Could HMAS Australia have been saved from scrapping ?

[Owens Z]

Two points:
...Friedman’s assessment (one that is in keeping with all other authors I've read) is clear:

Thanks for this further info. No need to quote (fellow New Yorker) Norman Friedman to me; I've been a big fan for many years. In his biography of Beatty, author Stephen Roskill does mention that post-Jutland report of Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt (of whom I'm also a longtime fan: among other achievements, he foresightedly helped invent the tank). But Roskill noted archly, and I think with justice, that D'Eyncourt, as Director of Naval Construction since 1912, was perhaps not a disinterested authority to ask about battlecruiser design and construction flaws.

Despite the (unnecessary) vehemence of your response, I notice you have backed off the strict claims in your post # 221. That the disastrous explosion of three battlecruisers at Jutland was "as much a failure of doctrine and tactical execution as of construction" is more or less my own view. And the view of author John Roberts (if that's indeed the "Roberts" whom you cite). So we'll agree on that.

For my safety, I made a vow never to set foot aboard a British battlecruiser that isn't named Tiger, and I have kept that vow (in spirit, of course).

 

[Owens Z]

All these proposals run into a massive, possibly insurmountable problem: the signatories of the Washington treaty, including the UK, considered Australia's armed forces to be completely integrated into Commonwealth defense policy, which was nearly completely determined in Whitehall.

Oberon has already replied well to your statement, so I will just put in a word. The 'point of divergence from the real world's timeline' for the alternate worlds we are conjecturing would not be that, during the last week of the Treaty conference in Washington DC, the Australian delegate suddenly stands, waves his arms, and yells "No! No! We've changed our minds! We DON'T agree to any of this!" That would, in addition to being implausible, obviously not go over well with the other parties to the negotiation.

Instead, we conjecture that from immediately following the war in which ANZAC troops had bled for Britain, creating a debt, and in which Australia was a friendly ally of Japan, the USA, France, and Italy, Australian representatives publicly repeat again and again, politely yet insistently, that "we, with malice toward none and friendliness to all, have our own separate (purely defensive) navy", and point out the truth: "that we, unlike other Commonwealth navies, already have one capital ship, paid for by Australian taxpayers, commissioned before the war as 'HMAS', and manned by Australians". Okay, that last point is a bit of a fudge—but to retain a straight face is why diplomats are paid the big bucks. As discussed above, I and others believe Australia probably would have succeeded.

Had the will been present. All sources I have read state that no such will was present in the Australian government and/or navy at the time, just as you point out, 1635yankee. The alternate histories presented here necessarily include a goad for Australia to better prepare for the terrible war that we see coming, but the people of 1919-23 (except Ferdinand Foch) did not.

 

[1635yankee]

Since this is an alternate history, one thing needed would be for the UK to promote manufacturing in Australia. The tendency was to promote extractive industries and agriculture. That would need to start about 1880.

Doing so in India might also be a good idea.

 

[Owens Z]

Everyone seems to have the idea that Darwin was some great port in the inter war /WW2 period. It wasn't.
The population of Darwin in 1941 was about 5,000-6,000. With evacuations that reduced to about 2,000-2,300 by the time it was bombed in Feb 1942.
It was very isolated compared with today. Between 1878 and 1929 a railway was built in fits and starts in difficult conditions between Port Augusta in South Australia and Alice Springs. There was then a nearly 600 mile gap to Birdum, where another rail line completed in 1929 ran the 300 miles to Darwin.
Otherwise transport connections were via the Stuart Highway. The Alice Springs to Birdum section was only upgraded from an often impassable track to an all weather sealed road completed in Dec 1940.
So virtually all materials and supplies had to come in by sea, from Fremantle or Brisbane.
Very few ships were intended to be accommodated there in pre-war Admiralty plans - 1 Battleship, 1 Carrier, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers. It was intended as an anchorage not a port. No dry docks but neither did Trincomalee until a battleship sized floating dock, built in India, turned up in 1944. That was nothing like the plans actually implemented in large part at Singapore with the large King George VI dry dock opened in 1938, a battleship sized floating dock plus another smaller floating dock plus repair and maintenance facilities.
Then there is the question of oil. In 1936 the oil storage available to the Admiralty in the whole of Australia and New Zealand total “about 120,000 tons”. By way of comparison Singapore had 1.328 million tons of storage with plans for another 500,000 tons of underground storage some of which was implemented before Dec 1941. Trincomalee had storage for another 1.248 million tons and Colombo another 72,000 tons. Plans for underground oil storage at Darwin weren’t begun until after the Feb 1942 raids.
https://www.ozatwar.com/bunkers/oiltunnelsdarwin.htm
By Dec 1941 there had been some expansion of fuel storage there to 11 tanks, 7 of which were destroyed by Japanese bombing in 1942, mostly by land based bombers.
As for the defences, some information here about WW2.

Darwin, Anti-submarine Indicator Loop Defences, Royal Australian Navy

Antisubmarine controlled mining defences at Darwin during WW2.

indicatorloops.com

So unless your "what if" involves a complete development of a naval dockyard, there is virtually nothing to defend at Darwin.

I accept your detailed info, EwenS, but Darwin couldn't have been too inconsequential—the Imperial Japanese Navy chose that place as the target for their one and only mass carrier strike on the Australian mainland, on 19 February 1942. A force in Darwin could deter invasion and its harbor seems well positioned to support the eventual New Guinea Campaign. Darwin is 700 nautical miles from the airbase the Japanese established in Kendari on Sulawesi and hence was within range of the Mitsubishi twin-engine bombers there, which did strike Darwin repeatedly from February 1942 to mid-1943. The US Navy established Naval Base Darwin for its subs fleeing the Philippines, but the air strikes prompted a retreat to Exmouth Submarine Base (which in turn was bombed), and then to the Perth/Fremantle region. If Darwin was considered too exposed for a few subs and their diesel fuel supply, then capital ships would probably not be thought safe there.

