WI Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 80.

• Capital Airlines bought the second largest number of Viscounts, between BEA (71) and TCA (now Air Canada) (51).
  • That's a total of 185 and is about 40% of the 444 Viscounts that were built.

Gardner credits much of the success of the Viscount to Air Canada. IIRC they told Vickers how to build airliners to North American standards and how to do North American customer service/after-sales service. However, I haven't re-read that part of the book so I may be wrong with the exact details.

Air Canada was the second (of two) customers for the Vanguard and bought 23 of the 44 built. IIRC BEA (the other customer) was so impressed with the Vanguards being built for Air Canada that it had 14 of the 20 aircraft that it had on order completed to the same standard as Air Canada's aircraft.

IIRC Air Canada wanted to buy the VC.7 and the VC.11. It didn't buy the Trident or BAC-111 because it bought 39 Boeing 727s and
53 DC-9s. It also bought 42 DC-8s including 11 with RR Conway engines.

Given the above Air Canada may have bought 39 Medway-Tridents instead of the 39 Boeing 707s and 53 BAC-111s if Rolls Royce was able to produce a more powerful engine (e.g. the Medway) for it.

However, it would be harder to get it to buy VC.10s instead of some of its DC-8s. It could have IOTL, but didn't, which I think is due to already having some DC-8s and it wanted to standardise on the type. Well that and BOAC's anti-VC.10 campaign.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm trying to see how Panair do Brasil would be a viable customer for the Super VC10 200; the airline was often on a "struggle-bus". Of their four DC-8s, one was written off, of their four Caravelles, one was bent beyond repair during collision-avoidance aerobatics, they couldn't afford to buy a fleet of DC-6As and had to lease them from Loide, the rest of their fleet consisted of four DC-7Cs (using the deposits for their undelivered Comet 2s) and several very old Constellations. They struggled for years to meet their scheduled routes until their politically-motivated demise. Their longest route segment was Rio de Janeiro to Dakar and then stops all along the way to London and Beirut. Interestingly Panair do Brasil was the first customer to take options on the Super Caravelle SST design project, but I wonder why Panair do Brasil would need a 212-seat 5,000 mile range jet airliner?

Terry (Caravellarella)

As far as I know, nobody is. For one thing VC.10s can't be substituted for its DC-8s because the latter were delivered before the former went into service. Secondly, it went bust a year after the Standard VC.10 entered service.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 79.

Trans Australian Airlines, one of the 2 heavily regulated airlines in Australia in the 60s/70s, considered the tridents operationally superior to the B727 but chose the B727 because it was chained to the earlier Ansett B727 buy. That make me think that the Trident wasn't an irredeemable loss, that picking up a few more sales, especially if it had the better performance the Medway would offer, isn't too much of a stretch.

FWIW (1).

• Ansett ANA bought 22 Boeing 727s, 28 Boeing 737 Classics and 13 DC-9s.
• Ansett Worldwide (a leasing company) bought 87 Boeing 737 Classics and 15 DC-9s.
• TAA bought 18 Boeing 727s and 36 Boeing 737 Classics.
  • And.
• Air New Zealand bought 19 Boeing 737 Classics.

That's a total of 40 Boeing 727s, 83 Boeing 737 Classics and 13 DC-9s from Ansett ANA, TAA and Air NZ, which might be 40 Medway-Tridents and 96 BAC-111s in your timeline.

FWIW (2) If: the Nimrod is based on the Medway-Trident, instead of the Comet ITTL; and it enters service in the middle 1960s rather than 1970; and Australia's domestic airlines buy the Medway-Trident; then the RAAF and RNZAF might buy it instead of the 35 new Lockheed Orions that they bought IOTL; starting with the 15 P-3Bs they bought in the 1960s.

FWIW (3) Ansett bought 4 Viscounts. I've already mentioned that TAA bought 12 Viscounts.

 

[Hood]

Was the VC.10 really a nicer aircraft to fly in? Is there anyone here who's been a passenger in both? As far as I can tell the only advantage the VC.10 had over the Boeing 707 is that having the engines at the back rather than on the wings may have made it quieter for the passengers.

My cynical side makes me think that the real reason for the above and for the VC.10,s much higher load factors was patriotism. The management of BOAC may have put profit before patriotism, but the Man on the Clapham Omnibus did differently. "I'm backing Britain!"

