Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

So there's another issue with that aircraft? A pressurization issue and then the door, which is separate to the pressurization?

Pressurization instrumentation issues, that started the day after it came back from the WiFi installation by AAR Oklahoma City. The timing of that is highly suggestive.
 
Spirit make some parts for Airbus aircraft assembled in the US as well.

The plug is made by Spirit but ive seen many people saying its actually fitted by Boeing quite late in production, I dont know for sure.
 
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FAA has extended the 737 MAX-9 with Plug grounding and asked Boeing to submit a revised inspection procedure after concerns were raised about the initial return to flight certification procedure that Boeing submitted to the agency in light of the Alaska and United preliminary inspections.


NTSB have reiterated their working theory is that the four bolts were never fitted in the first place and are considering broadening the probe to other MAX models.
 
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An history of manufacturing defects had raised concerns:

1704858324275.png

A bolt arrangement with a safety wire [pin] could have done the trick. Anyhow, a simple M6 to M8 (?) bolt working in shear (once loose and the plug is free to move up and down) doesn´t look to be the most statifying approach here (no redundancy).

 
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No, they were divested from Boeing years ago and build assemblies for other airframers, not only Boeing.
There has been talk about bringing it back in-house before now, but the current Boeing management had shied away at the cost (not to mention that at least some of them were cheerleaders for outsourcing Boeing-Wichita in the first place and reversing course would be in effect admitting that they had fouled up royally, putting it mildly). However they may have little choice now but to ultimately bite the bullet.
 
If Boeing rebought Spirit (and I think it highly unlikely they would, not least due to Boeings low liquidity to finance such an acquisition after years of losses) then they would likely have to sell their Glasgow, Ireland and Airbus US work or at least demonstrate independence such as a corporate fire wall with separate management chain but that would prevent Boeing reintegrating them which would be their aim in the first place.
 
An history of manufacturing defects had raised concerns:

View attachment 716618

A bolt arrangement with a safety wire could have done the trick. Anyhow, a simple M6 to M8 (?) bolt working in shear (once loose and the plug is free to move up and down) doesn´t look to be the most statifying approach here (no redundancy).


It's supposed to be 4 bolts with castle nuts and cotter pins, which would be plenty secure, if they were actually installed properly. Or at all. NTSB says one of their working theories is that the bolts were not fitted at all, which means the plane went several months with the plug being held in by gravity and the friction of the stop pads against the tabs on the airframe. '

Worth noting that the loose bolts found in other inspections do not seem to be the actual retention bolts on the door plug.

 
The NTSB is still investigating the accident, and no cause has been determined. But the incident is shining an uncomfortable spotlight on Boeing and one of its key suppliers, Spirit AeroSystems, which makes fuselages for the 737 Max.

Spirit is a defendant in a securities lawsuit, refiled last month, that accuses the company of hiding quality lapses from investors.

Court filings include an ethics complaint made by an employee who said a manager demoted him after he refused to under-report the number of defects discovered in Spirit’s products. The manager, the employee said, was “retaliating towards me for trying to do the right thing”.

Spirit declined to comment.

(Free article as of time of posting)
 
@TomS : castle nut and pin is good enough for me. However there is still no redundancy (as we can see with the improper fasteners fitted).

Usually, it works that way: either you find an assembly mode that would fail immediately without the proper fasteners (here the plug seat should not even restraint the plug without fastener), either you build redundancy that a successful failure, to happen has to be a two prongs monster.
 
@TomS : castle nut and pin is good enough for me. However there is still no redundancy (as we can see with the improper fasteners fitted).

There are four bolts, and in theory any one of them ought to do the job, because all they have to do is restrain the plug from moving in a direction it doesn't really want to move much anyway. Omitting all four is kind of shocking, if that is indeed what happened.

For others, here is the image from a UA aircraft showing some loose nuts on bolts in the plug assembly. But the loose nuts at the right side of the image are not on the actual the retention bolts. The retention bolt is the one near the center that we can see with a proper castle nut and cotter pin fitting.
1704894581158.png
 
Yes, looks someone took the initiative to simplify the design.

Notice to all: with airframe vibration, there is no way a flat washer with a single nut will not end getting loose.
 
