Design a Close Air Support aircraft

Today, I'd have to think about an unmanned drone capable of flying nap-of-the-earth, reaching speeds over 500 km/h and able to pull 12 gees, and enough endurance to fly a grid... have it lob a missile or bomb. There is still the issue of targeting, navigation and jamming. I'm not sure if a radar mounted on such a low flying fast moving platform would be sufficient to detect vehicles and navigation could be a challenge if it is flying so low.
Honestly, these days I'd want to use a whole flight of drones. One super stealthy TACIT BLUE type for radar data (and optionally EO), a handful of drones that carry boom, and an as-stealthy-as-possible airborne quarterback with guns.

Given that a close support aircraft is talking about Army troops with the enemy within a couple hundred meters, some of the CAS aircraft need guns. My mental model has been that the Quarterback gets the guns, nothing else [edit] gets guns.

Edited for conceptual clarity.
 
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Just use spare F-35s and XQ-58s for fixed target CAS lol. Hand over the A-10 roles to the Army and FVL.

My ideal force mix is a combo of F401 A-16 and Cheyennes. A real missed opportunity.
 
Honestly, these days I'd want to use a whole flight of drones. One super stealthy TACIT BLUE type for radar data (and optionally EO), a handful of drones that carry boom, and an as-stealthy-as-possible airborne quarterback with guns.
Why would your gun-armed quarterback be designed with LO? It's supposed to get down in the weed anyway.
Given that a close support aircraft is talking about Army troops with the enemy within a couple hundred meters, some of the CAS aircraft need guns. My mental model has been that the Quarterback gets the guns, nothing else.
Agreed. I used to be a proponent of "just SDB it luz" but quellish words on the topic are very enlightening. But a 25mm is no-no for me except for the near-term investment. Maybe a turreted 30mm for multi-axis engagement on a single strafe... The pilot directs his gun through a HMS/DAS combination. Or true aerial artillery with a 90mm dual recoil tube spitting guided ramjet KE shells on FVL carriers. Maybe @jsport would know...
 
Why would your gun-armed quarterback be designed with LO? It's supposed to get down in the weed anyway.
Because most of the quarterback's weapons are honestly best from medium altitude, not from the weeds. APKWS, SDBs, JDAMs, etc. Gun is the last resort for when the enemy is way too close, as a function of the various danger-close distances.

Also, it may end up being an Army tiltrotor, which isn't easy to stealth.


Agreed. I used to be a proponent of "just SDB it luz" but quellish words on the topic are very enlightening. But a 25mm is no-no for me except for the near-term investment. Maybe a turreted 30mm for multi-axis engagement on a single strafe... The pilot directs his gun through a HMS/DAS combination. Or true aerial artillery with a 90mm dual recoil tube spitting guided ramjet KE shells on FVL carriers. Maybe @jsport would know...
Which gun depends on who owns the quarterback. If it's USAF, I expect it to be a 25mm gun. But if it's a US Army tiltrotor or helo, I expect it'd use the 30x113mm gun. For someone using Soviet/Chinese calibers, probably 30x165mm. Or maybe Rhinemetall finally gets their 30x250mm recoilless revolver cannon working.
 
Between extreme technological conservatives, and an inability for the government to assume risk, pilot cultural ego, and LSI government capture a standoff battery won't happen.
 
To be fair, there are concerns of things like a Cordis Die scenario occurring in real life, that is, someone managing to hack or backdoor ones drone fleets at a strategic level.
 
Between extreme technological conservatives, and an inability for the government to assume risk, pilot cultural ego, and LSI government capture a standoff battery won't happen.
You mean the CAS CCAs?

It's a way for the Army to take control of their close air support and take it away from the USAF. Army is already flying armed drones without the USAF losing its mind.

The F-35s get to do the Battlefield Air Interdiction and maybe the deeper interdiction strikes like they're designed for.
 
Because most of the quarterback's weapons are honestly best from medium altitude, not from the weeds. APKWS, SDBs, JDAMs, etc. Gun is the last resort for when the enemy is way too close, as a function of the various danger-close distances.
If, assumed, the primary operating environment for your "quarterback" will be at med alt, with specific conditions for the employment of gun strafe, and sensor, self analysis and comms fidelity are potent enough, I'd suggest going full VLO with an upsized X-47B toting full-on Boeing's IWB deployed airborne howitzer, true multifunction DEWs, off/defensive missiles and mini-drones ala super stealth AC-130.

Seriously though, your quarterback operates with a gun anyway, and the employment of a gun place severe limitations on the configuration and tactics of a CAS plane without some major breakthrough eg hyper accurate airborne mini SLRC. Maybe some basic shaping and (which is the opposite of as-much-as-possible in my understanding) like a blended, chined Scorpion with Supabug intakes.

Also, it may end up being an Army tiltrotor, which isn't easy to stealth.



Which gun depends on who owns the quarterback. If it's USAF, I expect it to be a 25mm gun. But if it's a US Army tiltrotor or helo, I expect it'd use the 30x113mm gun. For someone using Soviet/Chinese calibers, probably 30x165mm. Or maybe Rhinemetall finally gets their 30x250mm recoilless revolver cannon working.
I prefer the turreted M230 the most cuz it allows for easy off-axis engagement, removing the need for long reattack/orbit. A big wing A-16 with A-6E/F equivalent attack avionics, auto GCAS, DIRCM and a double sight/gun turret would've been evil to the Iraqis. Low speed accurate bomblet dropping and the agility/self defense necessary to escape most low level threat.
 
The aircraft requirement.
A manned CAS aircraft that is cheaper than the F-35 but can still operate in a high threat environment.

The design attributes
Subsonic, off the shelf engine, higher bypass ratio to provide good endurance, stealthy, good sensors, multiple small guided weapons.

I think the end result will be a F-35 cockpit fitted into a MQ-20 avenger. The internal fuel capacity will probably be halved due to fitting a pilot but it will still have 8 hours of endurance and 600+ nm combat radius. Operating at medium altitude about the height of manpads.

