSR.2 in your timeline?

The mantra is more, 'the best we can reasonably get, when we need it'. F.155 was unreasonable, as was the P1154 and HS681, however the Lightning, P1127, Buccaneer and TSR2 were all within Britain's resources if properly managed.

IIRC (I've not got the notes out) the R&D cost of Spey-Phantom was estimated at around £25 million in 1964 and ended up being in the region of £100 million. In both cases half the cost was the Spey engines.

My guess is that a "clean sheet of paper" twin-Spey heavy fighter (started in 1962 instead of the P.1154) wouldn't have cost much more to develop. E.g. we can say with some confidence that the reheated Spey engine for this aircraft would have cost exactly the same to develop as the reheated Spey for the Phantom and taken exactly the same length of time. Plus we have the money spent on the P.1154 (the RAF still buys the P.1127 Harrier) and the money that might be saved from having the RAF buy Buccaneer from the start (in place of the TSR.2 and F-111K) to draw upon too.

It's unlikely to have been more expensive to build than the Spey-Phantom and would have been less of a drain on the balance of payments.

Finally, it might have performed better than the Spey-Phantom because the designers could have taken advantage of technological advances that had been made since the Phantom was designed. Maybe it would have had slower take-off and landing speeds than the Spey-Phantom.

I disagree. The development of a state of the art naval fighter will be every bit as complex and challenging as the TSR2 in its own way. Even if the Spey and AIRPASS radar family are used it will still cost more than the F4 to develop. However that's not the real game-stopper, which is the low unit numbers; less than 140 units and likely only about 100 even when things are going well. It's simply not worth developing such a powerful aircraft domestically as it will be in competition with other aircraft that will be built in considerably greater numbers.
 
The carriers were intimately tied into the colonial commitments and international policing.

It was....it frankly is ...cheaper to move the airfield where you want it than build airfield after airfield as need arised.
From Africa to Southeast Asia the RN might be called on to exert force in scale with the Army and Airforce.

And rapidly it was from Korea to Malaysia to a host of imperial commitments.

Which is why despite the stringent times, the RN got back into operations.

Mostly yes and also a bit no.

'International policing' drastically downplays what Britain was doing during the 50s and 60s. They weren't sailing around in an armed regatta keeping up demand for gin and tonics and goose feathered pith helmets. They were actually fighting the Cold War strategy of containment and keeping Communist encroachment at bay, as the Soviets had changed tack with the emerging thermonuclear stalemate in Europe.

The island bases strategy was cheaper but it had significant flaws. Most notably that the bases were too far apart to be mutually supporting and the chain as a whole was vulnerable to the instability of many or even most of the host countries; the loss of one meant that the RAF lacked the range to ferry aircraft along the route without it. In any case the whole Carriers vs Island bases didn't become an inter-service competition until the 1963 study on how to discharge EoS.
 
They got hold of land on the Northern shore by Devonport and had plans for upto 4 drydocks of over 1,000ft to 1 500ft length there. This part of the WWII effort if memory serves and likely connected to Malta and docking USN carriers.

Everything stopped in 1945.
Everything.
By 1948 the UK stood on the precipice as it was running out of money, facing a potential famine and planning to cut the populations calorific intake by 500 or more in rationing.
Only then did the US relent on it's demands as it faced the prospect of loosing Greece if we withdrew from fighting the Communists there and frankly loosing around the world if the British Empire collapsed.
The RN was virtually all at anchor or alongside.
Virtually all of it.

It's not for nothing Orwell wrote 1984 in 1948.
From a previous discussions on this board….

Edited….
I have added a copy of the ‘plan’ for the new Graving/Drydock planned at Portsmouth when the CVA-01 project was still very much alive…
Also, an illustration of a ‘suggested’ alteration to one of the big locks in Portsmouth Dockyard (Naval Base) to make it large enough for the current British carriers.
 

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Crusader has a touchdown speed under 100 miles an hour. That's about 83 knots.

