MOTS Phantom for the RN?

[uk 75]

Crewing its ships is as much as a problem for the RN as building/refitting them.
By the end of the 1960s it is only possible to keep two carriers in service at a time. By the 1980s this begins to go down ro one CVS and one LPD. The present RN has had to shed big ships to keep its two CVs.
The dispeptic British economy continues to undermine the UK's military capability as does its poor social and education system.

 

[Volkodav]

The saga of the three Command Cruisers was to last throughout the 1970s. The RN survived with Ark Royal in the fixed wing carrier role and Hermes/Bulwark as the commando/ASW ship. See my post about the BBC TV series Warship to watch them in action.
The Royal Navy in 1982 had completed its transformation to NATO's North Atlantic ASW force with T42 and T22 escorts taking over from the Countys and T12s of the previous decade.
I doubt if the alternative Royal Navy envisaged before 1966 of two carriers (Eagle and CVA01) with T82 and T12 escorts could have survived the disastrous inflation of 1973 onwards. Service in carriers was less popular than in escorts. The big ships would have been vulnerable to industrial unrest during refits.
Keeping both Eagle (or in reality Ark and Eagle cannibalised into one ship) and the one-off and probably temperamental CVA01 in service would have been challenging to say the least.
The decision to replace Polaris by Trident was inevitable some time in the early 80s.
With one obsolescent and one awkward carrier operating 60s designed aircraft it is hard to see the RN getting both new ships and new aircraft to replace them into service before the end of the decade.
So 1966 did turn out for the best..

The root cause is one that appears again and again over time, capability is required but money is limited, mistakes are made when trying to maximise the capability for the minimum cost, money is wasted, and capability is lost or not achieved.

The worst part is, and I encounter this in my day job, professionals identify a risk, ask the questions that need to be asked but "to save money" they are ignored. It's assumed, based on gut feeling, or a misunderstanding of history, everything is or will be ok, then it isn't.

A thorough analysis of requirements, and a comprehensive survey of the ships intended for upgrade / modernisation and the UK would never have completed the Tigers, may not have completed Hermes and would not have upgraded Victorious. That money could have gone towards other, more critical capabilities.

A thorough analysis of the Phantom, both the B and the UK evolved options, would have identified the costs and issues involved operating the type from the existing, even modernised UK carriers, the return on investment and the opportunity cost of the projects.

I am not talking hindsight, nor am I talking gut feelings and opinions (which is quite literally the root cause of many of the issues), I am talking thorough analysis of data and when the data is not available, obtaining it, and if it can't be obtained, rationally synthesising the answer.

 

[uk 75]

To illustrate how far the UK was from such an approach Austin Rover only found out it was selling the iconic Mini at a loss when a European carmaker costed it.

 

[red admiral]

I am not talking hindsight, nor am I talking gut feelings and opinions (which is quite literally the root cause of many of the issues), I am talking thorough analysis of data and when the data is not available, obtaining it, and if it can't be obtained, rationally synthesising the answer.

It's good to go through and do this activity, but particularly in defence then you are vulnerable to external factors e.g. threats, technology, policy, costs. These combine to often produce changing "right" answers over the course of the project.

 

[Volkodav]

It's good to go through and do this activity, but particularly in defence then you are vulnerable to external factors e.g. threats, technology, policy, costs. These combine to often produce changing "right" answers over the course of the project.

I agree 100% but part of the problem is the reluctance to change even when circumstances change, or the flipside, changing even though the circumstances don't require a change, or a change would be damaging.

I can't give details but many times I've been in a situation where every technically competent person consulted is, or ends up on the same page, but the "thrusting" PM or MBA type engineering manager is still certain they are right because they are following a case study or a gut feeling. They don't understand, they don't want to understand, because they already "know" and all these educated "idiots" are just wasting time and money.

Senior politicians and civil servants in the 50s and 60s were juniors between the wars and during the war. Upgrades and rebuilds were the name of the game because of treaties and other limitations, they had no experience of large scale, peace time naval programs, so their go-to was rebuild and upgrade rather than build new.

 

[Rule of cool]

The root cause is one that appears again and again over time, capability is required but money is limited, mistakes are made when trying to maximise the capability for the minimum cost, money is wasted, and capability is lost or not achieved.

This is the entire premise of this thread. I believe that with more or less the same resources Britain could have made alternative decisions and achieved good value for money capability investments. Further, in the particular case of Britain if such decisions were made they'd have a positive follow-on effects for later projects, even if only getting out of their way.

However there are limits to what can be achieved domestically with such methods, and a state of the art naval fighter with a fleet size of no greater than 140 units is not cost-effective for Britain to develop. Hence the technical interest in the MOTS F4 as the most cost-effective solution for the RNs requirement.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This is the entire premise of this thread. I believe that with more or less the same resources Britain could have made alternative decisions and achieved good value for money capability investments. Further, in the particular case of Britain if such decisions were made they'd have a positive follow-on effects for later projects, even if only getting out of their way.

However there are limits to what can be achieved domestically with such methods, and a state of the art naval fighter with a fleet size of no greater than 140 units is not cost-effective for Britain to develop. Hence the technical interest in the MOTS F4 as the most cost-effective solution for the RNs requirement.

