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The fledgling Lufftwaffe and Marineflieger appeared to be interesting in buying British in their earliest days. Of course this was the worst possible time to deal with the British, so every effort fell over.

Wiki referencing Wood.
The German Defence Ministry first expressed interest in the SR.177 in October 1955. The prospects of a large German order for as many as 200 aircraft, and for the SR.177 to be manufactured under licence in Germany.
During 1957 OR.337 was cancelled and the prospects of an order from the RAF had evaporated, the Royal Navy and Germany remained potential customers for the SR.177.
Minister of Supply Aubrey Jones assured German officials that the SR.177 project was continuing, Sandys contacted them to inform them that the aircraft was effectively dead.
The German government decided to change its priorities from seeking an interceptor aircraft to acquiring a strike fighter instead.
Minister visited the German government in November 1957 as the Germans wanted the arrangements to be between governments instead of between their government and Saunders-Roe.
Germany chose to withdraw support from the venture in December 1957.

Thunder and Lightnings
The P.1 had survived the Defence White Paper, export prospects practically disappeared. After frustrating and fruitless attempts to sell the aircraft to the Luftwaffe, EE discovered a government representative was actually telling the Germans not to buy the aircraft!

EwenS and TinWing in the USN-Buccaneer thread
NA.39 was demonstrated to the West German Defence Minister, Franz-Josef Strauss, at the 1960 Farnborough Air Show. The Germans were shopping for a new maritime strike aircraft for the Marineflieger. The German Navy requested detailed information on the Buccaneer, but with arcane British export regulations, all such material had to be physically passed through the British embassy in Bonn, where someone forgot about it for months on end. Eventually they bought the F-104G to fulfil the role.

If 1 or 2 of these deals went through the military history of the Cold War could be vastly different.
 
If 1 or 2 of these deals went through the military history of the Cold War could be vastly different.
Vastly different? I think this is rather over-egging the consequences of West Germany buying a limited number of British military aircraft.

The problems of course were that Britain had its industrial and financial problems, compared to the American aircraft British ones generally had much shorter production runs and fewer through-life upgrades, and West Germany was obligated to buy a certain amount of American defence products annually.
 
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Never going to happen.
The West Germans were constantly paying to keep the poorly equipped British Army of the Rhine in place. Bonn regarded London as a picky and demanding ally.
In contrast the US were willing to provide a full range of nuclear delivery systems (with US warheads safeguarded).
West Germans saw the UK as out of date. Macmillan compared with Kennedy.
Added to which De Gaulle in Paris was offering a share in a European aircraft industry (Atlantique, Transall).
Oh and Lightning F1 and Buccaneer S1 were even more Scheiss than the F104G
 
The West Germans were constantly paying to keep the poorly equipped British Army of the Rhine in place.
Did they? I know the FRG was required to buy a certain amount of American military products each year as a way of offsetting stationed US forces, but wasn't aware of any similar agreements with the UK.
 
Timing is important here. West Germany got full sovereignty in May 1955, joined NATO 4 days later and the Luftwaffe was formed in January 1956. At this point RAFG had 33 sqns, Fighter Command 35 sqns, Bomber Command 27 sqns, and Britain had large networks of alliances and military commands worldwide. So it's not surprising that the fledgling West German Luftwaffe would look at the British SR177, after all in 1956 Britain was going to buy hundreds for the RAF and RN.

This all changed with the Suez failure and the DWP with it's ludicrous declaration that manned combat aircraft were obsolescent. As has been shown the British Government actively campaigned against not only the SR177 but also the Lightning which was already on order for the RAF.

By the 60s the damage had been done, but there was a window of opportunity to do big business with West Germany in the late 50s.
 
I assume that in this Britfantasy of the late fifties there is no Suez fiasco and the 1957 Defence White Paper does not happen.
Meanwhile in the real world the UK was constantly looking to reduce the size of RAFG and BAOR, citing new nuclear weapons like the Corporal missile as grounds for doing so. Bonn viewed such efforts with despair.
 
