WI more Canberra's replaced by Valiants?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Though TSR2 did fly it was nothing like a production machine unlike F111 at the same stage in its programme.

At which stage in its programme? The F-111 had more than its fair share of development problems and IIRC the RAAF received its F-111Cs 6 years late.

Under Plan P the RAF was to have had 6 TSR.2s in half a squadron at 31.03.68 and the full force of 106 aircraft in 11 squadrons by 31.03.71. In Post 32 I was allowing for it to slip by up to 3 years with IOC by 31.03.71 and FOC by 31.03.74.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Under Plan P of March 1964 there were to be 6 P.1154s in half a squadron on 31.03.71 and 96 aircraft in 8 squadrons by 31.03.74.

The deployment was to be 2 sqns in UK, 2 in RAFG, none in NEAF, 2 in AFME and 2 in FEAF, but I'm assuming that the East of Suez withdrawal still happens and the 8 squadrons would have been distributed between No. 38 Group and RAFG.

1154s were to be 2 sqns in UK, 2 in RAFG and one each in NEAF and FEAF.

That's a total of 6 squadrons. Maybe there were 16 aircraft per squadron in your source which still makes a total of 96.

 

[Rule of cool]

For what it's worth the 12 Shackleton AEW.2s in No. 8 Squadron stood in for the Gannets.

Were they part of TACSMO? That's what I was referring to.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Eleven TSR2 squadrons seems on the high side. Before cancellation planning assumed aircraft would all be based in the UK with detachments to Cyprus and Tengah.

Under Plan P of March 1964.

Bomber Command - 32 aircraft in 3 squadrons​

24 aircraft in 2 strike squadrons.​

8 aircraft in one recce squadron.​

RAF Germany - 40 aircraft in 4 squadrons.​

24 aircraft in 2 strike squadrons.​

16 aircraft in 2 recce squadrons.​

Near East Air Force (Cyprus) - 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.​

16 aircraft in 2 strike squadrons.​

8 aircraft in one recce squadron.​

Far East Air Force.​

10 aircraft in one strike/recce squadron.​

Total 106 aircraft in 11 squadrons with 8, 10 or 12 aircraft.

64 strike aircraft in 6 squadrons - 4 with 12 aircraft and 2 with 8 aircraft.​

32 ecce aircraft in 4 squadrons of 8 aircraft.​

10 strike/recce aircraft in one squadron.​

There would also be one squadron of 10 Canberra PR.9s at Malta.

However, my guess is that in practice they'd be organised into 9 squadrons of 12 aircraft (total 108 aircraft) with the deployment on 31.03.74 being as follows:

Strike Command.​

36 aircraft in 3 strike squadrons taking the place of the 32 Vulcan B.2s in 4 squadrons.​

RAF Germany.​

24 aircraft in 2 strike squadrons taking the place of the 2 Buccaneer squadrons.​

24 aircraft in 2 strike squadrons taking the place of 2 Phantom FGR.2​

12 aircraft in one recce squadron taking the place of RAFG's Phantom FGR.2 recce squadron.​

Near East Air Force.​

12 aircraft in one strike squadron taking the place of the 16 Vulcan B.2s in 2 squadrons.​

If the Mason Defence Review still happened ITTL this squadron would move to Strike Command early in 1975.​

There were 2 Canberra PR squadrons on 31.03.74 IOTL (No. 13 at Malta and No. 39 which moved from Cyprus to Wyton in 1970) and I think there would still be 2 Canberra PR squadrons on that date ITTL.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Were they part of TACSMO? That's what I was referring to.

Yes. For what it's worth the squadron of Victor SR.2s (disbanded 1974) and the Vulcan SR.2 squadron that replaced it (formed 1973 and disbanded 1982) were part of the TASMO force too, but they didn't replace the FAA's Gannets.

However I would point out that by about 1970 with the Phantomised Ark Royal and the RAF TACSMO there were 2 Phantom and 3 Buccaneer sqns allocated to naval tasks in the North Atlantic. What's more there was a Victor/Vulcan sqn allocated to TACSMO as well, which might be a stand in for the Gannets the carriers had.

Strictly speaking . . .

There was only one Phantom squadron in the TASMO force at the beginning of 1970. (It was formed in 1969 with the aircraft that would have equipped Eagle's Phantom squadron.) The second squadron (which took the place of Ark Royal's Phantom squadron) didn't join the TASMO force until March 1980.

There was only one Buccaneer squadron in the TASMO force at the beginning of 1970. The second squadron (which took the place of Ark Royal's Buccaneer squadron) didn't join the TASMO force until July 1979. However, it was disbanded in August 1980 due to the Buccaneer's metal fatigue problems. The disbanded squadron wasn't replaced until July 1983* and the TASMO force had 2 Buccaneer squadrons from then until the end of the Cold War.

I didn't mention this before because I thought it didn't spoil your argument.

* This was No. 208 Squadron, which reformed at Honington in July 1974 as a Buccaneer as an overland strike squadron. It didn't become a maritime squadron (in the TASMO force) until July 1983 when it moved to Lossiemouth. I mistakenly included it as one of the 2 Buccaneer maritime strike squadrons at 31.03.74 in Post 32 when it didn't exist and didn't become a maritime squadron for another 9 years.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I am puzzled. What is a P1154 ADV? Rather like the TSR2 ADV this is a fanwork with no basis in planned reality.

