WI more Canberra's replaced by Valiants?

[Hood]

Given most of the products of the UK aerospace industry, it may have been better to tell them that they need to build better.

The customer has to know what it wants. Often it seems that BOAC, BEA and the RAF didn't know its aileron from its elevators (or arse from its elbow as us Brits like to quip).

We tend to get very hung up on projects and what-ifs, maybe that's the problem - too much design work, too many ideas, too much "humming and aaring" and dreaming up ways to build something for 20 years time instead of getting on with the job in hand.

 

[Rule of cool]

Given most of the products of the UK aerospace industry, it may have been better to tell them that they need to build better.

Maybe develop faster, the Hunter a year earlier would have been good, same with the Lightning and of course the biggest culprit is the Sea Vixen.

 

[Rule of cool]

The customer has to know what it wants. Often it seems that BOAC, BEA and the RAF didn't know its aileron from its elevators (or arse from its elbow as us Brits like to quip).

We tend to get very hung up on projects and what-ifs, maybe that's the problem - too much design work, too many ideas, too much "humming and aaring" and dreaming up ways to build something for 20 years time instead of getting on with the job in hand.

This is where Sandys could have (in my view) gotten the RAF on the right path, down from a myriad of types to 3 combat types within a decade; Lightning, P1127 Harrier and TSR2. Along with the Buccaneer narrowing British focus to this handful of types should make them more successful.

Much like the French with the F8E(FN) I can't see much alternative to buying the Phantom for the RN, but you can't win them all so you shouldn't waste time and money trying.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Thus nay be a bit ‘left field/out if the blue’, but, COULD another reason for the RAF’s difficulties have also been related to the fact that, for almost the entirety of it’s history, aircraft were only in service for a relatively short period of time before being replaced?
Thus mindset was (I think) carried forwards into the 1950’s/early 1960’s, and so, the “there’s something better just down the line” problem becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and they never get indigenous hardware, or rarely, to the service stage by the late 50’s into the 60’s.
THAT is surely a major reason for the ‘failure’ to realise certain project?

 

[Rule of cool]

Thus nay be a bit ‘left field/out if the blue’, but, COULD another reason for the RAF’s difficulties have also been related to the fact that, for almost the entirety of it’s history, aircraft were only in service for a relatively short period of time before being replaced?
Thus mindset was (I think) carried forwards into the 1950’s/early 1960’s, and so, the “there’s something better just down the line” problem becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and they never get indigenous hardware, or rarely, to the service stage by the late 50’s into the 60’s.
THAT is surely a major reason for the ‘failure’ to realise certain project?

I think so.

The generation of aircraft that included the Lightning, F104, F106 and Mirage III were the first generation of aircraft that would have a service life of over 15 years as opposed to about 10 for the Hunter, Sabre, Mystere, Mig 17. This was a big mental hurdle to jump and I don't think it became apparent this was the case until these aircraft had been in service for a few years. Mach 3 types like the F108 had been cancelled and the next generation wasn't much faster, just more 'rounded' in performance terms, and the advanmces came from new avionics. The choice became to buy a new fleet of new aircraft or give the current fleet an update.

Again, hindsight is 20-20 and it might be possible to trace a thread of clues to where the good decision is made but just as often the right decision has to be a fluke.

 

[Hood]

Thus nay be a bit ‘left field/out if the blue’, but, COULD another reason for the RAF’s difficulties have also been related to the fact that, for almost the entirety of it’s history, aircraft were only in service for a relatively short period of time before being replaced?
Thus mindset was (I think) carried forwards into the 1950’s/early 1960’s, and so, the “there’s something better just down the line” problem becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and they never get indigenous hardware, or rarely, to the service stage by the late 50’s into the 60’s.
THAT is surely a major reason for the ‘failure’ to realise certain project?

Agreed, that mindset lingered on well into the 1970s, design the replacement before it's even entered service was par for the course.
You can see why they did that, in theory they hoped to keep up with the technological pace, but you couldn't simply knock up a prototype in 6 months, complete the trials in 12 months and have it in frontline service within two years like you could in the pre-war era. The long development programmes of 1941-45 should have taught them a lesson (saying that the first generation jet fighters seemed to progress relatively quickly).

Much like the 'Digital Century Series', the reality is so often different once practicalities bite.