I share your cynicism.
While they may have been some passengers who wanted to travel by VC.10 when it was new I doubt that lasted once the novelty factor wore off as the years went by (Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor).

In any case its not likely passengers had a choice once the VC.10 settled into service. Once a certain type was allocated to a particular route and in service in numbers large enough to have a constant pool of available aircraft to reliably serve the route, then most often as not the expected service would be as scheduled. There would have been times when 707s or VC.10s swapped for serviceability/availability reasons, but that would have been last minute changes.

I'm wary of Gardner as much as I am about George Edwards' VC.7 claims (I've much about the latter in various VC.7 threads).
A manufacturer never admits they designed a duffer. In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s. Look how that panned out....

Perhaps. I would posit that the Super VC10 200 was just too much aeroplane in 1960 for 1964/65 service.

I agree. The Boeing 747 was too much aeroplane for 1969 as well and nearly flopped and nearly took Boeing down with it.
A manufacturer could always build as large or as fast (or as small and slow) as they wanted, but if it didn't chime with what the airlines wanted/could afford/finance/lease then it didn't sell. And sometimes the airlines didn't really know what they wanted. Trident was tailored to BEA and flopped, Lufthansa took a punt on the unknown 737 Boeing was desperate to find a buyer for and inadvertently begat a commercial giant.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor

I'd argue that the 747 did to some extent - the idea of flying on a 'Jumbo Jet' as something noteworthy was certainly still around in the 1990s.

In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s.

In their (partial) defence, those forecasts were based on oil prices staying low, and a continuation of entry and price restrictions.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 30.

In addition to those B707s BOAC received 12 VC10s and 17 Super VC10s, and serial numbers were allocated to 3 standard and 12 Super VC10s for BOAC but not built.

I think you're referring to this list: https://www.vc10.net/Data/vickers_vc10_prodnumbers.html which shows constructors numbers for 3 Standard and 13 Super VC.10s for BOAC that weren't built. That's BOAC had firm orders for 45 VC.10s in 1960, but the total was reduced in stages to 42 and then 29.

According to Gardner.

Vickers, however, were, at the time, privately hopeful of further substantial sales to BOAC because they had seen a detailed BOAC forecast, sent to the Minister, which showed an eventual need, by 1967, not of thirty-five aircraft, but sixty-two, and, by Vickers’ reckoning, a sale of sixty-two VC.10s would prove profitable and Weybridge badly needed the work. So, in May 1957 the order was announced for thirty-five VC.10s for use on the southern and eastern routes but the aircraft was to have the important new capability of development to serve the North Atlantic. This later proviso was made to cover the further twenty-seven of the sixty-two aircraft mentioned in the BOAC statement to the Minister, and the contract, when signed for thirty-five aircraft in January 1958, included an option for twenty more.

Therefore, the situation in January 1958 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 35 aircraft with options for 20 more for a total of 55 aircraft and all 55 were Standard VC.10s.

In January 1960, just as BOAC was being formed, Vickers ran into financial trouble over the VC.10. The cost estimates had been discovered to be under-estimated by “quite a lot” (as Sir George told the Select Committee) and, unless orders for ten of the twenty on option were made firm, the whole VC.10 production would be in jeopardy. These ten aircraft were to be of the developed type (Super VC.10), stretched and improved to be suitable for the North Atlantic, with maximum seating for 212 people.

Therefore, in January 1960, the Super VC.10 was what you call the VC10 Super 200.

In June 1960, the contract for the extra ten Super VC.10s was signed, making forty-five aircraft in all. Undoubtedly there was an element of duress about this extra order because the Minister had now added his pressure to that of Vickers, the VC.10 prospects being part of the Minister’s own plans for the formation of BAC. Certainly the incoming Chairman of BOAC, Sir Matthew Slattery, tried, unsuccessfully, to stop the contract being signed before he took office in July but was told that, because of Ministry pressure it was too late.

Therefore, the situation in June 1960 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 45 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 55 aircraft. Of the 45 on order 35 were Standard VC.10s and 10 were Super VC.10s with the latter being what you call the VC.10 Super 200.