Au contraire.

This is part of PRO file AIR20/11465/68706 "The Future Size and Shape of the Royal Air Force" from January 1964. (It is also known as the Spotswood Report because it was written by A.V.M. D.F. Spotswood.)

32. The present authorised purchase of Lightnings is sufficient to back this force until 1972/73. By the mid-1970s, a replacement will be required which could be either a variable geometry aircraft for joint use by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy or a derivative of the P.1154. Whichever aircraft is finally ordered this minimum force of 10 squadrons must be replaced on a one-for-one basis and the overall U.E. should thus remain as 120 aircraft.

The derivative of the P.1154 mentioned in the quote is the P.1154 ADV which was so called by me to distinguish it from the standard P.1154.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Money?

I am non plussed. Please explain.

 

[uk 75]

I have not got my books handy at the moment but I am pretty certain that the RAF had decided to base all its TSR2s in the UK with detachrnents to Akrotiri and Tengah.
This is reflected in the smaller requirement for F111Ks which were only planned to be based in UK and Tengah.
The RAF were as alarmed by the high cost of TSR2 as Ministers and were looking to bring it under control before the change of government in 1964.

The reference to a "developed 1154" as a Lightning replacement is interesting. In view of the AFVG being developed initially for both RAF and RN use the VG route seems to have been taken.

Michael Pryce is the expert on 1154 and may know if any work was done on developing it as a Lightning replacement.

 

[Rule of cool]

Yes. For what it's worth the squadron of Victor SR.2s (disbanded 1974) and the Vulcan SR.2 squadron that replaced it (formed 1973 and disbanded 1982) were part of the TASMO force too, but they didn't replace the FAA's Gannets.
Strictly speaking . . .

There was only one Phantom squadron in the TASMO force at the beginning of 1970. (It was formed in 1969 with the aircraft that would have equipped Eagle's Phantom squadron.) The second squadron (which took the place of Ark Royal's Phantom squadron) didn't join the TASMO force until March 1980.

There was only one Buccaneer squadron in the TASMO force at the beginning of 1970. The second squadron (which took the place of Ark Royal's Buccaneer squadron) didn't join the TASMO force until July 1979. However, it was disbanded in August 1980 due to the Buccaneer's metal fatigue problems. The disbanded squadron wasn't replaced until July 1983* and the TASMO force had 2 Buccaneer squadrons from then until the end of the Cold War.

The TASMO is a very interesting concept, given the argument that the fleet carriers were only useful EoS.

For the 1954-78 era there was a RN fleet carrier available for the North Atlantic-NATO role. When these fleet carriers retired they were replaced by 3 ASW carriers that cost 80% per ship of what the CVA01 class would have cost per ship. The Ark, and then the ASW carriers kept 2 jet combat aircraft sqns available for sea in the NATO role for the rest of the Cold War. These at-sea sqns were backed by the more or less equivalent of a 2nd fleet carrier CAG based on land.

The SR V-bombers are an interesting component of the TASMO, I compared them to the Gannets because of their surveillance role. However their cost and manpower requirements could have instead offset something like a Type 82 DLG. Alternatively given the rapid expansion of Vulcan capability in the Falklands they could be seen as the core of an extra attack sqn.

The point being that from a whole of Government or whole Force Structure perspective the British did more or less provide the resources to equip and operate a pair of CVA01 class ships from within existing budgets, manpower ceilings and procurement.

However, to bring this back to the Canberra, I still can't see a reasonable path for the RN to get their mid-late 60s heavy interceptor by cooperating with the RAF.

 

[Rule of cool]

The derivative of the P.1154 mentioned in the quote is the P.1154 ADV which was so called by me to distinguish it from the standard P.1154.

Had the P1154RN been killed as that report was being prepared? If the RN is getting P1154RN interceptors then it's hardly surprising that the RAF would get them too.

 

[Rule of cool]

I have not got my books handy at the moment but I am pretty certain that the RAF had decided to base all its TSR2s in the UK with detachrnents to Akrotiri and Tengah.
This is reflected in the smaller requirement for F111Ks which were only planned to be based in UK and Tengah.

When were these decisions and plans made? Were they changed later?

The RAF initially wanted 110 F111K and the AFVG was to replace the Lightning, this was when the new Labour Government expected to stay EoS indefinitely.

However this plan was changed to 50 F111K and 150 AFVG wheich had been re-roled into a mini TSR2 Canberra replacement. This was when the Government had decided to leave EoS by 1975, and to keep the Eagle and Ark in service until then.

In none of these plans were the P1154 and HS681 anything other than stupid ideas.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Well, with the British government, if it's a good idea they'd squash it before it had a chance. If it was a great idea, they'd strangle it before birth and then hunt down those responsible for it and punish them severely...

 

[starviking]

Had the P1154RN been killed as that report was being prepared? If the RN is getting P1154RN interceptors then it's hardly surprising that the RAF would get them too.

The Wiki article on the P1154 has reports of the RN variant being cancelled in Nov 1963.

