WI Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200?

[Rule of cool]

what list? (or am I missing something?)

Hyperlink didn't stick, fixed now.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Here's a list of B707 operators and the number they flew. It looks like in the 60s that state airlines were the rule rather than the exception in Europe. All in all there appears to be plenty of scope for a VC10 Super 200 to pick up some decent orders, for example Vickers allocated a Type designation for Aerolineas Argentinas who ended up with 11 B707s.

Ah, that makes the VC10s much more competitive, even without them being more efficient. Excellent!

 

[Rule of cool]

Ah, that makes the VC10s much more competitive, even without them being more efficient. Excellent!

I think the Super 200 would be efficient to fly but expensive to buy.

 

[Rule of cool]

Something I've learned from this thread is the evolution of Rolls Royce turbofans from Conway to Medway to Spey. Each step reduced LP compressor and increased HP compressor stages; 7-9, 6-11 & 5-12 and ever increasing bypass ratio; 30% (60% in final VC10 version), 70% & 100%.

In my mind this means that the Spey wasn't simply a smaller version of the Medway, it had 1 less LP compressor stage, 1 more HP compressor stage and a greater bypass ratio. Perhaps the Spey used Medway components like the combustion cans, turbines etc.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Here's a list of B707 operators and the number they flew. It looks like in the 60s that state airlines were the rule rather than the exception in Europe. All in all there appears to be plenty of scope for a VC10 Super 200 to pick up some decent orders, for example Vickers allocated a Type designation for Aerolineas Argentinas who ended up with 11 B707s.

What list? (or am I missing something?)

Here's my list of of the 1,010 Boeing 707s that were eventually built.
(Note that BOAC (British Airways in the table) acquired the 2 built for British Eagle International, so the total's 31, not 29.)

​

I can't put a link to the website where I found it, because I don't remember where and I didn't make a note in the spreadsheet.

Also note that the names of some of the airlines are their modern names and not their names at the time. E.g. BOAC is in the list as British Airways. This is because it was one tile a bigger spreadsheet showing all Boeing 707 to 777 manufactured to 2013 and it was necessary to standardise the names of the airlines. Therefore, I had to change the names of some of the airlines to make the summary tile work.

That's how I can see at a glance that to 2013 BOAC/British Airways received:

• 31 Boeing 707s (including the 2 delivered to Cunard Eagle/British Eagle International).
• 71 Boeing 737 Classics
• 92 Boeing 747s
• 50 Boeing 757s
• 28 Boeing 767s
  • and.
• 55 Boeing 777s.

I have another spreadsheet for the Douglas DC-8 to McDonnell Douglas MD-11, but I can't combine my list of DC-8 orders with the above because some of the names of the airlines are different.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

EDIT 18.02.25 - SEE THE REVISED COMBINED LIST IN MESSAGE 53

This is the Combined List.


​

The DC-8s came from Appendix B "Production Details and Douglas Serial Numbers" in the Putnams on McDonnell Douglas aircraft. However, my transcript of it may not be 100% accurate which is why I intend to spend some more time in spreadsheet hell creating a new one.

The table doesn't show that a handful of airlines ordered both aircraft due to the information being arranged in descending order of quantity. The airlines concerned were:

• Airliift International (USA) - 3 Boeing 707s and 9 DC-8s - Total 12.
• Eastern Air Lines (USA) - 15 Boeing 707s and 39 DC-8s - Total 54.
• Flying Tiger Line (USA) - 4 Boeing 707s and 19 DC-8s - Total 23.
• Pan American World Airways (USA) - 126 Boeing 707s and 19 DC-8s - Total 145.

Union Aéromaritime de Transport (UAT) seems to be the Gallic equivalent of British Caledonian. It was created in the 1960s by the merger of two airlines in the 1960s and looks to have been the French Republic's "Third Force" airline. UAT and its predecessors (Transports Aériens Intercontinentaux (TAI) and Union Aéromaritime de Transport (UAT)) ordered 10 DC-8s between them, but they are shown separately in the table.

The 10 DC-8s ordered by Panagra include 5 that were delivered after it merged with Braniff, which ordered 2 to its own account, for a total of 12 DC-8s.

 

[Rule of cool]

Thanks @NOMISYRRUC . That's a long list and surely there's scope for the Super 200 to pick up a few of those sales, as it would be the most capacious Trans-Atlantic airliner in the world.

• Airliift International (USA) - 3 Boeing 707s and 9 DC-8s - Total 12.
• Eastern Air Lines (USA) - 15 Boeing 707s and 39 DC-8s - Total 54.
• Flying Tiger Line (USA) - 4 Boeing 707s and 19 DC-8s - Total 23.
• Pan American World Airways (USA) - 126 Boeing 707s and 19 DC-8s - Total 145.

This is interesting, these airlines might well decide that the VC10 Super 200's characteristics are more suitable than the 'small' fleet.

