Could HMAS Australia have been saved from scrapping ?

[Oberon_706]

So back on topic...

Hypothetically;

Tiger is transferred to the RAN as either 1) part of the WNT settlement, OR, 2) in an alt. post-LNT scenario where the escalator clause is triggered earlier than in OTL and the RN transfers Tiger to the RAN once Hood comes out of refit.

Or...

HMAS Australia I is converted into an aircraft carrier as part of the WNT washup. In this capacity, it serves the RAN well into WWII and played an instrumental role in...

Thoughts? Anyone care to contribute?

 

[Dilandu]

Tiger is transferred to the RAN as either 1) part of the WNT settlement, OR,

It would require either very alternative WNT or some case of serious dancing around definitions.

an alt. post-LNT scenario where the escalator clause is triggered earlier than in OTL and the RN transfers Tiger to the RAN once Hood comes out of refit.

What justification can be used?

HMAS Australia I is converted into an aircraft carrier as part of the WNT washup. In this capacity, it serves the RAN well into WWII and played an instrumental role in...

Not reasonable. From 1920s point of view, aircraft carrier is a useful, but addition to the main combat force. Without such combat force, there is no reason to have a carrier.

 

[Scott Kenny]

HMAS Australia I is converted into an aircraft carrier as part of the WNT washup.

I dunno, I'm thinking that the ship is a bit too slow to be good as a carrier.

 

[EwenS]

So back on topic...

Hypothetically;

Tiger is transferred to the RAN as either 1) part of the WNT settlement, OR, 2) in an alt. post-LNT scenario where the escalator clause is triggered earlier than in OTL and the RN transfers Tiger to the RAN once Hood comes out of refit.

Or...

HMAS Australia I is converted into an aircraft carrier as part of the WNT washup. In this capacity, it serves the RAN well into WWII and played an instrumental role in...

Thoughts? Anyone care to contribute?

So if Australia is converted to a carrier it counts towards the British Empire 135,000 tons of carriers. And it would not be covered by the "experimental" clause able to be replaced anytime because it wasn't a carrier in Nov 1921.

So it couldn't be replaced until June 1933 at the earliest.

That then creates a problem in the 1930s when Ark Royal is built. Argus was reclassified as an auxiliary (Queen Bee carrier) to allow that to happen. So other sacrifices will also have to be made. Carrier Australia? Hermes? Eagle? Furious?

I haven't got the exact figures to hand but at least one if not 2 will have to go.

 

[1635yankee]

It would require either very alternative WNT or some case of serious dancing around definitions.


What justification can be used?

I think that since all the Commonwealth navies were jointly bound by the Washington and London treaties, transferring a capital ship from the RN to the RAN would be acceptable if there is no net increase in Commonwealth capital ship tonnage, although Japan may whine a bit.

Increasing Commonwealth capital ship tonnage would be a much harder sell, and likely impossible.

 

[Dilandu]

I think that since all the Commonwealth navies were jointly bound by the Washington and London treaties, transferring a capital ship from the RN to the RAN would be acceptable if there is no net increase in Commonwealth capital ship tonnage, although Japan may whine a bit.

Hm. If it's done within the British Empire limits, then yes, it won't matter to whom exactly those ships would be subordinated.

 

[Owens Z]

I think that since all the Commonwealth navies were jointly bound by the Washington and London treaties, transferring a capital ship from the RN to the RAN would be acceptable if there is no net increase in Commonwealth capital ship tonnage, although Japan may whine a bit.

Uh oh: earlier a postwar acquisition by Australia of one or more of the flimsy Courageous class battlecruisers was mooted. Now it seems we are getting close to somebody suggesting that one of the tired, slow R-class battleships be transferred to the Royal Australian Navy in the 1930's... OH NO! In post #70, 1635yankee did just that. Run away, Australia!

 

[Owens Z]

There is no argument that there weren't significant obstacles to be overcome before retaining the battlecruiser would have been a practicable possibility (the least of which was a monetary one), but I don't believe shipyard capacity or capability would have been one of them. Larger tasks than basic seaworthiness and engineering maintenance would have initially been beyond CoDock, requiring a trip to, at least, Columbo or Malta for dry-docking, but the yard would have grown and matured with the necessity. The real challenge would have arisen when tasks requiring infrastructure the yard didn't possess in the 20's and 30's came along, as Sunderland Dock never had an attendant large capacity cranage sufficient to, say, unship a tripod masthead or change a 12" gun barrel. Only the floating crane, Titan (lift cap. 150 tonnes), was remotely capable of such work, requiring the ship to be afloat and alongside at the time. Major refit or modernisation work would likely have required a trip to the UK, or at a minimum, Malta, Gibraltar or (from 1938 - if she was still in commission) Singapore. Not necessarily a problem, but not ideal either.

Whichever way you look at it, retention of Australia I or allocation of a replacement battle cruiser like, say, Princess Royal or Tiger would have required significant investments in Australia's military-industrial complex across the board. From shipyards and machine shops to steelmaking and fabrication, armaments/explosives production and beyond.

EwenS and Scott Kenny were quick to gainsay you, Oberon, but I think you are basically correct. Some commenters here believe that it would have been impossible for the country to maintain battlecruiser HMAS Australia until WW2, due to limited port facilities. This seems excessive: they were doing fine in 1913-14. And all the huge British Pacific Fleet was based in Sydney (until it forward-deployed to Manus Island). And between the wars, the dreadnought capital ships of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Turkey (hardly industrial powerhouses) managed to stay in service with modest funding. All accounts agree that the will to spend even modest funding on the battlecruiser was not there in Australia during the 1920's. But "unrealistic at the time, for understandable reasons" is not at all the same thing as "impossible". Had the will been there, the ship could have at least muddled through, and probably done a bit better.

The unavoidable problem, in true history and in plausible alternate worlds, is that the Indefatigable class were flawed ships even for WW1, much less WW2.

 

[EwenS]

EwenS and Scott Kenny were quick to gainsay you, Oberon, but I think you are basically correct. Some commenters here believe that it would have been impossible for the country to maintain battlecruiser HMAS Australia until WW2, due to limited port facilities. This seems excessive: they were doing fine in 1913-14. And all the huge British Pacific Fleet was based in Sydney (until it forward-deployed to Manus Island). And between the wars, the dreadnought capital ships of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Turkey (hardly industrial powerhouses) managed to stay in service with modest funding. All accounts agree that the will to spend even modest funding on the battlecruiser was not there in Australia during the 1920's. But "unrealistic at the time, for understandable reasons" is not at all the same thing as "impossible". Had the will been there, the ship could have at least muddled through, and probably done a bit better.

The unavoidable problem, in true history and in plausible alternate worlds, is that the Indefatigable class were flawed ships even for WW1, much less WW2.