Nope.
Here is the F-8E's stall speed, both "power off" and "approach power" (the number after the /) in KNOTS. You can't fly lower than stall except in very unusual circumstances.
With 4 AIM-9 only - 120.3 knots - 136.7 MPH.

F-8E SAC excerpt.jpg
 
Nope.
Here is the F-8E's stall speed, both "power off" and "approach power" (the number after the /) in KNOTS. You can't fly lower than stall except in very unusual circumstances.
With 4 AIM-9 only - 120.3 knots - 136.7 MPH.

View attachment 754933
I found this on a Russian site and you may find it useful, partticularly pages 65 and 68
 

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For all of the talk of other carriers to ease the RNs problems, CVA01 is the only one that is in any way realistic.
  • Audacious class; 2 completed, 1 re-ordered as Malta in 1944, 1 cancelled 26% complete in 1946.
  • Malta class; 3 ordered in 1943 before design finalised, 1 Audacious re-ordered as Malta in 1944, Vickers told to stop ordering materials for 'Gibraltar' April 1944, all 4 cancelled before drawings delivered to builders Oct-Nov 1945.
  • 1952 carrier; studies (and design work?) undertaken in 1952-53, no order for long lead items or ship placed.
  • CVA01; approved in 1963, some 3.5 million pounds (almost USD$10m) in long lead items ordered at cancellation in Feb 1966.
There is little to no chance the RN gets anything better than the Eagle and Ark prior to CVA01, Maltas and 1952 carriers are never going to get built under the prevailing economic and strategic circumstances.
 
I found this on a Russian site and you may find it useful, partticularly pages 65 and 68
And that shows landing speed at 18,000 lb is 135 knots, and power-off stall speed at 18,000 lb should be 117 knots (17,000 lb = 114 knots & 19,000 lb = 120 knots).

This does indeed mean that landing speed is considerably faster than stall speed, as I was pointing out to Scott Kenny.

I had the 30 June 1957 F11F-1 SAC and the 1 July 1967 F-11A SAC, but this has some info they didn't. Thanks.
 
And that shows landing speed at 18,000 lb is 135 knots, and power-off stall speed at 18,000 lb should be 117 knots (17,000 lb = 114 knots & 19,000 lb = 120 knots).

This does indeed mean that landing speed is considerably faster than stall speed, as I was pointing out to Scott Kenny.

I had the 30 June 1957 F11F-1 SAC and the 1 July 1967 F-11A SAC, but this has some info they didn't. Thanks
I found the touch down speed of 99 at 13k funny since I remember reading about how they were trying to meet a spec calling for a landing speed of 100 kts or under and how it just squeezed by
 
I found the touch down speed of 99 at 13k funny since I remember reading about how they were trying to meet a spec calling for a landing speed of 100 kts or under and how it just squeezed by
The F11F-1 flight manual you posted shows a STALL speed of 99 knots at 13,000 lb, not a landing speed. That's the "drop out of the air" speed. Carrier landing would likely be a bit slower than "field landing speed" which is shown at 119 knots at 14,000 lb, but still comfortably above stall speed.

The USN was indeed unhappy that its new supersonic fighters mostly had stall & landing speeds higher than the USN wanted.
 
The F11F-1 flight manual you posted shows a STALL speed of 99 knots at 13,000 lb, not a landing speed. That's the "drop out of the air" speed. Carrier landing would likely be a bit slower than "field landing speed" which is shown at 119 knots at 14,000 lb, but still comfortably above stall speed.

The USN was indeed unhappy that its new supersonic fighters mostly had stall & landing speeds higher than the USN wanted.
I was kind of extrapolating from one being given for a weight of 13k and one 14k... still it made me snort lol. In other threads the group of us all have come dang close on the numbers... a little BLC and a bit more wing and she would be positively dainty!
 
