I still like the Marinflieger Hunter theory. It could have been a good option if Germany was being realistic. They could have operated a separate aircraft for the Luftwaffe in the nuclear delivery role. Lightning would be an option for interceptors but I would think it would be tough to not buy Lightning at the time. A split buy is realistic but not all British picks.

Multiple, small fleets is bad fleet management and bad procurement practice and that becomes more and more important as aircraft become more complex and expensive. This was the RAF's problem, many small fleets of different aircraft rather than a handful of big fleets giving them huge and expensive fleet management overheads that take away from front line strength.

The NATO F104G buy created a huge fleet that minimised costs of ownership for the users. The LW and RAF creating a big fleet of Lightnings between them would provide similar benefits, but the Buccaneer would mean higher costs of ownership because of the smaller MF, RN and South African fleet. However this would be weighed against the Buccaneer's far greater suitability for the maritime strike role, perhaps the Marineflieger could get away with a smaller fleet of these bigger, more potent aircraft to balance out the costs.
 
I think the key is the RAF abandoning dreams of huge long range Tu28 Mig 25 lookalikes and developing the Lightning as a Mig21, Sukhoi Su7-11 equivalent.

Missiles are not an issue as they are all pretty much crap until technology matures in the 70s.

Get the RAF sorted out before 1957 and focus on Lightning followed by Bloodhound.

Once Lightnings are operating in RAF Germany you have a shop window for a joint programme.

The same pre 1957 review forces the RAF to take Buccaneer as a single nuke carrier like the US types in NATO.

Using the Su11 analogue how about a VG Lightning for the RAF, RN and Luftwaffe from the mid 60s.

The Hunter still gets roled as a low threat close air support type.
Hawker offer a replacement in 1962 to compete with Lightning. EWR Messerschmidt are partners on Lightning. Dornier joins Hawker on a strike trainer.

Buccaneer proves more complicated and its range is an issue. A straight swap of Seahawks for Buccaneer S50s is worked out.

Redesigning the Lightning to carry the standard US NATO freefall bomb draws on work done to fit Genie. The high speed and short range of Lightning make it ideal for W Germany removing the need for VSTOL.

The move to Flexible Response brings a new tactical fighter competition:
Lightning VG
Buccaneer S3
Hawk TFGR1
Phantom
Mirage
Corsair
 
The RAF wasn't in the Mid and Far East because of the low level threats, they were in CENTO and SEATO to try to limit Soviet and Chinese expansion as part of the global Cold War. Sure, the actual fighting done by Hunters was against ostensibly low level threats, but these low level forces were backed by Egypt which was by no means low level in the early-mid 60s.

The fact of the matter is that the Lightning can strafe, rocket and bomb tribesmen well enough but the Hunter (and Javelin) would struggle against Indonesian, Vietnamese, Egyptian and Iraqi Mig 21s.

The post 57 RAF is only going to have about 20 'fighter' sqns, best practice would be to maximise on a single type. Assuming that then the best option is for that single type to be the most capable type available, which is a developed Lightning not a Hunter conversion.
 
Its bad strategy to build a monolithic unit type in 1957. First, if its bad the whole fleet is bad. Two, if some design issue grounds the fleet similar to the first problem. Three, technology was moving faster than production. You wanted to build in incremental improvements with each successive batch.
 
Multiple, small fleets is bad fleet management and bad procurement practice and that becomes more and more important as aircraft become more complex and expensive.
You're not wrong.

But in 1957, a truly multirole aircraft was not possible.

So now you're looking at the idea of same airframe with different electronic fits, for example the F-101. Means all your airframe and engine spares are the same across the fleet, and you only have 2 separate electronics fits (maybe 3 if you count the recon version separately from the bomber).


This was the RAF's problem, many small fleets of different aircraft rather than a handful of big fleets giving them huge and expensive fleet management overheads that take away from front line strength.
Again, not really possible to resolve until the late 1960s and Phantom at the earliest.


The NATO F104G buy created a huge fleet that minimised costs of ownership for the users.
At the cost of not being suitable for much of anything but delivering a single can of instant sunshine. They weren't even good interceptors anymore (due to losing the good air-search radar).


