MOTS Phantom for the RN?

[H_K]

Which bring us back to the crux of this thread; the RN's 60s fighter needs cannot alone be met by British industry, the fleet is too small and the development cost for a State of the Art carrier fighter is too high. The RNs fighter fleet either needs to do a joint development programme with the RAF or with a foreign supplier.

Such as the P1121, which my brain is still parsing more as the "British Thunderchief" or "British Crusader" than "British Phantom"

I'm afraid that the Eagle and Ark are the only pre CVA01 carriers available and suitable for prolonged service, and their 151' BA5 cats require the Spey Phantom rather than the standard F4J with the extended nose oleo and dropped ailerons.

A joint-service "British Crusader" would have been the perfect way to solve this dilemma IMHO.

- Start with P.1103 circa 1954/55... big single engine, 2-seat fighter
- Hawker likes what it sees in the XF8U Crusader, reworks P.1103 with a variable incidence high-wing for lower take-off/approach speeds.
- Hawker pulls a Dassault and submits an unsolicited proposal to the Air Ministry and Royal Navy for a downscaled P.1103, built around the Avon 200 series, and able to meet both services' needs in a smaller, cheaper package. The RAF single-seater has a detachable rocket pack (as on the Mirage III) to meet interceptor requirements, while the RN 2-seater has a bigger radar, folding wings and more fuel
- Lightning and Sea Vixen having had mixed results with early prototypes (P.1A and DH110), and although more advanced prototypes are in the pipeline, they get canned before first flight in favor of Hawker's proposal
- Over time, this British Crusader evolves from Avon 200 to Avon 300 to Spey... and wins multiple export competitions against Mirage III and F104s (Australia, Canada etc)
- The RN’s carrier dilemmas get solved with 2-3 Centaurs still in service by 1982… the Falklands never happen

 

[Scott Kenny]

Given that there were white papers recommending Trident submarines as a replacement for Polaris as early as 1978, anyone who didn't see them coming was either not paying attention or actively ignoring them.

Okay, so the RN would definitely have evidence against doing the SLEP, excellent!

FEARLESS stuck around until 2002; if CVA-01 enters service in 1973, that gives it about a decade of being a 'steam orphan'. Not ideal, but manageable - especially if there's a CVA-02 entering service around 1978.

And you can keep a couple of the steam frigates around as moored training ships for not too much money. Even after their combat systems are all hopelessly out of date, because what you care about is the workings of the steam plant.

US does this with old submarines to train the nukes in reactor operations. Many of the MTS were Polaris boats with their missile compartments cut out. You wouldn't need to keep the Boiler sailors on the MTS for a year like the USN does with their nuke boats, but probably 6 months or so spinning the valves and learning the systems.

No, you can't really set MTS up to be power generators to plug into the grid, the Sailors need to spend a lot of time doing emergency shutdowns etc that would interrupt electrical supply. Unfortunately.

The Phantom could carry a hefty load of bombs, but it wasn't a CAS aircraft. It had a podded cannon that was very temperamental and having two aircrew was expensive for the CAS role. It didn't have LRMTS either.
Jaguar was a much better fit for the ground support role. The FGR.2s were much better suited as a swing-role interceptor/interdictor and in these roles was superior to P.1154.

You're moving the goalposts, Hood. You said "not suited to ground attack" in general. Not "Not suited to CAS".

CAS is a completely different mission set, and as you note the Phantom works quite well for interdiction.

Phantom also had space to install the LRMTS system, probably in a pod that could replace one of the Sparrows or alternatively under the nose where the F-4Bs carried the IRST pod.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Part of Post 271.

It's @Rule of cool that wants that to happen. Not me. I have my own ideas.

Without bigger carriers in service, you're stuck needing the heavily modified F-4Ks to be able to safely operate off the existing carriers.

So the RN needed to build something roughly Malta sized either in WW2 or immediately post-war.

 

[Rule of cool]

A joint-service "British Crusader" would have been the perfect way to solve this dilemma IMHO.

- Start with P.1103 circa 1954/55... big single engine, 2-seat fighter
- Hawker likes what it sees in the XF8U Crusader, reworks P.1103 with a variable incidence high-wing for lower take-off/approach speeds.
- Hawker pulls a Dassault and submits an unsolicited proposal to the Air Ministry and Royal Navy for a downscaled P.1103, built around the Avon 200 series, and able to meet both services' needs in a smaller, cheaper package. The RAF single-seater has a detachable rocket pack (as on the Mirage III) to meet interceptor requirements, while the RN 2-seater has a bigger radar, folding wings and more fuel
- Lightning and Sea Vixen having had mixed results with early prototypes (P.1A and DH110), and although more advanced prototypes are in the pipeline, they get canned before first flight in favor of Hawker's proposal
- Over time, this British Crusader evolves from Avon 200 to Avon 300 to Spey... and wins multiple export competitions against Mirage III and F104s (Australia, Canada etc)
- The RN’s carrier dilemmas get solved with 2-3 Centaurs still in service by 1982… the Falklands never happen

That's a more or less logical to solution to the problems of the early-mid 60s. The problem is that UK defence strategy and policy were totally changed in April 1957, which apart from one or two glaring shortcomings was more or less a good move.

