WI Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 4.

The rear engined VC10 can never compete with podded alternatives for ease or maintenance and engine safety. Even BAC was looking at podded versions of the type.

Rear mounted engines didn't stop Douglas selling 2,422 DC-9s, Boeing selling 1,832 B.727s, BAC-selling 244 One-Elevens and even Hawker Siddeley selling 117 Spey-Tridents for a grand total of 4,615 loss making death-traps.

I can see how easier access may make podded engines under the wing easier to maintain than rear mounted engines. I don't understand how it makes them safer. In any case 4,615 airliners with rear-mounted engines wouldn't have been sold if they were harder to maintain and less safe than airliners with podded engines under the wing.

FWIW podded engines weren't an option for the VC.10, which needed clean wings to meet the short-field requirements for the standard version.

If rear mounted engines were that bad why did Douglas have them on the DC-9 in the first place? Why didn't they redesign it with podded engines when Boeing announced the 737? According to you America's aircraft manufacturers were as brilliant as Britain's aircraft manufacturers were stupid. They must have known something that you don't.

If rear mounted engines were so bad, why did the proposed BAC.211 and 311 have them? BAC's designers should have learned how not to do it from the BAC.111 and VC.10. Oh I forgot. They were morons. A British aircraft designer wouldn't recognise a good aircraft design if a model of it was dangled right in front his eyes while one American aircraft designer shouted "that's a good aircraft design!" in into his right ear and another American aircraft designer shouted "that's a good aircraft design!" into his left ear!

EDIT: I forgot about the 282 rear-engined Sud Caravelles, which increase the grand total to 4,897 loss making death-rtaps.

 

[ArtosStark]

Making a profit wasn't part of Imperial Airways remit when HMG created in 1924 by encouraging the existing British airlines to merge

AIUI, making a profit was very much part of IA’s DNA in 1924. Which was part of the reason it struggled. British government sympathy would not allow for a state owned flag carrier airline in 1924 so IA was set up as a private monopoly with a public subsidy. Which meant it payed dividends to its investors funded out of taxpayer funds. This situation was intended to last only ten years after which it was assumed (highly incorrectly) that IA would then be profitable.

However, the prospectus allowed for a 10 percent dividend to investors with any further profits to be split between further development, further dividend and, most interestingly, repayment of subsidy to the government. Meaning that if IA had been as success as intended the government funds would have been a loan, rather than a subsidy.

In any case, the desire to make a profit to cover dividend responsibilities and repay the government hugely handicapped IA in a period when basically all of its competitors were state funded flag carriers. To reduce costs and try to make the airline profitable, IA almost invariably delayed the introduction of new aircraft and restricted the number of new ones purchased as much as possible. This didn’t do the British aircraft industry any favours, often led to loss of passenger routes due to lack of available aircraft and helped contribute to IA’s poor industrial relations.

 

[Archibald]

Part of Post 4.

Rear mounted engines didn't stop Douglas selling 2,422 DC-9s, Boeing selling 1,832 B.727s, BAC-selling 244 One-Elevens and even Hawker Siddeley selling 117 Spey-Tridents for a grand total of 4,615 loss making death-traps.

I can see how easier access may make podded engines under the wing easier to maintain than rear mounted engines. I don't understand how it makes them safer. In any case 4,615 airliners with rear-mounted engines wouldn't have been sold if they were harder to maintain and less safe than airliners with podded engines under the wing.

FWIW podded engines weren't an option for the VC.10, which needed clean wings to meet the short-field requirements for the standard version.

If rear mounted engines were that bad why did Douglas have them on the DC-9 in the first place? Why didn't they redesign it with podded engines when Boeing announced the 737? According to you America's aircraft manufacturers were as brilliant as Britain's aircraft manufacturers were stupid. They must have known something that you don't.

If rear mounted engines were so bad, why did the proposed BAC.211 and 311 have them? BAC's designers should have learned how not to do it from the BAC.111 and VC.10. Oh I forgot. They were morons. A British aircraft designer wouldn't recognise a good aircraft design if a model of it was dangled right in front his eyes while one American aircraft designer shouted "that's a good aircraft design!" in into his right ear and another American aircraft designer shouted "that's a good aircraft design!" into his left ear!

You forgot 270 Caravelles, which started the trend.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

You forgot 270 Caravelles, which started the trend.

Ninja'd ya. See the edit. And it's 282 not 270.

 

[alertken]

BOAC had management and/or equity links to actual/prospective VC10 Users EAAC, Ghana, MEAL, Nigerian, inc UK loan/Aid.
Laker/BUA presence was political expediency to curry favour for their efforts to leech off routes developed by BOAC (= taxpayers).
No VC10 was sold to an open market customer.

Until 12/46 UK held equity in Qantas and TEAL (to be ANZ), whose ports included, i.a Singapore, a Design Case for VC10's short-field performance (Paya Lebar was...challenging). Yet neither showed any interest...so: why? QF chose (7 (to be 13)x707-138, bespoke-designed for QF, ordered before VC10 was on offer, but followed by) many 707-338C when it was. Then for decades by anythingbyBoeing.
When ANZ decided to spread their wings afar wef 7/65 they chose DC-8/52 over VC10.

Both these carriers were, are, so widely respected that they are invited to Airbus, Boeing design focus-interest-groups to contribute, such as to cockpit ergonomics. Their Engineering competence was, is, able to keep 'em flying far, far from A.N.OTHER's parts and workshop.
They bought what was best for them: money - upfront, then downstream, but also the overall package of Care. Engineers' notions of excellence, like pilots' perception of feel, fun, are not decisive, even relevant..

 

[Rule of cool]

No VC10 was sold to an open market customer.

That is correct, however as it happened the VC10s standout attributes weren't the ones airlines wanted by 1964, even the stretched Super VC10 fell way short of providing something unique and useful to the open market. This is why I keep banging on about the Super 200, with 212 seats max combined with 5,000+ mile range, as it provides something both unique and useful to the 1965-66 onwards open market.

