Could HMAS Australia have been saved from scrapping ?

[Owens Z]

DK Brown, The Grand Fleet. I can't recall off hand whether there's anything in Friedman.

...Just looking at Brisbane, that's basically double the UK's build time - and you are talking about ships 3 times the size and more complex!
So in my original post I was considering that the Australians would NOT have even the first completed by the start of the WNT negotiations - and might not have even launched it yet!

Recently I was able to read the book cited by commenters here, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 by David K Brown (Chatham, 1999), at the local public library. Tony DiGiulian of NavWeaps had given this book a tepid review < https://www.amazon.com/gp/review/R2T03Y56LVD4GA?ref=pf_ov_at_pdctrvw_srp >, but I found it enjoyable and informative. Author Brown (1928-2008), who was a naval architect himself, credits Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt, the RN's famous Director of Naval Construction, for the 1913 'E2' and related cruiser designs mentioned in this thread (pp60-67). This book does not clarify what I had queried in post #145: which particular model of 9.2-inch gun was intended for the E2 design.

The book states (p163) that D'Eyncourt invented anti-torpedo bulges—I didn't know that. The specific prompt for this invention isn't mentioned other than the outbreak of WW1 (in early August 1914), but probably the disastrous Action of 22 September 1914, when small submarine U-9 torpedoed and sank the 'Live Bait Squadron' of armored cruisers HMS Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy with heavy loss of life, was on D'Eyncourt's mind. "From autumn 1914 bulges were incorporated in the design of all new classes of large ship" for the Royal Navy (p164).

Because an E2 or similar ship laid down in 1913 would not have the benefit of bulges and 1914-18 combat experience (and wartime developments like geared turbines, etc.), I think such a vessel for the Royal Australian Navy would turn out to be another lemon, like battlecruiser HMAS Australia. Instead, I posited ships laid down after the Armistice so those could incorporate the above, but BlackBat objects that having such ships ready before the Washington Naval Treaty is implausible, and perhaps he's right. An alternative would be to squeeze an E2 or similar design down to fit the Treaty's <10,000 ton standard displacement limit. However, this would result in more-or-less the two County-class heavy cruisers that the RAN actually got in the 1920's, or alternate-history tweaks like two Cockatoo cruisers. So not really worth fussing about.

 

[Archdude]

A thought, convert her into a seaplane carrier and depot ship, maybe a mother ship for torpedo boats.

An off-topic idea, based on another Alexander Clarke video, instead of doing anything with Australia and instead of buying the three modified Leanders, modernise all four Town Class Cruisers.

Basically rebuild them as destroyer leaders in the 1930s, the latest destroyer machinery, 4.7" twins, maybe a couple of 4" twins, and 21" torpedoes. Keep Albatross and the two Oberons with the money saved, and reap the benefits of an upsized, upskilled shipbuilding workforce.

This workforce could maybe have completed all the originally planned eight Tribal class destroyers, maybe even following them with a modified Dido.

Interesting ideas!!

 

[Volkodav]

Australian industry and infrastructure grew very rapidly during the early 1900s, with major upgrades to CoDock only undertaken in 1908. The third River Class destroyer being partially in the UK and transported to Australia for completion in 1911, and the three ships of the second batch being built in Australia. The first two Town Class cruisers were built in the UK and the second pair in Australia, Adelaides completion being significantly delayed due to the loss of critical forging in transit from the UK due to enemy action during the war.

Post war there was the cost of the war, the effects of the Spanish Flu and the transfer of more ships from the UK than the RAN could afford to operate. So basically no need to build anything, other than the two treaty cruisers intended to replace the battlecruiser. This, for all intents and purposes, killed Australian shipbuilding, other than a seaplane carrier and a couple of sloops and boom defence vessels, before the Tribal class destroyers were ordered in a panic in the late 30s.

There is no way Australia could have built a battlecruiser prior to the Washington Treaty.

That said, it could be argued that Australia could have license built County class cruisers locally instead of buying them from the UK. The ideal between the wars RAN was described as a Cruiser and Sloop fleet, yet much effort was spent on destroyers and submarines, as well as the seaplane carrier. Maybe the best option would have been to stick to the cruiser and sloop plan, and establish a continuous build of 10000ton cruisers and sloops, no surplus ships, no destroyers, no submarines.

The RAN, like the other commonwealth navies, were closely integrated with the RN, RAN personnel could have served with the RN on destroyers and submarines, even aircraft carriers, building expertise. The Australian Squadron would however operate modern cruisers and sloops, built locally as part of a continuous build program that could be rapidly expanded to destroyers as well.

Potentially Australia could also expand to build everything, including armour, turbines and up to 8" guns (although Australia also used shore based 9.2" guns ). Another possibility could be an Australian build of a Unicorn, definitely not an aircraft carrier, but a well and truly justified "Forward Aviation Support Ship"

 

[Dilandu]

Maybe the best option would have been to stick to the cruiser and sloop plan, and establish a continuous build of 10000ton cruisers and sloops, no surplus ships, no destroyers, no submarines.

No destroyers - means no escorts for the cruisers, no coastal defense, no ability to launch a torpedo attack. No submarines - means no capability of hampering enemy lines of communications. Not reasonable.

 

[Archdude]

Australian industry and infrastructure grew very rapidly during the early 1900s, with major upgrades to CoDock only undertaken in 1908. The third River Class destroyer being partially in the UK and transported to Australia for completion in 1911, and the three ships of the second batch being built in Australia. The first two Town Class cruisers were built in the UK and the second pair in Australia, Adelaides completion being significantly delayed due to the loss of critical forging in transit from the UK due to enemy action during the war.

Post war there was the cost of the war, the effects of the Spanish Flu and the transfer of more ships from the UK than the RAN could afford to operate. So basically no need to build anything, other than the two treaty cruisers intended to replace the battlecruiser. This, for all intents and purposes, killed Australian shipbuilding, other than a seaplane carrier and a couple of sloops and boom defence vessels, before the Tribal class destroyers were ordered in a panic in the late 30s.

There is no way Australia could have built a battlecruiser prior to the Washington Treaty.

That said, it could be argued that Australia could have license built County class cruisers locally instead of buying them from the UK. The ideal between the wars RAN was described as a Cruiser and Sloop fleet, yet much effort was spent on destroyers and submarines, as well as the seaplane carrier. Maybe the best option would have been to stick to the cruiser and sloop plan, and establish a continuous build of 10000ton cruisers and sloops, no surplus ships, no destroyers, no submarines.

The RAN, like the other commonwealth navies, were closely integrated with the RN, RAN personnel could have served with the RN on destroyers and submarines, even aircraft carriers, building expertise. The Australian Squadron would however operate modern cruisers and sloops, built locally as part of a continuous build program that could be rapidly expanded to destroyers as well.

Potentially Australia could also expand to build everything, including armour, turbines and up to 8" guns (although Australia also used shore based 9.2" guns ). Another possibility could be an Australian build of a Unicorn, definitely not an aircraft carrier, but a well and truly justified "Forward Aviation Support Ship"

Much of this discussion requires discussion of the political will and economic reality during the 1930s.

 

[Volkodav]

No destroyers - means no escorts for the cruisers, no coastal defense, no ability to launch a torpedo attack. No submarines - means no capability of hampering enemy lines of communications. Not reasonable.

Australia had no submarines, having traded the two Oberons back to the RN as part payment for the three modified Leanders. There were only five WWI vintage destroyers that served well but were supplement and replaced by locally built Tribal Class destroyers and transferred / Australian crewed N and Q class destroyers built during the war.

What I was proposing was Australia concentrate on building, crewing and operating cruisers and sloops between the wars, while maintaining skills on destroyers, submarines, and ideally, aircraft carriers, by seconding personnel to the RN between the wars. Possibly Australia could provide entire crews to the RN for some of their submarines destroyers and cruisers, maybe Australian officers could serve as squadron and flotilla commanders building their experience base prior to the war.

During the war Australia built three Tribal class destroyers, many Bathhurst class corvettes and several River class frigates. They received one County class cruiser to replace the lost HMAS Canberra, as well as several destroyers.

Infrastructure set up to build cruisers and sloops between the wars would have been able to deliver far more during the war than occurred. Having a greater number of cruisers and sloops early in the war would have been very useful, and having personnel trained by and experienced in working with the RN destroyer and submarine forces would have been invaluable in commissioning new build ships in the early war years.

 

[EwenS]

The wartime destroyer transfers (5xN & 2xQ) and 20 of the Bathursts, were RAN manned by agreement but remained RN property and under RN control. So they spent most of their time in the Med, IO and Pacific as part of RN fleets. The RAN did not control them except as noted below.


Some of the Bathursts were loaned to the RAN in the early days until the RAN could build up its escort forces.

Shropshire was a different case. She was a gift to Australia as a replacement for Canberra. So she, like Australia, the Tribals, Aussie built Rivers and the rest of the Bathursts were Australian property under RAN control.

The distinction is important.

In Oct 1945, the 4 surviving N class went back to the RN via crew swaps in Australia with the 3 remaining RN manned Q class in the BPF. All 5 Q class were then transferred to RAN control. But at that stage they were on loan to the RAN. In 1950 the transfer of all 5 was made permanent.

 

[Archdude]

The wartime destroyer transfers (5xN & 2xQ) and 20 of the Bathursts, were RAN manned by agreement but remained RN property and under RN control. So they spent most of their time in the Med, IO and Pacific as part of RN fleets. The RAN did not control them except as noted below.


