FFG(X)

[Josh_TN]

Inshore operations, incl. against fast swarmey opponents in restricted/shallow waters, and dashing out from ASCM seeker search range.

You may laugh at either of those requirements, but Russian navy doesn't anymore.

There were less expensive/invasive options for addressing those threats.

 

[Ainen]

There were less expensive/invasive options for addressing those threats.

While operating within Persian gulf and protecting traffic without need to dismantle Iran (which is a very big affair with nuclear aspect)?
I honestly wonder, even rather toothless Yemen doesn't work out all that well.

Both LCS and DDX failed in execution(too futuristic, support too wobbly for something this ambitious) and geopolitical analysis (which was quite good on Iran, but sorta failed on China).
But for what they predicted (and gulf region is still a pot on a verge of a war) - in their original form it was and still is quite complete and logical.

 

[Jimmo952]

While operating within Persian gulf and protecting traffic without need to dismantle Iran (which is a very big affair with nuclear aspect)?
I honestly wonder, even rather toothless Yemen doesn't work out all that well.

Both LCS and DDX failed in execution(too futuristic, support too wobbly for something this ambitious) and geopolitical analysis (which was quite good on Iran, but sorta failed on China).
But for what they predicted (and gulf region is still a pot on a verge of a war) - in their original form it was and still is quite complete and logical.

Has either one of them ever deployed to the Persian Gulf? The Red Sea?

 

[Josh_TN]

Adding 15 knots does not really create any significant capability in my mind. As noted, the “small boats” scenario in the Persian Gulf that seemed to drive the speed requirement nevertheless did not result in LCS deployments in the Gulf. I believe four are based in Singapore, for whatever reason.

 

[Ainen]

Adding 15 knots does not really create any significant capability in my mind. As noted, the “small boats” scenario in the Persian Gulf that seemed to drive the speed requirement nevertheless did not result in LCS deployments in the Gulf. I believe four are based in Singapore, for whatever reason.

Well, they don't work - and they never got the capabilities that were meant to make them work.
Anti surface module gutted, inshore asw - failed, and both did it like years and years late. Thus in their current form they're basically glorified expeditionary coast guard interceptors(when they work), and are employed as such.

Without modules and speed, deploying them against Iran is indeed a mess, and the result is indeed that US is sorta deterred (conflict boundary unacceptably high) by a rather weak opponent who's skillfully abusing his geography and available technology.

I don't remember exact numbers, but for (current)subsonic ASCM seekers, esp. without mid flight updates, 30 and 40+ knots does indeed makes all the difference - it allows you to get out of search pattern with reasonable forewarning.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The DDX was another ship with a questionable concept of operations, a lot of new, immature technology and a price tag that all but ensured it would never be built in numbers to replace the Burkes.

Was never supposed to replace the Burkes. Was supposed to replace the Sprucans.

Adding 15 knots does not really create any significant capability in my mind. As noted, the “small boats” scenario in the Persian Gulf that seemed to drive the speed requirement nevertheless did not result in LCS deployments in the Gulf. I believe four are based in Singapore, for whatever reason.

Anti-piracy. Yall would not believe how many pirates there are in the Straits of Malacca and SCS, or how brave they are. Many many moons ago, my Senior Chief's first boat was going through there. They had a .50cal mounted in the sail, because otherwise the pirates would attempt to board you!

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Inshore operations, incl. against fast swarmey opponents in restricted/shallow waters, and dashing out from ASCM seeker search range.

You may laugh at either of those requirements, but Russian navy doesn't anymore.

LCS was more designed around protect blue water combatants against threats venturing from the littorals, rather than going in to seek them out.



Speed was primarily for strategic mobility, increased ISR coverage and evasion of torpedoes, I doubt it would have been as useful when avoiding anti-ship missiles with their greater transit speeds.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

The DDX was another ship with a questionable concept of operations, a lot of new, immature technology and a price tag that all but ensured it would never be built in numbers to replace the Burkes.

Burke restart cost as much if not more as repeat Zumwalts.

