MOTS Phantom for the RN?

uk 75 said:
P1154RAF was an ambitious attempt to provide a Hunter FGA9 replacement for the 70s. It only became ridiculous because of the misguided attempt at commonality with the RN which delayed it for several years.
The planned buy of 150 P1154 would have re-equipped the RAF 38Group, RAFG, Air ForceGulf and FEAF Hunter squadrons.
Faced with delays and costs the cancellation was unavoidable and the RAF received F4s and P1127Harriers by 1970 (P1154 could not have reached service so quickly).
The RAF then turned the Jaguar trainer into a replacement for P1154 allowing the F4s to replace most of the Lightning force. As the RAF had needed a Lightning replacement this was reasonable.
I only suggested an F4E force to replace this process to match what the Luftwaffe wanted (it was not keen on MRCA) and am quite happy with what the RAF did. I would like to have seen P1154RAF work though
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My contention is that buying converted Hunters was the wrong decision and caused all those byzantine contortions that ultimately led to a weaker RAF and poorer Britain.
 
Disagree. The Hunters were excellent ground attack aircraft and worked well wherever the RAF used them.
Whether in Oman, Aden or in the Far East the agile Hunter was a better close support type than Lightning would have been.
P1154/Jaguar suited the needs of the Central Front (and post 1967 conflicts out of area like the 1991 Gulf War). Again both were better than Lightnings would have been.
All three were cheaper than F4s or Lightnings (P1154 ok only if ordered earlier).
 
uk 75 said:
The Hunters were excellent ground attack aircraft and worked well wherever the RAF used them.
Whether in Oman, Aden or in the Far East the agile Hunter was a better close support type than Lightning would have been.
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That's open to debate, but in the mid-late 50s the RAF was moving away from fighter-bombers doing close support to Canberra B6(I), B8(I), B.15 and B.16 doing tactical interdiction and close support. The capability reason they converted the Hunters rather than more Canberras is because the requirement was for a fighter-bomber/fighter-recce, and the Gnat/Hunter were capable of air-to-air fighting, indeed it was one of the criteria in the Venom Replacement Evaluation Trials in 1958.

In any case the Hunter was to meet an 'interim' requirement, and the interim nature was dropped just as the conversions were being delivered. Therefore, by its very nature the Hunter conversions to not represent good value for money from a Whole-of-Government procurement and fleet management perspective, no matter how well it rocketed rebels in Yemen and paratroopers in Malaysia.

uk 75 said:
P1154/Jaguar suited the needs of the Central Front (and post 1967 conflicts out of area like the 1991 Gulf War). Again both were better than Lightnings would have been.
All three were cheaper than F4s or Lightnings (P1154 ok only if ordered earlier).
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By the time these came along the path had been set, it was set in 1957-58.
 
We shall never agree on this one. I am content with that. I am willing to agree that P1154 should have been CTOL but rather like VG VSTOL was hard to dodge when the requirement was issued.
Lightning was not the answer. It was needed as an Interceptor and should have been developed faster in that role. Javelins served for far too long.
The F4 was a classic design but AFVG would have been a better buy if it could have been developed earlier. It answered most of the RAF (and FAA) requirements except for a Vulcan replacement.
 
uk 75 said:
We shall never agree on this one. I am content with that. I am willing to agree that P1154 should have been CTOL but rather like VG VSTOL was hard to dodge when the requirement was issued.
Lightning was not the answer. It was needed as an Interceptor and should have been developed faster in that role. Javelins served for far too long.
The F4 was a classic design but AFVG would have been a better buy if it could have been developed earlier. It answered most of the RAF (and FAA) requirements except for a Vulcan replacement.
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Britain was in a bind in the era, where it was perfectly capable of developing state of the art aircraft but could only afford to do 1 at a time and needed to ensure it would get the biggest possible production run from the aircraft it did develop.

How do you de-conflict the development and production of these proposals?
 
Rule of cool said:
Britain was in a bind in the era, where it was perfectly capable of developing state of the art aircraft but could only afford to do 1 at a time and needed to ensure it would get the biggest possible production run from the aircraft it did develop.

How do you de-conflict the development and production of these proposals?
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I suspect that the above will prove far more difficult the actually developing the aircraft. Juggling finances is a far more delicate art then most realize. Especially at the governmental level.
 
Lightning production was 1958-65.
Buccaneer production was 1962-67
TSR2 production would have been 1966 onward.
P1127 Harrier GR1 production was 1967 onward but could have started a couple of years earlier.

