WI Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 80.

• Capital Airlines bought the second largest number of Viscounts, between BEA (71) and TCA (now Air Canada) (51).
  • That's a total of 185 and is about 40% of the 444 Viscounts that were built.

Gardner credits much of the success of the Viscount to Air Canada. IIRC they told Vickers how to build airliners to North American standards and how to do North American customer service/after-sales service. However, I haven't re-read that part of the book so I may be wrong with the exact details.

Air Canada was the second (of two) customers for the Vanguard and bought 23 of the 44 built. IIRC BEA (the other customer) was so impressed with the Vanguards being built for Air Canada that it had 14 of the 20 aircraft that it had on order completed to the same standard as Air Canada's aircraft.

IIRC Air Canada wanted to buy the VC.7 and the VC.11. It didn't buy the Trident or BAC-111 because it bought 39 Boeing 727s and
53 DC-9s. It also bought 42 DC-8s including 11 with RR Conway engines.

Given the above Air Canada may have bought 39 Medway-Tridents instead of the 39 Boeing 707s and 53 BAC-111s if Rolls Royce was able to produce a more powerful engine (e.g. the Medway) for it.

However, it would be harder to get it to buy VC.10s instead of some of its DC-8s. It could have IOTL, but didn't, which I think is due to already having some DC-8s and it wanted to standardise on the type. Well that and BOAC's anti-VC.10 campaign.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm trying to see how Panair do Brasil would be a viable customer for the Super VC10 200; the airline was often on a "struggle-bus". Of their four DC-8s, one was written off, of their four Caravelles, one was bent beyond repair during collision-avoidance aerobatics, they couldn't afford to buy a fleet of DC-6As and had to lease them from Loide, the rest of their fleet consisted of four DC-7Cs (using the deposits for their undelivered Comet 2s) and several very old Constellations. They struggled for years to meet their scheduled routes until their politically-motivated demise. Their longest route segment was Rio de Janeiro to Dakar and then stops all along the way to London and Beirut. Interestingly Panair do Brasil was the first customer to take options on the Super Caravelle SST design project, but I wonder why Panair do Brasil would need a 212-seat 5,000 mile range jet airliner?

Terry (Caravellarella)

As far as I know, nobody is. For one thing VC.10s can't be substituted for its DC-8s because the latter were delivered before the former went into service. Secondly, it went bust a year after the Standard VC.10 entered service.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 79.

Trans Australian Airlines, one of the 2 heavily regulated airlines in Australia in the 60s/70s, considered the tridents operationally superior to the B727 but chose the B727 because it was chained to the earlier Ansett B727 buy. That make me think that the Trident wasn't an irredeemable loss, that picking up a few more sales, especially if it had the better performance the Medway would offer, isn't too much of a stretch.

FWIW (1).

• Ansett ANA bought 22 Boeing 727s, 28 Boeing 737 Classics and 13 DC-9s.
• Ansett Worldwide (a leasing company) bought 87 Boeing 737 Classics and 15 DC-9s.
• TAA bought 18 Boeing 727s and 36 Boeing 737 Classics.
  • And.
• Air New Zealand bought 19 Boeing 737 Classics.

That's a total of 40 Boeing 727s, 83 Boeing 737 Classics and 13 DC-9s from Ansett ANA, TAA and Air NZ, which might be 40 Medway-Tridents and 96 BAC-111s in your timeline.

FWIW (2) If: the Nimrod is based on the Medway-Trident, instead of the Comet ITTL; and it enters service in the middle 1960s rather than 1970; and Australia's domestic airlines buy the Medway-Trident; then the RAAF and RNZAF might buy it instead of the 35 new Lockheed Orions that they bought IOTL; starting with the 15 P-3Bs they bought in the 1960s.

FWIW (3) I've already mentioned that TAA bought 12 Viscounts. Ansett bought 4 Viscounts.

 

[Hood]

Was the VC.10 really a nicer aircraft to fly in? Is there anyone here who's been a passenger in both? As far as I can tell the only advantage the VC.10 had over the Boeing 707 is that having the engines at the back rather than on the wings may have made it quieter for the passengers.

My cynical side makes me think that the real reason for the above and for the VC.10,s much higher load factors was patriotism. The management of BOAC may have put profit before patriotism, but the Man on the Clapham Omnibus did differently. "I'm backing Britain!"

