WI more Canberra's replaced by Valiants?

[red admiral]

Every time these discussions go down the path of trying to untangle the damage done by Sandys my belief that he should have gone all in with the Lightning instead of the Hunter FGA/FR conversions gets stronger and stronger. It just makes the whole procurement debacle of the 60s go away and planning becomes simple. Its a classic case of the perfect being the enemy of the good enough.

But this still ignores the funding reality of the time that drove the 1957 review. Spending more money on more and "better" Lightnings in this period requires less spending elsewhere and there aren't any obvious candidates to save large amounts of money:

• Cancel MK2 Vulcan, Victor and Blue Steel
• Cancel Bloodhound
• Don't start GOR339 / TSR2
• Cancel Buccaneer

I think it's telling that no one seems to have suggested the approach of doubling down on Lightning at the time

 

[zen]

One of the counter arguments I've put forward in the past is that the failures of Type 556 as the longer term FAW solution to the RN FAA, is that the N/A.39 choice of B.103 Buccaneer, while a rational choice in isolation, leaves the RN still needing a new FAW at some stage in the future.
While Shorts PD.13 might have given them a better long-term path forward.

The RAF lacked it's desired FAW solutions, having a interim interceptor in the form of the Lightning.

Now had a fighter resolved this or had a more fighter capable solution been chosen for N/A.39.....

Then both RN FAA and RAF could have resolved funding constraints.

Earlier on the choice of DH.110 for both service had offered up just that prospect. But inter-service rivalry and development issues led them astray.

F4 ultimately resets both services to a more common platform.

But it was possible Earlier......

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

23. NATO. So far as the strength of the NATO-assigned TSR2 force is concerned, it must be appreciated that this force, plus the FGA/R aircraft also required, has effectively to replace 137 V-bombers, 88 Canberras, and 16 Hunters. In view both of the operational task and of the need to maintain influence in the Alliance, its is considered that at least 72 TSR2s must be assigned to SACEUR, in addition to the FGA/R aircraft considered in para. 43 below. As to the disposition of this force, the advent of the TSR2 introduces new possibilities of combining operational, organisational and economic advantages without losing tactical advantage or political influence. Hitherto it has been necessary to deploy on the Continent all those air forces assigned to Allied Command, Europe, with the exception of the V-Force and Fighter Command; this has been due to the nature (range etc.) of the available aircraft and the consequent need to base them forward for tactical and political reasons. Now, however, it is not only feasible but desirable to consider deployment of the Strike/Reconnaissance Force in the United Kingdom, for the following reasons:-
(a) Its long range and ubiquity makes it unnecessary to base it forward, at least permanently.
(b) By basing such aircraft in the United Kingdom instead of in Germany, their vulnerability to surprise attack (a matter of great concern to SACEUR) will be considerably reduced. Indeed, no attack by the Russians upon aircraft in the United Kingdom bases could possibly be construed as an act of "limited war", and this resultant immunity of the force in such conditions would in itself reduce still further the possibility of limited aggression in Central Europe.
(c) Deployment on the Home bases will ease the maintenance problems of a complex weapon system, as well as reducing considerably expenditure of foreign exchange.
(d) Full advantage can be taken of the complex of communications, bases, and dispersal airfields built up for Bomber Command.
(e) Political kudos could be gained by the obvious implication (already made by the assignment of Bomber and Fighter Commands) that the United Kingdom was very much part of the A.C.E. by the deployment of the assigned element in the United Kingdom (a tenable argument with such an aircraft). However, this would not obviate the need in any event for the deployment on the Continent of shorter range aircraft required to balance the ground forces there, and to provide "presence".

The above section of the Spotswood Report suggests that the 40 TSR.2s planned to replace the 78 Canberras in RAFG be based in the UK instead of Germany and lists the advantages of doing so. Those arguments could be used to the 48 Canberra interdictors in 4 squadrons with the 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons that were disbanded 1962-63. The displaced Canberras (which had all-weather capability) could in turn replace the 40 Canberras light bombers in NEAF and FEAF (which didn't have all-weather capability).

 

[Hood]

A future VG type, colloquially known as OR.346/355 in reflection of its feeder operational requirements: To replace everything from around 1980, none of the Type 58x series would have come close to meeting the initial RAF part of that requirement as it was mad, the Type 581 was designed to/alongside the RN's original OR.346 requirement.

