The families of 4 out of 5 marines that died in the 2022 crash are suing Boeing and Bell for producing an unreasonably dangerous product and not disclosing its flaws. There have been six hard clutch engagement accidents since the 2022 crash including the fatal 2023 crash in Japan, the families are alleging the manufacturers were aware of the defect beforehand but were concealing it.

 
It is a good thing we were not this legally sensitive in 1960 or the CH-47 would never have gotten past an Alpha model. Then, there were not as many lawyers in 1960.
 
It is a good thing we were not this legally sensitive in 1960 or the CH-47 would never have gotten past an Alpha model. Then, there were not as many lawyers in 1960.

They're going to have a really hard time getting over Boyle v. United Technologies:

 
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It is a good thing we were not this legally sensitive in 1960 or the CH-47 would never have gotten past an Alpha model. Then, there were not as many lawyers in 1960.
At the same time, the Military should go to great lengths to make equipment that isn't going to kill their troops. Their troops are OUR families. They're not "expendable assets". This is a citizen-based military. "National Defense" is not an excuse for gear that has high accident rates. Military aviation is inherently dangerous, but you could make a strong argument that Osprey operations present an unreasonable risk compared to other military transport aircraft.
 
At the same time, the Military should go to great lengths to make equipment that isn't going to kill their troops. Their troops are OUR families. They're not "expendable assets". This is a citizen-based military. "National Defense" is not an excuse for gear that has high accident rates. Military aviation is inherently dangerous, but you could make a strong argument that Osprey operations present an unreasonable risk compared to other military transport aircraft.

Except that it has an accident rate solidly in the middle of other rotorcraft, and significantly better than the aircraft it replaces.

 
They currently arent allowed to fly more than 30 minutes from a divertible airfield which makes them pretty useless for at sea replenishment.
 
They currently arent allowed to fly more than 30 minutes from a divertible airfield which makes them pretty useless for at sea replenishment.

Yes, but it seems like this isn't going to be a long-term limitation.
 
Except that it has an accident rate solidly in the middle of other rotorcraft, and significantly better than the aircraft it replaces.

How much of that rate is because of the numerous restrictions that have been placed on its operations?
 
How much of that rate is because of the numerous restrictions that have been placed on its operations?

It flew quite a lot in Afghanistan and fared better than the remaining CH-46s there.
 
How much of that rate is because of the numerous restrictions that have been placed on its operations?
It flew quite a lot in Afghanistan and fared better than the remaining CH-46s there.
Basically none.

If you look at the V22 accident rates from 2010 to 2023.

You see that it lower then any other rotary craft.

You dont hear how in this past February a CH53 crashed Killing 6 marines, or the October Army UH60 crash that killed 4 Soldiers, or the June's CH47 crash that killed 18. Maybe the Navy's Oceanhawk crash last January killing all the crew?

Oh! How bout the C130 crash a few years back that kill 60 troops and its crews when its FUCKING WING CAME OFF cause it was older then the damn B52?

No just the V22 osprey.

Does it have its issues?

Yes. Name me a plane that doesn't.

But for what its replacing? Its infinity better.


Helicopters are not safe, at all. They describe as 40 million parts flying in close formation that dont want to for a reason. Cause if one of those parts leave the formation...

You ARE crashing and theres not much you can do bout it.
 
At the same time, the Military should go to great lengths to make equipment that isn't going to kill their troops. Their troops are OUR families. They're not "expendable assets". This is a citizen-based military. "National Defense" is not an excuse for gear that has high accident rates. Military aviation is inherently dangerous, but you could make a strong argument that Osprey operations present an unreasonable risk compared to other military transport aircraft.

Last year a pair of HH-60s crashed into each other in Kentucky and killed almost a dozen Soldiers. It never made it past the local news.


People perceive V-22 as being less safe entirely because it looks like a plane, which gives it a unique appearance, and makes it stand out. If V-22 looked like a Sea Knight, nobody would bat an eye, even if troops were being shoved out the rear doors without parachutes. This is essentially what happened to H-46 and other aircraft. Nobody called for H-60 to be retired after the mass cas of Rangers in Grenada as being "inherently unsafe to fly" or whatever. Well, actually no they probably did, but we don't remember them (unlike the Nazi general who said M1's shot trap would be a death sentence on the Eastern Front lol).