 

[gral_rj]

The DC-8s came from Appendix B "Production Details and Douglas Serial Numbers" in the Putnams on McDonnell Douglas aircraft. However, my transcript of it may not be 100% accurate which is why I intend to spend some more time in spreadsheet hell creating a new one.​

Found one mistake: Panair do Brasil bought 3 DC-8s, not 2(those would later be part of VARIG's fleet after Panair's forced bankruptcy in 1965).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Found one mistake: Panair do Brasil bought 3 DC-8s, not 2 (those would later be part of VARIG's fleet after Panair's forced bankruptcy in 1965).

I've spent a considerable amount of time reading the source document three times and there are 2 sales to Panair do Brasil (not 3) and no sales to VARIG.

The source document contains the following.

1. Factory serial numbers (s/ns).
2. Aircraft model.
3. Original customer.
4. Original military serial numbers or civil registrations.
5. Number of aircraft in each batch of factory serial numbers.

And in that order.

The 2 aircraft for Panair do Brasil were DC-8-33s with the factory serial numbers 45272 & 45273 and were the 21st and 22nd DC-8s built after the prototype and the 19 built for Pan Am.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 46.

The DC-8s came from Appendix B "Production Details and Douglas Serial Numbers" in the Putnams on McDonnell Douglas aircraft. However, my transcript of it may not be 100% accurate which is why I intend to spend some more time in spreadsheet hell creating a new one.

Found one mistake: Panair do Brasil bought 3 DC-8s, not 2 (those would later be part of VARIG's fleet after Panair's forced bankruptcy in 1965).

Part of Message 49.

I've spent a considerable amount of time reading the source document three times and there are 2 sales to Panair do Brasil (not 3) and no sales to VARIG.

I've been through it four times now which has taken most of the afternoon.

Therefore, I can write (with some confidence) that of the 556 DC-8s delivered 1959-72 to 41 original customers in the table in Message 46 there was a grand total of 2 aircraft delivered to the wrong airline.

That is.

• 105 DC-8's delivered to United Airlines instead of 103.
  • And.
• 17 DC-8s delivered to the Flying Tiger Line instead of 19.

 

[Rule of cool]

I can see why people bang on about these British airlines breaking into the US market, 4 airlines alone bought about 500 B707/DC8 and there's daylight between them and 5th place.

FWIW I imagined the Super 200 picking up a couple of those double-digit buys and padding those out with the single digit buys that were historically proposed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 46.

The DC-8s came from Appendix B "Production Details and Douglas Serial Numbers" in the Putnams on McDonnell Douglas aircraft. However, my transcript of it may not be 100% accurate which is why I intend to spend some more time in spreadsheet hell creating a new one.

Found one mistake: Panair do Brasil bought 3 DC-8s, not 2(those would later be part of VARIG's fleet after Panair's forced bankruptcy in 1965).

Part of Message 49.

I've spent a considerable amount of time reading the source document three times and there are 2 sales to Panair do Brasil (not 3) and no sales to VARIG.

@gra;-rj: according to what I've seen on the Internet Panair do Brasil owned 4 DC-8s not 3. The fourth aircraft crashed in 1962.

From: https://www.baaa-acro.com/operator/panair-do-brasil

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-33 in Rio de Janeiro: 15 killed. Date & Time: Aug 20, 1962 at 2208 LT. Type of aircraft: Douglas DC-8. Operator: Registration: PP-PDT.

PP-PDT happens to be the original registration of Factory Serial Number 45273 the second (of two) DC-8s built for Panair do Brasil and the 22nd DC-8 built after the prototype and the 19 built for Pan Am.

As the reference book about Douglas aircraft says Panair do Brazil received 2 new DC-8s, the other 2 must have been second-hand aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the Revised Combined List.
1,010 Boeing 707s + 556 Douglas DC-8s = 1,566

​

However, the only differences between this list and the lists in Messages 45 and 46 are:

• 105 United Air Lines, not 103 (in Message 46).
• 31 British Airways (at the time BOAC) not 29 (in Message 45) because I've included the 2 delivered to Eagle Cunard/British Eagle International Airways that BOAC acquired. See Message 29 for the full story.
• 17 Flying Tiger Line, not 19 (in Message 46).

Convair built 102 CV.880 & 990s and BAC built 54 VC.10s. Add them to the 1,566 Boeing 707s & DC-8s in the above list and there is a market for 1,722 aircraft in this class.

 

[Rule of cool]

Surely there's some eriggle room in there if the VC10 got the full 28' stretch, 212 sears and 5000+ miles range.

 

[alertken]

So, what is it about A320 that has enabled it to match 737 sales, A330 to do well v 777, A350 v 787? Where CV880/990, Mercure, VC10s, Tridents, and, less drastically, BAC 1-11s did not. Yet Fokker came from empty nothingness in 1957 to win as Launch Customer a BEAC Associate who rejected the HP product. Fokker then caused it to be licence-built in US, where few remembered they had done that before.