The RAF had the F.155 project in the works in the mid 50s with the Lightning and SR177 as interims for it's ~35 sqns Fighter Command. A large number of fighter-bombers in Germany and elsewhere were being displaced by Canberra interdictors, as they were becoming surplus to Bomber command as V Bombers entered service, and presumably the fighter task in these Commands would be undertaken by Lightning, SR177 and F.155 in the future.

The RN had 6 carriers and had the Sea Vixen in the works with the SR177 to follow and a requirement big enough to develop its own fighter fleet.

However all this changed in 1957, Fighter Command was drastically reduced in size, 1/3 the size within a year of the 57 DWP and the RN went to 4 carriers. This is why Britina was in such a bind, to get success in a number of areas like the RAF fighter, fighter-bomber and strike roles and the naval strike role hangs the RN fighter out to dry.

 

[zen]

In context of P.1103....
It's more viable for the times to have focused the design on larger engines than the Avon.
But in affordability to have focused on engines smaller than the Gyron.

Happily there was options.
Bristol's Olympus Ol.15
(try to get the TSR.2 and Concord engines out of your mind here)
RR had the RA.19 scaled up Avon
Armstrong Siddeley had a new engine of 40" diameter, of much interest to Hawkers.

And so there was a happy medium between what would be difficult to meet requirements and what would be impossible.

Remember the early Mirage III is a Mach 2 fighter in the clean condition and with each additional pylon of stores, it's speed, acceleration, and climb drop below that performance level.

So a P.1103 wrapped around an Avon is similarly going to be 'maybe' a Mach 2 fighter.....in the clean condition.

But if you wrap it around the intermediate engines like a Olympus.....then retaining decent performance is plausible with stores.

However....
What is ideal is if Hawkers had a twin Avon P.1103 option in their back pocket......

 

[Archibald]

@zen Good point about the Mirage III with the SEPR auxiliary rocket packs - I have a pdf about them somewhere.
Fact is that SEPR-Mirage solution to the very high altitude threats bet Griffon & Leduc 022 ( = ramjets) and also the Trident (rocket too, but reversed compared to the Mirage : main rocket, auxiliary jets : much less practical).

And then the Mirage evolved into an exponential number of variants and missions. The AdA procured a total of 460-something airframe, and almost a thousand more went to exports.

 

[Hood]

You're moving the goalposts, Hood. You said "not suited to ground attack" in general. Not "Not suited to CAS".

CAS is a completely different mission set, and as you note the Phantom works quite well for interdiction.

In my mind:
Ground attack = CAS
Interdiction = strike

Phantom also had space to install the LRMTS system, probably in a pod that could replace one of the Sparrows or alternatively under the nose where the F-4Bs carried the IRST pod.

Maybe, but the fact is FGR.2 didn't have LRMTS nor was it ever spec'ed for it.

 

[JFC Fuller]

This is why the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, mandated in 1961 that all future fast jets should be joint RAF/RN developments.
That was fine and dandy on paper but when NMBR.3 looked like being the next big thing, everything was staked on it and the RAF was on board. Nobody asked the RN if they wanted VTOL. They didn't but had no choice but to buy whatever the RAF wanted - P.1154. NMBR.3 ended up a busted flush anyway, but the RAF was adamant it wanted V/STOL.
When the politicians finally wised up that mashing two different roles into one aircraft wouldn't work, the RN got Phantoms but as a consequence, when the RAF lost P.1154 in 1965, they were automatically obliged to buy Phantoms - which were not suited to ground attack and which led to Jaguar being purchased just the year after.

OR.346 was fantastic on paper, but once OR.356 came along shortly after to replace Sea Vixen, the strike aspects were emphasised as a Buccaneer replacement the RAF of course already had TSR.2 in development so it automatically pushed OR.346 back to the late 1970s as a tentative TSR.2 replacement, making it no good for the RN and having to devise new Bucc upgrades.
Now of course, when TSR.2 died the RAF was not forced to buy Buccaneers - they got F-111K over Bucc 3 (until of course F-111K was cancelled and then there was no alternative but to accept stock RN Buccs).

AFVG was meant to be dual Service but of course that died quickly and of course with the carriers earmarked for the scrappies in 1975 it made little sense then to develop a naval AFVG.

So the whole policy was a mish-mash of confusion with no real operational analysis of what either Service wanted. The RAF backed the wrong horse with V/STOL. Had they preserved with OR.346 for a VG-winged Type 583 it would have saved a lot of hassle. Yes it would have been expensive to develop but it could have replaced Sea Vixen, Buccaneer, Hunter, Javelin. It might even have killed TSR.2 earlier in the development path. The money saved would have been pretty useful all round. Production would be at least 300 aircraft, probably a little higher.

