Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

That's entirely predictable if Boeing was planning deliveries on the basis of a hike in production rates. OTOH I'm surprised it's only 3 to 6 months.
 
www.flightglobal.com

Southwest 737 hammered by high ground winds before ‘Dutch roll’ incident: NTSB

Southwest has since inspected its entire 737 Max fleet and Boeing has reminded airlines about "high-wind" inspections.
www.flightglobal.com www.flightglobal.com

There's enough details here to see why Boeing would claim the issue was unique to the aircraft, and why NTSB would differ with them.

TLDR: The aircraft had been flying around with damaged tail controls, probably since it was exposed to high winds (gusts to 73mph) on the ground at New Orleans on 16-17 May. While the problem only became a major one with the dutch roll incident on the 25th, the captain of that flight had noticed a log entry for yaw damper issues, resolved by "resetting a few stall management yaw damper computer codes” - whatever that means, I genuinely can't tell. The NTSB notes that anomalies started showing up on the first flight after Southwestern did some scheduled maintenance checks on the standby tail PCU on the 23rd.

So yes, there were possibly aircraft unique issues, as Boeing claimed. But those issues may have been masked by the tail controls until something related to the checks on the 23rd, in which case there's definitely whole fleet issues to be investigated to understand how the controls were masking the damage, and how the maintenance check changed that. And also potential whole fleet issues related to the gust-damping system intended to stop the rudder being slammed against its stops. (Plus did someone in Southwestern maintenance simply reset a breaker rather than properly investigating the yaw damper anomalies).

So overall, yes, NTSB were right to be pissed-off with Boeing over and above violating investigation protocols. And yes, Boeing's Chief Engineer should have known there was more involved and not tried to dupe the press.
 
Boeing in plea deal with US DoJ
Boeing agreed to pay a fine of $243.6 million as part of its plea agreement and admitted it defrauded the Federal Aviation Administration when seeking permission for the troubled 737 Max plane to carry passengers. The plea deal is subject to approval of a federal judge.
[...]
However, one additional condition detailed in a new filing on Wednesday is that Boeing’s board of directors will have to hold a meeting with victim families and their legal representatives within four months of the sentencing date.

Boeing will also have to invest at least $455 million into its compliance, quality and safety programs, the agreement states.
Click to expand...
 
I suppose it is meant as public recognition of the suffering of those families, as well as a reminder that decisions made by Boeing's board of directors had far-reaching consequences for people well out of normal view of that board. How that reminder will impact Boeing's current board of directors - if at all - is another question.
 
Triton said:
View: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_kKD6g53AA


Model of Boeing 737 MAX 8 on display at Dubai Air Show 2011.

Artist's impressions of Boeing 737 MAX 7, 8, and 9.

Source:
www.bangaloreaviation.com

Updated: Boeing Launches the 737 MAX -7, -8, and -9 New Engine Family of Aircraft - Bangalore Aviation

Earlier this morning, the board of Boeing officially approved the launch of a new engine variant of
www.bangaloreaviation.com www.bangaloreaviation.com

Se hace oficial el lanzamiento del B737 MAX

Boeing OKs upgrades of 737 engines BY MOLLY McMILLIN The Wichita Eagle Boeing on Tuesday officially launched a program to upgrade its 737 airliners with new, more fuel-efficient engines to be called the 737 MAX. Boeing's board of directors gave the program a green light at meetings...
www.fsmex.com www.fsmex.com
Click to expand...
All -

The core problem with Boeing making "rate" on B737 series production is the rate.

Share holders and Board members valued profitability above quality and safety.
Senior management communicated the constant drum beat of making monthly production
quotas down through subsequent lower management levels, with first level supervision feeling obliged to " ride " shop floor personel; frequently to an excessive degree.

The same unrelenting demand from Boeing to make " rate " was impressed upon Tier One parts supplier Spirit Aerosystems, who itself was little more than " Boeing Midwest " in locations like Wichita KS, and Tulsa OK.

I worked at Spirit Tulsa for 10+yr, on the G-650, B737; and B777 components lines.
I faced more stress there than I did working on fighter jets for the Air National Guard for 37 years.... and that includes my OEF/OIF deployments to Iraq.