The LW and RAF creating a big fleet of Lightnings between them would provide similar benefits, but the Buccaneer would mean higher costs of ownership because of the smaller MF, RN and South African fleet. However this would be weighed against the Buccaneer's far greater suitability for the maritime strike role, perhaps the Marineflieger could get away with a smaller fleet of these bigger, more potent aircraft to balance out the costs.
Still acceptable costs at the time.
 
Its bad strategy to build a monolithic unit type in 1957. First, if its bad the whole fleet is bad. Two, if some design issue grounds the fleet similar to the first problem. Three, technology was moving faster than production. You wanted to build in incremental improvements with each successive batch.

That was the strategy up to 1957-58 when the RAF had over 60 'fighter' sqns, but 57-58 was the period when this changed. When the RAF has less than 'fighter' 20 sqns it isn't good strategy to have multiple small fleets, its better to pick a type and back it fully, like France did with the Mirage III and Germany did with the F105G.
 
That was the strategy up to 1957-58 when the RAF had over 60 'fighter' sqns, but 57-58 was the period when this changed. When the RAF has less than 'fighter' 20 sqns it isn't good strategy to have multiple small fleets, its better to pick a type and back it fully, like France did with the Mirage III and Germany did with the F105G.
I'd still be willing to have say, Lightning (interceptor), Hunter (ground attack and photo recon), and Buccaneer (naval strike) than try to make F104G work in all 3 roles. Even the French didn't use Mirage III for everything.

Because up till Phantom, nobody had successfully put Interceptor and fighter-bomber in the same airframe at the same time, to the extent that as soon as a Phantom dropped its bombs it was now available to shoot down enemy fighters.
 
You're not wrong.

But in 1957, a truly multirole aircraft was not possible.

So now you're looking at the idea of same airframe with different electronic fits, for example the F-101. Means all your airframe and engine spares are the same across the fleet, and you only have 2 separate electronics fits (maybe 3 if you count the recon version separately from the bomber).

In 1957 it was becoming possible. The RAAF's Mirage IIIO(F) were fitted with the Cyrano II radar, the IIIO(A) had the Cyrano IIB and a doppler radar altimeter. The IIIO(F)s were retrofitted with the IIB and doppler altimeter by mid 1969, a year after the last IIIO(A)s were delivered. Despite having a unified avionics fit by 1969 the A and F sqn undertook different flying programmes until 1973.

The proposals for ground attack Lightnings had a doppler altimeter in the belly tank.

At the cost of not being suitable for much of anything but delivering a single can of instant sunshine. They weren't even good interceptors anymore (due to losing the good air-search radar).

Yet they chose the F104 and bought 916 of them. Compared to what was available at the decision point in late 1958 it was so competitive that a few bribes got it over the line.
 
I'd still be willing to have say, Lightning (interceptor), Hunter (ground attack and photo recon), and Buccaneer (naval strike) than try to make F104G work in all 3 roles. Even the French didn't use Mirage III for everything.

Because up till Phantom, nobody had successfully put Interceptor and fighter-bomber in the same airframe at the same time, to the extent that as soon as a Phantom dropped its bombs it was now available to shoot down enemy fighters.

The lifespan of the Hunter is too short, especially when compared to the Lightning and Buccaneer.

The Luftwaffe replaced the F104 in the air to air role first, however if they chose the Hunter they'd have to replace that first. It's a difficult and I'd guess expensive way to go about things.
 
Yet they chose the F104 and bought 916 of them. Compared to what was available at the decision point in late 1958 it was so competitive that a few bribes got it over the line.
Those "few bribes" were sufficiently large that the US passed an absolutely draconian law about it.

$22mil, roughly a full squadron of F-104s. And that's in various years dollar values. ~$10mil in 1960ish in Germany, another $1.1mil then in Denmark, ~$8.3mil in 1970ish in Japan, and based on what's left a couple million in Italy. And they paid a Saudi arms dealer some $106mil in commissions (starting at 2.5% and rising to 15%).