Well, obvs it is lifetime value as a business asset. That has such attributes as Product Support: Boeing on Stratocruiser was just as bad as others, but was bludgeoned by PanAm before they launched 707-100: so was Airbus before Eastern bought A300B. But it rests on reliability (largely driven by maintenance) and by other operating costs of lifting metal into the sky. Is anyone here savvy enough to divide Super VC10 tare by a "typical" seating config, to produce a weight per bum-on-seat; then compare that with 707-320B?

RoC here hopes VC10 Super Duper 200 would have competitive operating cost. One Fresci published a rant against UK Ministers for funding A300, not BAC 2-11. But.. if as I posit, Brit designers built...traditionally (=brick dunnies), then why would those later BAC schemes produce lower seat-mile costs than their predecessors', and lower than competitors'?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 46.

The DC-8s came from Appendix B "Production Details and Douglas Serial Numbers" in the Putnams on McDonnell Douglas aircraft. However, my transcript of it may not be 100% accurate which is why I intend to spend some more time in spreadsheet hell creating a new one.

Found one mistake: Panair do Brasil bought 3 DC-8s, not 2(those would later be part of VARIG's fleet after Panair's forced bankruptcy in 1965).

Part of Message 49.

I've spent a considerable amount of time reading the source document three times and there are 2 sales to Panair do Brasil (not 3) and no sales to VARIG.

@gral_rj these are the four (not three) DC-8s operated by Panair do Brasil, of which: two were new; one was second-hand, and; one was leased.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45253
Model: DC-8-33
Original Registration: N800PA
First Flight: 20.02.59
Delivered: 02.06.61 to Pan American World Airways, who named it Clipper Flying Cloud.

• It was delivered to Panair do Brasil on 29.09.62, who named it Garcia D’Avila and it was re-registered PP-PEA.
• It may have been acquired by Panair do Brasil to replace s/n 45273 which was written off on 20.08.62.
• It was acquired by VARIG in July 1965 (still as PP-PEA) and it was written off on 05.03.67 at Monrovia, Liberia.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45271
Model: DC-8-33 (but was converted to a DC-8-33F by Charlotte Aircraft Corporation in September 1974)
Original Registration: N818PA
First Flight: don’t know
Delivered: 22.12.60 to Pan American World Airways, who named it Jet Clipper Rambler.

• It was delivered to Panair do Brasil on 13.11.63, who named it Bras Cubas and it was re-registered PP-PEF.
• I think that it was leased rather than sold to Panair do Brasil, because it was returned to Pan Am on 09.09.65 as NP818PA its original registration.
• S/N 45273 was also named Bras Cubas and it may have been acquired to replace that aircraft.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45272
Model: DC-8-33 (but was converted to a DC-8-33F by Charlotte Aircraft Corporation in the 1980s)
Original Registration: PP-PDS
First Flight: don't know
Delivered: 21.03.61 to Panair do Brasil as Manuel to Borba Gato

• It was acquired by VARIG in July 1965 (still as PP-PDS) who sold it to American Jet Industries on 15.02.78.

Factory serial number (s/n): 45273
Model: DC-8-33
Original Registration: PP-PDT
First flight: don’t know
Delivered: 21.03.61 to Panair do Brasil, who named it Bras Cubas.

• It was written off on 20.08.62 when it crashed on take-off. See Message 52 for more details.
• S/N 45271 was also named Bras Cubas and it may have been leased to replace this aircraft.

 

[gral_rj]

@gral_rj these are the four (not three) DC-8s operated by Panair do Brasil, of which: two were new; one was second-hand, and; one was leased.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45253
Model: DC-8-33
Original Registration: N800PA
First Flight: 20.02.59
Delivered: 02.06.61 to Pan American World Airways, who named it Clipper Flying Cloud.

• It was delivered to Panair do Brasil on 29.09.62, who named it Garcia D’Avila and it was re-registered PP-PEA.
• It may have been acquired by Panair do Brasil to replace s/n 45273 which was written off on 20.08.62.
• It was acquired by VARIG in July 1965 (still as PP-PEA) and it was written off on 05.03.67 at Monrovia, Liberia.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45271
Model: DC-8-33 (but was converted to a DC-8-33F by Charlotte Aircraft Corporation in September 1974)
Original Registration: N818PA
First Flight: don’t know
Delivered: 22.12.60 to Pan American World Airways, who named it Jet Clipper Rambler.

• It was delivered to Panair do Brasil on 13.11.63, who named it Bras Cubas and it was re-registered PP-PEF.
• I think that it was leased rather than sold to Panair do Brasil, because it was returned to Pan Am on 09.09.65 as NP818PA its original registration.
• S/N 45273 was also named Bras Cubas and it may have been acquired to replace that aircraft.