Peter Thornycroft was Minister of Aviation in 1961, not the Minister of Defence, that was Harold Watkinson. Ministers had been pushing for future aircraft to be joint for months, if not years, but nothing had really happened. If anything the services were headed in the other direction with the RAF having withdrawn from OR.346, which they viewed as a VG study project but the Navy viewed as the future of the Fleet Air Arm. In December 1961, it was finally mandated that all future aircraft would be joint. Given the forum the decision was officially made in, its hasty and un-studied nature, and the lack of immediate resistance from both services, I think it was Macmillan that imposed it. The trigger was really the RAF scope creeping GOR.345 from a subsonic light attack aircraft into a VSTOL F-105. That meant the future aircraft development programme consisted of:

TSR-2
P.1127, unwanted by either the Navy or the RAF but a trilateral programme for which funding was sought
GOR.345, supersonic VSTOL strike/CAS aircraft
OR.346, the Navy's combined VG successor to Sea Vixen and Buccaneer

Thornycroft, and others, intention was for these future aircraft to be multi-role, which is where the Joint Services P.1154 came from. Neither service was willing to compromise its operational requirement, which was underpinned by a huge amount of operational analysis, so it died and separate variants prevailed until they too were cancelled. OR.346/355 was to be the generation after P.1154 but it was an endeavour in creating a common requirement out of two extant requirements, the challenge being that the RAF OR.355 had been written specifically to make aircraft carriers redundant. OR.355 was intended to provide a combined fighter and strike aircraft, some RAF officers got very excited about the long-range, loitering, big-radar concept the Navy had evolved for OR.346 and took that to an absurd extreme. The RAF wanted it to replace the Lighting and the Navy the P.1154RN (they really, really, hated the P.1154) in addition to TSR-2 and Buccaneer. Buccaneer upgrades beyond the basic Mk.2, notably A.W.162(T), originate prior to December 1961 (Link).

 

[Scott Kenny]

Maybe, but the fact is FGR.2 didn't have LRMTS nor was it ever spec'ed for it.

Was that due to RAF being too cheap to pay for such a capable tool or some other reason, though?

The US certainly fitted their Phantoms with various laser targeting pods, and I'm sure the RAF could have bought a few of the US units. My vote would be for the AN/ASQ-153 Pave Spike since that was small enough to fit into the left front Sparrow well on a Phantom. Pave Spike was also available by 1980. Crud, the RAF even bought a cheaper version, AN/AVQ-23E, to fit to their Buccaneers!

 

[zen]

Thank you JCF Fuller!

So if we'd kept GOR.345 as subsonic. We might have an affordable system that could build on the P.1127.......And I think early P.1154 using pegasus with PCB did that. But NMBR.3 blew it up with supersonic performance and BS.100 was needed....at much greater projected cost.

One is reminded of Zuckerman's reflection that going supersonic at low level cost a lot for precious little improvement in survivability of platforms.

While what was needed was the OR.355 and OR.346 were merged and kept within the weight budget of RN carriers. Or more accurately the RAF told this is your future fighter to succeed Lightning and current Javelin and it must keep the Navy in the game, but at least this means you share some of the costs.

But....equally if OR.355 is going to blow out the RN, it needs to grow into something closer to a V-Bomber in scale. At which point the Deterrent comes in like a hammer to squash it.

 

[Scott Kenny]

So if we'd kept GOR.345 as subsonic. We might have an affordable system that could build on the P.1127.......And I think early P.1154 using pegasus with PCB did that. But NMBR.3 blew it up with supersonic performance and BS.100 was needed....at much greater projected cost.

Except everyone and their grandmother had a want for the most speed they could get then. It took until the Teen series fighters that pure top-speed required was dialed back and a speed of maybe Mach 1.8 was seen as acceptable.

While what was needed was the OR.355 and OR.346 were merged and kept within the weight budget of RN carriers.

Is that even possible with 1950s/60s electronics?

 

[zen]

Is that even possible with 1950s/60s electronics?

It was with F4 and F111B.

 

[Rule of cool]

Except everyone and their grandmother had a want for the most speed they could get then. It took until the Teen series fighters that pure top-speed required was dialed back and a speed of maybe Mach 1.8 was seen as acceptable.

IIUC the analysis out of Vietnam was that no combat occurred at over Mach 1.6, and IIRC Mach 1.2-1.6 was only a few seconds. The vast majority of air combat took place in the transonic and subsonic realms. The Teen series was optimised to perform in that speed regime.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It was with F4 and F111B.

Neither of which were within the weight budget of existing RN carriers.

My question is, can you stuff all the avionics of an F-4 or F-111B into an F-8 sized airframe?

edit: fixed formatting.

 

[Rule of cool]

Neither of which were within the weight budget of existing RN carriers.

My question is, can you stuff all the avionics of an F-4 or F-111B into an F-8 sized airframe?

No, the avionics for the F4 and F111b were way too big for an F8.

As for the weight budget, the F4 wasn't able to operate on half the USNs carriers when it entered service and the F111b was even worse. Refits were required, in fact this is still occurring and is why only 5 USN carriers fly the F35C now. Refits, even extensive ones like the Midway's, to operate new aircraft. In the early 60s the UK had 2 carriers that could be refitted for the F4 and was going to build a third.