 

[red admiral]

As for British industry being a leader in Europe in the 50s and 60s, I struggle to believe that isn't obvious.

When you look through your examples, they're all subsystems. Maybe Warton just wasn't as good at designing and developing aircraft as Assault and Saab? and because the UK single sourced P.1 to EE in the late 40s it put the UK on an inevitable path to Warton being the only "high end" aircraft company.

In the 40s and 50s then the pace of airframe development was really fast, but costs were also rising rapidly so you could no longer afford to iterate. Then post 60s it's really about avionics. So the challenge is really about getting a "reasonable" airframe by the early/mid 60s. Unfortunately at that point then TSR2 was well already underway (but too early) consuming most effort, and then we're into VG and VTOL (or both) craziness, before running out of money. Whereas Dassault invested privately in a plan b.

 

[Rule of cool]

When you look through your examples, they're all subsystems. Maybe Warton just wasn't as good at designing and developing aircraft as Assault and Saab? and because the UK single sourced P.1 to EE in the late 40s it put the UK on an inevitable path to Warton being the only "high end" aircraft company.

In the 40s and 50s then the pace of airframe development was really fast, but costs were also rising rapidly so you could no longer afford to iterate. Then post 60s it's really about avionics. So the challenge is really about getting a "reasonable" airframe by the early/mid 60s. Unfortunately at that point then TSR2 was well already underway (but too early) consuming most effort, and then we're into VG and VTOL (or both) craziness, before running out of money. Whereas Dassault invested privately in a plan b.

I don't think it was airframe or structure that advanced in the 40s and 50s, but aerodynamics associated with supersonic speeds and Britain did fall behind to an extent although this needn't have been crippling. It wouldn't have been hard to make the Hunter and Victor transonic and maybe even the Sea Vixen. In any case the British got a mach 2 fighter into sqn service in 1960, so wasn't too far behind.

As for the subsystems, they're the hard part. Even Italy could produce a light fighter and advanced trainer in the 60s, but they couldn't make their own engines so had to use British. Even in the 80s the Italian AMX used a British Spey and more recently the Chinese relied on Russian engines. The same applies to avionics, the much beloved Saab Draken initially went without a radar, then used the French Cyrano II before a Swedish set was ready. BTW Saab used British and US engines for their fighters for decades.

 

[BlackBat242]

BTW Saab used British and US engines for their fighters for decades.

Still do.

The SAAB 21R used a licensed-built Goblin (first Swedish jet, most converted from piston-engined 21As).
The SAAB 29 Tunnan used a licensed-built Ghost.
The SAAB 32 Lansen used a licensed-built Avon 100*.
The SAAB 35 Draken used a licensed-built Avon 200 or 300.
The SAAB 36 was a supersonic nuclear bomber project, to use a licensed-built Olympus.
The SAAB 37 Viggen used a licensed-built P&W JT8D (turbofan version of P&W J52) modified with an afterburner.
The SAAB 39 Gripen uses a licensed-built GE F404 (A-D) or GE F414 (E).
The SAAB 105 used a licensed-built Turbomeca Aubisque, and GE J85, and Williams International FJ44.


* the only one planned for a Swedish engine design - initially envisaged as powered with the indigenously produced STAL Dovern turbojet engine. However, both timescale and technical difficulties encountered during the development of the Dovern resulted in the Swedish government electing to substitute the intended Dovern engine with the license-built Rolls-Royce Avon Series 100 turbojet engine, designated RM.5, instead.

 

[Rule of cool]

As for British aerodynamics, the Lightning successfully proved that the 'tube' aerodynamic shape and vertically stacked engines could get a fighter to mach 2.

 

[red admiral]

As for British aerodynamics, the Lightning successfully proved that the 'tube' aerodynamic shape and vertically stacked engines could get a fighter to mach 2.

MiG and Sukhoi did it with one engine...

Structures advanced a lot in the 50s but are much more hidden. The stresses experienced changed significantly (e.g flutter not so much of a thing in the 30s, e.g. thermal loads), but as well the complexity of the structure changed significantly in order to cope with these whilst minimising mass. Plenty of mistakes got made, with often fatal consequences.

 

[Rule of cool]

MiG and Sukhoi did it with one engine...