 

[TomS]

The LCS requirements and concept of operations came from the Navy, not the politicians.

Talking about the Navy as a monolith is really deceptive here. As is discounting OSD's influence, especially with Art Cebrowski sitting over in the Office of Net Assessment at the time. Rumsfeld was taken by Cebrowski's vision of a high-speed, cheap, combatant to fight in the littorals and hated the Navy's "Battlestar Galactica" approach characterized by the very expensive Zumwalt class.

So when the Zs were struggling, OSD pressed the Navy for a cheaper alternative and that gave us the Focussed Mission High Speed Ship, that evolved into LCS. There was a faction inside the Navy that liked the idea, but they only came into real ascendance thanks to Rumsfeld.

 

[Jimmo952]

Talking about the Navy as a monolith is really deceptive here. As is discounting OSD's influence, especially with Art Cebrowski sitting over in the Office of Net Assessment at the time. Rumsfeld was taken by Cebrowski's vision of a high-speed, cheap, combatant to fight in the littorals and hated the Navy's "Battlestar Galactica" approach characterized by the very expensive Zumwalt class.

So when the Zs were struggling, OSD pressed the Navy for a cheaper alternative and that gave us the Focussed Mission High Speed Ship, that evolved into LCS. There was a faction inside the Navy that liked the idea, but they only came into real ascendance thanks to Rumsfeld.

Maybe that's how LCS got started but it morphed into something nothing like Cebrowski's vision.

The top Navy brass got behind the LCS and championed it as critical to the Navy's needs.

 

[Jimmo952]

Burke restart cost as much if not more as repeat Zumwalts.

Part of the problem with the Zumwalt was it used a completely new combat management system.

Like any new, complex software system it was incomplete and buggy. The Navy came to the conclusion that maturing it was never going to happen.

There are only so many software engineers, money and time and AEGIS wasn't going away.

The Navy overreached with what it tried to accomplish.

I believe the Navy doesn't have the institutional knowledge to keep industry honest --- understand what industry can accomplish and what it can't.

 

[Jimmo952]

Well, they don't work - and they never got the capabilities that were meant to make them work.
Anti surface module gutted, inshore asw - failed, and both did it like years and years late. Thus in their current form they're basically glorified expeditionary coast guard interceptors(when they work), and are employed as such.

Without modules and speed, deploying them against Iran is indeed a mess, and the result is indeed that US is sorta deterred (conflict boundary unacceptably high) by a rather weak opponent who's skillfully abusing his geography and available technology.

I don't remember exact numbers, but for (current)subsonic ASCM seekers, esp. without mid flight updates, 30 and 40+ knots does indeed makes all the difference - it allows you to get out of search pattern with reasonable forewarning.

The anti-surface module was gutted because it didn't work.

NLOS was simply so bad, the plug got pulled.

Like the ASW module, the Navy and came to the painfull conclusion it was never going to work.

 

[Firefinder]

The anti-surface module was gutted because it didn't work.

NLOS was simply so bad, the plug got pulled.

The NLOS got pulled cause the entire system architecture that it was part of got deleted. And that was the Army's Future Combat system, with the tests showing that the NLOS systems did work very well with both the Army and Navy being happy with it results. Had some issues but expected ergonmics and doctrine ones from due to not being fully cooked.

Issue popped up in the Funding when the Army drop the FCS due to it not fitting the GWOT doctrine and needs.

The Navy funding of the NLOS lasted LESS THEN 6 months after the FCS got canned. They didnt test it or really pay for it on its own. That was a self enflicted wound the navy did there.

 

[Jimmo952]

The NLOS got pulled cause the entire system architecture that it was part of got deleted. And that was the Army's Future Combat system, with the tests showing that the NLOS systems did work very well with both the Army and Navy being happy with it results. Had some issues but expected ergonmics and doctrine ones from due to not being fully cooked.

Issue popped up in the Funding when the Army drop the FCS due to it not fitting the GWOT doctrine and needs.