On the other hand: the Royal Navy's 'far-flung' base at Scapa Flow is only 500 nautical miles from Germany. Luftwaffe planes bombed Scapa Flow starting 17 October 1939, three days after U-47 torpedoed and sank a battleship at anchor there. In his Osprey book Scapa Flow: Defences of Britain's Great Fleet Anchorage 1914-45, historian Angus Konstam (who lives in the area) points out that after the German conquest of Norway in 1940 brought Luftwaffe bases even closer to Scapa Flow, "no such raids ever materialized, although reconnaissance and minelaying sorties continued throughout the war" [p26]. Konstam believes that a mass air strike from Norway against the vulnerable capital ships and fuel oil storage tanks at Scapa was deterred by the hurried buildup of antiaircraft guns and fighter cover around the base. In our alternate history, a similar buildup of defenses around Darwin, Australia could be within the bounds of possibility, allowing warships to be stationed there and thus be conveniently near the 1941-43 fighting front. EwenS points out that Darwin had terrible rail and road connections with the rest of Australia (although I've heard this was a general problem for the whole continent back then). Maybe if Darwin had been chosen instead of Singapore as the UK's principal Far East base, then better connections would have been among the economic benefits that British investment would have brought in the 1920s and 30s.

 

[Owens Z]

Owens Z.
...Further to this, I find your suggestion of retaining Orion class BBs for the RAN to be a significantly inferior choice to a battlecruiser. None of the RN 'Super-Dreadnought' classes of 13.5-inch Battleships were capable of a more than 21-ish knots and even if beneficiaries of an Italian Navy-scale reconstruction (including repowering and a new bow, possibly the most outlandish and unrealistic suggestion we've given airtime to in this discussion), I don't envisage them getting to more than 23-24 knots. Given the primary opponent for any RAN Capital ship is the IJN Kongos (battlecruisers) and their growing and potent force of cruisers, a slow battleship, despite being nominally more survivable, seems a very poor choice to me.

Admittedly, while there is plenty to choose from among Royal Navy warships scrapped after the First World War due to obsolescence (e.g. pre-dreadnoughts) or the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, after considering an itemized list I wasn't much enthused by any of them. (I always did have a soft spot for seven-turreted HMS Agincourt, and was disappointed as a kid never to find a plastic model of her to build). But I reiterate that if one has to choose from that lengthy list, two Orion-class battleships would be a better deal for Australia than two Lion-class battlecruisers, being less liable to explode when hit. Oberon appears to believe that in 1941-42 superior speed (which Lions wouldn't have anyways) would be needed to chase after Japanese warships and corner an unwilling enemy into battle. I assure everyone—in 1941-42 the Japanese will be coming to you.

 

[Owens Z]

I don’t see Darwin as a realistic option for a major naval presence. It lacks the necessary infrastructure, and the Timor and Arafura Seas are still considered too shallow and constrained for the free movement of major naval forces. While Darwin does serve as a key base for RAN and Border Force patrol boats, these are shallow-draft constabulary vessels, not blue-water warships. Even during WWII, Darwin’s primary role was as a supply transshipment point for materiel and troops heading north, rather than a base for fleet operations.
A major fleet base needs to be near a significant population center with established infrastructure, transport links, a local workforce, and reliable supply chains. That naturally leads to the historically used locations—Sydney, Brisbane, and Fremantle. The Americans did build up Manus Island as a major forward base during WWII, but it had almost no permanent supporting infrastructure, meaning everything had to be shipped in from Australia or the US.
The Cocos/Keeling Islands and Christmas Island face similar challenges of isolation and exposure, though their locations would be useful for monitoring and controlling shipping routes through the Dutch East Indies. With enough investment, Cocos could have been developed into something like Diego Garcia, but even then, sustaining a base there would have been a logistical challenge.
In my view, there are very few truly credible options for a major fleet base north of the Tropic of Capricorn. The two that might be considered are:
1] Gladstone, QLD – Well-placed on the east coast with existing infrastructure, deep-water access to the Coral Sea, and fewer restrictions from the Great Barrier Reef than Townsville or Cairns.
2] Broome, WA – A strategically located port with a sheltered anchorage and reasonable access to Indian Ocean trade routes. However, it suffers from isolation, a lack of supporting infrastructure, and extreme vulnerability to monsoons and cyclones.
Neither location would be ideal for a full-scale fleet base, but they could serve as forward staging points for refueling, rearming, and initial battle damage triage via depot ships and floating dry docks. Major maintenance and repairs would still need to be handled further south. Sydney and Brisbane would continue supporting forward bases at Gladstone and Manus Island, while Fremantle would serve as the primary hub for Broome and possibly Cocos Island.

Being intrigued by Oberon's idea that if after WW1 the UK had chosen a port in Australia (instead of Singapore) for the Royal Navy's principal base in the Far East, then the Australian economy could have benefited, and the course of WW2 might have significantly changed, I did some reading about the history of that choice. Why Singapore? In his book British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After, Norman Friedman writes that during his 1919 cruise around the British Empire "Jellicoe identified Singapore as a potential fleet base" [p79]. The decision to build His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore was made in 1921, although the first funds were not allocated until 1923. In the book The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base 1919-1942, author McIntyre stated "the assumption that Singapore was the most suitable place for the dockyard was subjected to surprisingly little debate among the naval staff at that time... initially it seems that Singapore was simply taken as the obvious spot" [p7]. In 1921 "there were allusions to the view, still held by the 'defensive school', that Sydney should be the main base in the Pacific, but it was made clear that the naval staff rejected this" [p27]. In 1924 the UK's Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Admiral Beatty "why an Australian base would not do, and the First Sea Lord pointed out that damaged ships would take twenty-four days to get to Sydney and back" [p40].

Jellicoe had told the Australian government during his 1919 tour that it was "almost inevitable that the interests of Japan and the British Empire will eventually clash" [p24], and when his comment leaked to the press there was controversy about him bad-mouthing an ally, although in hindsight Jellicoe seems prescient. In 1924, new UK Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald "announced that the Singapore base would not go ahead. This was consistent with the idea current in the Labour Government that British initiatives were causing the Japanese to arm" [Friedman Cruisers p104]. Labour's cancellation was soon reversed, but construction dawdled until His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore was finally opened in 1938, though it remained far from finished. In fact construction work continued in 1941. As it turned out, it was Japanese warships which benefited.

It's tough to quarrel with the Admiralty's choice: Singapore was (and is) a key strategic location, and as Beatty identified was much closer to the assumed battle area near the Japanese home islands. But with the benefit of hindsight, an alternative choice in 1919-21 of an Australian port might have saved many British and Australian lives. If Darwin is ruled out, then feasible alternatives to Singapore for the RN would be Sydney (the choice of the British Pacific Fleet in 1945), Brisbane (where General MacArthur established his HQ, and site of Naval Base Brisbane), and Perth/Fremantle (conveniently closer to India and Suez). Oberon also points out two less-developed sites in northern Australia.