Factory Serial Number (s/n): 45272
Model: DC-8-33 (but was converted to a DC-8-33F by Charlotte Aircraft Corporation in the 1980s)
Original Registration: PP-PDS
First Flight: don't know
Delivered: 21.03.61 to Panair do Brasil as Manuel to Borba Gato

• It was acquired by VARIG in July 1965 (still as PP-PDS) who sold it to American Jet Industries on 15.02.78.

Factory serial number (s/n): 45273
Model: DC-8-33
Original Registration: PP-PDT
First flight: don’t know
Delivered: 21.03.61 to Panair do Brasil, who named it Bras Cubas.

• It was written off on 20.08.62 when it crashed on take-off. See Message 52 for more details.
• S/N 45271 was also named Bras Cubas and it may have been leased to replace this aircraft.

I had forgotten about he one that crashed(also, I thought all of them were new). I stand corrected.

 

[Caravellarella]

I'm trying to see how Panair do Brasil would be a viable customer for the Super VC10 200; the airline was often on a "struggle-bus". Of their four DC-8s, one was written off, of their four Caravelles, one was bent beyond repair during collision-avoidance aerobatics, they couldn't afford to buy a fleet of DC-6As and had to lease them from Loide, the rest of their fleet consisted of four DC-7Cs (using the deposits for their undelivered Comet 2s) and several very old Constellations. They struggled for years to meet their scheduled routes until their politically-motivated demise. Their longest route segment was Rio de Janeiro to Dakar and then stops all along the way to London and Beirut. Interestingly Panair do Brasil was the first customer to take options on the Super Caravelle SST design project, but I wonder why Panair do Brasil would need a 212-seat 5,000 mile range jet airliner?

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Archibald]

Panned do Brasil LMAO. Internationally pannaid.

 

[Rule of cool]

Is anyone here savvy enough to divide Super VC10 tare by a "typical" seating config, to produce a weight per bum-on-seat; then compare that with 707-320B?

RoC here hopes VC10 Super Duper 200 would have competitive operating cost.

@ArtosStark crunched the numbers in another forum a few years ago.

The baseline was:
Sir Giles Guthrie of BOAC cancelled the order for 30 x VC-10's as they weren't economical as the 707. In a memo from Vicker's themselves, the seat cost per miles was £4.24 compared to the 707's £4.10 and when this memo was leaked many airlines cancelled their orders.

ArtosStark's working was:
In calculating a cost per seat mile there are three variables:
The distance in miles
The cost of running the aircraft
The number of seats

Since we are comparing aircraft on the same route the miles remain constant, and can be ignored. If, as you say, the absolute cost of running the aircraft is the same for the Super 200 as the other versions then the only variable remaining is the number of seats that cost is divided across.

Since we don’t know if the cost of 4.24 per seat mile refers to the VC10 of 151 seats or the Super VC10 of 174 seats, we should calculate both.

The Super 200 has 40% more seats than the VC10 (212/151 = 1.40) and 22% more seats than the Super VC10 (212/174 = 1.22). Thus if the 4.24 per seat mile referred to the VC10 then the Super 200 should have a cost of 3.02 per seat mile (4.24/1.40 = 3.02). If, instead, the 4.24 per seat mile refers to the Super VC10 the Super 200 should have a cost of 3.48 per seat mile (4.24/1.22 = 3.48).

Now I suspect that the absolute cost of running the Super 200 will be somewhat larger than that of running the VC10 or Super VC10. But as long as it is not more than 40% more expensive than the VC10 or 22% more expensive than the Super VC10 it will still be cheaper to run the Super 200 on a per seat mile basis.

This is why I believe the VC10 Super 200 is a viable commercial aircraft but the historical Super VC10 isn't. I also agree that the Super 200 will be more expensive to run than the historical VC10 and Super, but not so much that it will still be more economical than the B707 it was compared to.

FWIW Giles Guthrie was chair of BOAC from 1/1/1964, so after the 1963 mandate for BOAC to be profitable and several years after BOSCs demand to limit the VC10 stretch to 13'.

 

[Rule of cool]

We've pored over the VC10s shortcomings and linked those to the lack of sales, but what about the Trident? Why didn't it get another 100 sales? Was it because of the early design revisions, or was it fundamentally uneconomic to operate? Would retaining the original size and Edways have resulted in a better product able to generate more sales? Would a fat military buy, maybe instead of the Nimrod, help with sales prospects?

 

[Caravellarella]

We've pored over the VC10s shortcomings and linked those to the lack of sales, but what about the Trident? Why didn't it get another 100 sales? Was it because of the early design revisions, or was it fundamentally uneconomic to operate? Would retaining the original size and Edways have resulted in a better product able to generate more sales? Would a fat military buy, maybe instead of the Nimrod, help with sales prospects?

I've never seen any evidence that any other airline attempted to order the original Airco Trident, other than BEA of course. Certainly none of the major USA domestic carriers expressed any interest; perhaps if Airco had offered the original Trident design with the JT8D engine?

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Caravellarella]

Getting back to the Super VC10 200; do we know of any attempt to sell this variant to another airline (apart from a submission/presentation to Pan American World Airways)?