The mantra is more, 'the best we can reasonably get, when we need it'. F.155 was unreasonable, as was the P1154 and HS681, however the Lightning, P1127, Buccaneer and TSR2 were all within Britain's resources if properly managed.
While I broadly agree with you I'm not going down the TSR.2 could have been put into service with the RAF in reasonable time and cost route this time, because it's a bruising experience for the believers and the non-believers. Plus at present I'm in the "it shouldn't have been started in the first place and the only reason for continuing with it in 1965 was that it had reached the point of no return because sunk costs aren't necessarily a fallacy" mood.

And I think you've said several times before that the 1960s UK only had the money and technical resources for one advanced combat aircraft. If it's a choice between TSR.2 and a new fighter then I'm going for the fighter because we have the Buccaneer to fall back on as the Canberra replacement.
I disagree. The development of a state of the art naval fighter will be every bit as complex and challenging as the TSR2 in its own way. Even if the Spey and AIRPASS radar family are used it will still cost more than the F4 to develop.
Maybe it will cost more than the Spey-Phantom to develop. But we can put in the money spent on P.1154 to cancellation into the TTL fighter project and there may be some spare cash from making the RAF buy Buccaneer instead of TSR.2 & F-111K.
However that's not the real game-stopper, which is the low unit numbers; less than 140 units and likely only about 100 even when things are going well.
The Spey-Phantom was also more expensive to the build than the J79-Phantom due to it being a non-standard aircraft. It might also have been due to some of it being built in the UK instead of the normal suppliers. For example the radar was built under licence by Ferranti and some of the fuselage was built in the UK in addition to the aircraft having British-built engines. This is why I suspect that a British Phantom substitute with Spey engines wouldn't cost any more to build than the Spey-Phantom.

It wouldn't have been an RN only project because the RAF would have bought it to replace Lightning. So in circa 1962 they'll be thinking of a production run of at least 300 consisting of 140 for the RN and 160-plus for the RAF. The latter needs to be enough to maintain 120 aircraft in the front-line (10 squadrons of 12 aircraft) plus the second-line units (e.g. the OCU) and "backing". FWIW Roy Boot in "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" McDonnell based their policy on an expected order for at least 400 aircraft.

It's effectively replacing the OTL P.1154 project for an supersonic VTOL aircraft to replace the Hunter and Sea Vixen with a supersonic CTOL aircraft to replace the Lightning and Sea Vixen. The OTL project failed because the services requirements were incompatible. The TTL project would have had a much higher probability of success because the two services had compatible requirements.

Furthermore, are 140 Spey-Phantom substitutes significantly less than the 175 P.1154RAFs and 193 TSR.2s that IIRC were planned in 1964? That's a rhetorical question, because I think it isn't significantly less and I think that at least 170 would have been built for at least a one-for-one substitution for the Spey-Phantom. One of the reasons for this is that the number built was reduced from 209 to 170 because it was a fixed-price contract and the devaluation of Sterling increased the unit cost. That wouldn't happen if the aircraft was assembled in the UK from British built components. Also although most people say that 209 Phantoms were ordered serials were issued for 223 aircraft, although the extra 14 come before the 39 that were cancelled as a result of the Sterling devaluation.

Talking of British built components the British content of the Spey-Phantom also included some of the fuselage and the radar which was built under licence by Ferranti.
It's simply not worth developing such a powerful aircraft domestically as it will be in competition with other aircraft that will be built in considerably greater numbers.
They effectively did that with the OTL Spey-Phantom due to the many differences between it and the J79-Phantom.

Furthermore, why should that matter because it (and the P.1154 & Spey-Phantom IOTL) weren't built for the export market. Any export orders that the aircraft that I propose would have got would be a bonus not the object of the exercise.

TSR.2 was in competition with an aircraft (the F-111) that was built in considerably greater numbers too.
 
We can envision a lot of the UK funds for Jaguar being piled into this conceptual British Fighter.
For what it's worth I reiterate that what was spent on the P.1154 and Spey-Phantom plus any surplus for making the RAF to buy Buccaneers instead of the TSR.2 and F-111K aught to cover the R&D and production costs.
 
