Design a Close Air Support aircraft

...do we still live in 1966?
Are the threats we face the same as they were back then?

In the 1980s the estimated losses in a peer-conflict with the Soviet Union for the A-10 were to be in the order of 10 aircraft every 24 hours.
Is that an acceptable rate of losses?
At that pace the entire fleet of A-10s would have been depleted in 2 weeks.

In the 1980s.
Which is 43 years ago.

Do you think the threats to air assets diminished or increased in the meantime?
Don't reference studies from over 50 years ago, try to look at how the world is right now and try to imagine how it will be in the future.
There haven't been any studies that I know about done since then. If you know of some, I'd like to read them!

20 years of COIN warfare says that loiter time is still highly desirable.



I think you keep missing the point.
The point is not that the gun doesn't do its job well.
The point is that you cannot bring a gun strapped to an aircraft close enough to a frontline and expect the aircraft to survive.
That concept of CAS in a peer-conflict is obsolete because it will get your crews killed.
The gun exists for that nasty point in time when the choice is "lose some aircraft" or "lose the battle/war because the unit stopping the breakthrough to Kyiv was wiped out"

Do you want to have to send pilots into that? No. Will they go in anyways? Yes.
 
There haven't been any studies that I know about done since then. If you know of some, I'd like to read them!

20 years of COIN warfare says that loiter time is still highly desirable.

20 years of COIN warfare has made the U.S. military, possibly permanently, incapable of winning the first fight of the next war. This is nothing new, but it is unfortunate that America has learned nothing from Kasserine Pass, the Philippines, or Pusan.

The gun exists for that nasty point in time when the choice is "lose some aircraft" or "lose the battle/war because the unit stopping the breakthrough to Kyiv was wiped out"

This is never a choice in a war where winning is a possibility in the first place, though. The Ukrainians protected their capital by blowing up dams, and using rocket launchers to stop a single airborne division with light aluminum tankettes, not by dying to Russian MANPADS.

An unopposed breakthrough leads to defeat within days, no matter how many planes you throw at it, because an unopposed breakthrough means you have run out of battalions or can't get them in the path of the enemy. CAS won't stop them. Do you think the Germans just walked over France without resistance? They were getting bombed by the RAF and AdA the entire time, it just didn't phase them because there were no ground troops to back it up. Same thing happened in 1973, just at a degraded level, because the Kub was reasonably effective.

Conversely, Dunkirk was won, because there was remnants of a field army standing between the Hitlerite legions and the Western Alliee.

CAS is merely a "nice to have" thing for ground troops. It is not necessary for them to conduct their mission, either in defense or attack, and it will not result in winning a war. It may be the difference in determining if a ground force can continue an operation a week afterwards, or if there needs to be a pause in fighting for a month to regenerate combat strength, though. Which is why it's lowest in the order of precedence for aviation arms.

It should probably be a mission for the U.S. Army at this point because the U.S. Army already has the capability to operate MQ-1s now.
 
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20 years of COIN warfare has made the U.S. military, possibly permanently, incapable of winning the first fight of the next war. This is nothing new, but it is unfortunate that America has learned nothing from Kasserine Pass, the Philippines, or Pusan.
Quite possible, but that's a separate argument.


This is never a choice in a war where winning is a possibility in the first place, though. The Ukrainians protected their capital by blowing up dams, and using rocket launchers to stop a single airborne division with light aluminum tankettes, not by dying to Russian MANPADS.

An unopposed breakthrough leads to defeat within days, no matter how many planes you throw at it, because an unopposed breakthrough means you have run out of battalions or can't get them in the path of the enemy. CAS won't stop them. Do you think the Germans just walked over France without resistance? They were getting bombed by the RAF and AdA the entire time, it just didn't phase them because there were no ground troops to back it up. Same thing happened in 1973, just at a degraded level, because the Kub was reasonably effective.

Conversely, Dunkirk was won, because there was remnants of a field army standing between the Hitlerite legions and the Western Alliee.
Right.

This is about keeping a battalion in the fight, not letting it get destroyed. Keeping the remnants of that field army intact enough to still be combat effective.

This is not "war winning" this is "preventing the war from being lost".

If you don't understand the difference between those two concepts, I don't know how to fix that.



CAS is merely a "nice to have" thing for ground troops. It is not necessary for them to conduct their mission, either in defense or attack, and it will not result in winning a war. It may be the difference in determining if a ground force can continue an operation a week afterwards, or if there needs to be a pause in fighting for a month to regenerate combat strength, though. Which is why it's lowest in the order of precedence for aviation arms.

It should probably be a mission for the U.S. Army at this point because the U.S. Army already has the capability to operate MQ-1s now.
I'm still wondering why the US Army hasn't formally announced replacing their MQ-1C Gray Eagles with Mojaves. Actual rough field capabilities so it can fly off a dirt track if it has to, and the same weapons load as an Apache.
 
lose the battle/war because the unit stopping the breakthrough to Kyiv was wiped out"
Is quite different from
This is about keeping a battalion in the fight, not letting it get destroyed. Keeping the remnants of that field army intact enough to still be combat effective.
If the enemy has mass up enough force to attain a breakthrough thats a failure of recon and BAI. And it also means you are sending semi-LO A-10s into the range of MR-SAMs and associated air search complexes. This is just outright suicidal.
Guns runs are good because
  • They can be done in permissive environment with little costs and high damage.
  • They are morally uplifting to ground troops, are good for PR and have a small danger close radius. Good for CAS.
Gun runs are bad because:
  • Any competent mechanized forces would have at least several MANPADs covering every sector and a lightweight Sentinel A4 equivalent hidden somewhere scanning the horizon for lumbering A-10s plus masted scouts. Gun runs against formations = dead from MANPADs. Troops popping out of hatch cover waving Strelas is a standard battle practice for the Soviet army for example.
  • Gun runs can only be done in permissive environment. Peer combats arent that. You would see OpFor mechanized formations accompanied by AWACS and fighter bombers which would sweep CAS crafts out of the sky real quick.
  • The effect could be delivered by alternative less consuming vectors ranging from 60mm mortars to drones lobbing microbombs.
 
If the enemy has mass up enough force to attain a breakthrough thats a failure of recon and BAI. And it also means you are sending semi-LO A-10s into the range of MR-SAMs and associated air search complexes. This is just outright suicidal.
Better than Paris 1940.
 
Right.

This is about keeping a battalion in the fight, not letting it get destroyed. Keeping the remnants of that field army intact enough to still be combat effective.

A field army is much bigger, and has more important things to worry itself about, than the complaints of a brigade commander about not getting enough Mavericks or CBUs. For the most part, CAS is a waste of resources for tactical air forces because it materially damages the ability of the tactical air force to effect the battle in genuinely meaningful ways.

Attacking a brigade that has not been committed to a fight is far more important job than bombing a brigade that is already being shot up while attacking a battalion's main battle position. Battalions, and brigades, will be destroyed in combat, and casualties will be rather large. Ukraine lost two brigade equivalents of troops in Bakhmut, Russia a division. That's dead, wounded is about two or three times more.

If you have to "keep a battalion in the fight," then you've already lost!

This is not "war winning" this is "preventing the war from being lost".

Wars are decided based on factors outside the control of a battalion, brigade, or division commander. One of these factors is the commitment of his allotted aviation by a theater or front commander to degrade the enemy's future fighting power.