Weapons
I think the weapons are just as important for this aircraft.

Small diameter bomb provides a 250lb weapon for larger targets such as buildings, bunkers or tanks.

AGM-176 Griffin provide a small rapid response missile. Being tubed launched allows for great packaging into a stealthy frame.
 
Today, a 75-ton tank cannot feel confident on the battlefield, what kind of "high-threat work" are you talking about? A swarm of high-speed disposable or reusable drones will displace the entire army aviation
The most protected of modern Su-25 aircraft cannot use a cannon and shoots from a range of 10 km, it will only get worse

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Today, a 75-ton tank cannot feel confident on the battlefield, what kind of "high-threat work" are you talking about? A swarm of high-speed disposable or reusable drones will displace the entire army aviation
The most protected of modern Su-25 aircraft cannot use a cannon and shoots from a range of 10 km, it will only get worse
The point of a cannon is to have something with a 50m Danger Close range. So that you could have your CAS plane relatively safely BRRT a line parallel to your own troops and ~75-100m away.

Do I expect that to happen very often? Heck no, probably less than 1 mission in 100 would require the gun. But to not have a gun at all means you are abandoning those missions entirely.
 
The point of a cannon is to have something with a 50m Danger Close range. So that you could have your CAS plane relatively safely BRRT a line parallel to your own troops and ~75-100m away.

Do I expect that to happen very often? Heck no, probably less than 1 mission in 100 would require the gun. But to not have a gun at all means you are abandoning those missions entirely.
I would think the AGM-176 or 70mm guided rocket would do a better job and would work from medium altitude and outside the MANPAD threat
 
I would think the AGM-176 or 70mm guided rocket would do a better job and would work from medium altitude and outside the MANPAD threat
100m or larger danger close radius, not the tool for troops in close contact.

Again, it's a very specific task, that's probably very unlikely in general. But when you have troops in close contact with the enemy, you need a gun and not rockets or glide bombs.
 
I would think the AGM-176 or 70mm guided rocket would do a better job and would work from medium altitude and outside the MANPAD threat

The danger close distances for those weapons are much greater than a gun.
 
Not sure where to post this one, but it was prompted by the heated discussion on whether to keep/ditch or replace the A10 in the USAF.
Apart from the A10 the other main CAS purpose built aircraft in service is the Su25 Frogfoot.
The UK and France use fighter/bombers in this role.
The RAF set up No 38 Group with three squadrons to support the Army Strategic Reserve when it deployed. Initially these used Hunters. In 1968 Harriers and Phantoms replaced them. Jaguars took over from the Phantoms in the 70s. They soldiered on long after the Cold War ended and were replaced by Typhoons.
West Germany was the only NATO country to join Italy in buying new Fiat G91 ground attack planes. They developed support facilities to operate them away from airfields before the RAF did the same with Harrier.
After looking at the VAK191 vstol the Luftwaffe opted for the Alpha Jet. This small aircraft had bombs and rockets but not Mavericks.
The USAF A10s for NATO were based in the UK but were deployed to West Germany in forward locations. They worked closely with anti tank helicopters. Not just US Cobras and Apaches but also West German Bo105s.
The main role of NATO close air support was to kill Soviet armoured vehicles. To do this they had to counter Zsu sp aa and various SP and shoulder launched missiles.
The Maverick missile was the counter weapon.
Fast forward to the present day where potential opponents have capable fighters as well as ground based air defence. How can aircraft survive in this environment?
Long range stand off weapons have a crucial role but cannons still have a job to do. Speed rather than armour protection probably the best defence.
Typhoon and Rafale in Europe and F16/F35 for the USAF seem the main systems.

After that lengthy background time to design a close air support platform.

The weapons to be carried remain a mixture of missiles, bombs and guns. As big a payload as possible suggests a fuselage and wing with many hard points.

Reaction times have to be fast and the platform needs good awareness of the battlefield. A pilot still seems the best way of doing this until AI develops.

Survivability calls for speed and robustness. Weight penalties mean that compromises will be necessary.

So far we have a single seat aircraft with large load capability.

Do we stick with the F35 (replacing Typhoon and F16) or go to an updated AX competition?
Regarding how to replace the A10, I think the USAF had already made its choice in the 1980s.
Between this being a column on designing airplanes, let's not go into specifics on CAS tactics and weapons used, and get right to the solution:
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First of all, since the end of the Cold War due to technological advances, anti-tanks have gone in the direction of missiles and guided bombs, and there is no longer an emphasis on machine gun anti-tanks. So in this case, as a gun platform, the A-10 with a high aspect ratio flat wing has become almost useless at the end of the Cold War due to its slow speed and low survivability in front of the new generation of Soviet divisional air defense weapons (SA17 Grizzly, 2K6 Tunguska).

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USAF's next-generation CAS and shallow-depth attack aircraft of the late 1980s, the A-7F, first flew in '89 and used one F100-PW-220 engine and a 20mm Vulcan cannon.

This supersonic version of the A-7 attack aircraft can accelerate from 400 knots to 550 knots in 15 seconds with close to 8 tons of weapon mounted, has near-fighter acceleration, and can pull a high-speed 7g turn with a top speed of Mach 1.2. Its survivability against advanced Soviet divisional air defenses was far superior to the outdated A-10.

Ironically, as a more stable and powerful gun platform, it was the A-10's large-scale service that squeezed the Air Force's originally faster hard-hitting A-7D (with only a 20mm Vulcan gun) into the Air National Guard. Instead, the A-7F, an improved version of the A-7D, was used to replace the A-10 as precision-guided weapons rolled into service.

In a sense, the A-10 was the fighter that benefited the most from the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S. Army had expected to retire all A-10s with insufficient survivability in the early 1990s, but it was not expected that this aircraft, which has little survivability in modern warfare, would be able to survive to the present day, as it gained a reputation far above its weight by slaughtering Iraqi armored units with no air defenses and no air cover in the Gulf War.
 