I share your cynicism.
While they may have been some passengers who wanted to travel by VC.10 when it was new I doubt that lasted once the novelty factor wore off as the years went by (Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor).

In any case its not likely passengers had a choice once the VC.10 settled into service. Once a certain type was allocated to a particular route and in service in numbers large enough to have a constant pool of available aircraft to reliably serve the route, then most often as not the expected service would be as scheduled. There would have been times when 707s or VC.10s swapped for serviceability/availability reasons, but that would have been last minute changes.

I'm wary of Gardner as much as I am about George Edwards' VC.7 claims (I've much about the latter in various VC.7 threads).
A manufacturer never admits they designed a duffer. In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s. Look how that panned out....

Perhaps. I would posit that the Super VC10 200 was just too much aeroplane in 1960 for 1964/65 service.

I agree. The Boeing 747 was too much aeroplane for 1969 as well and nearly flopped and nearly took Boeing down with it.
A manufacturer could always build as large or as fast (or as small and slow) as they wanted, but if it didn't chime with what the airlines wanted/could afford/finance/lease then it didn't sell. And sometimes the airlines didn't really know what they wanted. Trident was tailored to BEA and flopped, Lufthansa took a punt on the unknown 737 Boeing was desperate to find a buyer for and inadvertently begat a commercial giant.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor

I'd argue that the 747 did to some extent - the idea of flying on a 'Jumbo Jet' as something noteworthy was certainly still around in the 1990s.

In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s.

In their (partial) defence, those forecasts were based on oil prices staying low, and a continuation of entry and price restrictions.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 30.

In addition to those B707s BOAC received 12 VC10s and 17 Super VC10s, and serial numbers were allocated to 3 standard and 12 Super VC10s for BOAC but not built.

I think you're referring to this list: https://www.vc10.net/Data/vickers_vc10_prodnumbers.html which shows constructors numbers for 3 Standard and 13 Super VC.10s for BOAC that weren't built. That's BOAC had firm orders for 45 VC.10s in 1960, but the total was reduced in stages to 42 and then 29.

According to Gardner.

Vickers, however, were, at the time, privately hopeful of further substantial sales to BOAC because they had seen a detailed BOAC forecast, sent to the Minister, which showed an eventual need, by 1967, not of thirty-five aircraft, but sixty-two, and, by Vickers’ reckoning, a sale of sixty-two VC.10s would prove profitable and Weybridge badly needed the work. So, in May 1957 the order was announced for thirty-five VC.10s for use on the southern and eastern routes but the aircraft was to have the important new capability of development to serve the North Atlantic. This later proviso was made to cover the further twenty-seven of the sixty-two aircraft mentioned in the BOAC statement to the Minister, and the contract, when signed for thirty-five aircraft in January 1958, included an option for twenty more.

Therefore, the situation in January 1958 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 35 aircraft with options for 20 more for a total of 55 aircraft and all 55 were Standard VC.10s.

In January 1960, just as BOAC was being formed, Vickers ran into financial trouble over the VC.10. The cost estimates had been discovered to be under-estimated by “quite a lot” (as Sir George told the Select Committee) and, unless orders for ten of the twenty on option were made firm, the whole VC.10 production would be in jeopardy. These ten aircraft were to be of the developed type (Super VC.10), stretched and improved to be suitable for the North Atlantic, with maximum seating for 212 people.

Therefore, in January 1960, the Super VC.10 was what you call the VC10 Super 200.

In June 1960, the contract for the extra ten Super VC.10s was signed, making forty-five aircraft in all. Undoubtedly there was an element of duress about this extra order because the Minister had now added his pressure to that of Vickers, the VC.10 prospects being part of the Minister’s own plans for the formation of BAC. Certainly the incoming Chairman of BOAC, Sir Matthew Slattery, tried, unsuccessfully, to stop the contract being signed before he took office in July but was told that, because of Ministry pressure it was too late.

Therefore, the situation in June 1960 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 45 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 55 aircraft. Of the 45 on order 35 were Standard VC.10s and 10 were Super VC.10s with the latter being what you call the VC.10 Super 200.