No matter how many of your production team were absent....the team was expected to
make its daily rate. No matter how extensive sub-component parts shortages were, or how long the shortage lasted.....the team was expected to make its daily rate. No credit was given for exceeding the rate for the day, and as a result.. the teams could not get ahead of the rate....or otherwise offset one day's rate shortage by over-producing the next shift.

Spirit Tulsa was not required by regulation or by "regulators" to have tool control measures in-place for all aircraft component work areas....only for " close out " areas of certain structures which might not be opened or accessed once the structural area has been "closed out".

I was bounced between programs by five different Supervisors, because my " personal warrantee " ( personal quality standards ) were viewed as inconvenient and excessive.
I probably didn't make rate daily for 95% of my time @ Spirit. Supervision did not care
at all that my " first round pass " rate on QA inspections of my work was 99%.
" Macht nichts ".

All " they " wanted was " OTD ".... the " FOB " shipments to go " out the door " on time.
In such aerospace production environments, " parts go out the door.... while quality goes out the window ". The results and consequences of Boeing's excessive pressuring of suppliers has ultimately been revealed.

Boeing buying back Spirit Wichita and Spirit Tulsa will itself not fix the systemic problems.
Even today, Boeing presses hard towards a rate goal of 38 B-737/P-8 monthly. Yet, it is both unknown and unproven just how many conforming 737s Boeing can successfully produce monthly ( certainly right up front ). Operating under a level of quality the FAA
will dictate, Boeing will be brought dragging and screaming to " some " rate of production to start with. However.... Boeing skewering the number @ 38 right out of the gate... strongly suggests they have not fully grasped yet; the seriousness of their corporate position and responsibilities to both the flying public... and to their employees.

With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
All -

The core problem with Boeing making "rate" on B737 series production is the rate.

Share holders and Board members valued profitability above quality and safety.
Senior management communicated the constant drum beat of making monthly production
quotas down through subsequent lower management levels, with first level supervision feeling obliged to " ride " shop floor personel; frequently to an excessive degree.

The same unrelenting demand from Boeing to make " rate " was impressed upon Tier One parts supplier Spirit Aerosystems, who itself was little more than " Boeing Midwest " in locations like Wichita KS, and Tulsa OK.

I worked at Spirit Tulsa for 10+yr, on the G-650, B737; and B777 components lines.
I faced more stress there than I did working on fighter jets for the Air National Guard for 37 years.... and that includes my OEF/OIF deployments to Iraq.

No matter how many of your production team were absent....the team was expected to
make its daily rate. No matter how extensive sub-component parts shortages were, or how long the shortage lasted.....the team was expected to make its daily rate. No credit was given for exceeding the rate for the day, and as a result.. the teams could not get ahead of the rate....or otherwise offset one day's rate shortage by over-producing the next shift.

Spirit Tulsa was not required by regulation or by "regulators" to have tool control measures in-place for all aircraft component work areas....only for " close out " areas of certain structures which might not be opened or accessed once the structural area has been "closed out".

I was bounced between programs by five different Supervisors, because my " personal warrantee " ( personal quality standards ) were viewed as inconvenient and excessive.
I probably didn't make rate daily for 95% of my time @ Spirit. Supervision did not care
at all that my " first round pass " rate on QA inspections of my work was 99%.
" Macht nichts ".

All " they " wanted was " OTD ".... the " FOB " shipments to go " out the door " on time.
In such aerospace production environments, " parts go out the door.... while quality goes out the window ". The results and consequences of Boeing's excessive pressuring of suppliers has ultimately been revealed.

Boeing buying back Spirit Wichita and Spirit Tulsa will itself not fix the systemic problems.
Even today, Boeing presses hard towards a rate goal of 38 B-737/P-8 monthly. Yet, it is both unknown and unproven just how many conforming 737s Boeing can successfully produce monthly ( certainly right up front ). Operating under a level of quality the FAA
will dictate, Boeing will be brought dragging and screaming to " some " rate of production to start with. However.... Boeing skewering the number @ 38 right out of the gate... strongly suggests they have not fully grasped yet; the seriousness of their corporate position and responsibilities to both the flying public... and to their employees.