If you don't understand the difference between those two concepts, I don't know how to fix that.

If you lose a war because you misplaced a battalion, you were never going to win the war. It's just that simple.

Tactics are not important to achieving ultimate victory. American infantrymen in WW2 were often timid, skittish, and poor in their fighting power. Yet they were carried by their stronger aviation, armored, naval, and artillery firepower to defeat a pair of far more tactically sound opponents: the Germans and the Japanese. Now that shoe is on the other foot.

France didn't fall in a day, and it didn't lose because it never put any battalions in front of the Germans, because on the contrary, they had a ton of battalions in front of the Germans. Just ask Gort's British Expeditionary Force! Yet, not a difference it made, because the entire field armies with multiple corps were out of position and tied down in Belgium dealing with a feint.

A modern close air support aircraft is converging into a reusable cruise missile, or a remotely piloted vehicle, because manned aircraft are now far too advanced to be wasted on the job.

I'm still wondering why the US Army hasn't formally announced replacing their MQ-1C Gray Eagles with Mojaves. Actual rough field capabilities so it can fly off a dirt track if it has to, and the same weapons load as an Apache.

The US Army prefers MQ-1C because it has endurance, can share bases with the Air Force, and carries ground surveillance sensors. Mojave doesn't have much of a purpose besides maybe possibly being CV capable. The Marines would prefer it.
 
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A field army is much bigger, and has more important things to worry itself about, than the complaints of a brigade commander about not getting enough Mavericks or CBUs. For the most part, CAS is a waste of resources for tactical air forces because it materially damages the ability of the tactical air force to effect the battle in genuinely meaningful ways.

Attacking a brigade that has not been committed to a fight is far more important job than bombing a brigade that is already being shot up while attacking a battalion's main battle position. Battalions, and brigades, will be destroyed in combat, and casualties will be rather large. Ukraine lost two brigade equivalents of troops in Bakhmut, Russia a division. That's dead, wounded is about two or three times more.

If you have to "keep a battalion in the fight," then you've already lost!



Wars are decided based on factors outside the control of a battalion, brigade, or division commander.



If you lose a war because you misplaced a battalion, you were never going to win the war.
Then you're not understanding that preventing a unit from collapsing into a rout may be rather important to NOT LOSING.

Winning != Not Losing.



France didn't fall in a day and it didn't lose because it never put any battalions in front of the Germans. On the contrary, they had a ton of battalions in front of the Germans. Yet, not a difference it made, because the entire field armies with multiple corps were out of position.
That sounds like they failed to put battalions in front of the Germans.

(Yes, I know that the few times the French Army did manage to put a battalion in front of the Germans the French Army did pretty well.)


The US Army prefers MQ-1C because it has endurance, can share bases with the Air Force, and carries ground surveillance sensors.
Ah, that makes sense, though I still suspect that the Army will start buying Mojaves as soon as the USAF gets rid of the A-10s.
 
Then you're not understanding that preventing a unit from collapsing into a rout may be rather important to NOT LOSING.

Winning != Not Losing.

France didn't lose the Battle of France because it "routed". It actually fought quite well?

You're mostly misunderstanding the scale, I think. Battalions die pretty much every day or week, depending on the intensity of the battle. The U.S. Marines lost a battalion a day in Iwo Jima, after all, and it probably won't be much different when WW3 arrives. Ukraine and Russia both lose a battalion a week or something when it's attacking, and that's with modern dispersed forces, except when they're fighting in urban combat. It might be closer to a battalion per hour at that rate, but that rate is usually not sustained for more than a few minutes before a probing unit withdraws or something.

No army in human history has ever relied on a battalion and won. Persia won Thermopylae and the Spartans weren't even at the main battle.

Battalions only matter insofar as how quickly they can be replaced after being expended, and how many of the enemy's can I kill, before they engage my own battalions in a decisive battle. BAI is more effective than CAS because it destroys enemy battalions without exposing friendly battalions to danger, tends to catch battalions with their pants down, and puts the attacking forces away from the main brunt of enemy low and medium altitude air defenses. Rocket artillery, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles have similar effects of producing shock and similarly long range.

CAS only becomes preeminent when the enemy no longer has an air force, because if the enemy have no air force, the only missions for a tactical air force are Scud hunting, CAS, and BAI. This happened in Desert Storm. It happened in Bosnia. It happened in Afghanistan. It may or may not happen in Taiwan.

JSF is just built for Scud hunting and BAI, and not for CAS, in the sense that it's very expensive and would be painful to lose to a Buk. Genuinely it would probably be preferable for a theater commander to trade a Army company or something rather than risk a JSF, or a battalion rather than risk a JSF squadron, and the A-10 force simply wouldn't last very long.

It's why any future CAS aircraft needs to be like an order of magnitude cheaper than a JSF, or at least no more than a Predator or Apache.

That sounds like they failed to put battalions in front of the Germans.

(Yes, I know that the few times the French Army did manage to put a battalion in front of the Germans the French Army did pretty well.)

They put a few battalions in front of them at Lille, including a single tank battalion. It stopped the entire German Army for a week and a half.

Ah, that makes sense, though I still suspect that the Army will start buying Mojaves as soon as the USAF gets rid of the A-10s.

Maybe but I doubt they're interested. If they were going to buy something it would probably be trailer launched like an armed Shadow.

Marines want Mojave if it can operate from a LHA. They've been hankering to find a way to replace the OV-10 for decades now.
 
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France didn't lose the Battle of France because it "routed". It actually fought quite well?

(...)

They put a few battalions in front of them at Lille, including a single tank battalion. It stopped the entire German Army for a week and a half.
Where the French army actually fought, it fought well.

But most of the time the Germans went where the French Army wasn't, so the French army didn't fight.



JSF is just built for Scud hunting and BAI, and not for CAS, in the sense that it's very expensive and would be painful to lose to a Buk. Genuinely it would probably be preferable for a theater commander to trade a Army company or something rather than risk a JSF, or a battalion rather than risk a JSF squadron, and the A-10 force simply wouldn't last very long.

It's why any future CAS aircraft needs to be like an order of magnitude cheaper than a JSF, or at least no more than a Predator or Apache.
:D :D :D :D :D :D :D :D :D

An order of Magnitude cheaper is $8mil. I don't think you can buy a Predator for that (at least not a complete system, a single drone might be cheaper than that).

A new build Apache E is $40mil.

And I don't think you can buy the GFE for the plane at that price. Engine, sensors, etc.



Maybe but I doubt they're interested. If they were going to buy something it would probably be trailer launched like an armed Shadow.

Marines want Mojave if it can operate from a LHA. They've been hankering to find a way to replace the OV-10 for decades now.
I keep forgetting that the Marines had OV-10s... It should be operable from an LHA, it can operate from the QE class.
 
Better than Paris 1940.
Paris 1940? That Paris that got bombed to death?
Yeah I think that even further highlighted the fact that if the enemy has total air superiority then youre done. The baguettes had no idea what the Germans were doing ( shit intel), had no way to disrupt the Heer's logistical forces and bomb panzer divisions head on ( shit BAI), and was totally dominated in the air.
If you seriously think giving them the WW2 equivalent of an A-10C can win them that war, I am dead.

Airpower is the most important factor needed to win wars, militarily. This was reflected in WW2, sorta so in Vietnam, totally so in ME, sort sorta half-ish so in Syria, and is increasingly being desired in Ukraine.