Phantoms were just fine flying off the Midways, too big to fly off Essexes. Crusader was just fine flying off Essexes. The Crusader means a plane that can fly off any of the British carriers, unmodified in terms of flight characteristics.
Yes the Midways weren't super carriers and MOTS Phantoms could fly from them. But they couldn't fly from Centaur, Hermes & Victorious and I can't remember if its been established whether MOTS Phantoms could have flown from Ark Royal & Eagle after Ark Royal had gone through her OTL major Phantomisation refit & Eagle had gone through her projected Phantomisation refit.

Yes the the aircraft carriers had in the early 1960s didn't need expensive and time consuming refits to operate Crusaders, because they could fly off Crusaders in their existing condition.

Unfortunately, this isn't the RN buys Crusaders instead of Phantoms thread. Instead it's what the final paragraph of the Opening Post says.
What is the closest the RN can get to a Military Off The Shelf Phantom buy, starting in about 1963? Without having to worry about the Hermes and Vic does the Spey need to be fitted? IIUC the extended nose oleo and drooping ailerons were McD ideas not adopted for the USN. What about the 'bring back' requirement for ordnance, is the F4Js capability enough for this?
 
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What meets AW.406.....?

The best of options was the VG Type 583, as concluded at the time. The compromise there is Type 585 paralleling Type 584. Essentially tacking onto RAF production. Using single engines instead of a twin arrangement..... a.k.a A Very British Flogger.


The closest to AW.406 realised in hardware......? The F8U-III if I read what data is available correctly. 5 prototypes flying.

Closest to immediate operational availability.....F8. Minor modifications to the wing as per the French order is all that's needed to get an interim of an interim. Addition of a new engine in later production, results in improved performance. Alteration of the inlet increases top speed. Two seater option exists. Summing up, we can squeeze more out of the platform at modest cost, keeping it relevent until the new systems of the 1970's become available.

The F4 is overweight, comes in too hot, and costs more than double the F8. Essentially it imposes increased costs on upgrading the carriers.

Maybe a long shot, but could Franco-British cooperation have been accelerated around a carrier capable VG aircraft, leading to a Mirage G order in 1964, for service entry in ~1970? With French leadership on the airframe, UK leadership on avionics and engine (Spey).

This would line up nicely with the French change of direction in late 1963, away from deltas and the TF106 (cancelled by the US). The French Air Force wanted a 2-seater optimized for both low level strike/interdiction and interception, which also lines up with naval requirements (as long as size & weight are kept in check). This led to the Mirage F2 prototype program in 1964. However the French needed a new turbofan (-> Spey could replace TF30/306) and a high lift wing (-> VG could replace the Mirage F wing).

This would mean the F-4K order (July 1964) never materialized, and the Aeronavale's F-8E(FN) order (mid/late 1962) would have to be cancelled or significantly pared down. However, not sure the RAF would be too keen on a British Mirage G... unlikely that they would get on board.
 
But they couldn't fly from Centaur, Hermes & Victorious and I can't remember if its been established whether MOTS Phantoms could have flown from Ark Royal & Eagle after Ark Royal had gone through her OTL major Phantomisation refit & Eagle had gone through her projected Phantomisation refit.

Without re-reading the entire thread I believe the 151' BS5 bow cats on Eagle and Ark demanded the Spey.
 
While I broadly agree with you I'm not going down the TSR.2 could have been put into service with the RAF in reasonable time and cost route this time, because it's a bruising experience for the believers and the non-believers. Plus at present I'm in the "it shouldn't have been started in the first place and the only reason for continuing with it in 1965 was that it had reached the point of no return because sunk costs aren't necessarily a fallacy" mood.

And I think you've said several times before that the 1960s UK only had the money and technical resources for one advanced combat aircraft. If it's a choice between TSR.2 and a new fighter then I'm going for the fighter because we have the Buccaneer to fall back on as the Canberra replacement.