 

[uk 75]

Even the fanboys have not posted images of the RN version of the 1154 in RAF colours.
The RN forced this machine to mutate from the basic 1154 (not that different from the later 1127RAF) to a twin engined, two seater Phantom wannabe.
So, yes, in a frenzied world where the RN had been forced to take the 1154RN instead of the F4 they craved (to crossdeck with the USN cousins) the resulting aircraft would have been used like the F4 by the RAF to replace Lightnings.
The sensible answer to the RN's Sea Vixen problem emerged as the AFVG. It would also have been a decent Lightning replacement.
Oh and yes I know it is a paper airplane.

 

[starviking]

Au contraire.

This is part of PRO file AIR20/11465/68706 "The Future Size and Shape of the Royal Air Force" from January 1964. (It is also known as the Spotswood Report because it was written by A.V.M. D.F. Spotswood.)The derivative of the P.1154 mentioned in the quote is the P.1154 ADV which was so called by me to distinguish it from the standard P.1154.

I wonder if the cancellation of the RN variant of the P1154 had been confirmed too soon before publication for it to be excised from the report?

However, given the technological optimism around VTOL, and aeronautics in general, perhaps it was just that that led the RAF to posit a P1154 ADV. I say that, as I cannot see an actual technical way to get the P1154, as designed, to perform an ADV mission for the era it would be operating in.

The Lightning F6 had a supersonic intercept radius of 135 nmi. Now the P1154 requirement had a low-level combat radius of 250 nmi, but the wings were suited to that altitude - high level supersonic intercepts would have been impossible without a major change to wings, and intercept equipment would need either a magical level of shoehorning in the fuselage, or a stretch - which would be more difficult in a V/STOL aircraft than a CTOL one.

Even then, I can’t see it as being more than having incremental performance over the Lightning - unless an early F16 approach is taken to provide an aircraft that can out-fly its opponents in close-in combat. Even then, Air Defence of Great Britain is going to be undertaken by a weapons system unsuited to the role - as a significant number of medium-range missiles are unlikely to be able to be carried.

With the Phantom showing its excellent capabilities with the USN, USAF, and the RN closer to home - the P1154’s 4-missile capacity (extrapolated from the RN version) is going to look anemic - especially with the proposed Red Top.

I think it highly likely, in a world where the P1154 RAF goes ahead (and TSR2) that ADGB will be performed by a swing-wing aircraft - perhaps on a later schedule than AFVG - but close to the MRCA schedule. It may be multinational, but it will be planned initially in two versions: an ADV to provide long-range intercepts of Soviet bombers, and a strike aircraft to replace the RN Buccaneers - and eventually the Phantoms.

 

[Foo Fighter]

On the original point, how would this topic be affected by the fatigue isses, wing spar cracking etc of the Valiant and later, the Victor?

 

[uk 75]

We know what happened. Between 1965 and 1970 the RAF could no longer supply a medium bomber wing assigned to SACEUR for NATO.
The only difference is that instead of shiny new TSR2s (or F111s) the RAF assigned Vulcan B2 squadrons once Polaris took over the nuclear deterrent role.
Sadly the Vulcans were gone by 1984 and their roles had to be taken on by the new F111 wing at Lakenheath and then by GLCMs at Greenham Common. Tornado was too short ranged. UKVG might have done.

 

[Rule of cool]

On the original point, how would this topic be affected by the fatigue isses, wing spar cracking etc of the Valiant and later, the Victor?

The Bomber Command Valiants were to the the first to be replaced by TSR2. It looks as if if a Valiant sqn was to be stood down as soon as a unit of development batch TSR2 was ready for trials in about 1967, which doesn't sound to outlandish given the state of the programme at cancellation in 1965. These bomber Valiants were to be all gone by 1969 with the last BC TSR2 sqn stood up in 1970.

According to Wiki there was a repair programme in place to address the Valiant's issues and there was no plan to scrap the type until after the October 1964 election. The Hasting transport fleet had undergone and extensive repair-rebuild programme in the early 60s and there was no 'real' reason why the Valiant could not have had the same treatment.

 

[Rule of cool]

We know what happened. Between 1965 and 1970 the RAF could no longer supply a medium bomber wing assigned to SACEUR for NATO.
The only difference is that instead of shiny new TSR2s (or F111s) the RAF assigned Vulcan B2 squadrons once Polaris took over the nuclear deterrent role.
Sadly the Vulcans were gone by 1984 and their roles had to be taken on by the new F111 wing at Lakenheath and then by GLCMs at Greenham Common. Tornado was too short ranged. UKVG might have done.

1964 Plan P had the 3 Victor B.1 sqns stood down to 1 sqn in 1964 and the 1st sqn converted to K.1 tankers in 1965, with all 3 B.1 to K.1 conversions done by 1966 and all Valiant tankers gone by mid 1966.

Similarly the 3 Vulcan B.1A sqns were run down in 1965 and gone by 1966. However the Vulcan B.1A sqns were not re-roled or converted to do anything else.

The 3 Vulcan B.2 sqns were to be retained until 1972 and the 2 Victor B.2 sqns until 1975 (there the Plan P ends). Apparetly with the Polaris in service from 1969 these sqns were to provide additional deterrence in the Near and Far East, particularly against China.

