Design a Close Air Support aircraft

[Kat Tsun]

Under my system-of-systems approach, the manned aircraft is the only one armed with a gun. Do you need a gun very often? Absolutely not. The gun is there as the smallest-possible-danger-close weapon, for when friendly ground troops have bad guys within 150m.

A hand grenade or ICM bomblet has replaced these in modern combat.

All a conscript maintainer can do is replace a module. I'm not sure I'd trust conscripts to load weapons!

We used them in Vietnam as ordies just fine.

 

[Scott Kenny]

A hand grenade or ICM bomblet has replaced these in modern combat.

For roughly the 100th time, hand grenades and ICM bomblets have a longer "Danger Close" range than a gun.

We used them in Vietnam as ordies just fine.

And burned down 5 aircraft carriers.

 

[Ainen]

Don’t believe supersonic dash capability can be accommodated in such a manned CAS design….

Speed:
Reliance on pilot to provide WVR target recognition/discrimination using MK 1 eyeballs argues against high closing speeds, not to mention time allowed for critical decision making would be acutely shortened. BVR target engagement at supersonic speeds might take place occasionally air-to-air in the real world, however,.. history has shown a large amount of air-to-ground weapons being launched/dropped WVR at speeds well below the postulated /transonic or supersonic speed (600+ mph ). Additionally, transonic speed does not jive with helicopter-like maneuvering and weapons deployment down near the “ deck “.

My current understanding is that perhaps CAS is only worth it as a part of larger capability subset now, which really is "low altitude, small, numerous target". Killing MG nests is still important, but bringing down matrice(which can be used to call in theater level fires, destroying your whole formation) is far more important and urgent.
If aircraft can rapidly maneuver into unexpected location and shut down local situational awareness, theory is that local defenses are likely to collapse; modern defense by itself is very spread and numerically thin.

Threats of this category range from mavic and machine gun nest to jet shahed and storm shadow.

Idea was more or less that speed is function of sufficiently powerful engines(which we need for agility anyway), low speed control - of sufficient thrust and vector control(AFTI). They aren't mutually exclusive, simply due to stealth, combination of two became less important over 2000-2010s. This isn't the case anymore.

As regards airframe size:
In the notional starting design point shown, if an internal bay for weapons carriage is utilized; where is there space for fuel ? Moreover, if the engine(s) are outfitted for vectored thrust/vectored lift, overall airframe size would also have to grow out of necessity to accommodate the capability ( fans w/ drive shafts, or engine-provided thrust routed via ducting and post type thrusters ). ( Note F-35 and AV-8B design approaches, also perhaps Mirage IIIV-01 ).

Iirc, some AFTIs had IWB on top anyway. My compromise is small IWB aimed at small weapons. Main weapon is APKWS(perhaps in bay doors, like F-102), secondary - Stormbreaker(just 2...4 in a row). Shallow, very short bay, like 2.1x0.5x0.2m.

AFTI had its own set of attack/defensive electronics, made on 1970s level(i.e. bulkier). Hope is that on modern level package can be made in a reasonable size.
Basically, F-35 size isn't equipment driven, it is internal fuel and bay driven. We don't need much of either?

Target cuing:
A panoply of on-board sensors would themselves demand adequate space within the airframe, which would again… drives airframe size higher. Beyond that, is their power and cooling requirements, none of which come for free; as regards requiring their own dedicated spaces ). ( Note F-35 on-going upgrade on equipment cooling ).
Helmet and visor with built-in off boresight all-aspect targeting capability would obviate need to “ maneuver…. into kill position behind targets “.

Maneuvering wasn't brought up for traditional dogfighting.
It's for safety of low altitude flight, while catching terrain-hugging targets(many LA targets now fly low enough they require maneuvers in restricted space, potentially even urban). Some of those are very slow or static, some - very fast.

Pointing energetically rather lackluster weapons(apkws) into their intercept envelope is a concern, too. Giving apkws good off-bore performance will make it expensive, killing the whole point...

Additionally, it's for throwing SDBs with lowest exposure time("donbass throw").

 

[Kat Tsun]

For roughly the 100th time, hand grenades and ICM bomblets have a longer "Danger Close" range than a gun.

It doesn't and I don't know why you say this.