During the next year, BOAC wanted the specification of the Super VC.10 altered downwards to 163 seats, and this was done, giving the aeroplane a smaller capacity but a greater suitability for its deployment on all BOAC routes, North Atlantic included. Both parties seemed happy with the new specification, and the overall contract was freely altered to fifteen Standard VC.10s and thirty Super VC.10s. Later, the fifteen Standards were reduced to twelve to keep the mounting cost of the whole order within the Treasury’s capital authority. BOAC paid £600,000 compensation to Vickers.

Therefore, the situation in 1962 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 42 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 52 aircraft. Of the 42 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 30 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

So far. So good. However, two years later . . .

In January 1964, Sir Giles Guthrie became Chairman of BOAC (three months before the first Standard VC.10 services were introduced) and Guthrie immediately began drastically to re-organise BOAC, and its route structure. He first decided to cut the order for thirty Super VC.10s to seven and then to cancel the lot and buy six Boeing 707-320Cs instead. Prior to the publication of this decision, there had begun what appeared to be a BOAC-orchestrated campaign against the VC.10 in certain parts of the media, and this campaign did undoubted harm to sales prospects. It is hard to sell an aircraft whose own home customer is proclaiming lack its lack of faith in it from the housetops.

Therefore, the situation in January 1964 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 12 VC.10s with option for no more for a total of 12. The 12 aircraft on order were all Standard VC.10s.

The Government, however, refused (July 1964) to accept the Guthrie all-American plan, and told him to take seventeen of the thirty Super VC.10s to meet his new estimated requirements up to 1967, and to keep ten more on option – production for BOAC to be “suspended” after the seventeenth aircraft. At the same time, the remaining three BOAC Super VC.10 positions were allocated to the Royal Air Force, which had already increased its VC.10 order to eleven, this new decision thus bringing the RAF total to fourteen. All fourteen of the RAF aircraft were made to the “mixture” specification already described.

Therefore, the situation in July 1964 was that BOAC had placed firm orders 29 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 39 aircraft. Of the 29 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 17 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

Finally, in March 1966 – a year after the Super VC.10 had entered service on the North Atlantic – BOAC cancelled its “suspended” option for ten aircraft and paid £7½ million in cancellation charges.

Therefore, the situation in March 1966 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 29 VC.10s with options for no more for a total of 29. Of the 29 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 17 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

Part of Message 30.

If the full 28" stretch VC10 Super 200 was built they'd be delivered from 1966, so there's likely nothing can be done about the first 18 B707s, they were delivered even before the first standard VC10. Even the 3 Cunard Eagle they got were likely too early to be replaced by VC10s, and the standards were unsuitable anyway.

First, ITTL the full 28' (not 28'') stretch VC.10 Super 200 would have been delivered from 1965 in place of the OTL Super VC.10 and all the Super VC.10s built IOTL would have been built to that standard ITTL.

Second, there's absolutely nothing that could be done about the first 18 Boeing 707s, because they were delivered 1960-63, while the Standard VC.10 entered service in 1964 and the Super VC.10 entered service in 1965.

Third, the 2 (not 3) Cunard Eagle Boeing 707s were delivered in 1962. Therefore, it's impossible for a pair of VC.10s to be built in their place ITTL.

Fourth, British Eagle International Airways ordered their pair of Boeing 707 on 06.01.67. Therefore, it's perfectly feasible for a pair of Super VC.10s to be ordered on the same date.

• IOTL one was delivered to Airlift International in 1967
  • ITTL may be the VC.10s only US sale.
    • And.
  • The airline may sell it to BOAC in 1968. See below.
• The other was delivered to British Eagle on 21.12.67, but remained in Seattle until being registered as VR-BCP on 04.02.68.
  • It was leased to Middle East Airlines between March 1968 and November 1968.
    • So MEA would have operated one more VC.10 ITTL and one less Boeing 707 ITTL.
  • The aircraft was sold to BOAC as G-ATZD on 06.12.68.

Fifth, there was the Boeing 707 (ordered by Saturn Airways) but delivered to BOAC on 27.06.68. I don't see Saturn Airways ordering a VC.10 ITTL. However, Airlift International and BOAC may do a swap. See below.

• In 1968 Airlift International buys the 707 originally ordered by Saturn Airways, instead of BOAC buying it.
  • And.
• In 1968 Airlift International sells the VC.10 that it acquired in 1967 to BOAC.