That leaves the RN high and dry with a requirement for about 100 examples of an expensive fighter that wasn't worthwhile for Britain to develop right in the middle of TSR2 and Harrier production. The Phantom is the only option for every reason.
 
The Royal Navy had to make a gigantic leap from the sluggish 1950s Sea Vixen to the Phantom.
No other navy attempted something so foolish. When you then add that no in service RN aircraft carrier could operate Phantom without major surgery, the case for RAF land based and SSNs becomes hard to resist.
At this point the Me163 sorry SR177 rears its weird head. Sorry this just underscores how detached from reality the FAA were.
Compare how many iterations of carrier borne jets the USN got through (both built and unbuilt) to get to the Phantom.
 
uk 75 said:
Compare how many iterations of carrier borne jets the USN got through (both built and unbuilt) to get to the Phantom.
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You say that like it's a good thing. If the UK putting to sea only two planes between the straight-wing generation (Sea Hawk and Sea Venom) and the Phantom was too few, the US putting to sea seven in between their closest analogues (the Panther and Skynight) and the Phantom is far too many. They could've put to sea three and saved a lot of duplication of effort and wasted money.

I should also note that many USN squadrons made the leap from the similarly sluggish F3H Demon straight to the Phantom. I would submit the jump is not nearly so foolish as you believe.
 
uk 75 said:
At this point the Me163 sorry SR177 rears its weird head. Sorry this just underscores how detached from reality the FAA were.
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Let's just deal with that, because it's worse.
NA.47 was originally leaning towards F.155 territory.
But in order to get funding, in order to avoid the 'mistake' of the Sea Vixen (for which the RAF needs to be blamed), the FAA tacked onto the F.177. Trying to do 'joint' or 'common' platform with the RAF again.....as they had over....yes you've guessed it, the Sea Vixen!

F.177 was supposed to enter service earlier than F.155 and if you're now getting Sea Vixen, then you feel the need to catch up and to be fair F.177 had potential to get closer to F.155. As Saro offered up in last minute submissions then rejected....like DH was.

But all the FAA had to do was grasp that jet engines would be good enough with reheat (as Fairey was suggesting by 1956) and institutionally they could have arrived at F4 to F8U-III territory.....as early as 1955.

And then we'd be talking about Avon Phantoms......
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
There was also the SNCASE Aquilon which was the Sea Venom built under licence.
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The silver lining was that the Aquilons were land-based: as the two Independance-class carriers we got (Lafayette & Bois Belleau) were fast enough (30 kt) but deck too short (180 m) - and the Arromanches was the exact opposite: deck long enough (200 m+) but too slow (24 kt !)

Talk about a silly situation. The Aéronavale Arromanches and Lafayette aircraft carriers had to fight the Suez crisis with the Corsairs - the Aquilons (AFAIK) were not used.

It was for this reason the Corsairs hanged on until 1964. And indeed some Aéronavale squadrons jumped directly to the F-8 Crusader.
 
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Archibald said:
The silver lining was that the Aquilons were land-based: as the two Independance-class carriers we got (Lafayette & Bois Belleau) were fast enough (30 kt) but deck too short (180 m) - and the Arromanches was the exact opposite: deck long enough (200 m+) but too slow (24 kt !)

Talk about a silly situation. The Aéronavale Arromanches and Lafayette aircraft carriers had to fight the Suez crisis with the Corsairs - the Aquilons (AFAIK) were not used.

It was for this reason the Corsairs hanged on until 1964. And indeed some Aéronavale squadrons jumped directly to the F-8 Crusader.
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The Aeronavale had 2 Aquilon flotilles. Flotille 11F converted to the Etendard IVM and Flotille 16F converted to the Etendard IVP. Both flotilles operated their Aquilons from Clemenceau before they converted to Etendards.

The Aeronaval had 4 Corsair flotilles. Flotilles 12F and 14F converted to the Crusader. Flotilles 15F and 17F converted to the Etendard IVM.

Melbourne operated Sea Venoms, but she had a steam catapult and Arromanches didn't.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
The Aeronavale had 2 Aquilon flotilles. Flotille 11F converted to the Etendard IVM and Flotille 16F converted to the Etendard IVP. Both flotilles operated their Aquilons from Clemenceau before they converted to Etendards.

The Aeronaval had 4 Corsair flotilles. Flotilles 12F and 14F converted to the Crusader. Flotilles 15F and 17F converted to the Etendard IVM.