You cannot compare the naval facilities in Australia in 1945 with even that of 1939 let alone earlier in time.

The RN chose Singapore over Sydney in the 1920s to build a new RN Dockyard facility. But even in 1945 Australia couldn't cope with all the needs of the BPF.

Brisbane - Cairncross Dry Dock 800ft x 110ft. construction stared in Sept 1942, receiving its first ship in June 1944. When it opened it couldn't be used for the largest ships due to problems with access from the Brisbane River.

Sydney - Captain Cook Dry Dock and associated facilities. Approved in principle by Federal Govt in 1938. Construction started in 1941. HMS Illustrious was the first ship to use it on 2 March 1945 when she arrived in Australia.

Such was the shortage of dry docking facilities in Australia in 1945, especially in Sydney, that the battleship Howe had to be sent to Durban, South Africa in June for a 3 month refit. Destroyers and cruisers were being sent to Auckland in New Zealand due to lack of facilities in Australia. The two worst damaged ships, destroyers Ulster & Quilliam, were sent back to the UK. 3 destroyer sized floating docks had to be towed from Iceland, Britain & Malta to augment the docking facilities in Australia.

As for Chile, when the Admiral Latorre required modernisation in the late 1920s she spent nearly two years between 1929 and 1931 having the work carried out in Britain. Having been built in the USA the two Argentinian battleships Moreno & Rivadavia each spent spent 2-3 years between 1923 & 1926 being modernised in the USA. So these countries were definitely limited in the work that their home bases could carry out on them.

Edit - think about the various cruisers damaged in 1942/43 in the Solomons. Achilles and Leander both RNZN, New Orleans and Minneapolis from USN and Hobart RAN come immediately to mind. Some were patched up in Australia before being sent to US or Britain for full repairs. Only Hobart was fully repaired and had her AA modernised in Australia Aug 1943 to Dec 1944.

 

[Owens Z]

For what it's worth the Australian Government thought about acquiring one or more capital ships in the late 1930s. That's according to Chapter One of the official history of the RAN 1939-42, that can be downloaded from the Australian War Memorial website.

Chapter 1 – Between the Wars

www.awm.gov.au

See Page 39 onwards.

Thanks, NOMISYRRUC. I have read this Chapter 1 "Between the Wars" of the official Volume I: Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942; very interesting. Regarding a new Australian capital ship in the late 1930's, which this history states was being actively discussed in the government and among the general public, the chapter concludes:

"As to the proposal that Australia should acquire a battleship or battleships, that was of a long term plan which was overtaken and nullified by events. None suitable was in existence for purchase, and even had building facilities [in Australia] been available, four or five years must elapse before a battleship could be completed... So any hope that Australia might have had of acquiring a capital ship died with the outbreak of war [in September 1939]."

This sounds right. I think I will go on to read further chapters, to get the Australian view of the fierce naval battles of early 1942 around Indonesia.

 

[1635yankee]

Uh oh: earlier a postwar acquisition by Australia of one or more of the flimsy Courageous class battlecruisers was mooted. Now it seems we are getting close to somebody suggesting that one of the tired, slow R-class battleships be transferred to the Royal Australian Navy in the 1930's... OH NO! In post #70, 1635yankee did just that. Run away, Australia!

I think a "tired, slow R-class battleship" would be a better option than an obsolete, poorly armed and armored battlecruiser.

 

[Dilandu]

I think a "tired, slow R-class battleship" would be a better option than an obsolete, poorly armed and armored battlecruiser.

Essentially yes - at very least her guns would be able to match those on Japanese battleships, and her armor would not be defeated by 8-inch guns.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I think a "tired, slow R-class battleship" would be a better option than an obsolete, poorly armed and armoured battlecruiser.

I agree, in part because the obsolete, poorly armed and poorly armoured battlecruiser would be more tired than the slow R-class battleship.

 

[Owens Z]

I think a "tired, slow R-class battleship" would be a better option than an obsolete, poorly armed and armored battlecruiser.

Essentially yes - at very least her guns would be able to match those on Japanese battleships, and her armor would not be defeated by 8-inch guns.

I agree, in part because the obsolete, poorly armed and poorly armoured battlecruiser would be more tired than the slow R-class battleship.

The judgment that Australia would be stuck with a white elephant in an unscuttled battlecruiser HMAS Australia is no reason to burden that country with the albatross of an R-class battleship (or Courageous class junk). The R-class were later in conception than the ships of the innovative Queen Elizabeth class, but were consistently ranked below the preceding class in combat value; at the time by Royal Navy officers and His Majesty's Government, and to this day among historians and enthusiasts. After Japan's April 1942 Indian Ocean raid, the four R-class battleships of the British Eastern Fleet retreated all the way to Kenya. You think that had one of those battleships instead remained in Australian waters, it would be able to do anything of importance other than be sunk? No.

If we are going to push alternate histories here, then with Oberon_706's indulgence, let's at least give something to Australia that would actually be useful. Hard-hitting battlecruiser HMS Tiger is better discussed in its own existing thread. NOMISYRRUC's charts above show that the Royal Australian Navy retained no submarines after 1930 when the last J-class and Odin-class subs were disposed of, which is curious. In real life Australia will have no subs from then until the Oberon class starting in the late 1960's. USN, British, and Dutch submarines operated successfully against Japanese targets from Australian bases; e.g. Fremantle and Exmouth. In our counterfactual history, with the benefit of hindsight, how about giving the RAN some subs, either after Pearl Harbor or in the immediate prewar years, when the looming threat to Australia meant purse-strings were being loosened? Submarines would be of greater value to Australian defense than an old and brittle capital ship.

 

[Owens Z]

A slight tangent but this video is both interesting and relevant.
This raises the question on whether an actual evolved armoured cruiser, with 9.2" guns may have been a better option.

Some time ago in springsharp I made a rough guess at a 4x2x9.2in cruiser from 1913; if you gave it oil-fired engines you could get a pretty good speed on a ~12-13k displacement.
The version in the spoiler is a hypothetical late 30s refit with original engines but a bunch of light AA added (I think the original draft had a couple more 4 inch guns and one or two 3 inch for AA).

Why start from a hypothetical when you have the actual E2 and E3 ACR designs? Plus E from 1911

E: 15,750 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 16x 4in, 25kts, 6in belt, c£1.45 million
E2: 15,500 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 8x 6in, 28kts, 6in belt, c£1.35 million
E3: 17,850 tons, 4x2 9.2in, 8x 6in, 28kts, 6in belt+4in upper belt, c £1.5 million

This is interesting: one or more warships for Australia roughly equivalent to the Deutschland-class pocket battleships. Perhaps a better fit for the country's interwar financial and shipkeeping capacity than, and perhaps a greater potential against Japan than, one capital ship. The 9.2-inch caliber you three favor was retired by the Royal Navy immediately after WW1, but as I understand, it stayed in service with the British Army until the 1950's.