 

[uk 75]

CVA01 was designed to carry new generation aircraft like the F4B and F111B.
Unfortunately the ship was delayed so much and orders reduced from four down to only one.
P1154RN might have operated from Eagle, Ark Royal, Victorious and Hermes. But the RN prefered the more feasible Spey F4.
Unfortunately it became clear by 1966 that only Ark and Eagle (with new catapults and traps) could operate UK Phantoms. This left Hermes (the carrier with most life left) without modern fighters.
Enthusiasts for F8 variants or F11 Supertiger or a UK solution cannot get round this carrier dilemma. An RN with CVA01 wants better interceptors than any of these. Remove CVA01 and the UK can only keep Hermes beyond 1980.
As things turned out the Ark/Eagle hybrid as she became provided much of the CVA01 airgroup between 1970 and 1978 and allowed the Sea Harrier to be developed for use on Hermes (and in a limited way on Bulwark) while the Invincible Command Cruisers were being built.
I attempted to give the RN an F4B capable carrier force by giving it two to three Maltas instead of Ark/Eagle. In the light of well informed comments here I accept this could not happen without too dramatic changes to the UK.
Unfortunately Alt Hist should not be too sweeping in its changes or it risks being nothing more than Fantasy Football Teams. This section is already dismissed by many Site users.

 

[zen]

Neither of which were within the weight budget of existing RN carriers.

My question is, can you stuff all the avionics of an F-4 or F-111B into an F-8 sized airframe?

No (actually yes but it's complicated) but you can do tolerably well with a twin seater F8U-III.

All this talk of F4 avoids the fact AW.406 requirements were broken in the selection of it. Either one confronts the concept such requirements were wrong, for some reason, or the choice was political, not military.

Let us be clear F4 required multiple changes to operate effectively from RN carriers and the carriers required multiple changes too.
Despite all that it's highly doubtful Victorious or Hermes would ever utilise them beyond the more stripped back configurations....maybe.

 

[Archibald]

Yup, memories of Tony Butler books - RAF and RN specifications were god awful and only added to the chaos. Gold-plated, stuffed with blue-sky technologies driving cost through the roof. Resulting in monstrosities like VG + loads of lift jets.

 

[Hood]

I think its hard to disagree that the RN made the right choice in going for Phantom at the time.
Had events 1966-70 not killed the carrier fleet (or at least not put the 1975 then 1978 sword of Damocles over them) then its possible a naval MRCA would have emerged in the late 70s/very early 80s to succeed Phantom and Buccaneer.

Even if the VG option had been chosen over V/STOL, development would not have been cheap nor easy and inevitably there would have been the temptation to rope in collaboration with France or USA - with the CVA-01 being beefed up to take F-111B, collaboration with the USA would almost inevitably lead to becoming tied into TFX, which I suspect the RAF would not be upset about at all.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Without bigger carriers in service, you're stuck needing the heavily modified F-4Ks to be able to safely operate off the existing carriers.

So the RN needed to build something roughly Malta sized either in WW2 or immediately post-war.

I repeat. It's @Rule of cool that wants that to happen. Not me. I have my own ideas. He responded to Posts 271 (you) and 279 (me) in Post 280.

 

[BlackBat242]

Insert that and get to specifying a machine 2 jet only fighter by 1956 if not '55.

Which means eyes on the USN competition between F8U-III and F4.

But it also means domestic proposals. Priced in pounds.

Here's how that "competition" was in 1955:
F-4 Phantom:

McDonnell YF4H-1 Phantom II

McDonnell submitted a formal development proposal for the F3H-G/H to the Navy in August of 1954. The Navy responded in October of 1954 by issuing a letter of intent for two prototypes and a static test aircraft. The Navy assigned the designation AH-1 to the project, reflecting its intended ground attack mission. The AH-1 was to have no less then eleven weapons pylons. Armament was to consist of four 20-mm cannon.

On December 14, 1954, the multirole mission of the aircraft was formally abandoned by the Navy, and McDonnell was requested to rework the proposal as an all-weather interceptor. McDonnell was instructed to remove the cannon and all hardpoints except for a centerline pylon for a 600-US gallon fuel tank. In addition, troughs were to be added for four Raytheon Sparrow semi-active radar homing air-to-air missiles. A Raytheon-designed APQ-50 radar was added, this installation being essentially that installed in the F3H-2 Demon. A second seat was added to accommodate a radar operator.

On April 15, 1955, in a formal letter from the BuAer to the Commander of Naval Operations, the J79 engine was formally adopted, and all work on the J65-powered version was dropped.

On May 26, 1955, after further review of Navy requirements, the BuAer requested that the designers complete the two prototypes (BuNos 142259 and 142260) as two-seat all-weather fighters carrying an entirely missile-based armament. On June 23, 1955, the designation was changed to YF4H-1, a fighter designation. A day later, McDonnell issued a new model number for the project--98Q.

This factory designation was to be short-lived, since when a contract for 18 airframes beginning with 2 flight test prototypes and a static test article was signed on June 24, it was for the Model 89R with a modified APQ-50 I/J-band radar with a 24-inch dish which was to be compatible with the Sparrow III semi-active radar homing missile. This order was changed to Model 98S shortly thereafter, the changed designation indicating the provision of the capability of handling the infrared homing Sidewinder missile in addition to the radar-homing Sparrow.