This doesn't guarantee success, if this thread had taught me anything it's that the US 707/DC8s were a real juggernaut. However, I reiterate that my sights are set pretty low; initially I'd thought triple VC10 production (162 units) would be possible and make the VC10 very successful in European terms but now I'd think anything over double (108 units) would be a considerable success. @NOMISYRRUC analysis of the numbers makes me think that by some combination of real but cancelled orders, proposals that got reasonably far along and wild cards among the 707/DC8 buyers that 108+ units is possible and with the Super 200 unique attributes the possible becomes probable.

 

[Rule of cool]

Rear mounted engines didn't stop Douglas selling 2,422 DC-9s, Boeing selling 1,832 B.727s, BAC-selling 244 One-Elevens and even Hawker Siddeley selling 117 Spey-Tridents for a grand total of 4,615 loss making death-traps.

I can see how easier access may make podded engines under the wing easier to maintain than rear mounted engines.

Death traps.

I think the maintenance aspect is very much overblown. There is no shortage of scaffolding and other lifting equipment at the type of airports big planes like the VC10/707/DEC operate from, and airlines do their scheduled maintenance at their home airports which will have all of that. It's not as if any airline will say they won't buy an otherwise suitable airliner because of the price of a scissor lift and some scaffolding is too high, especially when the high mounted engines are virtually immune to FOD damage.

 

[uk 75]

No large airliner apart from the Il62 followed the VC10 design.
Although the B727 succeeded where Trident failed, its successor the B757 resembled the best Trident variant the HS134.
Both the BAC111 and the DC9 have been replaced by 737s and Airbus 737 lookalikes.
You'll be arguing next that four engines buried in the wing were a great idea.

 

[Rule of cool]

Earlier in the thread I suggested that the RAF bought 45 VC.10 C.1Ks tanker-transports instead of the 14 VC.10 C.1 aircraft of OTL and converting 31 Victor Mk 1s into tankers.

I think you're being a touch ambitious with the RAF tankers, although getting new-build VC10 tankers would be awesome!

6 of the Victor tankers were interim, (2 point) B1Ks thrown together rapidly to cover the sudden grounding of the Valiant fleet in December 1964, I think these would still be needed unless the Valiants were somehow extended. 25 were the more definitive (3 point) K1/K1A, I'd suggest these would be good candidates to be replaced by new-build VC10s. However, the RAF tanker transformation in the 80s is instructive on how this might play out if projected backwards.

The RAF only converted 14 VC10s to pure (3 point) tankers with extra fuel tankage, the 13 C1s were simply fitted with underwing HDUs and otherwise retained their standard fuel capacity (with fin tank), underfloor baggage and main deck seating/cargo. Post Falklands they also fitted 6 Tristars with 2 HDUs in the fuselage, making them single-point tanker/transports, with the 2nd HDU for redundancy rather than refuelling 2 aircraft simultaneously like the VC10 C1K wingtip pods.

I'd think that if the RAF went down the VC10 tanker route, which I think they should have, I think they'd only get about 14 much like they did with the used VC10 they converted. These could in theory carry 86-91 tons of fuel all up, doubling the Victor's 41 tons, which means that fewer aircraft could meet the pure tanker need. If the C1s were also converted to C1Ks in the process that RAF would have an impressive tanker and tanker/transport fleet from the 60s.

 

[Rule of cool]

No large airliner apart from the Il62 followed the VC10 design.
Although the B727 succeeded where Trident failed, its successor the B757 resembled the best Trident variant the HS134.
Both the BAC111 and the DC9 have been replaced by 737s and Airbus 737 lookalikes.
You'll be arguing next that four engines buried in the wing were a great idea.

They are a great idea, it is the least drag-inducing engine installation, which is why fighters don't hang their engines on the wings.

However buried engines have a very limited life span, they only work with turbojets and very low bypass turbofans, once the Conway was freed of the wing root its bypass ratio was doubled. The extra drag of externally mounted engines is an easy trade-off when turbofan bypass ratios exceed 1:1.

IIUC engine maintenance regimes and regulations have developed greatly since the 60s. While it was very handy to have underwing engines in the 60s and 70s when engine changes were common the time on the aircraft has gradually increased as have time between inspections to the point where rear mounted engines aren't really a detriment anymore.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Rear-mounted engines yield a quieter cabin. All the engine noise that isn't conducted by structure is strictly compressor whistle which is much easier to dampen out.

But mounting engines in the rear makes upgrades significantly more expensive because you need to design and install new engine mounts.

 

[ArtosStark]

But mounting engines in the rear makes upgrades significantly more expensive because you need to design and install new engine mounts

How often do you upgrade the engines on a used airframe?

 

[Scott Kenny]

How often do you upgrade the engines on a used airframe?

Every time the regulators increase the noise reduction standards. 727s got Hush Kits in the 1990s to comply with whatever the then-current Stage of noise reduction regulations was.

 

[ArtosStark]

Every time the regulators increase the noise reduction standards. 727s got Hush Kits in the 1990s to comply with whatever the then-current Stage of noise reduction regulations was.

That happen a lot in the 60’s? And did Hush kits lead to a drastic change in engine diameter that would have required a change in mount on a rear engine bird?

 

[Scott Kenny]

That happen a lot in the 60’s? And did Hush kits lead to a drastic change in engine diameter that would have required a change in mount on a rear engine bird?

It did require new engine mounts and skin reinforcements, plus a couple hundred pounds of ballast on the radar bulkhead. Most of the 727 Hush Kit was in a mixer section that added some 4ft to engine length. This was because the center engine was not enlargeable at all, limited by internal structure.

IIRC the MD80/90s got higher bypass engines which also helped their fuel economy.

 

[Caravellarella]

I wonder where the stated 5,000 mile range for the Super VC10 200 comes from; this contemporary advert shows an "over 4,000" mile range which is (probably) adequate for year-round transatlantic operations.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

I wonder where the stated 5,000 mile range for the Super VC10 200 comes from; this contemporary advert shows an "over 4,000" mile range which is (probably) adequate for year-round transatlantic operations.

Terry (Caravellarella)

It's my 'mashup from multiple sources then wound back for practicality' estimate.

BAe says the max range of the Super (with fin tank) was 6,260nm.
VC10.net says max range with max fuel no reserves for the Super was 6,195nm and with full payload no reserves 4,100nm.
Wiki referencing Harrison 1965 and Green 1964 say the range of a Standard was 5,850nm.