Re: 1980s etc.
The fact that the ability to operate F-111B-type aircraft (size and weight) was added to CVA-01 at a relatively late stage of design suggests that the RN had in mind a top-end VG design by 1966. I've never come across any suggestion of any intent to buy the F-111B, but certainly in terms of future growth they were thinking of a similar design as likely to appear in the late 70s/early 80s. Given the RAF ordered the F-111 it might have been harder to deny the RN that option (in the unlikely scenario the F-111B wasn't a flop cancelled by the USN), or indeed the successor F-14, which could have derailed any attempt to get a joint RAF/RN VG fighter programme going (Treasury probably spoils everyone's party by insisting both Services stick with F-4s until the 90s anyway)

I have suspicions that AFVG was a gambit to enable BAC to build the VG wings it wanted to. TSR.2 was cancelled by Cabinet 1 April 1965 (announced 6th) and warm sentiments expressed towards the F-111, 17 May MoU Collaboration in the Aeronautical Field was signed by Healey, Roy Jenkins and Messmer which covered Jaguar, AFVG, AEW and helicopters (to become Puma, Gazelle, Lynx), 13 July AFVG feasibility study specification issued, April 1966 F-111K ordered and AFVG spec issued.
So barely more than a month after TSR.2 was cancelled AFVG was cooked up without a specification to back it up. Within a year two VG strike projects were underway.

If anything, this shows that there was not a reluctance to spend money per se but a reluctance to spend too much.

 

[Hood]

Earlier on the choice of DH.110 for both service had offered up just that prospect. But inter-service rivalry and development issues led them astray.

The 1949 economic cutbacks that killed off a lot of the DH.110 prototypes killed off any hopes of a joint procurement and strike-versions.

Even when it looked like the RAF and RN might order the DH.110, the RN feared that in wartime all the construction priority would go to the RAF, leaving them short of fighters and so they sought an insurance type from another manufacturer. But if this mutual distrust could have been worked around, a joint DH.110 fleet of night-fighters, escort fighters/intruders and nuclear strike would have saved a lot of money and opened up all kind of Super Vixen developments (deltas, new engines etc.).

 

[zen]

The 1949 economic cutbacks that killed off a lot of the DH.110 prototypes killed off any hopes of a joint procurement and strike-versions.

Even when it looked like the RAF and RN might order the DH.110, the RN feared that in wartime all the construction priority would go to the RAF, leaving them short of fighters and so they sought an insurance type from another manufacturer. But if this mutual distrust could have been worked around, a joint DH.110 fleet of night-fighters, escort fighters/intruders and nuclear strike would have saved a lot of money and opened up all kind of Super Vixen developments (deltas, new engines etc.).

And connects neatly to scenario where DH rides triumphant as it nearly did and flush with the cash and increasing capacity within HSA, the next generation would be forthcoming relatively smoothly.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/dehaviland-triumphs.39282/

 

[Rule of cool]

But this still ignores the funding reality of the time that drove the 1957 review. Spending more money on more and "better" Lightnings in this period requires less spending elsewhere and there aren't any obvious candidates to save large amounts of money:

• Cancel MK2 Vulcan, Victor and Blue Steel
• Cancel Bloodhound
• Don't start GOR339 / TSR2
• Cancel Buccaneer

I think it's telling that no one seems to have suggested the approach of doubling down on Lightning at the time

Its true nobody thought of going all-in on the Lightning, I'm drawing in a couple of threads including the PMs 1956 criticism of the short range of RAF fighters and the ~1958 concepts of big belly fuel tank and ground attack options, and the real production items for the RAF and export. All of this is far less difficult than convincing a rocket obsessed Sandys that manned fighters/fighter-bombers have enough of a future to invest in such options.

Sandys had to (and did for 4-5 years more or less) save 100 million pounds from the 1.8 billion (1956) budget and 5.5 billion total government spend. As best as I can work out 150 Fighter-bomber Lightnings would cost about 100 million pounds including development; spread over 5 years is about 20 million pounds annually 1958-62, of which the cost of the Hunter conversions and preliminary P1154 would be subtracted. In any case I think most of the saved money was from drastically reducing the size of the army and cancelling the likes of F.155 etc. so I don't think financing such a Lightning buy would be overly difficult.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I read a book about jet fighters many years ago that might have been written by Bill Gunston. IIRC in the chapter about the Lightning the author claimed that English Electric offered to put all the airframe improvements (such as the extra fuel capacity) of the F.6 into the F.1 but the RAF wasn't interested. He continued by writing that the said airframe improvements were incorporated (at great expense) into the F.2s that were rebuilt as F.2As. Is that true?

 

[red admiral]

Maybe the real villain in all this was actually the Buccaneer? Did the RN really need a large, expensive dedicated strike aircraft vs a threat (Sverdlovsk) that wasn't actually "real"?

Or would it have been better to spend the effort on an all-weather fighter type instead that has ground attack capability? (e.g. Sea Vixen+ / 556 / other). If Sverdlovsk becomes a real threat then hang Red Beard under the fighter. You've then got a multirole fighter as the basis to be adapted into various versions in both RN and RAF

English Electric offered to put all the airframe improvements (such as the extra fuel capacity) of the F.6 into the F.1 but the RAF wasn't interested. He continued by writing that the said airframe improvements were incorporated (at great expense) into the F.2s that were rebuilt as F.2As. Is that true?