It depends on how you define 'reasonable'. Leaving aside the perfectly legitimate and reasonable capability requirements persevering with the TSR2 keeps Britain's aviation industry firmly at the state-of-the-art and able to follow the TSR2 with a 4th Gen fighter equal to the US teens series and the Mirage 2000. Without the TSR2 Britain goes down TTLs path of being a junior partner to a couple of countries who have not developed a state-of-the-art aircraft since WW2.

It wouldn't have been an RN only project because the RAF would have bought it to replace Lightning.

The key factor in my virtuous circle concept is that Britain does with the Lighting what France did with the Mirage III; bought ~470 of them at the expense of ~170 Hunter conversions. The RAF does not need a large fleet of fighters in the late 60s, it needs them in 1980 or so, therefore there is no P1154-RAF.

Allow me to labour an anecdote. In my previous career the Brass wanted a benchmark of 1 staff member in the System Programme Office for every $10m (or something like that) in budget. So, they hived off all the low-level support functions into their own System Programme Offices, leaving the big name F111 #1, F/A1 8#2, P3 #3, C130 #4 etc with their big staffs but big budgets hitting that target. The downside was the System Programme Offices for Ground Support Equipment, Aviation Publications, Test and Measuring Equipment down in #24, #26 and #31st place with big staffs but tiny budgets. I see the RN Phantom in a similar light; in order for other things like Lightning, Buccaneer, P1127 Harrier and TSR2 to win something has to lose, and that something is the RNs fighter requirement which is unavoidably an expensive and small fleet.

Of course, when 80% of the target is reached that remaining 20% that made it possible will become an itch that the Brass won't be able to resist scratching.
 
Maybe a long shot, but could Franco-British cooperation have been accelerated around a carrier capable VG aircraft, leading to a Mirage G order in 1964, for service entry in ~1970? With French leadership on the airframe, UK leadership on avionics and engine (Spey).

This would line up nicely with the French change of direction in late 1963, away from deltas and the TF106 (cancelled by the US). The French Air Force wanted a 2-seater optimized for both low level strike/interdiction and interception, which also lines up with naval requirements (as long as size & weight are kept in check). This led to the Mirage F2 prototype program in 1964. However the French needed a new turbofan (-> Spey could replace TF30/306) and a high lift wing (-> VG could replace the Mirage F wing).

This would mean the F-4K order (July 1964) never materialized, and the Aeronavale's F-8E(FN) order (mid/late 1962) would have to be cancelled or significantly pared down. However, not sure the RAF would be too keen on a British Mirage G... unlikely that they would get on board.

As @NOMISYRRUC has stated this isn't the F4 vs F8 for RN thread, but this is worth addressing from a Project and development perspective.

The RN has a requirement for 140 fighters and its carriers can handle 50,000t aircraft, the MN has a requirement for 40 fighters and its carriers can handle 35,000t aircraft. This means that the French capability requirements will drive the project and limit what the RN can get despite being only 20-25% partner in the project. Cooperating with the French will saddle the British with less of an aircraft than they can use in return for a pretty meagre cost saving.
 
The RN has a requirement for 140 fighters and its carriers can handle 50,000t aircraft, the MN has a requirement for 40 fighters and its carriers can handle 35,000t aircraft.
No AW.406 specifies 40,000lb if memory serves.
 
In terms of NMBR.3, we have Type 584 and it's navalised parallel Type 585 (early).
This was ambitious because of trying to get VG, combined with V/STOL.
But ditch the lift jet behind the cockpit and the clangbox diverter behind the main engine....and you have a British VG Flogger/Mirage G with a pair of internal weapons bays.

An alignment with the French might be possible if both agree to ditch NMBR.3 for nuclear secure airfields. Funding this instead of P.1154 and Mirage F2. That solves MRI for both, and fighters for both....And the RB.178 for both.....presumably RR sharing with SNECMA.