During the next year, BOAC wanted the specification of the Super VC.10 altered downwards to 163 seats, and this was done, giving the aeroplane a smaller capacity but a greater suitability for its deployment on all BOAC routes, North Atlantic included. Both parties seemed happy with the new specification, and the overall contract was freely altered to fifteen Standard VC.10s and thirty Super VC.10s. Later, the fifteen Standards were reduced to twelve to keep the mounting cost of the whole order within the Treasury’s capital authority. BOAC paid £600,000 compensation to Vickers.

Therefore, the situation in 1962 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 42 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 52 aircraft. Of the 42 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 30 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

So far. So good. However, two years later . . .

In January 1964, Sir Giles Guthrie became Chairman of BOAC (three months before the first Standard VC.10 services were introduced) and Guthrie immediately began drastically to re-organise BOAC, and its route structure. He first decided to cut the order for thirty Super VC.10s to seven and then to cancel the lot and buy six Boeing 707-320Cs instead. Prior to the publication of this decision, there had begun what appeared to be a BOAC-orchestrated campaign against the VC.10 in certain parts of the media, and this campaign did undoubted harm to sales prospects. It is hard to sell an aircraft whose own home customer is proclaiming lack its lack of faith in it from the housetops.

Therefore, the situation in January 1964 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 12 VC.10s with option for no more for a total of 12. The 12 aircraft on order were all Standard VC.10s.

The Government, however, refused (July 1964) to accept the Guthrie all-American plan, and told him to take seventeen of the thirty Super VC.10s to meet his new estimated requirements up to 1967, and to keep ten more on option – production for BOAC to be “suspended” after the seventeenth aircraft. At the same time, the remaining three BOAC Super VC.10 positions were allocated to the Royal Air Force, which had already increased its VC.10 order to eleven, this new decision thus bringing the RAF total to fourteen. All fourteen of the RAF aircraft were made to the “mixture” specification already described.

Therefore, the situation in July 1964 was that BOAC had placed firm orders 29 VC.10s with options for 10 more for a total of 39 aircraft. Of the 29 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 17 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

Finally, in March 1966 – a year after the Super VC.10 had entered service on the North Atlantic – BOAC cancelled its “suspended” option for ten aircraft and paid £7½ million in cancellation charges.

Therefore, the situation in March 1966 was that BOAC had placed firm orders for 29 VC.10s with options for no more for a total of 29. Of the 29 on order 12 were Standard VC.10s and 17 were Super VC.10s, with the latter being the 163-seat version rather than the 212-seat version.

Part of Message 30.

If the full 28" stretch VC10 Super 200 was built they'd be delivered from 1966, so there's likely nothing can be done about the first 18 B707s, they were delivered even before the first standard VC10. Even the 3 Cunard Eagle they got were likely too early to be replaced by VC10s, and the standards were unsuitable anyway.

First, ITTL the full 28' (not 28'') stretch VC.10 Super 200 would have been delivered from 1965 in place of the OTL Super VC.10 and all the Super VC.10s built IOTL would have been built to that standard ITTL.

Second, there's absolutely nothing that could be done about the first 18 Boeing 707s, because they were delivered 1960-63, while the Standard VC.10 entered service in 1964 and the Super VC.10 entered service in 1965.

Third, the 2 (not 3) Cunard Eagle Boeing 707s were delivered in 1962. Therefore, it's impossible for a pair of VC.10s to be built in their place ITTL.

Fourth, British Eagle International Airways ordered their pair of Boeing 707 on 06.01.67. Therefore, it's perfectly feasible for a pair of Super VC.10s to be ordered on the same date.

• IOTL one was delivered to Airlift International in 1967
  • ITTL may be the VC.10s only US sale.
    • And.
  • The airline may sell it to BOAC in 1968. See below.
• The other was delivered to British Eagle on 21.12.67, but remained in Seattle until being registered as VR-BCP on 04.02.68.
  • It was leased to Middle East Airlines between March 1968 and November 1968.
    • So MEA would have operated one more VC.10 ITTL and one less Boeing 707 ITTL.
  • The aircraft was sold to BOAC as G-ATZD on 06.12.68.

Fifth, there was the Boeing 707 (ordered by Saturn Airways) but delivered to BOAC on 27.06.68. I don't see Saturn Airways ordering a VC.10 ITTL. However, Airlift International and BOAC may do a swap. See below.