CAS should only be committed after most, or preferably, every medium-range and onward aerial acquisition/targeting complexes is wiped out. You cant bust every BMP with a Strela rack but you can design a CAS plane that can tank one. But if you already neutralize the OpFor's air denial capability ( air force + air defense) you are operating freely anyway. Why risk putting expensive, manned CAS planes to strafe targets when you can call on obscurants to blind/retreat and release a SDB spam from an UCAV?
 
Where the French army actually fought, it fought well.

But most of the time the Germans went where the French Army wasn't, so the French army didn't fight.

Yes, and that's exactly why CAS is generally pointless in big big wars...

The most important targets to be hit by aviation are the ones that aren't shooting at your own battalions! CAS might be second to last in the crude order of precedence I posted, but it's a very, very distant second, because CAS takes away airframes from the tasking pools that could be better used striking mobile forces instead!

The most dangerous enemies are the ones you don't see, which is why I brought up Thermopylae in the first place. The Greeks didn't lose because their main defensive effort collapsed, the Greeks lost because their camp was captured by an assault force of Persian skirmishers.

They had the same problem as the French in 1940, the Americans in 1951, and the Iraqis in 1991.

Air power solves the problem of reacting to enemy mobile troops by bringing fast action across an entire theater. If your airpower is bogged down adding a miniscule amount of firepower battalions, who are literally doing their job (dying engaged in decisive battle), it's going to result in a collapse of the main defensive effort, because it isn't going to stop the other guys from infiltrating gaps in the defense and destroying important things behind the battalions..

You can do OCA with a tank on a runway as well as a Paveway through a hangar's roof.

In wars where two titanic, continent-spanning countries aren't fighting each other, well you can do a lot of dumb stuff and not get slapped for it to say the least, which is how America got things like the AC-130 and SOCOM.

An order of Magnitude cheaper is $8mil. I don't think you can buy a Predator for that (at least not a complete system, a single drone might be cheaper than that).

Yep, LCAAT is truly supposed to be low cost and attritable.

A new build Apache E is $40mil.

Yep. Makes you wonder why we keep them around.

And I don't think you can buy the GFE for the plane at that price. Engine, sensors, etc.

Nope. The Navy purchased two Q-58s from Kratos recently for $7.5 million a piece. That's pretty bang on target for the money.


The USAF wants a thousand, at least.


I keep forgetting that the Marines had OV-10s... It should be operable from an LHA, it can operate from the QE class.

Then they'll be interested, maybe, if they can get the space for the vans and SATCOM aboard.
 
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Paris 1940? That Paris that got bombed to death?
The Paris that surrendered, hence better than losing the war.


Yeah I think that even further highlighted the fact that if the enemy has total air superiority then youre done. The baguettes had no idea what the Germans were doing ( shit intel), had no way to disrupt the Heer's logistical forces and bomb panzer divisions head on ( shit BAI), and was totally dominated in the air.
If you seriously think giving them the WW2 equivalent of an A-10C can win them that war, I am dead.
I mean, it is coming up on Samhain, but that's not what I meant.


Airpower is the most important factor needed to win wars, militarily. This was reflected in WW2, sorta so in Vietnam, totally so in ME, sort sorta half-ish so in Syria, and is increasingly being desired in Ukraine.

CAS should only be committed after most, or preferably, every medium-range and onward aerial acquisition/targeting complexes is wiped out. You cant bust every BMP with a Strela rack but you can design a CAS plane that can tank one. But if you already neutralize the OpFor's air denial capability ( air force + air defense) you are operating freely anyway. Why risk putting expensive, manned CAS planes to strafe targets when you can call on obscurants to blind/retreat and release a SDB spam from an UCAV?
Because SDBs have a pretty large Danger Close range, and guns don't.
 
The Paris that surrendered, hence better than losing the war.

It's the same thing. Especially if you're Taiwan or something.

Paris was captured because it had nothing between it and Sedan, not because it didn't have A-10s. If there had been like 20 or 30 French battalions in the way the German Army probably would have been stopped for idk a week or so more, even if they were being bombed by Stukas.

The point is to illustrate that the positioning of a battalion is more important than the firepower available to it.

All deficits in a battalion's materiel, manpower, and munitions can be made up by yelling louder, but nobody can flap their arms fast enough to carry a BRU-61 bomb rack 150 miles in thrice as many seconds; nor can you walk fast enough to move a Bradley (on blocks) 50 miles south in time for the battle, no matter how strong of a burlak you are. Both are relevant to the problem and questions of 1940.

Positioning is everything in ground combat, and aviation is supreme in that sphere, because it can kind of just ignore this. Planes attack things that your battalions aren't in position to attack, or aren't in position to be attacked by, and the latter takes precedence over the former.

A battalion screaming for CAS is a battalion that is keeping the air battle planners from needing to allocate sorties to strike a regiment.

Because SDBs have a pretty large Danger Close range, and guns don't.

Danger close just means "get behind something". Cool guys don't look at explosions anyway.

Bradleys already have 25mm guns so it's fine and a Stormbreaker will actually kill an armored target too.
 
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Because SDBs have a pretty large Danger Close range, and guns don't.
And there has been efforts to rectify this already. SDB FLM would replace the steel casing ( frag out to 600m) with a new composite casing ( near-zero frag).
Plus danger close only matters when your line of fire is close to troops. If a commander wants to have 500kg JDAMs on his targets he would pop smokescreens from mortars and roll back to entrench. Then call fire. It's a pretty basic procedure, the problem is infantry overextending into ambushes. In which case, to cite myself: "insufficient overhead supppresion/recon" . In the end it's a tactical problem not a technological problem, and whether it's a gun or a bomb incoming it doesn't matter. You would probably already have a dozen guys dead from mines, pre-designated mortar caps, interlocking MG fires and stormtroopers flinging nades CS style on your position.
 
The gun exists for that nasty point in time when the choice is "lose some aircraft" or "lose the battle/war because the unit stopping the breakthrough to Kyiv was wiped out"

Do you want to have to send pilots into that? No. Will they go in anyways? Yes.
You are thinking wars are decided by one big breakthrough. In the modern era where dispersed formations are necessary, the front line is manned by a tiny fraction of the complete force.

There is one defense line, two defense line, three defense line and more are dug up every day. There is reserve platoon, company, battalion, division and army groups that can be thrown into the fight. Divisions and armies and fronts get encircled and destroyed, but the war goes on for years. If the defense is properly positioned, the war would not be over until the losing side basically run out of forces.

A breakthrough is also far more than the point. An unopposed small formation can not win the war, modern forces need fuel and ammo to fight. To successfully have operational effects you need a constant stream of fuel and ammo, and constant reinforcements to cover the flanks so that the supply line remains open. To defeat a breakthrough you can attack the supply, attack the reinforcements and attack the flanks instead of stopping the spear point. Case in point, some irregulars attacked the supply convoy to Kyiv and get it stuck in a traffic jam for 2 weeks so that the spear point run out of fuel before achieving objects and the defense recover from surprise resulting in the failure of the attack. The value of air power is also that it can attack at the most vulnerable part of the enemy, and only occasionally it is the spear point. The ability to attack everywhere also disrupts the enemy even if the enemy is not destroyed: having to disperse, no use roads, set up air defenses and so on all slow down movement just due to the existence of the air threat.