(edited to add link to FCPA)
 
Last edited:
I think the key is the RAF abandoning dreams of huge long range Tu28 Mig 25 lookalikes and developing the Lightning as a Mig21, Sukhoi Su7-11 equivalent.
So Lightning but you remove one engine? :) and use the space for fuel. Sort of like P.6/1 but with an Avon. Still would really want more major changes e.g. main undercarriage in fuselage in order to give more space for pylons and fuel. Might even want a lower wing sweep to improve lift at low speeds; Wait, haven't we just recreated the F-104...

The Hunter still gets roled as a low threat close air support type.
Its pretty agnostic of threat. Lightning or other types are no more survivable. Its just that Hunters are much cheaper and are still relevant up to the 90s with historical mods (countermeasures, guided weapons etc.)

The fact of the matter is that the Lightning can strafe, rocket and bomb tribesmen well enough but the Hunter (and Javelin) would struggle against Indonesian, Vietnamese, Egyptian and Iraqi Mig 21s.
As pointed out before, this wasn't the experience of the likes of A-4 or A-7 operating in Vietnam against those threats

When the RAF has less than 'fighter' 20 sqns it isn't good strategy to have multiple small fleets, its better to pick a type and back it fully, like France did with the Mirage III and Germany did with the F105G.
If you look at actual costs then the savings are overblown. e.g. today when multiple air forces are operating multi type combat air forces with below 10 sqns of much more expensive aircraft. Back in the 50s I wouldn't expect it to make much difference at all given the aircraft are much less expensive to operate - production costs are the big driver at this point, so even 5% cheaper unit cost x 100s aircraft makes quite an impact.
 
When the RAF has less than 'fighter' 20 sqns it isn't good strategy to have multiple small fleets, its better to pick a type and back it fully, like France did with the Mirage III and Germany did with the F105G.
100 IIIC were ordered but only 95 were delivered, ultimately 192 Mirage IIIE were acquired but they did not enter service until 1964.
France used its 156 Super Mysteres until 1977, plus they had 100 F-100s which they used until 1978 and many of these Super Mysteres and F-100s were replaced by 160 Jaguars. Some Mystere IVs lingered on in frontline roles until 1974, others for fighter training until 1982.
So they did have penny packets of other types until the mid-1970s for ground attack and the Mirage III.

Ironically only West Germany managed to standardize on just two types (ignoring the dual-role Alpha Jet).

In 1957 it was becoming possible.
Yes and no depending on who is supplying the avionics.

The all-weather ground-attack capable Mirage IIIE with Cyrano II - which entered production in 1964 - Doppler and TACAN was not delivered until 1964 and, as you say, not until 1968 was it decided in Australia to upgrade the IIIO(F) aircraft to IIIO(A) ground attack standard.

Notably the F-104G entered service in 1960 and had a more advanced inertial navigation system and a multi-mode radar (though by no means a stellar performer). US avionics tipped the balance, neither the UK or France could match this provision at that time. They had the avionics and the Bomb - no one else did.

Interestingly, these early fighter-bombers were in production a long time - the last Luftwaffe F-104Gs were completed in 1973 (the F-104S would not cease production until 1979), Mirage IIIEs were still being built until 1976. By the end of their production runs they had been surpassed but they continued on.

The Bomb is the critical factor I think. The US would not sanction the integration of its tactical nuclear bombs onto a non-US airframe (Project Emily being the sole exception, and that was hard fought and the UK was a nuclear power - French F-100s has US Mk 28s during 1963-64). So if the Luftwaffe and Benelux bought Lightnings or Buccs, then either they would have to try and get Red Beards out of the UK government (highly unlikely and no spare fissile material) or additional USAF wings would be needed in Western Europe.
 
Its not like Germany could snap its finger and all of the aircraft magically appeared in one swoop. Purchases are delivered across a time vector and designs changes at a brisk pace. They may have worn the F-104 G name, but conventional wisdom tells me the first batch was no twin of the last.
 