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Court filings include an ethics complaint made by an employee who said a manager demoted him after he refused to under-report the number of defects discovered in Spirit’s products. The manager, the employee said, was “retaliating towards me for trying to do the right thing”.
If that person is a member of Spirit's ODA that's an outright violation of Federal Law called interference.
 
49 USC 44742: Interference with the duties of organization designation authorization unit members

49 USC 44742: Interference with the duties of organization designation authorization unit members
Text contains those laws in effect on January 9, 2024

From Title 49-TRANSPORTATION
SUBTITLE VII-AVIATION PROGRAMS
PART A-AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY
subpart iii-safety
CHAPTER 447-SAFETY REGULATION

§44742. Interference with the duties of organization designation authorization unit members​

(a) In General.-The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall continuously seek to eliminate or minimize interference by an ODA holder that affects the performance of authorized functions by ODA unit members.

(b) Prohibition.-

(1) In general.-It shall be unlawful for any individual who is a supervisory employee of an ODA holder that manufactures a transport category airplane to commit an act of interference with an ODA unit member's performance of authorized functions.

(2) Civil penalty.-

(A) Individuals.-An individual shall be subject to a civil penalty under section 46301(a)(1) for each violation under paragraph (1).

(B) Savings clause.-Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting or constricting any other authority of the Administrator to pursue an enforcement action against an individual or organization for violation of applicable Federal laws or regulations of the Administration.


(c) Reporting.-

(1) Reports to oda holder.-An ODA unit member of an ODA holder that manufactures a transport category airplane shall promptly report any instances of interference to the office of the ODA holder that is designated to receive such reports.

(2) Reports to the faa.-

(A) In general.-The ODA holder office described in paragraph (1) shall investigate reports and submit to the office of the Administration designated by the Administrator to accept and review such reports any instances of interference reported under paragraph (1).

(B) Contents.-The Administrator shall prescribe parameters for the submission of reports to the Administration under this paragraph, including the manner, time, and form of submission. Such report shall include the results of any investigation conducted by the ODA holder in response to a report of interference, a description of any action taken by the ODA holder as a result of the report of interference, and any other information or potentially mitigating factors the ODA holder or the Administrator deems appropriate.


(d) Definitions.-

(1) General applicability.-The definitions contained in section 44736(c) shall apply to this section.

(2) Interference.-In this section, the term "interference" means-

(A) blatant or egregious statements or behavior, such as harassment, beratement, or threats, that a reasonable person would conclude was intended to improperly influence or prejudice an ODA unit member's performance of his or her duties; or

(B) the presence of non-ODA unit duties or activities that conflict with the performance of authorized functions by ODA unit members.
 
This aircraft's reputation has gotten so bad now that I have family that aren't anywhere nearly as interested in aircraft as me suggesting I avoid booking flights if they use the 737 MAX though I don't know if you can even find that information before booking.

Whether or not this door plug was a manufacturing shortcut that shouldn't have have been taking I can't say, but judging from this and reports of leftover parts and tools being found on KC-46s Boeing's issues aren't getting any better.
 
Whether or not this door plug was a manufacturing shortcut that shouldn't have have been taking I can't say, but judging from this and reports of leftover parts and tools being found on KC-46s Boeing's issues aren't getting any better.
To be fair, this door plug system has been used as far back as the 737-900ER back in 2006
 
Poor corporate culture makes for poor worker culture.

I chalk this up to guys on the floor not giving a damn about their job.

What I wouldn't give to overhear some Motorola traffic in factories.

"If the suits don't care why should I?"
 
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There has been talk about bringing it back in-house before now, but the current Boeing management had shied away at the cost (not to mention that at least some of them were cheerleaders for outsourcing Boeing-Wichita in the first place and reversing course would be in effect admitting that they had fouled up royally, putting it mildly). However they may have little choice now but to ultimately bite the bullet.

What is Spirit's income share split between Boeing and Airbus? If Spirit has comprehensive quality issues, then which of the two suffers more?

Though in this case, it's not clear if the manufacturing error was Boeing or Spirit.
 