B.O.A.C didn't want the Super VC10 200: that is obvious. B.O.A.C didn't seem to care too much for the standard VC10 and the Super VC10 either.

Perhaps in 1960, 212 seats was to big a leap in capacity for service in 1964/65? The comparable capacity DC-8-61 arrived later in early 1967 for USA domestic carriers (which were already DC-8 operators) to add an easy capacity increase on prime transcontinental and other long range routes. The DC-8-63 offered the same capacity in mid 1968 for some international carriers (which were already DC-8 operators) and the DC-8-63CF arrived in time for the supplemental carriers to contribute to the trans-pacific airlift required for the Vietnam War.

Pan American didn't order any of the stretched DC-8s (although they did lease a single DC-8-62 from Braniff International on an interchange service to South America) and Pan American never ordered anything bigger than a 707-321B(H) until the Boeing 747 arrived. I wonder if Pan American thought the Super VC10 200 was too large when offered in 1960/61?

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

I've never seen any evidence that any other airline attempted to order the original Airco Trident, other than BEA of course. Certainly none of the major USA domestic carriers expressed any interest; perhaps if Airco had offered the original Trident design with the JT8D engine?

Terry (Caravellarella)

I don't think so, however in a period when BEA was there to provide a public service and nations strongly supported their own national industries to ensure full employment the original Trident order of 24 + 12 was the 2nd largest in the history of British civil aviation.

The problem as I see it is that BEA demanded the shrinking of the DH design, over BHs and the MoSs objections, so the Spey was locked in then growing the aircraft again so it was under-powered. I don't know if this impacted commercial sales, although IIUC it did eat into range pretty drastically, but it certainly hurt the chances of winning the MPA competition.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth this is what Charles Gardner wrote about the economics of the VC.10.

• In the event, as the aviation world knows, the VC.10’s success in service was immediate and sustained. The passengers loved it, and, at the end of July 1964, the passenger load factors on the West African routes were averaging 80 per cent. There were many authenticated case of passengers, unable to book on a desired VC.10 service, waiting days for a seat rather than fly in another aeroplane. In 1967, BOAC was still reporting in Sydney that the VC.10 was more than balancing its higher operating costs than the 707 by its consistently higher load factors.
• The success story of the Super VC.10 on the North Atlantic was equally dramatic. In its first year, 1965, the Super achieved a load factor nearly 20 per cent higher than the average of fourteen other IATA operators on the North Atlantic.
  • The Figures were:
    • 71.60 per cent - Super VC.10;
    • 60.80 per cent - average BOAC;
    • 52.14 per cent – average of fourteen airlines (excluding BOAC).
• BOAC’s B.707 figures were inflated by spill-over from fully booked Super VC.10s, and it also now emerged that the Super VC.10 need only an extra one or two passengers over the 707 to break even.
• Technically, all VC.10s gave an excellent account of themselves, and BOAC reported (1972-73) that the Super VC.10s were averaging 11.09 hours per day against the 707s 8.7 hours - and that the operating costs per revenue flying hour were: Super VC.10, £486, and B.707, £510.
• So the Super VC.10 – denigrated in advance by BOAC as “too expensive to operate economically” and for which reason they received £30 million in subsidy in recompense – turned out to be actually cheaper to fly than the 707 and also to attract more passengers.
• With a 60,000-hour airframe life, the rugged VC.10 was still firmly holding its place in the affection of the travelling public when BAC was nationalised, thirteen years after the VC.10's first introduction into service.
• [BAC was nationalised in 1977 so the thirteen years are 1964-77.]
• The saddest part of the story is that, when the VC.10 had good chances of export sales, notably to Middle East Airlines, BOAC were most reluctant to produce some operating data to support the BAC sales case. Indeed, they gave foreign operators the distinct impression that the aircraft was a money-loser when the contrary was the case. Nor did BOAC, reveal the large sums they had to pay for structural modifications to their fleet ob Boeing 707s. It is unwise to impute motives, but undoubtedly BOAC had, as they say, “egg on their face” over the anti-VC.10 campaign, and they also had obtained a £30 million “operating loss” subsidy whose validity could, perhaps, be called into question if the truth officially became known.
• It is true that, at the start, the Standard and Super VC.10 were a little more expensive to operate than the 707s – but this was more than offset by the passenger attraction of the aircraft. As Aircraft Engineering pointed out, such attraction “cannot be reflected in conventional technical evaluation methods and cost formulae . . . comparisons with other jets are incongruous unless full account is taken of such [passenger appeal] factors”.

However, as Mandy Rice-Davies once said, “Well he would, wouldn't he?”, because he wrote the history of the British Aircraft Corporation, which is the source of the above information.

 

[Rule of cool]

Getting back to the Super VC10 200; do we know of any attempt to sell this variant to another airline (apart from a submission/presentation to Pan American World Airways)?