On July 25, 1955, the Navy and the manufacturer agreed to a detailed list of specifications for the YF4H-1. The aircraft was to be capable of staying on patrol for up to two hours at a time at a distance of up to 250 nautical miles from its carriers and was to be able to remain in the air for at least three hours without midair refuelling. At the same time, the go-ahead for the F4H project was confirmed, with a formal contract being written for the two previously-ordered prototypes but also for five pre-production aircraft (BuNos 143388 to 143392).

The YF4H-1 mockup was inspected between November 17 and 23, 1955. The twin J79 afterburning turbojets were to be mounted in the lower portions of the fuselage and fed by fixed-geometry cheek air intakes. The primary armament was to be four Sparrow III radar-guided missiles mounted in semi-submerged slots beneath the fuselage. No provision was made for the mounting of cannon.

At the same time, the Navy authorized Vought to build two prototypes of the single-seat, single-engined F8U-3 Crusader III to compete with the F4H-1. In reality, the aircraft should have been designated F9U, and it should have been Crusader II rather than Crusader III.

F8U-3 Crusader III:

Vought XF8U-3 Crusader III

In 1956, with production of the F8U Crusader well under way, Russ Clark and his team at Vought were already beginning to think about its successor. The XF8U-3 Crusader III was the result.

The Vought XF8U-3 Crusader III (known by the company as the Vought V-401) was an extremely advanced fighter interceptor of the late 1950s. Although the aircraft was designated XF8U-3, it was essentially a completely new design and bore only a superficial relationship to the earlier F8U-1 and F8U-2.

Vought decided not to call their entry the XF9U-1, which would have been the logical choice. Instead, they designated the aircraft XF8U-3 Crusader III. Why Crusader III? The F8U-2 (F-8C) was considered such a major upgrade that it was initially called Crusader II, so it was logical to call the XF8U-3 Crusader III.

On July 25, 1955, the Navy authorized the construction of two XF8U-3 prototypes. Three more prototypes were ordered later.

So, paper proposals for which prototypes had just barely been ordered.

Nothing was really solid until 1958 - not even that it was actually a competition - as the Phantom was conceived as a replacement for the F3H Demon all-weather missile fighter, hence the initial proposals being designated "F3H-C/E/G/H/J", it is conceivable that with a bit more budget the USN could have ordered both - the Phantom to replace the Demon & F4D Skyray and the Crusader III to replace the F8U Crusaders and F11F Tigers that had both been ordered in 1953:

The XF8U-3 found itself in competition against the F4H Phantom II. In the spring of 1958, the Navy established two preliminary evaluation teams, one dedicated to the Phantom II and the other to the Crusader III.
The first prototype took off on its maiden flight on June 2, 1958, test pilot John Konrad at the controls. This was six days after the first flight of the rival McDonnell Phantom.

Although the Crusader III showed great promise, the Navy chose the competing McDonnell Phantom as the winner of the contest. The XF8U-3 was designed exclusively as a fighter/interceptor, but the Phantom was designed to a more encompassing set of requirements which included interception, reconnaissance, and ground attack roles.. The Vought development contract was cancelled in December of 1958.

 

[Scott Kenny]

No (actually yes but it's complicated) but you can do tolerably well with a twin seater F8U-III.

And the F8U-3 is all of 5000lbs heavier MTOW, 3ft longer, and 4ft4in wider wingspan (wings unfolded).

What engine does the UK have in the J75 class at this time? Olympus 593? Anything else? Trying to find a way to reduce the amount of US content as an option.

Because again, the only way I see a MOTS F-4B/J purchase being viable is if the UK bought bigger carriers at the end of WW2.

 

[zen]

What engine does the UK have in the J75 class at this time? Olympus 593? Anything else? Trying to find a way to reduce the amount of US content as an option.

Engines?
Late 50's....
DeHaviland Gyron single spool turbojet.
Bristol Olympus turbojet two spool engines Ol.21 and the Ol.22 ongoing development for GOR.339 (TSR.2)

Rolls Royce;-
Conway turbofan, project to fit reheat on Co.16.
Medway turbofan in development.
Between '54 and '57 two spool advanced (high titanium content) RB.106 to RB.128 development.....similar to Orenda Iriqois.

Armstrong Siddeley had several high supersonic cruise engines ongoing. Ultimately cancelled with supersonic recce bomber and a large bore turbojet that had interested Camm for the P.1121.

Radars AI.18 developments and AI.23.
Radios
VHF navigation
Doppler altimeter
Sidescan radars
X-band and S-Band homers for FAW and Buccaneer.
Inertial platforms.

Off the top of my head from memory

 

[Rule of cool]

Because again, the only way I see a MOTS F-4B/J purchase being viable is if the UK bought bigger carriers at the end of WW2.

This is true enough.

However it appears that it's easier to modify the F4 to fly from an Audacious than it is to build more suitable ships in the postwar era.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This is true enough.

However it appears that it's easier to modify the F4 to fly from an Audacious than it is to build more suitable ships in the postwar era.

Key word right there.

Appears.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is true enough.

However it appears that it's easier to modify the F4 to fly from an Audacious than it is to build more suitable ships in the postwar era.

As I'm in a James Burke mood . . . "Or was it?"