I know this is 8 years before "The Multi-Coloured Swap Shop", but where are Noel Edmonds and Keith "Cheggers" Chegwin when you need them?

Part of Message 30.

However the final 11 were perfect candidates for replacement with Super 200s, the 12 BAC allocated serial numbers to. This would bring BOACs Super 200 fleet to 29.

It would be 32 Super 200s:

• 17 instead of the OTL Super VC.10s that were built for BOAC.
• 13 instead of the VC.10s that BOAC cancelled.
  • And the.
• 2 that British Eagle International ordered ITTL in place of their pair of Boeing 707s that they ordered IOTL.

Part of Message 30.

I struggle to believe that if BOAC had a fleet of 29 of the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliners in the world that no other top tier airline would buy a decent sized batch.

I struggle to believe that if BOAC had a fleet of 32 of the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliners in the world that a top tier airline would buy a decent sized batch.

• They already have some-to-many Boeing 707s and DC-8s.
  • What they gain in extra revenue may be lost through increased operating costs due to operating two types of aircraft instead of one.
• BOAC obtained permission to buy its first 15 Boeing 707s (specifically for the Atlantic routes) by agreeing to buy 20 aircraft from British manufacturers.
  • That's how the VC.10 came to be designed and built in the first place.
  • None of the other top tier airlines had to do anything like that.
• Boeing and Douglas will fight back.
  • They will develop new versions of the 707 and DC-8 in the same class as the Super 200.
    • And.
  • They will do everything that they can to get the 747 and DC-10 into service sooner.

For what its worth my guess is that making the Super VC.10 the 212-seat version rather than the 163-seat version won't increase the number sold.

If you want to increase the number of VC.10s sold ITTL (which you do - and so do I) the easiest way is to avoid BOAC's partially successful attempt to cancel all 30 Super VC.10s that it had on order at the beginning of 1964. That way another 17 VC.10s are built for VC.10, there are more sales to other airlines and it may remain in production for long enough for BAC to accept the Chinese order for 30 VC.10s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 84.

I share your cynicism.

While they may have been some passengers who wanted to travel by VC.10 when it was new I doubt that lasted once the novelty factor wore off as the years went by (Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor).

In any case its not likely passengers had a choice once the VC.10 settled into service. Once a certain type was allocated to a particular route and in service in numbers large enough to have a constant pool of available aircraft to reliably serve the route, then most often as not the expected service would be as scheduled. There would have been times when 707s or VC.10s swapped for serviceability/availability reasons, but that would have been last minute changes.

I'm wary of Gardner as much as I am about George Edwards' VC.7 claims (I've much about the latter in various VC.7 threads).
A manufacturer never admits they designed a duffer. In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s. Look how that panned out . . .

FWIW, with hindsight, I should have written cautious, rather than cynical and hindsight is what alternative history is all about.

I'm not as wary of Gardner's claims as you are, because he's using BOAC's statistics to make his points, not BAC's. However, as I wrote before, he may only have used the BOAC statistics that support his case. BOAC have other statistics that don't support his case that he's not quoting.

That being written, it stands to reason, that an aircraft that was built to BOAC's specification, would have higher load factors, be cheaper to run, have higher utilisation rates and be more popular with it's passengers than an aircraft that wasn't. Or if it didn't, it was as much the fault of the customer for writing the wrong specification as it was the fault of the supplier for producing a "duff aircraft" - if not, more so.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Message 81 about Trans-Canadian Airlines/Air Canada.

If this was a VC.7 thread (rather than a VC.10 thread) and the VC.7 hadn't been a "duff aircraft" then I can see a minimum of 157 being built as follows:

• 60 BOAC in place of the 31 Boeing 707s and 29 VC.10s acquired IOTL.
• 43 RAF in place of the 6 V.1000s, 23 Britannias and 14 VC.10s ordered IOTL
  • But the V.1000s were cancelled IOTL so the RAF's getting 6 extra aircraft.
• 42 Air Canada in place of the 42 DC-8s bought ITTL.
• 10 in place of the 10 VC.10s sold to other airlines IOTL.
• 2 prototypes.
  • The OTL V.1000 prototype that was cancelled before it was completed.
    • And.
  • A second prototype for the V.1000 Mk 2, which would be built instead of the OTL VC.10 prototype. Freddie Laker bought the VC.10 prototype IOTL, he might have bought the second VC.7 prototype ITTL.