In fact, through the various armored carriers that were eliminated on both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, you can see how horrific countless CAS technologies were developed at the end of the Cold War and how effective they were in actual combat, and how much these things have turned aircraft missiles into nothing more than a delivery platform.
And to be honest, the firepower and density of the armored units in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and even the anti-armor technology were far inferior to the epochal armaments that NATO used to counter the Soviet tactics of great depth assaults developed at the end of the Cold War, so if you want I can write some more relevant answers or short articles on the topic (maybe a couple of thousand words?).
 
Engine selection is very important. The USAF thought that an A-7 with more power to give a higher thrust to weight ratio would be a good replacement for the A-10.

The problem is the YA-7F used an engine with a lower bypass ratio. Bypass ratio is strongly linked to the fuel burn during subsonic cruise and this determines the range. The TF41 used in the A-7D had better fuel burn during cruise than the afterburning fighter jet engines. Fitting a larger diameter engine would require an expensive redesign of the entire aircraft. Fitting a longer engine with afterburner can be done more easily with a stretch as this has been done many times with various aircraft.

The perfect engine for a high performance CAS aircraft was available at the time. It was the GE F101. With it's medium bypass ratio of 2:1 it had very impressive fuel burn during cruise and gives the B-1B it's excellent subsonic range. Many enthusiasts look at the thrust to weight ratio of an engine when determining if it is good or not. A higher bypass ratio engine will be heavier for the same thrust level. If we look at the civilian airliners when they fit new engines these engines are heavier yet the aircraft gets a decent range boost due to the higher bypass ratio. This also applies to combat aircraft but it is rarely considered in fantasy fighter design.

The GE F101 is similar diameter to the F135 in the F-35. The F101 is a metre shorter and 25% lighter. The reason why it is shorter is because the F101 has a higher bypass ratio. The F101 without afterburner would make the perfect engine for a high subsonic 20,000lb empty weight CAS aircraft. The F101 with afterburner would make a perfect engine for a 25,000lb CAS aircraft that required moderate Mach 1.3-1.5 dash.
 
Between this being a column on designing airplanes, let's not go into specifics on CAS tactics and weapons used, and get right to the solution

I would argue tactics and weapons are central to any discussion of CAS, including designing an aircraft.
 
I would argue tactics and weapons are central to any discussion of CAS, including designing an aircraft.
Very much agreed here.

At least to discuss the weapons in terms of their Danger Close ranges.

"Close Air Support" means "Air Support when the enemy is very close to friendly troops." Which by definition means you need a weapon with a very small danger close range, on the order of 50m. 70mm rockets, even if laser guided, have a 100m danger close range, if not more. Hellfires have a 100-150m danger close range. The GAU-8 and GAU-12/22 have a 50m danger close range, the M61 has a ~65m danger close range. I think the M230 30x113mm on the Apache also has a 50m danger close range.

So whatever your CAS bird is (jet, helo, turboprop, tiltrotor, tilt-turbine... etc ad nauseam), it needs to have a gun for the actual Close Support. You wanna kill tanks you can use Hellfires or ALEs or APKWS or whatever.
 
mmW for obstacles avoidance, sure. They are even available on cars, so theyre a pretty cheap and plentiful system.
TFR-wise, you can fly with a basic nav that flies on a pre-downloaded terrain map. Wiki calls it TERPROM, idk. But just having the pilot flies with visual/directional cues from his JHMCS, maybe occasionally checking the GPS terminal would be acceptable tbh. Russians fly Su-25 sorties with slapdash COTS GPS all day long and they dont seem to be particularly bothered by it.

Not many high tension power lines at 250ft AGL in Ukraine. Western Europe? Korea? populated parts of China? You'd better believe it, and you do NOT want to hit a 250KV power line.

TERPROM also requires a very good map of the area. And nothing else in inventory uses TERPROM, so that is a unique system for the plane (= expensive).

While many aircraft use a TFR, not least of which the USAF Pave Hawks and Ospreys. More units in service, cheaper per unit.

Ground mapping radar gets off-loaded to what looks like a JASSM but has a big radar on each side and is recoverable. Basically the TACIT BLUE as a drone instead of a manned aircraft. Every 100km of front gets at least one. If I was being evil, every strike package gets one.

So you have a 2-seater aircraft that's your drone wrangler. (This may be doable as the V-280, or maybe that Compound Apache idea. A regular Apache or Kiowa is going to be too slow.) The overall package has a couple of VLO sensor platforms orbiting high to look for where to hit, one radar and one thermals (since they're JASSM sized they don't have the power to run both). Then you have your various drone bomb trucks available. Finally, the drone wrangler itself has guns for that last ditch option, at least 30x113mm, and ideally something with 30x173mm power. Maybe that Rhinemetall 30x250mm recoilless weirdness?

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DJXTR6Lcn0

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUEkRJzfRSg


Apparently TERPROM is used on the F-16 and Eurofighter and was going to be used on the A-16. It works like the manual mode of some terrain following systems. However most of what I read says it’s a limited capability, I don’t know how viable it is for an attack aircraft.
Aviation Week & Space Technology

April 17, 1989

Falcon Eye Flir, GEC Helmet Aid F-16 Mission Flexibility

BYLINE: WILLIAM B. SCOTT

SECTION: INTEGRATED AVIONICS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT; Vol. 130, No. 16; Pg. 35

LENGTH: 4597 words

DATELINE: FT. WORTH, TEX.



The Falcon Eye system was designed specifically for CAS/BAI and reconnaissance applications, while Lantirn is tailored for high-precision strikes and deep interdiction missions.

Having seen both systems demonstrated on low-altitude night flights, I believe Falcon Eye and Lantirn are not competitive, as some have suggested. Their capabilities differ significantly, and Lantirn costs about four times what Falcon Eye will.

The head-steered Flir of Falcon Eye adds an excellent degree of tactical flexibility and night situational awareness by allowing the pilot to look in any direction -- including directly above the aircraft. When augmented by digital terrain database and automatic target handoff systems, Falcon Eye greatly improves the chances of hitting a ground target on the first pass. It still requires a ground or airborne controller to identify the target location, however, and pilots run the relatively small risk of colliding with objects which may not be in the digital database during low-level terrain-following operations. The Falcon Eye system is expected to sell for about $ 1 million per aircraft.