Some of the Bathursts were loaned to the RAN in the early days until the RAN could build up its escort forces.

Shropshire was a different case. She was a gift to Australia as a replacement for Canberra. So she, like Australia, the Tribals, Aussie built Rivers and the rest of the Bathursts were Australian property under RAN control.

The distinction is important.

In Oct 1945, the 4 surviving N class went back to the RN via crew swaps in Australia with the 3 remaining RN manned Q class in the BPF. All 5 Q class were then transferred to RAN control. But at that stage they were on loan to the RAN. In 1950 the transfer of all 5 was made permanent.

Interesting!

 

[Oberon_706]

Oberon, you started this interesting thread, and have read everybody's comments, but you haven't yet told us what you yourself think about the topic, "could HMAS Australia have usefully been saved from scrapping [sic] in 1924?"

My main gripe with the sacrificing of Australia in solidarity with Mother England [and the spirit of disarmament and naval arms control] has always been the loss of a credible deterrent capability, rather than its efficacy [potential or fanciful] in the interbellum or any particular sentimentality for the ship itself. In 1914, Australia's mere presence in the South Pacific was enough to cause Von Spee's Squadron [minus the SMS Emden] to abandon the Pacific to the Allies and run for South America, Cape Horn and a risky passage home via the South Atlantic. This was the role for which the 'Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser' was conceived and Australia [along with Invincible & Inflexible later at the battle of the Falklands] performed it with aplomb. Despite this, I firmly believe that for Australia to remain effective even in the mid-late 1920s--for such was the march of technological progress during the war--a major refit that was completely beyond the resources and will of her eponymous nation was necessary. To remain effective, Australia would have needed [at a minimum] bulging, repowering with oil-fired high pressure boilers + geared turbines and for such measures to allow a top speed of min. 28 knots. She would also have needed the addition of modern fire control and dual-purpose secondary armament + a nominal aviation capability for scouting and artillery correction. Even then, she would still be easily outgunned by the Kongo's and be easily outmaneuvered by any enemy cruiser she could potentially be required to interdict. I do not believe that such an investment would have created a viable platform that was worth the cost, even for an effective post-refit life of only 7-10 years. Far better would have been a negotiated clause in the treaty that allowed Australia to receive one of the 13.5" Battle Cruisers as a replacement for Australia, and for that vessel [be it Lion or Princess Royal] to be an exemption from Britain's tonnage total [bring the Statute of Westminster forward in history by 20-ish years to achieve it if needs be]. A refitted Lion/Princess Royal would have been the equal or better of a Kongo and would have been able to comfortably handle almost any 'treaty cruiser' built in the USA or Japan before the late-1930s.

A thought, convert her into a seaplane carrier and depot ship, maybe a mother ship for torpedo boats.

An off-topic idea, based on another Alexander Clarke video, instead of doing anything with Australia and instead of buying the three modified Leanders, modernise all four Town Class Cruisers.

Basically rebuild them as destroyer leaders in the 1930s, the latest destroyer machinery, 4.7" twins, maybe a couple of 4" twins, and 21" torpedoes. Keep Albatross and the two Oberons with the money saved, and reap the benefits of an upsized, upskilled shipbuilding workforce.

This workforce could maybe have completed all the originally planned eight Tribal class destroyers, maybe even following them with a modified Dido.

Discounting the possibility of a retained and refitted Lion/Princess Royal, I believe the best thing Australia could have done in the interbellum was to extend what it already pursued. Instead of just two County cruisers, we should have had three or four, perhaps building one ourselves after completing Adelaide to maintain and enhance the capabilities of the naval shipbuilding workforce at Cockatoo Island. If four fully equipped County cruisers were too great a drain on post-war finances, we should have complemented the two we received with a local build of 1-2 Type-B/York class rather than building Albatross. Additionally, we should have constructed sloops at a rate of 2-3 every 4-5 years from the mid-20's and submarines/light cruisers at a rate of 1-2 of each every 4 years from the introduction of the Leander/Arethusa & Odin class designs respectively. We should have also strongly advocated for the 'Singapore Strategy' to become a 'Fremantle Strategy' even offering to share the costs of establishing the requisite dockyard facilities. An Aircraft Carrier could be permanently based there, jointly equipped with RN and RAN-FAA squadrons, forward-deploying into the South Pacific and South China Sea together with RN and RAN Cruiser forces.

An inter-war RAN that, by the London Naval Conference, boasts a capable shipbuilding sector supporting and extending a fleet comprised of at least: 1 Carrier (attached from the RN and jointly manned), 3-4 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser (plus 1-2 more in build) 3-6 modern sloops and a flotilla each of Destroyers and Submarines is a force to be reckoned with that is affordable, agile and readily expandable as war clouds gather and rearmament kicks up a notch from 1935 onwards.

Perhaps by 1939 the RAN could then field:

- 1 x Aircraft Carrier [Joint RN/RAN asset]
- 4 x Heavy Cruiser [County and York classes]
- 4 x Light Cruiser [Arethusa class]
- 5 x Legacy Destroyers [V/W-class]
- 9 x Modern Destroyers in build/on order [Tribal-class]
- 4-6 Submarines [O-class or newer]
- 9-12 Sloops [Bridgewater-class or newer]
- 2 x Modern Depot ships [Submarines & Destroyers]

 

[Archdude]

My main gripe with the sacrificing of Australia in solidarity with Mother England [and the spirit of disarmament and naval arms control] has always been the loss of a credible deterrent capability, rather than its efficacy [potential or fanciful] in the interbellum or any particular sentimentality for the ship itself. In 1914, Australia's mere presence in the South Pacific was enough to cause Von Spee's Squadron [minus the SMS Emden] to abandon the Pacific to the Allies and run for South America, Cape Horn and a risky passage home via the South Atlantic. This was the role for which the 'Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser' was conceived and Australia [along with Invincible & Inflexible later at the battle of the Falklands] performed it with aplomb. Despite this, I firmly believe that for Australia to remain effective even in the mid-late 1920s--for such was the march of technological progress during the war--a major refit that was completely beyond the resources and will of her eponymous nation was necessary. To remain effective, Australia would have needed [at a minimum] bulging, repowering with oil-fired high pressure boilers + geared turbines and for such measures to allow a top speed of min. 28 knots. She would also have needed the addition of modern fire control and dual-purpose secondary armament + a nominal aviation capability for scouting and artillery correction. Even then, she would still be easily outgunned by the Kongo's and be easily outmaneuvered by any enemy cruiser she could potentially be required to interdict. I do not believe that such an investment would have created a viable platform that was worth the cost, even for an effective post-refit life of only 7-10 years. Far better would have been a negotiated clause in the treaty that allowed Australia to receive one of the 13.5" Battle Cruisers as a replacement for Australia, and for that vessel [be it Lion or Princess Royal] to be an exemption from Britain's tonnage total [bring the Statute of Westminster forward in history by 20-ish years to achieve it if needs be]. A refitted Lion/Princess Royal would have been the equal or better of a Kongo and would have been able to comfortably handle almost any 'treaty cruiser' built in the USA or Japan before the late-1930s.

Discounting the possibility of a retained and refitted Lion/Princess Royal, I believe the best thing Australia could have done in the interbellum was to extend what it already pursued. Instead of just two County cruisers, we should have had three or four, perhaps building one ourselves after completing Adelaide to maintain and enhance the capabilities of the naval shipbuilding workforce at Cockatoo Island. If four fully equipped County cruisers were too great a drain on post-war finances, we should have complemented the two we received with a local build of 1-2 Type-B/York class rather than building Albatross. Additionally, we should have constructed sloops at a rate of 2-3 every 4-5 years from the mid-20's and submarines/light cruisers at a rate of 1-2 of each every 4 years from the introduction of the Leander/Arethusa & Odin class designs respectively. We should have also strongly advocated for the 'Singapore Strategy' to become a 'Fremantle Strategy' even offering to share the costs of establishing the requisite dockyard facilities. An Aircraft Carrier could be permanently based there, jointly equipped with RN and RAN-FAA squadrons, forward-deploying into the South Pacific and South China Sea together with RN and RAN Cruiser forces.

An inter-war RAN that, by the London Naval Conference, boasts a capable shipbuilding sector supporting and extending a fleet comprised of at least: 1 Carrier (attached from the RN and jointly manned), 3-4 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser (plus 1-2 more in build) 3-6 modern sloops and a flotilla each of Destroyers and Submarines is a force to be reckoned with that is affordable, agile and readily expandable as war clouds gather and rearmament kicks up a notch from 1935 onwards.

Perhaps by 1939 the RAN could then field:

- 1 x Aircraft Carrier [Joint RN/RAN asset]
- 4 x Heavy Cruiser [County and York classes]
- 4 x Light Cruiser [Arethusa class]
- 5 x Legacy Destroyers [V/W-class]
- 9 x Modern Destroyers in build/on order [Tribal-class]
- 4-6 Submarines [O-class or newer]
- 9-12 Sloops [Bridgewater-class or newer]
- 2 x Modern Depot ships [Submarines & Destroyers]

I do not think Japan would have approved any increase in Britain's allotments, it would have taken it as a future threat.

 

[Oberon_706]

I do not think Japan would have approved any increase in Britain's allotments, it would have taken it as a future threat.