1,722 airliners in the Boeing 707's class were built IOTL. That is 1,010 Boeing 707s, 102 Convair CV.880s & 990s, 556 DC-8s and 54 VC.10s. If the VC.7 hadn't been a "duff aircraft" the 157 aircraft would have given it a would have given it a 9% market share instead of the VC.10s 3%.

 

[Caravellarella]

Trans Australian Airlines, one of the 2 heavily regulated airlines in Australia in the 60s/70s, considered the tridents operationally superior to the B727 but chose the B727 because it was chained to the earlier Ansett B727 buy. That make me think that the Trident wasn't an irredeemable loss, that picking up a few more sales, especially if it had the better performance the Medway would offer, isn't too much of a stretch.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/original-spec-dh121-vs-b727.3082/ - third post down

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[uk 75]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

 

[Rule of cool]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

I don't deny this, which is why I'm aiming for success at a European level not an American level. Double the 117 Trident sales of which 49 could be to the RAF as Nimrods and I was thinking triple the VC10 but would consider double of which 12 would be to BOAC.

As for the multiple aircraft fleets, airlines do it all the time, flying aircraft especially suited to particular routes and not flying them on others. Not just that, but they swap, and lease aircraft, airlines merge and collapse and other dive in on their fleets, like BOAC did with some of its 707s. Their operating model is different to the military that way, Air Forces prioritse flexibility so need as few fleets and as common specs as possible. While the Medway Trident wouldn't be special the VC10 Super 200 would be, and if BOAC provided the big 'anchor fleet' then other airlines which selected B707 or DC8s might have selected the VC10 S200 instead.

It's been interesting to investigate how difficult this is!

 

[JFC Fuller]

Sure, but IIUC the Super 200 was Vickers attempt at getting the most paying passengers from the overly powerful engine and highly efficient wing combo. That a design originally slated to have 151 seats could be stretched to accommodate 212 seat shows how overbuilt the original was, however in my mind getting the full stretch would right-size the basic design for commercial operation. Granted this is the tail wagging the dog; reverse engineering an overbuilt hot-and-high aircraft into an economical airliner, but who cares how you get there is the result is satisfactory.

I am curious about the apparent inherent stretchability of the basic VC-10, even excluding the later double-deck proposals. The Super 200 wasn't the limit of it, there was a 1959-60 proposal for a developed Super VC-10 stretched by a further 10ft, 38ft in total over the original VC-10 (24% length increase by my rough calculation), taking it to 222 seats. It would have had Conway Stage 7 engines (RCo.42/7) of 24,000lb thrust for take-off and specific fuel consumption of 0.758 lb./hr./lb during cruise. Fuel load would have been 24,000 gallons inclusive of the wingtip tanks that were to hold 750 gallons each.

I wonder if a truly civil VC-7, had such a thing ever been designed, would have had the same stretchability?

 

[Rule of cool]

I am curious about the apparent inherent stretchability of the basic VC-10, even excluding the later double-deck proposals. The Super 200 wasn't even the limit of it, there was a 1959-60 proposal for a developed Super VC-10 stretched by a further 10ft, 38ft in total over the original VC-10 (24% length increase by my rough calculation), taking it to 222 seats. It would have had Conway Stage 7 engines (RCo.42/7) of 24,000lb thrust for take-off and specific fuel consumption of 0.758 lb./hr./lb during cruise. Fuel load would have been 24,000 gallons inclusive of the wingtip tanks.

I think that the Super 200 was the biggest 'easy' stretch, which likely also made it a (relatively) cheap stretch for Vickers/BAC.

Going bigger would have required more engine development, and the Conway had already gone for 30% to 60% bypass ratio* for the VC10 and by the mid 60s was getting a bit long in the tooth. There was some detail trouble with the stretch to the Super with regards to the engine installation, I imagine adding wingtip tanks and another 10' stretch would have required even more detail changes and extensive testing, again driving up cost.

* The Medway had a 70% bypass ratio, Spey ~100% and the Pratt and Whitney JT-3D 142%.