Osprey was always going to have an accident rate, but because it looks funny to the non-expert it appears to be uniquely unsafe, because their brain is being reminded each time the V-22 shows up in a news article: "Hey, that funny heliplane is in the news again! And it killed people? Oh no."

With Blackhawk, you're just seeing "helicopter crash in Louisiana kills two servicemen" and your brain immediately discards that.

It's just the availability heuristic at work. It's easy to remember Osprey because, unlike Blackhawk, it's one of a kind and so it looks funny.
 
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It had four fatal crashes during testing before entering service, which for most aircraft development programs is a lot and thats what started its bad reputation. Since then over 50 people have died in it which is less than the 200 in Stallion though that aircraft entered service 30-40 years earlier! But the notable thing is almost all the Osprey crashes have occurred due to mechanical failure in routine training operations with the airframe receiving very little trial by fire combat experience. By contrast the stallion crashes have almost all occurred when carrying underslung loads, pilot error such as mid-air collisions, Sandstorm or nightime landings. Only 4% of Stallion crashes have been due to mechanical failure which in almost all cases was an engine fire.
 
Boeing itself only describes it has having a handful of combat operations and from that you have the crash in Afghanistan in April 2010 (the head of the investigation said he would never fly the aircraft again), The Jan 2017 crash in Yemen and the September 2017 crash in Syria. 12 were deployed in Iraq (and it performed worse than the aircraft it replaced with only 57-68% availability despite being described by users as being 'babied' with a low sortie rate) though started to repair its reputation in Afghanistan where again 12 were deployed (albeit commandant George Trautman stressed that while it saw slightly more kinetic action than in Iraq it was primarily a passenger and cargo ferry not a aircraft for embroiling in hostile action). But in its over a decade of service its never been able to sustain a operational availability rate on deployment greater than 60-62% for any prolonged period (or 80% in US based training squadrons), by comparison the CH-53E is experiencing an availability rate on deployment "in the high 90's".

The Osprey currently has a Mean Flight Hours Before Failure logged of 1.4 (down from 1.6) against 1.2 during development and a performance requirement for 0.9 and Mean Flight Hours Before Mission Abort of 28.9 (down from 29.2) against 15 hours during development and performance requirement of 15 hours according to its 2020 Presidential Acquisition Report. Do you have comparable figures for the CH-53E or CH-53K?
.
 
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Boeing itself only describes it has having a handful of combat operations and from that you have the crash in Afghanistan in April 2010 (the head of the investigation said he would never fly the aircraft again), The Jan 2017 crash in Yemen and the September 2017 crash in Syria. 12 were deployed in Iraq (and it performed worse than the aircraft it replaced with only 57-68% availability despite being described by users as being 'babied' with a low sortie rate) though started to repair its reputation in Afghanistan where again 12 were deployed (albeit commandant George Trautman stressed that while it saw slightly more kinetic action than in Iraq it was primarily a passenger and cargo ferry not a aircraft for embroiling in hostile action). But in its over a decade of service its never been able to sustain a operational availability rate on deployment greater than 60-62% for any prolonged period (or 80% in US based training squadrons), by comparison the CH-53E is experiencing an availability rate on deployment "in the high 90's".

The Osprey currently has a Mean Flight Hours Before Failure logged of 1.4 (down from 1.6) against 1.2 during development and a performance requirement for 0.9 and Mean Flight Hours Before Mission Abort of 28.9 (down from 29.2) against 15 hours during development and performance requirement of 15 hours according to its 2020 Presidential Acquisition Report. Do you have comparable figures for the CH-53E or CH-53K?
.
It replaced the CH-46 in USMC service. Would that not be a better comparison?
 
Boeing itself only describes it has having a handful of combat operations and from that you have the crash in Afghanistan in April 2010 (the head of the investigation said he would never fly the aircraft again), The Jan 2017 crash in Yemen and the September 2017 crash in Syria. 12 were deployed in Iraq (and it performed worse than the aircraft it replaced with only 57-68% availability despite being described by users as being 'babied' with a low sortie rate) though started to repair its reputation in Afghanistan where again 12 were deployed (albeit commandant George Trautman stressed that while it saw slightly more kinetic action than in Iraq it was primarily a passenger and cargo ferry not a aircraft for embroiling in hostile action). But in its over a decade of service its never been able to sustain a operational availability rate on deployment greater than 60-62% for any prolonged period (or 80% in US based training squadrons), by comparison the CH-53E is experiencing an availability rate on deployment "in the high 90's".