Of course [Probably the USA too if we're real about the situation], hence my mentioning the Statute of Westminster. Completing the devolution of Australian self-governance would have given its politicians and diplomats the ability to successfully argue that the RAN was a sovereign force not necessarily beholden to the will of the British, and that, like Spain, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, it could possess a dreadnought [such as Princess Royal or Lion] without it necessarily being a tool of the British to wield at their discretion. The Japanese would find it much harder to argue against that, and such a move towards 'self-determination' by a component of the British Empire would tickle the anti-colonial sentiments of the US congress, making it harder for them to argue against it either. Similar arguments apply today regarding home-grown or Chinese objections to the AUKUS submarines and other US-developed military assets being acquired and operated by the ADF. Whatever the naysayers opine, they are Australian sovereign assets to be wielded as the government sees fit. As long as that choice is real and not preordained, there is no argument to be made.

Besides, one battle cruiser [two words; not one] is hardly the titanic shift in the regional balance of power that Australia's acquisition was in the 1910s. At that stage, Japan was a treaty-bound ally of the British Empire, not a potential threat, and the only nominally hostile force in the region [the German one] was in all ways inferior. The situation in 1922 was completely different, Japan was free of its treaty obligations, expansionist and--thanks to the treaty--being given reason to hold a grudge. If they complain about it, let them keep another ship [as long as it's not one of the new generation ships under construction]. Retaining Settsu or Kawachi is hardly going to tip the scales in a real fight. With or without those two 12" relics, Japan's fleet [if it chose to use even a fraction of its strength] would completely overwhelm the RAN in the absence of British or American intervention. The difference is a risk-reward calculus - at what cost can we do this or that, and what price can we extract from them in doing so? Discounting the battle cruiser, as I mentioned previously, another way to introduce that deterrent effect is to base the British Far East/China fleet Down Under [either in Sydney or Fremantle] and structure the Australian fleet as a ready adjunct to that command. One could still forward base in Singapore or Hong Kong but have the major maintenance and logistics infrastructure here.

As Dr. Alex Clarke has often discussed on his YouTube channel, the County and Town class cruisers of the interwar era were biased toward the kind of presence patrolling [and, in wartime, offensive/defensive Commerce warfare] that Far East operations demanded. The carriers [Hermes and Eagle, later to be replaced by the 'Aviation Support' carrier, Unicorn] were an integral part of that strategy. Australian acquisition/funding of a second Far East Carrier [either an improved Hermes in the 20s or a 2nd Ark Royal/Unicorn in the 30s] and a supporting Cruiser Squadron would be a major change in the calculus. Instead of one RN carrier task group [augmented by the RAN], now you would have two, providing contingency for us and a significantly escalated risk for them.

 

[DWG]

the County and Town class cruisers of the interwar era were biased toward the kind of presence patrolling [and, in wartime, offensive/defensive Commerce warfare] that Far East operations demanded. The carriers [Hermes and Eagle, later to be replaced by the 'Aviation Support' carrier, Unicorn] were an integral part of that strategy.

Unicorn's role as a maintenance carrier was to support the airgroups of a couple of other carriers in forward deployed operations, not to replace the carriers themselves. She could operate as a CVL, as seen at Sicily, but that was intended to be a secondary usage*, her primary job was as part of the fleet train.

* So secondary Perseus and Pioneer gave up the ability to actually use their flightdecks.

 

[Oberon_706]

In wartime [and in the context of actual events], yes, that is true. Reading about her genesis and listening to Drachinifel and Alex Clarke talk about her, however, gives me the impression that Unicorn was intended to be more than a 2nd LNT-compliant 'Auxilliary', nor was she meant to be one of a kind. Dr Clarke does a bit of reading between the lines in the following videos, give them a look if you haven't already:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTm9Xa0aufo

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1snBrUEjZQg

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB7u-mqwxSc&t=187s&pp=ygUoZHJhY2hpbmlmZWwgaW50ZXJ3YXIgcm95YWwgbmF2eSBjcnVpc2Vycw%3D%3D


Note that, historically, a major issue with the deployment of modern airpower into the far east was the lack of maintenance and logistics support, a structural/operational weakness that Unicorn [and any sister carriers that were to have been built had the RN not so readily adhered to the 'spirit' of 2nd LNT] was meant to ameliorate.

 

[Owens Z]

My main gripe with the sacrificing of Australia in solidarity with Mother England [and the spirit of disarmament and naval arms control] has always been the loss of a credible deterrent capability, rather than its efficacy [potential or fanciful] in the interbellum or any particular sentimentality for the ship itself. In 1914, Australia's mere presence in the South Pacific was enough to cause Von Spee's Squadron [minus the SMS Emden] to abandon the Pacific to the Allies and run for South America, Cape Horn and a risky passage home via the South Atlantic. This was the role for which the 'Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser' was conceived and Australia [along with Invincible & Inflexible later at the battle of the Falklands] performed it with aplomb. Despite this, I firmly believe that for Australia to remain effective even in the mid-late 1920s--for such was the march of technological progress during the war--a major refit that was completely beyond the resources and will of her eponymous nation was necessary. To remain effective, Australia would have needed [at a minimum] bulging, repowering with oil-fired high pressure boilers + geared turbines and for such measures to allow a top speed of min. 28 knots. She would also have needed the addition of modern fire control and dual-purpose secondary armament + a nominal aviation capability for scouting and artillery correction. Even then, she would still be easily outgunned by the Kongo's and be easily outmaneuvered by any enemy cruiser she could potentially be required to interdict. I do not believe that such an investment would have created a viable platform that was worth the cost, even for an effective post-refit life of only 7-10 years. Far better would have been a negotiated clause in the treaty that allowed Australia to receive one of the 13.5" Battle Cruisers as a replacement for Australia, and for that vessel [be it Lion or Princess Royal] to be an exemption from Britain's tonnage total [bring the Statute of Westminster forward in history by 20-ish years to achieve it if needs be]. A refitted Lion/Princess Royal would have been the equal or better of a Kongo and would have been able to comfortably handle almost any 'treaty cruiser' built in the USA or Japan before the late-1930s.
Discounting the possibility of a retained and refitted Lion/Princess Royal, I believe the best thing Australia could have done in the interbellum was to extend what it already pursued. Instead of just two County cruisers, we should have had three or four, perhaps building one ourselves after completing Adelaide to maintain and enhance the capabilities of the naval shipbuilding workforce at Cockatoo Island. If four fully equipped County cruisers were too great a drain on post-war finances, we should have complemented the two we received with a local build of 1-2 Type-B/York class rather than building Albatross. Additionally, we should have constructed sloops at a rate of 2-3 every 4-5 years from the mid-20's and submarines/light cruisers at a rate of 1-2 of each every 4 years from the introduction of the Leander/Arethusa & Odin class designs respectively. We should have also strongly advocated for the 'Singapore Strategy' to become a 'Fremantle Strategy' even offering to share the costs of establishing the requisite dockyard facilities. An Aircraft Carrier could be permanently based there, jointly equipped with RN and RAN-FAA squadrons, forward-deploying into the South Pacific and South China Sea together with RN and RAN Cruiser forces.
An inter-war RAN that, by the London Naval Conference, boasts a capable shipbuilding sector supporting and extending a fleet comprised of at least: 1 Carrier (attached from the RN and jointly manned), 3-4 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser (plus 1-2 more in build) 3-6 modern sloops and a flotilla each of Destroyers and Submarines is a force to be reckoned with that is affordable, agile and readily expandable as war clouds gather and rearmament kicks up a notch from 1935 onwards.
Perhaps by 1939 the RAN could then field:
- 1 x Aircraft Carrier [Joint RN/RAN asset]
- 4 x Heavy Cruiser [County and York classes]
- 4 x Light Cruiser [Arethusa class]
- 5 x Legacy Destroyers [V/W-class]
- 9 x Modern Destroyers in build/on order [Tribal-class]
- 4-6 Submarines [O-class or newer]
- 9-12 Sloops [Bridgewater-class or newer]
- 2 x Modern Depot ships [Submarines & Destroyers]

Thanks, Oberon, for your expanded comments. I find that I am basically in agreement with you. I concur that the UK's 13.5-inch/45 Mark V was a successful, hard-hitting gun, especially after less-brittle Greenboy shells were available toward the end of the First World War. I am less taken with the Lion-class battlecruisers than you and Volkodav are: "improved" half-sister HMS Queen Mary blew up after just four shell hits at Jutland, killing almost her entire crew. In fact it was the next class, heavier HMS Tiger, which was the peer of Japan's British-designed Kongos. Robust Tiger endured sixteen German shells at Jutland yet kept moving and fighting. Discussed in a different thread is the speculative 1939-45 career of Tiger (in real life she was sadly scrapped in 1932 to comply with the London Naval Treaty), and I mentioned there your expressed interest in having that battlecruiser transferred to the Royal Australian Navy in time for intense WW2 service, which I endorse.

Deterrence is good, to a point, but your expectations for Australian deterrence appear to far surpass the one example you provide. Yes, Von Spee wisely didn't want his Ostasiengeschwader getting anywhere near HMAS Australia and her 12" guns. When SMS Emden dared to raid Australia's Cocos Islands in Nov 1914, light cruiser HMAS Sydney caught and sank her. Your if/then logic is unclear, but the implied "therefore" that the expanded RAN fleet you detail (or the four battlecruisers [!] that Dilandu wants, or whatever) could possibly have deterred the 1941-42 Japanese onslaught against Australia, or deterred World War 2 altogether, is unrealistic. I have been interested in plausible alternate-history mixes of the RAN's ships not because those would prevent the war: they won't. But instead, to make Australia's unavoidable wartime fighting at least a bit easier. Australia did of course win WW2 with what it had, and as mentioned earlier, I am open to the idea that what it had was—considering the true circumstances and all feasible alternatives—about the best the nation could have done.