While I think that a Spey Twosader or even a Crusader 3 would have been the better choice.

 

[zen]

Purely from existing philosophy, the F8U-III seems a better solution, bar the obvious lack of a second engine.

I've speculated on a thread about some conceptual twin J79 version. A missing option I feel.

As it was the RN was taking quite some interest in the contest between F8U-III and F4 in the USN, and even went to the trouble of asking Vought about a Conway powered version, with a recess for a tactical nuke.

In a period where they were finally getting Sea Vixen and Scimitar, the obvious future seemed to be hitching onto USN production orders.
But it TFX came along and was copied by OR.346. Horror at the size/weight!
Interim AW.406 was written and hoped that this would solve the problem.
Only P.1154 was then foisted on the RN.
They must have known that from UK studies a serious Anti-ship missile system was inevitable and in '63 the Soviets displayed just such.
The pressure was on!
F4K seemed to solve the lot.
Higher brochure performance.
Greater UK content.
Easier operation from extent carriers.
Supposedly cheap and quick to service....
So ditch P.1154, order F4K NOW.

And then it went wrong.
Cockpit transparency thermal limits meant Mach 1.8 or you replace the windscreen....every time you go above Mach 1.9. Treasury must've told them stick below thermal limit, forever.
Compatibility with extent carriers wasn't so simple and expensive upgrades needed.
Delays getting revised airframe to fit Speys into.
Weight increases resulted.
More delays.
RR had issues with Spey and production timing.
Coats increased irrespective of the Pounds further fall against the Dollar.
By '66 F4K had yet to enter service, the cost escalation on the future carriers caused government to throw the towel in and only the PM kept Ark Royal and her airwing for as long as possible into the 70's.

Very late 60's, F4K started entering service, around the time the original plan had for completion of all deliveries.

 

[Rule of cool]

And then it went wrong.
Cockpit transparency thermal limits meant Mach 1.8 or you replace the windscreen....every time you go above Mach 1.9. Treasury must've told them stick below thermal limit, forever.
Compatibility with extent carriers wasn't so simple and expensive upgrades needed.
Delays getting revised airframe to fit Speys into.
Weight increases resulted.
More delays.
RR had issues with Spey and production timing.
Coats increased irrespective of the Pounds further fall against the Dollar.
By '66 F4K had yet to enter service, the cost escalation on the future carriers caused government to throw the towel in and only the PM kept Ark Royal and her airwing for as long as possible into the 70's.

Very late 60's, F4K started entering service, around the time the original plan had for completion of all deliveries.

What option would produce better results than the Spey Phantom?

 

[Scott Kenny]

What option would produce better results than the Spey Phantom?

Spey Twosader, placing Sparrow or UK SARH missile control electronics in the belly rocket tray. Yes, this would require a different radar, but you have space for a 24" dish in the nose.

 

[Rule of cool]

Spey Twosader, placing Sparrow or UK SARH missile control electronics in the belly rocket tray. Yes, this would require a different radar, but you have space for a 24" dish in the nose.

How is that better? It might be cheaper, but certainly not better.

 

[Scott Kenny]

How is that better? It might be cheaper, but certainly not better.

Available much sooner and capable of flying off the existing carriers, plus it gives the UK the option to buy the whole production line and then sell France their Crusaders. Thus taking the entire thing out of the "needs dollars to buy it" discussion, which also hammered the UK Phantoms due to the collapse of the GBP.

 

[Volkodav]

This is the entire premise of this thread. I believe that with more or less the same resources Britain could have made alternative decisions and achieved good value for money capability investments. Further, in the particular case of Britain if such decisions were made they'd have a positive follow-on effects for later projects, even if only getting out of their way.

However there are limits to what can be achieved domestically with such methods, and a state of the art naval fighter with a fleet size of no greater than 140 units is not cost-effective for Britain to develop. Hence the technical interest in the MOTS F4 as the most cost-effective solution for the RNs requirement.

I recall one of the core requirements of the 1950s carrier concepts was the ability to cross-deck USN aircraft, including the A-3 Skywarrior, or a more generic Canberra sized aircraft. It didn't need to be an all singing, all dancing super carrier, it just needed to be good enough.

This shows the RN was well aware that none of their current ships were large enough, therefore none of the upgrades that occurred were a long-term solution. Other factors, in addition to the expense of the various upgrades, Centaur was retained in the carrier role to cover the upgrades of other ships.

Logically, if a new larger ship was ordered in the 1950s, then the rebuilds of Victorious, Eagle and Ark Royal wouldn't have been required. F-4B could have been ordered, or a less dramatically redesigned F-4K.

The legacy Ark and Eagle, with interim angled decks, could operate most of the FAA types, Hermes could operate all, the new carrier would operate anything in service with, or then planned, the USN or RN. If Hermes was completed as it was, Centaur wouldn't have been required with Ark, then Eagle, retired as additional new carriers entered service. Possibly Hermes could have been cancelled or sold and Centaur retained until the second new carrier entered service (assuming four carriers were required).