The Osprey currently has a Mean Flight Hours Before Failure logged of 1.4 (down from 1.6) against 1.2 during development and a performance requirement for 0.9 and Mean Flight Hours Before Mission Abort of 28.9 (down from 29.2) against 15 hours during development and performance requirement of 15 hours according to its 2020 Presidential Acquisition Report. Do you have comparable figures for the CH-53E or CH-53K?
.
Why are you comparing against the H53?

Compare to the H46!
 
By this rational the U.S. Army should never have bought UH-1.
Part of the issue is that fixed wing technology has traditionally received five to ten times the science and technology investment as rotorcraft technology. At one point the USAF was investing more money in engine technology demonstrations than than the entire Army Aviation technology budget.
Even the DARPA SPRINT program is doing nothing more than promoting development of half century (at least) old VTOL technologies that lacked investment when they were new.
 
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It replaced the CH-46 in USMC service. Would that not be a better comparison?

CH-46 was over 50 years old when it left service, that wouldnt be a fair comparison with a aircraft that officially entered service in 2007. Better to compare to a Heavy lift helicopter of similar age.
 
CH-46 was over 50 years old when it left service, that wouldnt be a fair comparison with a aircraft that officially entered service in 2007. Better to compare to a Heavy lift helicopter of similar age.
So compare the accident rate per X-flight hours over the first 20 years. It won't be definitive, but it might indicate how the V-22 is doing.
 
Ok in 2015 at end of its life the CH-46 had ten-year average accident rate of 2.98 per 100,000 flying hours compared to the V-22 with 3.2 per 100,000 (I cant find any accident-flying hours rates predating the late 90's).

The fatal accident rate (so not exactly comparable) in the US at the time was 0.72 per 100,000 for rotor aircraft and 1.029 for fixed wing aircraft. For the US Marine Corp specifically in 2017 the MV-22 had a 10 year accident rate of 3.16 per 100,000 compared to an average across all marine aviation of 3.10 though that was a bit skewed by the AV-8 having an accident rate of 31.77 per 100,000 (2.5x the accident rate of the Harrier II in RAF service).

P.S. As I am going away for a few weeks I sadly wont be able to read or respond to any replies until I get back
 
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They're going to have a really hard time getting over Boyle v. United Technologies:

1988 was a very long time ago. Back then, the XV-15 was an exceptionally successful concept demonstrator. Perhaps too successful. Over the decades, the Osprey has gained quite the reputation for a widowmaker, deserved or not. There was even a fatality where the airframe didn’t crash. Standard procedure was/is(?) apparently to leave the ramp down during takeoffs to make it easier to ditch. After an engine out warning, a crew member jumped out and was lost at sea while the pilot apparently recovered from the engine out. The recent fleet wide grounding means that there’s every reason to expect that a lawsuit might get to discovery instead of being summarily dismissed. Boeing’s current spiral doesn’t help but the limitation of COD Ospreys to operation within 50 miles of a divert airfield is the icing on the cake. When an aircraft of such protracted development and long service can’t safely operate over more than a 50 mile radius, there has to be a serious concern on the part of the Navy. I would consider this to be a good faith lawsuit and not entirely frivolous. It all depends on the initial judge. These days the law is a coin toss.
 
I doubt the U.S. government will just dump the platform regardless of a judicial outcome. Both investment and lack of suitable replacement in period of increasing tensions make that a very unlikely scenario.
 
I doubt the U.S. government will just dump the platform regardless of a judicial outcome. Both investment and lack of suitable replacement in period of increasing tensions make that a very unlikely scenario.
Honestly, I think the discovery process of a lawsuit would allow our elected leaders to move forward an Osprey replacement. Boeing might even get the contract. Looking back, Boeing’s own Model 360 was the lowest risk CH-46 replacement. Oddly enough the existing CH-47 has always had the ability to perform a water landing like a Sea King and all it really lacked were a few simple marinisation anti-corrosion measures. With the Marine Corp shifting to a defensive orientation, basically holding Pacific Islands as opposed to taking them, an interim CH-47 fleet might slot in nicely below the CH-53K. You could even resell them to allies if something better comes along. Throw in a proportion of Sikorsky S-70 derivatives and you have a relatively cheap and low risk fix for the Osprey. Or just replace the entire Osprey fleet with the V-280. All it takes is a little political courage to put the Osprey saga behind us.