• In 1968 Airlift International buys the 707 originally ordered by Saturn Airways, instead of BOAC buying it.
  • And.
• In 1968 Airlift International sells the VC.10 that it acquired in 1967 to BOAC.

I know this is 8 years before "The Multi-Coloured Swap Shop", but where are Noel Edmonds and Keith "Cheggers" Chegwin when you need them?

Part of Message 30.

However the final 11 were perfect candidates for replacement with Super 200s, the 12 BAC allocated serial numbers to. This would bring BOACs Super 200 fleet to 29.

It would be 32 Super 200s:

• 17 instead of the OTL Super VC.10s that were built for BOAC.
• 13 instead of the VC.10s that BOAC cancelled.
  • And the.
• 2 that British Eagle International ordered ITTL in place of their pair of Boeing 707s that they ordered IOTL.

Part of Message 30.

I struggle to believe that if BOAC had a fleet of 29 of the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliners in the world that no other top tier airline would buy a decent sized batch.

I struggle to believe that if BOAC had a fleet of 32 of the most capacious trans-Atlantic airliners in the world that a top tier airline would buy a decent sized batch.

• They already have some-to-many Boeing 707s and DC-8s.
  • What they gain in extra revenue may be lost through increased operating costs due to operating two types of aircraft instead of one.
• BOAC obtained permission to buy its first 15 Boeing 707s (specifically for the Atlantic routes) by agreeing to buy 20 aircraft from British manufacturers.
  • That's how the VC.10 came to be designed and built in the first place.
  • None of the other top tier airlines had to do anything like that.
• Boeing and Douglas will fight back.
  • They will develop new versions of the 707 and DC-8 in the same class as the Super 200.
    • And.
  • They will do everything that they can to get the 747 and DC-10 into service sooner.

For what its worth my guess is that making the Super VC.10 the 212-seat version rather than the 163-seat version won't increase the number sold.

If you want to increase the number of VC.10s sold ITTL (which you do - and so do I) the easiest way is to avoid BOAC's partially successful attempt to cancel all 30 Super VC.10s that it had on order at the beginning of 1964. That way another 17 VC.10s are built for VC.10, there are more sales to other airlines and it may remain in production for long enough for BAC to accept the Chinese order for 30 VC.10s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 84.

I share your cynicism.

While they may have been some passengers who wanted to travel by VC.10 when it was new I doubt that lasted once the novelty factor wore off as the years went by (Concorde is probably the only airliner to ever maintain its novelty factor).

In any case its not likely passengers had a choice once the VC.10 settled into service. Once a certain type was allocated to a particular route and in service in numbers large enough to have a constant pool of available aircraft to reliably serve the route, then most often as not the expected service would be as scheduled. There would have been times when 707s or VC.10s swapped for serviceability/availability reasons, but that would have been last minute changes.

I'm wary of Gardner as much as I am about George Edwards' VC.7 claims (I've much about the latter in various VC.7 threads).
A manufacturer never admits they designed a duffer. In 1966 plenty of economists/bean counters at Lockheed, Boeing, BAC etc. earnestly forecast huge fleets of supersonics by the 1990s. Look how that panned out . . .

FWIW, with hindsight, I should have written cautious, rather than cynical and hindsight is what alternative history is all about.

I'm not as wary of Gardner's claims as you are, because he's using BOAC's statistics to make his points, not BAC's. However, as I wrote before, he may only have used the BOAC statistics that support his case. BOAC have other statistics that don't support his case that he's not quoting.

That being written, it stands to reason, that an aircraft that was built to BOAC's specification, would have higher load factors, be cheaper to run, have higher utilisation rates and be more popular with it's passengers than an aircraft that wasn't. Or if it didn't, it was as much the fault of the customer for writing the wrong specification as it was the fault of the supplier for producing a "duff aircraft" - if not, more so.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Message 81 about Trans-Canadian Airlines/Air Canada.