Combining a navigation Flir, a dual field-of-view targeting Flir, terrain following radar, laser designator/rangefinder, and boresight correlator for automatic handoff of targets to Maverick missiles, the two-pod Lantirn system is designed for autonomous operations deep in enemy territory. It will be employed most effectively against high-value tactical targets rather than in support of Army ground units. Although the Falcon Eye Flir affords improved situational awareness, it lacks the degree of targeting sophistication and terrain following capability available with the Lantirn system.

The Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Systems Command currently are defining requirements and evaluating cost, schedule, performance and risk tradeoffs for a low-cost, head-steerable Flir that will meet CAS/BAI mission criteria in the mid-1990s. When released to industry, these requirements probably will differ substantially from the ones that launched the Lantirn program.

If a system like Falcon Eye eventually reaches the field, it probably will be installed in modified F-16s (or A-16s) and A-10s also configured with target handoff systems. These aircraft would be dedicated to CAS/BAI missions, and would not be assigned to Lantirn-equipped units, according to officers at TAC headquarters.

Contractor and Air Force officials also noted that pod-type Flir systems cannot be ruled out as cost-effective candidates for improving the night navigational and attack capabilities of tactical aircraft. Martin Marietta and Westinghouse both have assured TAC that head-steered Flir capabilities can be incorporated into their proposals, which probably will include pod-type systems.

Jon S. Beesley, a General Dynamics experimental test pilot, occupied the front seat for the Aviation Week demonstration flight. He was equipped with GEC Avionics Cat's Eyes night vision goggles, which ensured an independent non-Flir system was available to enhance the pilot's visibility during our low-level flight over west Texas. The Cat's Eyes advanced prism goggles are a key element of the Marine Corps' Harrier 2 night-attack system suite -- particularly for improved situational awareness during low-level flight -- and are being evaluated by the Falcon Eye team for similar applications (AW&ST Aug. 8, 1988, p. 34).

Normally, Beesley's out-of-cockpit view would have been augmented by a Flir image projected on the head-up display (HUD). The Flir information is provided by a Martin Marietta Pathfinder pod mounted on the F-16's engine inlet, and is routinely used as an added safety measure on these flights. An erroneous switch configuration in the F-16 testbed prevented the Pathfinder's operation on our flight, however. Both the Pathfinder and the GEC Avionics Atlantic Flir pods have been evaluated during the program and have been ''very reliable,'' General Dynamics officials said. Postflight maintenance checks of the Pathfinder confirmed it was operational.

With a full moon and clear skies for our flight, Beesley elected to continue with only the goggles, noting that the light intensifier devices presented an excellent view of the outside world. If it had been an overcast or moonless night, the Pathfinder Flir image -- projected on the HUD -- would have been essential for safe flight. General Dynamics has routinely flown with independent night vision systems in the front and rear cockpits during the Falcon Eye development effort.

In the back seat, I was fitted with the GEC Avionics helmet-mounted display (HMD), which projected biocular Flir imagery and HUD-type, stroke-written symbology on two small combiner glasses mounted directly in front of my eyes. Both displays present the same beamsplit image derived from a single, 1-in. cathode ray tube in the helmet's optics.

The display system adds 15 oz. of head-supported weight, but its center of gravity is far enough back that the helmet still feels well balanced. I found it quite comfortable up to the 4-5g maximum we pulled during the demonstration flight. In contrast, night vision goggles add about 1.5 lb. and are suspended from the front of the helmet, which tends to increase pilot fatigue.

LONG FITTING PROCESS It had taken Mitch L. Snyder, a General Dynamics avionics engineer, about 2 hr. to adjust the helmet and optics to fit me, ensuring the projected Flir images and symbology were clearly visible in the lower one-third of each display. Fitting the helmet system to a variety of people has presented a significant challenge to the development team, often taking up to 4 hr. of repeated modifications to get a proper fit. A full-scale development version will have more adjustments built in and will use form-fit helmets.

A Honeywell helmet-mounted sight (HMS) consisting of a magnetic sensor affixed to the helmet and another attached to the canopy's inner surface provided head position data to the Flir steering system. When I moved my head from left to right or up and down, a Texas Instruments Flir sensor mounted on the F-16 upper fuselage directly in front of the canopy followed my head movements. Output signals from the rotating sensor were processed and presented on the eyepieces as an infrared video image of the outside scene.

The Flir sensor is built into a 5-in. ball mounted on a three-axis, gimbaled turret on top of the aircraft nose just left of the centerline. This turret allows the sensor to slew in azimuth, elevation and tilt (roll) while maintaining a horizon-stabilized image. Two-axis helmet-mounted systems -- such as those used on some helicopters -- cause the Flir horizon to tilt when the pilot leans to one side or the other. This was deemed unacceptable for fighter-type aircraft, which dictated that the Falcon Eye Flir have three-axis stabilization.

The sensor ball extends in a fixed-periscope fashion a few inches above the aircraft skin, positioned on top of a Plessey-built optics assembly. It is controlled by two line replaceable units (LRUs) buried in the forward fuselage. A power supply in the ammunition bay completes the three-unit prototype Flir system. A full-scale development version would be repackaged into two LRUs that would occupy space made available by elimination of the F-16 electronic component assembly (ECA). This unit converts pneumatic pressures to electronic signals in F-16s having analog flight control systems, but is deleted in Block 40 and subsequent aircraft equipped with digital flight control computers. In pre-Block 40 aircraft, the ECA could be relocated to make room for a retrofitted Falcon Eye sensor assembly, according to General Dynamics officials.