An M67 has casualty producing radius of about 15 meters. You literally throw the thing. It won't hurt you if you aren't afraid. A 40mm shaped charge grenade like an M77 is probably about 10 meters, at most, because it has fewer and slower/bigger fragments. If you extrapolate to the maximum fragment distance, an F-35 or A-10 gun run is probably "dangerous" to anyone within half a mile of the attack.

People literally drop hand grenades from UAS in support of small unit attacks on trenches in Ukraine with no serious casualties.

There is no reason to think that when we're throwing 30-60 year old men into combat in WW3, which we almost certainly will be doing at some point, they'll be needing to get 25-30mm gun runs. They'll probably love the little robot quad copters that have six racks of M67s and drop them on a trench like a baby carpet bomber. The old men fighting and dying in Ukraine love them and they certainly aren't wasting F-16s or Su-25s on gun attacks. Even TB-2s have basically disappeared from the combat zone, which bodes poorly for MQ-9 operations.

CAS has become a mission that a company or a battalion should simply be capable of doing on its own.

And burned down 5 aircraft carriers.

This hasn't changed with the AVF just ask the Bonhomme Richard's fire watch.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It doesn't and I don't know why you say this.

An M67 has casualty producing radius of about 15 meters. You literally throw the thing. It won't hurt you if you aren't afraid. A 40mm shaped charge grenade like an M77 is probably about 10 meters, at most, because it has fewer and slower/bigger fragments.

Tell that to the kid who caught some fragments of a 40mm HEDP grenade at 150m and died.

Danger close on a grenade is not 15m. You throw the damn thing and then duck behind solid cover to stop the fragments from killing you.

Even TB-2s have basically disappeared from the combat zone, which bodes poorly for MQ-9 operations.

What do you expect for a non-stealthy prop job with not only no countermeasures but also no radar warning receivers or MAWS?

Sailors call something like that "skeet"!

CAS has become a mission that a company or a battalion should simply be capable of doing on its own.

Not sure it should be that low, yet.

Brigade, absolutely. (remember that there's no battlefield organizational structure in the US Army between Battalion and Brigade, a Brigade is directly made up of 6-9 battalions.)

This hasn't changed with the AVF just ask the Bonhomme Richard's fire watch.

BHR had a whole set of other issues. Like not having a working fire main. Or working watertight bulkheads. Or even a fucking clue who was in charge of fighting the fire, and then a godsdamned pissing match over who was in charge.

No I'm not salty about that at all.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Tell that to the kid who caught some fragments of a 40mm HEDP grenade at 150m and died.

Danger close on a grenade is not 15m. You throw the damn thing and then duck behind solid cover to stop the fragments from killing you.

That's not what "danger close" means. The fragments of a M67 are dangerous out to about 250 meters, sure. They will not produce casualties any less often at this distance than being struck by lightning while being bit by a shark happens, though. It's simply too rare to consider for a combat situation. Outside of about 10-15 meters you don't really need to duck, but it isn't a bad idea.

Outside of 20 meters you can watch and be fine like 99% of the time. The dispersion of an A-10 or F-35 gun run is sufficient to plaster the frontage of a platoon, though. Easily dozens of meters. Since they fire HEI rounds similar to the Bushmaster, they're far more dangerous, too.

A CAS gun run by a fixed wing aircraft probably has a moving threat zone that depends on what targets catch the pilot's eye, though. A funny human error thing happened in Grenada where a Navy A-7 did three successful dry runs on a target of Grenadan or Cuban troops and ended up strafing an Army TOC on the fourth pass, injuring a good portion of a battalion's command staff and killing someone IIRC, but would've been entirely prevented if they'd had the type of attack aircraft we do now:



This funny little robot with six hand grenades is really what the future of CAS will look like. Make the hand grenades aerodynamic, and impact fused HEDP rounds, and you have a really lethal weapon against infantry and light to medium armored vehicles.

A $90 million airplane isn't really attritable enough to fight in close combat at low altitudes anyway. Gun runs probably won't vanish but they won't be in the realm of LSCOs either. They'll be like something where Belizean or Honduran A-10s will strafe caravans of drug mules in Central America or whatever.

What do you expect for a non-stealthy prop job with not only no countermeasures but also no radar warning receivers or MAWS?

Even with RWR, MAWS, and countermeasures it would die. It simply cannot survive in the combat zone in any way, shape, or form.