If this was a VC.7 thread (rather than a VC.10 thread) and the VC.7 hadn't been a "duff aircraft" then I can see a minimum of 157 being built as follows:

• 60 BOAC in place of the 31 Boeing 707s and 29 VC.10s acquired IOTL.
• 43 RAF in place of the 6 V.1000s, 23 Britannias and 14 VC.10s ordered IOTL
  • But the V.1000s were cancelled IOTL so the RAF's getting 6 extra aircraft.
• 42 Air Canada in place of the 42 DC-8s bought ITTL.
• 10 in place of the 10 VC.10s sold to other airlines IOTL.
• 2 prototypes.
  • The OTL V.1000 prototype that was cancelled before it was completed.
    • And.
  • A second prototype for the V.1000 Mk 2, which would be built instead of the OTL VC.10 prototype. Freddie Laker bought the VC.10 prototype IOTL, he might have bought the second VC.7 prototype ITTL.

1,722 airliners in the Boeing 707's class were built IOTL. That is 1,010 Boeing 707s, 102 Convair CV.880s & 990s, 556 DC-8s and 54 VC.10s. If the VC.7 hadn't been a "duff aircraft" the 157 aircraft would have given it a would have given it a 9% market share instead of the VC.10s 3%.

 

[Caravellarella]

Trans Australian Airlines, one of the 2 heavily regulated airlines in Australia in the 60s/70s, considered the tridents operationally superior to the B727 but chose the B727 because it was chained to the earlier Ansett B727 buy. That make me think that the Trident wasn't an irredeemable loss, that picking up a few more sales, especially if it had the better performance the Medway would offer, isn't too much of a stretch.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/original-spec-dh121-vs-b727.3082/ - third post down

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[uk 75]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

 

[Rule of cool]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

I don't deny this, which is why I'm aiming for success at a European level not an American level. Double the 117 Trident sales of which 49 could be to the RAF as Nimrods and I was thinking triple the VC10 but would consider double of which 12 would be to BOAC.

As for the multiple aircraft fleets, airlines do it all the time, flying aircraft especially suited to particular routes and not flying them on others. Not just that, but they swap, and lease aircraft, airlines merge and collapse and other dive in on their fleets, like BOAC did with some of its 707s. Their operating model is different to the military that way, Air Forces prioritse flexibility so need as few fleets and as common specs as possible. While the Medway Trident wouldn't be special the VC10 Super 200 would be, and if BOAC provided the big 'anchor fleet' then other airlines which selected B707 or DC8s might have selected the VC10 S200 instead.

It's been interesting to investigate how difficult this is!

 

[JFC Fuller]

Sure, but IIUC the Super 200 was Vickers attempt at getting the most paying passengers from the overly powerful engine and highly efficient wing combo. That a design originally slated to have 151 seats could be stretched to accommodate 212 seat shows how overbuilt the original was, however in my mind getting the full stretch would right-size the basic design for commercial operation. Granted this is the tail wagging the dog; reverse engineering an overbuilt hot-and-high aircraft into an economical airliner, but who cares how you get there is the result is satisfactory.

I am curious about the apparent inherent stretchability of the basic VC-10, even excluding the later double-deck proposals. The Super 200 wasn't the limit of it, there was a 1959-60 proposal for a developed Super VC-10 stretched by a further 10ft, 38ft in total over the original VC-10 (24% length increase by my rough calculation), taking it to 222 seats. It would have had Conway Stage 7 engines (RCo.42/7) of 24,000lb thrust for take-off and specific fuel consumption of 0.758 lb./hr./lb during cruise. Fuel load would have been 24,000 gallons inclusive of the wingtip tanks that were to hold 750 gallons each.

I wonder if a truly civil VC-7, had such a thing ever been designed, would have had the same stretchability?

 

[Rule of cool]

I am curious about the apparent inherent stretchability of the basic VC-10, even excluding the later double-deck proposals. The Super 200 wasn't even the limit of it, there was a 1959-60 proposal for a developed Super VC-10 stretched by a further 10ft, 38ft in total over the original VC-10 (24% length increase by my rough calculation), taking it to 222 seats. It would have had Conway Stage 7 engines (RCo.42/7) of 24,000lb thrust for take-off and specific fuel consumption of 0.758 lb./hr./lb during cruise. Fuel load would have been 24,000 gallons inclusive of the wingtip tanks.

I think that the Super 200 was the biggest 'easy' stretch, which likely also made it a (relatively) cheap stretch for Vickers/BAC.