Franz Josef Strauss was eager to get US nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr.
Even if the F104G had not been offered I think F101 Voodoos (like Canada) would have been bought, plus perhaps F100 Super Sabres.
Messerschmidt wanted to get back in the combat aircraft business and the US was the obvious choice.
F104 training was done in the luxury of the USA grotty Britain could not have matched that.
 
Those "few bribes" were sufficiently large that the US passed an absolutely draconian law about it.

$22mil, roughly a full squadron of F-104s. And that's in various years dollar values. ~$10mil in 1960ish in Germany, another $1.1mil then in Denmark, ~$8.3mil in 1970ish in Japan, and based on what's left a couple million in Italy. And they paid a Saudi arms dealer some $106mil in commissions (starting at 2.5% and rising to 15%).

(edited to add link to FCPA)

True, but despite bribes the Germans had to pick a mach 2 fighter-bomber. A company couldn't bribe their way into getting the Germans to accept a WW1 biplane, or more realistically an obsolescent transonic fighter or something like a Canberra.
 
As pointed out before, this wasn't the experience of the likes of A-4 or A-7 operating in Vietnam against those threats

In Vietnam A4s and A7s either operated in the bengin South or in the North with serious support from escort fighters, Wild Weasel SEAD and whatever jamming, AEW and ELINT (Red Crown) support that could be laid on.

In the 1973 over half Israeli losses were A4s and they also took big losses in the Falklands.
If you look at actual costs then the savings are overblown. e.g. today when multiple air forces are operating multi type combat air forces with below 10 sqns of much more expensive aircraft. Back in the 50s I wouldn't expect it to make much difference at all given the aircraft are much less expensive to operate - production costs are the big driver at this point, so even 5% cheaper unit cost x 100s aircraft makes quite an impact.

I haven't bought a fleet of combat aircraft for a while, but IIRC the initial cost is 50% the unit costs of the aircraft and 50% the startup costs of 3 years spares, engineering, weapons, training, publications etc etc etc. This Initial cost is then matched by the operating cost over the life of the aircraft. So if a fleet costs a $1 billion to buy, the initial support will also cost $1 and to fly them for ~20 years will cost $2 billion. New Zealand found this out to their detriment when offered those F16s in the boneyard, they couldn't afford to join the 5 international F16 groups because they cost $1m p/a each for example, as well as the myriad of other costs.

Air forces go to great pains to minimise these cost, if they can have 3 rather than 4 or 5 engineer specialist streams they will, if the only have to retrofit half the fleet with updated avionics they will.

While the Hunter FGA converson was cheap it set up the RAF for expensive follow on activities and that's what going deep with the Lightning avoids.
 
100 IIIC were ordered but only 95 were delivered, ultimately 192 Mirage IIIE were acquired but they did not enter service until 1964.
France used its 156 Super Mysteres until 1977, plus they had 100 F-100s which they used until 1978 and many of these Super Mysteres and F-100s were replaced by 160 Jaguars. Some Mystere IVs lingered on in frontline roles until 1974, others for fighter training until 1982.
So they did have penny packets of other types until the mid-1970s for ground attack and the Mirage III.

The transition took time, and since the F100 and Super Mystere were transonic France had more time than the British did with the Venom and Hunter conversions. What's more these are legacy aircraft, already paid forin the 50s and likely with US MAP funds.

In any case the analogue in my mind would be how Canberras and V-bombers would cling on until the mid 50s until all the TSR2 could get buolt to replace them and likely they'd still linger in high specialist roles for long until their spares stock ran out.

The all-weather ground-attack capable Mirage IIIE with Cyrano II - which entered production in 1964 - Doppler and TACAN was not delivered until 1964 and, as you say, not until 1968 was it decided in Australia to upgrade the IIIO(F) aircraft to IIIO(A) ground attack standard.
......
Interestingly, these early fighter-bombers were in production a long time - the last Luftwaffe F-104Gs were completed in 1973 (the F-104S would not cease production until 1979), Mirage IIIEs were still being built until 1976. By the end of their production runs they had been surpassed but they continued on.