Maybe the RAF wasn't interested because of "the great expense" involved? Same with today of the "potential" to rebuild Typhoon Tr1s into Tr3s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Maybe the RAF wasn't interested because of "the great expense" involved? Same with today of the "potential" to rebuild Typhoon Tr1s into Tr3s.

Except that "the great expense" was the cost of rebuilding 31 Lightning F.2s to F.2A standard IOTL. Maybe it would have been less expensive to build all the F.1s, F.1As & F.2s with the proposed airframe improvements in the first place. Similarly, it might have been less expensive to build all the F.3s & F.3As (which had some of the F.6s airframe improvements) to the full F.6 airframe standard as 24 of them were rebuilt as F.6s in IOTL.

 

[uk 75]

The threat to the UK Air Defence Region changes considerably in the period we are looking at.
The main threat comes with the deployment of SS4 and SS5 MRBMs which can destroy the key bases in UK with a first strike.
It becomes clear that any fixed silos in the UK will be hard to place and in time will be vulnerable to Soviet missiles.
Polaris offers a missile system which is deployed at sea and can deter a Soviet strike. A missile defence system would be too costly.
The threat from fixed wing aircraft worries planners in the 50s but does not materialise until Fencers arrive in the late 70s. The Backfire is mainly aimed at maritime strike.
The RAF only needed Lightnings to shepherd away Bisons and Bears probing UK airspace.

 

[zen]

Maybe the real villain in all this was actually the Buccaneer? Did the RN really need a large, expensive dedicated strike aircraft vs a threat (Sverdlovsk) that wasn't actually "real"?

It could be argued that way. All that precious funding and effort for a limited number of FAA aircraft.....

RAF was critical and while we can see political maneuvering to secure their own favourite ideas. We cannot completely dismiss this criticism.

Or would it have been better to spend the effort on an all-weather fighter type instead that has ground attack capability? (e.g. Sea Vixen+ / 556 / other).

Indeed couldn't a variant of Sea Vixen do this, with a stretched fusilage and a recess.....much like they actually trotted out as an interim solution to GOR.339?

Note the RAF suggested that a Scimitar variant might do the N/A.39 role, at less cost and quicker to service.
People focus on the marginal savings in time and cost and presume it's just politics.
But perhaps miss the commonality and future development issue?
RAF had favourably assessed the Scimitar for carriage of bomb load at some 10,000lb of ordinance when flying from a airfield and this was nuclear cleared for Red Beard.

But we can envision a DH alternative here and even counter with the question, "could not a single seater, lightweight, cannon armed Vixen, do the role of the Scimitar?"

 

[Hood]

Indeed couldn't a variant of Sea Vixen do this, with a stretched fusilage and a recess.....much like they actually trotted out as an interim solution to GOR.339?

That was the plan in 1948 at least - although the Admiralty at that time freely admitted it didn't know which aircraft would be better for strike, the two-seat N.40/46 or the single-seat N.9/47 and wanted to prototype both to see. Four roles, two airframes.
Along the way that got blurred and the plan to rationalise on two airframes was lost. A pity really.

Maybe the real villain in all this was actually the Buccaneer? Did the RN really need a large, expensive dedicated strike aircraft vs a threat (Sverdlovsk) that wasn't actually "real"?

This is an interesting question (the same could be said for all the GW, torpedo and Cruiser-Destroyer efforts to deal with the same problem).

 

[red admiral]

Maybe it would have been less expensive to build all the F.1s, F.1As & F.2s with the proposed airframe improvements in the first place.

I don't think the time phasing works though? How do you build F.6s instead of F.1s when the F.6 doesn't exist for a few more years? There's a running joke about "never buy the Mk 1" but unfortunately you have to because without it then the Mk.2 etc. won't exist

But we can envision a DH alternative here and even counter with the question, "could not a single seater, lightweight, cannon armed Vixen, do the role of the Scimitar?"

I don't really see how the answer isn't "surely it could"? It's always been a bit of a puzzle how the RN ended up with 3 similar size, high subsonic, twin engine combat aircraft over only a few years difference... Feels more egregious than the usual complaints of no common Javelin/Sea Vixen

the same could be said for all the GW, torpedo and Cruiser-Destroyer efforts to deal with the same problem).

At least they got cancelled before very large amounts of money got spent?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Another part of the Spotswood Report.

The All-Weather Fighter Force
30. Ministers have agreed (D(62)54th Meeting) the following order of battle for the Lightning all-weather fighter force:-

This should be achieved by 1967.