Also, collateral damage means little in stopping a breakthrough. If the spear point gets destroyed with the defense, there is no more threat. If a formation is being overrun, broken arrow the problem instead of gun runs. Frankly with modern firepower only infantry would close to danger close, while only vehicles have the mobility to force a breakthrough. Just bomb the vehicles.

Frankly non-specialized aircraft like hellfire fit Cessnas under conditions of air superiority can massively mess up mechanized attacks. Air superiority and suppression of air defense is what matters more, ground targets are no so tough as to demand very specialized attack platforms.
 
You are thinking wars are decided by one big breakthrough. In the modern era where dispersed formations are necessary, the front line is manned by a tiny fraction of the complete force.
France 1940.

Iraq 1991 and 2003.

Attackers broke through and reached the capital city effectively unopposed. War over.


A breakthrough is also far more than the point. An unopposed small formation can not win the war, modern forces need fuel and ammo to fight. To successfully have operational effects you need a constant stream of fuel and ammo, and constant reinforcements to cover the flanks so that the supply line remains open. To defeat a breakthrough you can attack the supply, attack the reinforcements and attack the flanks instead of stopping the spear point.
Depends entirely on the combat range of the vehicles. Tanks with a 300mile range on a load of fuel? They can raid anywhere within about 100 miles of their refueling point, fight and return, and the US did that in Iraq. Twice.


Also, collateral damage means little in stopping a breakthrough. If the spear point gets destroyed with the defense, there is no more threat. If a formation is being overrun, broken arrow the problem instead of gun runs. Frankly with modern firepower only infantry would close to danger close, while only vehicles have the mobility to force a breakthrough. Just bomb the vehicles.
I know you're referring to the last ditch request at Ia Drang from "We Were Soldiers," but "Broken Arrow" means something very different to me. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_nuclear_incident_terminology#Broken_Arrow

Gun runs are for a last ditch effort. They can be employed closer to friendly troops than any other weapon. Use up all the bombs and rockets onboard, roll in for gun runs. Especially if other aircraft are not on scene yet. They're a very specific niche weapon that I do not believe anyone is willing to go without.


Frankly non-specialized aircraft like hellfire fit Cessnas under conditions of air superiority can massively mess up mechanized attacks. Air superiority and suppression of air defense is what matters more, ground targets are no so tough as to demand very specialized attack platforms.
Air superiority and zero active air defenses around the target, sure.

The point here is to have something that can make the attacks even when there are active air defenses around the target.
 
France 1940.

Iraq 1991 and 2003.

Attackers broke through and reached the capital city effectively unopposed. War over.

It wasn't.

As Dunkirk was not a decisive victory and was the most important factor for the Nazis' eventual defeat in Western Europe, same with Operations Cycle and Aerial, while the French Army continued fighting on the continent well into June. The Iraqis in 1991 capitulated in 72 hours. The French also surrendered not because their capital city was taken (what? is this a Hearts of Iron game?) but because literal Nazi sympathizers couped Daladier's government, arrested him with his staff in Morocco, but only after the government had fled twice previously, and forced an armistice.

Because they were Nazis, obviously, is why Petain surrendered and Weygand despaired. Not because France was beaten. France was never beaten, it was merely put in a disadvantageous position, and France never capitulated in any true sense. The French civilian government were intending to fight on from North Africa until the Vichy collaborators captured them.

De Gaulle merely continued this fight from the colonies where Daladier failed, and as history shows us, eventually won.

Iraq in 1991 is accurate-ish. The Iraqis stopped the U.S. at Phase Line Bullet, though.

I would consider Syria in the Golan Heights to be more in the realm of such things. Iraq 2003 was decidedly not, as the U.S. was stopped multiple times on account of enemy resistance and simple weather. 3rd ID halted an assault near Karbala, was stopped temporarily in Baghdad too, and had a command post hit by ballistic missile, among other things.

At the moment it seems like "big breakthrough" efforts need to conducted to achieve "small advance", which is the worst of both worlds.

Heavy equipment, deep magazines, and lots of bodies are needed, none of which the West has today.

A-10s are not conductive to this sort of heavy attrition-based warfare. Too expensive to stockpile, too hard to maintain, too difficult to fly. Today resembles 1915's Western Front or 1951 Korea's stalemate, more than anything, which means you need things closer to munitions than manned attack aircraft.

A-10 would be excellent to sell to Colombia to fight the FARC, to India to fight the Maoists, or to Mexico to fight the cartels, though. That's the literal sort of wars it was built for.

Depends entirely on the combat range of the vehicles. Tanks with a 300mile range on a load of fuel? They can raid anywhere within about 100 miles of their refueling point, fight and return, and the US did that in Iraq. Twice.

These kinds of deep raids like the 95th Air Assault Brigade did are no longer possible in Ukraine. It mostly has to do with the proliferation of highly accurate and lethal anti-tank artillery systems like ZALA Lancet.

What shin_getter fails to grasp is that this is not some unanticipated problem or novel thing, it's just an extension of the anti-tank missile threat writ large that people have been troubling themselves with since 1973. It's merely a speed bump to the eventual ability of tanks to conduct major mechanized offensives again. They just need some teething periods dealing with the problem and may eventually use drones themselves to provide the necessary solutions.

They ain't going anywhere, neither are CAS aircraft (or perhaps more accurately, strike platforms), but they will both need to change.
 
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Attackers broke through and reached the capital city effectively unopposed. War over.
Tbh the one who deserves all the credit is USAF.
Now a Coalition ground force trying to march across Kuwait- with no F-16s or B-52s to bust all the tanks, Scuds, AD, and Iraqi bases with bomb runs- would have been interesting. The Iraqi army was fighting dispersed unwillingly, credit to Coalition airstrikes for destroying their attack aviation and enforcing segregration. Henceforth, the Iraqi lost concentration of forces and got defeated miserably, 73 Easting for example.
Ukraine, being an actual modern example of what a failed breakthrough looks like, points to the destruction of enemy logistical forces being pivotal for actually blunting one, and this is what Assault Breaker was trying to achieve. Certainly not sending A-10s to get swatted by PL-15s fired from 7km higher up.
They can raid anywhere within about 100 miles of their refueling point, fight and return, and the US did that in Iraq
Iraqi didn't have loitering munitions, MLRS-delivered minefields or offensive aviation capability at all.
You can monitor a refueling station with sat feeds and strike with TBMs accordingly. Which is extremely cheap these days. Arguably killing a MBT's logistical tail is easier than a fighter jet, because they operates in large groups and is fairly close to the FLOT which put them into the range of HALE UAVs or airborne GMTI radars. Certainly not a capability that exists outside of the United States yet.
They're a very specific niche weapon that I do not believe anyone is willing to go without.
Most Asian and African air forces would disagree.
In Phillipines the situation was handled by man-handling 105mm mountain guns into direct fire positions.
Most other militaries didn't seem to hesitate in pulling back troops into safezones or strike enemy concentrations at distance. Either with rockets or LGBs.
attacks even when there are active air defenses around the target
What constitutes "active air defenses" anyway?
Any target that could break through layers of operational LRPF systems and USAF offensive air to arrive at the FEBA en masse would have enough counter-air capability that even the Hog would be minced meat against them.
Any target that couldn't would dissolve into pockets of little resistance that would get melted by even a Super Tucano carrying LGBs or routed by tank battalions and creamed by strategic fires.

Honestly at this point you can slap an M134 pod on a MQ-8C, army-lized and fly them from a Valor with a datalink pod and it still would be CAS. The better solution is to convert existing AH-64s into drones tbh.