In terms of "we're funding Lightning" the answer is VG Lightning navalised, as actually proposed. Which delivers short field capability for RAF as MRI (NMBR.3 mission set), extended CAP for BARCAP and naval multirole for FAA.

No need to add F4.
No need to fund P.1154, as VG Lightning could start late 50's under Type 588 studies as part of maximising the return on going 'all in' on the Lightning.
NMBR.3 becomes a brief paper forey that dies under critical examination of nuclear weapons security.
Unlike Spey F4, VG Lightning can deliver for Ark Royal, Eagle and possibly Victorious.....with a high probability of interim within a couple of years.
Solid nose variant might be a disaster and never go even into prototype
 
For what it's worth I reiterate that what was spent on the P.1154 and Spey-Phantom plus any surplus for making the RAF to buy Buccaneers instead of the TSR.2 and F-111K aught to cover the R&D and production costs.
You could also get on board earlier and buy F-4B/Cs instead of the Lightning F.2 onwards
 
In terms of NMBR.3, we have Type 584 and it's navalised parallel Type 585 (early).
This was ambitious because of trying to get VG, combined with V/STOL.
But ditch the lift jet behind the cockpit and the clangbox diverter behind the main engine....and you have a British VG Flogger/Mirage G with a pair of internal weapons bays.

An alignment with the French might be possible if both agree to ditch NMBR.3 for nuclear secure airfields. Funding this instead of P.1154 and Mirage F2. That solves MRI for both, and fighters for both....And the RB.178 for both.....presumably RR sharing with SNECMA.

In terms of "we're funding Lightning" the answer is VG Lightning navalised, as actually proposed. Which delivers short field capability for RAF as MRI (NMBR.3 mission set), extended CAP for BARCAP and naval multirole for FAA.

No need to add F4.
No need to fund P.1154, as VG Lightning could start late 50's under Type 588 studies as part of maximising the return on going 'all in' on the Lightning.
NMBR.3 becomes a brief paper forey that dies under critical examination of nuclear weapons security.
Unlike Spey F4, VG Lightning can deliver for Ark Royal, Eagle and possibly Victorious.....with a high probability of interim within a couple of years.
Solid nose variant might be a disaster and never go even into prototype

Given that there was some international funding initially for the Pegasus then later for the P1127, which was a totally realistic aircraft that actually entered service, I'm all for the UK putting it forward for NBMR-3b that was published in Dec 1961. The MoS asked HS for a quote to build 100 P1127 in 1961, so the interest was there.

However, any UK involvement or interest in NBMR-3a and NBMR-4 needs to be purged with fire!
 
You could also get on board earlier and buy F-4B/Cs instead of the Lightning F.2 onwards

The 50 F2s were ordered in 1959, 47 F3s in 1960 and another 45 F3s in 1962.

The RAF Lightning (and Hunter BTW) requirement was way too early to be filled by Phantoms, or almost any other possible candidate for that matter.
 
The 50 F2s were ordered in 1959, 47 F3s in 1960 and another 45 F3s in 1962.

The RAF Lightning (and Hunter BTW) requirement was way too early to be filled by Phantoms, or almost any other possible candidate for that matter.
Not really. You could notionally order Bs instead of F2 in 59
 
Not really. You could notionally order Bs instead of F2 in 59

Ordering something as an export customer that has not yet reached production with the Service that sponsored its development is risky. Look at the RAF experience with the Skybolt ABM and the RAAF with the F111 for examples of why that course of action is mostly avoided like the plague.

In any case why would the RAF buy the F4 when it's the task of each nation to prepare for its own defence and the British have their own Mach 2 fighter in production.
 