31. Of these squadrons, the three in NEAF and FEAF are required to defend the nuclear bases at Akrotiri, Tengah and Butterworth. The two squadrons in Germany - which, being Mark 2As as opposed to Mark 3s, will be unsuitable for long range reinforcement - are required to meet NATO force goals, Berlin contingency plans and Tripartite air policing commitments and, coincidentally, help meet our need to show "presence" on the Continent; indeed, for Berlin contingency plans the two squadrons would have to be reinforced from the United Kingdom. The five squadrons approved for the United Kingdom have always been regarded as barely adequate for the dual role of preserving the integrity of British air space and providing squadrons for overseas commitments, since the "worst case" reinforcement situation requires the simultaneous despatch of four squadrons. However, the calculated risk involved in the retention of only this small force must be accepted in view of the economic factors and other priorities involved, although there is little doubt that increased long term deployment overseas, e.g. AFME, will be required.

32. The present authorised purchase of Lightnings is sufficient to back this force until 1972/73. By the mid-1970s, a replacement will be required which could be either a variable geometry aircraft for joint use by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy or a derivative of the P.1154. Whichever aircraft is finally ordered this minimum force of 10 squadrons must be replaced on a one-for-one basis and the overall U.E. should thus remain as 120 aircraft.

The Surface-to-Air Missile Force
33. Bloodhound Mark 2 SAM squadrons will begin to form during 1964 and will be deployed as follows:-

34. The three squadrons in Cyprus and the Far East will continue to be required for the close defence of our nuclear bases particularly bearing in mind the growing offensive capabilities of possible enemies. The operational squadron in Britain is, in effect, our strategic reserve of SAM to cover unforeseen requirements wherever they may arise but, together with the training squadron, will add to the security of the United Kingdom air space when held on the Home base, though this will be a secondary role.

35. This force will last well into the Seventies and no change in numbers, role and deployment can be foreseen at present although there is no doubt that it will have to be supplemented by 1970 by a mobile system having a low level capability.

The Tanker Force
41. Authority has been given for the conversion of 24 Victor 1s to the tanker role. This is the minimum force required to flight refuel two squadrons of Lighting 3s from Britain to the Far East within 10 days laid down as a Chiefs of Staff requirement. These aircraft could also be used to assist ferry flights by TSR2s, fighter/ground attack/reconnaissance aircraft and the transport fleet. It can be argued that in certain circumstances both Lightning and other types of aircraft could require tanker assistance at the same time, thus raising the requirement for more tankers. However, it is considered that, in the circumstances being considered, it should be one more calculated risk that the planned strength of tankers will suffice, the possible shortfall being overcome by passing reinforcement flights in the event, in the interests of maintaining a minimal operational capability.

42. Particularly as the fatigue life of the Victors in the tanker role will permit their use well into the Seventies, the aim should be to maintain a minimum UE of 24 throughout the period covered by this paper.

To summarise the Lightning and Bloodhound squadrons:

• In the UK had dual role of preserving the integrity of British air space and providing squadrons for overseas commitments;
• In NEAF and FEAF were for the defence of the nuclear bases at Akrotiri, Tengah and Butterworth.

FWIW I though protecting the V-bomber bases was also a role of the Lightning and Bloodhound squadrons. The RAAF Mirage III squadrons in FEAF were at Butterworth, does that mean their main role at the time was protecting the nuclear base there?

My guess is that the airframe improvements to the Lightning proposed by English Electric weren't incorporated into marks F.1, F.1A & F.2 because the extra range wasn't required at the time.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I don't think the time phasing works though? How do you build F.6s instead of F.1s when the F.6 doesn't exist for a few more years? There's a running joke about "never buy the Mk 1" but unfortunately you have to because without it then the Mk.2 etc. won't exist

In Post 89 you seemed to be deliberately misunderstanding what I wrote in Post 88 and here you seem to be deliberately misunderstanding what I wrote in Post 90. I don't know what else to say.

 

[red admiral]

@NOMISYRRUC Apologies, but I simply don't understand. Is your point about rebuilding all the built Lightnings up to the F.6 standard? I can't think of any programmes off hand where that has been either feasible or cost/effective to do.

 

[zen]

By 3 January 1948 the DH110 had become the most important project in the UK. 13 prototypes were to be ordered, spanning RAF and RN Night Fighter, Naval Strike, and RAF Long-range Fighter requirements.

In August 1950 efforts were made to accelerate the plane's development.
Two protertypes were built for flight by late '51.
20 October 1952 the very public crash at Farnborough along with costs and DH's progres (slow being spread thin on multiple fronts) led the third prototype to be cancelled and Gloster got their chance....

Arguably had DH not been spread thin on resources by biting too many efforts for their personnel numbers, and had they caught on about fatigue issues. Then no prototype crash at Farnborough and no cancellation.
DH.110 stomps home as the successor to the Mosquito, and Javeline and Buccaneer never happens.....maybe even Canberra looses out?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

@NOMISYRRUC Apologies, but I simply don't understand. Is your point about rebuilding all the built Lightnings up to the F.6 standard? I can't think of any programmes off hand where that has been either feasible or cost/effective to do.