Not sure it should be that low, yet.

No, I wasn't suggesting it. I am telling you that. Battalions and companies do their own CAS in Ukraine. This is normal TTP.

Brigade, absolutely.

The Russians attach Lancets to battalions and companies depending on what they are doing. They live in the regiment IIRC.

 

[yeetmahboi]

An M67 has casualty producing radius of about 15 meters.

Outside of about 10-15 meters you don't really need to duck, but it isn't a bad idea.

Look up *any* grenade range. A barrier isn't there because someone had a surplus of cement.

Before GWOT there was no pressing need to reduce casualty radius. Switch out the frag sleeve on M67 nades for composite casings and all your company FPVs get a danger close qualified ordnance.

Even with RWR, MAWS, and countermeasures it would die. It simply cannot survive in the combat zone in any way, shape, or form.

The Reapers operating in AFRICOM deploys alone - they have no accompanying air or ground support and only drops JDAMs on targets. If there's WLR guys on the ground the situation will be much different. A Reaper with self defense systems can last enough to produce a backtrack with an IR EOSAT. Feed that to HIMARS and let it rip.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Look up *any* grenade range. A barrier isn't there because someone had a surplus of cement.

Before GWOT there was no pressing need to reduce casualty radius. Switch out the frag sleeve on M67 nades for composite casings and all your company FPVs get a danger close qualified ordnance.

The Reapers operating in AFRICOM deploys alone - they have no accompanying air or ground support and only drops JDAMs on targets. If there's WLR guys on the ground the situation will be much different. A Reaper with self defense systems can last enough to produce a backtrack with an IR EOSAT. Feed that to HIMARS and let it rip.

The idea of using Reapers as sacrificial sensor carriers is beyond USAF thinking at the moment but it would be a good use in a LSCO. They're cheap and can be easily replaced, unlike a similarly priced AH-64E, and they have a much higher uptime than Apache too.

It might be within grasp of U.S. Army thinking if only they had the budget to stockpile Gray Eagles like they were cruise missiles and have a few hundred in every theater. The loss rates of Orlan versus the stockpiles of Shadows in brigades tells us how painfully backwards DOD is with regards to actually addressing the issue, assuming they've even absorbed any lessons from Ukraine yet, tbh.

You need like a dozen Orlans/Shadows just to get through a single day of high intensity combat. It's simply not something the U.S. MIC is ready to address yet.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That's not what "danger close" means. The fragments of a M67 are dangerous out to about 250 meters, sure. They will not produce casualties any less often at this distance than being struck by lightning while being bit by a shark happens, though. It's simply too rare to consider for a combat situation. Outside of about 10-15 meters you don't really need to duck, but it isn't a bad idea.

Outside of 20 meters you can watch and be fine like 99% of the time. The dispersion of an A-10 or F-35 gun run is sufficient to plaster the frontage of a platoon, though. Easily dozens of meters. Since they fire HEI rounds similar to the Bushmaster, they're far more dangerous, too.

As per the documents used by the forward air controllers (JTACs and TACPs), the Danger Close range for an A10's gun is 65m, and the 20mm M61 is 50m. The Danger Close range for a Hydra rocket including APKWS is 100m, and for a Hellfire or JAGM it's 150m.

A $90 million airplane isn't really attritable enough to fight in close combat at low altitudes anyway. Gun runs probably won't vanish but they won't be in the realm of LSCOs either. They'll be like something where Belizean or Honduran A-10s will strafe caravans of drug mules in Central America or whatever.

Gun runs are grossly unlikely in near-peer conflicts, I agree.

They are extremely likely in COIN situations, where the bad guys know that the only place they can survive is on top of US forces so that the superior firepower cannot be employed against them.

Even with RWR, MAWS, and countermeasures it would die. It simply cannot survive in the combat zone in any way, shape, or form.

It's an unstealthy prop plane. WTF do you expect?

The point of adding the self-defense pod is to make it so that two schmucks with MANPADS can't bring one down. Make the bad guys have to use bigger SAMs, the kind that have to be carried on vehicles, because those are easier to track and destroy.

No, I wasn't suggesting it. I am telling you that. Battalions and companies do their own CAS in Ukraine. This is normal TTP.

Not for the US military.