The helmet-mounted sight and Flir sensor systems were coordinated very well, allowing rapid head movement without any discernible lag or image instability. Once the helmet was boresighted -- about a 30-sec. process performed before each flight -- the outside world registered on a one-to-one basis with the Flir image of that scene. The helmet-mounted Flir provided a field of regard close to what a pilot would experience during daytime flight. Rotating my head, I easily could see most of the left wingtip missile, the forward end of the right missile and as far up as I could comfortably tilt my head back. This covered an area +- 165 deg. in azimuth and an elevation range from 72 deg. up to 32 deg. down, and about +- 20 deg. in roll (head tilt to each side). Because the sensor is mounted to the left of centerline, downward vision is better to the left than the right.

FRONT SEAT VIEW The Flir sensor's position provided a unique perspective -- a clear view of the nose-mounted pitot boom and everything directly in front of the aircraft. Even though I was in the rear seat, I was afforded the same forward sight picture as the front seat pilot enjoyed.

Our F-16B was the second B-model built in the late 1970s and had been repeatedly modified for flight test work. As a result, its configuration was well-suited for development testing, but was not representative of today's operational F-16 fleet. It also had been modified further with systems tailored for CAS/BAI evaluations. These included:

-- A British Aerospace terrain profile matching (Terprom) navigation system. The digital terrain database for our flight contained all natural and man-made cultural features, including elevation information, for an 80 80-km. area of west Texas.

Linked with real-time radar altimeter data, this system is capable of providing covert terrain following guidance, predictive ground proximity information, and passive ranging to a known target location (AW&ST May 4, 1987, p. 85). By matching radar altimeter data of actual terrain features below the aircraft with profiles of the same terrain stored in the digital database, this system provides accurate navigation information, as well as target or waypoint location.

Terprom was integrated with the F-16's fire control computer to present a terrain-following box on the HUD and Falcon Eye displays. Manual terrain following proved to be a simple task of flying the aircraft to keep the flight path marker in the box -- exactly how Lantirn manual terrain following is flown.

-- A Rockwell-Collins automatic target handoff system (ATHS). Information about target location and type can be sent from a ground-based or airborne forward air controller, an airborne scout helicopter or Army ground forces over a data link to the F-16. Digital information is transmitted as a brief burst over standard military ultra or very high frequency radio channels, then is loaded automatically into the F-16's fire control computer. Target location is represented as a small square -- called the target designator or TD box -- in the HUD or helmet mounted display symbology. The type of target, such as ''armor,'' is displayed in the lower left area of the HUD. The Army is installing ATHS units in its McDonnell Douglas AH-64A Apache and Bell OH-58D helicopters, and the system is being evaluated now for CAS applications on the AFTI F-16 at Edwards AFB (AW&ST Nov. 7, 1988, p. 51).

-- Low-light-level television (L3TV). Although intended to be an integral part of the Falcon Eye concept, General Dynamics' development team has had disappointing results with three out of four low-light systems tested so far. In theory, a night-capable TV image displayed on the HUD would compensate for Flir degradation when athermal (uniform temperature) conditions and high atmospheric moisture content prevail. The fourth low-light TV system -- now under evaluation -- is offering ''encouraging results,'' Lydick said. For the Aviation Week demonstration flight, a low-light-level TV system was not installed.

-- Modification of the cockpit lighting controls for use with night vision goggles. General Dynamics adopted a simple approach to the NVG/cockpit night lighting compatibility problem -- turn the lights off when inside information is of secondary interest. Cockpit lighting levels are adjusted before flight, then a modified lighting control panel is set up to activate a push-button switch at the base of the pilot's sidestick control. Pressing this switch with the small finger of his right hand, the pilot toggles the cockpit lights on or off. This philosophy holds that most data required for night flight are on the HUD or helmet display, and in-cockpit fuel or system checks require only an occasional brief update. For these, the lights are momentarily turned on. Otherwise, the cockpit is kept essentially dark, which also reduces the chances of being detected by other aircraft or ground-based low-light systems, according to Joseph W. (Joe Bill) Dryden, Jr., senior experimental test pilot for General Dynamics.

The night Beesley and I flew, the air was clear and cold following an unusual six-day stretch of rain and fog in the Dallas/Ft. Worth area. As a result, the ground, trees and man-made objects were ''cold soaked,'' creating athermal conditions that are considered less than optimum for Flir operation.

While we waited for takeoff clearance at the Carswell AFB, Tex., runway adjoining General Dynamics' production facility, I tried to find and track aircraft in the area with the helmet-mounted Flir and display system. A Cessna Citation and a Navy F-4 were readily identified by the shape of their Flir images as they approached the field for landing. Switching to narrow field of view provided a 5.6 magnification that proved very effective in quickly checking an airborne ''hot spot'' first detected in wide field of view. This wide-to-narrow field of view switching technique -- accomplished by pressing the throttle-mounted UHF/VHF radio button inboard -- later proved quite effective at locating ground targets, as well.

DEVELOPING TRACKING TECHNIQUE On takeoff roll, I could see the runway -- marked with tire skid strips -- race toward us and disappear under the nose, giving the impression I was sitting in the front cockpit. The forward perspective of the Flir display is very close to what the pilot normally experiences visually and is more natural than that presented by the Lantirn navigation Flir. The Lantirn image, derived from a pod mounted under the engine inlet, presents an eye-position perspective about 4 ft. above the ground. Once airborne, Beesley set the Terprom's terrain following set clearance plane to 1,000 ft. and turned west. My Flir picture appeared too bright after takeoff, so Beesley selected a gray scale pattern for display along the bottom of the Flir sight picture, allowing me to adjust brightness and contrast for the best image. He also suggested deleting HUD-type symbology from the helmet display to assess the Flir image better.

After reinstating the symbology, my attempts to locate and track ground vehicles on Interstate 20 and other aircraft in the area with the helmet-mounted display produced mixed results. Tracking required controlled head movement to keep the vehicles under the display's crosshair symbol, Beesley said. This took some adaptation, since humans typically turn their heads to bring a target into view, then perform the fine tracking by moving only their eyes.

I found head-tracking easier if it could be done as a slow, steady movement, keeping a constant rate going. Holding the aiming cross stable enough to simulate designating a target was not a trivial task, especially in narrow field of view. The key, I found, was to concentrate on making corrections through slow head movements, preferably as a steady, continuous motion in one direction.