The ultimate modern CAS craft, designed to be survivable, attritable and lethal would look more like a Delilah or a Gray Wolf tbh. It should be powered by a cheap electric motor, travel within the subsonic regime, has an onboard navigation system that guides it safely to a killzone designated by that ISR UAS hovering above and loiters around looking for targets through a dual FOV FLIR turret and communicates with other assets through a local datalink that unifies targeting and IFF so that it doesn't hit a guy under mud or something. By its nature this missile would be LO-ish with no treatment; it has a cheap motor, foam composite construction and a COTS imager; and it would pack a 60mm mortar size warhead. Essentially what Kat Tsun stated above, though I shudder at the thought of CAS with AGM-129 swarms.
 
It wasn't.

As Dunkirk was not a decisive victory and was the most important factor for the Nazis' eventual defeat in Western Europe, same with Operations Cycle and Aerial, while the French Army continued fighting on the continent well into June. The Iraqis in 1991 capitulated in 72 hours. The French also surrendered not because their capital city was taken (what? is this a Hearts of Iron game?) but because literal Nazi sympathizers couped Daladier's government, arrested him with his staff in Morocco, but only after the government had fled twice previously, and forced an armistice.

Because they were Nazis, obviously, is why Petain surrendered and Weygand despaired. Not because France was beaten. France was never beaten, it was merely put in a disadvantageous position, and France never capitulated in any true sense. The French civilian government were intending to fight on from North Africa until the Vichy collaborators captured them.

De Gaulle merely continued this fight from the colonies where Daladier failed, and as history shows us, eventually won.
That's not the usual understanding of how France fell, they surrendered rather than let the Germans destroy Paris is the usual description.


Iraq in 1991 is accurate-ish. The Iraqis stopped the U.S. at Phase Line Bullet, though.

I would consider Syria in the Golan Heights to be more in the realm of such things. Iraq 2003 was decidedly not, as the U.S. was stopped multiple times on account of enemy resistance and simple weather. 3rd ID halted an assault near Karbala, was stopped temporarily in Baghdad too, and had a command post hit by ballistic missile, among other things.

At the moment it seems like "big breakthrough" efforts need to conducted to achieve "small advance", which is the worst of both worlds.

Heavy equipment, deep magazines, and lots of bodies are needed, none of which the West has today.

A-10s are not conductive to this sort of heavy attrition-based warfare. Too expensive to stockpile, too hard to maintain, too difficult to fly. Today resembles 1915's Western Front or 1951 Korea's stalemate, more than anything, which means you need things closer to munitions than manned attack aircraft.

A-10 would be excellent to sell to Colombia to fight the FARC, to India to fight the Maoists, or to Mexico to fight the cartels, though. That's the literal sort of wars it was built for.
Say what?

A-10s are designed around ease of maintenance (though could probably be improved a little) and easy to fly. They're so easy to fly that they're the first combat plane that doesn't have a dedicated 2-seat trainer version (beating the F-117 into service by a bit).

What you're wanting is something that is stored as a wooden round and uses NO maintenance efforts at all. If it can't be rearmed and sent back out immediately, just scrap it.

While I do expect that to be the Loyal Wingman for the next generation of CAS plane, I don't expect that to replace the CAS plane.



They ain't going anywhere, neither are CAS aircraft (or perhaps more accurately, strike platforms), but they will both need to change.
Agreed there. Tanks need APS development (including some very fast APS systems), and CAS/strike platforms need to go LO.
 
That's not the usual understanding of how France fell, they surrendered rather than let the Germans destroy Paris is the usual description.

I'll suggest you read Julian Jackson's The Fall of France. France never "surrendered", obviously, and the French government ran from Paris, to Tours, and then Bordeaux, and after arriving in Morocco to attempt to continue to fight the war from Africa, the gaggle of the Prime Minister's office were arrested by Vichy officials.

It was well established at the time that wars could be fought from colonies to retake the metropole. That's what Franco did. It's what the Dutch intended to do as well, until the Japanese scuppered those plans. Likewise the British would have fled to Canada or India had they lost the islands to the Nazis and continued the war from there.

Say what?

A-10s are designed around ease of maintenance (though could probably be improved a little) and easy to fly. They're so easy to fly that they're the first combat plane that doesn't have a dedicated 2-seat trainer version (beating the F-117 into service by a bit).

Yeah, which means it's really amazing how they don't achieve the necessary thresholds for XXI aircraft.

Well, not really, it's to be expected. The maintenance demands of A-10 are pretty rough: It's an order of magnitude higher than a MQ-9 and broadly comparable to F-16 in all areas. Maybe if it were a single engine aircraft it would be less demanding, or if it were more comparable to a Super Tweet in dimensions.

The engines and systems may not be terribly complex, at least by manned aircraft standards, but it's still very high in absolute terms.

What you're wanting is something that is stored as a wooden round and uses NO maintenance efforts at all. If it can't be rearmed and sent back out immediately, just scrap it.

LCAAT isn't a "wooden round" and A-10 isn't "basically no maintenance". A-10 requires something like a dozen ground crew. There are dozens of aircraft such as the PC-9, T-37, BAE Hawk, and L-39 that require less maintenance than A-10 to do the same job, America just doesn't use those aircraft. Other people do. The Germans and French used the Alpha Jet as an attack aircraft for decades. This would be pretty decent.

You want something that's slightly more difficult to maintain than a Predator drone. Because a Predator or Reaper can be airborne 3x more often than an A-10, with similar size ground crews, and less necessary maintenance.

While I do expect that to be the Loyal Wingman for the next generation of CAS plane, I don't expect that to replace the CAS plane.

The manned CAS aircraft of the future will be either B-21 or F-35, depending on what's available, and when it can be employed. Later, once an IADS has been rolled back, this can be expanded to the more conventional T-7/T-38, Super Tucano, F-16, F-15E, and F/A-18. Dedicated assault aviation will likely be MQ-9 and possibly Marine/Navy or Army LCAATs. The manned CAS aircraft is simply being sidelined in favor of the robotic CAS aircraft, while manned aircraft get shunted to the far more important BAI mission, until legacy aircraft can operate in theater without dying.

There will likely never be a dedicated, manned CAS aircraft built again in most peoples' lifetimes today. The closest you will get will be conversions of agricultural aviation or something like the AT-802, or armed trainers like the T-50 or T-7 conversions, because these are low maintenance enough and strong enough they can carry genuinely good payloads of weapons.

The force densities and types of targets the A-10 was supposed to engage simply went extinct nearly 30 years ago and are never to return.

This is not an aberration or some unusual twist of fate. It's a return to historic norms because A-10 was an odd aircraft with an odd role.
 
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I'll suggest you read Julian Jackson's The Fall of France.
Thank you for that, added to the list of books to read.

The manned CAS aircraft of the future will be either B-21 or F-35, depending on what's available, and when it can be employed. The manned CAS aircraft is simply being sidelined in favor of the robotic CAS aircraft, while manned aircraft get shunted to the far more important BAI mission.
Won't be the F-35, as it cannot wrangle drones due to lack of a back seater.

Hopefully the USAF removes head from ass about wanting the NGAD to be a single seater.



There will likely never be a dedicated manned CAS aircraft built again in most peoples' lifetimes today. The closest you will get will be conversions of agricultural aviation or something like the AT-802, because these are low maintenance enough and strong enough they can carry genuinely good support loads.