The Navy funding of the NLOS lasted LESS THEN 6 months after the FCS got canned. They didnt test it or really pay for it on its own. That was a self enflicted wound the navy did there.

I'm not sure I can agree with that, at least not all of it.

There were reports of failed tests and widely inaccurate test firings.

It was not hitting the milestones it was supposed to be fitted.

The Army pulled the plug.

You are right in that left the Navy in a jam but it was more than about money. It was the money expected to be needed to get the system to work.

 

[Firefinder]

I'm not sure I can agree with that, at least not all of it.

There were reports of failed tests and widely inaccurate test firings.

It was not hitting the milestones it was supposed to be fitted.

The Army pulled the plug.

You are right in that left the Navy in a jam but it was more than about money. It was the money expected to be needed to get the system to work.

There was also reports of it working just fine and be ready for the slated prime time date as well.

With lots of the issues being from the newness of the programming for the system. It was basically a learning model AI which was in its infancy at that point with all that implied. Once that was lick it was going just fine.

When the Army Pulled the Plug on the FCS they trash the entire lot of some 100+ different systesm ranging from Radios to engines. It didnt mater if it worked like the Xm1111, XM1203, etc. IF it was part of the FCS Program it went right into the fuck it bucket.

Lots of those systems could have been very easily salvage but didnt due to cost. That was right when Congress start sequestion and that hurt the entire DODs RD efforts badly. Basically was no money to go around before adding in the fun times in GWOT.

 

[TomS]

Maybe that's how LCS got started but it morphed into something nothing like Cebrowski's vision.

The top Navy brass got behind the LCS and championed it as critical to the Navy's needs.

Lots of effort spent trying to turn the sow's ear they had been saddled with into a silk purse.

 

[Ainen]

It is twice as damning when compared to Chinese shipbuilding effort it's meant to match.

Two 054b were started later, are already on trials, and when they're still there - additional 10 of updated previous 054a(g) type are being added, for a total of 50. Continuous flow of ships, and risk mitigation, and advanced design on a matching schedule.

And something tells me that this isn't the extent of what Chinese frigate program will achieve by 2029.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It is twice as damning when compared to Chinese shipbuilding effort it's meant to match.

Two 054b were started later, are already on trials, and when they're still there - additional 10 of updated previous 054a(g) type are being added, for a total of 50. Continuous flow of ships, and risk mitigation, and advanced design on a matching schedule.

And something tells me that this isn't the extent of what Chinese frigate program will achieve by 2029.

Yes, the US has shown a severe lack of industrial planning, especially post-2000.

Design a ship. Build 10-12 of that type, NO MODIFICATIONS once contract is awarded. If USN wants changes to equipment, that goes into the next batch/class of ships, which start their design process as soon as the first class starts construction.

Ship-building contractors need to start putting in absolutely brutal change-order cost penalties to their bids. On the order of "cost of a whole ship per change order".

 

[Jimmo952]

There was also reports of it working just fine and be ready for the slated prime time date as well.

With lots of the issues being from the newness of the programming for the system. It was basically a learning model AI which was in its infancy at that point with all that implied. Once that was lick it was going just fine.

When the Army Pulled the Plug on the FCS they trash the entire lot of some 100+ different systesm ranging from Radios to engines. It didnt mater if it worked like the Xm1111, XM1203, etc. IF it was part of the FCS Program it went right into the fuck it bucket.

Lots of those systems could have been very easily salvage but didnt due to cost. That was right when Congress start sequestion and that hurt the entire DODs RD efforts badly. Basically was no money to go around before adding in the fun times in GWOT.

Details Emerge On Army's Failed NLOS-LS Missile

In testimony before lawmakers yesterday, David Duma, OSD’s Principal Deputy Director for Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E), detailed failings of the Army’s Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS).

www.military.com

The thing was missing it's intended target by as much as 14K.

It failed the accuracy and reliability requirements.

Too bad because it was a nice concept, maybe just ahead of it's time.