Yet in post # 148 above I agreed with Volkodav's view that judicious investments in Australian shipbuilding during the 1920s and 30s could have improved the RAN in WW2 and also helped the nation's general economic growth. While more money would be needed from Australian taxpayers, that money would be spent in Australia, rather than overseas. Oberon, four heavy cruisers for 1939-45 instead of the two of real history (HMAS Canberra, sunk off Guadalcanal, and the second HMAS Australia) sounds challenging, but still within the bounds of possibility, given the will. Especially as seen in hindsight, choosing an Australian port (instead of Singapore) as the Royal Navy's principal Far East base, and forward-deploying an aircraft carrier and, in due time, Force Z there seems strategic and might have saved many British and Australian lives, in addition to further boosting Australia's economy. The British believed His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore would deter Japan and be the impregnable 'Gibraltar of the East'—didn't turn out that way.

 

[Owens Z]

I do not think Japan would have approved any increase in Britain's allotments, it would have taken it as a future threat.

Archdude, the Washington Naval Treaty (as all signatories had agreed) expired at the end of 1936, and as far as I can tell, none of Oberon's ship numbers (while challenging financially) would contravene the London Naval Treaty or the Second London Naval Treaty before those lapse with the outbreak of the Second World War in Sept 1939, assuming as I do that the one aircraft carrier he mentions is an existing forward-deployed RN unit (I believe carrier-capable ANZAC planes and pilots before 1944 to be implausible). And assuming as I do (and I think Oberon does here too) that during the Washington Naval Treaty's negotiations in 1921-22, the independent country of Australia had taken pains to ensure its navy was legally separate from the Royal Navy's tonnage totals, with one capital ship allowed. The latter assumption breaks from real history, but due to the fact that battlecruiser HMAS Australia already existed, and remembering the goodwill during the immediate aftermath of the "war to end all wars", when Japan was allied with the UK and Australia and (as mentioned in post #148 above) had three of its cruisers overhauled at His Majesty's Australian Dockyard Cockatoo Island in Sydney, this doesn't seem too unreasonable. But let me know if I'm mistaken about legalities.

I agree with you that later, Japan's attitude toward Australia and the British Empire turned predatory. Japan walked out of the negotiations of the Second London Naval Treaty and never signed.

 

[Owens Z]

You cannot compare the naval facilities in Australia in 1945 with even that of 1939 let alone earlier in time.
The RN chose Singapore over Sydney in the 1920s to build a new RN Dockyard facility. But even in 1945 Australia couldn't cope with all the needs of the BPF.
Brisbane - Cairncross Dry Dock 800ft x 110ft. construction stared in Sept 1942, receiving its first ship in June 1944. When it opened it couldn't be used for the largest ships due to problems with access from the Brisbane River.
Sydney - Captain Cook Dry Dock and associated facilities. Approved in principle by Federal Govt in 1938. Construction started in 1941. HMS Illustrious was the first ship to use it on 2 March 1945 when she arrived in Australia.
Such was the shortage of dry docking facilities in Australia in 1945, especially in Sydney, that the battleship Howe had to be sent to Durban, South Africa in June for a 3 month refit. Destroyers and cruisers were being sent to Auckland in New Zealand due to lack of facilities in Australia. The two worst damaged ships, destroyers Ulster & Quilliam, were sent back to the UK. 3 destroyer sized floating docks had to be towed from Iceland, Britain & Malta to augment the docking facilities in Australia.
As for Chile, when the Admiral Latorre required modernisation in the late 1920s she spent nearly two years between 1929 and 1931 having the work carried out in Britain. Having been built in the USA the two Argentinian battleships Moreno & Rivadavia each spent spent 2-3 years between 1923 & 1926 being modernised in the USA. So these countries were definitely limited in the work that their home bases could carry out on them.
Edit - think about the various cruisers damaged in 1942/43 in the Solomons. Achilles and Leander both RNZN, New Orleans and Minneapolis from USN and Hobart RAN come immediately to mind. Some were patched up in Australia before being sent to US or Britain for full repairs. Only Hobart was fully repaired and had her AA modernised in Australia Aug 1943 to Dec 1944.

Point taken, EwenS. A decision in the early 1920's to put the UK's main Far East base in an Australian port instead of in Singapore, in addition to the economic benefits for Down Under and the eventual effects on the disastrous Malaya/Singapore Campaign and the fate of Force Z, would presumably have also mitigated some of these problems with the British Pacific Fleet's 1945 sojourn in Australia that you mention. Speeding up the integration that was coming anyway, to both Australia's and the UK's profit. A lost opportunity?

 

[Owens Z]

Now it's just 'The Treasury', we don't embellish the Royal part these days but it may have been different in the 20s. After all we didn't get our own Governor General until the 30s or ratify the 1931 Statute of Westminster until 1942.

Much of this discussion requires discussion of the political will and economic reality during the 1930s.

...bring the Statute of Westminster forward in history by 20-ish years to achieve it if needs be...

This interesting thread is about alternate history, but in the real life that must constrain our musings, during the interwar period there seems to have been little or no actual interest inside Australia in paying the modest funds needed to keep battlecruiser HMAS Australia operational; in expanding the nation's prewar/WW1 expertise in shipbuilding and repair by, for example, erecting a single heavier-lift crane; in retaining a submarine service; in other defense spending; or even (as Rule of cool points out) in more clearly asserting its independence. So again, maybe what Australia had to work with at the beginning of WW2 was about all that could have plausibly been done.

 

[Owens Z]

...battle cruiser [two words; not one]...

Nope.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This interesting thread is about alternate history, but in the real life that must constrain our musings, during the interwar period there seems to have been little or no actual interest inside Australia in paying the modest funds needed to keep battlecruiser HMAS Australia operational; in expanding the nation's prewar/WW1 expertise in shipbuilding and repair by, for example, erecting a single heavier-lift crane; in retaining a submarine service; in other defense spending; or even (as Rule of cool points out) in more clearly asserting its independence. So again, maybe what Australia had to work with at the beginning of WW2 was about all that could have plausibly been done.

Honestly, that's what surprises me the most.

How expensive was it to send the RAN ships clear back to the UK to be refitted? Compared to building up the ability to do those refits at home? Not just financial costs, there's also the cost of not having your ships around for months at a time.

 

[Oberon_706]

Nope.

Reference to Alex Clarke's habit of defining pre-1918 Battle Cruisers [that is to say, thin-skinned Dreadnought Armoured Cruisers of the HMS Invincible lineage] vs Fully-Armoured Battlecruisers/Fast Battleships [of which HMS Hood was arguably the first] which came later.

 

[Oberon_706]

I am less taken with the Lion-class battlecruisers than you and Volkodav are: "improved" half-sister HMS Queen Mary blew up after just four shell hits at Jutland, killing almost her entire crew. In fact it was the next class, heavier HMS Tiger, which was the peer of Japan's British-designed Kongos.

The loss of Queen Mary [as with that of the other Battle Cruisers lost at Jutland] was proven to be attributable to 'relaxed' ammunition and propellant handling procedures in Adm. Beatty's Command aimed at increasing rates of fire at the expense of safety. Nowhere have I read that the Lion/Queen Mary class's armour scheme was to blame. All Battle Cruisers were under-armoured relative to receiving fire from similar or superior ships - that's an inescapable fact, but let's not misplace blame here; Lion received just as much [if not more] enemy attention/damage as any of the ships lost on that day and survived. Relative armour protection had precious little to do with it.

Would it be nice to have a ship as relatively well-armoured as Tiger gitfted to the RAN? Yes! Absolutely. However, the RAN was never going to succeed in getting her 'gifted' to them before the early '30s as she was still very much a valued RN asset and was even then intended to remain in RN commission until at least 1930. Lion and Princess Royal, on the other hand, were destined for the scrapheap unless saved by virtue of being gifted to Australia, hence my suggestion of these ships. Their comparative firepower and speed vis-a-vis a Kongo makes them a credible prospect, especially after a thorough refit had increased their armour, repowered them and, likely, increased the elevation/range of their guns.

Deterrence is good, to a point, but your expectations for Australian deterrence appear to far surpass the one example you provide. Yes, Von Spee wisely didn't want his Ostasiengeschwader getting anywhere near HMAS Australia and her 12" guns. When SMS Emden dared to raid Australia's Cocos Islands in Nov 1914, light cruiser HMAS Sydney caught and sank her. Your if/then logic is unclear, but the implied "therefore" that the expanded RAN fleet you detail (or the four battlecruisers [!] that Dilandu wants, or whatever) could possibly have deterred the 1941-42 Japanese onslaught against Australia, or deterred World War 2 altogether, is unrealistic. I have been interested in plausible alternate-history mixes of the RAN's ships not because those would prevent the war: they won't. But instead, to make Australia's unavoidable wartime fighting at least a bit easier. Australia did of course win WW2 with what it had, and as mentioned earlier, I am open to the idea that what it had was—considering the true circumstances and all feasible alternatives—about the best the nation could have done.