B.O.A.C didn't want the Super VC10 200: that is obvious. B.O.A.C didn't seem to care too much for the standard VC10 and the Super VC10 either.

Perhaps in 1960, 212 seats was to big a leap in capacity for service in 1964/65? The comparable capacity DC-8-61 arrived later in early 1967 for USA domestic carriers (which were already DC-8 operators) to add an easy capacity increase on prime transcontinental and other long range routes. The DC-8-63 offered the same capacity in mid 1968 for some international carriers (which were already DC-8 operators) and the DC-8-63CF arrived in time for the supplemental carriers to contribute to the trans-pacific airlift required for the Vietnam War.

Pan American didn't order any of the stretched DC-8s (although they did lease a single DC-8-62 from Braniff International on an interchange service to South America) and Pan American never ordered anything bigger than a 707-321B(H) until the Boeing 747 arrived. I wonder if Pan American thought the Super VC10 200 was too large when offered in 1960/61?

Terry (Caravellarella)

I doubt any airline looked at the Super 200 seriously, BOAC knocked it over the head during a temporary slow growth period in the late 50s. The 1958 BOAC VC10 order of 35 + 20 was the largest civil aviation order in British history, it was a major reason behind industry consolidation. BOAC forced the small Super VC10 in about 1960 then whinged 4 years later when it wasn't as economical as it could have been.

 

[Hood]

• BOAC’s B.707 figures were inflated by spill-over from fully booked Super VC.10s, and it also now emerged that the Super VC.10 need only an extra one or two passengers over the 707 to break even.
• Technically, all VC.10s gave an excellent account of themselves, and BOAC reported (1972-73) that the Super VC.10s were averaging 11.09 hours per day against the 707s 8.7 hours - and that the operating costs per revenue flying hour were: Super VC.10, £486, and B.707, £510.
• So the Super VC.10 – denigrated in advance by BOAC as “too expensive to operate economically” and for which reason they received £30 million in subsidy in recompense – turned out to be actually cheaper to fly than the 707 and also to attract more passengers.

So it all boils down to whose economists we believe. BOAC's bean counters Vs BAC's bean counters/marketing department.
Someone somewhere obviously did their sums wrong.

There were many authenticated case of passengers, unable to book on a desired VC.10 service, waiting days for a seat rather than fly in another aeroplane.

A somewhat different market from today choices are Spamcan A or Spamcan B and no-one but ardent plane spotters have a clue which they are flying on.

The interesting fact is that the investment in the Airbus A320 (which was by no means certain from the Thatcher government) has reaped a dividend that has repaid the cost of every commercial subsidy previously applied to building airliners, and then some!
So in a sense just keeping in the game eventually paid off, it took 60 years but better late than never.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 65.

• BOAC’s B.707 figures were inflated by spill-over from fully booked Super VC.10s, and it also now emerged that the Super VC.10 need only an extra one or two passengers over the 707 to break even.
• Technically, all VC.10s gave an excellent account of themselves, and BOAC reported (1972-73) that the Super VC.10s were averaging 11.09 hours per day against the 707s 8.7 hours - and that the operating costs per revenue flying hour were: Super VC.10, £486, and B.707, £510.
• So the Super VC.10 – denigrated in advance by BOAC as “too expensive to operate economically” and for which reason they received £30 million in subsidy in recompense – turned out to be actually cheaper to fly than the 707 and also to attract more passengers.

Part of Message 67.

So it all boils down to whose economists we believe. BOAC's bean counters Vs BAC's bean counters/marketing department.
Someone somewhere obviously did their sums wrong.

For what it's worth, the above was a BAC bean counter/marketing man quoting BOAC's bean counters.

In my capacity as a third-party bean counter.

• A VC.10 was 4.71% cheaper to run than a B.707.
  • And.
• A B.707 was 4.94% more expensive to run than a VC.10.

That is according to the information provided by a BAC bean counter who claims that the information came from BOAC's bean counters.

Another part of Message 65.

There were many authenticated case of passengers, unable to book on a desired VC.10 service, waiting days for a seat rather than fly in another aeroplane.

Another part of Message 67.

A somewhat different market from today choices are Spamcan A or Spamcan B and no-one but ardent plane spotters have a clue which they are flying on.

Was the VC.10 really a nicer aircraft to fly in? Is there anyone here who's been a passenger in both? As far as I can tell the only advantage the VC.10 had over the Boeing 707 is that having the engines at the back rather than on the wings may have made it quieter for the passengers.

My cynical side makes me think that the real reason for the above and for the VC.10,s much higher load factors was patriotism. The management of BOAC may have put profit before patriotism, but the Man on the Clapham Omnibus did differently. "I'm backing Britain!"

The interesting fact is that the investment in the Airbus A320 (which was by no means certain from the Thatcher government) has reaped a dividend that has repaid the cost of every commercial subsidy previously applied to building airliners, and then some!
So in a sense just keeping in the game eventually paid off, it took 60 years but better late than never.