The force densities and types of targets the A-10 was supposed to engage simply went extinct nearly 30 years ago and are never to return.
China?
 
While I do expect that to be the Loyal Wingman for the next generation of CAS plane, I don't expect that to replace the CAS plane.
Arguably UCAVs can do the work of traditional manned CAS already. And by that manned CAS craft would evolve to become similar to the attack helicopter-survivable, operates close to the FLOT, but uses ALEs to deliver effects instead.
Something like Kiowa, or at least priced as much and no higher, would be more suited for that role than a semi-LO, re-engined A-10 tbh. The nature of non-permissive CAS demands both survivability and expenda-bility, since it is a high-risk, low-return mission ( already expressed in this topic before) and any platform designed specifically to do CAS would have to conform to these requirements.
A Kiowa is operated by US Army aviation, hence no Key West here. It's manned, so it can be equipped with ESM and IRCM to tackle barebone SAMs, or at least dash away or descend to low altitude to dodge them. It has large internal space for electronics and a team of operators, and so it can conduct CAS through drones and artillery more effectively. And, it's runway-independent, so it doesn't rely on tactical airbases situated at least a hundred klick inward.

I'm imagining something like a cheaper S-97 with large stub wings that can accomodate ALEs or rocket pods so as to deliver fire effects on call.

Alternatively, B-21 meets Boeing B1 gunship for the ultimate CAS.
Edit: spelling
 
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Won't be the F-35, as it cannot wrangle drones due to lack of a back seater.

Hopefully the USAF removes head from ass about wanting the NGAD to be a single seater.

All the more reason CAS should be done robotically, then a JTAC can control it with a tablet, like some of the more wild Small Unit Operations (SUO) and Future Combat Systems (FCS) ideas that were kicking around in the late '90's and early '00's.

LCAAT wants autonomous combat systems though so CAS control by ground may become as obsolete as talking down aircraft vice ILS.


The highest force density battles today have about a dozen tanks and IFVs together across a multi-kilometer front.
 
Arguably UCAVs can do the work of traditional manned CAS already. And by that manned CAS craft would evolve to become similar to the attack helicopter-survivable, operates close to the FLOT, but uses ALEs to deliver effects instead.
Something like Kiowa, or at least priced as much and no higher, would be more suited for that role than a semi-LO, re-engined A-10 tbh. The nature of non-permissive CAS demands both survivability and expenda-bility, since it is a high-risk, low-return mission ( already expressed in this topic before) and any platform designed specifically to do CAS would have to conform to these requirements.
A Kiowa is operated by US Army aviation, hence no Key West here. It's manned, so it can be equipped with ESM and IRCM to tackle barebone SAMs, or at least dash away or descend to low altitude to dodge them. It has large internal space for electronics and a team of operators, and so it can conduct CAS through drones and artillery more effectively. And, it's runway-independent, so it doesn't rely on tactical airbases situated at least a hundred klick inward.

I'm imagining something like a cheaper S-97 with large wings that can accomodate ALEs or large rocket pods so as to delicer fire effects on call.

Alternatively, B-21 meets Boeing B1 gunship for the ultimate CAS.
Edit: spelling
You do realize that a new build AH-64E Apache Guardian is $40mil, right?

An OH-58A Kiowa cost $6.7mil in 1990 dollars, that's $15.4mil in 2022 dollars, plus another ~$5mil for the basic equipment to be brought up to date (Based on Tunisia Kiowa sale price). Plus the cost of all the equipment you're going to have to shove into it to wrangle the drones.

Frankly, if you can get one for under $30mil, I will be shocked.

And that's incremental price, not including the development costs.
 
An OH-58A Kiowa cost $6.7mil in 1990 dollars, that's $15.4mil in 2022 dollars
15mil is enough for a cheap CAS heli lol.
You can build an Q-58 with the IWB replaced by a pod station and larger wings for hardpoints for below 10mil.
Besides first page of google says a Kiowa Warrior is priced around 6.7mil so idk. At least it's cheaper than an A-10.
Frankly, if you can get one for under $30mil, I will be shocked.
CR-500 costs around 5mil yuan, or approx 700k, but it's an UAV.
You can prolly get a Kiowa-class helicopter, fully updated and running, to run below 30mil if you produce it in quantity. Economy of scale combines with available OTS soft/hardwares. The main thing would be the electronic and protection suite. RWR and countermeasure gears to detect/dodge MANPADs and loitering munitions, a good radio set, a cheap DFOV FLIR, SATCOM and a datalink to fly in your own drones at minimum. Other sensors should be offboard to lower cost.
It would be below standard but imo at least it will hit that "below 30mil" cap.

Otherwise the need for a 1mil CAS drone becomes even more apparent.
 
You can prolly get a Kiowa-class helicopter, fully updated and running, to run below 30mil if you produce it in quantity. Economy of scale combines with available OTS soft/hardwares. The main thing would be the electronic and protection suite. RWR and countermeasure gears to detect/dodge MANPADs and loitering munitions, a good radio set, a cheap DFOV FLIR, SATCOM and a datalink to fly in your own drones at minimum. Other sensors should be offboard to lower cost.
That's where all the costs are. Systems, not airframe and engines!

Side note, you need a MMW radar for terrain following and obstacle avoidance in bad weather. Flying into power lines sucks. Not much point in a CAS plane that can only fly in the daytime and if the weather is good.
 
Side note, you need a MMW radar for terrain following and obstacle avoidance in bad weather. Flying into power lines sucks.
mmW for obstacles avoidance, sure. They are even available on cars, so theyre a pretty cheap and plentiful system.
TFR-wise, you can fly with a basic nav that flies on a pre-downloaded terrain map. Wiki calls it TERPROM, idk. But just having the pilot flies with visual/directional cues from his JHMCS, maybe occasionally checking the GPS terminal would be acceptable tbh. Russians fly Su-25 sorties with slapdash COTS GPS all day long and they dont seem to be particularly bothered by it.
 
mmW for obstacles avoidance, sure. They are even available on cars, so theyre a pretty cheap and plentiful system.
TFR-wise, you can fly with a basic nav that flies on a pre-downloaded terrain map. Wiki calls it TERPROM, idk. But just having the pilot flies with visual/directional cues from his JHMCS, maybe occasionally checking the GPS terminal would be acceptable tbh. Russians fly Su-25 sorties with slapdash COTS GPS all day long and they dont seem to be particularly bothered by it.
Not many high tension power lines at 250ft AGL in Ukraine. Western Europe? Korea? populated parts of China? You'd better believe it, and you do NOT want to hit a 250KV power line.

TERPROM also requires a very good map of the area. And nothing else in inventory uses TERPROM, so that is a unique system for the plane (= expensive).

While many aircraft use a TFR, not least of which the USAF Pave Hawks and Ospreys. More units in service, cheaper per unit.

Ground mapping radar gets off-loaded to what looks like a JASSM but has a big radar on each side and is recoverable. Basically the TACIT BLUE as a drone instead of a manned aircraft. Every 100km of front gets at least one. If I was being evil, every strike package gets one.

So you have a 2-seater aircraft that's your drone wrangler. (This may be doable as the V-280, or maybe that Compound Apache idea. A regular Apache or Kiowa is going to be too slow.) The overall package has a couple of VLO sensor platforms orbiting high to look for where to hit, one radar and one thermals (since they're JASSM sized they don't have the power to run both). Then you have your various drone bomb trucks available. Finally, the drone wrangler itself has guns for that last ditch option, at least 30x113mm, and ideally something with 30x173mm power. Maybe that Rhinemetall 30x250mm recoilless weirdness?
 