Vastly different? I think this is rather over-egging the consequences of West Germany buying a limited number of British military aircraft.

The problems of course were that Britain had its industrial and financial problems, compared to the American aircraft British ones generally had much shorter production runs and fewer through-life upgrades, and West Germany was obligated to buy a certain amount of American defence products annually.

It depends on what happens. For example if the Marineflieger gets the Buccaneer does the Luftwaffe, and if so how does the Luftwaffe having a long range nuclear strike aircraft from the 60s affect the Cold War?

As for production numbers, West German orders would turn that around.
 
Both Moscow and Paris would have had strong objections to supplying long range strike aircraft to Bonn. The UK press and many politicians would have shared these concerns.
Many years later Tornado had its range reduced because Bonn did not want to upset Moscow.
There was also a postwar treaty limiting German rearmament.
Buccaneer S1 was as hopeless if not more so than F104G. I doubt Germany would have waited until the mid 60s for S2.
S Africa had Canberras and its S50s were delivered in 1965.
The Lightning FMK53 which is the closest we came to the mythical multi role Lightning is also not available until the mid 60s.
A more realistic option for W Germany would have been the Mirage III which like the F104G could be used as a fighter and a strike aircraft.
 
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Never going to happen.
The West Germans were constantly paying to keep the poorly equipped British Army of the Rhine in place. Bonn regarded London as a picky and demanding ally.
In contrast the US were willing to provide a full range of nuclear delivery systems (with US warheads safeguarded).
West Germans saw the UK as out of date. Macmillan compared with Kennedy.
Added to which De Gaulle in Paris was offering a share in a European aircraft industry (Atlantique, Transall).
Oh and Lightning F1 and Buccaneer S1 were even more Scheiss than the F104G

Unlikely without political change, but never is too strong because there was contact on both the SR177 and NA39.

You're mismatching the timeframes, the SR177 was 1956-57 and the Buccaneer 1960.

The Germans wouldn't be getting the F1 or S1.
  • Lightning F1/A were ordered for the RAF in November 1956,
  • West Germany pulled out of the SR177 in December 1957.
  • The Hunter won the Venom Replacement Evaluation Trials August 1958.
  • F104 wins West German competition November 1958
  • West Germany orders first 66 F104Gs February 1958.
  • Britain orders 50 Lightning F2 December 1959.
  • NA39 shown to Marienflieger mid 1960.
  • Buccaneer S2 ordered into production January 1962.
West Germany bought 916 F104s between 1960 and 1973, so if the world turned topsy-turvy and they bought British they would have at least bought Lightning F2s and some Buccaneer S1s but the bulk of the orders would have been F3/6 etc and Buccaneer S2s.
 
Still think Mirage III is closer to the W German requirement.
Missile armament is another factor. W Germany became a key production site for Sidewinder. R350 and Firestreak would have been much less lucrative.
W Germany developed the Kormoran anti shipping missile which served on its Starfighters and Tornados.
Buccaneer had no ASM armament in UK service until the Martel arrived at the end of the 60s..SAAF used the AS30 on its Bucs. RAF AS30s were only used on Canberras.
 
I assume that in this Britfantasy of the late fifties there is no Suez fiasco and the 1957 Defence White Paper does not happen.
Meanwhile in the real world the UK was constantly looking to reduce the size of RAFG and BAOR, citing new nuclear weapons like the Corporal missile as grounds for doing so. Bonn viewed such efforts with despair.

The White Paper has to happen, Suez defeat or not. The security environment was changing in the late 50s and Britain wasn't alone in adapting to it, Australia started reducing conscription in the same year. What they did wrong was do it in the immediate aftermath of a national humiliation and then go too far with some of the most controversial aspects, in particular the all in with nukes and missiles are the future.

That said, I think Suez did strike at British confidence and this was detrimental to efforts to sell the decent defence equipment Britain did make.
 
It is pretty hard to get round the negative aspects of the Lightning F1 and the Buccaneer S1 compared with the F104 and Mirage III.
 