Structures advanced a lot in the 50s but are much more hidden. The stresses experienced changed significantly (e.g flutter not so much of a thing in the 30s, e.g. thermal loads), but as well the complexity of the structure changed significantly in order to cope with these whilst minimising mass. Plenty of mistakes got made, with often fatal consequences.

The British were not miles behind in the airframe and structure department, sure mistakes were made such as using an unsuitable alloy in the wing of Valiants, but the British were building the V bombers when the French were building the Vautour and therefore pushing the state of the art more.

As has been said at least once, Britain's aviation problems were political not technical.

 

[red admiral]

As has been said at least once, Britain's aviation problems were political not technical.

Not really, as per the many examples at this time of multiple companies failing to deliver. e.g. look at Supermarine post-WW2. There's no political problems there, just a company repeatedly producing poor designs (with massive government funding) that weren't competitive at home or abroad.

Most older histories were written by ex-Industry, usually pretty bitter about their pet project. There isn't any introspection or objectivity. This mythology somewhat continues today with the likes of "Empire of the Clouds".

 

[Rule of cool]

Not really, as per the many examples at this time of multiple companies failing to deliver. e.g. look at Supermarine post-WW2. There's no political problems there, just a company repeatedly producing poor designs (with massive government funding) that weren't competitive at home or abroad.

Most older histories were written by ex-Industry, usually pretty bitter about their pet project. There isn't any introspection or objectivity. This mythology somewhat continues today with the likes of "Empire of the Clouds".

I don't deny there were some duds in the 50s, but again why were they selected for production? IIUC it was because the plan was to be ready for WW3 by 1957 but then the panic caused by the Korean War.

In contrast the Canberra was a world beater, the Hunter was successful as were the V bombers and the Lightning was a Mach 2, all-weather fighter in wing level service before the Mirage IIIC. The British aviation industry of the 60s was not a total dud unable to turn out quality aircraft and therefore needing to go cap in hand to other Europeans to beg for their help. In fact it was able to turn out a perfectly reasonable early Mach 2 fighter, produce a good naval strike aircraft with world leading BLC, produce the world only practical VTOL aircraft and develop to pre-production a state of the art long-range, 'blind, first-pass' theatre strike aircraft, not to mention 3 airliners.

If Britain had played her cards right it should have been her that other countries were approaching cap in hand to give their industries a leg up with British expertise and advanced components.

 

[red admiral]

If Britain had played her cards right it should have been her that other countries were approaching cap in hand to give their industries a leg up with British expertise and advanced components.

But that attitude doesn't really lead to successful collaboration, so it's difficult to see what benefit it would be besides making some people feel smug.

Of course, outside of the airframe tin-bashers, the likes of RR, Ferranti, GEC etc. historically did pretty well selling products and licenses to other countries.

 

[Rule of cool]

But that attitude doesn't really lead to successful collaboration, so it's difficult to see what benefit it would be besides making some people feel smug.

Of course, outside of the airframe tin-bashers, the likes of RR, Ferranti, GEC etc. historically did pretty well selling products and licenses to other countries.

In the 60s and 70s the only equal collaborator with Britain can be France, the USA is the senior partner and other Europeans or Canada etc are junior partners. This is not unusual, Britain was the junior partner in Harrier II development and Italy was the junior partner in MRCA development and both relationships show the relative contribution that each partner can or will make but also the amount of design input each partner will have. The USMC wanted the Harrier II to be a bomb truck while the RAF wanted more speed and agility, so the Harrier II turned out to be a bomb truck with LERX to increase the turn rate.

I believe it is inevitable that Britain to take on partners if it is to keep developing combat aircraft after the TSR2. However Britain can still take the design lead and get the aircraft it wants with less compromises demanded by other partners who will stall take a good chunk of the cost burden from Britain in exchange for work-share and design input.

 

[Hood]

Every chief designer, design team and manufacturer made some excellent aircraft and some duff ones and some that were complete disasters.
Some firms, like SAAB and Dassault struck it relatively lucky with a run of good designs without serious flaws.
Given the time and effort put into R&D and prototyping there really isn't much of an excuse post 1957 for designing a crap aircraft.