 

[donnage99]

I'd argue that the LCS cost overruns were caused by political interference: that 40+knot high speed requirement that never had a reasoning attached to it. It was just a "wouldn't it be cool if we had a 400ft ship that did 40something knots?!? We could zoom in and out of the littorals like a ski boat!" The LCS are faster than a carrier in a sprint! Anything over a couple day's travel and the carrier wins, since the LCS would have to slow down to refuel.

Yes the requirements were ridiculous but I was interpreting "political interference" in the sense that requirements or deadlines were changed midway for political reasons.

example - ddg-1000 was running quite smoothly and meeting deadlines until everything got pulled out under their feet.

 

[Moose]

I'd argue that the LCS cost overruns were caused by political interference: that 40+knot high speed requirement that never had a reasoning attached to it. It was just a "wouldn't it be cool if we had a 400ft ship that did 40something knots?!? We could zoom in and out of the littorals like a ski boat!" The LCS are faster than a carrier in a sprint! Anything over a couple day's travel and the carrier wins, since the LCS would have to slow down to refuel.

And so the boats are massively over-engined, and the Freedom-class gearbox just could not handle the power and broke all the time. Indys went with hydrodynamic trickery of the trimaran hull to go fast on less horsepower so they're mechanically reliable, but the aluminum hull tends to crack where the trimaran pontoons join the main hull due to wave pounding and flexing. And that's a pain in the ass to fix. Stop drill the cracks, then figure out how to (or even whether to) reinforce the sections to make them more resistant to flexing or make those locations out of more flexible materials that won't crack.

Ford is first in class, those always cost more than you expect.

What's the reason for the cost increases for the LSMs? Significantly increased weapons and equipment needed to survive in the Pacific? Like SPY6, Aegis, and a 16- or 32-cell VLS? That's called, "yeah, we really goofed on the defensive requirements in the initial concept. We thought these could be escorted by DDGs, but the threat has gotten significantly greater than we originally thought and the ships need FFG protection levels all by themselves."

Just want to caution on the "political interference" thing because there were plenty of non-politicians making bad decisions. Hell I once had a retired SWO tell me flat out that speed was the most important thing for a combatant and the AB replacement needed to be capable of sustained 45+ knots to be successful. This type of delusion can be found lots of places

 

[that_person]

Just want to caution on the "political interference" thing because there were plenty of non-politicians making bad decisions. Hell I once had a retired SWO tell me flat out that speed was the most important thing for a combatant and the AB replacement needed to be capable of sustained 45+ knots to be successful. This type of delusion can be found lots of places

Can you elaborate on his thinking?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Just want to caution on the "political interference" thing because there were plenty of non-politicians making bad decisions. Hell I once had a retired SWO tell me flat out that speed was the most important thing for a combatant and the AB replacement needed to be capable of sustained 45+ knots to be successful. This type of delusion can be found lots of places

Any Pentagon or Office of the SecDef level office is political. Which yes, means EVERY officer with a star is a politician.

 

[Moose]

Can you elaborate on his thinking?

I don't have his bullet points and it's been awhile, from what I recall he thought outrunning torpedoes and making fast Pacific transits to rapidly appear at flashpoints or targets of opportunity were essential combatant capabilities.

 

[Moose]

Any Pentagon or Office of the SecDef level office is political. Which yes, means EVERY officer with a star is a politician.

I don't disagree, however if we use too much shorthand we risk important details being lost in translation. "Political interference" might not obviously translate to "political interference by uniformed leadership" if a reader isn't as familiar with Pentagon follies.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I don't disagree, however if we use too much shorthand we risk important details being lost in translation. "Political interference" might not obviously translate to "political interference by uniformed leadership" if a reader isn't as familiar with Pentagon follies.

Fair point.

I don't have his bullet points and it's been awhile, from what I recall he thought outrunning torpedoes and making fast Pacific transits to rapidly appear at flashpoints or targets of opportunity were essential combatant capabilities.