My musings in the previous post expanded far beyond the scope of the original question - so don't overthink that exploration of theoreticals. If the question at hand is limited to 'What replaces HMAS Australia to create a viable deterrent in the manner that the former was pre-war?' then the retention of either Lion or Princess Royal is one theoretical I deem to be viable, and the formation of a 'Carrier-Cruiser' squadron permanently based in Australian waters [of similar composition and strength to the RN's pre-war China Squadron [1 CV [Eagle], 4-6 Cruisers, 1 DD Flotilla, 1-2 Submarine Flotillas]] is a second.

Context: No new build carriers were produced for the RN between the commissioning of Hermes in 1924 and the completion of Ark Royal nearly 15 years later. I've always taken this fact to be a failure of RN procurement policy in this period. In the second theoretical, I envisage a new WNT-compliant 'light' carrier design, iterated from Hermes being built and fielded in the late 1920s to replace Argus and provide an additional carrier for the Far East/RAN. Building two more Improved Hermes class would stay within the restrictions of WNT and is therefore quite plausible as the OTL RN never built up to or exceeded their tonnage allowance for Carriers under either WNT or 1st LNT. Hermes could operate an airgroup of 20 aircraft, allowing a demi-squadron each of Fighter and Torpedo/Recce aircraft, or, two demi-squadrons of fighters for pure fleet defence to be embarked.

Note: Neither theoretical is a panacea in/of itself, but both introduce an adverse risk calculus into the mind of the IJN admirals that isn't there otherwise. In the first instance, any incursion into Australia's area of interest requires the IJN to bring at least two Kongo class [or larger] as not even a couple of 8" refitted Mogami's will trump a modernised 13.5" Battle Cruiser if the latter can match their 25km range at max. elevation. In the second theoretical, the IJN now have to bring a carrier of their own [perhaps even a multi-carrier task group] to ensure overmatch, let alone mission success and will likely still lose ships either to air attack, or, more likely, submarine attack in the effort [OTL Japanese ASW was woeful so 15-20 RN/RAN submarines lurking around the Philippine sea and the Dutch East Indies is actually far more of a deterrent to the IJN than one demi-squadron of fairey swordfish/albacores would be...].

Context: In 1937, the RNs' China Station was furnished with 1 Carrier [HMS Eagle], 4 x Heavy Cruisers [all County class], 2 x large light cruisers [Town class], a demi-flotilla of destroyers and 15 submarines [all relatively modern O, P & R classes]. Japanese ASW was so bad that in 1940, just before being recalled to the Med Flt to combat the Italians, R class sub. HMS Regulus conducted a cruise into Japanese home waters and conducted intimate recces of several major ports + tagged along to observe and report on a full IJN fleet exercise, all completely undetected. The first the Japanese knew of it was when their intelligence section discovered the mission reports and photographs after the surrender of Singapore.

 

[Oberon_706]

the Washington Naval Treaty (as all signatories had agreed) expired at the end of 1936, and as far as I can tell, none of Oberon's ship numbers (while challenging financially) would contravene the London Naval Treaty or the Second London Naval Treaty before those lapse with the outbreak of the Second World War in Sept 1939, assuming as I do that the one aircraft carrier he mentions is an existing forward-deployed RN unit (I believe carrier-capable ANZAC planes and pilots before 1944 to be implausible).

As I've explored above, Carrier numbers and tonnages are OTL treaty compliant. All other ship class acquisitions in the 2nd theoretical would also be compliant as the RN never hit the tonnage limits or max. numbers for any of its ship classes [save for Battleships/Battle Cruisers]. RAN carrier pilots and planes would have been a natural extension of a different attitude to naval policy between the wars, which is a necessary prerequisite if either of these theoreticals is to be given any credence whatsoever. Saying that ANZAC carrier aircraft and pilots are unrealistic pre-1944 is therefore incompatible with the premise under which we are entertaining these thoughts.

 

[Scott Kenny]

My musings in the previous post expanded far beyond the scope of the original question - so don't overthink that exploration of theoreticals. If the question at hand is limited to 'What replaces HMAS Australia to create a viable deterrent in the manner that the former was pre-war?' then the retention of either Lion or Princess Royal is one theoretical I deem to be viable, and the formation of a 'Carrier-Cruiser' squadron permanently based in Australian waters [of similar composition and strength to the RN's pre-war China Squadron [1 CV [Eagle], 4-6 Cruisers, 1 DD Flotilla, 1-2 Submarine Flotillas]] is a second.

Honestly, the RAN probably should have been looking at that kind of force as the minimum. I'd personally want some more cruisers and destroyers for patrolling around separate of the core Squadron.

 

[Oberon_706]

Honestly, that's what surprises me the most.

How expensive was it to send the RAN ships clear back to the UK to be refitted? Compared to building up the ability to do those refits at home? Not just financial costs, there's also the cost of not having your ships around for months at a time.

Cockatoo Island Dockyard was a very capable facility and well able to undertake all but the most comprehensive refits and repairs on RAN ships. The floating crane Titan had a max. lift capacity of 150-tons, so could be used to remove/replace guns on the County class cruisers if required, and even unship a turret if said turret was partly dismantled and removed in several lifts. HMAS Australia was dry docked in Sydney several times during its short life [Sunderland Dock was just big enough].

Any choice to refit in the UK would have been due to the work involved being completely beyond Cockatoo's means, or, more likely, due to the fact the ship in question happened to be in the euro-atlantic anyway, which happened periodically between the wars when RAN ships were rotationally seconded to operate with the RN for training and familiarisation purposes.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Cockatoo Island Dockyard was a very capable facility and well able to undertake all but the most comprehensive refits and repairs on RAN ships. The floating crane Titan had a max. lift capacity of 150-tons, so could be used to remove/replace guns on the County class cruisers if required, and even unship a turret if said turret was partly dismantled and removed in several lifts. HMAS Australia was dry docked in Sydney several times during its short life [Sunderland Dock was just big enough].

If you cannot lift the complete turret, you need to build a bigger crane.

 

[Oberon_706]

Honestly, the RAN probably should have been looking at that kind of force as the minimum. I'd personally want some more cruisers and destroyers for patrolling around separate of the core Squadron.

Agreed. As I've previously indicated, RAN [and its supporting infrastructure/supply chain] was too weak for what it was required to protect - and far too dependant on RN support. This is not to say that I think it should have been capable of fending off the Japanese on its own, that's not realistic at all, but it's not unrealistic to consider a far stronger RAN in the Interbellum to be an achievable prospect.

Historically, only 2 x Heavy and 1 x Light cruiser [pre-1938] was far too small a force to be credible, there is no spare capacity at all, rendering the force of negligible worth under the rule-of-three viability precept. The 2nd-hand demi-flotilla of destroyers was always a cadre capability, not really a credible one [the exploits of the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla' in the Med notwithstanding], after all, post 1924 they had no capital asset to escort! The RAN's go-stop-go-stop attempts to retain a submarine capability were equally half-hearted. Even so, I consider the decision to trade-in the two O-class boats as part payment for Sydney, Perth and Hobart to be a grave error. In light of the importance of submarines to RN pre-war doctrine in the far east, the RAN should have doubled down, not given up. Imagine the effect a few RAN submarines, forward deployed [with a tender/depot ship] to Christmas Island and patrolling the Dutch East Indies could have had in repairing the fortunes of ABDA command in early 1942!

 

[Scott Kenny]

Agreed. As I've previously indicated, RAN [and its supporting infrastructure/supply chain] was too weak for what it was required to protect - and far too dependant on RN support. This is not to say that I think it should have been capable of fending off the Japanese on its own, that's not realistic at all, but it's not unrealistic to consider a far stronger RAN in the Interbellum to be an achievable prospect.

100% agree here. If you want to claim it, you need to enforce the claim. Same issue with Canada. Country too physically big for the economy to produce an adequate defense force.

The RAN's go-stop-go-stop attempts to retain a submarine capability were equally half-hearted. Even so, I consider the decision to trade-in the two O-class boats as part payment for Sydney, Perth and Hobart to be a grave error. In light of the importance of submarines to RN pre-war doctrine in the far east, the RAN should have doubled down, not given up. Imagine the effect a few RAN submarines, forward deployed [with a tender/depot ship] to Christmas Island and patrolling the Dutch East Indies could have had in repairing the fortunes of ABDA command in early 1942!

Given what the USN did with their subs, I would assume that there'd be a lot less flags painted on the wall sunk by the USN around Oz...

There's a wall inside the SUBPAC office that has a 3x5" flag painted everywhere a Japanese ship was sunk in the Pacific. I don't think it's public view, but next time I'm in Hawaii I'm going to try to get a picture of it.

 

[Oberon_706]

If you cannot lift the complete turret, you need to build a bigger crane.

Probably, but Australia made do until WWII pretty well. Even then, historically, Battleship/Battlecruiser turrets were never lifted intact, even in the UK and continental USA [a twin 8" turret on a County class Heavy Cruiser such as Australia [II], Canberra or Shropshire weighed over 170 tons [over 250 tons if one includes the barbette/trunk] - the Hammerhead crane at Garden Island had a max. cap. of 250 tons, its max. recorded lift was 227 tons. For boilers and turbines, shafts, props and other predictable refit-associated lifts, Titan's 150-ton cap. was more than sufficient for anything the RAN operated, even the post-war light fleet carriers [which also, incidentally, fitted in the Sunderland Dock on Cockatoo Island]. It only became insufficient once major capital units of the RN Pacific Fleet became regular visitors during the final two years of the war.