Thus (the Tory govt's) Plan P kept Valiant bombers while getting rid of Vulcan B.1 bombers. Surely it couldn't have been too difficult to re-role the Vulcan B.1s to undertake the SACEUR strike role for the late 60s if it wasn't worthwhile fixing the Valiants.

 

[uk 75]

It is interesting to note that unlike the Victors no role was found for the Vulcan B1s. I imagine that money and crew shortages meant that they had to go even in the ambitious plan P.

 

[Rule of cool]

It is interesting to note that unlike the Victors no role was found for the Vulcan B1s. I imagine that money and crew shortages meant that they had to go even in the ambitious plan P.

What role would you suggest, given the TSR2 trials unit was due in 2-3 years and all 3 sqns in 5-6 years?

 

[uk 75]

I am not sure how the Vulcan B1s compared with the Valiants in carrying the US weapons as the SACEUR wing. They might have been a better delivery system.
Other than that with enough Victors for free fall bombing, recce and tanking, no need to keep them past 66.

 

[Rule of cool]

I suspect there would have been a cost with switching from Valiants to Vulcan B.1s for the SACEUR role. The Valiant was likely good enough in the role to make such a cost not worth paying for an aircraft that would only serve for 3 years.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I have not got my books handy at the moment but I am pretty certain that the RAF had decided to base all its TSR2s in the UK with detachments to Akrotiri and Tengah.

For what it's worth the report suggests moving the German based TSR.2s to the UK and that the aircraft in NEAF & FEAF be deployed on a rotational basis. It also suggests that the number of first-line TSR.2s be increased from 106 to 140 by creating a strategic reserve of 24 aircraft based in the UK and doubling the number of aircraft in FEAF from 10 to 20.

This is the relevant section of the report.

Strike/Reconnaissance Forces
16. In 1966 our total long range strike and reconnaissance force will consist of 270 aircraft (200 for strike and 70 specifically for reconnaissance). This force will be required to meet:-

(a) Our contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent;​

(b) Our contribution to NATO and CENTO;​

(c) Our contribution to the deterrence of China;​

(d) The necessary availability for purely national purposes.​

17. The strike element will, in addition to its nuclear capability, have a 1,400 ton lift of H.E. in the conventional role.

18. However, the following decade will show a marked change in these capabilities. Under current plans as reflected in Defence Review Costings, and unless normal peacetime wastage is provided for later, by 1976 our long range strike/reconnaissance capability will consist of only 92 TSR2s for both functions, the total conventional lift of which will only be a fraction of the 1966 potential (perhaps 280 tons).

19. These figures demonstrate the effect, however indirect, of the United Kingdom's ability to deter aggression, in whatever form or wherever this might be threatened, of the decision to base our strategic deterrent on Polaris submarines which, however effective they may be in posing a degree of strategic nuclear deterrence, have no limited war potential. Improvements in accuracy will make the bomb-lift of the 1970s more effective, weight for weight; but it clearly cannot make up for the startling diminution in the number of aircraft the Royal Air Force could deploy and the striking power that could be developed under limited war operations.

20. All this is particularly important in relation to:-

(a) NATO, to which at present 225 strike/reconnaissance aircraft are assigned, and to which we must continue to play a major role;​

(b) The growing need to contain China. This is to be recognised by the retention of 3 V-bomber squadrons for this purpose after the introduction of Polaris. However, in the Seventies, these will become a less credible deterrent and the role must be taken over by the TSR2 force.​

Necessary Modification to Present Plan for Long Range Strike/Reconnaissance Force
21. The TSR2 Strike/Reconnaissance force planned at present is:-

All these aircraft will have a strike and limited reconnaissance capability. One third of them will also have full reconnaissance capability. The build-up of this force is planned to begin in 1968 and be complete by 1972.

22. The strength and distribution of the TSR2 force is planned is neither in consonance with the circumstances outlined at the beginning of this paper nor with the commitments the force will have to meet.

23. NATO. So far as the strength of the NATO-assigned TSR2 force is concerned, it must be appreciated that this force, plus the FGA/R aircraft also required, has effectively to replace 137 V-bombers, 88 Canberras, and 16 Hunters. In view both of the operational task and of the need to maintain influence in the Alliance, its is considered that at least 72 TSR2s must be assigned to SACEUR, in addition to the FGA/R aircraft considered in para. 43 below. As to the disposition of this force, the advent of the TSR2 introduces new possibilities of combining operational, organisational and economic advantages without losing tactical advantage or political influence. Hitherto it has been necessary to deploy on the Continent all those air forces assigned to Allied Command, Europe, with the exception of the V-Force and Fighter Command; this has been due to the nature (range etc.) of the available aircraft and the consequent need to base them forward for tactical and political reasons. Now, however, it is not only feasible but desirable to consider deployment of the Strike/Reconnaissance Force in the United Kingdom, for the following reasons:-

(a) Its long range and ubiquity makes it unnecessary to base it forward, at least permanently.​

(b) By basing such aircraft in the United Kingdom instead of in Germany, their vulnerability to surprise attack (a matter of great concern to SACEUR) will be considerably reduced. Indeed, no attack by the Russians upon aircraft in the United Kingdom bases could possibly be construed as an act of "limited war", and this resultant immunity of the force in such conditions would in itself reduce still further the possibility of limited aggression in Central Europe.​