Its not like Germany could snap its finger and all of the aircraft magically appeared in one swoop. Purchases are delivered across a time vector and designs changes at a brisk pace. They may have worn the F-104 G name, but conventional wisdom tells me the first batch was no twin of the last.

Countries know these build programmes will take years and can arrange their procurement planning around that. The RAAF got the fighters first and attack second then harmonised the fleet's equipment fit when the parts became available. The RAF got F1, F1A and F2 first then F3, F3A and F6, before binging the F2s up to near F6 standard with the F2A in 1970. France bought the IIIC initially and bought greater numbers of the IIIE when it became available, as well as IIIB and IIID trainers and IIIR recce aircraft.
 
The real world RAF was in no hurry to replace the Hunter FGA9 but did develop the Lightning up to F5 with Red Top.
P1154 might well have survived to enter service in 1970 if the F4 Phantom had not been so imoressive and already ordered by the RN .
When Jaguar proves very suitable as a strike aircraft the F4 becomes available to replace the Lightning.
I have never seen any suggestion that a FGA Lightning was ever considered by the RAF.
 
P1154 might well have survived to enter service in 1970 if the F4 Phantom had not been so imoressive and already ordered by the RN .
I'm not so sure, my read of the RAF Phantoms is more that the RAF order effectively saved the RN order since the increased buy made the Spey conversion affordable.
 
True, but despite bribes the Germans had to pick a mach 2 fighter-bomber. A company couldn't bribe their way into getting the Germans to accept a WW1 biplane, or more realistically an obsolescent transonic fighter or something like a Canberra.
No, they needed an interceptor, a fighter-bomber for nuclear strike, and a recon plane.

There were several other options available, some of which would have been very cheap as US surplus. F101s.
 
So if we accept the premise, rather than repeating what we already know, what happens with the RAF, LW and MF?

The RAF would get the TSR2 and P1127 Harrier and the LW would get the RF4E and F4F in the late 60s early 70s.

The big question is what replaces the Lightning? Ideally something akin to the Super Hornet.
 
RAF still doesn't get TSR2. There's even less money to fill the massive funding hole in this scenario.

RAF gets Phantom to replace Lightning. Maybe later on given less money and some newer Lightning airframes.

Tornado GR still happens, but with Germany as the majority partner and UK, Italy more minor. Driven by earlier tech transfer to Germany, and earlier rebuilding of German aerospace industry driven by this Lightning GR development.
 
Last edited:
Why is there a massive funding hole? The RAF isn't paying for the Hunter conversions, P1154 development, AW681 development, Phantoms that cost triple the US cost, Jaguar growth into a strike aircraft and AFVG as a mini TSR2. Instead they are buying another ~180 Lightnings, but the Lightning production line is ramped-up through the roof to meet RAF and LW requirements, so the unit cost is lower the support costs amortised over a larger fleet.
 
Oh dear I think we need to lie down in a darkened room.
There is no real world basis in even the vaguest RAF wish list for a Lightning FGA.
You are trying replace Hunter and P1154 with a fictional plane that was never considered for their roles.
Moreover BAC itself was delighted to get Jaguar rather than a Lightning FGA for its 70s and 80s product lineup. India agreed.
If we are dreaming up David Baddiel RAF variants what about Javelin or DH110 paper planes or RAF Scimitars?
 
There is no real world basis in even the vaguest RAF wish list for a Lightning FGA.

By 'RAF' you mean the handful of top brass who answer to the Minister of Defence. This Minister of Defence who (incorrectly) declared manned combat aircraft obsolescent.

This small coterie of key people's decisions drive procurement, so if these handful of people make a different decision then different procurement outcomes are the result.

After all nobody wished for the Hunter FGA conversion, it got foisted on them by the Minister.
 
Some of these decisions were realistically a stroke or heart attack away from reality. The circle of people making decisions was small.
 
Some of these decisions were realistically a stroke or heart attack away from reality. The circle of people making decisions was small.