All those max range figures look awesome, but the real one to look at is the full payload no reserves 4,100nm, which brings them all back to reality.

On another note, that's the 2nd picture of a VC10 you've posted with wingtip tanks. I was under the impression that the Super 200 would have been just like the Super but 15' longer and that tip tanks were a further development. Have I been labouring under a misapprehension?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I think you're being a touch ambitious with the RAF tankers, although getting new-build VC10 tankers would be awesome!

You think wrong because I'm not being the least bit ambitious with the RAF tankers.

6 of the Victor tankers were interim, (2 point) B1Ks thrown together rapidly to cover the sudden grounding of the Valiant fleet in December 1964, I think these would still be needed unless the Valiants were somehow extended. 25 were the more definitive (3 point) K1/K1A, I'd suggest these would be good candidates to be replaced by new-build VC10s. However, the RAF tanker transformation in the 80s is instructive on how this might play out if projected backwards.

All the sudden grounding of the Victor did was accelerate the implementation of the RAF's already existing plans to (1) replace the Valiant tankers with Victor tankers and (2) increase the number of tanker squadrons from two to three.

This had been the plan for several years. I can't tell you the exact number of years because I don't remember and I don't want to spend half-an-hour reading through my notes and my copy of Wynn to find that information.

However, if you have a look at the copy of Plan P that I sent to you for your "Britwank on a Budget" thread on Alternatehistory.com you'll discover the following:

• 24 Victor B(K).1 tankers to be delivered between 01.04.65 and 31.03.67.
• They were to equip 3 tanker squadrons.
  • 4 aircraft in one squadron at half-strength on 31.12.65.
    • At this stage there would still be 16 Valiant B(K).1/B(PR)K.1 tankers in 2 squadrons.
    • For a total force of 20 aircraft in two-and-a-half squadrons.
  • 8 aircraft in one squadron at full-strength on 31.03.66.
    • At this stage there would still be 16 Valiant B(K).1/B(PR)K.1 tankers in 2 squadrons.
    • For a total force of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.
  • 16 aircraft in two squadrons at full-strength on 30.06.66.
    • At this stage there would be 16 Valiant B(K).1/B(PR)K.1 tankers in one squadrons.
    • For a total force of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.
  • 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons on 31.12.66.
    • At this stage both Valiant tanker squadrons had disbanded or converted to Victor tankers.
    • For a total force was 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons.
  • Which due to attrition was expected to reduce to 18 aircraft in 3 squadrons on 31.03.75, which is when Plan P ended.

Plan P was dated 06.03.64. That's 10 months before the Valiant was grounded and 12 months before the Valiant tanker squadrons were disbanded.

According to my RAF Squadrons 1950-70 Spreadsheet.

• The first Victor tanker squadron was No. 55.
  • The first B(K).1A to fly was XH620 on 28th April 1965.
  • All six went to No. 55 Sqn at Marham, which became operational as a tanker unit in May 1965.
  • (Wynn P.481).
• The second Victor tanker squadron was No. 57.
  • The squadron moved to Marham in December 1965 to become a tanker squadron equipped with 3-point Victors.
  • The first three-point tanker (XA937) arrived on 14th February 1966.
  • The squadron became operational in June 1966.
  • (Wynn P.486 to 488).
• The third Victor tankers squadron was No. 214.
  • The squadron officially re-formed at Marham on 1st July 1966 with an establishment of 8 Victor tankers.
  • The squadron effectively reformed on 1st August 1967 after the first crew finished its course with the Tanker Training Flight.
  • Initially the Squadron had to borrow aircraft from No. 57.
  • The first of its own aircraft (XA938) was delivered to Marham on 27th September and by the end of 1966 it had 7 aircraft out of its establishment of 8.
  • (Wynn P.488).
• The 3-squadron Victor tanker force at RAF Marham (Nos 55, 57 and 214) was operational from the beginning of 1967 and it continued in that form for the next 10 years, sustaining and improving the RAF flight refuelling capability. (Wynn P.488).

Therefore.

• The first Victor tanker squadron was operational in the second quarter of 1965 instead of the first quarter of 1966.
• The second Victor tanker squadron was operational in the second quarter of 1966 - bang on schedule.
• The third Victor tanker squadron was operational in the fourth quarter of 1966 - bang on schedule.

However, 31 Victor Mk 1s were converted to tankers instead of 24. The 7 extra aircraft allowed a front-line of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons to be maintained until 31.03.78. See your copy of Plan Q from mid-1967.

Interestingly, that plan also has a squadron of VC.10 tankers on 31.03.78. It's formed in the year ending 31.03.74 with a strength of 4 aircraft, increasing to 6 by 31.03.75, 8 by 31.03.76 and remains at 8 aircraft until Plan Q ended on 31.03.78. (A total of 12 second-had VC.10s would be converted between 01.04.73 to 31.03.78.) That made a total force of 32 tankers in 4 squadrons.

The RAF only converted 14 VC10s to pure (3 point) tankers with extra fuel tankage, the 13 C1s were simply fitted with underwing HDUs and otherwise retained their standard fuel capacity (with fin tank), underfloor baggage and main deck seating/cargo. Post Falklands they also fitted 6 Tristars with 2 HDUs in the fuselage, making them single-point tanker/transports, with the 2nd HDU for redundancy rather than refuelling 2 aircraft simultaneously like the VC10 C1K wingtip pods.

You don't understand the cause and effect.

• The RAF planned to convert 29 Victor B.2s to K.2s to replace the K.1s.
• However, the Mason Defence Review reduced the number of conversions to 24 and the number of tanker squadrons to 2.
• The third Victor tanker squadron (No. 214 equipped with the K.1) disbanded in January 1977.
• Of the 14 second-hand VC.10s airliners converted to tankers.
  • 5 K.2 - First flights Jun 82 to Mar 84 - Delivered Jul 83 to Oct 84.
  • 4 K.3 - First flights Jul 84 to Aug 85 - Delivered Feb 85 to Mar 86.
  • 5 K.4 - First Flights Jul 93 to Dec 95 - Delivered Apr 94 to Mar 96
• The 13 VC.10 C.1Ks converted to transport-tankers made their first flights (as tankers) from Feb 92 to Feb 97 and were delivered as tankers from Dec 92 to Dec 97.
• The initial run of 9 tanker conversions (delivered from July 1983 to March 1986) was intended to replace one of the two Victor K.2 squadrons. Which it did.
  • No. 101 Squadron reformed on VC.10 K.2s & K3s in May 1984.
    • And it replaced.
  • No. 57 Squadron disbanded in June 1986.
  • No. 55 Squadron didn't disband until October 1993.
• The Tristars were bought because of the Falklands War.