"If at first you don't succeed, try, try again."

Unfortunately, there have been more than a few examples of "If at first you don't succeed, give up", and worse "If at first you don't succeed, try again, and then give up".

Or put another way there were too many times when they gave up too soon and too many times when they gave up too late. But, as Robert Evans said about the movie business, "Nobody knows".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

My cynical side makes me think that the real reason for the above and for the VC.10,s much higher load factors was patriotism. The management of BOAC may have put profit before patriotism, but the Man on the Clapham Omnibus did differently. "I'm backing Britain!"

I couldn't find the relevant clip of "Carry on up the Khyber". The best I can do is this.

​

"Of course, they're all completely mad, you know!"​

Those lines were said by Peter Butterworth, which is a tenuous link to what @Hood wrote about the UK finally getting it right with the Airbus A320. Said tenuous link is that he was married to Scottish actress, comedian and impressionist Janet Brown who was well known in Britain in the 1970s and 80s for impersonating Mrs Thatcher on the television. She may be better known outside Britain for playing "Mrs T" in the James Bond film "For Your Eyes Only" and in the US for her part in the practical joke the Johnny Carson played on Joan Rivers.

 

[Caravellarella]

I wonder if there are any cases of airlines (other than B.O.A.C) which operated both the 707 and the VC10 at the same time and which made proper comparison of the actual operating costs?

M.E.A - Air Liban - leased two VC10s, bought a fleet of second-hand 720-023Bs & bought four new 707-3B4Cs.

Nigeria Airways Ltd - leased one VC10 & bought one second-hand VC10, bought three new 707-3F9Cs.

East African Airways Corporation - bought five new Super VC10s, leased one second-hand 707-323C for charter/freight/supplemental services.

I wouldn't pay too much attention to either BAC's or B.O.A.C's analysis of 707-versus-VC10/SuperVC10 operating costs; both would obviously promote their own agendas in this regard.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Caravellarella]

Panned do Brasil LMAO. Internationally panned.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I wouldn't pay too much attention to either BAC's or B.O.A.C's analysis of 707-versus-VC10/SuperVC10 operating costs; both would obviously promote their own agendas in this regard.

For what it's worth the figures I quoted were BOAC's not BAC's. However, the author may have only used the BOAC statistics that supported BAC's case and not quoted the BOAC statistics that didn't.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I wonder if there are any cases of airlines (other than B.O.A.C) which operated both the 707 and the VC10 at the same time and which made proper comparison of the actual operating costs?

FWIW another was British Caledonian which inherited VC.10s form BUA and Boeing 707-320s from Caledonian Airways.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8y1CANyq-k
​

 

[Rule of cool]

if as I posit, Brit designers built...traditionally (=brick dunnies),

You've said this a few times, would you care to elaborate?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

THE BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Npn7QMxwZNY


VERSUS

YORKSHIRE AIRLINES

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rm6VC5gdaFA
​

 

[Caravellarella]

You've said this a few times, would you care to elaborate?

There's a full set of posts elsewhere on this site. alertken confirms that the VC10 design was overweight, compromised and overdesigned for airline service because it was intended to also be a Skybolt ALBM carrier. Similarly the V.1000/VC-7 was overweight and overdesigned because it was intended to be a military transport with exceptional short-field abilities.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc-10-projects.8819/

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc-7-and-v-1000.1067/

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc10-aew-pofflers-and-other-unbuilt-variants.5553/#post-120186

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

There's a full set of posts elsewhere on this site. alertken confirms that the VC10 design was overweight, compromised and overdesigned for airline service because it was intended to also be a Skybolt ALBM carrier. Similarly the V.1000/VC-7 was overweight and overdesigned because it was intended to be a military transport with exceptional short-field abilities.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc-10-projects.8819/

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc-7-and-v-1000.1067/

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vickers-vc10-aew-pofflers-and-other-unbuilt-variants.5553/#post-120186

Terry (Caravellarella)

Sure, but IIUC the Super 200 was Vickers attempt at getting the most paying passengers from the overly powerful engine and highly efficient wing combo. That a design originally slated to have 151 seats could be stretched to accommodate 212 seat shows how overbuilt the original was, however in my mind getting the full stretch would right-size the basic design for commercial operation. Granted this is the tail wagging the dog; reverse engineering an overbuilt hot-and-high aircraft into an economical airliner, but who cares how you get there is the result is satisfactory.

In contrast the BAC 1-11 sold well (in European terms) even on the US market, presumably because it was designed around what BAC thought would sell rather than niche BOAC requirements.

As for the Trident, I don't know if it was overbuilt as much as underpowered as a result of the Spey downsize then re-growth and would have been fine with Medways.

 

[Caravellarella]

Sure, but IIUC the Super 200 was Vickers attempt at getting the most paying passengers from the overly powerful engine and highly efficient wing combo. That a design originally slated to have 151 seats could be stretched to accommodate 212 seat shows how overbuilt the original was, however in my mind getting the full stretch would right-size the basic design for commercial operation. Granted this is the tail wagging the dog; reverse engineering an overbuilt hot-and-high aircraft into an economical airliner, but who cares how you get there is the result is satisfactory.