DWG, what is your source for the E, E2, and E3 projects that you mention? I would like to do some further reading on this thought-provoking subject.

 

[DWG]

This is interesting: one or more warships for Australia roughly equivalent to the Deutschland-class pocket battleships. Perhaps a better fit for the country's interwar financial and shipkeeping capacity than, and perhaps a greater potential against Japan than, one capital ship. The 9.2-inch caliber you three favor was retired by the Royal Navy immediately after WW1, but as I understand, it stayed in service with the British Army until the 1950's.

DWG, what is your source for the E, E2, and E3 projects that you mention? I would like to do some further reading on this thought-provoking subject.

DK Brown, The Grand Fleet. I can't recall off hand whether there's anything in Friedman.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I recall reading in DK Brown about the 'Armoured Cruiser' design, a sort of Queen Elizabeth class BB in miniature idea....
The following was posted on (I think) an older version of the board....
Unfortunately it's only details for one of the series....

 

[Volkodav]

This is interesting: one or more warships for Australia roughly equivalent to the Deutschland-class pocket battleships. Perhaps a better fit for the country's interwar financial and shipkeeping capacity than, and perhaps a greater potential against Japan than, one capital ship. The 9.2-inch caliber you three favor was retired by the Royal Navy immediately after WW1, but as I understand, it stayed in service with the British Army until the 1950's.

DWG, what is your source for the E, E2, and E3 projects that you mention? I would like to do some further reading on this thought-provoking subject.

It was a very common coastal defence gun.

 

[BlackBat242]

I have some info from years ago... off the internet.


RN Atlantic cruiser designs of 1913

T2, E2/E3: a pair of armoured cruiser designs from 1913 contained in Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt's notebook.

Drawings of the "Atlantic" cruisers of about the same time were published in "Grand Fleet" by DK Brown. They are in the d'Eyncourt notebook, but there are also drawings larger scale in the Ship's Cover at the Brass Foundry. Those published in DKB's book had actually been redrawn by Rear-Admiral Roger Morris, based on d'Eyncourt's notebook.

E2/E3 drawing: Redrawn from a sketch DKB had made from T d'E's notebook. It doesn't have the armour scheme, either.

E2 £1.35M; E3 £1.5M;

E3 is the larger ship with the deeper belt, but her displacement is 17,850 tons against the smaller E2's 15,500. (Did you take it to be 11,850, BCR, from the handwriting?)
They are traditional, if modern style, armoured cruisers rather than light battlecruisers. What I mean by that is they were designed for cruiser functions; aimed to be cheaper than battlecruisers (but not enough to build many more even at Invincible level) and would have no chance in a 1914/15 battleline. Updated Minotaurs. Speed 28knots. Guns (4x2) 9.2in; armour belt 6" to 4".

DK Brown did a comparison in "Grand Fleet" and gave them little chance against Invincible, let alone their contemporaries, Tiger or even Renown.

1913 E2 / E3

15,500 normal / 17,850 normal (not the sum of the weights below because of fuel and stores)
560’ pp / 580’ pp
75 beam / 76 beam
26’; 28.5’ deep / 26’; 28.75’ deep
55,000 shp / 60,000 shp
28 knots / 28 knots
2500 tons oil / 2500 tons oil (1000 at normal load)
(4x2) 9.2in / (4x2) 9.2in
(8x1) 6in / (8x1) 6in
4-21”TT / 4-21” (submerged I think 20 torps)

Weights
5500 / 6000 hull
3560 / 5070 protection
1900 / 1900 armament
2700 / 3000 machinery
685 / 700 general
155 / 180 board margin

E2 internal arrangement:



E2 M scale approx:

 

[Pirate Pete]

Also these…
From D.K. Brown ‘Grand Fleet’, plus, a selection of later “Atlantic Cruiser” designs

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 134.

If we are going to push alternate histories here, then with Oberon_706's indulgence, let's at least give something to Australia that would actually be useful. Hard-hitting battlecruiser HMS Tiger is better discussed in its own existing thread. NOMISYRRUC's charts above show that the Royal Australian Navy retained no submarines after 1930 when the last J-class and Odin-class subs were disposed of, which is curious. In real life Australia will have no subs from then until the Oberon class starting in the late 1960's. USN, British, and Dutch submarines operated successfully against Japanese targets from Australian bases; e.g. Fremantle and Exmouth. In our counterfactual history, with the benefit of hindsight, how about giving the RAN some subs, either after Pearl Harbor or in the immediate prewar years, when the looming threat to Australia meant purse-strings were being loosened? Submarines would be of greater value to Australian defense than an old and brittle capital ship.

The table shows that the RAN had 38 warships and auxiliaries in May 1921, which declined to 15 in May 1933 and increased slightly to 17 in March 1939.

Warships.

Their numbers were reduced from 29 in May 1921 to 14 in March 1939, which was a reduction of 16 ships. The reductions were:

• 6 Submarines
• 1 Battle Cruiser
• 1 Cruiser
• 7 Destroyers
• 1 Sloop

However, the cruiser HMAS Amphion commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Perth at Portsmouth on 29.06.39. She took over the crew of Adelaide which paid off on 17.05.39. As far as I know Amphion was acquired to replace Adelaide (which under the terms of the First London Naval Treaty became overage in 1938) but Adelaide hadn't been disposed of when World War II broke out and she recommissioned on 01.09.39, two days before war was declared.

That increased the total on 03.09.39 to 18 ships and the number of cruisers from 5 to 6 which equalled the number that the RAN had in May 1921.

The following ships were under construction or on order at the outbreak of World War II.

• 6 Tribal class destroyers were on order. I've read that they were to screen the capital ship that was projected.
• 2 Sloops were under construction

Depot Ships, Tenders and Auxiliaries.

There had been a reduction of 5 ships from 9 to 4. The most important losses were one Depot ship and One fleet collier & oiler (see below).

The 4 ships in service were.

• The Depot Ship Penguin (ex-Platypus) at Sydney.
• The Motor-Boat Cerberus, which was a tender to Flinders Naval Depot.
• The Fleet Oiler Kurumba. She was a civilian manned Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary from March 1919 to paying off on 04.06.28 and didn't recommission until 04.09.39 (AFAIK) into the RAN rather than the RAFA with which she served until paying off for the final time on 29.07.46.
• The Boom Defence Vessel Kookaburra. She's in the table as a Local Defence Vessel and was brand new in March 1939 because she'd only commissioned on 28.02.39. She was employed as a tender to the Anti-Submarine School at Sydney.

2 Boom Working Vessels were on order in March 1939. Koala was laid down on 21.06.39 and Kangaroo was laid down on 15.11.39.