• Spey Phantom is reputed to have cost £100 million to develop.
• It was more expensive to build than the MOTS Phantom.
• The Phantomisation refit of Ark Royal cost £30 million.

How many CVA.01s would that pay for?

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82GUX_NA7AU

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is true enough.

However it appears that it's easier to modify the F4 to fly from an Audacious than it is to build more suitable ships in the postwar era.

And I was the person who suggested in the thread “Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?” that the entire Audacious, Centaur & Tiger classes be cancelled in January 1946 and plans to modernise the 6 armoured carriers be abandoned in 1946 so the money spent on them 1945-61 IOTL could be spent on as many 1952 Carriers as it would buy ITTL.

Link to Post 291 in the thread "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?"

A suggestion which I span off into the following thread.

Link to the Opening Post of the thread "Argus class Fleet Aircraft Carriers".

 

[Rule of cool]

How much costs can be sunk before it becomes a fallacy? Sure it was expensive to develop the Spey Phantom, but to get the standard version the RN to simultaneously build CVA01 and 02 at a combined 120-150 million pounds while throwing away the recent 31m rebuild of the Eagle.

 

[Scott Kenny]

How much costs can be sunk before it becomes a fallacy? Sure it was expensive to develop the Spey Phantom, but to get the standard version the RN to simultaneously build CVA01 and 02 at a combined 120-150 million pounds while throwing away the recent 31m rebuild of the Eagle.

You mean like how Spey Phantom cost some 100mil pounds to develop?

Let the Eagle get turned into an ASW carrier, give it a couple of S-2s/S-3s and E-2s, a pile of Sea King ASWs.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

How much costs can be sunk before it becomes a fallacy? Sure it was expensive to develop the Spey Phantom, but to get the standard version the RN to simultaneously build CVA01 and 02 at a combined 120-150 million pounds while throwing away the recent 31m rebuild of the Eagle.

Due to the generous payment terms that (IIRC) the USA offered we're talking of at least £300 million to spend over 10 years starting 1964. That is £30 million from no refit of Ark Royal, £100 million from no R&D costs for the Spey-Phantom and £170 million from the Spey-Phantom costing at least £1 million more per aircraft to build than the MOTS Phantom.

In addition to the sunk costs of about £30 million on the recently rebuilt Eagle there are also the sunk costs of Hermes and the rebuilt Victorious. Hermes had a hull & machinery that was good to at least 1979 (and ended up remaining in commission with the RN until 1984). Victorious was virtually a new ship after her 1950-58 rebuild so she may have a hull & machinery that was good to 1978.

I think the plan in 1962 when the CVA.01 project was begun was for five ships to replace the five existing strike carriers one-for-one, but by 1965 the number of new ships had been reduced to three to replace Ark Royal, Hermes & Eagle in that order. Though the £60-75 million each that you're suggesting for CVA.01 & 02 would be enough for four or five CVA.01s buy the middle 1970s if my guesstimate of saving £300 million from buying MOTS Phantom instead of Spey-Phantom and not Phantomising Ark Royal is accurate.

However, I'm sticking to three CVA.01s to make allowance for inflation & other cost overruns, because they're effectively taking the place of the Invincible class that isn't built in my TL and I think that three strike carriers are the maximum that the UK could afford to operate from 1970 to the end of the Cold War. The latter is based on having two ships in commission and the third in long refit/reserve with two 1970s Ark Royal size air groups plus a training group which in the event of World War III or the Falklands would have been broken up to provide reinforcements for the operational groups as was done with the Invincible class IOTL.

Which is a long-winded way of saying that Ark Royal, Hermes & Eagle will have to make do with their Sea Vixens until the early 1970s when they're replaced (in that order) by CVA.01, CVA.02 and CVA.03.

For the sake of argument CVA.03 is completed in 1975 and Eagle pays off earlier in that year to provide her crew. Therefore, the British taxpayer gets 11 years of service out of the £31 million spent on her 1959-64 refit, which is three years more than they got IOTL because she was paid off early in 1972 which was eight years after her 1959-64 refit was completed.

 

[Rule of cool]

That is a logically sound way to get the more or less MOTS Phantom onto RN carriers more or less within historical budgets. However, I cannot see a single key politician authorising it. Cabinet ministers would pitch a fit when told the Eagle and Victorious, just rebuilt at great expense would be disposed of within their likely term in Parliament and the taxpayers wouldn't be getting value for the money spent.

The cost of the Spey Phantom is one of life's greatest mysteries.

About the firmest thing I can ascertain is that at some point there was a fixed price contract for 400 RAF and RN aircraft which included development and production costs. From there I guess that every cost escalation ate into the number of aircraft that the fixed price allowed. In addition, I'd guess that from November 1967 the ~60% of the aircraft value that was being spent in the US increased by 14% with devaluation and perhaps that included some remaining development costs which the US charges but tends to make payments easier by spreading them out.

IIUC the RN ordered the development of the Spey Phantom in July 1964 for the long-term carriers (at that point in time) Eagle, Ark and CVA01. 1st July 1965 an initial batch of F4s for the RAF was ordered/announced but no decision on J79/Spey was made until November 1965 when the RAF would get Speys.