The Terprom system quickly self-adjusted its navigation confidence factor to level K1 (K0 being the best possible on a 0-9 scale) after having drifted to a K5 level while we had waited to take off. Its accuracy was confirmed at our first steerpoint, a dam on the Brazos River.

As Beesley descended to 500 ft. altitude, I located the dam in the Flir's wide-field-of-view image by looking for the target designator (TD) box symbol, turning my head to place the box near the center of my display, then going to narrow field of view. The Terprom-directed target box was just slightly above the right end of the dam. Beesley said the terrain matching system's accuracy was good enough to attack any desired corner of the dam, even if the target remained hidden until the last few seconds on run-in.

Turning toward our next steerpoint, the terrain-following box -- also driven by the Terprom system -- continued to provide smooth vertical guidance cues, even in a 70-deg. bank. Although holding bank or pitch angles above 30 deg. for an extended period of time will ''starve'' the terrain correlation process of radar altimeter data, the system will continue to provide reliable TF and navigation for about 5-6 min. before it starts to decrease its confidence factor.

At one point, Beesley demonstrated Terprom's ground proximity warning feature by pulling up, rolling inverted and pulling the nose gently toward the ground. The system continuously predicted our flight path, and displayed a ''LO TF'' warning when we descended below 75% of the set clearance plane altitude. An attention-getting large ''X'' flashed across my Flir display (and the HUD) when Terprom demanded a 2g pull-up to avoid dropping below 50% of the set clearance plane.

The only real anomaly I saw on the HMD during the entire flight occurred during this inverted maneuver. My Flir image slowly brightened for no apparent reason, then gradually returned to its previous balance of brightness/contrast after we completed the demonstration point. Neither the General Dynamics pilots nor engineers had seen this before, and no explanation for it was available in the post-flight review.

All terrain proximity warnings were based on knowing our position accurately, then comparing the flight path with terrain elevation information stored in the Terprom database, even when radar altimeter data was not available during inverted flight. Towers and other obstacles in our flight path would cause ''OBST'' and ''NO TURN'' alerts to flash on my display, whether I was looking to the side or directly ahead of the aircraft.

ACCURATE GUIDANCE The Terprom system proved to be quite reliable, although it is limited by the accuracy of information stored in its database. If a new tower or construction crane had been erected since the last database update, we would have received no indication of its presence. For the majority of tactical situations, however, Terprom -- or another digital terrain system -- would be an excellent mission aid for navigation, targeting and terrain avoidance, especially for aircraft not equipped with sophisticated Lantirn-like TF radars.

The locations of navigation turn points (stored in the flight control computer) were identified by the TD box on my HMD as soon as Beesley selected them. Finding these points was a matter of turning my head until the box appeared, then pulling the aircraft nose to the heading seen at the top of my display. One waypoint, a truck stop along Interstate 20, was depicted so accurately that the TD box overlayed the facility's large road sign visible in the Flir image. Being able to look in any direction and see terrain and man-made objects in the night provided a situational awareness that closely approximated that of daytime visual flight. This and other head-steered Flir advantages were most apparent when we started making simulated attacks on a bridge, dam and vehicle targets. The dam and bridge target locations were loaded into the F-16's computer before takeoff. Beesley selected them on the fire control/navigation panel (FCNP), offset about 60 deg. from a straight-in track to the target, and asked me to verbally guide him to the TD box. As we turned inbound, the box was positioned just below the top of a ridge until we got close enough to see the bridge, which had been hidden behind the hill. Beesley had selected a continuously computed impact point (CCIP) weapons delivery mode, enabling him to place the pipper over the bridge as soon as it came into view on the HUD. The simulated bomb delivery was made with ranging data computed by Terprom; the radar -- which normally, provides range information -- was in standby mode.

Slight turbulence at low altitudes made tracking the targets with the helmet-mounted display more difficult, but still well within a pilot's capability. The ability to keep the target in view, even off-axis, allowed day-type delivery tactics to be used without hesitation.

For example, our attack run on the Possum Kingdom dam involved an offset pop-up maneuver typical of daytime tactics. Beesley flew at a TF altitude of 200 ft. until we were 4 naut. mi. from the dam, then started a climb and turn to our offset heading, about 30 deg. from the run-in line. Looking to my left, I found the target in my display, switched to narrow field of view for a brief, closer look, and directed Beesley to turn toward the target. Once the TD box was visible in his HUD display, he completed the attack in CCIP.

While setting up for CAS-type attacks, Beesley spotted two transports flying in formation several miles away and directed me to them. I saw them as two ''hot spots'' in wide field of view, switched to the ''zoomed'' narrow view, and could identify them as C-130s by their Flir image against the cold sky. Finding other aircraft at night -- without their position lights on -- is another obvious advantage of a head-steered Flir.

Our CAS targets were three personal vehicle-sized vans General Dynamics had outfitted with propane-heated surfaces to simulate the thermal signature of an M-60 tank. We contacted the vans -- call sign ''Roadshow'' -- and told them we were making our first pass. Roadshow was in position and was ready to upload their coordinates through the automatic target handoff system.

ACQUIRING TARGET Beesley then ''digitally'' requested their position by activating a mode select button on the properly-configured FCNP, which commanded ATHS to transmit the digital message: ''F-16 ON STATION, SEND TARGET.'' About a 1-sec. ''squelch'' tone could be heard over the intercom when the message was trans- mitted. It was answered immediately by a second tone, alerting us that target coordinates had been transferred to the F-16's fire control computer. The word ''ARMOR'' appeared in the lower left corner of my Flir/symbology display, as did a distance of 15 naut. mi. in the right corner. Beesley said, ''That replaced a very long series of events that used to be done by voice. Now, we know the coordinates of our targets, what type they are, and how far away they are.'' Turning my head left and right, I found the TD box marking the vans' location, and Beesley switched my Flir polarity to ''white hot'' so the hottest objects appeared lighter than the background. Experience has shown that the human eye is most proficient at picking light objects out of a darker background. Three miles from the target, I switched to narrow field of view -- still in white hot polarity -- and immediately saw three equal-sized hot spots in a line-abreast pattern. Beesley flew to the TD box location but never saw the vans with his night vision goggles until we passed over them.