The Fleet Collier & Oiler was Bilolea a civilian manned Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary. She was commissioned on 05.07.20, paid off on 14.11.27 and sold in March 1931. In the Yearbooks of Australia (that I constructed the table from) her classification was Fleet Collier from May 1921 until June 1924 and Fleet Collier & Oiler from June 1925. Her entry on the RAN website mentions no conversion into a combined collier-tanker, but it does say this.

During the early 1920s plans were formulated for Biloela's conversion to a seaplane carrier embarking twelve aircraft, but along with a similar plan for RAFA Kurumba the scheme was dropped, as it would divert the ships from their principal task of fleet support.

Which, suggests to me that they built Albatross instead and because the plan was to covert 2 auxiliaries to seaplane carriers the original plan was for two ships of the Albatross class.

The RAN website's entry on Kurumba doesn't mention plans to convert her into a seaplane carrier.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 134.

If we are going to push alternate histories here, then with Oberon_706's indulgence, let's at least give something to Australia that would actually be useful. Hard-hitting battlecruiser HMS Tiger is better discussed in its own existing thread. NOMISYRRUC's charts above show that the Royal Australian Navy retained no submarines after 1930 when the last J-class and Odin-class subs were disposed of, which is curious. In real life Australia will have no subs from then until the Oberon class starting in the late 1960's. USN, British, and Dutch submarines operated successfully against Japanese targets from Australian bases; e.g. Fremantle and Exmouth. In our counterfactual history, with the benefit of hindsight, how about giving the RAN some subs, either after Pearl Harbor or in the immediate prewar years, when the looming threat to Australia meant purse-strings were being loosened? Submarines would be of greater value to Australian defense than an old and brittle capital ship.

If it was up to me I'd make maintaining a force of 12 destroyers my top priority.

However, the entry on the HMAS Platypus (I) on the RAN website says some things of interest

HMAS Platypus was built to the order of the Australian Government. After completion in March 1917 she passed to the control of the Admiralty until 25 March 1919 when she was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy at Portsmouth, under the command of Commander Edward Boyle VC RN, as a Submarine Depot Ship for six J Class submarines transferred as a gift from the Admiralty to the Royal Australian Navy.

Platypus sailed from Portsmouth on 8 April 1919 and with the submarines in company proceeded to Australia via the Suez Canal, arriving in Sydney on 15 July 1919.

In February 1920 Platypus proceeded to Port Phillip where a Submarine Depot had been established at Geelong. In May 1922 the Naval Board decided to abandon the policy of maintaining a Royal Australian Navy Submarine Service. The three J Class boats remaining in commission were paid off, and on 1 July 1922 Platypus proceeded to Sydney. On 12 July at Sydney she paid off as a Submarine Depot Ship and on the following day recommissioned as a Destroyer Depot and Fleet Repair Ship. Operating with the Fleet, mainly in home waters, she served in this role until 1929.

Meanwhile, in 1924, a Five Year Naval Development Programme had been approved by the Australian Government, which included the re-establishment of a Royal Australian Navy Submarine Service with a flotilla of six boats.

Two Royal Navy Odin Class submarines were initially ordered. Named Otway (I) and Oxley (I), the submarines reached Sydney on 14 February 1929. Platypus returned to Sydney from a cruise in Queensland waters the following day. She paid off on 31 March 1929 to recommission in her former role as a Submarine Tender.

The reconstituted Royal Australian Navy Submarine Service suffered from the outset from the world wide naval retrenchments beginning in 1929. On 10 May 1930 Otway (I) and Oxley (I) were paid off into Immediate Reserve with provision for one day diving exercises per fortnight each boat. As a result it was decided to use Platypus as a Depot Ship at Garden Island, acting also as parent ship for the submarines.

Platypus paid off on 15 August 1929 and the following day commissioned as HMAS Penguin. In April 1931 Otway (I) and Oxley (I) were transferred to the Royal Navy.

Platypus continued in service as the Depot Ship at Garden Island, Sydney, under the name of Penguin until 26 February 1941 when she recommissioned as HMAS Platypus to resume seagoing service as a training ship.

HMAS Platypus (I) | The Sea Power Centre

Royal Australian Navy

seapower.navy.gov.au

Although the entries on each and every J class submarine on the RAN website says that the entire class was paid of on 12.07.22. Five boats (J.1 to J.5) were sold in 1924 and sunk in 1926. However, J.7 wasn't sold until 1929 and was sunk in 1930.

The RAN website's entries for Otway and Oxley say they commissioned in 1927, but they didn't said for Australia until 15.11.28 and arrived at Sydney on 14.02.29. The entries also say that Otway and Oxley paid off into Reserve on 10.05.30, alternating with each other once weekly for diving exercises. Otway and Oxley paid off on 09.04.31 for transfer to the Royal Navy, commissioning as HMS Otway and HMS Oxley on 10.04.41. They sailed from Sydney (for Malta) on 29 .04.31.

So, first don't pay off the J class of in 1922 and keep them in commission until they can be replaced by the 6 new submarines in the five-year development programme of 1924. Otway and Oxley would be built as IOTL, but would be followed by 4 Odin class ordered in 1926, laid down in 1927 and completed 1929-30.

The spending cuts resulting from the Depression would force the RAN to pay off all 6 boats would be paid off in 1930, but they wouldn't be transferred to the RN in 1931. Instead all 6 ships would recommission over the course of the 1930s as the Australian economy recovered and go on to have distinguished war records.

Except, the First London Naval Treaty (which Australia signed) limited the British Commonwealth (of which Australia was part) to 52,700 tons of submarines. Although, that target did have to be reached until the end of 1936. IOTL the British Commonwealth had 57 submarines of 47,859 tons on 22.04.30 (the day the Treaty was signed) plus another 17 of 22,090 tons building, on order or authorised. It actually had 52 of 52,959 tons on 31.12.36 plus another 14 of 14,495 tons building, on order or authorised.

The Odin class displaced 1,475 tons so 4 of them with a combined displacement of 5,900 tons and would increase the British Commonwealth's total at 22.04.30 to 61 boats of 53.759 tons. Almost exactly what the Treaty allowed.

However, that would increase the total on 31.12.36 to 56 boats of 58,859 tons, which is about 5,000 tons more than Treaty allowed. Therefore, Britain would have to cut its own submarine force to remain within Treaty limits.

And there's how they would be employed in wartime. The O-to-R classes of submarines (of which the TTL RAN submarines would be a part) were intended to defend Singapore from the Japanese. Except that when war was declared they all transferred to the Home and Mediterranean Fleets where many were sunk and none were available to defend Singapore at the end of 1941. That's very likely to be the fate of the RAN's submarine force ITTL.