 

[Archdude]

Being intrigued by Oberon's idea that if after WW1 the UK had chosen a port in Australia (instead of Singapore) for the Royal Navy's principal base in the Far East, then the Australian economy could have benefited, and the course of WW2 might have significantly changed, I did some reading about the history of that choice. Why Singapore? In his book British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After, Norman Friedman writes that during his 1919 cruise around the British Empire "Jellicoe identified Singapore as a potential fleet base" [p79]. The decision to build His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore was made in 1921, although the first funds were not allocated until 1923. In the book The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base 1919-1942, author McIntyre stated "the assumption that Singapore was the most suitable place for the dockyard was subjected to surprisingly little debate among the naval staff at that time... initially it seems that Singapore was simply taken as the obvious spot" [p7]. In 1921 "there were allusions to the view, still held by the 'defensive school', that Sydney should be the main base in the Pacific, but it was made clear that the naval staff rejected this" [p27]. In 1924 the UK's Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Admiral Beatty "why an Australian base would not do, and the First Sea Lord pointed out that damaged ships would take twenty-four days to get to Sydney and back" [p40].

Jellicoe had told the Australian government during his 1919 tour that it was "almost inevitable that the interests of Japan and the British Empire will eventually clash" [p24], and when his comment leaked to the press there was controversy about him bad-mouthing an ally, although in hindsight Jellicoe seems prescient. In 1924, new UK Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald "announced that the Singapore base would not go ahead. This was consistent with the idea current in the Labour Government that British initiatives were causing the Japanese to arm" [Friedman Cruisers p104]. Labour's cancellation was soon reversed, but construction dawdled until His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore was finally opened in 1938, though it remained far from finished. In fact construction work continued in 1941. As it turned out, it was Japanese warships which benefited.

It's tough to quarrel with the Admiralty's choice: Singapore was (and is) a key strategic location, and as Beatty identified was much closer to the assumed battle area near the Japanese home islands. But with the benefit of hindsight, an alternative choice in 1919-21 of an Australian port might have saved many British and Australian lives. If Darwin is ruled out, then feasible alternatives to Singapore for the RN would be Sydney (the choice of the British Pacific Fleet in 1945), Brisbane (where General MacArthur established his HQ, and site of Naval Base Brisbane), and Perth/Fremantle (conveniently closer to India and Suez). Oberon also points out two less-developed sites in northern Australia.

Interestingvint of view!!!

 

[Dilandu]

But I reiterate that if one has to choose from that lengthy list, two Orion-class battleships would be a better deal for Australia than two Lion-class battlecruisers, being less liable to explode when hit.

Better armor didn't actually save Hood. And slow speed of Orion-class would made them a true pain to operate in 1930-1940s.

 

[Owens Z]

Slightly off topic, well a mile off topic, Albatross was ordered in large part to maintain shipbuilding skills at Cockatoo after it was decided to build the two Counties offshore. I suspect it would have been cheaper to build the two cruisers locally and not bother with a seaplane carrier...

The excessive time and cost assoc. with building Albatross (and Adelaide before her, which apparently ended up costing over £1,200,000, over 50% more than sister ship Brisbane) was used after the fact to help justify the decision to order the 8" cruisers from Britain...

Albatross was the largest navy vessel built in Australia until HMAS Stalwart some 40 years later...

The build of Adelaide was used to justify not building ships locally but there are major issues with the narrative. Forgings and machinery that were not at that point able to be produced locally were lost in transit during the war, there were major design changes implemented during the build. On top of that, according to Freidman's British Cruisers, Adelaide was almost built as a very different ship a sort of a hybrid Town / Frobisher.

During a recent read of Norman Friedman's reference British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After, I noticed the Supermarine Walrus small flying boat had been "designed to an Australian specification" [p92]. I didn't know that. I had seen a surviving Walrus during a visit to the RAF Museum in northern London. So originally it was a bespoke design for seaplane carrier HMAS Albatross, before Walruses were mounted on the RAN's two heavy cruisers and three of its light cruisers?

 

[Arjen]

About right. In Beyond the Spitfire by Ralph Pegram, The History Press 2016, the Seagull V was in response to an RAAF specification as a replacement for its Seagull IIIs. The IIIs were ordered originally for a flight tasked with photographic reconnaissance of the Australian coastline and Great Barrier Reef. After the survey was finished, they were assigned to HMAS Albatross. They served with the RAAF until their replacement by Seagull Vs in 1938. The Seagull V was virtually identical to the FAA's Walrus, apart from the Seagull V's 625 hp Pegasus II with the Walrus having a 750 hp Pegasus III.
@Schneiderman will probably know more about this. Any inaccuracies here are mine.

 

[EwenS]

I accept your detailed info, EwenS, but Darwin couldn't have been too inconsequential—the Imperial Japanese Navy chose that place as the target for their one and only mass carrier strike on the Australian mainland, on 19 February 1942. A force in Darwin could deter invasion and its harbor seems well positioned to support the eventual New Guinea Campaign. Darwin is 700 nautical miles from the airbase the Japanese established in Kendari on Sulawesi and hence was within range of the Mitsubishi twin-engine bombers there, which did strike Darwin repeatedly from February 1942 to mid-1943. The US Navy established Naval Base Darwin for its subs fleeing the Philippines, but the air strikes prompted a retreat to Exmouth Submarine Base (which in turn was bombed), and then to the Perth/Fremantle region. If Darwin was considered too exposed for a few subs and their diesel fuel supply, then capital ships would probably not be thought safe there.

It was not what Darwin was interwar that made it a target for the Japanese, but rather what it became in the space of a few short months starting in Sept 1941 due simply to its geographical location relative to what went on to the north..

When the US decided to increase its air power in the Philippines in late 1941, the B-17s had to be flown there. But the airfield building programme for the Central Pacific air route was not complete (there was no airfield on Guam). So the route chosen for the 19th BG in Sept 1941 was California - Hawaii - MIdway (airfield built 1941) - Wake Island (airfield built 1941) - Port Moresby - Darwin - Philippines. But that involved a degree of risk as it involved flying over the Japanese Mandate territories in the Marshall & Caroline Islands. Darwin being on the UK - Empire route already had an airfield for use as a stop-over point.

Once war broke out the Central Pacific route was closed. The South Pacific route had been developed in 1941 with airfields built on various islands all the way down to SE Australia. From there it extended to Darwin and then on to the DEI. Amongst the aircraft being fed into Java via Timor were the P-40E fighters that engaged the IJN aircraft over Darwin on 19th Feb.