With regards,
357Mag
Click to expand...
This should be official testimony. Alle Achtung und Respekt fuer das ehrliche Zeugnis.
 
From Boeing
investors.boeing.com

Boeing Board Names Kelly Ortberg President and CEO

- Respected industry veteran with more than 35 years of aerospace experience Boeing [NYSE: BA] today announced that its Board of Directors has elected Robert K. "Kelly" Ortberg as the company's new president and chief executive officer, effective August 8, 2024. Ortberg will also serve on...
investors.boeing.com investors.boeing.com
 
The massive half year loss and continual bleeding of cash is worrying. Supposedly the only division of Boeing that is actually profitable at the moment is commercial airliner maintenance services.
 
WatcherZero said:
The massive half year loss and continual bleeding of cash is worrying. Supposedly the only division of Boeing that is actually profitable at the moment is commercial airliner maintenance services.
Click to expand...
Is that just commercial side, or overall?

I would have expected BMAC to be doing alright. But Boeing Commercial and Boeing Space are definitely bleeding money at arterial spray.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Is that just commercial side, or overall?

I would have expected BMAC to be doing alright. But Boeing Commercial and Boeing Space are definitely bleeding money at arterial spray.
Click to expand...
All -

The losses on the KC-46 Tanker program certainly made/make a negative impact on
Boeing's MIL business side.


Regards,
357Mag
 
Few tidbits from the two day NTSB door plug failure hearing which has mostly been reviewing the taped/written witness interviews and statements.

* The Boeing and Spirit employees at the factory were at odds, one Spirit employee said they were treated like the Cockroaches of the factory (by Boeing staff).
* Theyve still not been able to identify who actually removed the plug doors and Boeing now accepts paperwork for the job wasnt just lost, it never existed.
* One Boeing employee said they were given no extra training to remove door plugs versus doors and the plugs and doors were being removed for faults more often than he changed his underwear.
* Multiple Boeing employees said they were being overworked, not given enough time to complete jobs.
* The manager of the door plug team is still on medical leave and still hasnt been interviewed by the NTSB six months after they first requested to speak with them.
* NTSB suspects collusion by the fitters/Boeing as all 25 members of the fitting team when questioned used the exact same phrase "I have no knowledge", the exact same phrasing.
* Boeing said they were going to change the design of the door plug and retrofit it to existing aircraft.
* The pilots of the Alaska flight didnt know there was a hole in the fuselage until after they landed as the noise was so great they could barely communicate with the rest of the plane, the flight attendants also initially couldn't make contact with the pilots and feared they were dead. One flight attendant said they also believed they had lost passengers as they forgot that run of five seats including the two window seats happened to be empty when the rest of the plane was full.
 
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Boeing is SO FUCKED. Like, the entire world is looking at this, and now it looks like Boeing is conspiring to bury evidence. They should have just let the guys talk, because this might be more damning than simply having their bullshit coming into the light.

If you're trying to bury evidence and get caught, as this looks like, no one is going to trust you. With anything. Not even a lemonade stand.
 
All -

Let's ask the continuous " why ", like a 5yr old does ; until the true...final answer is given:

- For Spirit employees to be treated poorly by Boeing, they first has to be present at Boeing's Washington B737 factory.

- The reason a team of Spirit employees were present on Boeing's B737 manufacturing
" line " was for them to complete " traveled " work ( or botched production work) that had
been identified by Spirit ( listed to inform Boeing ) preceding shipment to Boeing.

- The reason why Boeing knowingly accepted the level of traveled work that they did was their * unrelenting insistence that parts suppliers ( especially Spirit ) ship components to them on time in-support-of a fixed production " rate " ( otherwise known as " make rate " ).

- Spirit's inability to reliably / consistently " make rate " and production errors found by Boeing on Spirit components newly received, drove Boeing to insist that Spirit provide teams of their own personnel to correct both the already identified traveled work plus those deficiencies Boeing found on their own. Boeing believed they could then focus on processing 737s through their plant @ rate, while Spirit would make good on their responsibilities to Boeing.

