I think that is incorrect. If the report from passengers had been taken with care, i-e professionalism, the ground crew would have directed their attention toward the plug and not front door. The cost equation threshold would have been adverted.
Once again, that´s why you have this chain of responsibility to pass and treat information precisely.
You don´t bring your personal car to the mechanics without a word or two explaining your concerns for God sake.
And if your complaint at the mechanic is "it makes a funny whistling noise" be prepared to spend an absolute fuckton of money while they have the car for long enough to find that whistle.
Again.
It requires disassembling a significant chunk of the interior to gain access to the plug. Probably removing all seats behind the wings on both sides so that the mechanics have room to work. There's an hour or two for your night check team. Then pull the interior panels out. That's a trivial amount of time, even if you're trying to be gentle so they can be reused. Next you have a lot of insulation to remove, and that absolutely sucks. Now the mechanics can finally look at the plug itself. Where was that photo that showed a plug with the bolts in and tightened to spec?
That's not ground crew work.
Mechanics.
The plane was going to the maintenance base at the end of the day.
There were ZERO indications that there was a reason that plane could not fly overland routes. Yes, the Airline pulled it from overwater routes due to the alarms on the pressurization system, because having both pressurization controllers working is on the Minimum Equipment List for ETOPS.
Those alarms? There's about a dozen different things that could cause that alarm.
None of which would suggest "rip the interior apart and check the plugs." Furthermore, you are assuming that the plug was not reseating itself when pressurization was let off and that there would be something to catch the mechanic's eyes before ripping half the plane apart.
The Cabin Pressurization AUTO FAIL alarm
is specifically saying that the primary pressurization controller is having issues maintaining cabin pressure. It could be the controller itself, it could be one of the
hydraulic valves DC electrical motors, it could be the outflow door itself, it could be the pressure sensors, it could be the wiring harness between all those parts. None of those components are near the plug,
so there's no reason for the crew to specifically look at the plug.
If the plug was standing proud of the skin the mechanics
might catch it out of the corner of their eye as they walked around the plane. But with it only standing 1mm/0.040" tall of the skin, you'd have to have the lights hit it
perfectly on the way into the hangar to cast a shadow, and the spotter would have to be looking right at the
perfect spot to see that 1mm shadow from 30ft away. (edited to correct method of actuation)
There are no further details as to what caused the Cabin Pressurization AUTO FAIL alarm.
This is not a modern car that can tell you that cylinder #4 misfired when the engine was at 785rpm, at 1943MDT on Thursday the 23rd of May. Aircraft systems don't have that much memory or even data collection capabilities.
The indication that would be needed was something along the lines of "outflow door position is abnormally low compared to pressure differential." Translation: there's more air coming out of the cabin than just the outflow door opening, there is a leak someplace.
From Wiki:
The aircraft involved in the accident had its
cabin pressurization "AUTO FAIL"
indicator illuminated on three previous occasions – on December 7, January 3 (in flight), and January 4 (after landing). This indicates that the primary automatic cabin pressurization controller was disabled by a fault condition, which can be caused by a problem with the controller itself, one of the valves it controls, an excessive pressure differential, an excessive rate of cabin pressure change, or a high cabin altitude. When a fault is detected, pressurization control automatically transfers to an alternate automatic controller. The "AUTO FAIL" indicator alerts the crew to this change, but no intervention is prescribed.
[49] On each occasion of a fault, the alternate controller was used, and flights proceeded normally.
[20] However, due to the faults, Alaska Airlines had restricted the aircraft from operating extended overwater flights (under
ETOPS rules) until a detailed maintenance inspection could occur.
[20] It is not yet known if the indicator warning is related to the accident; the NTSB investigation will include the issue.
[20]
Note 49 is from a Nordwind Airlines procedure that is uploaded to Scribd. Airline-written procedures are considered legal documents in terms of what actions if any they tell the crew to do, and are pretty consistent between airlines.
Note 20 is from the NTSB Media Brief on January 7.
========================================
I am an A&P mechanic, with experience on heavy commercial aircraft.
I am telling you that you are panicking over something that the airline had
very little indication was wrong,
and that you are blaming the wrong people in this case.