After 8th Dec 1941 Darwin became the most northerly port in Australia from which reinforcements and supplies could be sent forward to the Philippines and the DEI. It became a major supply base. It also served as the jumping off point for a failed attempt to reinforce Allied troops on Timor in mid-Feb 1942 (those transports were present in Darwin on 19th Feb). It also served as a major point for air and sea forces being evacuated from further north.

Th Japanese recogised its importance by Jan 1942. They were flying recce missions over the whole Timor Sea area with H6K aircraft as soon as they got bases withing range. At the beginning of Jan 1942 they sent minelaying subs to the area (12-16 Jan I-121 & I-124 laid 66 mines off Darwin; I-123 laid 30 in Dundas Strait, NE of Darwin on the 20th; and I-122 laid 30 at the western end of the Torres Strait on the 15th, to catch anything coming from Australia's east coast ports).

As it was put in "Bloody Shambles Vol 2"
"Darwin was overflowing with Allied ships and aircraft. As the main supply base from which reinforcements and equipment could be delivered to the East Indies and to the forces still resisting in the Philippines, its importance was obvious. For the Japanese it posed the greatest threat they faced at this time, not only to their proposed invasion of Timor but also their important base at Rabaul. Regular aerial reconnaissance of the port and its surrounds was undertaken, while an attack by the full weight of the First Carrier Division was planned. This was to be launched by the land based bombers of the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas."

Darwin wasn't the only IJN strike on the Australian mainland. Land based aircraft from Timor hit Broome, a place that had become a major flying boat base and evacuation centre for Java, on 3 March inflicting considerable damage.

On the other hand: the Royal Navy's 'far-flung' base at Scapa Flow is only 500 nautical miles from Germany. Luftwaffe planes bombed Scapa Flow starting 17 October 1939, three days after U-47 torpedoed and sank a battleship at anchor there. In his Osprey book Scapa Flow: Defences of Britain's Great Fleet Anchorage 1914-45, historian Angus Konstam (who lives in the area) points out that after the German conquest of Norway in 1940 brought Luftwaffe bases even closer to Scapa Flow, "no such raids ever materialized, although reconnaissance and minelaying sorties continued throughout the war" [p26]. Konstam believes that a mass air strike from Norway against the vulnerable capital ships and fuel oil storage tanks at Scapa was deterred by the hurried buildup of antiaircraft guns and fighter cover around the base. In our alternate history, a similar buildup of defenses around Darwin, Australia could be within the bounds of possibility, allowing warships to be stationed there and thus be conveniently near the 1941-43 fighting front. EwenS points out that Darwin had terrible rail and road connections with the rest of Australia (although I've heard this was a general problem for the whole continent back then). Maybe if Darwin had been chosen instead of Singapore as the UK's principal Far East base, then better connections would have been among the economic benefits that British investment would have brought in the 1920s and 30s.

A main reason for the failure of the Germans to carry out a major attack on Scapa Flow, after its defences were substantially improved in the winter of 1939/40, was the long running dispute between the Kriegsmarine & the Luftwaffe as to which should have operational control of Luftwaffe anti-shipping assets, such as were allocated from time to time for that purpose. At the beginning of WW2 the KM controlled the Kustenflieger units equipped with a variety of obsolete types. It was early 1940 before they received the still obsolete He111J & Do17 and the transfer in of KG26 & KG30. But the main target was seen as merchant shipping on the east coast. But the arguments between Raeder & Goring continued and frequently had to be referred to Hitler to adjudicate. The result was that Luftwaffe units moved in and out of the control of the KM.

Fuel oil storage tanks are extremely difficult to destroy from the air, especially if they contain heavy fuel oil to power steam powered warships. It is thick, viscous, not easy to set light to and generally needs to be heated before it can be pumped around. Scapa Flow had 4x8,000ton tanks dating from WW1. 12x12,000ton were constructed 1937-39, each surrounded by its own earth berm to contain any oil spilling from a ruptured tank. Each tank therefore needs to be hit individually to stand a chance of being destroyed. In 1936 plans were drawn up for 200,000 tons of underground oil storage. Work on phase 1 (100,000 tons) began in 1938. By Aug 1943 there were 6 underground tanks in tunnels under the hills behind the Lyness naval base with a capacity of 101,000 tons. These would have been impervious to Luftwaffe bombs of the time.

Despite all their attempts in 1942, the Japanese only succeeded in destroying 7 of the 11 above ground oil tanks at Darwin. And by then underground tanks were planned.

 

[Owens Z]

...The prevailing assumption—erroneous in hindsight—was that no significant threat to Australian interests would emerge that the might of the Royal Navy couldn’t handle. This belief was reinforced by faith in the planned ‘Singapore Strategy’, which was intended to compensate for Britain’s forced abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which (along with the humiliating effect of the treaty ratios on Japanese sensibilities and national pride) had the effect of turning Japan from an ally into a competitor...

I agree with your points, Oberon, but let's be careful here, especially since we might have some impressionable readers with little knowledge of history. Everybody falls short, and words and deeds could always have been done better, in individual lives and in world history. But to imply that the UK (and, inevitably, the USA) provoked the Axis and thereby caused World War II would be a calumny. Japan was responsible for Japan. Japan's predatory 'Twenty-One Demands' of China in 1915 raised suspicions worldwide. Japan was free to sign the negotiated Washington Naval Treaty or not, and chose to do so. Yes, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA objected to Japan's proposed Racial Equality Clause for the Treaty of Versailles, and the UK came to agree, and thus gave offense. But an honest survey of the Japanese people's own attitude toward gaijin over, say, the past two centuries till today would not be a shining example of the brotherhood of man. Ask a Korean.

 

[Owens Z]

Better armor didn't actually save Hood. And slow speed of Orion-class would made them a true pain to operate in 1930-1940s.

Welcome back to the thread, Dilandu. Oberon proposed an alternate-history scenario where the Royal Australian Navy could have its free pick from among any of the extant warships the British retired after WW1 and the Washington Naval Treaty, and he chose two Lion-class battlecruisers. I countered with two Orion-class battleships instead, for the reasons I gave. (You and Oberon overlook that thirteen old US Navy battleships each productively served through the end of WW2 despite a top speed of only 20 or 21 knots.)

Which retiring British warships would you (and any others here who would like to weigh in) select for Australia? You have a lengthy list to choose from.