Before I retired from Spirit Tulsa, they had asked for Assemblers who were willing to volunteer to serve on the Boeing re-work team. When asked " for how long "....
management just replied that I the duration was open-ended.

The problem is " the rate "..... Make rate no matter what.


With regards,
357Mag
 
WatcherZero said:
Few tidbits from the two day NTSB door plug failure hearing which has mostly been reviewing the taped/written witness interviews and statements.

* The Boeing and Spirit employees at the factory were at odds, one Spirit employee said they were treated like the Cockroaches of the factory (by Boeing staff).
* Theyve still not been able to identify who actually removed the plug doors and Boeing now accepts paperwork for the job wasnt just lost, it never existed.
Click to expand...
Oh, Boing is Effed.

You DO NOT EVER do work without documentation when working on airplanes.


WatcherZero said:
* One Boeing employee said they were given no extra training to remove door plugs versus doors and the plugs and doors were being removed for faults more often than he changed his underwear.
* Multiple Boeing employees said they were being overworked, not given enough time to complete jobs.
* The manager of the door plug team is still on medical leave and still hasnt been interviewed by the NTSB six months after they first requested to speak with them.
* NTSB suspects collusion by the fitters/Boeing as all 25 members of the fitting team when questioned used the exact same phrase "I have no knowledge", the exact same phrasing.
Click to expand...
Or their union lawyer talked to them.

My A&P instructors always said to answer, "whatever the maintenance manual said" when questioned by FAA/NTSB. That continued when employed at Tramco, because FAA could roam the floor and talk to you about work you'd done.
 
Goddamnit Boeing.

Seattle Times report on what led to the door plug blowout

Apparently the one person who knew about door plugs was on vacation.

A 35-year veteran on the door team told NTSB investigators that he is "the only one that can work on all the doors" and he was typically the only mechanic who would work on door plugs.

That mechanic was on vacation on the two critical days, Sept. 18 and 19 last year, when the door plug on the Alaska MAX 9 had to be opened and closed.
Click to expand...

Outsourcing until only one guy knows how to do a thing, and then not asking Spirit when he's on vacation, but just winging it.

A single point of failure. What happens when that guy dies?
 
MihoshiK said:
Goddamnit Boeing.

Seattle Times report on what led to the door plug blowout

Apparently the one person who knew about door plugs was on vacation.



Outsourcing until only one guy knows how to do a thing, and then not asking Spirit when he's on vacation, but just winging it.

A single point of failure. What happens when that guy dies?
Click to expand...
All -

Boeing failed to have an adequate number of assets present, to cover the required work during any shift. They also by extension, failed to provide necessary training to all personel that would have thereby been tasked if selected; to perform the work. In other words, they failed to create more comparably trained adjuncts to the " door team ".
There was no team.

IMHO -
The purportedly well-qualified, experienced mechanic bears some responsibility in the debacle; too. It is hard to imagine that such an individual would believe his highly refined... sub-specialization of a select set of tasks would not eventually lead to a critical abscence for Boeing at some point during his service as the door / door plug guru. He created and then perpetuated a fiefdom, with the ongoing at least tacit approval of Supervision and Management.

More to the point: not only did Supervision and Management fail to provide an
adequately trained number of workers for these tasks, they failed to direct the experienced Technician to conduct the important cross-training the with additional workers.

For his part, the senior worker failed to see/recognize the training needs, and insure crucial training took place with multiple people...of his own volition. Or worse, he was fully aware; and remained constant in his beliefs and convictions; and perpetuated the sole-source approach year after year. As a minimum, this makes one of wonder if all of his work was
 
MihoshiK said:
Goddamnit Boeing.

Seattle Times report on what led to the door plug blowout

Apparently the one person who knew about door plugs was on vacation.



Outsourcing until only one guy knows how to do a thing, and then not asking Spirit when he's on vacation, but just winging it.

A single point of failure. What happens w
Click to expand...
All -

The central question going forward for Boeing + re-acquired Spirit Aero employees and the B737 line is:. How well can they hold down the amount of " re-work " being generated
within each work areas, " cell " ; or team.