The Russians attach Lancets to battalions and companies depending on what they are doing. They live in the regiment IIRC.

And the US does not use regiments as anything but an administrative thing. A combat Brigade is directly made up of multiple Battalion-sized entities, there are no regiments involved. Lancet-equivalents would be something assigned to the Brigade in US forces.

 

[Desertfox]

In COIN situations an AT-6 or AC-130 can do gun runs. In near-peer conflicts you wont be doing any anyways. So an A-10 as designed is obsolete. You either need something expensive and survivable like an F-35 or you can get away with something cheap like an armed trainer.

 

[Kat Tsun]

As per the documents used by the forward air controllers (JTACs and TACPs), the Danger Close range for an A10's gun is 65m, and the 20mm M61 is 50m. The Danger Close range for a Hydra rocket including APKWS is 100m, and for a Hellfire or JAGM it's 150m.

This is significantly further than any hand grenade or ICM bomblet, which can be visibly demonstrated to be conducting fire support missions within literal throwing distance of friendly troops. Half a dozen tiny drone helicopters that cost about $12,000 with a few already-paid-for grenades from a Mk 20 can humble an armored battalion about half the time. It used to take a $20 million attack aircraft or two, three to six $10 million helicopters, and dozens of $15,000 missiles to do the same.

Drones have unlocked a lot of fascinating and interesting possibilities for close air support that frees up more expensive airframes for actually important work, while also reducing the need for maintainer schools and type familiarization overhead.

Gun runs are grossly unlikely in near-peer conflicts, I agree.

They are extremely likely in COIN situations, where the bad guys know that the only place they can survive is on top of US forces so that the superior firepower cannot be employed against them.

Well, we aren't fighting COIN anymore. We're preparing for a world war with the Chinese and Russians and Iranians and North Koreans in about 2-4 years according to DOD. COIN is something our allies in South America and Southeast Asia will be doing.

It's an unstealthy prop plane. WTF do you expect?

That it will be about as limited in utility and use case as the Kronstadt Orion. Any major efforts at modernization or overhaul are wasted.

Not for the US military.

It will need to be since we aren't going to have the pilots, the airframes, or the airbases necessary to have on-demand sorties like Afghanistan.

And the US does not use regiments as anything but an administrative thing. A combat Brigade is directly made up of multiple Battalion-sized entities, there are no regiments involved. Lancet-equivalents would be something assigned to the Brigade in US forces.

The Motor Rifle Regiment or Mechanized Brigade is the closest approximation to the U.S. Army Armored Brigade Combat Team in Russian and Ukrainian ground forces. They conduct their own CAS and perform their own aerial reconnaissance with organic drone aviation. This will be necessary for the U.S. Army to absorb at some point but I suspect it won't be taken seriously until the shooting starts.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

This is significantly further than any hand grenade or ICM bomblet, which can be visibly demonstrated to be conducting fire support missions within literal throwing distance of friendly troops. Half a dozen tiny drone helicopters that cost about $12,000 with a few already-paid-for grenades from a Mk 20 can humble an armored battalion about half the time. It used to take a $20 million attack aircraft or two, three to six $10 million helicopters, and dozens of $15,000 missiles to do the same.

It's a pretty miserable excuse for an armor battallion if they can't contend with six quadcopters dropping grenades. Counters to the cheapest drones are being fielded by any nation that seeks to be relevant on the modern battlefield. Soon enough even a typical MBT should be able to detect and intercept the smallest type of practical drones attempting to attack them. The much more dangerous threats to them (from the air) will remain guided weapons deployed by far more capable airframes, both manned and unmanned. Those of course are far more expensive but they will force that armor battalion to need significant supporting assets (in form of complete air-superiority or very good SHORAD) to survive.

 

[Kat Tsun]

It's a pretty miserable excuse for an armor battallion if they can't contend with six quadcopters dropping grenades.

Yes, well, most can't.

I don't think the U.S. Army is particularly well equipped despite Sergeant Stout being available in very limited quantities to frontline squadrons of 2CAV for air defense against drones. They have like four or five of them right now for the entire brigade. Maybe the cavalrymen can fire by platoon like the Ukrainians and Russians did throughout 2022 and early 2023. I'm sure they have ACOGs and binos for the lieutenant to direct their tracers.