Pre-1945 it was always likely that imperfect materials and aerodynamic knowledge would risk a serious balls up somewhere, either excessive drag, poor handling, rubbish engine etc.
I'd give the designers of 1944-56 some leeway given that jet technology changed so rapidly and that it was hard to keep up with all the changes jumping from straight-wing centrifugal turbojets of 600mph in 1944 to delta-wing afterburning-axial flow turbojets with Mach 2 performance in 1954.
These days it takes you a decade just to mess around with CAD and CGI before you even finalise the design.

However Britain can still take the design lead and get the aircraft it wants with less compromises demanded by other partners who will stall take a good chunk of the cost burden from Britain in exchange for work-share and design input.

But nation's like West Germany and Italy had active design teams with innovative designs on the drawing boards and they were licence-building F-104Gs and had other aircraft and helicopters in production. They saw themselves as near-peers and wanted to grow their industries further. So for them obtaining maximum workshare was key.
To maintain their lead, Britain and France didn't want to give up their leading share - plus the more partners you have, the more ways the cake has to be cut.

Perhaps the greatest mystery is why countries kept/keep partnering with France. There is hardly a single collaboration that does not involve argument and bad feeling, regardless of the nation they pair with. There are multiple cases of undercutting quotes supported by government credit, attempted dumping of ex-AdlA airframes, bribery etc. in many sales contests all over the world. And yet despite all this, somehow they seem to have attracted partners and still do (SCAF etc.) despite all the aggro that comes with it. Perhaps the end product makes it worth it?
Britain lacked that post-1960.

This week at Kew I found a humorous item in a Foreign Office file; a clipping of an article in Le Monde complaining that the British had adopted French sales techniques and were being more successful than them!!

 

[Rule of cool]

During early Tornado development the Germans, who had equal workshare with the British, stated their requirement as over 600 aircraft. With this the got the design HQ and first flight, they then dropped their requirement to 325, less than the RAF, but this didn't mean the British got HQ and first flight.

Cooperation can be cut-throat.

 

[alertken]

Cooperation can be cut-throat. Quite, as can Seniors trying to "do things our way, because that's what (/all) we know". Success only comes when all that nonsense is squashed, replaced by "the best interests of the project".

FRG is discovering right now on SCAF that their good experience on Tornado+Typhoon (and it was, for them, good overall) may not easily be repeated. GCAP/Tempest is by Policy to be a collaboration of equals, so we must hope that team grasps "best interests" (and that the Joint Programme Office finds a better name than Garbage In...)

This is Japan's 1st. Collaborative Equal-Prime: they have chosen on their Aerostructures for civil Boeings to fabricate great chunks, make-to-print, no Design or Project Mngt, so no liability for anything, yet profit may have been elusive. Now they, like Italy/UK, are to own all Decisions.

MRCA: that began 2/68 as F-104G Users Group for a successor, NKF75: FRG/Belg/Canada/Italy/Neths on that day had track record matching, if not superior to, that of BAC (certainly to HSAL's) in high-rate production of nearly-a-Weapon System. UK MoD Healey muscled 6/68 in when Observer France was ejected for insisting on Baseline Study of anyMirage: on that day UK Aero's USP was the management of cancellation. BAC Lightning's aerodynamics and AAM IR sensor derived from work closer to Munich than Preston. He was not welcomed as Project Saviour, so made no fuss about HQ, so contracts' Legal Code, site (nor did FRG, about Project Language!).

 

[Rule of cool]

There's a huge gap between the mid 60s and now, much water has flowed under the bridge. In the 60s collaborative projects were new, so of course there will be teething problems.

I'm thinking in terms of a virtuous circle for Britain, where a handful of better decisions in the 50s enables better aircraft programmes in the 60s and beyond. I believe that this approach would mean the TSR2 would reach sqn service but the next combat aircraft (the big Lightning fleet successor) for production in the 70s would have to be collaborative.

Britain doesn't have to be a bully about it, however it doesn't need to be a supplicant either. I suspect there wouldn't any shortage of partners for Britain if the aircraft was spec'd right, after all the Canadians, Belgians and Dutch left MRCA, the Canadian for the superlative F/A18 and the Belgians and Dutch in order to join with Norway and Denmark on a comprehensive F16 programme. These 5 countries, or others, might leap at the chance to step up from mere licence production to having some design and specification input, control and input into the supply chain and some share of export earnings money and influence. It's not as if a fighter Britain would want for the 70s would be way out of line with what the US, France and Sweden produced, perhaps more on the bigger end like the F/A18 or Mirage 4000.