TERCOM combined with FLIR and NVGs seems viable enough for for manned aircraft doing radar-silent low-level penetration, the RAF planed to use of the GEC Spartan TRN for their original planned Mid-Life Update for the Tornado circa 1988.

Then the Gulf War and they switched to medium altitude and the scope of the MLU changed.
 
France 1940.

Iraq 1991 and 2003.
France lost all its armor, its air force, have collapsing front lines and no reserves whatsoever.

1991 did not involve spearhead anywhere near baghad. The Iraqi air force was crushed, all iraqi front line formations also crushed and pushed out of the strategic relevant location.

2003 Iraqi was defeated after its field armies were also defeated in detail.

Such defeats are not a battalion diving into the capital and thus the war is over, such defeats is where the defense was hopeless with the formal end of hostilities being close to the main body of the attacking force reaching the capital.

Also note that in all such defeats, the losing side have no effective air force by the end of it. You can insert what, 100, 1000 A-10s into these conflict in the last month of the war for the losing side and it wouldn't stop them from losing.

Attackers broke through and reached the capital city effectively unopposed. War over.
Napoleon thought the war would be over after Moscow too.

The 2nd Sino-Japanese war had Japan capture the Chinese capital Nanjing in 1937 and the war lasted until 1945 where Japan was defeated, where during 1937 to 1941 Chinese fights alone.

In the Chinese civil war, the Nationalists captured Communist's capital in 1934, the war got a ceasefire on 1937 due to Japanese invaion, the war resumes in 1946 and on 1949 Communists captures Nationalist capital in 1949 with the nationalists retreating to Taiwan. Neither sides surrenders and we have a frozen conflict here in 2023 due to defensible water barrier.

In the war of 1812, British forces burned down the White house in Washington DC in 1814. United States was not defeated. Conversely, every time the united states was defeated, none of it involve the opponent invading Washington DC.

The will to fight and the capacity to fight is what sustain wars. Capital cities are symbolic thus sometimes influences will the fight, but for many combatants it is not relevant. Ask how the Taliban manages to fight without a capital city.

Depends entirely on the combat range of the vehicles. Tanks with a 300mile range on a load of fuel? They can raid anywhere within about 100 miles of their refueling point, fight and return, and the US did that in Iraq. Twice.
100 miles is a huge problem if you are planning a defense of Singapore. 100 miles is nothing if Washington DC is thousands of kilometers of oceans away using your "national capital" theory of warfare.

The point here is to have something that can make the attacks even when there are active air defenses around the target.
Airplanes man, airplanes. In a world where armored vehicles don't have enough armor against infantry weapons, airplanes are hopeless.

Airplane's natural advantage is stored energy from speed and height of flight. Use it and use glide bombs and out range the threat at no cost.
 
Hmm, if we are to do CAS anyways, one should leverage modern developments in autonomous systems.

Need a gun, bring a gun

Need more stored kills and loiter? bring smaller bombs

Its drones all the way down~

FPV being used to target individual infantry means that precision, I mean, knock you on the head precision, strike for all human scale targets is economically feasible. Well, just bring in the slaughterbots

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-2tpwW0kmU

* can we have teh LX-700K liberator on an AC-130? please~ pretty please*
 
Hmm, if we are to do CAS anyways, one should leverage modern developments in autonomous systems.
We should, but the governmental contracting timeline is 5-10 years from "we would like to buy this" to "we are buying this." Legal timelines alone require a minimum 90 days from posting RFI to close of RFI, 6 months to think about information, 90 days from posting RFP to close of RFP, etc. That one cycle from posting RFI to close of first RFP is a full year. Now comes the development contracts. 4-9 years from award of developmental contracts to first flight. Fly-off of competing prototypes. Now there's a production contract award that will likely be appealed (there goes another year or more). 5+ years to get from flying prototype to flying production model. That just took a decade plus from first RFI to first production model flight.
 
The Germans and French used the Alpha Jet as an attack aircraft for decades. This would be pretty decent.

The Alpha Jet Lancier and KWS upgrades both look pretty cool, and yes cheaper than an A-10. Main benefit over the Hawk would have been the 2nd engine.

But surely they would have been death traps over Central Europe?!

alphajet_kws-jpg.68176


alpha-jet-lancier-dassault-jpg.14314


P.S. More discussion here https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/how-useless-were-the-luftwaffes-alpha-jets.33094/
 
Arguably UCAVs can do the work of traditional manned CAS already. And by that manned CAS craft would evolve to become similar to the attack helicopter-survivable, operates close to the FLOT, but uses ALEs to deliver effects instead.
Something like Kiowa, or at least priced as much and no higher, would be more suited for that role than a semi-LO, re-engined A-10 tbh. The nature of non-permissive CAS demands both survivability and expenda-bility, since it is a high-risk, low-return mission ( already expressed in this topic before) and any platform designed specifically to do CAS would have to conform to these requirements.
A Kiowa is operated by US Army aviation, hence no Key West here. It's manned, so it can be equipped with ESM and IRCM to tackle barebone SAMs, or at least dash away or descend to low altitude to dodge them. It has large internal space for electronics and a team of operators, and so it can conduct CAS through drones and artillery more effectively. And, it's runway-independent, so it doesn't rely on tactical airbases situated at least a hundred klick inward.

I'm imagining something like a cheaper S-97 with large stub wings that can accomodate ALEs or rocket pods so as to deliver fire effects on call.

Alternatively, B-21 meets Boeing B1 gunship for the ultimate CAS.
Edit: spelling
ALEs are OK to a point, but manned CAS is plenty survivable as is. UAS has significant limitations that preclude it from doing the roles that dedicated manned CAS platforms can do. I'd argue you need mass in both camps to fully satisfy all missions.


Also it's important to recognize that the A-10 had roles beyond CAS that stretched into the CSAR and FAC(A) space, unmanned platforms can't perform those missions. Another thing to add is that fixed wing aircraft are going to be superior in almost every way as a platform than a rotor-wing platform. The major issues being environmental performance, payload capacity, and loiter time.

LO for helicopters is a peculiar problem, and there's a reason the Army did not make a fuss about including them into either FLRAA or FARA. Per Army FMs, aviation is not an individual force. I'd find it unlikely that a bunch of ground joes aren't going to fix a MANPAD team or SPAA enough to limit their SA. Worse case scenario, reliance on modern CMs and standoff weapons like SPIKE and JAGM in teams is sufficient enough to deal in non-permissive environments.

I'd also strongly caution against removal of "dumb" weapons like guns and rockets. While not being a pinpoint precision weapon as compared to PGMs, they are a great weapon to immediately deal with a moving threat as soon as possible with the side-effect of removing stand off range. The B1B, or any fast jet runs into the issue of being so fast that they need pods to see ground targets. Pods provide a narrow view and don't provide as high resolution picture of battle. Being fast also comes in with the side effect of having limited re-attack capability. You can only make 1 pass, and if your bombs miss it'll take a longer amount of time than an A-10 to re-attack a target.

A great example of the problem is the B1B strike on COP Keating after the Battle of Kamdesh. USAF BDA found little damage done to the outpost after the bombing.
 