(c) Deployment on the Home bases will ease the maintenance problems of a complex weapon system, as well as reducing considerably expenditure of foreign exchange.​

(d) Full advantage can be taken of the complex of communications, bases, and dispersal airfields built up for Bomber Command.​

(e) Political kudos could be gained by the obvious implication (already made by the assignment of Bomber and Fighter Commands) that the United Kingdom was very much part of the A.C.E. by the deployment of the assigned element in the United Kingdom (a tenable argument with such an aircraft). However, this would not obviate the need in any event for the deployment on the Continent of shorter range aircraft required to balance the ground forces there, and to provide "presence".​

24. NEAF. While, within the financial limitations that must be imposed on defence expenditure, the small number of aircraft planned to support CENTO should be accepted, it is for consideration, for technical and economic reasons, that the force should be deployed on a rotational basis. The nature of the aircraft lends itself to such an arrangement.

25. FEAF. A contribution to the deterrence of China, and Indonesia, of only 10 TSR2s backed by forces assigned to other theatres is unrealistic in the time period particularly as, in terms of numbers, these potential reinforcing elements themselves fall short of the respective Treaty force goals. Moreover, should war break out in South-East Asia (particularly in a SEATO context) the resultant tension in NATO and CENTO is virtually certain to be as such that reinforcement of the Far East from such sources would be opposed most strongly even if we, ourselves, thought it possible. The resident force should be at least doubled if it is to provide the necessary military and political influence but similar arguments apply for rotation of units to those given in para 24.

26. Strategic Reserve. It is apparent from the foregoing that the TSR2 force as planned at present is too small either to meet the commitments for it or to provide the necessary flexibility to meet reinforcement needs for allied or national purposes. A strategic reserve must be provided under national control (although some agreed formula for "earmarking" this reserve to NATO might well gain us additional political influence without restricting our freedom of action) to meet the needs of reinforcement in the Far East, the Middle East, and other possible areas of tension where swift reinforcement by an obviously potent force could, in the event, prevent the outbreak of limited wars with all the possibilities they have for escalation.

27. Revised Requirement. The force required is, therefore:-

This force should start to build up as planned at present and be complete by 1972.

28. For the reasons previously agreed (COS 126/63) by the Chiefs of Staff, the TSR2 is essential if the full operational requirements of our strategy in all the theatres win which we have commitments are to be met. It will therefore be necessary to arm the whole Strike/Reconnaissance force with the aircraft. The additional cost of the force proposed above, in comparison to that planned at present, will be offset, particularly in terms of foreign exchange expenditure, by the major deployment being in the United Kingdom, and by the additional political and military influence it can bring to bear on events, however these may arise.

29. Moreover, and without regard to the need for reserves, which are considered in [blank space], this force must be maintained at this minimum strength throughout the period (at present it is planned as a wasting asset virtually from the outset).

 

[Rule of cool]

Interesting insight on British thinking in early 1964. The negative impacts of Polaris on deterrence, the offsetting effect of accuracy on bomb tonnage and the 'threshold raising' effect of basing TSR2 in the UK are interesting points.

Some international events, outside British control, are important when considering the assumptions made in this paper. In the 1972-74 period the US had withdrawn from Vietnam and begun normalisation of relations with China, Pakistan has withdrawn from SEATO and the UK had withdrawn forces from CENTO and Australia had supplied Indonesia with ex-RAAF Sabres.

I'm one for Britain doing better and extending the world role, mainly for reasons of Australian self-interest, but with all of that I'd expect that by the mid 70s the only 'major' EoS role the British could maintain would be akin to the one they restarted in 1980; the Armilla Patrol in the Persian Gulf. While the Gulf presene might require a MR aircraft sqn and maybe a fighter-bomber sqn to defend it there isn't really a role for the TSR2 EoS after the early 70s, although rotations of TSR2 through Cyprus would be handy in the NATO context.

 

[uk 75]

The emergence of stable and prosperous countries in the Gulf and Far East had begun by1967. At the same time the UK was faced with greater challanges in its NATO roles.
The Labour Government's response was largely implemented by the 1970-4 Conservative Government.
The continued economic problems in Britain force both the 1974-9 Labour Government and the Thatcher Government to make further cuts.
It is only in the period after the 1982 Falklands War that some extra resources are found. But from then on the size of the British Armed Forces has continued to shrink.
Some commentators even on the Right like Peter Hitchens have argued that the UK should go even further and relinquish the Trident force and reduce other capabilities to fund better public services in the UK.
I am reminded of the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments seeking to balance rearmament with rebuilding the economy in the 1930s by pursuing Appeasement of Germany and Italy.
This took place when the US followed the Trumplike policy of avoiding involvement in Europe's affairs.

 

[Hood]

Any talk of EoS has to take into account the UK government's political plans versus reality.

It attempted to set up a unified Malaysia, including Sarawak and Singapore on which to build a stable base of operations and at the same time attempted to build the Federation of South Arabia to protect Aden.
The first ended with Indonesia kicking up a fuss (Confrontasi) and then Singapore was kicked out and became independent, so there was no centralised structure on which to build a safe base and resulted in a lot of effort and cash being expended in Borneo for not much return. Nasser and Yemen successfully subverted the Federation of South Arabia which led to the rapid withdrawal of British forces. Add in to that the Greece Vs Turkey strife over Cyprus at the same time (plus ongoing tension in Kenya and Belize to prop up), it's clear that any EoS basing plan was open to upheaval and failure on many levels.