 

[Rule of cool]

Available much sooner and capable of flying off the existing carriers, plus it gives the UK the option to buy the whole production line and then sell France their Crusaders. Thus taking the entire thing out of the "needs dollars to buy it" discussion, which also hammered the UK Phantoms due to the collapse of the GBP.

Was the UK buying the Crusader production line something that was being negotiated?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Was the UK buying the Crusader production line something that was being negotiated?

That I don't know, but how much of the Crusader tooling was recycled for the A-7?

Crusader was out of production for the USN, so tooling was likely available, if someone thought to ask for it.

 

[zen]

What option would produce better results than the Spey Phantom?

A loaded question.
What meets AW.406.....?
The best of options was the VG Type 583, as concluded at the time.
The compromise there is Type 585 paralleling Type 584. Essentially tacking onto RAF production.
Using single engines instead of a twin arrangement.....
a.k.a A Very British Flogger.

The closest to AW.406 realised in hardware......?
The F8U-III if I read what data is available correctly. 5 prototypes flying.

Closest to immediate operational availability.....F8. Minor modifications to the wing as per the French order is all that's needed to get an interim of an interim.
Addition of a new engine in later production, results in improved performance.
Alteration of the inlet increases top speed.
Two seater option exists.
Summing up, we can squeeze more out of the platform at modest cost, keeping it relevent until the new systems of the 1970's become available.

The F4 is overweight, comes in too hot, and costs more than double the F8. Essentially it imposes increased costs on upgrading the carriers.

 

[bobtdwarf]

That I don't know, but how much of the Crusader tooling was recycled for the A-7?

Crusader was out of production for the USN, so tooling was likely available, if someone thought to ask for it.

I should consider this kind of scenario in my F-11 musings as well.

 

[Archibald]

For the record
-France changed its Crusader wings circa 1969-70 (for F-8J wings).
-SNIAS / Aérospatiale was willing to take an A-7 licence circa 1971-72
- Meanwhile Vought was courting both Dassault and Aérospatiale
- the former on VG combat aircraft (I often think VFAX, USN Mirage G might have been licence-built by Vought)
- The latter - on this forum I vaguely remember LTV and Aérospatiale got a big agreement related to helicopters, but I may be wrong.
BINGO
https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/art...es-de-l-ensemble-de-1969_3120289_1819218.html

-So Vought was selling SNIAS Alouette helicopters since 1969 at last.

Hence Vought and France had a rather productive honeymoon at the time. Then again, they knew each other since 1939 and the V-156F dive bombers. Plus many F4Us in the 1950's.

We need a TL where the Vought - France honeymoon goes even... hotter ?

- Although the honeymoon soured at some point: during the big battle for Swiss combat aircraft; Dassault Milan versus Vought SLUFF. In the end the Swiss bought more refurbished Hawker Hunters (facepalm).

Presently daydreaming about a big Mirage G / A-7 deal, circa 1971... Aéronavale and USN, VFAX, Dassault, SNIAS and Vought...
Think of a Jaguar / AFVG kind of agreement, where -
-SNIAS takes an A-7 licence from Vought, making the Aéronavale happy...
-Vought takes a Mirage G licence from Dassault, making the Aéronavale happy... and also the Navy for a reborn VFAX.
- in passing, SNECMA and Pratt use that to salvage the TF306E, as the A-7 is familiar with it : A-7A and co, before the TF41.

But this is off topic here.

 

[bobtdwarf]

A loaded question.
What meets AW.406.....?
The best of options was the VG Type 583, as concluded at the time.
The compromise there is Type 585 paralleling Type 584. Essentially tacking onto RAF production.
Using single engines instead of a twin arrangement.....
a.k.a A Very British Flogger.

The closest to AW.406 realised in hardware......?
The F8U-III if I read what data is available correctly. 5 prototypes flying.

Closest to immediate operational availability.....F8. Minor modifications to the wing as per the French order is all that's needed to get an interim of an interim.
Addition of a new engine in later production, results in improved performance.
Alteration of the inlet increases top speed.
Two seater option exists.
Summing up, we can squeeze more out of the platform at modest cost, keeping it relevent until the new systems of the 1970's become available.

The F4 is overweight, comes in too hot, and costs more than double the F8. Essentially it imposes increased costs on upgrading the carriers.

one thing I was kicking around in my head was smaller aircraft options until a large carrier is IN HAND would allow a late in the run F-4 buy using RB-199 and all the little improvements in handling(and gun), for the RN

 

[zen]

So the future looked like TFX, and despite the problems there, the F14 realises the essential concept.

This was visible from 1960, and more so by '62. Which is clearly not viable for RN carriers, including Ark Royal and Eagle.

So any new CV is likely to designed around TFX, or it's UK parallel OR.346. CVA-01 seems to be just that.

So why detract from the future for an expensive interim type?
F4K was sold as being cheap and quick of reasonable performance if not exceptional according to the brochure.
None of it was true.
Cheaper and quicker to correct the lumbering Vixen and Scimitar, is the F8.

Superior is F8U-III, with potential to at least be equal in performance (from a early 60's perspective) to the VG wonder planes of the future.

So when new carriers die in '66, current fleet is able to operate F8 and the big three can manage F8U-III into the 70's.