And as a measure of this... To what extent can workers be aided I

MihoshiK said:
hen that guy dies?
Click to expand...
 
All -

Apologies for the typing problems I am experiencing....

As a measure of this : " To what extent can workers be aided in the quest for the maximum amount of " first round passes " on work quality inspections ? Ideally, workers will find their own mistakes and correct them; in-advance of calling for the Inspector.

With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
All -

Boeing failed to have an adequate number of assets present, to cover the required work during any shift. They also by extension, failed to provide necessary training to all personel that would have thereby been tasked if selected; to perform the work. In other words, they failed to create more comparably trained adjuncts to the " door team ".
There was no team.

IMHO -
The purportedly well-qualified, experienced mechanic bears some responsibility in the debacle; too. It is hard to imagine that such an individual would believe his highly refined... sub-specialization of a select set of tasks would not eventually lead to a critical abscence for Boeing at some point during his service as the door / door plug guru. He created and then perpetuated a fiefdom, with the ongoing at least tacit approval of Supervision and Management.

More to the point: not only did Supervision and Management fail to provide an
adequately trained number of workers for these tasks, they failed to direct the experienced Technician to conduct the important cross-training the with additional workers.

For his part, the senior worker failed to see/recognize the training needs, and insure crucial training took place with multiple people...of his own volition. Or worse, he was fully aware; and remained constant in his beliefs and convictions; and perpetuated the sole-source approach year after year. As a minimum, this makes one of wonder if all of his work was
Click to expand...
Objection! Assumes facts not in evidence!

You're assuming that the Senior Worker was not pestering his bosses about getting someone else up to standards to be able to take over when Senior Worker is not available (whether on vacation, retired, or injured/dead from an accident). Trust me, Senior Worker wants to be able to take vacation days, especially if they're use-or-lose!

I have seen FAR too many companies/manglement not caring that they are setting up a single-point failure over "that one dude who knows everything." Hell, even Amazon seems to still run on that model...
 
Scott Kenny said:
Objection! Assumes facts not in evidence!

You're assuming that the Senior Worker was not pestering his bosses about getting someone else up to standards to be able to take over when Senior Worker is not available (whether on vacation, retired, or injured/dead from an accident). Trust me, Senior Worker wants to be able to take vacation days, especially if they're use-or-lose!

I have seen FAR too many companies/manglement not caring that they are setting up a single-point failure over "that one dude who knows everything." Hell, even Amazon seems to still run on that model...
Click to expand...
Scott -

Howdy !

Hey... I'm " frequently wrong, but...never in doubt " !

I don't believe you have taken me to task over the facts, as-much-as for the conclusions I've drawn ?

What I tried to articulate was:
Neither Boeing factory floor leadership nor 2nd and 3rd level managers put sufficient numbers of adequately trained / qualified workers in-place to prevent the door plug from being re-installed improperly... in the Senior Worker's absence. That's an established fact.

Even devoid of proper direction and guidance on work team composition & training, the Senior Worker could have invested time in bringing at least a few other co-workers up-to-speed on door/ door plug removal/install info...on things like: proper tools, pertinent tech data, test equipment, parts, consumables, proper documentation; and certainly HANDS ON " On-the-job-Training ". He could have done this on his own initiative. I have no specific knowledge that the Senior Worker agitated, campaigned for, cajoled, or otherwise tried to get Supervision / Management off " top dead center " on these collective issues. If it is revealed that he did do so, I'd be happy...more than happy...to recant.

From what I've read, the Senior Worker did not train others who could as minimum, work in his absence. This was factual information coming from a reliable source, otherwise.... people like investigators, interviewers; or by extension the FAA and Hearing Committee members were given non-factual information. And for that matter, us too.

Going forward:
Management will communicate approved manufacturing process corrective actions down the chain to workers on the floor ( who doubtless identified all these in the first place ).

I'd be surprised if these actions did not include refinements being made to the "Door Team".
Things like number of workers assigned, their qualifications and experience level.
As regards " qualification ", there will likely be a certain level of qualification training taking place... " Know & Show ". Special certification to be cleared to perform these tasks, should at least be considered.