Spirits revenue in 2022 was 60% Boeing, 22% Airbus, 18% Other. Boeing share of its revenues gradually declined from a decade ago when it was 83% Boeing, 10% Airbus and 7% Other. However Spirit is responsible for 70% of Boeing aerostructure components overall with some models like the MAX being as high as 90%.
 
FAA has notified Boeing its conducting a formal investigation into its non compliance with finished aircraft quality inspection and testing and aircraft certification requirements. The letter sent on the 10th may have been why the Boeing chairman was making a public apology and accepting responsibility for the accident.

View: https://twitter.com/FAANews/status/1745491519266542047


 
plug-exit-anatomy-948x1024.jpg


 
Thanks for the clear article and picture, but not sure what the role of those possibly loose fasteners would have been in this mishap.
Previous pictures of the accident aircraft seem to clearly show the "roller plates" and their fasteners in place.
Also, I would think that the condition of those "roller plates" was probably one of the very first things that the NTSB investigators inspected on the aircraft (the finding of anything loose around these would probably have been reported already)?
 
Class action lawsuit launched against Boeing for emotional and physical harm by seven of the passengers of the Alaska flight.

 
OK... Alaska Airlines has admitted that that exact airframe had had pressurization warnings on the 3 flights immediately previous to the incident flight - and instead of grounding it until the problem was found, they just scheduled it for "over-land or short over-water flights only" to ensure it would not be far from an airport "in case something happens".

The responsible people in the maintenance department need to be fired!

 
Pressurisation warnings are not unusual on commercial airliners, can be a bad seal or a faulty sensor and the ETOPs guidance tells you what type of faults and how many you can continue to operate with. In the case of Alaska the fault cleared each time and didnt reoccur during the flights when switched to the alternate computer so the NTSB dont think it was being caused by the door plug (and there are no pressure sensors in a plug door to generate a fault with the warning lights in the cockpit for those doors marked inoperable). Also wasnt the three preceding flights, it was two with the third warning having occurred a full month previously.
 
Poor corporate culture makes for poor worker culture.

I chalk this up to guys on the floor not giving a damn about their job.

What I wouldn't give to overhear some Motorola traffic in factories.

"If the suits don't care why should I?"
I doubt that this is the problem. Most of my experience has been in the construction and telco areas. But I have always found that shop-floor workers usually understand the impications of faults in their work better than their managers do, particularly so when lives are at stake.

I suspect that the the real problem is either unauthorized, managerial "design simplication" (i.e. cost reduction), as suggested above, or constant pressure to complete tasks more quickly with fewer workers (cost reduction again). Tired, over-stressed workers make just the kinds of mistakes cited above: tasks overlooked, performed put of order, or left incomplete, tools left behind, etc.

Cost avoidance is, moreover, the obvious reason for Boeing's continued reliance on an elderly, suboptimal design. The 737 undercuts newer Airbus arcraft on cost, and captures more of the market, because it reduces the costs encurred by customer airlines.

So the root cause is cost avoidance and profit chasing, "our obligation to the shareholders", in current corporatese. Boeing management has clearly put "maximizing shareholder value" above engineering, build quality, and safety. No doubt, the way in which all large companies now make stock the main form of executive compensation encourages this. Managers at both Boeing and the customer airlines are incentivized to cut costs and maximize profits.

The FAA is compromised as well. It is chartered to both insure both the viability/profitability and the safety of commercial aviation. Historically, the former has always outweighed the latter. Until we have an independent safety agency--an NTSB with regulatory and enforcement power--737MAX-type problems are inevitable.
 
@iverson : totally agree with you on the probable responsibility for fasteners change.
I have worked extensively in quality escape in aerospace (and other industries) and that kind is nearly never associated with operators/fitters but more often supervisor, managers or an imprecise/erroneous/outdated mounting instructions.
 
Boeing's woes are continuing to mount:

 
Boeing have announced they will be doing more QA checks on both their own and Spirits work with a Boeing team to be based at Wichita, they are bringing in a 3rd party to provide independent assessment of their Quality testing practises and airline customers will now be allowed to do spot inspections of its factories.
 
That sounds pretty desperate.

Also, can Boeing afford to bring Spirit Aerosystems up to quality?
 
Seems the removable plugs fasteners were temporary bracings that slipped through inspection.


(Boeing internal memo at the end of the report)
 

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