Then things are seriously affected by the personal prejudice of the decision maker. Duncan Sandys was the commander of the first Z battery of rocket AA in October 1940. In April 1943 he was tasked with learning German progress on the V2 rocket and was chairman of the Flying Bomb Countermeasures Committee. Thus he was all too ready to believe the moat optimistic claims about rockets, claims other ministers would likely have been skeptical about, and boldly declare manned combat aircraft obsolescent.

Change one man's personal prejudice and all sorts of obstacles to the premise become much reduced.
 
The view of manned aircraft obsolescence was prevalent tho (and understandable when looked at through advances taking place at the time) ALL the main players were looking to replace (or at least augment) interceptors with missiles.

In hindsight was Sandys wrong In his thinking ?
 
Why is there a massive funding hole? The RAF isn't paying for the Hunter conversions, P1154 development, AW681 development, Phantoms that cost triple the US cost, Jaguar growth into a strike aircraft and AFVG as a mini TSR2. Instead they are buying another ~180 Lightnings, but the Lightning production line is ramped-up through the roof to meet RAF and LW requirements, so the unit cost is lower the support costs amortised over a larger fleet.
As gone through before, that isn't how costs or budgets work. Money historically spent on acquiring Phantoms in 1970 can't be spent in 1957 developing a Lightning FG.

In hindsight was Sandys wrong In his thinking ?
No, completely correct as proven out - I can't see many crewed interceptors in service to protect against ICBMs...

But he was just the heavyweight politician to push through the changes (of which many more than just aircraft within the DWP). It was led from Macmillan as PM. It's not just one person's views, but considered and valid analysis, driven by a need to save large amounts of money - better not to spend this on things that are ineffective.
 
The view of manned aircraft obsolescence was prevalent tho (and understandable when looked at through advances taking place at the time) ALL the main players were looking to replace (or at least augment) interceptors with missiles.

In hindsight was Sandys wrong In his thinking ?

Sandys got most of the 57 DWP right, certainly there is much less need for Fighter Command when ballistic missiles proliferate and certainly SAMs have a major role in air defence. However that doesn't make fighters wholly obsolete, after Sandys was well and truly gone it was decided that FC should have about 7 fighter sqns, as fighters have the range, flexibility and combat persistence that SAMs lack.

It is instructive that no other greater power decided that manned fighters, let alone manned combat aircraft in general, were obsolete and almost 70 years later they still aren't.
 
As gone through before, that isn't how costs or budgets work. Money historically spent on acquiring Phantoms in 1970 can't be spent in 1957 developing a Lightning FG.

No, but money spent on developing the P1154 and AW681 prior to 1965 could instead be spent building Lightnings. Similarly the money spent after 1965 on RAF Phantom development and production and F111K development could instead be spent on TSR2 development.
 
Was curious about the fate of the LW F104s so put together this spreadsheet about the F104 (and G91) wings and what replaced them. Of the 9 F104 wings some 5 (and 1 G91) wings were replaced by RF4E and F4F in the mid 70s; both fighter, both recce and one of 5 fighter-bomber wings. The remaining four fighter-bomber wings were replaced by Tornados in the 80s, the last units gone by 1987.

This closely mirrors the fate of the RAF Lightning sqns, 1 was disbanded in 1971 (although 43 sqn with diverted RN FG1 Phantoms was formed in 1969), 6 were replaced by Phantoms in the mid 70s and the final 2 by Tornado F3s in 1987-88.

Would a big LW and RAF Lightning fleets have the same timelines? Or maybe the higher unit cost of the Lightning might change the trajectory a bit?
 

Attachments

  • German Cold War combat wings.xlsx
    9.9 KB · Views: 5
The changes to the RAF's fighter and missile forces between 1956 and 1991 reflected the changing mix of nuclear and conventional Soviet forces they faced.
The arrival of Soviet SS4 and SS5 IRBMs clearly made defending the V bomber bases in a nuclear war impossible.
The mix of Lightnings, Javelins and Bloodhounds was designed to cope with limited war situations and peacetime patrols.
Supersonic bombers did not materialise as a threat until Backfires and Fencers began arriving in the 70s. The RAF responded with Tornados and AEW.
A trickier issue is the nature of UK forces outside the NATO area. Bloodhound was easily deployable by air and Lightnings were based overseas. Javelins could also deploy overseas.
The sale of Migs to countries like Indonesia led the RAF to ask for a fighter ground attack aircraft with twin Red Tops which could operate from rough strips unlike Lightning. By 1967 the UK was pulling out of such places and the F4 / P1127 combo was seen as adequate for NATO plus some overseas detachment with Victor refuelers.
I repeat there was no Lightning FGA sized hole created by Sandys.
 