Still think Mirage III is closer to the W German requirement.
Missile armament is another factor. W Germany became a key production site for Sidewinder. R350 and Firestreak would have been much less lucrative.
W Germany developed the Kormoran anti shipping missile which served on its Starfighters and Tornados.
Buccaneer had no ASM armament in UK service until the Martel arrived at the end of the 60s..SAAF used the AS30 on its Bucs. RAF AS30s were only used on Canberras.

Didn't Marcel Dassault hate the Germans and vowed to never sell them an aircraft.

That said the Mirage IIIE is better than the F104G, that's how it overcome US backing to win the RAAF order.
 
It is pretty hard to get round the negative aspects of the Lightning F1 and the Buccaneer S1 compared with the F104 and Mirage III.

What negative aspects in particular, keeping in mind the respective states of development in 1958?

Its not as in anyone thought the Lightning F1 was the definitive version, the F1A had already been ordered after all, any more than anyone thought the F104A or Mirage IIIA were definitive.
 
Both Moscow and Paris would have had strong objections to supplying long range strike aircraft to Bonn. The UK press and many politicians would have shared these concerns.
Many years later Tornado had its range reduced because Bonn did not want to upset Moscow.
There was also a postwar treaty limiting German rearmament.
Buccaneer S1 was as hopeless if not more so than F104G. I doubt Germany would have waited until the mid 60s for S2.
S Africa had Canberras and its S50s were delivered in 1965.
The Lightning FMK53 which is the closest we came to the mythical multi role Lightning is also not available until the mid 60s.
A more realistic option for W Germany would have been the Mirage III which like the F104G could be used as a fighter and a strike aircraft.
France in 1957 had agreed to a joint nuclear weapons program with Germany and Italy. They have no problem with literally giving Germany the bomb but they are going to care about Buccaneers?
 
I've seen a reference in a P.177 file that Germany was equally reliant on British recommendations on technology as much as it was on buying arms.
For example, just pre-White Paper some Whitehall folks were wondering if pressing the Germans to buy F.177 would be a mistake. As they saw it, being so close to the Soviet threat, the fighters would have little chance to intercept anything against an incoming a nuclear strike and felt that relying on SAMs was better. There was, it seems, some talk of offering Blue Envoy instead and the Germans seemingly did begin a defence policy review after the White Paper came out. I don't think that its a coincidence that Germany at that point decided it wanted a nuclear-armed fighter-bomber rather than a classic interceptor.
 
We have rough figures of 150 each for F.177 for RAF and FAA.
Which with an initial German build of 200 makes a reasonable starting figure of 500 airframes.
We can assume if Germany opts in, Denmark, and Norway, possibly Italy follow.
The French might opt for this instead of F8.
A Japanese order and license might thus emerge. As might an Australian order.

A more nuanced view is the German Navy and RN would increasingly push for more flexibility in Attack, while the RAF could divide on the issue of pure interception or multirole.
The naval version is likely the most potential for success. If it can operated safely from modified Colossus and Majestic carriers.

Buccaneer is interesting, but without US approval and clearance for their nuclear weapons. Germany would confine their order to anti-shipping strike.
 
FRG Defence Procurement and Foreign Exchange Offset.

Great agitation attended the FOREX Drain of Allied Forces in W.Germany, from Sovereignty, 5/5/55 to...well, very recently: FRG quite legitimately noted we were all there in part to defend...ourselves. Payments were made to and/or equipment was procured (implicitly, not solely on open-market merit) from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France*, Neths, UK, US. So, early selections were spread around to share the joy (so UK got Sycamore, France Fouga Magister). For the supersonic types merit would be sought, plus noble work better than Lego. Obviously US had the highest cost so highest entitlement. (When US lost NKF75 to MRCA - the largest single Defence budget item into '80s - Land and Sea had to take more ex-US).

UK 4/58 deleted Napier Scorpion rocket boost from Lightning (that's what the ventral pack was for) when RR showed some reheat competence, sufficient to cause Avon 200 to meet Spec. climb rate. It was the probability of that that caused RAF not to persevere with a split Fleet when advising Sandys 2/57 that 2 supersonic interceptors would be one too many, so let's settle on Lightning. RN was very happy not to have toxic liquids on their ships.