Counters to the cheapest drones are being fielded by any nation that seeks to be relevant on the modern battlefield.

And yet, somehow, the drones continue to be a menace that has forced massive dispersion beyond even Force XXI levels. Brigades can expect to hit 50-60 km of frontage at maximum Force XXI densities, which was the objective of Future Combat Systems, too. SBCTs would do 30 kilometer frontages back in 2005 at NTC. It's double this in Ukraine.

Rifle squads typically hold a kilometer or more of land distributed among fireteams. The typical "large" attack capable of threatening the position of a battalion is about four to six men and a single tank or IFV. The only real counter to drones, as with any highly lethal combat system, is dispersion, camouflage, and hardening. Lots of it.

Hand grenade drones are so effective they've forced an order of magnitude reduction in troop densities compared to the A-10 and Su-25, and a halving of densities compared to Future Combat Systems, Force XXI, and the EXFOR of the 1990s. It's kind of mind boggling, since Army After Next was talking about 100 kilometer brigade frontages in 2050, not 2025.

A lot of CPTs and MAJs understand this implicitly, while the LTCs and COLs observing are writing on it, but it's not something that's permeated the budget yet or had to percolate down into inventory of combat systems that big dogs decide. They know it's there and what we need to do but we're very far from actually being able to do tackle this threat. I suspect we'll be catching up even a decade from now if we don't have a big war.

There was a great article in the MWI about drones in Ukraine and the MDTF.

Soon enough even a typical MBT should be able to detect and intercept the smallest type of practical drones attempting to attack them.

It'll be IOC in a mere 20 years, I'm sure.

The vast majority of armor available to the U.S. Army will remain the M1A1SA for decades to come, much as the vast majority of armor available to the Russians is the T-72B, and the vast majority to the Ukrainians is the T-64BV, and so on. All these very fancy, expensive, and quite scarce systems will not protect units where they do not exist, which is where we see tremendous battlefield losses in combat battalions in the UKR and RU armies. The U.S. Army and PLA will likely be no different here.

The much more dangerous threats to them (from the air) will remain guided weapons deployed by far more capable airframes, both manned and unmanned.

There is literally no evidence of this in the only active LSCO in the world. What we see is that the majority of armor losses come from:

1) Tube guns firing HEF rounds.
2) FPV drones equipped with hollow charge warheads.
3) Landmines and their associated technics.
4) Anti-tank guided missiles.
5) Direct-fire anti-tank guns.

You can swap two and three depending on what the particular battalion is. Somewhere around 7 or 8 is probably the air-launched ATGW or glide bomb I guess. Those tend to be reserved for strategic systems and SEAD like S-300P and S-400, though, and that will be true for the Pacific War as well, since the USAF definitely isn't big enough to do anything more than a Battle of Britain type thing where both sides have air parity with brief spurts of air superiority.

Those of course are far more expensive but they will force that armor battalion to need significant supporting assets (in form of complete air-superiority or very good SHORAD) to survive.

Which doesn't exist in quantity either now nor at any time this decade and well into the next. Sergeant Stout will almost certainly be curtailed with budget cuts to pay for GBSD and INDOPACCOM. Probably not canceled, but definitely slowed down, to find the monies to proceed with improved tactical and theater level ballistic missile defense while also gutting $50 billion from non-priorities. The Army isn't winning this round of modernization money lotto, while the Navy will definitely get big cash with the Air Force or Space Force pulling in second.

 

[yeetmahboi]

The vast majority of armor available to the U.S. Army will remain the M1A1SA for decades to come

Wut?

 

[Kat Tsun]

Wut?

Sorry it's M1A2SEPv2s. -A1SAs are the majority Guard tanks.

Point is they have no more protection against drones, and in some ways less protection, than a T-72B or T-64BV.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Yes, well, most can't.

I don't think the U.S. Army is particularly well equipped despite Sergeant Stout being available in very limited quantities to frontline squadrons of 2CAV for air defense against drones. They have like four or five of them right now for the entire brigade. Maybe the cavalrymen can fire by platoon like the Ukrainians and Russians did throughout 2022 and early 2023. I'm sure they have ACOGs and binos for the lieutenant to direct their tracers.

I hadn't realized the SHORAD Stryker had received its own name. But an armored battalion is three tank companies IIRC so maybe something like 45 tanks total. I'd expect a force that large to be able to improvise something to content with a mere six quadcopters. Regardless this is a rather irrelevant very specific scenario, the real threat from drones is much more numerous.