As the targets went under our wing, I realized I was trying to stretch and look over the canopy rail when the aircraft fuselage appeared in the bottom of my Flir image. The sense of realism offered by the Flir display, coupled with the freedom to look in any direction, spoke well for how the head-steered system had been mechanized. Normal flight tasks soon became almost as routine as they would be in the daylight as I became accustomed to the Flir display.

We made several more attacks on the simulated tanks, approaching from different directions, from behind masking terrain, offset left and right, and making arcing approaches. Offset maneuvers allow a pilot to place the target about 30-45 deg. to his right or left, pull up in a standard pop-up, then roll in to put the pipper on target. The off-axis helmet display allowed me to keep the targets in sight throughout the maneuver, tracking them by looking up through the top of the canopy during roll-in.

Pod-type Flir systems such as Lantirn require pilots to make straight-ahead pop-ups, roll inverted and pull the nose down until the target comes into view, then roll back to an upright, descending attitude for weapons delivery. This tactic works well, but requires flying directly at a target, losing sight of it during the pop-up, and rolling inverted while relatively close to the terrain. The offset maneuver with Falcon Eye allows a pilot to keep his target in sight throughout the pop-up and roll-in, and avoids inverted maneuvers at low altitude. It is typical of standard daytime conventional weapons delivery tactics.

On each attack, Roadshow would transmit target update information over the ATHS, refining TD box placement over the targets' location. I was able to detect the targets about 4 naut. mi. away, switching between wide and narrow field of view. With night vision goggles, Beesley could pick out the targets at about 1 naut. mi. if the moonlight was hitting the vans at the proper angle, but was hampered by the goggles only having a single field of view.

I typically located the TD box in wide field of view, centered it in my display, then switched briefly to narrow field of view to actually detect the individual targets and relay their position relative to the TD box to Beesley for the attack. He normally simulated deliveries in CCIP mode, using Terprom data for ranging. Our run-in angle to the target determined how effectively I could head-track the vans. If they were about 45-90 deg. to left or right, it was more difficult to track them until we turned inbound. Being able to designate their location and lock the TD box on specific targets should simplify head-steered tracking and deliveries.

Returning to Carswell AFB, Beesley suggested I look at downtown Ft. Worth to assess the Flir image of large, clustered buildings on an athermal night. I found that the city's bright lights overpowered the Flir image and were mildly disorienting, even when I adjusted the brightness and contrast or switched between black and white hot polarity. It seemed that my eyes could not decide which image to concentrate on -- the Flir picture or the actual light-illuminated scene.

My view of the approach and landing was not a lot different than it would have appeared in the daylight. The Flir sensor position is so close to the pilot's eye position that the runways, lights, flare height and attitudes looked very natural. This may be considered a minor difference when compared to the image presented by a pod-mounted Flir -- which causes pilots to start a flare too high at times -- but reinforces the desirability of having a Flir sensor near the pilot's eye level if night, blacked-out landings ever are required for tactical reasons.

The Falcon Eye system is a significant technological and systems integration step that could open the night to effective CAS/BAI missions. Since Army operational doctrines are dominated more and more by night maneuvers, the Air Force must adapt its capabilities to provide close air support around the clock. Systems like Falcon Eye can provide an extra measure of flexibility that should give new confidence to the Army commander in desperate need of timely, accurate firepower from the air.
 
Apparently TERPROM is used on the F-16 and Eurofighter and was going to be used on the A-16. It works like the manual mode of some terrain following systems. However most of what I read says it’s a limited capability, I don’t know how viable it is for an attack aircraft.
Huh. Had no clue.

So it's available, but I want something that can see to dodge large trees and power lines at 300+ knots without costing an arm and a leg. Okay, maybe 200 knots for the minimum capability and 300+ for goal capability.

USMC version is definitely going to be doing 350-400 knots while dodging trees and power lines.

It still requires obscenely high resolution maps of the area you're playing in. Details like distance between the bottom of the wires as they sag and the terrain. Distance between telephone poles, and the wire sag there. Distance between the top of the fences at the edge of the field and the bottom of the wires at max sag. Basically, cropduster bullshit level of details, all over the world.
 
Very much agreed here.

At least to discuss the weapons in terms of their Danger Close ranges.

"Close Air Support" means "Air Support when the enemy is very close to friendly troops." Which by definition means you need a weapon with a very small danger close range, on the order of 50m. 70mm rockets, even if laser guided, have a 100m danger close range, if not more. Hellfires have a 100-150m danger close range. The GAU-8 and GAU-12/22 have a 50m danger close range, the M61 has a ~65m danger close range. I think the M230 30x113mm on the Apache also has a 50m danger close range.

So whatever your CAS bird is (jet, helo, turboprop, tiltrotor, tilt-turbine... etc ad nauseam), it needs to have a gun for the actual Close Support. You wanna kill tanks you can use Hellfires or ALEs or APKWS or whatever.

This is a misconception that keeps on being repeated. Overall, the GAU-8 does not have a 50m danger close range.

As per Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs), danger close counts as being within 0.1% PI (probability of incapacitation) range. All numbers are calculated assuming a prone man on a line perpendicular to the line of flight.

As per these charts, "danger close" of 0.1% PI is 150 meters for the GAU-8 with the 10% PI range being 100 meters.

The same charts give a 100m 0.1% PI for the AGM-65 with a 25m 10% PI.

Meanwhile, while they aren't yet in the catalogs, I've seen precision thermobaric munitions (and prefragmented) being advertised at trade shows with a 0.1% PI of well under 50m.

Just think of the Switchblade 300. I don't know official numbers, but it basically requires a direct hit on the target for better or worse.

DangerClose.png

APKWS has been advertised as providing "90% reduction in Surface Danger Zone", but more realistically, it's just a matter of giving them a new warhead.