 

[BlackBat242]

Australian large drydocks WW1-WW2:

Cockatoo Island, Sydney: Fitzroy Dock (1880): 643 feet (196 m) 76 feet (23 m) in breadth, with an entrance 60 feet (18 m) wide.
Sutherland Dock (1890): 695 feet (212 m) long, 88 feet (27 m) in breadth (entrance 84 feet (25.6 m)) and 32 feet (9.75 m) in depth.
Morts, Sydney: Woolwich Dock (1901) 675 feet long, 83 feet wide, 28' depth

In the 1919 Jane's there is an entry under Australia for: "private docks &c"
that includes" Fremantle (W. Australia) Dry dock, originally designed as 594 feet long, but enlarged to 694 feet and may be now 910 x 100 x 34 feet (L,W,O.S), divisible into two sections (Dreadnought).

A number of years ago I was informed by a native Australian poster on another forum that this didn't exist, but I can't remember or find exactly what he said - I wonder if this was a privately-owned/built floating dock that was either scrapped or sold off out of Australia.

 

[Oberon_706]

Australian large drydocks WW1-WW2:

Cockatoo Island, Sydney: Fitzroy Dock (1880): 643 feet (196 m) 76 feet (23 m) in breadth, with an entrance 60 feet (18 m) wide.
Sutherland Dock (1890): 695 feet (212 m) long, 88 feet (27 m) in breadth (entrance 84 feet (25.6 m)) and 32 feet (9.75 m) in depth.
Morts, Sydney: Woolwich Dock (1901) 675 feet long, 83 feet wide, 28' depth

In the 1919 Jane's there is an entry under Australia for: "private docks &c"
that includes" Fremantle (W. Australia) Dry dock, originally designed as 594 feet long, but enlarged to 694 feet and may be now 910 x 100 x 34 feet (L,W,O.S), divisible into two sections (Dreadnought).

A number of years ago I was informed by a native Australian poster on another forum that this didn't exist, but I can't remember or find exactly what he said - I wonder if this was a privately-owned/built floating dock that was either scrapped or sold off out of Australia.

Definitely no Dry Dock in Fremantle, not even in more recent times. The South Mole slipways (at the mouth of the Swan River and today forming part of the WA Maritime Museum) were constructed between 1940-1942 for the support of the naval and merchant shipping - the largest slip being 600ft long and having a winch capacity of 2000 tons, perfect for the slipping of RAN Destroyers/sloops/corvettes and USN Submarines.

Elsewhere in Australia...
- Melbourne: Duke and Orrs Drydock, Port Melbourne [310 ft x 54 ft]; Alfred Dock, HMA Dockyard, Williamstown [420 ft x 79 ft]
- Brisbane: South Brisbane Dry Dock, Brisbane River [430 ft x 79 ft]

WWII-built facilities
- Cairncross Dock, Brisbane River [800 ft x 110 ft]
- King George V Dock, Garden Island, Sydney Harbour [1138 ft x 147 ft]

 

[Owens Z]

The loss of Queen Mary [as with that of the other Battle Cruisers lost at Jutland] was proven to be attributable to 'relaxed' ammunition and propellant handling procedures in Adm. Beatty's Command aimed at increasing rates of fire at the expense of safety. Nowhere have I read that the Lion/Queen Mary class's armour scheme was to blame. All Battle Cruisers were under-armoured relative to receiving fire from similar or superior ships - that's an inescapable fact, but let's not misplace blame here; Lion received just as much [if not more] enemy attention/damage as any of the ships lost on that day and survived. Relative armour protection had precious little to do with it.

Regarding the three British battlecruisers that exploded with dreadful loss of life during Jutland, including HMS Indefatigable, sister-ship of HMAS Australia: I wasn't there, and I hesitate before contravening respected authorities like Norman Friedman, Lawrence Burr, etc., but no, nothing has been "proven", Oberon. HMS Warspite famously endured fifteen German shell hits at Jutland without exploding, and Warspite (with the rest of 5th Battle Squadron) was in Vice-Admiral David Beatty's command. But we don't have to look to a battleship to compare-and-contrast. As mentioned earlier, battlecruiser Tiger (about the same dimensions as the Lions, with the same eight 13.5-inch guns, but two thousand tons heavier partly due to improved protection), presumably with identical "relaxed ammunition and propellant handling procedures aimed at increasing rates of fire at the expense of safety" as Beatty's other ships, absorbed fifteen heavy shells plus a smaller 149mm without exploding. Explanation? One hit blew in the armored roof of the third (Q) turret, and although that turret was silenced, Tiger continued to zealously steam and fight. After its own Q turret was penetrated by a German shell, Beatty's flagship Lion was moments away from becoming the fourth exploding battlecruiser of that day, except dying Francis Harvey ordered Q's magazine flooded. Harvey was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross explicitly for saving the ship.

After Jutland, the Royal Navy decided to take the time and trouble to add considerable weight of new armor around the magazines of all surviving battlecruisers, and to thicken their turret roofs. The authorities there on the spot must have disagreed with your contention that "relative armour protection had precious little to do with [the losses]". And they hurriedly redesigned HMS Hood to add more protection, in vain as it turned out. To blame Beatty, who died in 1936, for the 1941 loss of Hood from a mere two 380mm shell hits (after one 203mm), once again killing almost all the crew, would be a reach.

You say "nowhere have I read that the Lion/Queen Mary class's armour scheme was to blame". Coincidentally, I recently finished Stephen Roskill's comprehensive biography of Beatty. Roskill does write (pp190-91) Beatty "considered that the additional protection [added to his battlecruisers after Jutland] was inadequate and did not 'compensate for radical defects in design' which in his opinion the battle had revealed. Though Beatty probably also had in mind the damage suffered by Lion in the Dogger Bank action, when her armour protection had failed against 11- and 12-inch shells, the loss of three of his battle cruisers at Jutland may have been attributable to faults in the make-up of cordite charges and in the drill used to get them from the magazines to the guns rather than to inadequate armour protection... The emphasis placed by Beatty among others on achieving the highest possible rate of fire resulted in thoroughly dangerous practices being adopted in the magazines and handling rooms, such as stacking charges at the bottom of the hoists."

But author Roskill criticizes (pp186-87) naval historian Arthur J Marder who stated "that 'There is at least no firm proof that the German armour was superior to British', and castigates what he calls 'the legend' of our battle cruisers' 'indifferent protection'—which ignores Beatty's grave concern over the failure of Lion's 5-inch side armour against a German 11-inch shell at the Dogger Bank action... Marder also considers that even if British armour was 'indifferent to moderate' it probably was 'no more than a contributory factor' to the loss of the three ships on 31st May 1916... Though the manufacture and testing of armour is a complicated story all the evidence of the 1914-18 war points to the inadequacy of our ships' protection as well as to the inefficiency of our armour-piercing shell... Thus there is at the very least a possibility that penetration of the weak and inadequate British armour caused an internal explosion (e.g. in a secondary armament magazine) which spread quickly to the highly vulnerable main armament cordite supply system, and so blew up the ships; and that may have happened in the case of Hood in 1941 as well as at Jutland. In sum there is no doubt that Beatty was right to point to the inadequacy of his ship's protection in 1915, and the whole question of ship design, including the manufacture and testing of armour plate, during the Fisher era at the Admiralty is open to question."

"Proven" that design choices had little or nothing to do with the losses? No. Rather, warship designs demonstrated to be deficiently protected against anything more formidable than a cruiser (battlecruiser designers in Germany, by obvious contrast, did better). Keep the glass-jawed Lion- and Courageous-class ships far away from Australia, for its own good.

 

[Owens Z]

Would it be nice to have a ship as relatively well-armoured as Tiger gitfted to the RAN? Yes! Absolutely. However, the RAN was never going to succeed in getting her 'gifted' to them before the early '30s as she was still very much a valued RN asset and was even then intended to remain in RN commission until at least 1930. Lion and Princess Royal, on the other hand, were destined for the scrapheap unless saved by virtue of being gifted to Australia, hence my suggestion of these ships. Their comparative firepower and speed vis-a-vis a Kongo makes them a credible prospect, especially after a thorough refit had increased their armour, repowered them and, likely, increased the elevation/range of their guns.

Regarding Oberon's latest alternate-history scenario (without commenting about how realistic his conjecture is): if Down Under is allowed its free pick in 1923 from among all the numerous British warships scheduled for deletion due to the signed Washington Naval Treaty, then I suggest selecting two of the Orion-class battleships instead of Lions, accompanied by a freighter-load of spare barrels and new Greenboy 13.5-inch shells rescued from the scrapheap. Warehoused in Australia, those munitions should last the RAN for some time. While we're being ebullient, take the opportunity to give some additional 13.5-inch guns to the Australian Army, to set in concrete emplacements (Darwin? Christmas Island?) and also, though I've heard Australia's railways were not well integrated until long after WW2, a few rail mountings. Continental defense on the cheap.

If Oberon's scenario is delayed till 1930, and Australia is allowed its pick of British ships deleted due to the signed London Naval Treaty, then select battlecruiser HMS Tiger (and again a freighter-load of 13.5 ammo and spares). Or instead, claim battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg (refloated in Scapa Flow in 1930) and refurbish her for the RAN.

 

[Owens Z]

My musings in the previous post expanded far beyond the scope of the original question - so don't overthink that exploration of theoreticals. If the question at hand is limited to 'What replaces HMAS Australia to create a viable deterrent in the manner that the former was pre-war?' then the retention of either Lion or Princess Royal is one theoretical I deem to be viable, and the formation of a 'Carrier-Cruiser' squadron permanently based in Australian waters [of similar composition and strength to the RN's pre-war China Squadron [1 CV [Eagle], 4-6 Cruisers, 1 DD Flotilla, 1-2 Submarine Flotillas]] is a second.