 

[Scott Kenny]

1913 E2 / E3

15,500 normal / 17,850 normal (not the sum of the weights below because of fuel and stores)
560’ pp / 580’ pp
75 beam / 76 beam
26’; 28.5’ deep / 26’; 28.75’ deep
55,000 shp / 60,000 shp
28 knots / 28 knots
2500 tons oil / 2500 tons oil (1000 at normal load)
(4x2) 9.2in / (4x2) 9.2in
(8x1) 6in / (8x1) 6in
4-21”TT / 4-21” (submerged I think 20 torps)

Weights
5500 / 6000 hull
3560 / 5070 protection
1900 / 1900 armament
2700 / 3000 machinery
685 / 700 general
155 / 180 board margin

Is a 1% margin for weight growth really that typical for ships of this time? (My interest is generally more WW2 than WW1 and before)

 

[Owens Z]

I recall reading in DK Brown about the 'Armoured Cruiser' design, a sort of Queen Elizabeth class BB in miniature idea....
The following was posted on (I think) an older version of the board....
Unfortunately it's only details for one of the series....

I have some info from years ago... off the internet.
RN Atlantic cruiser designs of 1913

Also these…
From D.K. Brown ‘Grand Fleet’, plus, a selection of later “Atlantic Cruiser” designs

Thanks to Pirate Pete and BlackBat242 for posting this detailed info, before I could access the cited DK Brown book at the public library. I won't bother engaging with those pedestrian 7-8kt cruiser designs, because relying on a modest fleet of cruisers and destroyers and corvettes (no submarines) is what the Royal Australian Navy actually did in the Second World War. Arguably that may indeed have been the country's optimal choice, considering all feasible alternatives. But in a thread like this whose very raison d'être is counterfactual history, I prefer to discuss vessels of more zest.

'E3' seems like a lot of ship for only eight 9.2" guns, the equivalent of Germany's SMS Blücher mistake. And seen in hindsight, the 25 knots of 'E' is just too slow—might as well keep already-paid-for battlecruiser Australia in service instead. How about two or three of the 'E2' design (or Atomic Coyote's similar design) for the RAN? I will call them Tiger cubs as per author Alexander Clarke. They would not be laid down in the UK in 1913, but after the Armistice, so that their design can incorporate post-Jutland magazine protection improvements and the vast increase in attention to torpedo defense in 1919 as compared to 1913. (HMS Defence of comparable size exploded at Jutland, killing her entire crew.) And 1919 would allow a more efficient geared drive for the turbines, rather than the older direct drive. While sort of "pocket battleships", the Tiger cubs are not capital ships, and thus are not banned by the Washington Naval Treaty. As mentioned in post #69 above, Australia never did have a battle line, so the Tiger cubs not being powerful enough for the line is of no consequence. They would fit into the Sutherland drydock in Sydney.

With the benefit of hindsight, I would delete E2's underwater torpedo tubes and torpedo magazines, and use the saved weight and space for better purposes. As Atomic Coyote mentioned, the Tiger cubs' anti-aircraft weapons would have to be greatly strengthened in time for service in WW2. Plus a substantial increase to the main battery's no-doubt inadequate original max elevation.

 

[Owens Z]

It was a very common coastal defence gun.

I see that Tony DiGiulian has a wide selection of Marks of British 9.2-inch guns listed in his informative NavWeaps site. Anybody here know which particular model gun was intended for the E2 design? I would like to calculate the weight of broadside of a Tiger cub vis-à-vis the Japanese heavy cruisers that fought in the 1942 naval battles around Indonesia and also pocket battleship Admiral Scheer (which prowled the Indian Ocean).

 

[EwenS]

Part of Post 134.

The table shows that the RAN had 38 warships and auxiliaries in May 1921, which declined to 15 in May 1933 and increased slightly to 17 in March 1939.

Warships.

Their numbers were reduced from 29 in May 1921 to 14 in March 1939, which was a reduction of 16 ships. The reductions were:

• 6 Submarines
• 1 Battle Cruiser
• 1 Cruiser
• 7 Destroyers
• 1 Sloop

However, the cruiser HMAS Amphion commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Perth at Portsmouth on 29.06.39. She took over the crew of Adelaide which paid off on 17.05.39. As far as I know Amphion was acquired to replace Adelaide (which under the terms of the First London Naval Treaty became overage in 1938) but Adelaide hadn't been disposed of when World War II broke out and she recommissioned on 01.09.39, two days before war was declared.

HMAS Sydney was purchased by Australia before launch, entering service in 1935. Most of her crew came from the old cruiser Brisbane, which was reactivated and sailed to Britain where she was sold for scrap. HMAS Hobart (ex HMS Apollo) was transferred to the RAN in Sept 1938 following nearly two years of service with the RN. Her crew came from the seaplane carrier Albatross, which again had been reactivated from reserve just to take a crew to Britain, where she was to be transferred to the RN as part payment for Hobart.


Adelaide had been in reserve for 10 years between June 1928 and 1938. FRom the RAN Seapower site:-

"After more than ten years in reserve Adelaide (I) was taken in hand in 1938 for an extensive refit and modernisation at Cockatoo Island Dockyard. The refit, which was completed in March 1939, included conversion to burn oil fuel only, involving removal of the two forward boilers, the forward funnel and uptakes, and the construction of additional oil fuel tanks. Several alterations were made to the armament, including removal of one 6-inch gun, the 3-inch anti-aircraft gun and the torpedo tubes. (The 12-pounder gun had been removed in 1937). Three 4-inch anti-aircraft guns were fitted and the gunnery control positions were rearranged."

That refit reportedly cost £60k. Not something you do if the intention was to discard her just a few months later, even if she was considered overage under the now expired 1930 LNT. And her crew travelled to Britain by liner to take over the Perth (ex HMS Amphion in June 1939 after nearly 3 years service with the RN). So there is no indication of an RAN intention to discard her.

That increased the total on 03.09.39 to 18 ships and the number of cruisers from 5 to 6 which equalled the number that the RAN had in May 1921.

The following ships were under construction or on order at the outbreak of World War II.

• 6 Tribal class destroyers were on order. I've read that they were to screen the capital ship that was projected.

From Friedman "British Destroyers and Frigates. The Second World War and After" about the Australian Tribals:-
"The Australians expected to have to deal with raiders in any future war, and their cruiser fleet was limited, and so they may well have emphasised the quasi-cruiser role. In February 1936 the Admiralty advised the RAN to build a unit of four large destroyers. In June the Australian Naval Staff chose the 'Tribal' class. The Government postponed any decision, but in October 1938, with war clearly imminent, it approved a programme including three 'Tribals' (later reduced to two) plus 12 MTBs. The MTBs were later eliminated in favour of two more 'Tribals', only one of which of which, Bataan, was built. Larger numbers may have been planned. A May 1939 report by the Australian Chiefs of Staff proposed a further naval expansion including, among other ships, four more 'Tribals' (its report also called for a capital ship with a screen of four more destroyers, presumably not 'Tribals').
The first pair of Australian Tribals were ordered on 24 Jan 1939 from Cockatoo Docks and Engineering (Sydney) and laid down 15 Nov 1939 (Arunta), and 10 Feb 1940 (Warramunga).
The third vessel, Kurnai (renamed Bataan before launch) was ordered on 20 Dec 1939 and laid down on 30 November 1940, following the launch of Arunta earlier that day.
I've seen no evidence for the fourth ship ever being ordered, let alone any later vessels of the class for Australia.