 

[EwenS]

About right. In Beyond the Spitfire by Ralph Pegram, The History Press 2016, the Seagull V was in response to an RAAF specification as a replacement for its Seagull IIIs. The IIIs were ordered originally for a flight tasked with photographic reconnaissance of the Australian coastline and Great Barrier Reef. After the survey was finished, they were assigned to HMAS Albatross. They served with the RAAF until their replacement by Seagull Vs in 1938. The Seagull V was virtually identical to the FAA's Walrus, apart from the Seagull V's 625 hp Pegasus II with the Walrus having a 750 hp Pegasus III.
@Schneiderman will probably know more about this. Any inaccuracies here are mine.

The Supermarine Seagull V was developed as a private venture (Supermarine Type 223) and first flew on 22 June 1933 as N-1 later acquiring the RAF serial K4797. Australia then placed an order for 24 Seagull V covered by a British Aircraft Spec 6/34 issued around Aug 1934. The first Australian aircraft, A24-1, flew on 25 June 1935 and was delivered to HMAS Australia at Spithead on 9 Sept 1935 followed by A24-2 to HMAS Sydney on 18 Oct. The remainder were shipped to Australia by sea.

The Air Ministry in Britain issued a Spec dated 4 April 1935 which was followed by a contract for 12 Seagull amphibians. In Aug 1935 the aircraft name was officially changed to Walrus. The first of these, K5772, flew on 18 March 1936. The next aircraft, K5773 and later received the Pegasus VI engine. A revised Spec was issued on 25 April 1936 to cover later production as the Supermarine Type 236 Walrus I.

 

[Dilandu]

Which retiring British warships would you (and any others here who would like to weigh in) select for Australia? You have a lengthy list to choose from.

I would still go for 343-mm battlecruisers. They have speed, which is of importance for a smaller fleet, that is under threat of superior enemy. Battlecruisers at least could disengage and run, if they got into too big troubles. Orion-class battleships would only be able to stand their ground and die, if Japanese or American battleline would hit them.

 

[Dilandu]

Welcome back to the thread, Dilandu. Oberon proposed an alternate-history scenario where the Royal Australian Navy could have its free pick from among any of the extant warships the British retired after WW1 and the Washington Naval Treaty, and he chose two Lion-class battlecruisers. I countered with two Orion-class battleships instead, for the reasons I gave. (You and Oberon overlook that thirteen old US Navy battleships each productively served through the end of WW2 despite a top speed of only 20 or 21 knots.)

Basically my point against Orion-class ships is that they could be useful only in major operation with Royal Navy battleline. Outside of such operation, their operational use is pretty limited. They can't efficiently catch enemy cruisers or strike enemy convoys, and in case of major operation it would almost certainly be covered by superior forces. From which they wouldn't be able to escape, too.

 

[EwenS]

In choosing a base for the RN fleet in the Far East the great distances involved need to be considered. The engagement area was expected to be somewhere around Formosa / Taiwan and northwards.

Sydney to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 4,300 nautical miles (12 days at 15 knots). In 1945 the BPF took 6-10 days to travel from Sydney to Manus while carrying out exercises along the way as might be expected of any fleet on its way to war. Then add time at slower speeds for refuelling / replenishment where required.
Fremantle to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 3,450 nautical miles (9.5 days at 15 knots)
Singapore to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 1,620 nautical miles (4.5 days at 15 knots)

Then you have to build in the extra time distance and time required for ships to travel from the UK and Med where they were based, to these Far East ports for them to gather and reprovision before sailing north for the scene of the action. And equally if not more important, it was a even longer way back for any damaged vessel.

In that context Singapore IMHO becomes a no brainer.

 

[Arjen]

The Supermarine Seagull V was developed as a private venture (Supermarine Type 223) and first flew on 22 June 1933

True, with some qualifications if Profile 224: Supermarine Walrus I & Seagull V Variants by David Brown is to be believed. There was a 1929 RAAF specification for a boat-hulled amphibian for shipboard operations. Then it gets confusing, as I read Supermarine Aircraft since 1914 by CF Andrews and EB Morgan, Putnam 1981, the chapter about Seagull V and Walrus:

The Royal Navy had shown little interest in the Seagull III so another private venture was started and its specifications were sent to the Royal Australian Air Force, which had made such good use of the earlier Seagulls.
[...]
The first reference to the designation Seagull Mk V was in November 1932 indicating that Mitchell was basing the concept on the previous Seagulls but involving a complete redesign including, for the first time for Supermarine, a one-step hull.
[...]
At this time [March 1933, when prototype construction was proceeding] an Australian specification was received which corresponded closely to that of the Seagull V, except that the Supermarine strength factors were higher and their aircraft weight estimates lower. With various modifications or additions as required in the specification the all-up weight would be exactly the same.

So, a private venture Seagull V, not in direct response to the 1929 RAAF specification. Supermarine guessed / knew of the RAAF's need / specification for a Seagull V-like aircraft, on receiving the specs the RAAF replied with a new(?) specification. Seagull V then modified accordingly by Supermarine, more modifications followed as a result of test flying prototype.
Profile and Supermarine-Putnam both name 750 hp Pegasus VI as Walrus engine.

 

[Archdude]

I would still go for 343-mm battlecruisers. They have speed, which is of importance for a smaller fleet, that is under threat of superior enemy. Battlecruisers at least could disengage and run, if they got into too big troubles. Orion-class battleships would only be able to stand their ground and die, if Japanese or American battleline would hit them.

Agree. They also might be usable as escorts for smaller aircraft carriers.

 

[Owens Z]

It was a very common coastal defence gun.

They have only 9.2-inch guns, though; by 1922 they likely would be considered armored cruisers. Which weren't actually covered by Treaty.

...Potentially Australia could also expand to build everything, including armour, turbines and up to 8" guns (although Australia also used shore based 9.2" guns )...

The 9.2-inch was a formidable British caliber (similar-sized calibers were the Kaiserliche Marine's 238mm, and the French Navy's and US Army's 240mm). A 9.2-inch gun emplacement was built as an exhibit on the grounds of the Imperial War Museum at Duxford outside Cambridge, using a retired gun from a Gibraltar battery; see my attached four photos from a 2018 visit there. A Royal Australian Navy warship armed with these would outgun any non-capital ship, and WW1-surplus shells and spare barrels could have been acquired dirt-cheap. Attractive. Yet the signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty (of which Australia was considered one, under the UK) agreed to have no guns bigger than 8 inches in non-capital ships completed after the Treaty's 1923 ratification. While the Treaty was not retroactive, I fear that a 9.2-armed vessel designed and laid down before WW1's combat experience and technical developments would be obsolete on the day it entered service, indeed putting its own crew in jeopardy, even before Japanese naval airpower became dangerous in the 1930s. I tried to squeeze in some appropriate shipbuilding between the 1918 Armistice and 1923, but as you saw, BlackBat was not having it.