I'd think that if the RAF went down the VC10 tanker route, which I think they should have, I think they'd only get about 14 much like they did with the used VC10 they converted. These could in theory carry 86-91 tons of fuel all up, doubling the Victor's 41 tons, which means that fewer aircraft could meet the pure tanker need. If the C1s were also converted to C1Ks in the process that RAF would have an impressive tanker and tanker/transport fleet from the 60s.

I know that if the RAF went down the VC.10 taker route, which I now think that they should have, I know they'd have bought enough to equip the OTL tanker force of three squadrons and one training flight. That requires the purchase of at least 30 aircraft.

The 31 VC.10s that I want built instead of the 31 converted Victors have to be ordered several years in advance to be delivered at the same time as the converted Victors. However, that isn't necessarily a bad thing. Exactly the opposite in fact.

The advanced payments on these aircraft would take the place of the £10.4 that Vickers received from HMG in launching aid between 1961 and 1963. Having 100 on order for BOAC and the RAF at the end of 1963 instead of 53 would look better to potential customer and help Vickers tool up for larger scale production. BOAC might be less prejudiced against the aircraft if they were sharing the launching costs with another major customer (the RAF).

AIUI the VC.10s converted to K.2, K.3 and K.4 couldn't carry their theoretical maximum load of fuel in practice and that the C.1K carried about the same amount of transferrable fuel in practice. Even if the pure tankers did the RAF would still want 31 VC.10s in the 1960s instead of 31 converted Victors even if the former carried a lot more fuel than the latter. The purchase cost may be more but the operating cost would be about the same.

Furthermore, as they were transport-tankers rather than pure tankers a force of 45 VC.10K tanker-transports (in 4 squadrons) would have been more flexible than 14 VC.10 C.1 transports (in one squadron) and 31 VC.10 K.2 or K. 3 tankers (in 3 squadrons).

 

[Caravellarella]

It's my 'mashup from multiple sources then wound back for practicality' estimate.

BAe says the max range of the Super (with fin tank) was 6,260nm.
VC10.net says max range with max fuel no reserves for the Super was 6,195nm and with full payload no reserves 4,100nm.
Wiki referencing Harrison 1965 and Green 1964 say the range of a Standard was 5,850nm.

All those max range figures look awesome, but the real one to look at is the full payload no reserves 4,100nm, which brings them all back to reality.

On another note, that's the 2nd picture of a VC10 you've posted with wingtip tanks. I was under the impression that the Super 200 would have been just like the Super but 15' longer and that tip tanks were a further development. Have I been labouring under a misapprehension?

Yes Rule of Cool, the Super VC10 200 was designed with tip tanks to guarantee a transatlantic range for BOAC, otherwise it was so big that it wouldn't have been able to guarantee year round transatlantic operations from London. To me, this implies a marginal performance, which is perhaps why BOAC preferred the smaller Super VC10 to match the 707 & DC-8 range wise. All the imagery I have of the Super VC10 200 variants show tip-tanks.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Caravellarella]

Rule of Cool, this version of the Super VC10 200 (which I believe was called the VC10 Super 212) even had extra fuel tanks on forward extensions of the wing-root fairings. I believe this was the specific version submitted to Pan American World Airways Inc. in 1960.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Caravellarella]

Rule-of-cool, herewith pdfs of the appropriate Flight magazine pages on the Super VC10 200 from July & November 1960; tip-tanks and a 4,000 mile range would appear to be fundamental parts of the design.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Caravellarella]

Rule-of-cool, herewith a pair of scanned photographs from my own collection of the Super VC10 200 project; note it doesn't (yet) feature the extended-chord wing leading edge, engine nacelle "beaver-tail" fairings and canted engine installation of the Super VC10.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[zen]

Does a more successful Medway Trident bend the British Government to support the Airbus and HS, or does a more successful VC10 bend the British government to support the BAC 211 or BAC 311?

It all depends on how successful either be.

As a bonus question, what happens with Rolls Royce if it produces another ~200 Conways for ~50 more VC10s and 600+ Medways for 200+ Medway Tridents but 351 less Speys?

Medway into production sucks resources away from scaled Medway a.k.a Spey.
This could see HS.681 with Medway go forward instead in some form.
But it hampers Spey.....F4....unless.....major biting the bullet moment....., and we have Medway F4, which makes for a beast of an F4!
This also strengthens case for SAAB System 37 to continue design around Medway.
The French did show interest at one point......

How many US airlines might opt for RR Medway? Even on Boeing aircraft?

Do they still go broke in 1971?

Sadly development of RB.211 with three spool design was just horrendously expensive. Considering how much cash was burned through to do it. I doubt it saves RR. But it might keep the crisis shorter and cheaper.....
Government Minister was taken to RR testing site and saw how much just development of test systems was eating up. Something like "never before realised how we could use up over £200 million in a day"

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'd think that if the RAF went down the VC10 tanker route, which I think they should have, I think they'd only get about 14 much like they did with the used VC10 they converted. These could in theory carry 86-91 tons of fuel all up, doubling the Victor's 41 tons, which means that fewer aircraft could meet the pure tanker need. If the C1s were also converted to C1Ks in the process that RAF would have an impressive tanker and tanker/transport fleet from the 60s.

According to Wynn (P.486) the transferrable fuel load of a Victor Mk 1 tanker was 23.59 long tons. According to what's on the internet (which unfortunately is according to the Wikipedia entries).

• 23.59 long tons Victor K.1 - Transferrable load.
• 40.63 long tons Victor K.2 - This may be the maximum load rather than the transferrable load.
  • Furthermore, the Victor Mk 2 had more powerful engines which may account for some of the difference.
• 80.00 long tons VC.10 C.1K - Which is the same as when they were C.1 transports.
• 85.00 long tons VC.10 K.2 - Maximum load.
• 90.00 long tons VC.10 K.3 - Maximum load.
• 90.00 long tons VC.10 K.4 - Maximum load.