Melbourne operated Sea Venoms, but she had a steam catapult and Arromanches didn't.
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This. I did a quick search today, and this was the exact reason given on french websites and forums. Arromanches was too slow and had a catapult too weak, to safely operate the Aquilons.
Seems the first Aquilon carrier landing had to wait 1960 and the Clemenceau. General consensus seems to be they never tried landing these planes on Arromanches - and even less on Lafayette / Bois belleau.

Note that Arromanches got a big modernization, angled deck included, circa 1957. But no steam catapult. There is also the distinction between the two subclasses : Colossus / Majestic. Arromanches belonged to the first and less capable subclass.
 
I can see the logic behind what happened, with many decisions made for the right reasons being overtaken by events while other decisions, that in hindsight would have been better, being passed over because the decisions made were more logical at the time.

As I see it, there are two possible AH options.

1. The RN decides the Phantom is the only way forward and hence the need for an affordable carrier design able to operate them (as well as Buccaneers and the support types) in useful numbers, with sufficient margins for future growth to operate larger future aircraft, i.e. an F-111B sized airframe.

2. A perfectly good enough fighter to permit the RN to continue to operate the current carriers, including Hermes and Victorious, into the 70s and 80s, some of them, possibly into to 90s. This would permit the later acquisition of a carrier design along the lines of option 1.

A perfectly good enough option for a carrier would be a simple but large ship designed for maximum flight deck and hangar size; bench-marked to cross deck the largest envisaged USN carrier aircraft.

The perfectly good enough fighter? Maybe an Anglicized or joint Anglo-French F-8 Crusader, maybe minimum change, or maybe Spey and avionics, or even a full Twosader able to fly from Hermes. The F-8 served France into the 90s, the Buccaneer served the RAF into the 90s, the radars from the Gannet AEWs were still flying on Shackleton AEWs into the 90s. Later A-7 Corsairs served the USN onto the 90s.
 
Volkodav said:
I can see the logic behind what happened, with many decisions made for the right reasons being overtaken by events while other decisions, that in hindsight would have been better, being passed over because the decisions made were more logical at the time.

As I see it, there are two possible AH options.

1. The RN decides the Phantom is the only way forward and hence the need for an affordable carrier design able to operate them (as well as Buccaneers and the support types) in useful numbers, with sufficient margins for future growth to operate larger future aircraft, i.e. an F-111B sized airframe.

2. A perfectly good enough fighter to permit the RN to continue to operate the current carriers, including Hermes and Victorious, into the 70s and 80s, some of them, possibly into to 90s. This would permit the later acquisition of a carrier design along the lines of option 1.

A perfectly good enough option for a carrier would be a simple but large ship designed for maximum flight deck and hangar size; bench-marked to cross deck the largest envisaged USN carrier aircraft.

The perfectly good enough fighter? Maybe an Anglicized or joint Anglo-French F-8 Crusader, maybe minimum change, or maybe Spey and avionics, or even a full Twosader able to fly from Hermes. The F-8 served France into the 90s, the Buccaneer served the RAF into the 90s, the radars from the Gannet AEWs were still flying on Shackleton AEWs into the 90s. Later A-7 Corsairs served the USN onto the 90s.
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The genesis of this thread comes from my belief that the British had what it took to have a great 1960s in terms of aircraft, warship and tank production if only for a handful of political decisions. It is explored in this thread and others.

Whatever else happens to sort out the rest of the British armed forces (and civil aviation) using good procurement policy decisions from 1957 the RN is left with a requirement for a world class fighter fleet that is too small to be worthwhile for the British to develop domestically, hence the F4.

I suppose that's the way of things, you can get 4 out of 5 things right but that will likely make the 5th thing bad, or at least look bad by comparison. In reality 75 million pounds to develop the best naval fighter in the world at the time, then a high unit cost, is still cheaper than trying to develop a suitable British fighter, or to build carriers big enough for MOTS F4s to operate from.
 
Volkodav said:
I can see the logic behind what happened, with many decisions made for the right reasons being overtaken by events while other decisions, that in hindsight would have been better, being passed over because the decisions made were more logical at the time.

As I see it, there are two possible AH options.

1. The RN decides the Phantom is the only way forward and hence the need for an affordable carrier design able to operate them (as well as Buccaneers and the support types) in useful numbers, with sufficient margins for future growth to operate larger future aircraft, i.e. an F-111B sized airframe.