As regards training:
Training items listed above would ideally be taught and overseen by a person(s) that
possesses the requisite knowledge. Moreover, this " Master Trainer " would also need to
train additional " Trainers ". IF the Senior Mechanic didn't perform in this capacity previously, he most likely WILL soon; if not already doing so @ Management's behest.
Annual refresher training on door /door plug tasks should also be considered.
That the Senior Mechanic didn't " see the need " and step off on at least some of this vital training on his own, nearly beggars belief.

Boeing would do well to find out when this specific worker intends to transfer or retire; and respond in a timely fashion.

With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
Scott -

Howdy !

Hey... I'm " frequently wrong, but...never in doubt " !

I don't believe you have taken me to task over the facts, as-much-as for the conclusions I've drawn ?

What I tried to articulate was:
Neither Boeing factory floor leadership nor 2nd and 3rd level managers put sufficient numbers of adequately trained / qualified workers in-place to prevent the door plug from being re-installed improperly... in the Senior Worker's absence. That's an established fact.
Click to expand...
Agreed.


357Mag said:
Even devoid of proper direction and guidance on work team composition & training, the Senior Worker could have invested time in bringing at least a few other co-workers up-to-speed on door/ door plug removal/install info...on things like: proper tools, pertinent tech data, test equipment, parts, consumables, proper documentation; and certainly HANDS ON " On-the-job-Training ". He could have done this on his own initiative. I have no specific knowledge that the Senior Worker agitated, campaigned for, cajoled, or otherwise tried to get Supervision / Management off " top dead center " on these collective issues. If it is revealed that he did do so, I'd be happy...more than happy...to recant.

From what I've read, the Senior Worker did not train others who could as minimum, work in his absence. This was factual information coming from a reliable source, otherwise.... people like investigators, interviewers; or by extension the FAA and Hearing Committee members were given non-factual information. And for that matter, us too.
Click to expand...
Training takes time away from production activities. If manglement won't budge on the delivery rate to train a backup Door Dude, you can't train the backup.



357Mag said:
Going forward:
Management will communicate approved manufacturing process corrective actions down the chain to workers on the floor ( who doubtless identified all these in the first place ).

I'd be surprised if these actions did not include refinements being made to the "Door Team".
Things like number of workers assigned, their qualifications and experience level.
As regards " qualification ", there will likely be a certain level of qualification training taking place... " Know & Show ". Special certification to be cleared to perform these tasks, should at least be considered.

As regards training:
Training items listed above would ideally be taught and overseen by a person(s) that
possesses the requisite knowledge. Moreover, this " Master Trainer " would also need to
train additional " Trainers ". IF the Senior Mechanic didn't perform in this capacity previously, he most likely WILL soon; if not already doing so @ Management's behest.
Annual refresher training on door /door plug tasks should also be considered.
That the Senior Mechanic didn't " see the need " and step off on at least some of this vital training on his own, nearly beggars belief.
Click to expand...
Again, you're assuming that Senior Mechanic was given time off the production floor to train a backup.

Yes, there are factories with their heads that far up their asses, that don't make time for training or hiring a backup specialist. Then their Senior Mechanic gets in a car accident and can't work for a month and the whole company collapses due to lack of products delivered.

Manglement doesn't recognize that business critical skills need a backup.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Scott -
Click to expand...
Howdy, again. I'm not sure how you do a " quote ", but will try here...
Scott Kenny said:
Training takes time away from production activities. If manglement won't budge on the delivery rate to train a backup Door Dude, you can't train the backup.
Click to expand...
Scott Kenny said:
357Mag - Boeing ( and Spirit Aero ) management previously maintained mindless adherence to a fixed production " rate " and pressed too hard on rate increases that they unrealistically expected to keep rising on a sustainable level . This is exactly what drove production realities to what is seen today. Training takes time, HOWEVER...OJT needs to be performed CONCURRENT with production, as there are no practical alternative methods to do it. It's not all or nothing...production or training. BOTH must take place on the actual hardware. Boeing failed to grasp that in the past, as regards the door/door plug team's lack of depth. The light should have already come on for Boeing by now, as they work on corrective actions to the identified problems. And again, the Senior Worker would have been present on the fuselages at the same time other workers were also there...repeatedly ...over shifts,workdays, work weeks, months; and even years. All the necessary elements for OJT were present when he was present on the hardware yet, the Senior Worker couldn't find any time to capitalize on " teachable moments " ?! That's why the former burger flipper who was pretty new to his Boeing job was not able to successfully re-install the door plug... not enough/adequate training.
Click to expand...
The response simply cannot be " production rate pressure prevented training from taking place ". Or...." We didn't / don't have time to train ". Let's all say it...ON-THE-JOB training.
They should look it up in their Funk & Wagnalls.
Scott Kenny said:
Again, you're assuming that Senior Mechanic was given time off the production floor to train a backup.