I couldn't find a figure for the K.4, but as it and the K.3 were converted Super VC.10s my guess is that the fuel load was the same. Although the maximum load of K.2-to-K.4 is more than a C.1K it's not a massive amount more and they couldn't carry the theoretical maximum anyway.

I repeat that if the RAF did buy new VC.10s in the 1960s instead of having 31 Victor B.1s converted to tankers it would want a one-for-one substitution regardless of the extra cost and double the fuel per aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

How many US airlines might opt for RR Medway? Even on Boeing aircraft?

For the Conway IOTL on the Boeing 707 it was 37 by five airliners out of 92 Boeing 707s ordered by those.

• 20 BOAC out of 31 including the 2 ordered by Cunard Eagle.
• 6 Air India out of 11.
• 5 Lufthansa out of 31.
• 3 El Al out of 10.
• 3 VARIG out of 9.

For the Conway IOTL on the DC-8 it was 32 by three airlines out of 79 DC-8s bought by those airlines.

• 11 Air Canada out of 42.
• 15 Alitalia out of 26.
• 6 Canadian Pacific Airlines out of 11.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

"Please will the lemming report to the cliff!"

The VC.10 happened because the VC.7 was cancelled and BOAC wanted to buy the Boeing 707. HMG let BOAC buy them on the condition that it bought British next time.

Reading through the VC.10 chapter in Charles Gardner's reveals that at one point BOAC had a requirement for 62 airliners in the Boeing 707 class by 1967 that were in addition to the 15 Boeings. At one point Vickers had options and orders for 55 of them. That leaves a balance of 7 which could be the 3 additional Boeing 707-420s ordered by BOAC and the pair of dash-420s that BOAC acquired when it merged with Cunard Eagle. The 20 Boeing 707-420s that BOAC acquired plus the 55 VC.10s that were on order or on option at the end of 1963 equals 75 aircraft. That is 5 short of the supposed break even point of 80 aircraft.

What if ITTL HMG allowed BOAC to buy the 15 Boeings on the condition that they were a stop-gap aircraft that the airline would operate until a British aircraft in the Seven-Oh-Seven class could be developed? Therefore at the end of 1963 a grand total of 75 VC.10s would be on order or on option for delivery by 1967. The last 20 would replace BOAC's 20 Boeing 707-420s which would be sold on the second-hand market as part payment for the 20 extra VC.10s.

75 aircraft is 5 short of the supposed OTL break-even point of 80 aircraft. However, ITTL Vickers may do their sums differently and "do the arithmetic" on a minimum production run of 75 aircraft.

 

[Caravellarella]

"Please will the lemming report to the cliff!"

The VC.10 happened because the VC.7 was cancelled and BOAC wanted to buy the Boeing 707. HMG let BOAC buy them on the condition that it bought British next time.

Reading through the VC.10 chapter in Charles Gardner's reveals that at one point BOAC had a requirement for 62 airliners in the Boeing 707 class by 1967 that were in addition to the 15 Boeings. At one point Vickers had options and orders for 55 of them. That leaves a balance of 7 which could be the 3 additional Boeing 707-420s ordered by BOAC and the pair of dash-420s that BOAC acquired when it merged with British Eagle. The 20 Boeing 707-420s that BOAC acquired plus the 55 VC.10s that were on order or on option at the end of 1963 equals 75 aircraft. That is 5 short of the supposed break even point of 75 aircraft.

What if ITTL HMG allowed BOAC to buy the 15 Boeings on the condition that they were a stop-gap aircraft that the airline would operate until a British aircraft in the Seven-Oh-Seven class could be developed? Therefore at the end of 1963 a grand total of 75 VC.10s would be on order or on option for delivery by 1967. The last 20 would replace BOAC's 20 Boeing 707-420s which would be sold on the second-hand market as part payment for the 20 extra VC.10s.

75 aircraft is 5 short of the supposed OTL break-even point of 80 aircraft. However, ITTL Vickers may do their sums differently and "do the arithmetic" on a minimum production run of 75 aircraft.

NOMISYRRUC, do mean in the same way that BOAC was allowed to order ten "stop-gap" Douglas DC-7Cs to remain competitive on transatlantic routes when Bristol proved incapable of delivering Britannia 312s in a timely manner and according to contract?

A Boeing 707-436 is a costly stop-gap!

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

NOMISYRRUC, do mean in the same way that BOAC was allowed to order ten "stop-gap" Douglas DC-7Cs to remain competitive on transatlantic routes when Bristol proved incapable of delivering Britannia 312s in a timely manner and according to contract?

A Boeing 707-436 is a costly stop-gap!

Terry (Caravellarella)

Don't know, because I don't know much about the DC-7C purchase.

I half-remember something about the Britannias being delivered 18 months late because BOAC wouldn't accept them. The half-remember thing being that the engines would flame out over a mountain in Africa and that the issue could have been avoided by flying at a slightly different altitude. Though that was Bill Gunston BOAC bashing again. Is that correct? I suspect not

 

[Caravellarella]

Don't know, because I don't know much about the DC-7C purchase.

I half-remember something about the Britannias being delivered 18 months late because BOAC wouldn't accept them. The half-remember thing being that the engines would flame out over a mountain in Africa and that the issue could have been avoided by flying at a slightly different altitude. Though that was Bill Gunston BOAC bashing again. Is that correct? I suspect not

Yes NOMISYRRUC, the Britannia's Proteus engine was underdeveloped and had a strange back-to front compressor section (the air entered the compressor at the back of the engine so any moisture in the air under certain conditions would freeze where the compressor inlet turned 180 degrees and cause the combustor to flame out). The Proteus engine was a shorter, fatter engine designed to fit in the wing leading edge of the Brabazon & Princess.

A point to remember about Bristol is that they didn't invest in effective production facilities and didn't have the wherewithal to produce the Britannia quickly and in volume. This is why some Britannia production was sub-licensed to Short Brothers & Harland in Belfast and this is why Bristol couldn't meet delivery dates requested by Trans World Airlines Inc. & United Air Lines Inc. when they both tried to order Britannias.