France will jump on either F8 or F8U-III is RN is going this route from early 60’s.

If there is money, then save it by buying F8 and getting new AEW instead.

Mirage G opens up return to new carriers in the 70's at affordable prices if UK and Vought be onboard.....
AN lusted over Mirage G, knew it might manage A7, felt it could afford A4 and got Super Etendard.....
Mirage G too expensive for just AN.
Insert FAA keen to find successor to F8.....And now Mirage G becomes affordable.

 

[Rule of cool]

To bring back some focus on the thread may I remind people that in this scenario Britain has made better choices in a whole-of-Government, value-for-money way in a period of financial stringency from 1957. This approach requires a measure of ruthlessness and a lack of sentimentality in decision making and may not result in Britain not getting the bestest, shiniest, fastest planes, ships and tanks.

This is where the Phantom comes in; even the Spey version only cost 75m pounds to develop, no other fighter as good will cost so little to develop.

 

[uk 75]

Without two or three Maltas in service by 1960 the RN is doomed to lose its carrier force by 1980.

If the 1963 plan had worked and CVA 01 had been built and entered service by 1974, by 1980 it would have been on its own. Even if money had been found for CVA02 to be laid down in 1974 (hard to imagine given real world events in 1973), Eagle/Ark (only one could be cobbled together to serve through the 70s) would be at the end of its life. Hermes would have a few more years left but only with Buccaneers.

Without CVA01 we had Ark Royal in service until 1979. Hermes was needed as an ASW/Commando ship to replace Albion.
Three Command Cruisers (later CVS) had been ordered to replace them.

The Maltas (instead of Eagle, Ark and Victorious) would have been much easier to Phantomise. They could all have received T984. Hermes, Centaur, Albion and Bulwark would have been available as ASW/Commando ships once Seahawk leaves service.

CV70 would have evolved from a decade of operating Maltas. Two or three ships depending on the economy could have been ordered in the 60s/early 70s.

The Tigers would not have been needed in this RN and been sold or scrapped as the Countys entered service.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Logically, if a new larger ship was ordered in the 1950s, then the rebuilds of Victorious, Eagle and Ark Royal wouldn't have been required. F-4B could have been ordered, or a less dramatically redesigned F-4K.

Unfortunately, if you dig into the history this isn't the case. Victorious' rebuild was funded and designed in the 12-carrier plan of the late 1940s was absolutely necessary if the Brits were going to meet the force goals.

(That those force goals were hilariously unrealistic is a whole other problem.)

With Victorious, the best you can do is inflict better project management so you're not tearing down the whole ship twice. In hindsight, sticking to the original design with the original propulsion was the way to go. Yes, she'd be obsolescent, but from the perspective of getting the Royal Navy some actual post-war builds that's a benefit.

Eagle's rebuild is unfortunately a necessity based on the fact that the RN financially has to build carriers one at a time. By the time of that rebuild the RN had four carriers authorized (Eagle, Ark, Vic, Hermes IOTL); if you get a new one in the 50s it's not going to commission before 1960, which means not getting a second until the mid-60s at the earliest, and at that point you really do need a fully modernized third carrier because Eagle isn't getting replaced until the 1970s pretty much no matter what.

Ark's Phantomization can be skipped in most scenarios, at least.

Without two or three Maltas in service by 1960 the RN is doomed to lose its carrier force by 1980.

If the 1963 plan had worked and CVA 01 had been built and entered service by 1974, by 1980 it would have been on its own. Even if money had been found for CVA02 to be laid down in 1974 (hard to imagine given real world events in 1973), Eagle/Ark (only one could be cobbled together to serve through the 70s) would be at the end of its life. Hermes would have a few more years left but only with Buccaneers.

Without CVA01 we had Ark Royal in service until 1979. Hermes was needed as an ASW/Commando ship to replace Albion.
Three Command Cruisers (later CVS) had been ordered to replace them.

The Maltas (instead of Eagle, Ark and Victorious) would have been much easier to Phantomise. They could all have received T984. Hermes, Centaur, Albion and Bulwark would have been available as ASW/Commando ships once Seahawk leaves service.

CV70 would have evolved from a decade of operating Maltas. Two or three ships depending on the economy could have been ordered in the 60s/early 70s.

The Tigers would not have been needed in this RN and been sold or scrapped as the Countys entered service.

Are you going to address the counterargument that the Maltas aren't going to last much past 1975 either? Your CV70 idea is hilariously optimistic given the difficulties you lay out with CVA-01.

 

[uk 75]

I am assuming the two to three Maltas are built at the same delayed rate as the Eagle and Ark.
I agree this is all a bit "fantasy football team" but I have only given them the same life span as Ark in real life.
The problem with CVA01 was that it was too small because it had to draw on Eagle experience.
The Maltas would have been accompanied by suitable infrastructure like drydocks.
Two new CVs between 1963 and 1980 is not much more demanding than three Command Cruisers that were built.
What killed the carriers in 1966 was the Hermes question. If you have two to three Maltas all able to operate F4 Hermes is not needed.
I however accept that 1966 is also about moving away from fixed wing carriers to an ASW force. So even the Maltas would not have saved the FAA.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The problem with CVA01 was that it was too small because it had to draw on Eagle experience.
The Maltas would have been accompanied by suitable infrastructure like drydocks.