As to the state of US Army SHORAD in general, I'd agree it is an area has been neglected for a long time now. I don't think anyone can deny that. Historically US Army air defense stuff tended to be among the first items on the chopping block. New systems are finally being fielded but everything seems to move glacially slow these days, if we were in or about to be in such a war, maybe things would move with more urgency.

And yet, somehow, the drones continue to be a menace that has forced massive dispersion beyond even Force XXI levels. Brigades can expect to hit 50-60 km of frontage at maximum Force XXI densities, which was the objective of Future Combat Systems, too. SBCTs would do 30 kilometer frontages back in 2005 at NTC. It's double this in Ukraine.

The artillery and the sheer scale of territory forces the level of dispersion you see in Ukraine. If the Russians only had drones to contend with and not the wide array of Ukranian field artillery including their rocket and missile systems, then they ought to have been able to concentrate enough of a force to make some real advances. Instead, we see 1917 western front levels of progress. Concentration of forces would make it much easier to protect against drones. Yet in practical terms artillery, which is easier to spot for than ever in part due to drones, prevents that.

Rifle squads typically hold a kilometer or more of land distributed among fireteams. The typical "large" attack capable of threatening the position of a battalion is about four to six men and a single tank or IFV. The only real counter to drones, as with any highly lethal combat system, is dispersion, camouflage, and hardening. Lots of it.

That's what the war has turned into there, which is of course not an ideal scenario for either side (for different reasons). It's something officers and everyone else involved in the big picture should strive to avoid because bloody wars of attrition with minimal progress are never all that popular or effective.

Hand grenade drones are so effective they've forced an order of magnitude reduction in troop densities compared to the A-10 and Su-25, and a halving of densities compared to Future Combat Systems, Force XXI, and the EXFOR of the 1990s. It's kind of mind boggling, since Army After Next was talking about 100 kilometer brigade frontages in 2050, not 2025.

Tube artillery, rockets, and missiles firing from many kilometers away is what is going to smash a concentrated enemy force, not drones dropping hand grenades. That artillery is a lot harder to counter in the big picture. There are of course assets in which both sides are lacking or have been generally unable to utilize effectively. Primarily air assets. An Su-25 lobbing rocket volleys at the general area of entrenched infantry ensures the Su-25 is likely to return to base, but also doesn't accomplish very much. Neither side has been able to secure air superiority and effectively suppress enemy air defenses, and that is something which would fundamentally change the current state of affairs.

A lot of CPTs and MAJs understand this implicitly, while the LTCs and COLs observing are writing on it, but it's not something that's permeated the budget yet or had to percolate down into inventory of combat systems that big dogs decide. They know it's there and what we need to do but we're very far from actually being able to do tackle this threat. I suspect we'll be catching up even a decade from now if we don't have a big war.

It's the US Army, everything moves glacially slow in peacetime with rare exceptions throughout history.

It'll be IOC in a mere 20 years, I'm sure.

Unacceptable but all too likely. And I'm not optimistic the new budget-cutting department is going to help anything.

The vast majority of armor available to the U.S. Army will remain the M1A1SA for decades to come, much as the vast majority of armor available to the Russians is the T-72B, and the vast majority to the Ukrainians is the T-64BV, and so on. All these very fancy, expensive, and quite scarce systems will not protect units where they do not exist, which is where we see tremendous battlefield losses in combat battalions in the UKR and RU armies. The U.S. Army and PLA will likely be no different here.

The technology is available, and for the USA there is no good reasons fielding a lot of this stuff should take as long as it does. Modern Russia isn't the Soviet Union but once upon a time they did mass-produce thousands of ZSU-23-4 Shilkas which were pretty advanced for their day. Such efforts, albeit maybe not on the scale of the Cold War, are going to be needed by nations that want to remain competitive on the battlefield. It has to go beyond mechanized formations too. Every important airfield or military installation is going to need countermeasures from the low cost/capability category of drones. Even in times of peace there are plenty of bad actors out there.