357Mag - No, that's no what I said at all. He was not given the time to do it, and we DK if he even agitated for it, how often; or for how long. I'm saying that even without a management blessing or directive to perform OJT, the Senior Mechanic should have taken action on his own. He had the knowledge, and other production team members were present with him on the hardware...time and again. If in the past he would have been criticized by leadership/management for conducting OJT, I should think those days are O-ver; N'est-ce Pas?
Click to expand...
" Experience is the ability to recognize mistakes, when you make them again ! "

With regards,
357Mag
 
Apples and oranges one might say,* but the core of the argument is that with complex technological systems, outsourcing to subcontractors without firm oversight and centralised, comprehensive knowledge of all the subsystems AND their integration is a recipe for disaster.

www.theguardian.com

‘Professional buck-passers’: why the excoriating Grenfell report was right to damn architects

The ultimate responsibility for the tower’s safety lay with its architect, said the 1,700-page report, which highlighted a ‘widespread failure among the profession’. Why are so many architects now utterly detached from the realities of construction?
www.theguardian.com www.theguardian.com

Architects have long complained of the erosion of their status, seeing their role at the top of the tree relentlessly undermined and usurped by specialist subconsultants. There are now separate experts for every part of the design process, from environmental performance to facade design, people flow to drainage, leaving the architect as an increasingly ineffectual middleman, supposedly presiding over these multiple specialisms while having little technical knowledge of any of them.

*Le Corbusier wouldn't
 
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357Mag said:
The response simply cannot be " production rate pressure prevented training from taking place ". Or...." We didn't / don't have time to train ". Let's all say it...ON-THE-JOB training.
They should look it up in their Funk & Wagnalls.
Click to expand...
It still means that you have at least one fewer body working on the line while training occurs, because Senior Dude and Trainee are both doing the same tasks.

And yes, I'm willing to bet a case of good Scotch that Spirit was manned so tight that they would drop behind on delivery timelines if any one line worker took time off. But the delivery timelines could not be slipped, which is why non-compliant incomplete airframe sections were being delivered to Boeing-Renton to be worked by employees of Spirit until all deficiencies are corrected.
 
Scott -

Howdy !
Scott Kenny said:
" It still means that you have at least one fewer body working on the line while training occurs..."
Click to expand...
357Mag - Training concurrent with production = some production takes place, also.
Train five people at a time.....10. How important is training to Boeing, and how high a priority will it be given ?
Scott Kenny said:
" ....But the delivery timelines could not be slipped...."
Click to expand...
357Mag - I understand this statement as reflecting the mindset of Boeing and Spirit Aero, leading up to B737Max incidents. However, in today's current realities, Boeing is nowhere close to being able to predict let alone skewer a production" rate ". They'll have to first demonstrate the ability to produce & deliver conforming subassemblies and aircraft at some lower rate...and then grow the process from there.

Beyond that, the new Boeing will have to have the fortitude to accept relaxed production rates....missed " rate " goals....and even, to pull the " all stop " cord when necessary.

Catching Airbus ? Fegetabadit.


With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
Scott -

Howdy !

357Mag - Training concurrent with production = some production takes place, also.
Train five people at a time.....10. How important is training to Boeing, and how high a priority will it be given ?

357Mag - I understand this statement as reflecting the mindset of Boeing and Spirit Aero, leading up to B737Max incidents. However, in today's current realities, Boeing is nowhere close to being able to predict let alone skewer a production" rate ". They'll have to first demonstrate the ability to produce & deliver conforming subassemblies and aircraft at some lower rate...and then grow the process from there.