...

CVA-01 is bigger than the Maltas.

Like, CVA-01 is the size it is for a reason. They're about the minimum size you can comfortably operate 70,000-lb aircraft off of in reasonable numbers. The RN got to this point by a series of actual design studies that have been shown elsewhere on this site, and the USN reached very similar conclusions in the CVV process.

Of all the problems CVA-01 had, being too small is not one of them.

I am assuming the two to three Maltas are built at the same delayed rate as the Eagle and Ark.
I agree this is all a bit "fantasy football team" but I have only given them the same life span as Ark in real life.

Considering Ark was gone in 1978, that still puts replacement of the Maltas starting in 1975 and thus still puts the timer in the same place.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I should consider this kind of scenario in my F-11 musings as well.

It's definitely worth including in a sales pitch.

 

[uk 75]

Not quite sure why this is a problem:

two (worst case) Maltas in 1963 able to operate F4s with minimal conversion even if CVA01 not built vs only one Eagle/Ark able to do after significant conversion.

Unless the two Maltas had unforeseen build difficulties and accidents in service a 30 year service life takes them to 1980 -83 assuming the first Malta enters service in 1950 and the second by 1955.

Design and construction of my CV70 would thus not be under the same pressure as CVA01 which had to replace Ark and Victorious by 1972 leaving Eagle as her sistership until 1980 when CVA02 might have materialised under 1963 plans. But by 1966 only CVA01 is planned leaving it (and the unconverted Hermes) as the only RN fixed wing carrier after 1980.

 

[Volkodav]

Unfortunately, if you dig into the history this isn't the case. Victorious' rebuild was funded and designed in the 12-carrier plan of the late 1940s was absolutely necessary if the Brits were going to meet the force goals.

(That those force goals were hilariously unrealistic is a whole other problem.)

With Victorious, the best you can do is inflict better project management so you're not tearing down the whole ship twice. In hindsight, sticking to the original design with the original propulsion was the way to go. Yes, she'd be obsolescent, but from the perspective of getting the Royal Navy some actual post-war builds that's a benefit.

Eagle's rebuild is unfortunately a necessity based on the fact that the RN financially has to build carriers one at a time. By the time of that rebuild the RN had four carriers authorized (Eagle, Ark, Vic, Hermes IOTL); if you get a new one in the 50s it's not going to commission before 1960, which means not getting a second until the mid-60s at the earliest, and at that point you really do need a fully modernized third carrier because Eagle isn't getting replaced until the 1970s pretty much no matter what.

Ark's Phantomization can be skipped in most scenarios, at least.


Are you going to address the counterargument that the Maltas aren't going to last much past 1975 either? Your CV70 idea is hilariously optimistic given the difficulties you lay out with CVA-01.

Totally agree on the project management side. PMs are meant to be generalists looking at the big picture and keeping everything on track while the specialists work in their swim lanes or silos, the trouble is PMs tend to focus on details they don't understand and don't listen to experts. There is a need for senior technical generalists, people who understand enough about the big picture to ensure all the pieces are in place and the relevant specialists have been engaged.

Victorious was selected for rebuild after Illustrious and Formidable were surveyed and found to be in too poor a material state for rebuild. The Illustrious Class were selected for rebuild because there were three of them, thereby providing an economy of scale advantage over the two Implacables. As a Technical Director in that situation, the first thing I would have done with multiple classes available for upgrade is survey them to baseline what I was actually working with. Illustrious was divebombed and Formidable was torpedoed, I would have looked at them first and assumed they required additional work.

This isn't rocket science and the result would have been switching focus from upgrading Victorious to the Implacable Class. This also would have resulted, considering plans to upgrade all six armoured fleet carriers, in a recognised need to acquire new carriers in the 1950s.

I'm not just applying modern practice to the past, what I'm doing is applying established practice from the past, that we should be using today, to projects from the more recent past. There needs to be more holistic, bottom-up, thinking, looking where you need to go and working out the pieces you need to get there. If you don't know the answer find it, if you can't find it, do what you can to synthesise and mitigate it. Never assume the best outcome when you don't know, assume the worst.

Aggregate your risks, sometimes individually minor risks have a greater impact than a single more severe risk. A classic is the assumption that critical systems don't need to be replaced, then when you go to reactivate them you discover they needed to be (e.g. Victorious). It is assumed a new carrier design is too expensive and too time consuming, yet such a project would have, in hindsight, required less effort than the rebuild program, especially as there were resources assigned to new carriers and rebuilds.

 

[zen]

Essentially yes.
The 1947 meeting was the moment that surveys that should have been held in 1945-46 were discussed in the context of carriers, upgrading or replacing.
In other words, the 1952 process should have started in 1948 and that would immediately provoke the building of at least one 1000ft long 135ft wide, drydock. Probably Devonport on the site held just for that purpose.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To illustrate how far the UK was from such an approach Austin Rover only found out it was selling the iconic Mini at a loss when a European carmaker costed it.