There is literally no evidence of this in the only active LSCO in the world. What we see is that the majority of armor losses come from:

There is no evidence of it because consider what both sides have in terms of air assets. The Ukrainians have old Soviet fighters with occasional Western upgrades, like the ability to lob a JDAM or HARM but without the ability to get really precise targeting for those. They also have some F-16s generally modernized to late 1990s standards. Their best attack helicopters are old Mi-24s little different from as they were back in the 1980s, maybe with a handful having some improvised methods of firing newer munitions. The Russians have some much more capable fixed-wing aircraft at their disposal, but for various reasons have not been able to utilize them all that effectively. They have some much more capable attack helicopters, which proved useful to them in halting the Ukranian counteroffensive, but when used more offensively they seem often caught by surprise by some threat or another.

Neither of these forces can face the degree of air defenses on the battlefield well enough to have the sort of effect airpower might otherwise have.

Which doesn't exist in quantity either now nor at any time this decade and well into the next. Sergeant Stout will almost certainly be curtailed with budget cuts to pay for GBSD and INDOPACCOM. Probably not canceled, but definitely slowed down, to find the monies to proceed with improved tactical and theater level ballistic missile defense while also gutting $50 billion from non-priorities. The Army isn't winning this round of modernization money lotto, while the Navy will definitely get big cash with the Air Force or Space Force pulling in second.

Demands of the other services aside, this isn't a good time to be making cuts to an area where the Army has to improve upon to fulfill their basic function. But I don't know what the hell they're thinking in DC now, and even before the current administration I found so many choices relating to national defense bewildering.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I hadn't realized the SHORAD Stryker had received its own name. But an armored battalion is three tank companies IIRC so maybe something like 45 tanks total. I'd expect a force that large to be able to improvise something to content with a mere six quadcopters. Regardless this is a rather irrelevant very specific scenario, the real threat from drones is much more numerous.

The real threat from drones is one or two per target chasing down already routed infantrymen or destroying tanks that are entirely unawares. There is literal, actual combat footage on Telegram and Twitter about this. You can literally just watch it happen. Swarms don't exist. They never have. They may never exist. They're not necessary.

You shell them with howitzers and they run away and you chase them down with drones and they die, either by their own hand or the drone's.

Also did you ignore the part where I said 45 tanks have to cover a frontage of 100 kilometers? You're looking at a tank every mile. In reality it's more like every two or three miles, because you're doing two up one back and likely holding someone in an assembly area about 20-30 kilometers behind the FLOT. Anything within 10 kilometers or less of the FEBA is under semi-constant aerial attack by guided munitions, with no real defense or detection systems in place to stop them, and literally none forthcoming.

It's a nightmare.

Six quadcopters is fully capable of killing an armored brigade. It would be a significant planned operation though. That said they would have enough grenades to drop on nearly every vehicle accurately and probably hit them in vital spots, because the operators aren't stupid, unlike a spin distributed random scattering of the same grenades from a cluster bomb.

The lethality of the drone is that it is simple, cheap, easy to use, guided all the way to target, and can perform ISR, BDA, and attack in a single action. In prior eras this required very sophisticated organizations to do. What once needed a Corps and COCOM air planning cell and tactical fighter wing equipped with air to ground missiles can be done by about two or three guys in a truck with some small 40-60mm shaped charge grenades with 3D printed stabilizer fins on them.

The end result is the same: burning armor and dead tankers.

It won't replace aircraft, of course, but it will certainly liberate them from the need to babysit ground troops with CAS runs and let them perform the much more important job of degrading enemy air defenses for major attacks on C4I nodes, counterbattery, and operational-strategic logistical elements such as ship convoys.

Again, the best CAS aircraft for the XXI century is going to be a DJI Phantom with a rack of six little 40mm ICM bomblets that can defeat roof armor and kill a tank by detonating ammo under the turret, or under the bustle rack, or lighting the engine on fire, or whatever.

The reality is that CAS, artillery, and fiber optic guided anti-tank missiles are merging into a single flexible weapon system capable of operating within 5-10 kilometers combat radius at a platoon, company, or battalion level. The jet aircraft is too expensive to be attritable in any real sense when it is wasted on blowing up a tank. That's $90 million down the drain compared to maybe $40-50 million of tanks and troops if we blow up eight T-72B3s for a single JSF. That's a losing proposition since war is ultimately economic exchange. That JSF is better expended blowing up $120-250 million of attack helicopters, tactical fighters, or air defense command and control systems.