Going bigger would have required more engine development, and the Conway had already gone for 30% to 60% bypass ratio* for the VC10 and by the mid 60s was getting a bit long in the tooth. There was some detail trouble with the stretch to the Super with regards to the engine installation, I imagine adding wingtip tanks and another 10' stretch would have required even more detail changes and extensive testing, again driving up cost.

* The Medway had a 70% bypass ratio, Spey ~100% and the Pratt and Whitney JT-3D 142%.

 

[uk 75]

By the 1960s airliner purchase outside the US had a lot to do with politics.
Airlines that might have bought Brirish or French were now buying US or in some cases Russian jets.
The Trident's big order came not from the Commonwealth or Europe but from China. Having fallen out with Kruschev's Soviet Union but not yet wooed by Nixon the PRC opted for the Trident and would have taken VC10s if they had still been built.
Ceaucescu''s Romania did an infamous food for BAC111s deal and also would have taken VC10s.
Egypt after 1973 was another country which had fallen out of love with Russia.
The trouble is that all three went on at some point to buy US aircraft.
The Airbus A300 is arguably Europe's first large scale success story in the jet airliner business. It takes the political determination of France and W German money to do what vaccilating impoverished Britain cannot.

 

[Caravellarella]

Boeing's genius was to create and deliver a coherent family of aircraft with similar cockpits. Lufthansa even boasted in its late 60s ads that it had an all Boeing fleet.
Sadly both BEA and BOAC left to their own devices would have done the same.
Douglas did a pretty good job of coming second. KLM, SAS and Swissair used their family.
The UK had its typical "Fred in a Shed' approach. Neither BAC nor Hawker Siddeley could offer an economic family of aircraft for cost conscious airlines.
This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

Yes uk 75, commonality.

In the case of BEA, they specified that their fleet of BAC 1-11-510EDs (ordered instead of Boeing 737s) would have a cockpit layout/instrumentation/systems based on their existing HS.121 Trident fleet cockpits; this is why BEA's BAC 1-11-510EDs pilots were not cross-qualified to fly other other BAC 1-11 versions.

In the case of BOAC, the original design of the VC10 was to have a VC9 Vanguard-based fuselage (as it was developed from various "Vanjet" projects) to be built in Vanguard jigs with an upper-lobe internal diameter of 10ft 11¾ inches. This was enlarged at the design stage to a wider upper-lobe internal diameter of 11ft 4¾ inches to allow the same passenger seats, cabin trim panels and cabin fittings as BOAC's fleet of Boeing 707-436s. I do recall reading that this change in fuselage diameter resulted in an £80,000.00 cost increase per unit built and would, of course, have precluded the use of Vanguard tooling.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Rule of cool]

In the case of BOAC, the original design of the VC10 was to have a VC9 Vanguard-based fuselage (as it was developed from various "Vanjet" projects) to be built in Vanguard jigs with an upper-lobe internal diameter of 10ft 11¾ inches. This was enlarged at the design stage to a wider upper-lobe internal diameter of 11ft 4¾ inches to allow the same passenger seats, cabin trim panels and cabin fittings as BOAC's fleet of Boeing 707-436s. I do recall reading that this change in fuselage diameter resulted in an £80,000.00 cost increase per unit built and would, of course, have precluded the use of Vanguard tooling.

IIUC Vickers originally designed the VC10 to break even at 80 units, then BOAC ordered 25 so Vickers changed production plans to re-use Vanguard jigs and break even at 35 units. In January 1958 BOAC ordered 35 + 20 options, so Vickers decided to not re-use Vanguard jigs.

Presumably this fits in with using the 707 trim etc?

 

[Rule of cool]

By the 1960s airliner purchase outside the US had a lot to do with politics.
Airlines that might have bought Brirish or French were now buying US or in some cases Russian jets.
The Trident's big order came not from the Commonwealth or Europe but from China. Having fallen out with Kruschev's Soviet Union but not yet wooed by Nixon the PRC opted for the Trident and would have taken VC10s if they had still been built.
Ceaucescu''s Romania did an infamous food for BAC111s deal and also would have taken VC10s.
Egypt after 1973 was another country which had fallen out of love with Russia.
The trouble is that all three went on at some point to buy US aircraft.
The Airbus A300 is arguably Europe's first large scale success story in the jet airliner business. It takes the political determination of France and W German money to do what vaccilating impoverished Britain cannot.