• 2 Sloops were under construction

Ordered 1938 (probably July & Nov). Parramatta laid down 9 Nov 1938 and Warrego on 5 May 1939.

Design of the Bathurst class corvettes had begun in July 1938, with an order for the lead ship, Bathurst, placed in Dec 1939 at Cockatoo, where she was laid down on 10 Feb 1940.

Depot Ships, Tenders and Auxiliaries.

There had been a reduction of 5 ships from 9 to 4. The most important losses were one Depot ship and One fleet collier & oiler (see below).

The 4 ships in service were.

• The Depot Ship Penguin (ex-Platypus) at Sydney.
• The Motor-Boat Cerberus, which was a tender to Flinders Naval Depot.
• The Fleet Oiler Kurumba. She was a civilian manned Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary from March 1919 to paying off on 04.06.28 and didn't recommission until 04.09.39 (AFAIK) into the RAN rather than the RAFA with which she served until paying off for the final time on 29.07.46.
• The Boom Defence Vessel Kookaburra. She's in the table as a Local Defence Vessel and was brand new in March 1939 because she'd only commissioned on 28.02.39. She was employed as a tender to the Anti-Submarine School at Sydney.

2 Boom Working Vessels were on order in March 1939. Koala was laid down on 21.06.39 and Kangaroo was laid down on 15.11.39.

The Fleet Collier & Oiler was Bilolea a civilian manned Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary. She was commissioned on 05.07.20, paid off on 14.11.27 and sold in March 1931. In the Yearbooks of Australia (that I constructed the table from) her classification was Fleet Collier from May 1921 until June 1924 and Fleet Collier & Oiler from June 1925. Her entry on the RAN website mentions no conversion into a combined collier-tanker, but it does say this.

Which, suggests to me that they built Albatross instead and because the plan was to covert 2 auxiliaries to seaplane carriers the original plan was for two ships of the Albatross class.

I've never seen anything to suggest that Albatross was ever intended to be more than a one off. Designed in Britain specifically for the RAN for trade protection in South Pacific waters. Australia at that time could not have afforded a full scale carrier either in financial or crewing terms. (See Friedman "British Carrier Aircraft"). It also helped create jobs in Australia in a time of high unemployment.

Albatross had a crew (excluding the air component) of about 420. Even a small carrier like Hermes needed a crew of nearly 600, while the likes of Furious, Eagle, C & G took that to around 800. If the RAN couldn't afford a full carrier in 1925/26 when Albatross was being planned and laid down, it couldn't afford a second Albatross. at least in crewing terms.

The RAN website's entry on Kurumba doesn't mention plans to convert her into a seaplane carrier.

 

[EwenS]

Part of Post 134.

If it was up to me I'd make maintaining a force of 12 destroyers my top priority.

However, the entry on the HMAS Platypus (I) on the RAN website says some things of interest

HMAS Platypus (I) | The Sea Power Centre

Royal Australian Navy

seapower.navy.gov.au

Although the entries on each and every J class submarine on the RAN website says that the entire class was paid of on 12.07.22. Five boats (J.1 to J.5) were sold in 1924 and sunk in 1926. However, J.7 wasn't sold until 1929 and was sunk in 1930.

The J class was a design of fast ocean submarine dating from 1913 and ordered in Jan 1915, to work with the fleet, with a surfaced speed of 19.5 knots. Not much information has been retained in the ships's cover about them. J7 was built to a modified design with the control room and conning tower further at than in the others. As the J class wasn't deemed fast enough that led to the steam powered 24 knot K class. The concept of this type of submarine rapidly went out of favour.

These submarines seem to have been in relatively poor condition when passed to the RAN and only deteriorated further in RAN service. The cost of refitting them and subsequently maintaining them was why they went to reserve in 1922. By 1921 they required new battery sets.

They were also equipped with 18in TT at a time when the RN was seeking to standardise on the much more powerful 21in.

The RAN website's entries for Otway and Oxley say they commissioned in 1927, but they didn't said for Australia until 15.11.28 and arrived at Sydney on 14.02.29. The entries also say that Otway and Oxley paid off into Reserve on 10.05.30, alternating with each other once weekly for diving exercises. Otway and Oxley paid off on 09.04.31 for transfer to the Royal Navy, commissioning as HMS Otway and HMS Oxley on 10.04.41. They sailed from Sydney (for Malta) on 29 .04.31.

Otway & Oxley were built for the RAN as a slightly modified version of the RN Oberon, the first of the new post WW1 generation of patrol submarines designed with a view to tackling the IJN out of Hong Kong and so requiring greater range than previous designs..

The design requirements for Oberon arose from an RN Conference in Feb 1922, with the design approved by the Admiralty in Feb 1923 for inclusion in the 1923/24 programme. Laying down this sub was delayed by work to complete the WW1 programme ships in an effort to smooth work flow in the Royal Dockyards and industry. As a result it was March 1924 before she was laid down.

Oxley & Otway followed at VA (Barrow) in March 1925. But these did not live up to expectations, proving slower than expected at the design stage (13.74 v 15.5 knots). All three completed between July & Sept 1927. As the first of a new type there would have been all sorts of trials to complete before they could be dispatched to Australia

The next 6 modified Oberons for the RN were pushed back from the 1925/26 Programme to the 1926/27 Programme. These were followed by 6 Parthian class in 1927/28 and 6 (reduced to 4 in July 1929 as part of the run up to the 1930 LNC). These completed Feb 1929 - Jan 1932.

So, first don't pay off the J class of in 1922 and keep them in commission until they can be replaced by the 6 new submarines in the five-year development programme of 1924. Otway and Oxley would be built as IOTL, but would be followed by 4 Odin class ordered in 1926, laid down in 1927 and completed 1929-30.

Where is the money coming from for this scheme?

The spending cuts resulting from the Depression would force the RAN to pay off all 6 boats would be paid off in 1930, but they wouldn't be transferred to the RN in 1931. Instead all 6 ships would recommission over the course of the 1930s as the Australian economy recovered and go on to have distinguished war records.

Except, the First London Naval Treaty (which Australia signed) limited the British Commonwealth (of which Australia was part) to 52,700 tons of submarines. Although, that target did have to be reached until the end of 1936. IOTL the British Commonwealth had 57 submarines of 47,859 tons on 22.04.30 (the day the Treaty was signed) plus another 17 of 22,090 tons building, on order or authorised. It actually had 52 of 52,959 tons on 31.12.36 plus another 14 of 14,495 tons building, on order or authorised.