2. A perfectly good enough fighter to permit the RN to continue to operate the current carriers, including Hermes and Victorious, into the 70s and 80s, some of them, possibly into to 90s. This would permit the later acquisition of a carrier design along the lines of option 1.

A perfectly good enough option for a carrier would be a simple but large ship designed for maximum flight deck and hangar size; bench-marked to cross deck the largest envisaged USN carrier aircraft.

The perfectly good enough fighter? Maybe an Anglicized or joint Anglo-French F-8 Crusader, maybe minimum change, or maybe Spey and avionics, or even a full Twosader able to fly from Hermes. The F-8 served France into the 90s, the Buccaneer served the RAF into the 90s, the radars from the Gannet AEWs were still flying on Shackleton AEWs into the 90s. Later A-7 Corsairs served the USN onto the 90s.
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I'd say that the best option for the British was really the Spey Twosader. A cheaper rebuild than the Spey Phantom, and generally a very capable fighter. Crud, the UK could probably buy the whole production line since the USN was phasing them out in favor of Phantoms (and that only because Congress said "Crusaders or Phantoms, pick ONE").
 
TsrJoe said:
This seems to be a rerun of the previous thread ? ... Thread 'British 'virtuous circle' 1957 onwards?' https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/british-virtuous-circle-1957-onwards.43117/
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It's a tangent from that.

The virtuous circle can address a lot of problems, but it can't address the RNs post Sea Vixen fighter requirement. Given that fact (using the term losely, like 'my truth') the MOTS Phantom is likely the cheapest effective solution to the RNs requirement.
 
Within The Virtuous Circle, the option of further development of Lightning does open a solution domestically. One that plugs into existing production, training and spares.
However....

The argument for F8 or F8U-III seems very strong. The F8 on price is nearly one third to almost one fourth the quoted price of F4K.
And....the F8U-III in a twin seater format would deliver.

While the case to the RN just defining something like F4 even as Mcdonnell Douglas is designing the F4 is actually quite plausible. Which solves a lot and shifts timing earlier, making mk1 Sea Vixen a brief interlude. But....could harm Buccaneer mkII funding.
 
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Scott Kenny said:
I'd say that the best option for the British was really the Spey Twosader. A cheaper rebuild than the Spey Phantom, and generally a very capable fighter. Crud, the UK could probably buy the whole production line since the USN was phasing them out in favor of Phantoms (and that only because Congress said "Crusaders or Phantoms, pick ONE").
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J57 is older and bigger than J79... which make it easier to replace by a Spey (engine bay).
 
zen said:
Within The Virtuous Circle, the option of further development of Lightning does open a solution domestically. One that plugs into existing production, training and spares.
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Thanks for the capitalisation, it makes it seem real instead of a Fleet Management/Procurement fantasy that I can't let go of. :p

zen said:
The argument for F8 or F8U-III seems very strong. The F8 on price is nearly one third to almost one fourth the quoted price of F4K.
And....the F8U-III in a twin seater format would deliver.

While the case to the RN just defining something like F4 even as Mcdonald Douglas is designing the F4 is actually quite plausible. Which solves a lot and shifts timing earlier, making mk1 Sea Vixen a brief interlude. But....could harm Buccaneer mkII funding.
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The Spey Phantom development was supposed to cost 25m pounds at a time when ~25m had been spent on P1154, 21m on HS681 and 150m (+45m cancellation costs) on TSR2. However it actually wound up costing 75m pounds to develop and the unit cost was greater although some ~40% of that was spent in Britain, presumably in Sterling not US dollars.

This was to get a version of the fighter that the USN judged was better than the F8E Crusader in-production, the Super Crusader in the prototype fly-off and the USAF found to be better than the in-production F106 in a competitive fly-off.

Further, the RN's requirement was small, at the absolute most optimistic 140 units but even in a virtuous circle ~100 units is most likely and it began to enter service in 5 years from it's earliest thought bubbles in 1963.