Volkodav mentioned that the Australian Army had coastal 9.2-inch guns in service. Anybody here know where those were emplaced? I read that when the Japanese invaded, Christmas Island had just one 6-inch gun, although I see that in those days, Christmas and the Cocos Islands were the responsibility of the UK from Singapore, not Australia as is true today.

 

[1635yankee]

I still believe that two R-class battleships would be a better choice than any battle cruiser or battleship built before HMS Tiger, and that ship would need a major, if not massive, refit to be useful. Of course, so would the Rs, but they would stand a slightly better chance if anything bigger than a heavy cruiser (or a Deutschland) happens within gun range.

As for the 9.2 in, I have read (iirc, Buxton's book about RN monitors), that its dispersion was pretty bad.

 

[Owens Z]

I still believe that two R-class battleships would be a better choice than any battle cruiser or battleship built before HMS Tiger, and that ship would need a major, if not massive, refit to be useful. Of course, so would the Rs, but they would stand a slightly better chance if anything bigger than a heavy cruiser (or a Deutschland) happens within gun range.

No R-class battleships were retired following the Washington or London Naval Treaties, so those ships are outside the bounds of Oberon's scenario and were not considered by me. Yes, I would take an R over an Orion if that choice was available. But I'm not a fan of the R class, and you and EwenS among others are, so we will agree to disagree. You and Oberon and Dilandu seem to concentrate on directly interfering with Japanese fleets in Indonesian waters in 1941-42, which is fair. I tend to give more emphasis to gunfire support of Australian Army units fighting in 1943-45: they could have used the help. I point out that although their powerful 15-inch/42 Mark I guns continued to have plenty of targets in occupied Europe and on Pacific islands into 1945 (a British battleship shelled Japan itself that July), your preferred R-class ships were already being put to sleep by the Admiralty before the end of 1943.

As for the 9.2 in, I have read (iirc, Buxton's book about RN monitors), that its dispersion was pretty bad.

In fact I have a copy of Ian Buxton's fine book Big Gun Monitors on my shelf, and checking just now I see that various 9.2" gun models are indeed included in the index. When I get some time I will read up about this matter; thanks for the reference.

 

[Dilandu]

tend to give more emphasis to gunfire support of Australian Army units fighting in 1943-45: they could have used the help. I

Problem is, that from 1920s posirion, the need to deter/hamper Japanese attack is much more important than ground troops support in some kind of Indonesian campaign.

 

[Owens Z]

I would still go for 343-mm battlecruisers. They have speed, which is of importance for a smaller fleet, that is under threat of superior enemy. Battlecruisers at least could disengage and run, if they got into too big troubles. Orion-class battleships would only be able to stand their ground and die, if Japanese or American battleline would hit them.

Agree. They also might be usable as escorts for smaller aircraft carriers.

Okay. Oberon pooh-poohed the idea, but can I offer the two of you 27-knot battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg rather than a too-fragile British ship? Hindenburg was one of the few German warships that didn't capsize (thus dropping turrets) after scuttling at Scapa Flow in 1919. After being refloated in 1930, the battlecruiser was towed to Scotland and scrapped. But at a modest price I can offer this ship to you and Australia instead, for refurbishment and WW2 service.

 

[Dilandu]

but can I offer the two of you 27-knot battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg rather than a too-fragile British ship?

Erm... just imagine what a terrible headache would be providing components to it. Literally nothing of its weapons or equipment is produced in Britain. Just getting a spare parts would be a problem, since they are metric.

 

[Volkodav]

The sweet spot is very much a Tiger like armoured cruiser with 9.2" guns. It would have fit very well within the pre WWI Henderson Plan for the RAN, which included eight armoured cruisers / battle cruisers.

Not just the configuration of the turrets but more importantly the internal subdivision and scaled armour distribution (superior to Hoods apparently) of Tiger, made her the best of the battlecruisers, closest in fact to a fast battleship. A class of armoured cruisers based on her would have been very special ships.

 

[Owens Z]

I did this one a while back for some discussion or another. HMAS Australia modernized. One stack is gone with new, and fewer, boilers. New turbines. 4 twin 4" Mk XIX mounts, 3 eight barrel 2 pdr pom poms, 4 quad .50 Vickers MG's. A catapult is added. The bridge and foretop are modernized to include a fire control director for the main battery and spotting tops on a tripod mast. Deck armor would be improved while the side armor remained largely unaltered.
She might have gotten bulges but may not have based on what speed was now achievable. I figured it at about 28 knots on about 60,000 shp total, up from the previous say, 24-ish. With oil firing and more capacity, range would have been about double the original figure.

...I like the updated Australia, and wonder what her presence in the Pacific would have done. Possibly she joins up with PoW and Repulse and shares their fate, or stays near Australia to defend against air attacks and invasion, supports Aussie troops in New Guinea, or joins in the ship-to-ship battles of 1942.

I like the line drawing (attached) you made of a prospective interwar modernization for battlecruiser HMAS Australia (which in real life was scuttled off Sydney in 1924); thank you TA Gardner. According to John Roberts's book British Battlecruisers rev ed [p72], her original coal-fired, direct-drive engines made 55,881 shp for 26.89 knots during Australia's 1913 trials. As discussed in this thread, I believe later replacement with new oil-fired, geared engines and larger, lower-rpm screws would have been infeasible for financial and political reasons. But if you and JoeCalPo are going to go for it, I suggest that 60,000 shp is a bit conservative.

What is the railing-like feature, much taller than the normal handrail, which you have drawn along the ship's sides? It would hinder turret rotation while the main armament is at low elevation.

You appear to have deleted all the battlecruiser's WW1 fit for wireless telegraphy, meant for Tune A down to Tune Z (3 MHz—70 kHz), and instead added what looks like a conical antenna for VHF to the mainmast. Or perhaps that's an early British-made radar?

 

[Owens Z]

Erm... just imagine what a terrible headache would be providing components to it. Literally nothing of its weapons or equipment is produced in Britain. Just getting a spare parts would be a problem, since they are metric.

Would you take the raised SMS Hindenburg if I throw in some boxes of cannoli?