With this in mind, it is surprising that the government didn't back the RN's carrier fleet strategy as being more independent of relying on local elites.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Re the comments & questions upthread about TSR.2 ADV and P.1154 ADV

Both have been discussed on other threads in the last year if not sooner.

IIRC (1) from said other threads TSR.2 couldn't be turned into a very long range interceptor because its nose wasn't big enough and IIRC (2) secondary reasons why it couldn't be done were that: underwing stores like fuel tanks, ECM pods and the missiles would have degraded its performance considerably; the weapons bay was the wrong shape to carry any/many AAMs that were the same size as Red Top, Skyflash & Sparrow; and the weapons bay & wing pylons could only carry about 20,000lbs of stores which was about two thirds of what I thought they could carry, i.e. about 30,000lbs.

FWIW (1) TSR.2 ADV was Derek Wood's idea (not mine) and was part of Scenario 1964 in "Project Cancelled". FWIW (2) reading that book in the 1980s is the main reason why I'm here and readers I suspect that many of you are here because you read that book when you were at an impressionable age too.

The quote from PRO file AIR20/11465/68706 "The Future Size and Shape of the Royal Air Force" from January 1964 (also known as the Spotswood Report because it was written by A.V.M. D.F. Spotswood) in Post 46.

32. The present authorised purchase of Lightnings is sufficient to back this force until 1972/73. By the mid-1970s, a replacement will be required which could be either a variable geometry aircraft for joint use by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy or a derivative of the P.1154. Whichever aircraft is finally ordered this minimum force of 10 squadrons must be replaced on a one-for-one basis and the overall U.E. should thus remain as 120 aircraft.

I thought the derivative of the P.1154 would have been a land-based version of the P.1154RN. However, when I wrote as much in other threads I was told that it would have been a derivative of the P.1154RAF.

FWIW (3) I saw a file on the external stores the P.1154RAF could carry at the National Archives when it was still the Public Record Office that included line drawings of it carrying the usual suspects (such as 1,000lb bombs, fuel tanks & rocket pods) plus one drawing showing a Red Top AAM slung underneath each of the four wing pylons. Unfortunately, it was long before they had the scanning machines and IIRC (3) the photocopying service charged £1 per sheet of foolscap so I can't prove it.

However, given the technological optimism around VTOL, and aeronautics in general, perhaps it was just that that led the RAF to posit a P1154 ADV. I say that, as I cannot see an actual technical way to get the P1154, as designed, to perform an ADV mission for the era it would be operating in.

In early 1964 the P.1154RAF was scheduled to reach IOC in 1971 and FOC (96 aircraft in 8 squadrons) in 1974 while whichever aircraft was chosen to replace the Lightning wasn't scheduled to enter service until the second half of the 1970s. Would that be enough time to get the P.1154 as designed to perform an ADV mission for the era it would be operating in?

 

[Rule of cool]

The emergence of stable and prosperous countries in the Gulf and Far East had begun by1967. At the same time the UK was faced with greater challanges in its NATO roles.

The Trucial States were surprised by the 1968 'cut and run by 71' decision, they were more than happy to have Britain be responsible for the foreign and defence policy and for arbitrating disputes between them. There is plenty of scope for Britain to stay in this area long after the 1971 withdrawal date, and to link up with the 1980 establishment of the Armilla Patrol.

The Labour Government's response was largely implemented by the 1970-4 Conservative Government.
The continued economic problems in Britain force both the 1974-9 Labour Government and the Thatcher Government to make further cuts.

What makes Britain interesting to me, in a way that the US and France are not, is that procurement decisions were so closely related to the geopolitical position and that those decisions were so difficult to reverse. The 1970 Tory government did reverse the Labour decision to scrap the Ark Royal after ~3 years of service, pushing it out to 8 years, however by 1970 the array of previous decisions meant it would be difficult to bring the Eagle back into long-term service; it's Phantom sqn had already been given to the RAF for starters.

This is why I pick apart procurement decisions, fleet management possibilities and the like. I think there is a procurement path that if affordable and practical that would put Britain in a much better, or at least less vulnerable, position by the time the late 60s crises occurred.

 

[uk 75]

The balance between political dogma and the reality of events is difficult in the UK. It is usually hard to unpick the component parts without taking sides.
I agree that UK is very different from the US and France in its circumstances.
Once India gained its independence, something unimaginable to Churchill but already inevitable before WW2, the rest of Britain's Empire became irrelevant.
The Suez crisis was an anachronism. The canal was built to link England and India. We had withdrawn from Egypt in 1953 because it was too costly and unpopular with Egyptians.
The African colonies were late additions to Empire and as Macmillan recognised needed to be given independence quickly
The Gulf's oil becomes less significant once the US controls the vast Saudi oilfields and the Shah those in Iran.
Events dear boy, events as Macmillan observed.
Entry to the EEC in 1971 was supposed to mark the UK's recognition that its future lay in Europe not in distant trouble spots.
But France and Germany made the club rules. De Gaulle was right that London looks to New Yprk not Paris (or Washington for that matter)
While some Brits moved to France and Spain the attrsctions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA remained greater.
US and Australian entertainers not French or Germans filled our screens.
So in 2024 despite the clusterguck of Brexit the UK remains different but not sure where it wants to be.