It is entirely possible that FRG/Japan "interest" in SR177 was unreal, intended to encourage US supersonic bidders to price tightly.

(" amended 15/7: I forgot France! The arrangement changed 12/66 after CDG left NATO's Integrated Military Command Structure).
 
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Didn't Marcel Dassault hate the Germans and vowed to never sell them an aircraft.
On the contrary, Marcel Dassault wanted the german contract for 950 aircraft
the Bundes Luftwaffe even send Pilot to France to test the Mirage III,
But that Pilot recommend vehement the Lockheed F-104 instead...
 
What negative aspects in particular, keeping in mind the respective states of development in 1958?

Its not as in anyone thought the Lightning F1 was the definitive version, the F1A had already been ordered after all, any more than anyone thought the F104A or Mirage IIIA were definitive.
The USAF had F104A in 1958 and Lockheed developed the F104G specifically to meet a W German requirement for a fighter bomber in 1957. Not just Germany but also Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands and Norway operated them for some 20 years.

The Lightning F1 basic version was not in RAF service till 1960. Only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were persuaded to buy the marginally better Fmk53 (still only 2 AAM, not Sidewinder capable). Both regretted it and shopped for better aircraft as soon as politics (British withdrawal from Gulf) permitted.

Noone bought Buccaneer S1. S Africa were content to wait for the S50 till the mid 60s as they had Canberras and no alternatives.
 
to put in perspective
the Saunders-Roe SR.177 started in same time as XF-104 program in 1952
in end 1957 stand of both program:
XF-104 ending it test program with 16 build prototypes, the F-104 enter production, for servis on 28 January 1958.
SR.53 prototype 2 build what flew in 1957. missing airborne Radar, the F-104 has.
SR.177 single prototype for 90% complete, as program was canceled on 24 December 1957.

So a complex Interceptor that need rocket engine, with 2 prototypes and one not ready.
Against simple Interceptor with 16 prototype and already in production to go in service.

As German i drop the SR.177 and take better product, either F-104 or Mirage III
 
Seahawk and Gannet beg to differ.

That's a prime example of what was lost, West Germany had no problem buying British kit.

In 1956 ordered 66 Sea Hawks and 16 Gannets while talking about building 200 SR177s under license. The Suez and the 1957 DWP happened and Britain lost this potentially mutually beneficial relationship.
 
FRG Defence Procurement and Foreign Exchange Offset.

Great agitation attended the FOREX Drain of Allied Forces in W.Germany, from Sovereignty, 5/5/55 to...well, very recently: FRG quite legitimately noted we were all there in part to defend...ourselves. Payments were made to and/or equipment was procured (implicitly, not solely on open-market merit) from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Neths, UK, US. So, early selections were spread around to share the joy (so UK got Sycamore, France Fouga Magister). For the supersonic types merit would be sought, plus noble work better than Lego. Obviously US had the highest cost so highest entitlement. (When US lost NKF75 to MRCA - the largest single Defence budget item into '80s - Land and Sea had to take more ex-US).

UK 4/58 deleted Napier Scorpion rocket boost from Lightning (that's what the ventral pack was for) when RR showed some reheat competence, sufficient to cause Avon 200 to meet Spec. climb rate. It was the probability of that that caused RAF not to persevere with a split Fleet when advising Sandys 2/57 that 2 supersonic interceptors would be one too many, so let's settle on Lightning. RN was very happy not to have toxic liquids on their ships.

It is entirely possible that FRG/Japan "interest" in SR177 was unreal, intended to encourage US supersonic bidders to price tightly.

Maybe there is benefit in a split interceptor fleet when Fighter Command is 35 sqns and there there interceptor-fighter wings and sqns elsewhere around the world. But when the number of interceptor and fighter-bomber sqns shrinks to ~20 then concentration on a single type is the best course of action.
 