Absolutely yes? This is why CAS is the lowest priority/lowest importance air mission for air forces and theater commanders. The order of precedence of priorities for aviation is something like:

- Destruction of enemy nuclear strike means and reconnaissance-strike complexes.
- Protection of friendly nuclear and reconnaissance-strike complexes from enemy attack.
- Destruction of enemy fighter/bomber aircraft, assault aviation, and their operating bases ("offensive counter-air").
- Protection of ground troops and operating bases from enemy aviation/missile attacks ("defensive counter-air").
- Destruction of enemy ground troops massing for an offensive operation ("battlefield air interdiction").
- Protection of ground troops from enemy ground forces directly attacking them ("close air support").

More prosaically, if troops are being attacked, they have not been overrun, and if they have not been overrun, they are slowing the enemy's advance. This is a good thing. Troops in contact can either defeat an attack by themselves, with support of their own artillery and mortars, or if they don't, they die, and another battalion of a brigade will need to stop the enemy. This is to be expected in a major ground war.

If the enemy has to actually fight through a position in the first place, they have messed up somewhere, as major attacks tend to disrupt a defense before they begin, as was the case in Desert Storm. Those are the attacks where JSFs would need to engage ground (and, more importantly, air) targets the most, and I think the USAF defines that as "battlefield air interdiction" at best. More likely it would be tasking JSFs as part of a general defensive counter-air operation to blunt an enemy ground offensive, because it may not have enough JSFs in theater for them to do anything else, while the battlefield air interdiction may need to fall onto F-15Es and F-16s.

More to the point, infantrymen and tanks are easier to replace than fighter pilots and JSFs. The latter, because of their relative scarcities, are more important, and will likely need to be husbanded by theater commanders for committal to major operations, due to their absolute scarcity. Because the USAF isn't going to procure as many JSFs or B-21s as it says it needs, just like how it didn't procure as many ATFs or ATBs as it says it needs.

It's why a dedicated bomb delivery platform, cheaper than a helicopter gunship but faster than the same, is needed. This covers the "fire support gap" better than relying on a JSF and artillery alone, can be stockpiled in the numbers necessary to fight a major war (Russia has fired how many cruise missiles or some equivalent so far? 1,000? 2,000? More than the USN has in inventory, either way.), and be used in ways that will necessarily involve putting itself in dangerous positions that are not conductive to VLO mission planning, like being right on top of a Tor M2 or HQ-7 (e.g. Scott O'Grady or Package Q), and entirely impractical for legacy airframes like F-15/F-16 or A-10.

CAS is a high risk-low return mission, so it is a low priority for air forces. If there is to be tasking for CAS at all then, it needs a cheap aircraft, because it's too dangerous to risk a JSF, or even a helicopter gunship, doing. The cheap aircraft will look more like a large cruise missile than a ordinary bomber, because cruise missiles are disposable, while stealth bombers and helicopter gunships are not.

A robot plane like a Q-58 or Q-28 would achieve this quite well, without risking high value weapon complexes like JSF, for a reasonably low cost. Alternatively, increasing the capacities of artillery using fiber-optic guided missiles or long range reconnaissance-fire complexes like ZALA Lancet, NLOS-LS PAM, or AFATDS enabled HIMARS in brigade combat teams could work for substituting the JSF.

Russia seems to prefer the latter while the USAF is pursuing the former but for different (albeit similar) reasons. Since CAS in the American understanding requires rapidity of speed, only a turbofan powered system meet this at the moment, with a cruise speed in the mid-low subsonic regime. While FLRAA might offer some limited CAS capacities, it's not ready for combat and it won't be for a long time, while a robotic plane like the LCAAT can probably produce a functional CAS system in under 5 years.

The good thing about LCAAT's robot planes is that they're probably useful for more than just CAS.
While this is how the usaf sees things Is think that's backwards. No airforce has ever managed a strategic win, it has never happened. Airforces have managed some operational leval success (the us airforce war on the French road and rail network did minifully shorten ww2, the bombing campaign in Germany did not). but as the Luftwaffe showed in 1940 and every war since has shown, tactical level close air support is the most effective way an airforce can effect a war, because that is when it's actively being involved in a combined arms formation. As oposed to other roles a airforce can do, as thats when it's on its own (rather like infratry attacking without artillery or tanks).
Qute frankly a airforces doctrine order of priorities should be
1/2 air superiority
2/1 sead/dead
3 tactical/cas
4 operational/interdiction
5 strategic (comand and control targets sences no airforce has managed to miningfully damage a nation's warfighting ability)
 
Quite frankly a airforces doctrine order of priorities should be
1/2 air superiority
2/1 sead/dead
3 tactical/cas
4 operational/interdiction
5 strategic (command and control targets)
Is tactical/CAS better done by a dedicated air force aircraft? Or by small drones + armed reconnaissance helicopters operating right on the front line and immediately behind it (say 5-20 miles in depth), and backed by 155mm artillery and MLRS?

I think that’s part of the reason it’s so hard to justify a dedicated CAS aircraft. For interdiction in depth in high threat environments you need an expensive fighter, ideally with its own drones for reconnaissance and threat suppression.
 
Gotta remember that Close Air Support means that your air support is shooting into an active infantry/armor firefight. The enemy is in close contact with your troops. CAS is on top of the FEBA.

Battlefield Air Interdiction means the zoomies are flying well beyond the FEBA and are hitting things like POL dumps or marshalling points, bridges, etc.

CAS and BAI are two separate missions and take different abilities.


Is tactical/CAS better done by a dedicated air force aircraft? Or by small drones + armed reconnaissance helicopters operating right on the front line and immediately behind it (say 5-20 miles in depth), and backed by 155mm artillery and MLRS?
That is the $64mil question...

I suspect that the US Army is going to make do with the attack version of the V280 plus drones as their CAS source, whether it's really the best option or not.


I think that’s part of the reason it’s so hard to justify a dedicated CAS aircraft. For interdiction in depth in high threat environments you need an expensive fighter, ideally with its own drones for reconnaissance and threat suppression.
I mean, for interdiction the US has the F-35. It should be damn good at interdiction, that was the entire mission set it was designed for!
 
Conversely, Dunkirk was won, because there was remnants of a field army standing between the Hitlerite legions and the Western Allies.
I would hardly call Dunkirk a "win."
At best, Dunkirk was a well-ordered retreat.

Even if they evacuated most of the British and French troops, they were forced to abandon most of their tanks, trucks, artillery, etc. Factories in the British Commonwealth struggled for a couple of years to replace losses.

WALLIES definitely lacked sufficient air cover. Fairey Battles and BP Defiants suffered heavy losses over Dunkirk. My great uncle's Lysander squadron was stood down after a British biplane squadron got mauled over Dunkirk.

Sadly, many of the evacuated French soldiers were re-landed in Southern France where they were defeated a few weeks later.
 
I've got some really interesting 'back of the napkin' designs that I did some validation of in X-Plane, but they are from the 1940s. I also had a rather interesting design from the 1920s.

Today, I'd have to think about an unmanned drone capable of flying nap-of-the-earth, reaching speeds over 500 km/h and able to pull 12 gees, and enough endurance to fly a grid... have it lob a missile or bomb. There is still the issue of targeting, navigation and jamming. I'm not sure if a radar mounted on such a low flying fast moving platform would be sufficient to detect vehicles and navigation could be a challenge if it is flying so low.
 

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