 

[uk 75]

The UK found it hard enough to build three Command Cruisers in the 1970s.
Apart from Fearless and Intrepid no large surface warships had been laid down since Eagle, Hermes and co.
I have serious doubts as to whether the UK could have built CVA01 still less any additional ships.

 

[Rule of cool]

The UK found it hard enough to build three Command Cruisers in the 1970s.
Apart from Fearless and Intrepid no large surface warships had been laid down since Eagle, Hermes and co.
I have serious doubts as to whether the UK could have built CVA01 still less any additional ships. In a virtuous circle

John Brown and Harland & Wolff built Fearless and Intrepid and IIUC were the preferred contractors for CVA01 and 02. Ideally CVA01 could have been ready to go with one of these yards soon after the LPD had been launched in order to maintain momentum in the yard, with CVA02 ready lay down immediately after CVA01 had been launched. This gets a lot of the work underway before the worst of the 70s appears.

 

[uk 75]

Neither Brown nor Harland were in particularly good shape in the 1960s. The problems building and completing the QE2 are worth looking at.

QE2: The 50-year journey of a British style icon

The QE2 is one of the most famous liners in the world and the last large liner to be built on the Clyde.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[zen]

Of course a left field option might be to go the other way an try to use a pair of RB.153 variants.
Although of lower thrust, their lower weight and fuel economy might actually translate into a more RN carrier friendly version of the F4.

This sort of option was set out for the Lightning, and give the same performance but with more modern engines of easier maintain-ability.

At least one version cranked up projected thrust to over 17,000lb in reheat. Weighing in rather less than an Avon.

 

[Scott Kenny]

John Brown and Harland & Wolff built Fearless and Intrepid and IIUC were the preferred contractors for CVA01 and 02. Ideally CVA01 could have been ready to go with one of these yards soon after the LPD had been launched in order to maintain momentum in the yard, with CVA02 ready lay down immediately after CVA01 had been launched. This gets a lot of the work underway before the worst of the 70s appears.

The UK then were absolutely incompetent in terms of industrial policy/keeping shipyards busy with production.

They allowed shipyards to. just. STOP. and lay off all their workers. So that when the next ships get built, the yard has to go hire a bunch of new employees, who then all need to be cleared.

Keep your shipyards busy all the time, people!!!! (6.4TB profanity-laced rant deleted for space and sanity)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That is a logically sound way to get the more or less MOTS Phantom onto RN carriers more or less within historical budgets. However, I cannot see a single key politician authorising it. Cabinet ministers would pitch a fit when told the Eagle and Victorious, just rebuilt at great expense would be disposed of within their likely term in Parliament and the taxpayers wouldn't be getting value for the money spent.

The cost of the Spey Phantom is one of life's greatest mysteries.

About the firmest thing I can ascertain is that at some point there was a fixed price contract for 400 RAF and RN aircraft which included development and production costs. From there I guess that every cost escalation ate into the number of aircraft that the fixed price allowed. In addition, I'd guess that from November 1967 the ~60% of the aircraft value that was being spent in the US increased by 14% with devaluation and perhaps that included some remaining development costs which the US charges but tends to make payments easier by spreading them out.

IIUC the RN ordered the development of the Spey Phantom in July 1964 for the long-term carriers (at that point in time) Eagle, Ark and CVA01. 1st July 1965 an initial batch of F4s for the RAF was ordered/announced but no decision on J79/Spey was made until November 1965 when the RAF would get Speys.

For what it's worth the following is according to Aeromilitaria magazine.

​

So 223 Spey-Phantoms were actually ordered in 3 batches. I don't know when or why the last 14 of the July 1965 order were cancelled. AFAIK the last 39 of the October 1966 order were cancelled because it was a fixed price contract and the devaluation of Sterling in late 1967 pushed the unit cost up.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 311.

About the firmest thing I can ascertain is that at some point there was a fixed price contract for 400 RAF and RN aircraft which included development and production costs.

According to Derek Wood on Page 204 of "Project Cancelled" Julian Amery MP (the Minister of Aviation) announced a provisional production programme of 600 P.1154s (400 RAF & 200 RN) on 18.02.63. On the same page Wood wrote that the estimated R&D cost was £25 million and unit costs were around £900,000. However, he doesn't give a date for that.

The Key Publishing book on British Phantoms says (on Page 13) that in February 1963 Julian Amery said that an order for 600 P.1154s (400 RAF & 200 RN) was envisaged. Unfortunately, it doesn't say how many Phantoms were wanted.

The closest I've come to a fixed price contract for 400 Phantoms is this quote from Page 185 of Roy Boot's "From Spitfire to Eurofighter".

Whilst MACAIR had based their policy on an expected order for 400 aircraft from the United Kingdom, with other worldwide sales of the variant to follow, in the end only 170 Spey-engined Phantoms were built, making it a very expensive programme.

However, Page 5 of the Ian Allan book on RAF Phantoms says . . .

Once the Phantom had been adopted by both the Royal Navy and the RAF it was the intention to order 140 F-4Ks and 182 F-4Ms all powered by the Rolls-Royce Spey engine.

Which makes a total of 322.

It also says.