 

[Oberon_706]

Okay. Oberon pooh-poohed the idea, but can I offer the two of you 27-knot battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg rather than a too-fragile British ship? Hindenburg was one of the few German warships that didn't capsize (thus dropping turrets) after scuttling at Scapa Flow in 1919. After being refloated in 1930, the battlecruiser was towed to Scotland and scrapped. But at a modest price I can offer this ship to you and Australia instead, for refurbishment and WW2 service.

Would you take the raised SMS Hindenburg if I throw in some boxes of cannoli?

I'm sensing a certain degree of jest coming through Owens Z's post [at least, I truly hope so...]


As I previously stated, the best and only notionally 'realistic' option involving ex-German ships/war prizes is using Battlecruiser hulls as the basis of aircraft carrier conversions. Resurrecting Hindenburg or completing one of the Mackensens as a RAN-operated battlecruiser in the 1920s is completely ridiculous, if someone had had the stones to float the idea publically, they'd have been bundled off to the looney bin! [no offence intended by saying so... ].

As for British Battlecruisers being 'too fragile' compared to their German compatriots, they are apples and oranges, designed according to different principles and for different roles. Even if one were to compare the pair directly, such an assessment would very much depend on the usage situation being considered [I've already laid out the case for this].

The sweet spot is very much a Tiger like armoured cruiser with 9.2" guns. It would have fit very well within the pre WWI Henderson Plan for the RAN, which included eight armoured cruisers / battle cruisers.

Not just the configuration of the turrets but more importantly the internal subdivision and scaled armour distribution (superior to Hoods apparently) of Tiger, made her the best of the battlecruisers, closest in fact to a fast battleship. A class of armoured cruisers based on her would have been very special ships.

Absolutely! Tiger was considered the best all-round ship in the battlecruiser force and shows the direction things would have gone if Fisher redux. had been able to keep his sticky fingers off things (unrealistic, but one can dream). A 9.2-inch 'Tiger-Cub' would be the logical post-war progression for the roles and capabilities of the old pre-dreadnought Armoured Cruisers.

 

[Dilandu]

Would you take the raised SMS Hindenburg if I throw in some boxes of cannoli?

Only if I have an export customer - say, from South America - who is not particularly bothered about her non-standard design (since he have no "standards" in his navy to start with). Then yes, it's probably could be done - albeit I'm not sure that it would justify the cost of repair, after a few years sitting underwater.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I like the line drawing (attached) you made of a prospective interwar modernization for battlecruiser HMAS Australia (which in real life was scuttled off Sydney in 1924); thank you TA Gardner. According to John Roberts's book British Battlecruisers rev ed [p72], her original coal-fired, direct-drive engines made 55,881 shp for 26.89 knots during Australia's 1913 trials. As discussed in this thread, I believe later replacement with new oil-fired, geared engines and larger, lower-rpm screws would have been infeasible for financial and political reasons. But if you and JoeCalPo are going to go for it, I suggest that 60,000 shp is a bit conservative.

What is the railing-like feature, much taller than the normal handrail, which you have drawn along the ship's sides? It would hinder turret rotation while the main armament is at low elevation.

You appear to have deleted all the battlecruiser's WW1 fit for wireless telegraphy, meant for Tune A down to Tune Z (3 MHz—70 kHz), and instead added what looks like a conical antenna for VHF to the mainmast. Or perhaps that's an early British-made radar?

The taller feature would be a sun canopy used in port. The position on the foretop and one aft are the HA Mk IV directors for the 4" Mk XIX battery with their canvas cover closed.

 

[Owens Z]

Erm... just imagine what a terrible headache would be providing components to it. Literally nothing of its weapons or equipment is produced in Britain. Just getting a spare parts would be a problem, since they are metric.

Only if I have an export customer - say, from South America - who is not particularly bothered about her non-standard design (since he have no "standards" in his navy to start with). Then yes, it's probably could be done - albeit I'm not sure that it would justify the cost of repair, after a few years sitting underwater.

"This warship was made for foreigners, so I cannot use it"?

History disagrees with you and Oberon about the appeal of war prizes. There was a time when a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet consisted of taken Chinese and Russian warships (see my attached PDF). Russian dreadnought Imperator Aleksandr III was commissioned into the Kaiser's navy in 1918 (although the German crew put to sea only a few times before the Armistice, after which that battleship was seized by the British, and later by France). The United States examined USS Ostfriesland in Brooklyn before she was famously bombed and sunk by Billy Mitchell. Destroyer Amiral Sénès (ex-German S113) served the French Navy for fifteen years, and the French also adopted five German cruisers. After WW2, France took two Italian cruisers into service, and the Soviets commissioned battleship Novorossiysk (ex-Italian Giulio Cesare) and cruiser Admiral Makarov (ex-German Nürnberg). The German sail training barque Horst Wessel was taken as a war prize and serves as Eagle in the US Coast Guard to the present day. Non-standard parts were obviously not deal-breakers.

Granted, immersion in seawater under Scapa Flow for eleven years is a problem. Yet not prohibitive. Battleship West Virginia endured six months on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Type XXI submarine U-2540, scuttled in 1945, was raised from the Baltic seabed by West Germany in 1957, refurbished, and served a further twenty years. I know the better-than-new condition, because I have been aboard: U-2540 is docked in Bremerhaven as a museum ship.

 

[Dilandu]

History disagrees with you and Oberon about the appeal of war prizes. There was a time when a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet consisted of taken Chinese and Russian warships (see my attached PDF)

The situation was different. Firstly, Japanese Navy was already non-standartized, with numerous ships of different origin and designs. If anything, addition of Russian prizes increased Japanese uniformity (since those ships were mostly build for same standards)

Secondly, this measure was heavily criticized even then, as waste of resources that could be much better implemented to build new warships. The restoration of Russian prizes - especially heavily damaged ones - took a massive amount of money, and did not actually provide IJN with any kind of lasting combat capability, since with a few exceptions ("Oryol" and "Retvisan") most of the prizes were of 1890s build.

If anything, the great cost of restoring the prizes damaged Japanese entry into dreadnough era; they were forced to abandon the idea of completing the Satsuma-class battleships in all-big-gun configurafion due to lack of money for more 12-inch barrels.

Destroyer Amiral Sénès (ex-German S113) served the French Navy for fifteen years, and the French also adopted five German cruisers.

French and Germans used metric system.

After WW2, France took two Italian cruisers into service, and the Soviets commissioned battleship Novorossiysk (ex-Italian Giulio Cesare) and cruiser Admiral Makarov (ex-German Nürnberg

Again; France, Italy and USSR were all-metric, so supporting those ships wasn't as big headache. Also, French Navy was pretty much as mishmash of French, British and Ameican warships already, so they simply don't care.