I see better now what you mean by 'viable deterrent', Oberon; thank you. The definition I had in mind, '(successful) deterrence = absence of fighting', appears to be more restrictive than your usage of the word. As you know, battlecruiser HMAS Australia did not prevent combat in the Pacific during WW1: Von Spee's squadron bombarded Papeete and fought the Battle of Coronel off Chile, and later raider Wolf lurked around Australia and New Zealand. By extension of the battlecruiser's example, the powerful RAN fleet that you advocate, while not preventing WW2, would "make Australia's unavoidable wartime fighting at least a bit easier". Perhaps you and I are closer here than I thought.

 

[EwenS]

Everyone seems to have the idea that Darwin was some great port in the inter war /WW2 period. It wasn't.

The population of Darwin in 1941 was about 5,000-6,000. With evacuations that reduced to about 2,000-2,300 by the time it was bombed in Feb 1942.

It was very isolated compared with today. Between 1878 and 1929 a railway was built in fits and starts in difficult conditions between Port Augusta in South Australia and Alice Springs. There was then a nearly 600 mile gap to Birdum, where another rail line completed in 1929 ran the 300 miles to Darwin.

Otherwise transport connections were via the Stuart Highway. The Alice Springs to Birdum section was only upgraded from an often impassable track to an all weather sealed road completed in Dec 1940.

So virtually all materials and supplies had to come in by sea, from Fremantle or Brisbane.

Very few ships were intended to be accommodated there in pre-war Admiralty plans - 1 Battleship, 1 Carrier, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers. It was intended as an anchorage not a port. No dry docks but neither did Trincomalee until a battleship sized floating dock, built in India, turned up in 1944. That was nothing like the plans actually implemented in large part at Singapore with the large King George VI dry dock opened in 1938, a battleship sized floating dock plus another smaller floating dock plus repair and maintenance facilities.

Then there is the question of oil. In 1936 the oil storage available to the Admiralty in the whole of Australia and New Zealand total “about 120,000 tons”. By way of comparison Singapore had 1.328 million tons of storage with plans for another 500,000 tons of underground storage some of which was implemented before Dec 1941. Trincomalee had storage for another 1.248 million tons and Colombo another 72,000 tons. Plans for underground oil storage at Darwin weren’t begun until after the Feb 1942 raids.
https://www.ozatwar.com/bunkers/oiltunnelsdarwin.htm

By Dec 1941 there had been some expansion of fuel storage there to 11 tanks, 7 of which were destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1942, mostly by land based bombers.

As for the defences, some information here about WW2.

Darwin, Anti-submarine Indicator Loop Defences, Royal Australian Navy

Antisubmarine controlled mining defences at Darwin during WW2.

indicatorloops.com

So unless your "what if" involves a complete development of a naval dockyard, there is virtually nothing to defend at Darwin.

 

[Oberon_706]

Owens Z.

Two points:

Point 1:
I use the word proven because, first and foremost, I’m not an academic, and second, in the absence of direct access to primary source material, I rely on the consistently expressed views of multiple respected authorities—Friedman, Burt, Roberts, Marder, et al.—as more than sufficient evidence of an actual or likely truth. My participation in these discussions isn’t driven by any need to argue them to the hilt—after all, this forum focuses on alternate history and speculative scenarios, not rigid academic analysis. I’d rather keep things civil, enjoyable and constructive than get bogged down in a depressing debate over pedantics. I present the following in support of my previous and will say no more on the issue after this;
To me, there is no real debate over the fact that ALL British battlecruisers from Invincible to Renown/Repulse were built with the understanding that they lacked the protection necessary to stand up to ships of comparable or superior armament in a line-of-battle engagement. The fundamentals of their conception deliberately sacrificed armor in favor of heavier armament and greater speed. Their use as the scouts and fast wing of the Grand Fleet during WWI ran counter to the limitations inherent in their design and to the principles on which they were built. If anything, the appearance of the first directly comparable German battlecruiser—Von der Tann—should have signaled the need to abandon the concept entirely in favor of pursuing a true fast battleship. First Generation Battlecruisers like Invincible and her sisters could have stayed as genuine 'Armoured Cruisers/Cruiser Killers' and new designs be developed for complementing the Battle Fleet after the completion of Indefatigable. But that wasn’t the course taken. The decision to send such ships to sea as part of the Grand Fleet was therefore the first and greatest failure, with their inadequate armor simply being an inseparable part of that broader issue. All British ships that took fire at Dogger Bank and Jutland were penetrated by opponents whose calibre and weight of shot was inferior to their own. Friedman in 'The British Battleship 1906-1946' references the royal navy's actions and the views of the DNC [d'Eyncourt] on damage incurred to surviving battlecruisers [incl. Tiger]. He notes several observances/findings in Chapter 10:

After Jutland, the Royal Navy immediately moved to address the vulnerabilities exposed in its battlecruiser force.

• The most significant reform was the strict enforcement of ammunition-handling safety protocols:
  • The practice of storing additional cordite outside magazines was banned.
  • Anti-flash precautions were restored and reinforced.
  • Turret/barbette designs were modified to better contain/diffuse internal explosions and prevent them from reaching the magazines.
• Additionally, all British capital ships underwent armor upgrades, including:
  • Thicker turret, barbette and magazine protection (Turrets/barbettes don't have room for internal splinter protection, therefore such armour increases were necessary to deflect incoming shells, or, prematurely trigger their bursting charge).
  • Enhanced deck armor, addressing concerns about plunging fire (although Friedman notes that DNCs post-Jutland analysis dismissed plunging fire as the decisive threat that Beatty said it was).

Friedman’s assessment (one that is in keeping with all other authors I've read) is clear:

• The primary cause of the British battlecruiser losses at Jutland was reckless ammunition-handling practices, not simply thin armor.
• Unsafe relaxations of magazine protocols—made in pursuit of higher sustained rates of fire—directly led to the catastrophic explosions that sank Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible.
• The design flaws of British battlecruisers played a role, but these ships were never intended to be used in prolonged engagements against analogous battlecruisers, much less battleships. Their losses were as much a failure of doctrine and tactical execution as of construction.
• German ships survived similar hits because of superior ammunition safety measures, proving that structural protection alone was not the decisive factor. That said, excluding catastrophic magazine explosion as a cause of ship loss, no other British Battleship or battlecruiser was immobilised or lost whilst the Germans lost Lutzow and very nearly lost Seydlitz. Several other German ships were severely damaged, taking far longer to return to the fleet than their British equivalents and rendering questionable any notion that German armour schemes and construction were better than the British ones.
• Post-Jutland reforms in the Royal Navy focused on restoring safety protocols and improving protection, ensuring that British capital ships would not suffer similar disasters in future engagements.
• In light of an acceptance that plunging fire was not all it was cooked up to be, and that safety protocols were the key factor, the decision to delay/redesign Hood and cancel her three sisters looks like overkill. Friedman expressed the view that, in cancelling the three Admirals in favour of a clean-sheet approach, the Royal Navy was choosing to gamble on getting something better over something it probably could have had quite successfully (imagine what changes if the RN enters into the WNT negotiations with Hood and her three sisters complete and in service!).

Point 2:
As regards the core issue of the suitability of Lion or Princess Royal (suitably upgraded and modernised) for adoption by the RAN in the interwar years, something to keep in mind;
As previously stated, the RN would never let Tiger go. She was the insurance policy for the battlecruiser fleet, allowing, in the absence of the Admirals or the G3s, one ship to be docked for maintenance/refit whilst still maintaining an available strength of three hulls. As the next best battlecruiser in the fleet after Renown/Repulse and Hood, and given WNT limitations on hull numbers and overall tonnage, Tiger is the only option for the British and, therefore, indispensable. As such, I have not seriously considered her in the context of our discussion, unless one operates on the premise that she doesn't become available until the mid-1930s.

Further to this, I find your suggestion of retaining Orion class BBs for the RAN to be a significantly inferior choice to a battlecruiser. None of the RN 'Super-Dreadnought' classes of 13.5-inch Battleships were capable of a more than 21-ish knots and even if beneficiaries of an Italian Navy-scale reconstruction (including repowering and a new bow, possibly the most outlandish and unrealistic suggestion we've given airtime to in this discussion), I don't envisage them getting to more than 23-24 knots. Given the primary opponent for any RAN Capital ship is the IJN Kongos (battlecruisers) and their growing and potent force of cruisers, a slow battleship, despite being nominally more survivable, seems a very poor choice to me.

 

[Oberon_706]

Regarding Oberon's latest alternate-history scenario (without commenting about how realistic his conjecture is): if Down Under is allowed its free pick in 1923 from among all the numerous British warships scheduled for deletion due to the signed Washington Naval Treaty, then I suggest selecting two of the Orion-class battleships instead of Lions, accompanied by a freighter-load of spare barrels and new Greenboy 13.5-inch shells rescued from the scrapheap. Warehoused in Australia, those munitions should last the RAN for some time. While we're being ebullient, take the opportunity to give some additional 13.5-inch guns to the Australian Army, to set in concrete emplacements (Darwin? Christmas Island?) and also, though I've heard Australia's railways were not well integrated until long after WW2, a few rail mountings. Continental defense on the cheap.