 

[uk 75]

By the 1960s airliner purchase outside the US had a lot to do with politics.
Airlines that might have bought Brirish or French were now buying US or in some cases Russian jets.
The Trident's big order came not from the Commonwealth or Europe but from China. Having fallen out with Kruschev's Soviet Union but not yet wooed by Nixon the PRC opted for the Trident and would have taken VC10s if they had still been built.
Ceaucescu''s Romania did an infamous food for BAC111s deal and also would have taken VC10s.
Egypt after 1973 was another country which had fallen out of love with Russia.
The trouble is that all three went on at some point to buy US aircraft.
The Airbus A300 is arguably Europe's first large scale success story in the jet airliner business. It takes the political determination of France and W German money to do what vaccilating impoverished Britain cannot.

 

[Caravellarella]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

Yes uk 75, commonality.

In the case of BEA, they specified that their fleet of BAC 1-11-510EDs (ordered instead of Boeing 737s) would have a cockpit layout/instrumentation/systems based on their existing HS.121 Trident fleet cockpits; this is why BEA's BAC 1-11-510EDs pilots were not cross-qualified to fly other other BAC 1-11 versions.

In the case of BOAC, the original design of the VC10 was to have a VC9 Vanguard-based fuselage (as it was developed from various "Vanjet" projects) to be built in Vanguard jigs with an upper-lobe internal diameter of 10ft 11¾ inches. This was enlarged at the design stage to a wider upper-lobe internal diameter of 11ft 4¾ inches to allow the same passenger seats, cabin trim panels and cabin fittings as BOAC's fleet of Boeing 707-436s. I do recall reading that this change in fuselage diameter resulted in an £80,000.00 cost increase per unit built and would, of course, have precluded the use of Vanguard tooling.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

In the case of BOAC, the original design of the VC10 was to have a VC9 Vanguard-based fuselage (as it was developed from various "Vanjet" projects) to be built in Vanguard jigs with an upper-lobe internal diameter of 10ft 11¾ inches. This was enlarged at the design stage to a wider upper-lobe internal diameter of 11ft 4¾ inches to allow the same passenger seats, cabin trim panels and cabin fittings as BOAC's fleet of Boeing 707-436s. I do recall reading that this change in fuselage diameter resulted in an £80,000.00 cost increase per unit built and would, of course, have precluded the use of Vanguard tooling.

IIUC Vickers originally designed the VC10 to break even at 80 units, then BOAC ordered 25 so Vickers changed production plans to re-use Vanguard jigs and break even at 35 units. In January 1958 BOAC ordered 35 + 20 options, so Vickers decided to not re-use Vanguard jigs.

Presumably this fits in with using the 707 trim etc?

 

[Rule of cool]

By the 1960s airliner purchase outside the US had a lot to do with politics.
Airlines that might have bought Brirish or French were now buying US or in some cases Russian jets.
The Trident's big order came not from the Commonwealth or Europe but from China. Having fallen out with Kruschev's Soviet Union but not yet wooed by Nixon the PRC opted for the Trident and would have taken VC10s if they had still been built.
Ceaucescu''s Romania did an infamous food for BAC111s deal and also would have taken VC10s.
Egypt after 1973 was another country which had fallen out of love with Russia.
The trouble is that all three went on at some point to buy US aircraft.
The Airbus A300 is arguably Europe's first large scale success story in the jet airliner business. It takes the political determination of France and W German money to do what vaccilating impoverished Britain cannot.

I haven't really given much thought to China, I think once the 747 enters service the Super 200 is done. However, if BOAC had taken the extra 12 Supers (in whatever form) and a couple of the other potential buyers had bought in their small numbers its possible the VC10 might still be in production to get 10 instead of 707s.

As for the politics, it's hard to imagine now how different thing were in the 60s. I think its @alertken who had said that British people could only take 50 pounds out of the country, and national economies and industries were considerably more important than they were in the era of 'globalisation'.

 

[Rule of cool]

Here's a question.

Apparently Aerolineas Argentinas was a potential customer, according to VC10.net the type designation was to be 1125 and may have been a hybrid standard/Super design. AA bought 6 B707s so presumably they would have bought a similar number of VC10s.

Give the VC10s excellent short field performance and the short distance of mainland Argentina could VC10s have flown into Stanley during the airlift that occurred prior to the war? B737, BAC1-11 and F28s all did.