*snort* The first warning a surface ship has of torpedoes is when the active sonar in the seeker catches them (forget the exact distance, but it's close). Not even an LCS or hydrofoil can accelerate fast enough to avoid the boom. Your skimmer target has active sonar? That's nice, but there's a solid thermocline at about 200ft that the torpedo is below, it will pop up right about the time the seeker needs to go active to acquire.

I can't imagine pounding over the Pacific swells at 45+ knots. That will break things, bad.

 

[1635yankee]

Part of the problem with the Zumwalt was it used a completely new combat management system.

Like any new, complex software system it was incomplete and buggy. The Navy came to the conclusion that maturing it was never going to happen.

There are only so many software engineers, money and time and AEGIS wasn't going away.

The Navy overreached with what it tried to accomplish.

I believe the Navy doesn't have the institutional knowledge to keep industry honest --- understand what industry can accomplish and what it can't.

I would tend to agree with that last paragraph, expanding it to include aviation procurement: too much expertise has been outsourced from government employees (uniformed and civil) to vendors.

 

[1635yankee]

I don't have his bullet points and it's been awhile, from what I recall he thought outrunning torpedoes and making fast Pacific transits to rapidly appear at flashpoints or targets of opportunity were essential combatant capabilities.

I doubt if the LCS could make a faster Pacific transit than a 23 kt container ship, because it would have to slow down multiple times to refuel.. San DIego to Taiwan (a likely hotpoint....) is about 6,100 nautical miles. With a maximum range of 3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots, I'd estimate a range of under 400 nmi at 45 knots.

A few years ago, I saw a comparison in the trip time from London to Hong Kong flying a 747 vs a Concorde. The 747 would win, by a significant margin because the Concorde's range was so short. The LCS would have the same issue: if it's going fast, it's go to be refueled so often that its speed advantage is completely useful.

 

[Moose]

Fair point.




*snort* The first warning a surface ship has of torpedoes is when the active sonar in the seeker catches them (forget the exact distance, but it's close). Not even an LCS or hydrofoil can accelerate fast enough to avoid the boom. Your skimmer target has active sonar? That's nice, but there's a solid thermocline at about 200ft that the torpedo is below, it will pop up right about the time the seeker needs to go active to acquire.

I can't imagine pounding over the Pacific swells at 45+ knots. That will break things, bad.

I'm in violent agreement with this. However I share it as an example of the thinking you can find in the community which makes decisions about such things. To be fair, there are also those who've said from the beginning that the Need For Speed was an insane misuse of resources.

 

[Ainen]

I don't have his bullet points and it's been awhile, from what I recall he thought outrunning torpedoes and making fast Pacific transits to rapidly appear at flashpoints or targets of opportunity were essential combatant capabilities.

If he's old enough, maybe it was a reference to old Zumwalt's cushion dream?
Then 50 fast cruise/100 combat dash regardless of sea state would make sense.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Missed this one:

I really don't know why you think we can't design new warships. From a technical standpoint, all of the Post-Cold War programs have worked just fine. All delays to Ford, the Zumwalts, and the LCS were due to political meddling. The Flight III redesign went just fine, on budget and on schedule, Virginia production is continuing just fine, I believe the Columbias are on budget, and DDG Mod 1.5 is working just fine. Not to mention all the amphib and auxiliary programs are coming along too. Explain your thinking.

The USN hasn't designed a new ship in decades. It's all been outsourced to US shipbuilders. For example, EB has designed every sub since the 688s. (I'm reasonably sure that they were designed by BuShips, but remember that means the early 1970s).

I'm not sure if Burkes were designed by Babcock Gibbs & Cox or BuShips, I think it was Babcock G&C. Ford class was designed by Newport News, not BuShips.

Edited to correct firm name.

 

[Cordy]

I'm not sure if Burkes were designed by Babcock or BuShips, I think it was Babcock. Ford class was designed by Newport News, not BuShips.

BuShips was abolished 1966, the Burke destroyer was designed by Gibbs & Cox back in 1980, a more recent design was the fiasco that was the LCS Freedom class for Lockheed, currently have design contracts for the Constellation and the DDG(X) along with BIW and Ingalls.