It was BMC (not Austin Rover) and Ford of Britain (not a European carmaker) that costed it.

Furthermore, Ford of Britain's cost accountants may have been wrong. See "The Mini tear-down explained" and the comments in the following.

History : The BMC Story – Part Two : 1960 – Mini takes off - AROnline

Ian Nicholls, AROnline’s historian-in-residence, recounts the history of the British Motor Corporation (BMC). He follows up his excellent run-down of the British Motor Holdings and British Leyland stories with an eight-part study of BMC from 1959 to 1966.

www.aronline.co.uk

 

[Archibald]

The six Illustrious were actually three different subclasses, and not 2 2 2 but more like 2-1-3. With three different armored hangars which in turn impacted rebuilds. A true nightmare and monetary black hole

 

[red admiral]

Totally agree on the project management side. PMs are meant to be generalists looking at the big picture and keeping everything on track while the specialists work in their swim lanes or silos, the trouble is PMs tend to focus on details they don't understand and don't listen to experts. There is a need for senior technical generalists, people who understand enough about the big picture to ensure all the pieces are in place and the relevant specialists have been engaged.

You're more describing "bad" PMs there. There are definitely really good ones, but its a skill. Your "senior technical generalist" could be the PM, or good be the Chief Designer, or Chief Engineer, or some other title. Its much more about the skills and experience that they have. Part of that skill is in deciding how much to listen to which "experts" - because there are "bad" engineers much as there are "bad" leaders. Different people also have different views of risks. Something that one discipline may see as a critical risk may be negligible in the whole project. Similarly, different disciplines often want mutually exclusive options - there's a need to adjudicate between.

For complex projects then success is largely around the social activity of communication and relationships between people, rather than purely technical factors.

None the effort and skill to do this should be underestimated. It is really hard.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To bring back some focus on the thread may I remind people that in this scenario Britain has made better choices in a whole-of-Government, value-for-money way in a period of financial stringency from 1957. This approach requires a measure of ruthlessness and a lack of sentimentality in decision making and may not result in Britain not getting the bestest, shiniest, fastest planes, ships and tanks.

"The best is the enemy of the good". Fair enough. On that basis, is the RAF forced to buy the Buccaneer instead of TSR.2 in your timeline?

This is where the Phantom comes in; even the Spey version only cost 75m pounds to develop, no other fighter as good will cost so little to develop.

IIRC (I've not got the notes out) the R&D cost of Spey-Phantom was estimated at around £25 million in 1964 and ended up being in the region of £100 million. In both cases half the cost was the Spey engines.

My guess is that a "clean sheet of paper" twin-Spey heavy fighter (started in 1962 instead of the P.1154) wouldn't have cost much more to develop. E.g. we can say with some confidence that the reheated Spey engine for this aircraft would have cost exactly the same to develop as the reheated Spey for the Phantom and taken exactly the same length of time. Plus we have the money spent on the P.1154 (the RAF still buys the P.1127 Harrier) and the money that might be saved from having the RAF buy Buccaneer from the start (in place of the TSR.2 and F-111K) to draw upon too.

It's unlikely to have been more expensive to build than the Spey-Phantom and would have been less of a drain on the balance of payments.

Finally, it might have performed better than the Spey-Phantom because the designers could have taken advantage of technological advances that had been made since the Phantom was designed. Maybe it would have had slower take-off and landing speeds than the Spey-Phantom.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

See my post about the BBC TV series Warship to watch them in action.

I did a search for "warship" by @uk 75 and I couldn't find it. Please provide a link.

But it does give me the opportunity to plug the Hatchet Hopkirk and Paul Lagasse YouTube channels.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNYWIDCFCFI&t=2s

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cuub0dYzzkA

 

[JFC Fuller]

Unfortunately, if you dig into the history this isn't the case. Victorious' rebuild was funded and designed in the 12-carrier plan of the late 1940s was absolutely necessary if the Brits were going to meet the force goals.

(That those force goals were hilariously unrealistic is a whole other problem.)

With Victorious, the best you can do is inflict better project management so you're not tearing down the whole ship twice. In hindsight, sticking to the original design with the original propulsion was the way to go. Yes, she'd be obsolescent, but from the perspective of getting the Royal Navy some actual post-war builds that's a benefit.

Eagle's rebuild is unfortunately a necessity based on the fact that the RN financially has to build carriers one at a time. By the time of that rebuild the RN had four carriers authorized (Eagle, Ark, Vic, Hermes IOTL); if you get a new one in the 50s it's not going to commission before 1960, which means not getting a second until the mid-60s at the earliest, and at that point you really do need a fully modernized third carrier because Eagle isn't getting replaced until the 1970s pretty much no matter what.

Unfortunately, if you dig into the actual history this isn't the case either.

The Victorious reconstruction was part of a programme approved by the Admiralty in 1949 that would have produced a frontline fleet in 1957 consisting of:

Eagle
Ark Royal
Victorious (reconstructed)
Implacable (reconstructed)
Indefatigable (reconstructed)
Centaur
Bulwark
Albion
Hermes

Victorious was to complete, or at least leave her dry-dock,gf in 1953 when the Implacable and Indefatigable reconstructions would begin.