 

[zen]

Had P1154RN gone ahead.
It was expected to mount the new FMICW AI set that would have been designated AI.24 but was not the later Foxhunter. IOC was expected to be 1972.
As such whether that integrates Sparrow or Radar Red Top or some new UK AAM, is it's own debate.

If the requirement called for 4 radar and 4 IR AAMs. P.1154RN was configurable for such and still leaves the inboard pylons free for drop tanks, or Martel or 2,000lb bombs or WE.177, etc....
The ventral point might still mount a 30mm ADEN cannon.

The main issue is wiring up the various pylons and choices would have to be made, which confer limitations on what can be connected on a specific pylon.

Had IOC become more pressing then a interim expanded capability version of the AI.23 was possible in time. Likely with Red Top.

Had P1154 RAF only gine ahead and then a limited navalised version produced. One might expect the AI.23 again, but this would be limited. Either with 4 AAMs, one per pylon or more closely following the RAF version just 2 AAMs.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Money?

I am non plussed. Please explain.

As you haven't explained I'll presume that "Money?" meant "How would it be paid for?" which is a reasonable question.

From 1965 to 1985:

• There's the money that was spent on HS.681, P.1154RAF and TSR.2 to cancellation and the cancellation charges.
• There's the money that was spent on AFVG and F-111K.
• There's the money that was spent on F-4M.
  • However, F-4K would have been even more expensive as the R&D cost was spread over 52 aircraft instead of 170 aircraft.
  • OTOH the cost of F-4M (and F-111K) went up when the Sterling was devalued in November 1967.
  • The cost of P.1154RAF (and TSR.2) wouldn't have gone up as much.
• There's the money that was spent on C-130K.
• There's the money that was spent on the 40 Buccaneers ordered for the RAF and the 3 ordered for the RAE.
• There's the money that was spent on the P.1127 Harrier.
• There's the money that was spent on Jaguar.
• There's the money that was spent on Tornado IDS and Tornado ADV to 1985. IIRC from Gardner the UK paid 48% of the former's R&D costs.
• IIRC (1) some of the avionics in development for P.1154RAF and TSR.2 was fitted to Harrier, Jaguar & Tornado IDS. If I have remembered correctly it means there was no saving in the R&D and production costs of these items.
• IIRC (2) cancelling TSR.2 increased the R&D and production costs of Concorde's Olympus engines. If I have remembered correctly, it means that some of what the British Taxpayer gained by cancelling TSR.2 was lost by the increased cost of Concorde.

Was that enough for 66 HS.681s, 200-odd P.1154RAFs, 150-200 P.1154 ADVs, nearly 200 TSR.2s and further batches of those aircraft to replace attrition? Don't know.

I remember reading decades ago that the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee investigated the 1960s purchases of American aircraft. It's conclusions were: (1) that they came into service no earlier than the cancelled British aircraft, and; (2) they weren't cheaper than the cancelled British aircraft. However, that may be a false memory and it might only apply to the Phantom purchase if it isn't a figment of my imagination.

 

[Hood]

The quote from PRO file AIR20/11465/68706 "The Future Size and Shape of the Royal Air Force" from January 1964 (also known as the Spotswood Report because it was written by A.V.M. D.F. Spotswood) in Post 46.

I've always assumed that the VG-winged design Spotswood had in mind was one of Vickers/BAC's Type 58x series designs. BAC Warton later in '64 tried to interest the RAF in the P.45 as a light fighter but the RAF was not interested - partly because it didn't want a light fighter and partly because by then the future fighter was seen as a project for IOC ~1975 so of less urgency. Given what turned up a couple of years later with proposed interceptors based on AFVG, its not hard to imagine that AFVG may have produced a suitable interceptor and fighter-bomber, although it would have needed foreign partners in either case.

 

[uk 75]

Timing is a major factor in the demise of the gang of three.
TSR2s could and should have been flying in some numbers by 1964 and been at Farnborough that year.
If Thorneycroft had not tried to do a McNamara with 1154 a few with similar avionics to 1127 could have been flying by 1964.
Give the 681 straightforward fan Medways or Speys and it is a simple enough aircraft which again could have flown by 1964.
As an aside a simpler version of CVA01 minus Broomstick and Seadart and other gimmicks like scissor lifts would not have been much of a leap from Eagle and Hermes. AFVG or a similar VG fighter would have met RN (and French) needs. It might even have been sold to the US for the Essexes.

R

 

[red admiral]

As you haven't explained I'll presume that "Money?" meant "How would it be paid for?" which is a reasonable question.

Wood in the back of Project Cancelled has a go at actually trying to put numbers onto things and adding up the totals. But there's a fair amount of uncertainty across a number of areas depending on what numbers you want to use.

There's also an affordability issue as the budgeting process is a yearly thing and there's a massive peak in the mid 60s here with concurrent full scale development of all 3 types plus production ramp up

 

[JFC Fuller]

I've always assumed that the VG-winged design Spotswood had in mind was one of Vickers/BAC's Type 58x series designs.