In any case why would the RAF buy the F4 when it's the task of each nation to prepare for its own defence and the British have their own Mach 2 fighter in production.
Because its better and available, never mind the cost side. There was plenty of precedent at this period of UK procuring US aircraft when UK industry couldn't deliver. e.g. B-29 Washingtons, F-86 Sabres or Skybolt / Polaris

Say the 57 review concludes that a longer range, multi-role fighter is required (as historically discussed). The UK firms don't have anything on the books that can fulfill this need, or even an OR developed for them to tender against. As a stop gap then UK jumps onboard with Phantom from the begining - maybe ticely tieing into the UK-US rapprochement around nuclear tech around this time period. Lightning is left as the F.1 procurement (or abandoned entirely) as an even more gap fill until F-4Bs arrive in 62 and Bloodhound II in 64.

Meanwhile an OR for a "multi role combat aircraft" is derived that wraps up a longer range multi role fighter, possibly with TSR2, Buccaneer S.2 aims, and maybe P.1154RN into a single package for competition amongst a streamlined UK Industry who've had more time to merge. Maybe something like Vickers 580 series or DH.127 (CTOL). Or maybe it's all too hard and UK simply ends up buying later Phantom variants.
 
The RN was offered these:

But McDonnell was always keen on offering Spey, even as far back as 1960 (offering it for a TFX entry).
The existence of Hermes is a problem in that operating Phantoms from her means more thrust needed. Even Eagle and Ark were not optimal (199ft waist catapult fine, 151ft bow catapult less so). (I'm ignoring CVA-01 as you still have to factor in the older ships and even if CVA-01 was built, there was no certainty that CVA-02 or -03 would be).

Buying a stock F-4J (or K or L) would be politically problematic without some kind of UK industry involvement.
Either way, Phantom was wanted because it was available sooner than any UK aircraft - although ironically the need to rebuild the carriers made this availability a rather moot point).

I could waffle about how the Type 583/584 was the best choice and that the RAF was stupid to ignore because of its obsession with V/STOL (and interference of NMBR.3), but that's kind of beyond the point of the OP and topic at hand.
 
Buying a stock F-4J (or K or L) would be politically problematic without some kind of UK industry involvement
I wouldn't be convinced about this given the precedent at the time e.g. at this point then the RAF is using Thor missiles from US for their nuclear deterrent as a more critical role

I'd expect the carrot to UK industry would be a new UK (only probably) multi role aircraft to pick up, but with good fall back option of more Phantoms if this doesn't pan out. Choices of whether to split up into multiple projects for land/sea based strike/recce/fighter or make requirement compromises to allow a single base type.
 
Like, CVA-01 is the size it is for a reason. They're about the minimum size you can comfortably operate 70,000-lb aircraft off of in reasonable numbers. The RN got to this point by a series of actual design studies that have been shown elsewhere on this site, and the USN reached very similar conclusions in the CVV process.
There's a reason why CVA-01, CVV, and the QUEEN ELIZABETH class all come out to about the same size. And, for that matter, why KUZNETSOV isn't all that different.
I'm still confused as to why the UK didn't build/rebuild a big drydock during or after WW2.
It starts with 'M' and rhymes with 'funny'.
From a previous discussions on this board….

Edited….
I have added a copy of the ‘plan’ for the new Graving/Drydock planned at Portsmouth when the CVA-01 project was still very much alive…
Also, an illustration of a ‘suggested’ alteration to one of the big locks in Portsmouth Dockyard (Naval Base) to make it large enough for the current British carriers.
Somewhere I also have the original layout for Rosyth from before WW1, featuring eight docks 1,000 feet long and 120 feet wide, of which three were double-ended to serve as entrance locks. And the original layout for Singapore dockyard, with six docks of that size, two of them double-ended.

You may note that the drawings you've attached (which were drawn up in 1943 for postwar reconstruction) give Devonport the same provision (four docks, two lock/docks) as planned for Singapore. I'd be surprised if equivalent provision for Portsmouth and Rosyth wasn't considered in the same timeframe.

That the RN needed bigger docks wasn't even remotely new. IIRC the proposed CVA-01 dock at Portsmouth was even bigger, possibly 1,200 feet long and 150 feet wide, allowing it (in theory) to take the USN's attack carriers.
 
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