No it isn't about rebuilding all the built Lightnings up to the F.6 standard.

I found the book on Internet Archive and it more or less says what I thought it did when I read it 2 or 3 decades ago. More being that Lightings F.1 to F.3A could have been built with the F.6 airframe (e.g. the kinked/cambered wing flew in 1956) and less being that the rebuilds of earlier marks to that standard weren't done at great expense.

 

[uk 75]

The UK deployed two different fighters carrying 4 Firestreaks in the early 1960s.
The Javelin was around until the mid 60s when longer ranged Lightnings and Red Tops arrived.
The Sea Vixen was developed and armed with Red Tops. It served until the early 70s.
Developing a supersonic fighter for the RAF and RN able to carry four Firestreaks should have given them a Mach 1 aircraft by 1957.
The failure to do so put too much weight on the Lightning. It also opened the door for the F4 Phantom as the only alternative in the 60s.
It would not have been easy. The US analogues were not that great. The F8 and F104 were similar to Lightning. The F101 F102 and various USN types were, however, better than anything the UK built.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Lightnings were needed in the UK in the era of Massive Retaliation because powerful carcinatron jammers rendered the BMEWS radars less effective and such jammer aircraft operated outside the range of SAMs. Then as others have pointed out the other nuclear bases needed protection and RAFG also needed fighters.

The F101 F102 and various USN types were, however, better than anything the UK built.

The F102 was a total dud, the F106 was built because of that.

The F101 needs a bit more examination, mainly because it was a fighter-bomber and had long range.

The F101A was a fighter-bomber had a top speed of Mach 1.5 and in practice was only armed with 4 x 20mm guns and nuclear weapons, Falcon AAMs and conventional bombs were not actually fitted although they might have been. 77 built.
The F101B was an interceptor, a hotted up A model, it could reach Mach 1.85 and had Falcon and Genie AAMs but no guns or air to ground weapons. 479 built.
The F101C was an improved F101A fighter-bomber with good range but still only nuclear armed. 50 built.

I could possibly see the F101A/C being used instead of the Canberra but I don't see a huge requirement for the F101Bs range in the UK context, the air defence radar system wasn't set up to use it. In any case the F101 was an early 50s, transonic aircraft that would struggle by the mid 60s with the proliferation of Mach 2 types, leaving aside having to buy it with USD in an era of financial tightness.

 

[Rule of cool]

No it isn't about rebuilding all the built Lightnings up to the F.6 standard.

I found the book on Internet Archive and it more or less says what I thought it did when I read it 2 or 3 decades ago. More being that Lightings F.1 to F.3A could have been built with the F.6 airframe (e.g. the kinked/cambered wing flew in 1956) and less being that the rebuilds of earlier marks to that standard weren't done at great expense.

I don't know what the big expense would be, they omly fitted F6 spare parts (wing, vertical tail, belly tank) to F2s. The parts were being made anyway and would have been fitted during major services.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I could see the UK buying F-111Bs along with the -Ks. The -Bs are really the type of fighter that the UK needed, BARCAP. Long range, good loiter time, good sensors and weapons. Ideally, they'd stick afterburning Speys into their versions instead of the TF30s.

But that gets us into the problem of those planes being bought with US dollars, and the British were always short of dollars.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I could see the UK buying F-111Bs along with the -Ks. The -Bs are really the type of fighter that the UK needed, BARCAP. Long range, good loiter time, good sensors and weapons. Ideally, they'd stick afterburning Speys into their versions instead of the TF30s.

But that gets us into the problem of those planes being bought with US dollars, and the British were always short of dollars.

I can't. Not only would Treasury fall about laughing (You want fighters the size of a medium bomber, Air Marshal? And they cost how much? And in dollars?), but when the RAF was looking at a BARCAP fighter they were unimpressed with the AWG-9's ECCM capabilities.

It would also require an alternative fighter for the tactical forces. F-111Bs would be totally unsuited to air defence in Germany, and probably the Far East too, though they might be OK for Cyprus.

 

[Rule of cool]

The F111 would not be part of a successful UK's defence plans, the TSR2 would cover the RAF's replacement for the Canberra B(I).6, B(I).8, B.15, B.16 and Valiant (or Vulcan B1 if the Valiants are retired early) and the Spey Phantom is brand new in 1968 and would serve until at least 1983.

Maybe the real villain in all this was actually the Buccaneer? Did the RN really need a large, expensive dedicated strike aircraft vs a threat (Sverdlovsk) that wasn't actually "real"?

It could be argued that way. All that precious funding and effort for a limited number of FAA aircraft.....

I can see some merit in this arguments, and if it doesn't apply to the Buccaneer it certainly applies to the next FAA carrier aircraft (the Spey Phantom) and everything after that. At best the RN-FAA get get on board with the RAF if they build something in the 40-50,000lb class in the late 70s early 80s period that replaces the Lightning: and Buccaneer and Spey Phantom. If not the FAA will again have to buy American in the 80s, assuming the 2 x CVAs get built of course.