Nope. Spotswood was simply referencing the then extant, and ministerially imposed, official future aircraft programme. The December 1960 decision that future combat aircraft types would be joint wasn't just for the P.1154, it was for all future types. Had the policy have been maintained there would only have been one type in development at any one time (e.g. once TSR-2 was finished) with two generations outlined, specifically:

P.1154: For the RAF, to replace the Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 from the late 1960s, and maybe the Lightning subsequently. In the RN to replace the Sea Vixen on a similar but not identical timeline. Ministers would have preferred these aircraft be identical rather than derivative variants, hence the Joint Services version that was unable to simultaneously meet both services stated operational requirements.

A future VG type, colloquially known as OR.346/355 in reflection of its feeder operational requirements: To replace everything from around 1980, none of the Type 58x series would have come close to meeting the initial RAF part of that requirement as it was mad, the Type 581 was designed to/alongside the RN's original OR.346 requirement.

The Lighting fell between the in-service dates of the two types so it was variously considered to replace it with either. The Navy proposed to replace its version of the P.1154 with the VG type. However, the Navy actually wanted nothing to do with the whole affair, having been hostile to the P.1154 when the RAF first proposed it, rightfully recognising it as an additional drain on the defence R&D budget that could in turn threaten their own projects. Eric Brown, as Deputy Director Air Warfare, spent a good part of his time in post trying to extricate the RN from the P.1154. He advocated the Vickers Type 583 along the way before finally achieving his goal with the F-4. The RAF's earliest interest in AFVG was for an interceptor to meet the Lightning replacement requirement.

 

[Rule of cool]

Every time these discussions go down the path of trying to untangle the damage done by Sandys my belief that he should have gone all in with the Lightning instead of the Hunter FGA/FR conversions gets stronger and stronger. It just makes the whole procurement debacle of the 60s go away and planning becomes simple. Its a classic case of the perfect being the enemy of the good enough.

 

[Rule of cool]

The balance between political dogma and the reality of events is difficult in the UK. It is usually hard to unpick the component parts without taking sides.
I agree that UK is very different from the US and France in its circumstances.
Once India gained its independence, something unimaginable to Churchill but already inevitable before WW2, the rest of Britain's Empire became irrelevant.
The Suez crisis was an anachronism. The canal was built to link England and India. We had withdrawn from Egypt in 1953 because it was too costly and unpopular with Egyptians.
The African colonies were late additions to Empire and as Macmillan recognised needed to be given independence quickly
The Gulf's oil becomes less significant once the US controls the vast Saudi oilfields and the Shah those in Iran.
Events dear boy, events as Macmillan observed.
Entry to the EEC in 1971 was supposed to mark the UK's recognition that its future lay in Europe not in distant trouble spots.
But France and Germany made the club rules. De Gaulle was right that London looks to New Yprk not Paris (or Washington for that matter)
While some Brits moved to France and Spain the attrsctions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA remained greater.
US and Australian entertainers not French or Germans filled our screens.
So in 2024 despite the clusterguck of Brexit the UK remains different but not sure where it wants to be.

Yes, events mean that Britian won't keep it's world role much past the early 70s. That said I think it still a place for withdrawing from S.E.A. to the Mid East/Trucial States in order to keep some influence in that region. After all the British did establish the Armilla Patrol 9 years after withdrawing from the Gulf, without the benefit of a base in the area.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Wood in the back of Project Cancelled has a go at actually trying to put numbers onto things and adding up the totals. But there's a fair amount of uncertainty across a number of areas depending on what numbers you want to use.

There's also an affordability issue as the budgeting process is a yearly thing and there's a massive peak in the mid 60s here with concurrent full scale development of all 3 types plus production ramp up

My numbers of P.1154RAFs and TSR.2 were the numbers that I remembered from Plan P rounded to the nearest 50. The RAF bought 66 C-130Ks so I assumed 66 HS.681s. 150-200 P.1154 ADVs was a guesstimate of the number required to support a UE of 120 aircraft in 10 squadrons of 12.

The actual numbers in Plan P were 193 TSR.2s (including the 11 pre-production aircraft but excluding the 9 development aircraft), 162 P,1154s and 62 HS.681s.

Was there a massive peak in the mid 1960s? A lot of money was spent anyway including £70 million in cancellation charges on TSR.2.

The production overlap wasn't as bad as you may believe. The TSR.2s were to be delivered 1967-72, the P.1154s were to be delivered 1971-75 and the first 57 of the 62 HS.681s 1970-75. However, there's not guarantee that those schedules would have been met.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to Wiki there was a repair programme in place to address the Valiant's issues and there was no plan to scrap the type until after the October 1964 election. The Hasting transport fleet had undergone and extensive repair-rebuild programme in the early 60s and there was no 'real' reason why the Valiant could not have had the same treatment.

I intended to say that at 1964 the plan was to keep the Hastings in service for at least 5 years longer than the Valiant and that may have been why the Hastings fleet had the rebuild programme and Valiant didn't. However when I checked there were still 2 Valiant tactical bomber squadrons in March 1969 and the Hastings was to remain in service until 1972