In contrast the BAC 1-11 sold well (in European terms) even on the US market, presumably because it was designed around what BAC thought would sell rather than niche BOAC requirements.

As for the Trident, I don't know if it was overbuilt as much as underpowered as a result of the Spey downsize then re-growth and would have been fine with Medways.

Perhaps. I would posit that the Super VC10 200 was just too much aeroplane in 1960 for 1964/65 service.

The BAC 1-11 had a non-Vickers origin as the Hunting 107 and wasn't designed to meet a state-owned airline specification; if anything, the BAC 1-11 was the perfect Viscount replacement at the time and did very well (at the start) as it pre-dated it's competitors by 2 years at the time.

The Trident could not compete with the Boeing 727 as it was (initially) tailored to closely to BEA's very specific requirement to counter the Caravelle on European routes (something the Vanguard could not do). The 727 was larger, more powerful, more versatile, offered some commonality with an existing Boeing product range and had a sparkling performance.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

Perhaps. I would posit that the Super VC10 200 was just too much aeroplane in 1960 for 1964/65 service.

BOAC thought that but Vickers/BAC didn't, in my mind it's a flip of the coin in 1960 and might have gone either way. However, but given the way things actually panned out I can't help but think Vickers/BAC was correct and if the decision had gone their way even BOAC would have been better off by the time Super 200 entered service in 1965-66.

The BAC 1-11 had a non-Vickers origin as the Hunting 107 and wasn't designed to meet a state-owned airline specification; if anything, the BAC 1-11 was the perfect Viscount replacement at the time and did very well (at the start) as it pre-dated it's competitors by 2 years at the time.

Yes, I refer to it as evidence that the British aviation industry could produce a commercially successful airliner and underperformance of the VC10 and Trident isn't indicative of an intrinsic inability of British industry to produce reasonable airliners.

Bear in mind that I'm using European standards of success for airliners, not American ones. 240+ units (Caravelle, BAC 1-11, Fokker F28) constitutes success in the European context but 250 units (Lockheed Tristar) counts as failure in the US.

The Trident could not compete with the Boeing 727 as it was (initially) tailored to closely to BEA's very specific requirement to counter the Caravelle on European routes (something the Vanguard could not do). The 727 was larger, more powerful, more versatile, offered some commonality with an existing Boeing product range and had a sparkling performance.

Trans Australian Airlines, one of the 2 heavily regulated airlines in Australia in the 60s/70s, considered the tridents operationally superior to the B727 but chose the B727 because it was chained to the earlier Ansett B727 buy. That make me think that the Trident wasn't an irredeemable loss, that picking up a few more sales, especially if it had the better performance the Medway would offer, isn't too much of a stretch.

After all that I still think the path to 'success' for the VC10 Super 200 and Medway Trident would lie through the more or less captive domestic markets: BOAC getting the 12 extra VC10s instead of the 2nd batch of B707s and the RAF selecting Medway Trident instead of the Comet for the 49 Nimrods. This might be seen a 'cheating' but Boeing's B707 certainly benefitted from massive the USAF C135 buy.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 2.

The unknown here is whether US airlines would have ordered either type as they did the Viscount and 111.

FWIW 88 Viscounts were bought by 3 American airlines. They were Northeast Airlines (10), Continental Airlines (15), Capital Airlines (63) and represented about 20% of the 444 Viscounts that were built. Another 5 were bought by Standard Oil (1), Union Carbide (1) and US Steel (3).

My analysis of the 444 Viscounts that were built is.

• Capital Airlines bought the second largest number of Viscounts, between BEA (71) and TCA (now Air Canada) (51).
  • That's a total of 185 and is about 40% of the 444 Viscounts that were built.
• Fourth was Trans-Australian Airlines (TAA) with 16.
  • TAA was one of 5 airlines that bought 11-16 aircraft for a total of 66 Viscount or about 15% of the total.
• 14 customers bought 6-10 aircraft for a total of 106 Viscounts, which is about a quarter of the 444 that were built.
• 30 customers bought 1-5 aircraft for a total of 87.
• Which leaves the 4 prototypes.

A regional analysis of the number sold and who bought them reveals the following:

• 124 aircraft (28%) were sold to 17 customers (32%) in the Commonwealth.
• 108 aircraft (24%) to 9 customers (17%) in the British Isles.
  • That includes the 4 prototypes and 12 Viscounts sold to Aer Lingus.
• 93 aircraft (21%) were sold to 6 customers (11%) in the United States.
• 59 aircraft (13%) were sold to 7 customers (13%) in Europe.
• 39 aircraft (9%) were sold to 7 customers (13%) in Asia.
  • And.
• 21 aircraft (5%) were sold to 7 customers (13%) in Latin America.