 

[alertken]

If France had accepted that logic, so replacing F-8E, with F/A-18, Rafale would have matched EF2000 head to toe and, maybe, only 1 to be funded, AMD/BAe/DASA/CASA as one, so on today to GCAP/FOAS same. To great benefit of all except the Bad Guys.

 

[Rule of cool]

If France had accepted that logic, so replacing F-8E, with F/A-18, Rafale would have matched EF2000 head to toe and, maybe, only 1 to be funded, AMD/BAe/DASA/CASA as one, so on today to GCAP/FOAS same. To great benefit of all except the Bad Guys.

IIUC the French looked at the F/A18A in the late 80s but the 151' BS5 catapults on the Clem and Foch couldn't launch them at decent weights. That said, the French buying the F8E at the very end of its production run is a prime example of the problem and its solution for small carrier fleet navies.

I don't think about the Rafale/Typhoon, its hard enough to think how to replace the Canberras and Valiants in the 60s let alone what might happen 2 decades later with fighters.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Re: 1980s etc.
The fact that the ability to operate F-111B-type aircraft (size and weight) was added to CVA-01 at a relatively late stage of design suggests that the RN had in mind a top-end VG design by 1966. I've never come across any suggestion of any intent to buy the F-111B, but certainly in terms of future growth they were thinking of a similar design as likely to appear in the late 70s/early 80s. Given the RAF ordered the F-111 it might have been harder to deny the RN that option (in the unlikely scenario the F-111B wasn't a flop cancelled by the USN), or indeed the successor F-14, which could have derailed any attempt to get a joint RAF/RN VG fighter programme going (Treasury probably spoils everyone's party by insisting both Services stick with F-4s until the 90s anyway)

The RN had a "top-end" VG design in mind well before that. Their original OR.346 solution was to be a 50,000lb VG design, effectively the Vickers 581. Combining the RN (OR.346) and RAF (OR.355) requirements produced a much heavier aircraft, the RN wanted to replace the P.1154RN with the next-gen VG type when they could, so the carrier had to be able to take it. It was sensible future proofing, one of the most time consuming aspects of the carrier modernisations was increasing hangar deck weight limits - to the point it often wasn't done. I have yet to find any evidence of serious RN interest in the F-111B. The RN was very interested in the missileer concept (though seemingly not the F6D itself) up until they settled on VG, and they came very close to buying the E-2.

I have suspicions that AFVG was a gambit to enable BAC to build the VG wings it wanted to. TSR.2 was cancelled by Cabinet 1 April 1965 (announced 6th) and warm sentiments expressed towards the F-111, 17 May MoU Collaboration in the Aeronautical Field was signed by Healey, Roy Jenkins and Messmer which covered Jaguar, AFVG, AEW and helicopters (to become Puma, Gazelle, Lynx), 13 July AFVG feasibility study specification issued, April 1966 F-111K ordered and AFVG spec issued.

So barely more than a month after TSR.2 was cancelled AFVG was cooked up without a specification to back it up. Within a year two VG strike projects were underway.

If anything, this shows that there was not a reluctance to spend money per se but a reluctance to spend too much.

I doubt that. VG was all the rage and had been for a while by then, it had been baked in as the next generation technology since 1960/61, VG would have been the obvious choice for any new combat aircraft. Had TSR-2 run 4 years later it almost certainly would have been VG itself.

 

[Rule of cool]

Much like VTOL, Variable Geometry wings were a fad that didn't last too long. The Tornado was about the last aircraft to have it, and ultimately its genesis was in the mid 60s AFVG with some input from other 60s designs. I think a clean sheet design from about 1970, perhaps the replacement for an enlarged Lightning interceptor/fighter-bomber fleet, would likely not have VG wings.

 

[Hood]

I doubt that. VG was all the rage and had been for a while by then, it had been baked in as the next generation technology since 1960/61, VG would have been the obvious choice for any new combat aircraft. Had TSR-2 run 4 years later it almost certainly would have been VG itself.

I don't dispute that VG wings were wanted - BAC raved about them like HSA raved about vectored thrust.
As I've often said, TSR.2 was ill-timed in that regard, just a couple of years too early to take advantage of electronic and structural miniaturisation.

AFVG only came about because BAC insisted that VG winged combat studies be included as quid pro quo for building half of ECAT/Jaguar once it was clear the French would not accept VG wings on ECAT. They thought it was a done deal to get France to fund half of their VG work for them - sadly they didn't seem to be aware that Dassault already had the Mirage G studies underway for over a year. You can't really blame Dassault for not wanting to pay BAC to replicate work they already had underway. BAC redesigned a fair chunk of the Br.121, I don't think BAC would have let Dassault redesign a chunk of Warton's designs or take any credit for the VG wings.