Petraeus's "money is ammunition" line remains as true as ever even in LSCO.

If the Russians only had drones to contend with and not the wide array of Ukranian field artillery including their rocket and missile systems, then they ought to have been able to concentrate enough of a force to make some real advances. Instead, we see 1917 western front levels of progress. Concentration of forces would make it much easier to protect against drones. Yet in practical terms artillery, which is easier to spot for than ever in part due to drones, prevents that.

I put artillery on top of the kill list for a reason. Drones contribute to the dispersion, not artillery, though. Drones are way more lethal.

That's what the war has turned into there, which is of course not an ideal scenario for either side (for different reasons). It's something officers and everyone else involved in the big picture should strive to avoid because bloody wars of attrition with minimal progress are never all that popular or effective.

You don't avoid it. Russia went into this war with an expectation of 72-96 hours to Kiev and has ended up with a three year slog. We will be the same unless we surrender preemptively. Which seems to be what we're doing but I suspect this may be a ploy to sucker the Chinese in for a Sunday Punch and attrition war, since Hegseth's fat list of "shit we need to buy" includes CCAs, assault drones, and INDOPACCOM. It's basically Obama's Pacific Pivot x10.

Tube artillery, rockets, and missiles firing from many kilometers away is what is going to smash a concentrated enemy force, not drones dropping hand grenades.

Concentrated. Enemy. Forces. Do. Not. Exist. Anymore.

They don't exist! They haven't existed for five years and counting! The most serious major attacks involve about two dozen men, a tank, and a pair of infantry carriers. Maybe another dozen men with AGS and .50 cals at the 500 meter line. And a couple snipers.

That used to be so miniscule it was considered irrelevant.

Now it changes the course of an entire ground operation!

That's considered a massive, theater defining attack nowadays. The Cold War was almost 40 years ago. Times have changed since then. The modern equivalent of a tank regiment is a combined arms company. A brigade is a division. A division is a corps. A corps is a theater. Hell it might even be bigger than that now. Brigades are expected to cover what divisions covered in the 1990s, 30 years ago, and what a corps covered in the 1970s, 50 years ago.

Force XXI envisioned an advanced armored division with WIN-T that could cover a third to half of Israel. Now, that same armored division is expected to cover two Israels.

Maybe platoons are the equivalent of a tank regiment today at this rate? Who knows. Probably Ukraine and Russia do.

There is no evidence of it because consider what both sides have in terms of air assets. The Ukrainians have old Soviet fighters with occasional Western upgrades, like the ability to lob a JDAM or HARM but without the ability to get really precise targeting for those. They also have some F-16s generally modernized to late 1990s standards.

What does the USAF have again? Mostly 1970s a/c modernized to late 1990s standards. It's still majority F-15, F-16, B-1 and B-2.

Their best attack helicopters are old Mi-24s little different from as they were back in the 1980s,

The most common Russian assault helicopter in theater is the Ka-52, which is from the early 2000s. They're actually ahead of America in this regard, both in terms of gunship use, and in terms of armaments for those gunships.

The Russians have some much more capable fixed-wing aircraft at their disposal, but for various reasons have not been able to utilize them all that effectively.

Yeah it turns out 1980s SAMs produce an effective anti-access/area denial network. This ain't Desert Storm or KARI that's for sure.

They have some much more capable attack helicopters, which proved useful to them in halting the Ukranian counteroffensive, but when used more offensively they seem often caught by surprise by some threat or another.

This will be worse in Pacific because the PLA is more modern than Ukraine.

Neither of these forces can face the degree of air defenses on the battlefield well enough to have the sort of effect airpower might otherwise have.

It's gone it's not going to have the sweeping effects we saw in Desert Storm, Kosovo, or Bosnia. Period. Get ready for an actual world war. We're the RAF and the Chinese are the Luftwaffe. Who's the United States? Nobody. The Blitz will continue until both air forces exhaust each other.

The Soviets have had the last laugh.

Demands of the other services aside, this isn't a good time to be making cuts to an area where the Army has to improve upon to fulfill their basic function. But I don't know what the hell they're thinking in DC now, and even before the current administration I found so many choices relating to national defense bewildering.

They aren't thinking. They're cutting. This is what severe self-imposed austerity to pay down a debt looks like.