Save the bashing for The Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd rather than BOAC.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yes NOMISYRRUC, the Britannia's Proteus engine was underdeveloped and had a strange back-to front compressor section (the air entered the compressor at the back of the engine so any moisture in the air under certain conditions would freeze where the compressor inlet turned 180 degrees and cause the combustor to flame out). The Proteus engine was a shorter, fatter engine designed to fit in the wing leading edge of the Brabazon & Princess.

A point to remember about Bristol is that they didn't invest in effective production facilities and didn't have the wherewithal to produce the Britannia quickly and in volume. This is why some Britannia production was sub-licensed to Short Brothers & Harland in Belfast and this is why Bristol couldn't meet delivery dates requested by Trans World Airlines Inc. & United Air Lines Inc. when they both tried to order Britannias.

Save the bashing for The Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd rather than BOAC.

Terry (Caravellarella)

Thank you.

I'd heard about the strange back-to-front compressor and that it was designed for a pair of aircraft that didn't get beyond the prototype stage and that this was the cause of the Britannia's problems. I half-remember Stanley Hooker saying that when he joined Bristol he was told that the Proteus was intended to have the lowest fuel consumption of any turboprop regardless of size and weight - so far they had the size and weight.

Lack of effective production facilities is new to me. I didn't know that was why some of the production was subcontracted to Short & Harland. I'd been led to believe that it was to keep S&H occupied after Comet 2 & 3 were cancelled buy building some for the RAF and that was part of the reason why the V.1000 was cancelled. I'd heard that TWA* was interested and had not idea about United's interest. How many aircraft did they want to buy.

FWIW my impression is that Bristol's Board of Directors deserved all the bashing it received and more. E.g. Roy Fedden left the Firm out of frustration with its Board of Directors. Are my impression and my example correct?

* In the 1980s there was a series on BBC2 called "All Our Working Lives" about British industry in the 20th Century. In the episode about the aircraft industry someone said that he took Howard Hughes for a test flight in a Britannia. Hughes was so impressed with the aircraft, that when the flight was over, he produced his chequebook and made an on-the-spot offer to buy some. Which, as you say, the firm was unable to accept.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

NOMISYRRUC, do mean in the same way that BOAC was allowed to order ten "stop-gap" Douglas DC-7Cs to remain competitive on transatlantic routes when Bristol proved incapable of delivering Britannia 312s in a timely manner and according to contract?

A Boeing 707-436 is a costly stop-gap!

Terry (Caravellarella)

I'd say no, because the gap being stopped is much larger. That is 5-7 years rather than 18 months.

The 20 extra VC.10s (for a total of 75) are to replace the 15 Boeing 707-420s delivered in 1960 & the 5 delivered in 1962 circa 1967 after the original 55 VC.10s were delivered (1964-67). At that stage the 15 original 707s were 7 years old and the 5 additional aircraft were 5 years old.

The 15 original Boeing 707-420s cost £44 million which may include spares and may not include the engines. (Does anyone know better?) That's about £3 million an aircraft. Therefore, all 20 may have cost £60 million, which may include spares and not include the engines. BOAC and HMT will get some of that money back in 1967 when they're sold.

I discovered in the discussion section on VC.10net that the VC10's airframe had a much higher fatigue life than the 707's and BOAC's aircraft were rebuilt to extend their service life. If that's true then the 20 Boeing 707s that were delivered 1960-62 may have been reaching the end of their service lives anyway.

 

[alertken]

Best source for Bristol is its last MD's autobiog: P.Masefield, Fight Path, Airlife,2002: P209 : “abysmal lethargy of (owner-family) Board of Bristol Aeroplane Co". Vickers Ltd+EE Co Ltd 1/3/60 “merged” with Bristol "with weary resignation, not sparkling enthusiasm". K.Hayward, Formation of (BAC) 57-61,Jrnl. of Aero.Hist.2012/01.

His ghost was Flight's Bill Gunston whose biog of Fedden has him dismissed by the family after he was knighted. He was never appointed to TopCo's Board. “Why are Bristols so important? I suggest their most notable achievement since the war is the amount of Govt. R&D. money they have absorbed to achieve so little. My guess is that the total now exceeds £150m. We shall only get value for money out of Bristols if they have to fight for existence in a competitive world". MoSi internal memo, 29/3/57, Nahum_world_war p.259.*

Qantas interest in Britannia lapsed in ’55 for L.188 Electra J.Gunn,High Corridors,QUP,88,P69: “too late to be competitive (negative view after their 7/55 visit to Filton) to assess Bristol(’s ability to meet schedule, or show an orgn) adequate to service (it.)”
(QF also rejected Comet 4: “unable to consider(it) an economic proposition.”) Do not overreact to H.Hughes flamboyance, waving a chequebook for NOW! delivery. No-one could do that.

HMG owned Short/Belfast, empty after Swift, then Comet 2 were chopped. When Vickers 1000 was also chopped and floor-strengthened Brit 250 ordered, Bristol was required to utilise Shorts, so, 7/54, courageously bought 15.25% (held until taken back by HMG to facilitate Bristol's 12/59 absorption into BAC - EE/Vickers wanted no involvement in Shorts).

(*: https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3568/1/Nahum_world_war_to_cold_war.pdf)

 

[alertken]

NOM #146: stop gap. MTCA to HoC 24/10/56: "(707) purchase (£44Mn inc £33Mn in $) is therefore regarded, both by the Govt and by B.O.A.C., as an exceptional measure to bridge the gap until a new British type is produced". They were then to be sold. MTCA spoke of a DH a/c “to command a ready sale in world markets.”

After PAA 13/10/55 707/DC-8 Launch, as MTCA "owned" BOAC, MoS put out a Request for Proposals for Future Large Civil A/c for 1964.
AWA bid AW.174; Avro, Atlantic (Vulcan-base); DH Comet 5, then D.H.118; HP.97 (Victor-base), then laminar flow HP.102/111C.
V-A rebid VC7 and doodled a podded 707-clone. BOAC Chair M.Thomas,Out on a Wing,M.Joseph,64,Pp.336/44: “keen {1st jet to NYC to be Brit. I and DH A/c MD A.Burke) generated (D.H.118 Conway-Comet 1/56: chance for) a 'world beater.' (I) pressed MTCA Watkinson... getting nowhere” (DH expected R&D fairy dust +an Economic Order Quantity >BOAC need). None buried Boeing, so...£44Mn.