 

[Scott Kenny]

BuShips was abolished 1966, the Burke destroyer was designed by Gibbs & Cox back in 1980, a more recent design was the fiasco that was the LCS Freedom class for Lockheed, currently have design contracts for the Constellation and the DDG(X) along with BIW and Ingalls.

Oops, fixed, thank you!

But still nothing designed in-house since the Nimitz class, I think.

 

[Cjc]

I remember the navy pushing back on the idea that the class should have 48 to 64 vls cells because it would "require extensive redesign". well if you are going to do that anyway you could at lest give the design a useful number of cells.

 

[joshjosh]

I remember the navy pushing back on the idea that the class should have 48 to 64 vls cells because it would "require extensive redesign". well if you are going to do that anyway you could at lest give the design a useful number of cells.

32 cells is more than enough for a frigate if the cost can be kept under control. There is value in having more ships, even if you have fewer VLS cells. A Burke with 96 cells can still only be in one place at a time.

 

[Cjc]

32 cells is more than enough for a frigate if the cost can be kept under control. There is value in having more ships, even if you have fewer VLS cells. A Burke with 96 cells can still only be in one place at a time.

We have had this argument many times on this forum, not that I want to get into it. But cost have not been kept under control on this frigate wich makes the 32 cell desition seem so bad, especially sense adding more cells would have been a hell of a lot easier then most of the other shit the navy added to this design.

 

[Ozair]

We have had this argument many times on this forum, not that I want to get into it. But cost have not been kept under control on this frigate wich makes the 32 cell desition seem so bad, especially sense adding more cells would have been a hell of a lot easier then most of the other shit the navy added to this design.

By the time FFG(X) hits the fleet there will likely be a reasonable unmanned companion vessel available or in test. Why increase the size of the FFG(X) if you can provide the flexibility of a companion unmanned asset?

 

[apparition13]

What I don't get is the decision. If "off the shelf" is a requirement, and you want Aegis, then the only sensible decision is F100/Alvaro De Bazan/Hobart since that's the only submission that includes Aegis, which means you can get away with minimal modifications and be in service the fastest. Anything else requires putting Aegis on a ship that doesn't have it, which will inevitably run into delays and overruns.

 

[Cjc]

By the time FFG(X) hits the fleet there will likely be a reasonable unmanned companion vessel available or in test. Why increase the size of the FFG(X) if you can provide the flexibility of a companion unmanned asset?

Well a) a usv devifnatly would not have been available if the ship hadn't had a 3+ year delay and b) is there even a program for a ship like that for the usn, the only navy I know of that has a program like that is the Dutch right now, everything else is pretty renders by vendors.

 

[Ozair]

Well a) a usv devifnatly would not have been available if the ship hadn't had a 3+ year delay and

Sure but the FFG(X) will be in service for 30 plus years so a few years late on LUSV doesn't really impact right now.

b) is there even a program for a ship like that for the usn, the only navy I know of that has a program like that is the Dutch right now, everything else is pretty renders by vendors.

Plan is for build to start in FY2027.

LUSV. The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvette (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol craft and smaller than a frigate).The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land attack missiles. Each LUSV could be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 16 to 32 missile-launching tubes. Although referred to as unmanned vehicles, LUSVs might be more accurately described as optionally or lightly manned ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members, particularly in the nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational concepts. The Navy has been using LUSV prototypes to develop LUSV operational concepts. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission programs the procurement of production LUSVs through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, with the first LUSV to be procured in FY2027 at an estimated cost of $497.6 million, the next two in FY2028 at a combined estimated cost of $652.8 million (i.e., an average of about $326.4 million each), and the next three in FY2029 at a combined estimated cost of $994.3 million (i.e., an average of $331.4 million each). Under the Navy’sFY2024 budget submission, procurement of LUSVs was to begin two years earlier, in FY2025. The Navy states: “This necessary [two-year] delay reduces risk associated with concurrency in requirements development, design specifications and machinery reliability testing.”

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45757/75

which probably lines up reasonably well with the FFG(X) build.