If Oberon's scenario is delayed till 1930, and Australia is allowed its pick of British ships deleted due to the signed London Naval Treaty, then select battlecruiser HMS Tiger (and again a freighter-load of 13.5 ammo and spares). Or instead, claim battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg (refloated in Scapa Flow in 1930) and refurbish her for the RAN.

The idea of SMS Hindenberg being refloated and resurrected like Frankenstein's maritime monster is pretty out there and unrealistic, even more than the RAN retaining 1-2 Orions instead of a Battlecruiser. If you're going down that path, i'd suggest you think about a scenario that allows the retention of the incomplete Mackensen class ships as potential future aircraft carrier conversions - even that would be pushing it i think (I don't think that any ex-german battleship or battlecruiser is seeing service in its originally intended guise under RN or RAN control in any remotely conceivable scenario).

I see better now what you mean by 'viable deterrent', Oberon; thank you. The definition I had in mind, '(successful) deterrence = absence of fighting', appears to be more restrictive than your usage of the word. As you know, battlecruiser HMAS Australia did not prevent combat in the Pacific during WW1: Von Spee's squadron bombarded Papeete and fought the Battle of Coronel off Chile, and later raider Wolf lurked around Australia and New Zealand. By extension of the battlecruiser's example, the powerful RAN fleet that you advocate, while not preventing WW2, would "make Australia's unavoidable wartime fighting at least a bit easier". Perhaps you and I are closer here than I thought.

I've never explored these possibilities under the premise that Australia would be able to acquire a post-WWI 'Deterrent' that would absolve it of any need to fight. The dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japan's relative naval strength renders this a frank impossibility. The goal therefore must be to inject a risk/loss calculus into any Japanese calculation that makes any move against Australian interests a very costly endeavour.

 

[1635yankee]

All these proposals run into a massive, possibly insurmountable problem: the signatories of the Washington treaty, including the UK, considered Australia's armed forces to be completely integrated into Commonwealth defense policy, which was nearly completely determined in Whitehall.

 

[Oberon_706]

Everyone seems to have the idea that Darwin was some great port in the inter war /WW2 period. It wasn't.

The population of Darwin in 1941 was about 5,000-6,000. With evacuations that reduced to about 2,000-2,300 by the time it was bombed in Feb 1942.

It was very isolated compared with today. Between 1878 and 1929 a railway was built in fits and starts in difficult conditions between Port Augusta in South Australia and Alice Springs. There was then a nearly 600 mile gap to Birdum, where another rail line completed in 1929 ran the 300 miles to Darwin.

Otherwise transport connections were via the Stuart Highway. The Alice Springs to Birdum section was only upgraded from an often impassable track to an all weather sealed road completed in Dec 1940.

So virtually all materials and supplies had to come in by sea, from Fremantle or Brisbane.

Very few ships were intended to be accommodated there in pre-war Admiralty plans - 1 Battleship, 1 Carrier, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers. It was intended as an anchorage not a port. No dry docks but neither did Trincomalee until a battleship sized floating dock, built in India, turned up in 1944. That was nothing like the plans actually implemented in large part at Singapore with the large King George VI dry dock opened in 1938, a battleship sized floating dock plus another smaller floating dock plus repair and maintenance facilities.

Then there is the question of oil. In 1936 the oil storage available to the Admiralty in the whole of Australia and New Zealand total “about 120,000 tons”. By way of comparison Singapore had 1.328 million tons of storage with plans for another 500,000 tons of underground storage some of which was implemented before Dec 1941. Trincomalee had storage for another 1.248 million tons and Colombo another 72,000 tons. Plans for underground oil storage at Darwin weren’t begun until after the Feb 1942 raids.
https://www.ozatwar.com/bunkers/oiltunnelsdarwin.htm

By Dec 1941 there had been some expansion of fuel storage there to 11 tanks, 7 of which were destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1942, mostly by land based bombers.

As for the defences, some information here about WW2.

Darwin, Anti-submarine Indicator Loop Defences, Royal Australian Navy

Antisubmarine controlled mining defences at Darwin during WW2.

indicatorloops.com

So unless your "what if" involves a complete development of a naval dockyard, there is virtually nothing to defend at Darwin.

I don’t see Darwin as a realistic option for a major naval presence. It lacks the necessary infrastructure, and the Timor and Arafura Seas are still considered too shallow and constrained for the free movement of major naval forces. While Darwin does serve as a key base for RAN and Border Force patrol boats, these are shallow-draft constabulary vessels, not blue-water warships. Even during WWII, Darwin’s primary role was as a supply transshipment point for materiel and troops heading north, rather than a base for fleet operations.


A major fleet base needs to be near a significant population center with established infrastructure, transport links, a local workforce, and reliable supply chains. That naturally leads to the historically used locations—Sydney, Brisbane, and Fremantle. The Americans did build up Manus Island as a major forward base during WWII, but it had almost no permanent supporting infrastructure, meaning everything had to be shipped in from Australia or the US.


The Cocos/Keeling Islands and Christmas Island face similar challenges of isolation and exposure, though their locations would be useful for monitoring and controlling shipping routes through the Dutch East Indies. With enough investment, Cocos could have been developed into something like Diego Garcia, but even then, sustaining a base there would have been a logistical challenge.


In my view, there are very few truly credible options for a major fleet base north of the Tropic of Capricorn. The two that might be considered are:


1] Gladstone, QLD – Well-placed on the east coast with existing infrastructure, deep-water access to the Coral Sea, and fewer restrictions from the Great Barrier Reef than Townsville or Cairns.


2] Broome, WA – A strategically located port with a sheltered anchorage and reasonable access to Indian Ocean trade routes. However, it suffers from isolation, a lack of supporting infrastructure, and extreme vulnerability to monsoons and cyclones.


Neither location would be ideal for a full-scale fleet base, but they could serve as forward staging points for refueling, rearming, and initial battle damage triage via depot ships and floating dry docks. Major maintenance and repairs would still need to be handled further south. Sydney and Brisbane would continue supporting forward bases at Gladstone and Manus Island, while Fremantle would serve as the primary hub for Broome and possibly Cocos Island.

 

[Oberon_706]

All these proposals run into a massive, possibly insurmountable problem: the signatories of the Washington treaty, including the UK, considered Australia's armed forces to be completely integrated into Commonwealth defense policy, which was nearly completely determined in Whitehall.

Correct. However, since this is an 'Alternate Universe and Future Speculation' thread, we've been leaning into the possibilities [within reason].


Historically, Australia dutifully followed Britain’s lead in almost all defense matters, and the Washington Naval Treaty negotiations were no exception. While Australia theoretically had the right to refuse the terms, it ultimately chose not to, prioritizing financial constraints, domestic policy concerns, and maintaining its good standing with Britain and other global powers. As a result, when the Royal Navy made its tonnage concessions under the treaty, Australia complied—sacrificing HMAS Australia without significant resistance.


At the time, this decision didn’t seem like a major loss. Defense budgets had already been drastically curtailed, and HMAS Australia had been laid up in reserve, never to sail under her own power again. The prevailing assumption—erroneous in hindsight—was that no significant threat to Australian interests would emerge that the might of the Royal Navy couldn’t handle. This belief was reinforced by faith in the planned ‘Singapore Strategy’, which was intended to compensate for Britain’s forced abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which (along with the humiliating effect of the treaty ratios on Japanese sensibilities and national pride) had the effect of turning Japan from an ally into a competitor.


However, reality played out very differently. The combination of the treaty’s restrictions and the economic devastation of the Great Depression meant that the Singapore base was never fully developed as originally envisioned and the Royal Navy was so weakened as to be unable to redeploy in the strength required when push came to shove. Worse still, Australia’s own fleet was not recapitalized to maintain even a fraction of the pre-war deterrent effect that HMAS Australia—as the most powerful surface warship in the southern hemisphere—had once represented. When the time came that Australia truly needed a modern fleet, it (like Great Britain) found itself dangerously underprepared and scrambling to catch up with the march of events.


But what if things had played out differently?


If Australia had taken a more independent stance—perhaps by formalising its self-determination a few years early through an accelerated Statute of Westminster and British Commonwealth framework—it could have approached the negotiations with greater agency and autonomy. This wouldn’t have meant outright defiance of the UK, nor would it necessarily have antagonised the US or Japan. Rather, it would have given Australia a stronger negotiating position to argue for its own strategic needs.


It is under this presumption that we have been exploring all the alternatives we have discussed in this thread.

 

[Owens Z]

As I've explored above, Carrier numbers and tonnages are OTL treaty compliant. All other ship class acquisitions in the 2nd theoretical would also be compliant as the RN never hit the tonnage limits or max. numbers for any of its ship classes [save for Battleships/Battle Cruisers]. RAN carrier pilots and planes would have been a natural extension of a different attitude to naval policy between the wars, which is a necessary prerequisite if either of these theoreticals is to be given any credence whatsoever. Saying that ANZAC carrier aircraft and pilots are unrealistic pre-1944 is therefore incompatible with the premise under which we are entertaining these thoughts.

Understood. But while alternate history can explore anything interesting; and while battlecruiser Australia did feature flying-off platforms for Sopwiths from 1918, and the two heavy cruisers bore a catapult for a small flying boat; and while I heard that there was indeed mild discussion in the 1920s about creating an Australian Fleet Air Arm; and while as you pointed out Cockatoo Dockyard built seaplane carrier HMAS Albatross, I still think your premise of a vigorous carrier-borne Arm in the 1930s is science fiction territory. However helpful an Australian FAA would have been for the coming world war, financial and political constraints back then made this unrealistic.