DH fell into Blue Streak drift and £ bloat. V-A was still delivering the only UK transport to yield profit to Treasury (Viscount): to avoid that ghastly fate again they launched Vanguard PV on BEAC's 20/7/56 order for 20.

BOAC 4/57 came up with "need" for shorter-field performance than offered by 707/DC-8 as then in build. V-A offered to PV fund such a thing, so MoS then talked only to V-A. R.Gardner,Bouncing Bombs,Sutton,2006,,P133 has GRE abandoning pods, “poking about at some length” before need for unbroken flaps/slats put the engines at the back, so clean, strong (heavy) wing. BOAC Letter of Intent 5/57. DH protested, settled for (to be)18 BEAC Comet 4B. BOAC order 35 VC10 14/1/58.

VC10 Launch R&D estimate “proved to be wrong by quite a bit” GREdwards in K.Hayward,Govt.& Civil Aerospace,MUP,1983,P.39. V-A abandoned PV and touched D.Sandys 17/12/59 for VC10 Launch Aid (to be £10.25Mn.),“hardly a 'promising civil project' (criterion for Aid, yet given) to tide (V-A over) present difficulties (to) prevent them (leaving) civil business”Hayward,Jrl.Aero.Hist.12/01,P19. That, and RAF's need for a longer endurance platform than Vulcan for the ALBM in R&D to a Joint USAF/RAF Requirement, 22/1/59, announced to HoC 13/4/60 as Douglas Skybolt. That platform needed a clean wing.

 

[Archibald]

Do not overreact to H.Hughes flamboyance, waving a chequebook for NOW! delivery. No-one could do that.

I've heard similar stories related to Avro Canada C-102. Seems Hughes liked spinning his checkbook like the proverbial cowboy spinning his gun.

 

[Rule of cool]

@Caravellarella thanks for all that info.

Does it strike anyone else as a bit strange that a 13' stretch and fin tank extends the Super VC10 range by several hundred NM, but another 15" drops the range so much that it requires tip tanks and even wing root extensions with tanks?

That said, I'm probably stressing too much about them. they aren't very big, maybe similar in size to the Convair 880/990 'carrots'.

 

[Caravellarella]

@Caravellarella thanks for all that info.

Does it strike anyone else as a bit strange that a 13' stretch and fin tank extends the Super VC10 range by several hundred NM, but another 15" drops the range so much that it requires tip tanks and even wing root extensions with tanks?

That said, I'm probably stressing too much about them. they aren't very big, maybe similar in size to the Convair 880/990 'carrots'.

Yes Rule of Cool, perhaps Vickers realised that the Super VC10 200 was a stretch too far with Conway engine as it was in 1960 and the tankage available? Remember too that the Super VC10 200 (I can't find a date for the actual offer) pre-dates the actual Super VC10 (ordered 23rd June 1960).

I wonder if any VC10 variants were studied with more effective (than the Conway) turbofans/by-pass turbojets (other than the abortive Rolls-Royce RB-178) such as the Pratt & Whitney JT3D?

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 149.

A point to remember about Bristol is that they didn't invest in effective production facilities and didn't have the wherewithal to produce the Britannia quickly and in volume. This is why some Britannia production was sub-licensed to Short Brothers & Harland in Belfast and this is why Bristol couldn't meet delivery dates requested by Trans World Airlines Inc. & United Air Lines Inc. when they both tried to order Britannias.

According to Page 509 of the Putnams on Shorts Aircraft the Firm built 12 Britannias on sub-contract from Bristol Aircraft Ltd and 23 more on a direct contract. That is a total of 35 aircraft out of the 85 Britannias that were built.

• The 12 built on sub-contract were 2 Britannia 300s, 5 Britannia 305s and 5 Britannia 314s.
  • And.
• The 23 built on direct contracts were 3 Britannia 252s and 20 Britannia 253s.

Except that 5 sets of Belfast-made Britannia components were shipped to Filton for final assembly there, which reduced the number of aircraft built by Short & Harland from 35 to 30 out of 85 Britannias.

Part of Message 150.

Lack of effective production facilities is new to me. I didn't know that was why some of the production was subcontracted to Short & Harland. I'd been led to believe that it was to keep S&H occupied after Comet 2 & 3 were cancelled* buy building some for the RAF and that was part of the reason why the V.1000 was cancelled. I'd heard that TWA was interested and had not idea about United's interest. How many aircraft did they want to buy.

The production of 30 out of 85 Britannias by Short & Harland due to the lack of effective production facilities is all the more surprising to me given this paragraph from Page 54 of Charles Gardner's book.

The immediate first-aid needed was to save Bristol, whose airframe side was facing shut-down. One of Sir George Edwards' first task on becoming Chief Executive (Aircraft) was to go to Bristol and make a through investigation in the Filton situation. "I was horrified at what I found", he was later to say. "They had virtually nothing. There was some Britannia work, and they were building the first two little Type 188 all-steel experimental aircraft - and that was it. The design team was working on the Supersonic Transport study which was a long way from being a contract, and on the Silver City Freighter, which came to nothing. the last think I wanted to do was to start BAC off with a closure of even serious unemployment, so I had to shift some work down to Filton from other sites, and do it right away". In fact what Sir George did was to move assembly of the two-seat Lightning (the Mark IV) and some VC.10 work to Filton; by so doing, me manged to keep it afloat - but only just.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

@Rule of cool's theory that more VC.10s would have been sold if BOAC had bought the "long" Super VC.10 instead of the "short" Super VC.10 is a variation of the proverb.

"Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door”.​

I think it won't work because entering service in 1965 is too far away from the service entry of the Boeing 707 & Douglas DC-8 and too close to the service entry of the Boeing 747. (E.g. BOAC ordered its first batch of 747s on 01.09.66.) Furthermore, there are better ways to sell more VC.10s. See my previous posts.

Could the VC.10 have been got into service sooner? The prototype flew on 29.06.62, the Standard entered service with BOAC on 29.04.64 and the Super entered service with the airline on 01.04.65.