"Maj. Travis Burton, the 40th FTS A-10 pilot who performed the APKWS tests. "In improving rocket accuracy by several orders of magnitude, the APKWS makes the rocket a better weapon for today's low intensity conflicts, where minimizing collateral damage is a top priority.""

"For the final sortie, two armed, guided rockets were fired at a surface target at altitudes of 10,000 and 15,000 feet. The last APKWS shot was fired into a 70-knot headwind and impacted the target within the two-meter requirement specifications."

"We watched real-time video of the test at the central control facility when the rocket hit within inches of the laser spot," he said."

"This is a lighter weapon with a smaller warhead that can potentially minimize collateral damage," he said. "We've added precision guidance; and based on our tests, we're within inches of the intended target. We don't have a precision weapon out there now that can do that."

The accuracy is certainly there and a 100m danger close range would be solely due to old-fashioned fragmentation warheads which is an easy problem to fix.

There are a lot of other tiny air-launched pgm's entering the market (Hatchet, Shryke, SB300, etc.). The future of danger close air support is 100% PGMs and not guns.
 
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Alright, so where the hell did that number come from? I got it on this forum!

JFIRE, which is what is actually used for CAS. JMEM is not. JMEM may be used as input into JFIRE in some cases, but JFIRE is what those calling in CAS actually use. JFIRE takes into account many more factors than JMEM does like the platform employing the weapon etc.
 
JFIRE, which is what is actually used for CAS. JMEM is not. JMEM may be used as input into JFIRE in some cases, but JFIRE is what those calling in CAS actually use. JFIRE takes into account many more factors than JMEM does like the platform employing the weapon etc.

So, this?

JFIRE.png

It really doesn't give much details on methodology.

"Warning: The risk-estimate distances listed in Tables 33 and 34 are highly generalized and are valid only for the conditions specified in the assumptions spreadsheet on the ALSA classified website http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/jfire. Any change to these assumptions may significantly increase the risk-estimate distances. "

I also don't see where the numbers for APKWS come from. Still, interesting.
 
Sword missiles and sword drones shall do the job~

(ok, maybe just warheads that works like offensive grenades)
 

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I also don't see where the numbers for APKWS come from.
Same line as the 2.75" rockets. Because while APKWS will hit more or less on the laser spot, it still has some 10-17lbs of HE plus the rocket going boom as the grain shatters under impact.
 
What you probably want today is something like this modernized:

eugeny-knupfer-ov-1-01-demo-01-1600.jpg


A modern version would incorporate a degree of signature reduction and other EM and IR passive countermeasures to make it harder to detect and target.

With modern flight controls, along with more powerful engines and better prop design, you have the controls set where the plane is nearly as maneuverable as a helicopter. That is the props and throttles along with flight control surfaces are used to maneuver the plane.

A crew of two is retained so you have a dedicated weapons control crewman while the pilot can concentrate on flying. The design should be relatively compact too. Since it's for dedicated CAS, don't bother with making it capable of flying much above 15,000 feet and optimize it for lower altitudes.

The design would incorporate sensors and systems that make it capable of doing anti-helicopter and drone operations in addition to close support.

It could use a wide variety of PGM's and has enough hardpoints--I'd say 10 to 12--to be a true "bomb truck" with a good loiter time. Stick 4 x 20mm cannon with lots of ammo and a lower ROF on it for blasting helicopters and drones as an alternative to it using shorter range AAM's for the same task alone. The 20mm double as CAS fire support.

In support of own helicopters or drones, the later could be operated in conjunction with the plane, it is designed to support these as the counter to enemy helicopters and drones.
 
Interesting. So the PI value apparently combines both dispersion from intial aimpoint and lethality distance.

I wonder how well would KEM/LOSAT perform on that chart.
 
What you probably want today is something like this modernized:

eugeny-knupfer-ov-1-01-demo-01-1600.jpg
Just without the USAF losing their minds over the Army flying an armed fixed wing.

Which is why I think it's going to be a tilt-rotor, not a fixed wing.


A modern version would incorporate a degree of signature reduction and other EM and IR passive countermeasures to make it harder to detect and target.

With modern flight controls, along with more powerful engines and better prop design, you have the controls set where the plane is nearly as maneuverable as a helicopter. That is the props and throttles along with flight control surfaces are used to maneuver the plane.

A crew of two is retained so you have a dedicated weapons control crewman while the pilot can concentrate on flying. The design should be relatively compact too. Since it's for dedicated CAS, don't bother with making it capable of flying much above 15,000 feet and optimize it for lower altitudes.

The design would incorporate sensors and systems that make it capable of doing anti-helicopter and drone operations in addition to close support.

It could use a wide variety of PGM's and has enough hardpoints--I'd say 10 to 12--to be a true "bomb truck" with a good loiter time. Stick 4 x 20mm cannon with lots of ammo and a lower ROF on it for blasting helicopters and drones as an alternative to it using shorter range AAM's for the same task alone. The 20mm double as CAS fire support.

In support of own helicopters or drones, the later could be operated in conjunction with the plane, it is designed to support these as the counter to enemy helicopters and drones.
I'll be surprised if it has more than 2 guns on it, though we might make an argument for the old Cheyenne load of 1x 7.62mm Minigun, 1x 40mm autoGL, and 1x 30mm.
 
Just without the USAF losing their minds over the Army flying an armed fixed wing.

Which is why I think it's going to be a tilt-rotor, not a fixed wing.



I'll be surprised if it has more than 2 guns on it, though we might make an argument for the old Cheyenne load of 1x 7.62mm Minigun, 1x 40mm autoGL, and 1x 30mm.
Yea, that's always the sticking point. The USAF doesn't want the mission and doesn't want anything in the way of a CAS aircraft in their inventory because it makes them look subordinate to the Army. The solution for that is dissolve the USAF as a separate branch of service and make them part of the Army again.

Even a tilt rotor is too close to a fixed-wing aircraft that the USAF is going to whine about it. The Cheyenne would work if you could get it to hover in ground effect. That was the biggest issue with the original with its rigid rotor.
 

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