The Victorious reconstruction was harder than expected but the scope was initially kept very tight. For example, a proposal to add an angled deck, very early on, was rejected and hold-ups in the availability of the 3"/70 were not allowed to delay the programme. This changed in 1954, which is not coincidental with all other attempts at further reconstructions (Implacable and Indefatigable) or new construction (so called 1952 carrier) having been stymied by bureaucratic or budgetary constraints in the prior years. The design was reworked into what was completed, adopting all of the technological developments that had been matured since the late 1940s. D.K. Brown implies this was a torturous exercise in scope creep when in reality it was an eyes-open complete recasting of the programme undertaken in one go.

The result was an outstanding ship, regarded by the Navy itself as superior to Hermes in almost every way despite having cost a very similar amount, she was faster, better protected, had a bigger air wing, and a higher capacity CDS. Courtesy of her new boilers she even had the best steam conditions of any British carrier.

The Eagle reconstruction was an utterly miserable affair, firstly delayed by the equally miserable modernisation of Centaur then constrained in scope by a desire to get it done in 3 years the end result was a ship that had some impressive features but also some unpleasant ones. The decision to retain the aft 4.5" guns strikes me as especially poor given the ongoing concerns about habitability (it would have reduced crew demand and increased crew space in a very crowded ship), irrespective of DGS' protestations of their continued effectiveness.

 

[Volkodav]

You're more describing "bad" PMs there. There are definitely really good ones, but its a skill. Your "senior technical generalist" could be the PM, or good be the Chief Designer, or Chief Engineer, or some other title. Its much more about the skills and experience that they have. Part of that skill is in deciding how much to listen to which "experts" - because there are "bad" engineers much as there are "bad" leaders. Different people also have different views of risks. Something that one discipline may see as a critical risk may be negligible in the whole project. Similarly, different disciplines often want mutually exclusive options - there's a need to adjudicate between.

For complex projects then success is largely around the social activity of communication and relationships between people, rather than purely technical factors.

None the effort and skill to do this should be underestimated. It is really hard.

When I moved to defence PMs were almost always project engineers, and experienced ones at that. In fact, it was after I started that the first three non-engineers joined the PM department, all had come up through trade to become senior and principal technical officers. The organisation also had career paths for technical officers and designers to become senior managers and to even obtain chartered status.

Several efficiency reviews later and things have changed for the worse.

I am no longer with that organisation but where I am has the same disease, you want to be a project director, you get an MBA, PMs are appointed in "fit" and "culture" with no requirement for any formal qualifications at all, not even a trade. This has created a need for technical "specialists" to advise the PMs as they do not have this knowledge themselves, but the PM is very much the boss, so the techo is usually either a very pissed of ex-defence technical NCO, or a junior engineer, meaning there is no career path for them.

I thought this was just a quirk of one place I worked but can now, after a few years of trying to find a sane company or project to work on, confirm it is pretty much everywhere.

It's gotten so bad that it's one of the core topics of every conference and industry networking event I've attended in the last couple of years. The head shed knows there is a problem but the people they need to step up fix the problem are quite happy with the status quo and have no intention of changing any essential part of it. This is because they are the unqualified, incompetent, non-techncial PMs and directors who currently run the show. Anything done to fix things will do them out of a job unless they can pull two or three decades of technical expertise out of their backsides.

I wasn't there in the 50s and 60s so can't say what happened, just there's enough books from those around in the 70s and 80s to know there was a similar problem when naval design was progressively outsourced.

Victorious and the carrier modernisation was different in one way, it was very much driven by the RNs inability to sell their needs to the GoD. This led to them not being able to get new ships over the line so they pushed for upgraded which was better than nothing. This in turn made the hump of designing and building new carriers later, with the degraded industrial and design base, even more expensive and difficult to justify.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Essentially yes.
The 1947 meeting was the moment that surveys that should have been held in 1945-46 were discussed in the context of carriers, upgrading or replacing.
In other words, the 1952 process should have started in 1948 and that would immediately provoke the building of at least one 1000ft long 135ft wide, drydock. Probably Devonport on the site held just for that purpose.

I'm still confused as to why the UK didn't build/rebuild a big drydock during or after WW2.

Finally, it might have performed better than the Spey-Phantom because the designers could have taken advantage of technological advances that had been made since the Phantom was designed. Maybe it would have had slower take-off and landing speeds than the Spey-Phantom.

I'm not willing to bet on that. Phantom was the product of a company that had made a whole series of naval jets...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The RN needed to order a Malta like carrier instead of the Audacious class.
Building 2 to 3 Maltas between 1945 and 1960 would have given the RN a carrier similar to Midway
Experience with the Maltas would have allowed a less radical CVA01 design to be laid down in the 60s and 70s.
F4J and Bucs operate from these ships until replaced by F18s.

Building 2 or 3 Maltas between 1945 and 1960 wouldn't happen unless they were laid down 1942-44 instead of the Audacious class. I don't know whether that could have been done, but it does give you 2 or 3 ships that (according to Conway's 1922-46) were 100 feet longer, 3 feet beamier, had 4 lifts instead of 2, a third more shaft horsepower and the same size crew.