 

[EwenS]

Granted, immersion in seawater under Scapa Flow for eleven years is a problem. Yet not prohibitive. Battleship West Virginia endured six months on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Type XXI submarine U-2540, scuttled in 1945, was raised from the Baltic seabed by West Germany in 1957, refurbished, and served a further twenty years. I know the better-than-new condition, because I have been aboard: U-2540 is docked in Bremerhaven as a museum ship.

Seawater in the Baltic is of course generally less salty, less oxygenated and colder where U-2540 was sunk off Flensburg compared to the open ocean. All of which helps slow down corrosion.

 

[Owens Z]

In choosing a base for the RN fleet in the Far East the great distances involved need to be considered. The engagement area was expected to be somewhere around Formosa / Taiwan and northwards.
Sydney to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 4,300 nautical miles (12 days at 15 knots). In 1945 the BPF took 6-10 days to travel from Sydney to Manus while carrying out exercises along the way as might be expected of any fleet on its way to war. Then add time at slower speeds for refuelling / replenishment where required.
Fremantle to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 3,450 nautical miles (9.5 days at 15 knots)
Singapore to Kaohsiung, Taiwan = 1,620 nautical miles (4.5 days at 15 knots)
Then you have to build in the extra time distance and time required for ships to travel from the UK and Med where they were based, to these Far East ports for them to gather and reprovision before sailing north for the scene of the action. And equally if not more important, it was a even longer way back for any damaged vessel.
In that context Singapore IMHO becomes a no brainer.

Agreed. Although as mentioned in post #246 above a location in Australia was in the 1919-24 conversation, and although Jellicoe and Beatty and colleagues proved to be wrong about how a UK-Japan naval war would go, it does seem that Singapore was the superior choice for the Royal Navy's main Far East base, as made by professionals without superhuman prescience. Seen in hindsight, even had His Majesty's Naval Base Singapore been promptly finished in the 1920s (instead of still being under construction on the eve of the Japanese invasion, as in real life), that would not have significantly changed the UK's or Australia's WW2 experience. It's too bad—the choice of a base in Australia could have seen welcome investment there during the lean 1920s and 30s, and might have saved many Australian and British lives lost in the Malayan/Singapore campaign (or later murdered as POWs) and in Force Z's first and last sortie.

 

[Owens Z]

I recently had the pleasure of reading the article "The Australian Bathurst-class Minesweeping Corvette" (pp178-190) by Mark Briggs in the 2022 edition of Warship. In addition to covering the design of these interesting corvettes and their wartime experience, Briggs emphasizes the role this class played in the revival of shipbuilding in Australia, which (he writes) had been terribly run down since its zenith during the First World War, when for example His Majesty's Australian Dockyard Cockatoo Island in Sydney was busy repairing ships (including three visiting Japanese cruisers) and building HMAS Brisbane and Adelaide, as mentioned in post #148 above. The Bathurst class's 4-inch gun had to be imported all the way from the UK, which of course was under stress herself, until local manufacture of the guns could begin in 1942. (Briggs names the particular 4" gun as the Mark XVII, but a check of Tony DiGiulian's NavWeaps site including photos convinces me that this was a mistake for the Mark XIX, of more modest muzzle energy.)

HMAS Deloraine of the Bathurst class vigorously counter-attacked and destroyed the Japanese submarine I-124 on 20 January 1942 between Darwin and the class's namesake Bathurst Island, in what are (as Oberon noted earlier) quite shallow waters. There were plans for RAN and USN hard-hat divers to try to enter the sub's wreck and retrieve anything interesting, but after the bombing of Darwin began on 19 February 1942 (which continued into mid-1943) it was thought unwise to anchor a salvage ship at the site, and the wreck was forgotten until the 1970s.

 

[Owens Z]

...As for British Battlecruisers being 'too fragile' compared to their German compatriots, they are apples and oranges, designed according to different principles and for different roles. Even if one were to compare the pair directly, such an assessment would very much depend on the usage situation being considered [I've already laid out the case for this].

A warship's job is to be lethal to the enemy. Repeatedly coming off as second best against enemy ships of similar size, age, and expense means there is a problem, a problem that cannot be explained away. Battlecruisers designed and built in Germany shrugged off the single torpedo hits and handful of heavy shells that for British battlecruisers would be crippling, or worse.

 

[Owens Z]

The sweet spot is very much a Tiger like armoured cruiser with 9.2" guns. It would have fit very well within the pre WWI Henderson Plan for the RAN, which included eight armoured cruisers / battle cruisers.
Not just the configuration of the turrets but more importantly the internal subdivision and scaled armour distribution (superior to Hoods apparently) of Tiger, made her the best of the battlecruisers, closest in fact to a fast battleship. A class of armoured cruisers based on her would have been very special ships.

...Absolutely! Tiger was considered the best all-round ship in the battlecruiser force and shows the direction things would have gone if Fisher redux. had been able to keep his sticky fingers off things (unrealistic, but one can dream). A 9.2-inch 'Tiger-Cub' would be the logical post-war progression for the roles and capabilities of the old pre-dreadnought Armoured Cruisers.

I agree with you. Any ideas about how to get two or three valuable Tiger cub "pocket battleship"-like vessels for the Royal Australian Navy without having those designed and laid down before Jutland (so that the ships don't incorporate hopelessly obsolete features) yet without having those completed after the Washington Naval Treaty takes effect (so that the ships can be Treaty-compliant)?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I agree with you. Any ideas about how to get two or three valuable Tiger cub "pocket battleship"-like vessels for the Royal Australian Navy without having those designed and laid down before Jutland (so that the ships don't incorporate hopelessly obsolete features) yet without having those completed after the Washington Naval Treaty takes effect (so that the ships can be Treaty-compliant)?

The only way it could possibly work is if the powers that be decided that the max cruiser caliber gun was 9.2".

Then the Tiger Cubs could simply be heavily armored cruisers, but I'd suspect that allowing 9.2" guns on cruisers would see all post-treaty ships armed with such.

 

[Dilandu]

The only way it could possibly work is if the powers that be decided that the max cruiser caliber gun was 9.2".

Then the Tiger Cubs could simply be heavily armored cruisers, but I'd suspect that allowing 9.2" guns on cruisers would see all post-treaty ships armed with such.

Or re-arm them with 8-inch turrets.