Alertken hits a valid point over reheat improvements.
But misses the wider mark of jet engine improvements, themselves.
And utterly misses the then predicted new jet engines with reheat and their potential that RR, AS and BS were all starting to point out.

This is why Fairey start asking RR about the further scaled up RB.106 design RB.128 for Delta III, that obviates the need for rocket motors at all.

So a minister could look at this and conclude that new jet engines with good reheat remove the risky business of rocket motors and promptly cancel such hybrids.
RR then had notably offered much of the new technologies incorporated into a refreshed versions of Avon.

Promptly undermined by the new current thing of low level penetration strikers.

But briefly interim options still included RB.133 which was supposedly a more high altitude Avon.....it was what RR had on the books available soon.
 
The USAF had F104A in 1958 and Lockheed developed the F104G specifically to meet a W German requirement for a fighter bomber in 1957. Not just Germany but also Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands and Norway operated them for some 20 years.

The Lightning F1 basic version was not in RAF service till 1960. Only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were persuaded to buy the marginally better Fmk53 (still only 2 AAM, not Sidewinder capable). Both regretted it and shopped for better aircraft as soon as politics (British withdrawal from Gulf) permitted.

Noone bought Buccaneer S1. S Africa were content to wait for the S50 till the mid 60s as they had Canberras and no alternatives.

Yes, the F104 story is well known, including how palms were greased to get it over the line. However this thread is exploring how the West German combat aircraft acquisition story might have been different.

I'm the first to acknowledge the F104's advantages; it was the furthest along in its development cycle in 1958, indeed it was entering USAF sqn service, it was ~20-30% cheaper per unit than the Lightning and was backed by the economic might of the USA.

However in the context of this thread I think it's only fair to acknowledge that the disadvantages placed in the way of the Lightning were largely 'artificial'. IIUC declaring it interim and obsolescent slowed production work down and put it's future in doubt, just when the Luftwaffe needed to believe their aircraft of choice had a bright future. If Sandys put as much vigour into whipping the Lightning into shape as he did crippling it then I have no problem believing it would have been in sqn service 6-12 months earlier and the ground attack proposals that appeared from about 1959 would have appeared in 1957-58. The engineering challenges could have been overcome with a little political will and some money.

As for South Africa S50s, that was because of the particular hot and high conditiosn in South Africa. Sure, S1s were under-powered, but the British used them for training and trials alongside their active S2 sqns. Presumably if West Germany bought the Buccaneer they'd get S1s early and S2s later and use the S1s in support-flying roles like the British.
 
We seem to again have the fantasy of "if only the British government had given even more subsidy to Industry than the massive historical amount then everything would be wonderful"

Maybe a more rational take would be say that SARO's aircraft design division should have been wound up in the mid 30s, saving the government a lot of money that SARO milked out of them for various poor aircraft (mostly the flying boats), and freeing up the engineers to do more productive things.

More on topic, given how the German requirement changed towards a nuke carrying fighter bomber, has anyone seen any schemes for Red Beard or similar on SR.177? Seems ok for weight on the pylon when balanced with a drop tank, but might be a bit big?
 
Lightning could have been developed faster if the UK had not wasted so much time and effort on other fighter programmes.
The Luftwaffe were able to move smoothly from Sabres to Starfighters and then to Phantoms.
Significantly the UK botched its Sabre equivalent (Swift) and never did get AAMs on its Hunters. The F89 Scorpion at least had two types of AAM compared with the Gloster Javelin.
If I had been Sandys I would have asked the USAF to station F102s then F106 in the UK to defend joint RAF USAF bases and given up on Lightning and ordered more Bloodhounds instead. I would also have nixed the Canberra replacement in favour of Army Blue Waters which could deploy anywhere by Beverley while Hunters took on Army Cooperation.
I might have agreed to NEAF and FEAF getting F102 and F104 if the US wanted us to be active there and provided MDAP.
The freed up industry could then have produced household goods (You've never ha it so good).
 