Beyond that, the new Boeing will have to have the fortitude to accept relaxed production rates....missed " rate " goals....and even, to pull the " all stop " cord when necessary.

Catching Airbus ? Fegetabadit.


With regards,
357Mag
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I dearly wish Monty Python had at some point done a skit on inept aerospace company management (perhaps too specific? But Upper Class Twit of the Year would perhaps be the closest approximation), but the Romans, whatever god(s) bless(ed) their little pagan hearts, had, as for oh so many occasions, a short quip for this particular instance as well - festina lente.
 
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357Mag said:
Training concurrent with production = some production takes place, also.
Train five people at a time.....10. How important is training to Boeing, and how high a priority will it be given ?
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Based on how they got themselves into this position? Training is utterly unimportant, all executive compensation appears to be based on number of airframes completed.

It will likely require the DOJ to demand all of these ideas as penalty actions from the violation of Boeing's plea agreement before Boeing gets the memo.


357Mag said:
I understand this statement as reflecting the mindset of Boeing and Spirit Aero, leading up to B737Max incidents. However, in today's current realities, Boeing is nowhere close to being able to predict let alone skewer a production" rate ". They'll have to first demonstrate the ability to produce & deliver conforming subassemblies and aircraft at some lower rate...and then grow the process from there.

Beyond that, the new Boeing will have to have the fortitude to accept relaxed production rates....missed " rate " goals....and even, to pull the " all stop " cord when necessary.
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Correct.

Good luck with that.
 
In regards to the Alaska Airlines 737MAX plug door blowout here's an interesting short video in regards to the vacationing mechanic:


In interviews with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a Boeing mechanic told investigators that they were on vacation while the Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9’s door plug was being repaired at the assembly line in Renton, Washington. The mechanic also told the NTSB that they were the only one who was able to work on all doors on the 737 MAX 9.
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NMaude said:
In regards to the Alaska Airlines 737MAX plug door blowout here's an interesting short video in regards to the vacationing mechanic:

Click to expand...
NM -


Howdy !

While I’ll be the first to admit I have not heard read all testimony and interviews on the Alaska Airlines door plug incident, the YouTube clip linked above ( for me ) raises more questions than answers ( to my way of thinking ).

How was the installation worker identified ?
If the former fast food worker was identified as not re-installing the door plug correctly, I should think he was identified by time/ labor accounting inputs he made to Boeing’s B737 MMS, or whatever it is called.

If that’s the case, then they at least know who made the install error; albeit… they don’t know who removed the door plug in the first place. I doubt the junior worker was relying solely on memory.

None-the-less…the installation worker shares blame in the lack of documentation on the maintenance action. Apparently, he did not have enough knowledge of the task or even the extent of his documentation obligations; to discern that the door plug removal was not “ written-up “ correctly from the git-go.

Conclusion:
No one documented the door plug removal…the junior worker documented just his installation work…and no body documented any follow-on tasks, or required QA inspection(s).

Or…..?


With regards,
357Mag
 
Two stories for you:

www.seattletimes.com

On Boeing’s factory floor, workers feel ‘overmanaged and undersupported’

After the nearly catastrophic blowout on Alaska Flight 1282, Boeing factory workers, while proud of their work, are skeptical of the company’s promised changes.
www.seattletimes.com www.seattletimes.com

www.police1.com

Dozens arrested in drug raid at Pa. Boeing plant

Federal agents on Thursday raided a Boeing plant that makes military helicopters
www.police1.com www.police1.com

Why the second one, you ask—of what relevance?

Many employees have a side-hustle to make ends meet…and that doesn’t have to be a second job.

The first story shows top-down problems—treating employees like second class citizens.

That can lead to the second story.

Say you work in a big company—it isn’t just your actual manager you have to answer to—speak up about co-workers, and you can wind up in the hospital real fast. That’s a second source of worry.

That’s the bottom-up problems.

The things you hear over a Motorola…

Over time, such an environment will cause your best people to throw up their hands and walk out.

—and here we are…
 
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