That's an extremely tough set of points to not just match but be superior to. I have no doubt that if there was more money, more time, larger fleet etc than a better fighter could be developed, (obviously- since the F14 exists) but that wasn't the RN's circumstances so I struggle to imagine something more suitable than the Spey Phantom given the F4J couldn't safely operate from 151' BS5 catapults
 
Scott Kenny said:
I'd say that the best option for the British was really the Spey Twosader. A cheaper rebuild than the Spey Phantom, and generally a very capable fighter. Crud, the UK could probably buy the whole production line since the USN was phasing them out in favor of Phantoms (and that only because Congress said "Crusaders or Phantoms, pick ONE").
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When forced by Congress the USN chose the Phantom for good reasons. By the early 60s the F8 was at the end of it's development life, which had started as a day-gunfighter in the mid-late 50s whereas the F4 was just beginning it's development life. Further, the F4 was by all objective measures a better fighter; faster, better climb, longer endurance, greater weapon load. With the VFAX and TFX in the USNs future it was no huge loss to stop producing the F8.
 
The figures I always remember is.
F4K projected cost was 1.2 million per plane, when P.1154RN was projected at 1.5 million....

The Shorts bid of F8K was under 0.4 million.... vaguely remember 0.35 or something like that.

The F4K ended up over 3 million per plane....maybe 3.5 million but my memory is a little flaky on that.

Arguably we could say F8K is then projected to one third the cost of F4K. But even if F8K blows out the budget like F4K did, it would only be about 1.2 million......
 
Rule of cool said:
When forced by Congress the USN chose the Phantom for good reasons. By the early 60s the F8 was at the end of it's development life, which had started as a day-gunfighter in the mid-late 50s whereas the F4 was just beginning it's development life. Further, the F4 was by all objective measures a better fighter; faster, better climb, longer endurance, greater weapon load. With the VFAX and TFX in the USNs future it was no huge loss to stop producing the F8.
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Yet the Navy still wanted BOTH Crusader and Phantom.

Even with the USN canceling the production, the UK could have bought the entire production line and made their Spey Twosaders in house. Okay, maybe you'd need to change radar sets, I'm sure you could fit the Phantom's AWG-10 in there.
 
zen said:
The figures I always remember is.
F4K projected cost was 1.2 million per plane, when P.1154RN was projected at 1.5 million....

The Shorts bid of F8K was under 0.4 million.... vaguely remember 0.35 or something like that.

The F4K ended up over 3 million per plane....maybe 3.5 million but my memory is a little flaky on that.

Arguably we could say F8K is then projected to one third the cost of F4K. But even if F8K blows out the budget like F4K did, it would only be about 1.2 million......
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I'm not surprised that there is a significant price difference, after all the F8 was a generation before the F4, much like the Hunter and Lightning. That said the actual pricing of the Spey Phantom might be the most confusing of the earths great mysteries, certainly the pound was devalued by 14% during the production run and the development cost tripled.

What's more important is that the F4 is significantly more capable than the F8 therefore likely represents a better value for money investment. A Virtuous Circle means that there should be a bit less pressure on the procurement budget, so the extra up front cost is less unpalatable.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Yet the Navy still wanted BOTH Crusader and Phantom.

Even with the USN canceling the production, the UK could have bought the entire production line and made their Spey Twosaders in house. Okay, maybe you'd need to change radar sets, I'm sure you could fit the Phantom's AWG-10 in there.
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Of course they wanted both, they want everything including the USS America being a repeat of Enterprise and JFK being a 4 x A3W reactor carrier. The US Treasury has to be the parent and tell the US DoD child that they can't have every toy in the shop and they'll have to pick one.

As for the F8 itself, why would the RN chose it over the F4? The bigger RN carriers and those they planned to build could operate the F4 and the F4 was a better, more modern fighter with more development potential.
 
Rule of cool said:
As for the F8 itself, why would the RN chose it over the F4? The bigger RN carriers and those they planned to build could operate the F4 and the F4 was a better, more modern fighter with more development potential.
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Because the Crusader could operate off the existing carriers with little/no modification, while the Phantom needed a LOT to be able to fly off the existing carriers.
 
I think this could all have been different had certain efforts actually come good.

The two that most obviously come to mind be.
Navalised Swift.
Scimitar.

Especially the Scimitar. Since had it actually gained reheat and an AI radar, as intended. Would then give something approximate to Crusader in performance as a result.
But crucially with both is the use of reheat on aircraft carriers. Which would force some of effort later applied in 'Phantomisation'.

The Swift really is a disappointment, and under circumstances where it had delivered performance as desired. We'd likely have seen it win out over the Hunter and potentially have a longer useful life in Ground Attack. Due to higher speeds with reheat.

We wouldn't really need to have looked at Crusader under such circumstances and had Type 556 come good. The F4 decision could have been delayed or allowed a domestic solution.
 
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