Authorisation for the F-4M, or Phantom FGR2, production was given on 5 May 1965 and were Anglicised inn similar fashion to that of the F-4K, except those specifically associated with carrier operations. However, in spite of favourable design studies carried out by MACAIR and Rolls-Royce, actual flight testing threw up many problems, not least those associated with propulsion.

The next paragraph says.

Within the UK order there were incorporated two prototype F-4Ks (XT595/6) and two pre-production F-4Ks (XT597/8) and two prototype F-4Ms (XT852/3). of these it was intended that the the pre-production aircraft would be to the production standard but the prevailing problems surrounding the Spey installation precluded this, although some years later XT598 was eventually brought up to production standard. The major problems were eventually overcome although in the long term the unit cost of the F-4K reportedly rose by more than 500%, whilst delivery of the first aircraft was delayed until 25 April 1968.

 

[Hood]

The UK then were absolutely incompetent in terms of industrial policy/keeping shipyards busy with production.

They allowed shipyards to. just. STOP. and lay off all their workers. So that when the next ships get built, the yard has to go hire a bunch of new employees, who then all need to be cleared.

The shipbuilders were entirely lukewarm about putting in bids for CVA-01 at the initial presentation to industry.
The only yard that could build it alone was H&W and they didn't seem keen on bidding. It was clear any other bids would need to be a consortium of yards, cancellation came just before the tender documents were due to be posted out so we'll never know who for sure who might have built them.

By the time of Invincible, only Vickers had a big enough slipway available - but they were massively overloaded with SSNs, Type 42 lead yard and Invincible. Swan Hunter luckily was able to step in and build the remaining pair.
There were plenty of orders for T42s and T21s in the early 70s, but the situation was feast and the yards were overloaded and the yards ended up doing a lot of the detail design work and costs spiraled and it was clear the approved designs had very optimistically low costings. It's likely that CVA-01 was underestimated as well. It's possible the bids might have come in quite high compared with the estimates.
Those high costs pushed the follow-on orders later than planned and trimmed the ultimate numbers to be acquired.

There seems to have been a sense of unreality - on the one hand doing everything to reduce capability to reduce cost but yet underestimating that cost and ending up with fewer less-capable than planned ships at highly-inflated prices (T22 was actually allowed to spiral in size and cost, as was Invincible). The LTC system was poorly implemented and didn't really help to spread costs or help future planning at all.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 311.

The cost of the Spey Phantom is one of life's greatest mysteries.

For what they're worth these are the notes about the cost of the Spey-Phantom. They were handwritten many years ago from books about the Phantom that I found at Northallerton and York libraries. There are three pages and unfortunately I didn't write down the name & author of the book on two out of the three pages and I didn't write the page references for any of them. So they can't be checked.

The First Page Of Handwritten Notes​

• In 1963 the estimated cost of P.1154 was £750 million including several hundred aircraft at £1.5 million each.
• In February 1964 the estimated R&D cost of the Spey-Phantom was £25.3 million (£12.4 million for the engines). This had risen to £45.5 million (£28.7 million for the engines) in May 1965 and the bill was eventually £100 million.
• On 28.02.66 February 1966 Dennis Healey put the cost of F-4K/M at £300 million of which £160 million was to be paid by April 1970.
• However, on 04.04.66 the costs of American aircraft to be paid over a 10 year period were.
  • £590 million F-4K/M
  • £280 million F-111K
  • £210 million C-130K
• In mid-1966 the unit costs were.
  • £1.15 million F-4K
  • £1.20 million F-4M
  • £9.00 million C-130K
  • The Phantom costs were on an order for 210 aircraft.
• In June 1967 the cost of F-111K had gone up to £336 million and 50 TSR.2s would cost £610 million.
• In May 1968 the unit costs were
  • £1.4 million F-4K
  • £1.5 million F-4M
  • Including the development cost about £2 million per aircraft for 170 aircraft. The F-4 programme was not a financial success and wasn't in service any earlier than P.1154 would have been. Invalidating major reasons for procurement.

The Second Page Page Of Handwritten Notes - Which May Be From A Different Book​

• 52 F-4K (including 2 YF-4K) for RN to Ark Royal & Eagle. When Eagle's conversion was cancelled 20 went straight to the RAF. Eagle's Phantomisation would have cost £5 million. Eagle was to get the second F-4K squadron.​
• F-4M cost twice as much as F-4D, but no one knew this in 1964. Development of F-4M [yes F-4M] cost £100 million. The RAF didn't need the extra power of the Spey. By 1968 F-4Ms were costing £2 million per copy.

The Third Page Of Handwritten Notes.
This Time I Wrote That They Were From Phantom by Frances K. Mason​

• 59 F-4K ordered (including 2 YF-4K) and reduced to 52 because it was a fixed price contract.
• 150 F-4M (including 2 YF-4M) and reduced to 118 because it was a fixed price contract and the transfer of RN F-4Ks to the RAF.
• When the RN phased out 892NAS it was thought that a second RAF F-4K squadron would be formed. In the event No. 111 converted to the F-4K and the redundant F-4Ms were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.

These notes are where my oft stated R&D cost for the Spey-Phantom of £100 million comes from.