I’m not even sure that Boeing has any substantial liability regarding the Osprey. The discovery process might even restore the reputation of the company, as I suspect the fundamental issues with the Osprey might have been adequately disclosed to the Pentagon by Boeing and/or Bell engineers. Generation old political decision and flawed operational requirements should be easy enough to admit after the decision makers have been retired for decades.

Personally, I’m more supportive of Boeing than most during these trying times. I would have gladly flown on a 737 Max even during the grounding, as the crashes were the result of foreign flight crews who didn’t or couldn’t read or understand the flight manual.
 
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Honestly, I think the discovery process of a lawsuit would allow our elected leaders to move forward an Osprey replacement. Boeing might even get the contract. Looking back, Boeing’s own Model 360 was the lowest risk CH-46 replacement. Oddly enough the existing CH-47 has always had the ability to perform a water landing like a Sea King and all it really lacked were a few simple marinisation anti-corrosion measures. With the Marine Corp shifting to a defensive orientation, basically holding Pacific Islands as opposed to taking them, an interim CH-47 fleet might slot in nicely below the CH-53K. You could even resell them to allies if something better comes along. Throw in a proportion of Sikorsky S-70 derivatives and you have a relatively cheap and low risk fix for the Osprey. Or just replace the entire Osprey fleet with the V-280. All it takes is a little political courage to put the Osprey saga behind us.
CH47s are the size of an H53. Much bigger than an H46!
 
CH47s are the size of an H53. Much bigger than an H46!
Flight deck size doesn’t matter as much in a largely defensive Marine Corp strategy that focuses on holding islands rather than taking them. In other words, more emphasis is based on land based assets.
 
Flight deck size doesn’t matter as much in a largely defensive Marine Corp strategy that focuses on holding islands rather than taking them. In other words, more emphasis is based on land based assets.
Still using those flight decks to get to the islands to be held.

Also, if you use H47s or H53s, you have to get ships within 200nmi of the island you're holding for the moment. V22s can start flying to the islands when they're 390nmi away.
 
Range/radius is the crucible of the Pacific. As good as CH-47 is, its range and speed are very limited in that region. They can be made to go further, carrying less, but you put twice the hours on the platform to go anywhere. Twice the time on the passengers as well.
 
Congressman from the great state of anywhere -"So General, with these MV-22 attack variant, we can get rid of the Harriers, right?"
Commandant: "No, congressman, these replace the AH-1 Cobras that cannot keep up with the Ospreys. Harriers are about twice the speed of the AV22, and carry different weapons. So they do a different job. Harriers do what the USAF calls 'interdiction,' stopping the enemy before he's gotten into close contact with our troops. AV22s do close air support as if they're a helicopter."
 
Perhaps this is going a bit off topic, but how often were USMC AH-1s expected to perform the sort of nap-of-earth flight tank hunting that US Army AH-1s and AH-64s trained to do? I know USMC aviation is all about close-air-support, but depending on enemy SHORAD a typical "gunship" attack profile might not work. The AV-22 might have offered a major improvement over the AH-1 while simultaneously being less ideal for some specific cases.

Of course, the funding was never going to be there for it. IIRC the AH-1W Super Cobra itself came into existence because the USMC couldn't get the funds for shiny new AH-64s, so I don't think there was any way in hell the money would be found for AV-22s.
 
Perhaps this is going a bit off topic, but how often were USMC AH-1s expected to perform the sort of nap-of-earth flight tank hunting that US Army AH-1s and AH-64s trained to do? I know USMC aviation is all about close-air-support, but depending on enemy SHORAD a typical "gunship" attack profile might not work. The AV-22 might have offered a major improvement over the AH-1 while simultaneously being less ideal for some specific cases.

Of course, the funding was never going to be there for it. IIRC the AH-1W Super Cobra itself came into existence because the USMC couldn't get the funds for shiny new AH-64s, so I don't think there was any way in hell the money would be found for AV-22s.
What I've seen of Marine helicopters is that they tend to stay moving instead of stopping in a hover somewhere
 
I always believed they flew a 'shoot and scoot' profile from behind cover. Show the mast and nothing else.
 

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