So far so good. Except (all other things being equal) it gives you:

• One Standard D Malta with DC electrics instead of Eagle.
• One Standard C Malta with DC electrics instead of Ark Royal and unless the shipyard preserves her hull better than it did IOTL with all of Real-Ark Royal's material defects.
  • And perhaps.
• One Standard A Malta with AC electrics instead of the rebuilt Victorious.

Although the hulls are longer my guess is that ALT-Ark Royal still received a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4s. My guess is that the ALT-third ship would have a pair of 151ft stroke BS.4s, which while an improvement on the 145ft stroke BS.4s that Victorious, the Real-third ship would have been completed with 151ft stroke BS.4s too. Neither ship would have been completed with arrester gear capable of handling a Phantom either.

Therefore, ALT-Ark Royal would have required a Phantomisation refit like the one that the real Ark Royal had 1967-70 IOTL (BS.5 steam catapults, new arrester gear and a fully-angled flight deck). Except the longer hull may have allowed longer stroke BS.5 steam catapults to be fitted.

The ALT-third ship would have required a Phantomisation refit along the lines of Ark Royal too. The main difference being that she already had a fully-angled flight deck. Whether that happened ITTL would depend if it was due to start before or after the devaluation of Sterling. If it had been completed before, then it's a non-issue. If it was in progress (as Ark Royal's was IOTL) then the Government would have allowed it to be completed. If it hadn't been started then it would have been cancelled.

ALT-Eagle would have needed a Standard A refit, which like the real one would have gone over time and cost despite keeping the DC electrical system. However, like her sisters the longer hull may allow longer-stroke BS.5 catapults to be fitted. She would still need another refit to enable her to operate Phantoms, which all other things being equal would have been cancelled following the devaluation of Sterling and still run aground.

I doubt that they would have had Midway-size air groups, because that would have required larger crews and a much bigger logistics & training organisation ashore to support them. They probably would have had air groups that were not much larger than the OTL Ark Royal & Eagle or at best CVA.01-size air groups.

I don't see why experience with these ships would have allowed a less radical CVA.01 to be laid down in the 1960s and 1970s.

I like the idea of them being in service long enough to have their Phantoms & Buccaneers replaced by Hornets. Unfortunately, given that the OTL grounding of Real-Eagle probably happens to ALT-Eagle and ALT-Ark Royal probably had Real-Ark Royal's defects it looks like only the ALT-third ship would be able to stay in service for long enough to operate Hornets. (Midway only served for as long as she did because of her SCB.101 refit in the second half of the 1960s which IIRC took twice as long as estimated and cost 2½ times more than estimated.) And Phantoms and Buccaneers could have operated from the Audacious class until replaced by Hornets too if Eagle hadn't run aground and Ark Royal's defects were avoided.

The RN needed to order a Malta like carrier instead of the Audacious class.
Building 2 to 3 Maltas between 1945 and 1960 would have given the RN a carrier similar to Midway
Experience with the Maltas would have allowed a less radical CVA01 design to be laid down in the 60s and 70s.
F4J and Bucs operate from these ships until replaced by F18s.

The other way to do it is abandon plans to modernise the Illustrious class in favour of new construction in the late 1940s instead of the early the early 1950s. Then you get some 1952 Carriers built in the 1950s. As someone else wrote one instead of rebuilding Victorious and maybe another instead of completing Hermes. However, a minimum of 3 ships would have been better. Compared to the Maltas (and Audaciouses) they would have had have modern torpedo defence systems, AC electrics and better accommodation for the crew.

However, it's unlikely that they'd have been built with steam catapults and arrester gear that could launch and recover Phantoms. (IIRC from Friedman they were to have been fitted with two or three 151ft stroke BS.4s.) If that's correct, more powerful catapults and stronger arrester gear would have to be fitted to make them Phantom-capable. On the other hand the work aught to have been less drastic than was required for Ark Royal IOTL (e.g. they would have been completed with fully-angled flight decks) and due to the ships being larger longer stroke BS.5s could have been fitted.

I don't see why experience with them would have allowed a less radical CVA.01 design to be laid down in the 1960s and 1970s either. Although two or three 1952 Carriers wouldn't need replacing until at least the late 1970s and were more likely than two or three Maltas to survive for long enough to see their Phantoms and Buccaneers replaced by Hornets.

Edit 07.01.25

I've checked my copies of Brown & Freidman. The short answer is that 1952 Aircraft Carriers would have been built with steam catapults and arrester gear that could have launched and recovered Phantoms along with flight and hangar decks that were strong enough for them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm not willing to bet on that. Phantom was the product of a company that had made a whole series of naval jets...

Which were designed to operate from super carriers and British companies made their own series of naval jets too.

Dassault designed a supersonic fighter (Mirage G) that could operate from the Clemeneau class. Breguet designed the Br.120 to meet the same specification, which was to be powered by a pair of Speys, but as it was a paper plane we'll never know if it would have met the specification.

 

[red admiral]

@Volkodav I agree with your observations and have seen much the same. But there are still definitely good PMs / leaders around.

I wouldn't necessarily say that the PM is always the boss. In some organisations they are definitely in a supporting role to the project lead.