The Odin class displaced 1,475 tons so 4 of them with a combined displacement of 5,900 tons and would increase the British Commonwealth's total at 22.04.30 to 61 boats of 53.759 tons. Almost exactly what the Treaty allowed.

However, that would increase the total on 31.12.36 to 56 boats of 58,859 tons, which is about 5,000 tons more than Treaty allowed. Therefore, Britain would have to cut its own submarine force to remain within Treaty limits.

And there's how they would be employed in wartime. The O-to-R classes of submarines (of which the TTL RAN submarines would be a part) were intended to defend Singapore from the Japanese. Except that when war was declared they all transferred to the Home and Mediterranean Fleets where many were sunk and none were available to defend Singapore at the end of 1941. That's very likely to be the fate of the RAN's submarine force ITTL.

 

[Owens Z]

From the page 80 of the book: Cockatoo Island: Sydney's Historic Dockyard:
http://books.google.hu/books?id=1ulc79wlY54C&printsec=frontcover&hl=hu#v=onepage&q=cruiser&f=false
These cruisers are designed by Cockatoo Island naval Dockyards in 1924 and Vickers in 1929.
In the end, it was the expense of building these ships in Australia to a unique design that cancelled them in favor of buying two Kent class 8" cruisers "off-the-shelf" from UK shipyards in 1925.

Slightly off topic, well a mile off topic, Albatross was ordered in large part to maintain shipbuilding skills at Cockatoo after it was decided to build the two Counties offshore. I suspect it would have been cheaper to build the two cruisers locally and not bother with a seaplane carrier.
The skills acquired on those ships would have made building replacements for Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane locally more justifiable.
Such a move would likely have seen the yard still building cruisers once war became inevitable.
Australia, with a much more experienced, capable and efficient shipbuilding capability could have built cruisers and a greater number of destroyers through the war. Potentially even light fleet carriers could have been built locally.

Sunderland Dock (Cockatoo Island) = 635’ (later increased to 690’)
HMAS Australia = 590’

In the different thread "The Cockatoo Heavy Cruiser", Tzoli had posted info about an Australian plan to design and build in-house two heavy cruisers during the 1920's. I have been reading through the interesting locally published book he cites (see his link above) about the activities of His Majesty's Australian Dockyard Cockatoo Island in Sydney Harbour and its big Sutherland drydock. On pages 226-27, for example, Cockatoo Island is shown as keeping very busy during the First World War not only on overhauling merchant ships and RAN light cruisers, but also three visiting Imperial Japanese Navy light cruisers. And cruisers HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Adelaide were built there around this time. So the implication some make on this thread that there wasn't the equipment or expertise in the country to keep battlecruiser HMAS Australia in service until WW2 with periodic mild refits seems unlikely.

As discussed earlier, all-in-all I do think a budget-limited nation probably made the best decision when in 1924 it scuttled the battlecruiser offshore. But as Volkodav mentions, a firm decision to keep more shipbuilding work inside Australia during the 1920's and 30's, expanding on the equipment and expertise already there, could have benefitted the country's economy and its WW2 defense, with aftereffects felt to this day (in real life, Cockatoo Island closed in 1991). Yes, more money needed from Australian taxpayers in the interwar period. But it would have been spent in Australia, instead of in Britain.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In the different thread "The Cockatoo Heavy Cruiser", Tzoli had posted info about an Australian plan to design and build in-house two heavy cruisers during the 1920's. I have been reading through the interesting locally published book he cites (see his link above) about the activities of His Majesty's Australian Dockyard Cockatoo Island in Sydney Harbour and its big Sutherland drydock. On pages 226-27, for example, Cockatoo Island is shown as keeping very busy during the First World War not only on overhauling merchant ships and RAN light cruisers, but also three visiting Imperial Japanese Navy light cruisers. And cruisers HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Adelaide were built there around this time. So the implication some make on this thread that there wasn't the equipment or expertise in the country to keep battlecruiser HMAS Australia in service until WW2 with periodic mild refits seems unlikely.

Cannot make ammunition or repair/replace the guns in Oz.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

. . . even if she was considered overage under the now expired 1930 LNT.

And considered overage under the in force 1936 LNT.

C. OVER AGE

Vessels of the following categories and sub-categories shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the undermentioned number of years have elapsed since completion:

(a) Capital ships 26 years​

(b) Aircraft carriers 20 years​

(c) Light surface vessels, sub-categories (a) and (b):​

(i) If laid down before 1 January 1920, 16 years
(ii) If laid down after 31 December 1919, 20 years​

(d) Light surface vessels, sub-category (c) 16 years​

(e) Submarines 13 years​

​

Under the 1936 Treaty Adelaide was a Light Surface Vessel of Sub-Category (b)

(3) Light surface vessels are surface vessels of war other than aircraft-carriers, minor war vessels or auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

The category of light surface vessels is divided into three sub-categories as follows:

(a) Vessels which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.);​

(b) Vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which exceeds 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons);​

(c) Vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which does not exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons).​

​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Where is the money coming from for this scheme?

His Majesty's Australian Treasury or whatever the proper name of Australia's finance ministry was at the time - @Rule of cool may know.

 

[Rule of cool]

Now it's just 'The Treasury', we don't embellish the Royal part these days but it may have been different in the 20s. After all we didn't get our own Governor General until the 30s or ratify the 1931 Statute of Westminster until 1942.

 

[Owens Z]

Under the Naval Aid Bill of 1912, Canada was to commit $35m to build battleships or armoured cruisers "of the most modern type". The usual assumption is three modified QEs (Churchill built the 1913 Estimates around that assumption), but the bill died in Parliament due to opposition from the Liberal majority in the Senate.

Actually they do. The Naval Aid Bill of 1912, that came reasonably close to reality (passed the House of Commons, was defeated in Senate) called for three modern capital ships, battleships or battlecruisers - usually it's assumed that "Queen Elizabeth"-class battleships were planned to be ordered - to be constructed. On the other hand, the idea was mainly to donate those units to RN, instead of operating them themselves (which was one of the reason it was defeated).

We could quibble about just what constitutes "serious consideration" by Canada, but this info about a bill for new capital ships that was debated in Parliament at Ottawa before being turned down is news to me; thank you.

 

[Owens Z]

Cannot make ammunition or repair/replace the guns in Oz.