Of the 2 requirements I think the Buccaneer is the easiest fit. It wouldn't require Britain to do anything to the aircraft or its development program, and by 1960 Sandys is gone and so is the anti-aircraft dogma. It would just require a bit of competence and enthusiasm on the part of British personnel to give the sale a good chance, and it would be a nice boost for Hawker SIddeley.

The 1958 strike fighter requirement is a bit harder but in technical terms not particularly difficult given the competition was the F104. The SR177 is not going to happen, the change in German requirement from interceptor to strike-fighter is a major problem for the aircraft, even without all the garbage on the British end. That leaves the Lightning, which apparently was pushed by EE in the face of British Government opposition. I have little doubt that the Lightning could have been developed into something akin to the F104G, which was hardly a great strike-fighter, but the British Government was against it and they're harder to deal with than aircraft engineers.
 
I admit to liking the Lightning in its 60s shiny finish with various bright coloured squadron markings.. I have models of it in my collection. Its performance at the September Battle of Britain displays was always noisy and epic.


Perhaps if the FMk 3/6 and Red Top had been available sooner? But like a Jaguar car of the day Lightning looked cool but was thirsty and
maintenance heavy.
 
Would a stock AIRPASS be effective enough to detect ground targets to feed range data into a bomb toss computer?
 
Germany was looking for joint designs. Germany would have dramatically changed a Lightning design. Their character was to re-engineer designs for ease of maintenance and adaptability. Germany could have gone Heinkel He 31 Florett (looked like MiG-21 with wingtip missiles or the Messerschmitt P.1211 (weird canard tailsitter) but chose off the shelf options instead. The F-104G was unique with a bunch of customizations.
 
Germany was looking for joint designs. Germany would have dramatically changed a Lightning design. Their character was to re-engineer designs for ease of maintenance and adaptability. Germany could have gone Heinkel He 31 Florett (looked like MiG-21 with wingtip missiles or the Messerschmitt P.1211 (weird canard tailsitter) but chose off the shelf options instead. The F-104G was unique with a bunch of customizations.

Basically Germany would pay to get the ground attack Lightning off the ground, so to speak. EE could load it up with all their bright ideas and plans and if the Germans choose it over the F104 then they'd pay to get all those goodies built.

The Luftwaffe had 5 wings of strike F104s, 2 of interceptor and 2 of recce. That's a huge force, a massive win if it went to the British.
 
I think you had a better chance for Mirage than Lightning. If money was the issue they buy both Starfighter and Super Tiger in initial batches, run them through operations a bit, then buy a follow on batch of the better buy.
 
I think you had a better chance for Mirage than Lightning. If money was the issue they buy both Starfighter and Super Tiger in initial batches, run them through operations a bit, then buy a follow on batch of the better buy.

Apparently the Mirage test pilot hated it and his damming report landed on the evaluators desk at decision-making time and scuppered the Mirages chance. In any case the Lightning was far more advanced in the development process during 1958, with 20 development batch aircraft being delivered for testing and a production order for 50 being built. IIUC the first of 10 Mirage IIIA prototypes first flew in 1958 and no production order had been placed.

The Super Tiger never stood a chance as it was not ordered for the USN.

In any case this thread is about what happens after if the Germans bought British, not if they bought French. Imho that would be a pretty boring thread: the Mirage III becomes even more successful, the end!
 
Didn't it emerge later that a senior German politician pocketed a huge bribe, 'put thumb on scales' to favour the 'Starfighter' ??

As I understand it, by the time heavy, all-weather Radar etc was added to the 'standard' model, it needed bigger wings. Without, became the Luftwaffe's infamous 'Widowmaker' lawn-dart...
 
Yes bribes were paid, however I wonder how much effect they had on the procurement process. Its not as if the F104 was a WW1 biplane that should have obviously lost to the Lightning and Mirage. It was more or less competitive on cost, performance, development level to the level where its more nuanced factors that get the deal done, like work share, tech transfer, offsets and all the other things that go into an arms deal of such magnitude. The bribes get hidden within that environment.

I don't know if the radar made the F104 crash, planes of this era were notoriously crashy. The RAF crashed 50 of 280 Lightnings for example.
 
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