Hawker Siddeley was all but cut out of the MoU agreements (the AEW went nowhere), BAC was doing all the industrial running on the airframe side and the MoA was happy to go along with that. It's not clear - from what I've seen - that the Air Staff actually wanted an aircraft like AFVG given that it had eyes on the F-111 and, as you say, the future fighter was seen as a 1970s project.

 

[Rule of cool]

As I've often said, TSR.2 was ill-timed in that regard, just a couple of years too early to take advantage of electronic and structural miniaturisation.

While I think the twin centralised VERDANs in the TSR2 could have worked, once the double-sided versions were available to create the desired memory, it certainly wasn't the future of aircraft computers.

What do you mean by structural minimisation? I understand the words but can't think of an example.

 

[Rule of cool]

The shenanigans that occurred when Britain went into partnership with other countries, first the 50/50 with France for the ECAT and AFVG then the 42.5/42.5/15 with Germany and Italy with the MRCA then everything after that is why I'm so rabid about getting British combat aircraft production 'right' in the 60s.

Britain will eventually have to go into partnership with other countries for the main fleet of the RAF's combat aircraft. Ideally this should be from a position of strength, with Britain as the undoubted lead and other partners being junior and joining to take advantage of Britian's highly developed industry. This can't happen if the RAF requires penny packets of tactical aircraft of different types every few years, this was already evident with the RNs requirements. In contrast if the RAF needs 400+ 4th generation fighter-bombers from the late 70s it can claim 51%+ of a project and with such leadership can set the parameters and reap the rewards. However, to get there the right decisions need to be made with the previous generation of aircraft in order that success breeds success.

 

[Hood]

What do you mean by structural minimisation? I understand the words but can't think of an example.

The VG wing. Compact nuclear weapons. The need not to carry the Albert Hall for the 'black boxes'.
More efficient turbojets/turbofans were probably too far down the line though.

 

[alertken]

RoC,#112. But UK was never "the undoubted lead" in Euro-Aero, "highly-developed industry": that's the myth of Empire of the Skies.

Let's start with the Peace Dividend, 1946, Munitions Industry dismantled, avionics firms back to civil radio: no enemy. UK Aero tried its best, labour oozing away, to do the Brabazon suite of turbine replacements for DC-3, DC-4, L-049. All, bar Viscount....failed.

US and USSR did not know they had no enemy, so a spiral of military spend. We can understand why USSR wondered why US continued to build B-50, B-36 and their Bombs, after VJ-Day, before Berlin Airlift provocation.

So...Korea, 10/50, USSR's puppet invades and kills Brit/ANZ/US et al. WW3 imminent. By Armistice, 6/53 US has put Aero-UK, France back on their feet and has started to create New-Aero-Italy/Japan, 5/55 /FRG - not for their $-renewed production facilities to build Airbus destroyers of US taxpayers' jobs, but to share the cost and cadavers.
Success, so we all move to steady-state vigilant Defence and to civil prosperity. Heavyweight US techno-leads, from Defense Budgets consistently higher than UK's (Japan's never >1%, FRG's >3.1% of GDP), included GW and avionics. A list of US licences taken by UK is long: this thread, for TSR.2 has Verdan Main Computer, but there were more. RAE and NASA exchanged Tech.Papers, 2-way street, e.g.: flap-blowing, much mutual benefit, no "ownership".

Then Ike pre-empted Trump and cut the $, so 801xRAF Canberras, muchly $-Aided, would have become 50xTSR.2.
By then 3/65, France, FRG, Italy in every Aero sector, and Japan in some, could match UK, product by product, box by box, projectile by...and exceeded UK in Space, GenAv...and why on earth not? No-one can do everything.

The glorious past never was; the excellent today is real - in Space, in RR, in MBDA's GW...it's just that UK does not now rollout solo Air Vehicles (bar some UAVs).

We have used up too much bandwidth on this thread on Lightning - a low payload-range, very bespoke disruptor of high-incoming manned platforms, and on snarling at Ministers for keeping Hunters so long: but this was capital-sparing means of doing the Army Co-op which for so long was RAF budget orphan. US had $-Aided F.6 procurement; the FGA.9 mod was within the capacity of RAF MUs where many were done sort-of-doubly-free.

The oft-over-looked feature of Defence Procurement decisions, 1955-60 was demise of conscription; the X-Factor added to military pay scales, to offset uncivil aspects of life; the grotesque cost of ownership of...warmware. It's 7 years right now till RAF will set you free on a Fast Jet; then you might have 3 active tours before you fly a desk awhile; then unsociable you, you intend to draw a pension for with luck 40 years, your better half, half awhile longer. So of course Ministers try to collaborate with a mate so to try to get solo-£100 kit for...something less.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

More efficient turbojets/turbofans were probably too far down the line though.

TSR2 could have had Medway right from the start.