The changes to the RAF's fighter and missile forces between 1956 and 1991 reflected the changing mix of nuclear and conventional Soviet forces they faced.
The arrival of Soviet SS4 and SS5 IRBMs clearly made defending the V bomber bases in a nuclear war impossible.
The mix of Lightnings, Javelins and Bloodhounds was designed to cope with limited war situations and peacetime patrols.
Supersonic bombers did not materialise as a threat until Backfires and Fencers began arriving in the 70s. The RAF responded with Tornados and AEW.
A trickier issue is the nature of UK forces outside the NATO area. Bloodhound was easily deployable by air and Lightnings were based overseas. Javelins could also deploy overseas.
The sale of Migs to countries like Indonesia led the RAF to ask for a fighter ground attack aircraft with twin Red Tops which could operate from rough strips unlike Lightning. By 1967 the UK was pulling out of such places and the F4 / P1127 combo was seen as adequate for NATO plus some overseas detachment with Victor refuelers.
I repeat there was no Lightning FGA sized hole created by Sandys.

That's fair enough, but you've focused on the demand side and not the supply side, which is or should be a factor in decision making.

Firstly, unlike US, USSR and France Britain did not have a transonic F100/Super Mystere/Mig 19 class of aircraft that it could lean on to get it through the 60s transition to Mach 2. It made the jump directly from subsonic to Mach 2, therefore was in an 'all or nothing' situation; either embrace the jump to mach 2 wholly or stick with subsonic types that get more obsolescent by the week.

Britain went forward with obsolescence in the form of prolonging the Javelin to 1967 and converting Hunter FGA/FRs and as you point out was behind the 8 ball for the rest of the Cold War, playing catch up to the advances made by others. This is not what Great Powers do, and Britain certainly could have done better and was lucky that the supersonic bomber threat didn't materialise nor did it face more serious fighter opposition in its various crises in the 60s.

So from the supply perspective there was indeed a Lightning FGA sized hole in Britain's force structure. If the Britain had gone with the transonic P1083 there wouldn't be, but they didn't so there was.
 
Last edited:
The view of manned aircraft obsolescence was prevalent tho (and understandable when looked at through advances taking place at the time) ALL the main players were looking to replace (or at least augment) interceptors with missiles.

In hindsight was Sandys wrong In his thinking ?
Not exactly. Interceptors do not defend against ICBMs. Or even IRBMs, if Soviet launchers in East Germany had the legs to reach England.

What he missed was bombers armed with long range missiles. England is effectively in the same situation as a USN carrier, in that bombers can potentially come at it from a lot of angles and not many bombers could completely wreck the country. Once those bombers start carrying long range missiles, deck launched interception doesn't work, the interceptors cannot get to the bombers before they launch. So you need to have a fighter already airborne, loitering at some distance away from the place to be defended. Which pushes the needed airframe larger and larger.

Fortunately, this threat didn't really appear till the 1970s.
 
So going back to the original premise, 'what if Germany buys British' ?
we can see, A, they did (when fitted requirements and avaliable), and B, at the time, the equipment purchased by FGR., the UK. had no direct equivalents avaliable, eg. F-104G & F-4F or were working in partnership with France, eg. Transall & Alpha Jet
(and C, in reality would probably not have made much difference to actual events other than in 'alternate time lines') :)
 
Is Germany buying british SAMs realistic `? Bloodhound instead of Nike Hercules ?
 
Only if the Swedish "mobile" Bloodhound comes about earlier, though Thunderbird is mobile.
(Poor Thunderbird tends to always get overlooked, despite have a cool name.)
 
Back
Top Bottom