I thought that could be done by building more prototypes to complete the development flying sooner. However, as 3 were flying by the end of 1962, which had increased to 5 by the middle of 1963; 9 by the end of 1963; and 13 by the middle of 1964 it looks like that isn't possible.

Which is a pity. Because the following may have happened if both versions entered service a year earlier.

• Sir Giles Guthrie became chairman of BOAC on 01.01.64.
  • The Standard VC.10 would have been in service for 8 months.
  • The Super VC.10 would enter service in less than 4 months.
  • Production of the 45 VC.10s on order for BOAC would have been more advanced.
    • IOTL 11 out of 12 Standard VC.10s were delivered by the end of 1964 and the 12th was delivered in February 1965.
    • ITTL 14 out of 15 Standard VC.10s were delivered by the end of 1963 and the 15th was delivered in February 1964.
    • IOTL.
      • The first Super VC.10 for BOAC flew on 07.05.64, the second flew on 29.09.64, the third flew on 01.01.65 and 5 more flew by the end of 1965 for a total of 8.
      • The first aircraft were delivered in March 1965 and 7 out of the 8 aircraft that had flown were delivered to BOAC by the end of the year.
    • ITTL the first.
      • The first Super VC.10 for BOAC flew on 07.05.63, the second flew on 29.09.63, the third flew on 01.01.64 and 5 more flew by the end of 1964 for a total of 8.
      • The first aircraft were delivered in March 1964 and 7 out of the 8 aircraft that had flown were delivered to BOAC by the end of the year.
    • Therefore, it would have been a lot harder for him to have the number of VC.10s built for BOAC reduced from 30 to the 17 that he got, let alone to have all 30 cancelled, which is what he wanted.
  • He may not have wanted to cancel the Super VC.10 order in the first place ITTL.
    • The Standard had been in service since the end of April 1963 and was showing that the aircraft's higher operating costs were more than cancelled out by its higher load factors a year earlier than it did IOTL.
    • The same may have been expected for the Super VC.10 when it entered service at the beginning of April 1964 and if BOAC's management didn't, it would soon be proven wrong.
    • Rather than wanting to cancel the entire order for 30 Super VC.10s he might want all the aircraft that he could get and convert the 10 on option into firm orders for a total of 40.
    • Even if he did want to cancel the Super VC.10 ITTL, it would have been very hard for him to persuade BOAC's owner (HMG) to let him to do so after considering that the Standard VC.10 was already in service and making more money for BOAC than its Boeing 707s.
  • Initially the VC.10 cost more to run than a Boeing 707 and had a lower utilisation rate. However, this situation was reversed by the early 1970s.
    • The reason for that may be that the VC.10 was a brand new aircraft and it took time for BOAC to learn how to make the most of it.
    • Meanwhile, BOAC had already learned how to make the most out of the 707 by the time the VC.10 entered service.
      • It had been in service with the Airline for 4 years when the Standard VC.10 entered service.
        • And.
      • It had been in service with the Airline for 5 years when the Super VC.10 entered service.
    • Putting the VC.10 into service a year earlier.
      • Might have reduced the initial difference between the operating costs and utilisation rates of the two aircraft. This is because BOAC would have had one year's less experience of operating the 707 before its rival entered service and therefore have been less proficient in its use.
        • And.
      • It gives BOAC another year to learn how to use the VC.10 effectively so it would have become cheaper to run and have higher utilisation rates a year earlier.
• The Standard VC.10 was designed use airports that the Boeing 707 and DC-8 couldn't.
  • Unfortunately, this problem didn't exist by the time it entered service because said airports had extended their runways.
  • If the aircraft had been put into service sooner then there would have been more airports that only it could use and therefore it might have taken some sales from Boeing and Douglas.
• Every year before 1964-65 reduces the gap between the service entry of the VC.10 and the service entry of the 707, DC-8 & CV.880 family and increases its chances of selling in greater numbers.

Is there anything that could be done to get the aircraft in service sooner?

One thing that springs to my mind is not building the Vanguard so Vickers can get on with the VC.10 and avoid the loss of £18 million that it made on that aircraft. However, the VC.10 evolved from the Vanjet which in turn evolved from the Vanguard. Therefore, it may be necessary for Vickers "to do" the Vanguard before it can design the VC.10.

If Vickers could have put the VC.10 into service several years sooner by not doing the Vanguard it's a win-win situation for BAC and its predecessors.

• Vickers would have avoided the loss of £18 million that it made on Vanguard.
  • Because there was no Vickers Vanguard ITTL.
• Vickers would have avoided the loss of £20 million that it made on VC.10.
  • Because it would have sold enough VC.10s to break even - and then some.
• 43 Britannias would have been built for BEA and TCA instead of 43 Vanguards plus one prototype.
  • That would have avoided the need to transfer work from English Electric and Vickers to Filton when BAC was formed.
    • Gardner called it "The Filton Crisis".
  • It increased the number of Britannias built in Britain from 85 to 128.
    • And.
  • The aircraft would have been regarded as a moderate success, rather than a failure.
• The losses made on Britannia, Vanguard and VC.10 IOTL would have been replaced by profits on Britannia and VC.10 ITTL which would have given BAC the money and perhaps more importantly the confidence to develop follow-on aircraft.

The small commercial success of Britannia & VC.10 ITTL rather than the commercial failure of Britannia, Vanguard & VC.10 IOTL would have been "Great PR" for the British aircraft industry in general and BAC in particular. Which, would have been of great help when the time came to raise the money to build follow-on aircraft like Airbus and the BAC-311.

 

[Scott Kenny]

@Rule of cool's theory that more VC.10s would have been sold if BOAC had bought the "long" Super VC.10 instead of the "short" Super VC.10 is a variation of the proverb.

"Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door”.​

I think it won't work because entering service in 1965 is too far away from the service entry of the Boeing 707 & Douglas DC-8 and too close to the service entry of the Boeing 747. (E.g. BOAC ordered its first batch of 747s on 01.09.66.) Furthermore, there are better ways to sell more VC.10s. See my previous posts.

Could the VC.10 have been got into service sooner? The prototype flew on 29.06.62, the Standard entered service with BOAC on 29.04.64 and the Super entered service with the airline on 01.04.65.

Build the full length VC10 as the standard. Didn't BOAC force it to be shortened?