 

[uk 75]

The Lightning options which Rule of Cool likes and the various projects Zen mentions may well have been feasible technically but my objection to them is that they are only attractive because we know that the projects pursued in reality met with problems. The people dealing with them at the time did not know this was going to happen.
I have joined in this process by looking at changes to TSR2, 1154, and 681 and advocating AFVG as a way to get Tornado earlier.
The harsh reality as Denis Healey realised was that the RAF and RN needed to live within the options deliverable by 1970.
At the heart of the problem was over-specification.
Buccaneer S2 was a reasonable way of delivering one nuclear weapon and four ASMs to most of the likely targets. As such it was a decent replacement for the Canberra and apart from payload, the Valiant.
The Phantom offered a way of replacing Canberras and Hunters in frontline squadrons by 1970 as well as meeting the need to replace Javelins and in due course Lightnings.
Jaguar then provided arguably what 1154 should have been designed as, a one for one Hunter replacement that was as simple and reliable.
Just as Australia persevered with F111C and found it a valuable tool, the F111K could have been a Valiant/Vulcan replacement more effectively than TSR2. But I have argued that it made financial sense to let the US take on this role from UK bases.
The UK required to support a French or US style aerospace industry did not exist in real life. Its history, traditions and above all economic performance in the 50s and 60s made it impossible.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think the reason Britain, as opposed to the US, France or others, gets constantly re-hashed is because we all know that Britain did not tread an optimal path. One of the first things I read when I first became interested in aircraft in the 80s was that the RAF was big, but not as big as it needed to be or as big as the money spent should have made it.

As for British industry being a leader in Europe in the 50s and 60s, I struggle to believe that isn't obvious. The first French jet fighter used a British engine, as did their first airliner and the French developed a single military jet from a WW2 German design (using German engineers) and kept using it for 20 years, when Britain had multiple turbojets and turbofans. Italy's first combat jet the G.91 used a British engine, and it was far behind the likes for the Harrier or Buccaneer, and the Airpass radar was the world first monopulse fighter radar and far superior to the Cyrano II. No European country built a 4 engine trans-Atlantic airliner, or a 3 engine regional airliner and the Fokker F28 merely matched the BAC111 in sales and even used the same British engines. All of which brings us back to the choices made by a handful of key people.

they are only attractive because we know that the projects pursued in reality met with problems. The people dealing with them at the time did not know this was going to happen.

Hindsight is 20-20, and my glasses are rose coloured.

 

[Scott Kenny]

One of the first things I read when I first became interested in aircraft in the 80s was that the RAF was big, but not as big as it needed to be or as big as the money spent should have made it.

Same problem as Japan. Not enough desire or ability to buy foreign, so you end up with small production runs of really expensive hardware made in country. If the R&D spending spins off into other useful areas, great, but that doesn't seem to have happened in the UK.

That said, Japan has been a sterling example of how you should handle your naval procurement. Always keeping shipyards busy, though not necessarily making the most of their production runs for the largest ships. Their DDs and DDGs are only getting built in pairs or so. However, Submarines and Frigates are getting built in classes of 10 or more, so economies of scale can kick in and get the total built for less.

 

[Rule of cool]

Same problem as Japan. Not enough desire or ability to buy foreign, so you end up with small production runs of really expensive hardware made in country. If the R&D spending spins off into other useful areas, great, but that doesn't seem to have happened in the UK.

That said, Japan has been a sterling example of how you should handle your naval procurement. Always keeping shipyards busy, though not necessarily making the most of their production runs for the largest ships. Their DDs and DDGs are only getting built in pairs or so. However, Submarines and Frigates are getting built in classes of 10 or more, so economies of scale can kick in and get the total built for less.

Japan would have been rebuilding an aviation industry shattered by defeat in WW2, so large cost excesses would have been borne in order to gain expertise. I know Japan doers/did reprocess spent nuclear fuel for similar reasons, Japan has no uranium of its own so to maintain the ability to stretch imports as far as possible is a worthwhile capability even if it is too expansive in commercial terms.

Britain in contrast has a strong aviation industry, unbroken by WW2, so should have been working to maintain that national capability as best as they could rather than saying it sucked and trying to deny it work.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Japan would have been rebuilding an aviation industry shattered by defeat in WW2, so large cost excesses would have been borne in order to gain expertise. I know Japan doers/did reprocess spent nuclear fuel for similar reasons, Japan has no uranium of its own so to maintain the ability to stretch imports as far as possible is a worthwhile capability even if it is too expansive in commercial terms.

Britain in contrast has a strong aviation industry, unbroken by WW2, so should have been working to maintain that national capability as best as they could rather than saying it sucked and trying to deny it work.

Given most of the products of the UK aerospace industry, it may have been better to tell them that they need to build better.

Which includes things like building things under license, like how Westland built all the Sikorsky helicopters.

Japan built a lot of aircraft under license, after all...