If this is a response to the post #41 which refloated this thread that "had Australia foresightedly obtained and warehoused the Royal Navy's stocks of 12" Mark VIIa Greenboy shells, and spare barrels, at little expense when the RN put the 12"/45 Mark X gun out of service in the early 1920's, there would have remained a plentiful supply of ammunition for the ship (stocks of USN AP Mark 15s might have been made available had Greenboy deterioration in storage become a real problem)", and/or a response to my post #69's second paragraph that engages with your, Dilandu's, and EwenS's overemphasized worries about shell supply (Oberon_706 named the many posts about this "a side debate" from the main topic), and/or a response to my point that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Turkey each did fine with no more industry than Australia had, then please be more specific.

But if this is a claim that it would have been against some law of physics to erect one heavier-lift crane in the entire continent: Scott, Scott, you are not getting the hang of this alternate-history oeuvre.

 

[Dilandu]

We could quibble about just what constitutes "serious consideration" by Canada, but this info about a bill for new capital ships that was debated in Parliament at Ottawa before being turned down is news to me; thank you.

The Naval Aid Bill of 1912

Basically, the question of Canadian naval defense at this time became the question of political struggle between pro-Imperial conservatives and pro-autonomy liberals. The conservatives argued for the larger naval spending, but in terms of ships gifted for Royal Navy, for the purpose of common defense. Liberals, on the other hand, argued for smaller, but fully Canadian navy, build & crewed in Canada and not subordinated to Royal Navy. Initially Liberals won, pushing for a small navy of light cruisers and destroyers in 1911. But then they lost the elections (by antagonizing French-speaking population) and Conservatives immediately tried to push for their plan; pay for three dreadnoughts or battlecruisers, that would be operated by Royal Navy. They did not sucseed, though.

P.S. I wonder, what if both sides could reach a compromise by ordering a "fleet unit" - a battlecruiser, three light cruisers and a number of destroyers and submarines - like Australia did? If such compromize could be reached in 1911, they would probably order a HMS Tiger's sistership. Or possibly even two; Canada have two coastlines to defend, after all, so it make sence to order a pair of "fleet units", one for each.

 

[ArtosStark]

The Naval Aid Bill of 1912

Basically, the question of Canadian naval defense at this time became the question of political struggle between pro-Imperial conservatives and pro-autonomy liberals. The conservatives argued for the larger naval spending, but in terms of ships gifted for Royal Navy, for the purpose of common defense. Liberals, on the other hand, argued for smaller, but fully Canadian navy, build & crewed in Canada and not subordinated to Royal Navy. Initially Liberals won, pushing for a small navy of light cruisers and destroyers in 1911. But then they lost the elections (by antagonizing French-speaking population) and Conservatives immediately tried to push for their plan; pay for three dreadnoughts or battlecruisers, that would be operated by Royal Navy. They did not sucseed, though.

P.S. I wonder, what if both sides could reach a compromise by ordering a "fleet unit" - a battlecruiser, three light cruisers and a number of destroyers and submarines - like Australia did? If such compromize could be reached in 1911, they would probably order a HMS Tiger's sistership. Or possibly even two; Canada have two coastlines to defend, after all, so it make sence to order a pair of "fleet units", one for each.

Unlikely unfortunately.

What the Liberals really wanted was not to be saddled with the cost of Naval spending at all. Laurier had initially created the Navy to head off the increasing pressure to contribute more to the growing cost of Imperial Defence, cloaking it in the national sentiment of a separate Canadian Navy. Once that was done he did everything he could to avoid funding it any more than he had to.

Borden from the Conservatives meanwhile, wanted to use contribution to Imperial Defence as a way to raise Canada’s position within a relatively close Empire. He was not thrilled with the Navy he had had foisted on him, and did all he could to limit its access to the Treasury.

Outside of Borden’s desire to use Naval spending to increase Canada’s standing in the Empire and Laurier’s desire to avoid the same, neither had much use or desire for Naval spending. They preferred to perpetuate the proud Canadian tradition of having someone else pay for Defence. Part of the attraction of buying ships for the RN was that Canada would not face the cost of crewing and maintaining them. So the reasonable compromise of maintaining a Canadian fleet unit would have been to no ones political taste.

 

[Dilandu]

So the reasonable compromise of maintaining a Canadian fleet unit would have been to no ones political taste.

On the other hand, history knew a lot of compromises made exactly like that. The compromise doesn't need to make both sides happy to stand; it merely must make both sides equivally unhappy.

 

[ArtosStark]

On the other hand, history knew a lot of compromises made exactly like that. The compromise doesn't need to make both sides happy to stand; it merely must make both sides equivally unhappy.

True enough I suppose. And Laurier’s line of critique of the 1912 bill was that it was a large sum of money that brought no benefit to Canadian businesses. If Borden for some reason decided to try and neutralize that criticism with a local fleet unit that would be available to the RN in the event of war, that might do it. I am not sure a local fleet unit would actually benefit local industry much (Canada had neither the funds nor the expertise to build such ships economically and even maintaining them would take some investment) but perhaps the impression could be maintained that it could.

 

[EwenS]

Warship 2017 contained a "Warship Notes" short article by Ian Johnston about a "Canadian Super Yard" dating to 1910-11. He had been digging in the records of Fairfield in Glasgow and came across several plans for a new shipyard for Haifax in Canada, but with little additional information. There were 3 plans for yards if different sizes.

The largest covered 140 acres (none in Britain at the time exceeded 100 acres). It had 11 covered berths as 1x1,000ft, 1x800ft, 3x600ft, 6x500ft. There was also an 1,100ft dry dock capable of being divided in two.

On 9 March 1911 Fairfield's Chairman reported to the Board "negotiations regarding a Canadian shipbuilding programme and was authorised to proceed on the matter".

 

[BlackBat242]

The J class was a design of fast ocean submarine dating from 1913 and ordered in Jan 1915, to work with the fleet, with a surfaced speed of 19.5 knots. Not much information has been retained in the ships's cover about them. J7 was built to a modified design with the control room and conning tower further at than in the others. As the J class wasn't deemed fast enough that led to the steam powered 24 knot K class. The concept of this type of submarine rapidly went out of favour.

These submarines seem to have been in relatively poor condition when passed to the RAN and only deteriorated further in RAN service. The cost of refitting them and subsequently maintaining them was why they went to reserve in 1922. By 1921 they required new battery sets.

They were also equipped with 18in TT at a time when the RN was seeking to standardise on the much more powerful 21in.

Part of Post 134.

Although the entries on each and every J class submarine on the RAN website says that the entire class was paid of on 12.07.22. Five boats (J.1 to J.5) were sold in 1924 and sunk in 1926. However, J.7 wasn't sold until 1929 and was sunk in 1930.

Interestingly, there are two of the RAN's J-class subs whose hulks are still in existence.

J-3 is located just off the tip of Swan Island (pics from the World Naval Ships Forum, taken in 2014-19):








J-7 was sunk as breakwater suburban Hampton Victoria in 1929, now Sandringham Yacht Club 1 (same pic source, 2013-15):