I haven't really given much thought to China, I think once the 747 enters service the Super 200 is done. However, if BOAC had taken the extra 12 Supers (in whatever form) and a couple of the other potential buyers had bought in their small numbers its possible the VC10 might still be in production to get 10 instead of 707s.

As for the politics, it's hard to imagine now how different thing were in the 60s. I think its @alertken who had said that British people could only take 50 pounds out of the country, and national economies and industries were considerably more important than they were in the era of 'globalisation'.

 

[Rule of cool]

Here's a question.

Apparently Aerolineas Argentinas was a potential customer, according to VC10.net the type designation was to be 1125 and may have been a hybrid standard/Super design. AA bought 6 B707s so presumably they would have bought a similar number of VC10s.

Give the VC10s excellent short field performance and the short distance of mainland Argentina could VC10s have flown into Stanley during the airlift that occurred prior to the war? B737, BAC1-11 and F28s all did.

 

[alertken]

Traditionally built Brits. (RoC # 79 “brick dunnies” please explain): I know not of providence of this site:

Boeing707-320 performance | aircraft investigation info | passengeraircraft

Operating empty weight, 64,600kg. TWA mixed config. 151 pax, So: 428 kg oew/seat

Super VC10: oew 71,155kg, “typical” config 139 pax. So: 520 kg oew/seat.

That alone explains why BOAC/BA operated 707-320B to 6/84, Super VC10 to 4/81.

 

[Rule of cool]

Traditionally built Brits. (RoC # 79 “brick dunnies” please explain): I know not of providence of this site:

Boeing707-320 performance | aircraft investigation info | passengeraircraft

Operating empty weight, 64,600kg. TWA mixed config. 151 pax, So: 428 kg oew/seat

Super VC10: oew 71,155kg, “typical” config 139 pax. So: 520 kg oew/seat.

That alone explains why BOAC/BA operated 707-320B to 6/84, Super VC10 to 4/81.

Here are some rough guess numbers for the VC10 Super 200.

13' stretch and fin tank added about 4,467kg to the VC10s weight, my guess is the full 28' stretch would have added about another 5,000kg bringing the empty weight to about 76,200kg.

Two class 'typical' configuration for both Super VC10 and B707 reduced seating by about 30 from max capacity, so a 212 seat Super 200 would have a typical config of about 180 pax.

That makes the Super 200 have 423 kg oew/seat. Bear in mind there are rough guess numbers, those with more knowledge and mathematical ability than myself can redo them.

However the B707 had the ~18,000 lbs JT3D with a 1:1.42 bypass ratio whereas the VC10 had the 22,500lbs late model Conway with a bypass ratio of 1:0.6. I'm guessing the more powerful Conway would be slightly more thirsty.

All in all, given the political-economic situation of the era where much greater weight was given to buying domestics by state owned airlines I don't think these numbers would be the clincher either way.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Trident's big order came not from the Commonwealth or Europe but from China. Having fallen out with Kruschev's Soviet Union but not yet wooed by Nixon the PRC opted for the Trident and would have taken VC10s if they had still been built.

I haven't really given much thought to China, I think once the 747 enters service the Super 200 is done. However, if BOAC had taken the extra 12 Supers (in whatever form) and a couple of the other potential buyers had bought in their small numbers its possible the VC10 might still be in production to get 10 instead of 707s.

I've already mentioned that in the early 1970s China wanted to buy 30 VC.10s, but it wasn't economical to re-start production.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As for the politics, it's hard to imagine now how different thing were in the 60s. I think its @alertken who had said that British people could only take 50 pounds out of the country, and national economies and industries were considerably more important than they were in the era of 'globalisation'.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iaantXm3CM

 

[Rule of cool]

I've already mentioned that in the early 1970s China wanted to buy 30 VC.10s, but it wasn't economical to re-start production.

If BOAC got those extra 12 Supers (S200s ITTL) and a few other little orders came in, 8-10 units maybe, would that keep production going just long enough to make it worthwhile to build ~30 for China? 54 OTL + 12 BOAC + ~9 for small buyers + 30 for China would more or less double OTL VC10 production.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IIUC Vickers originally designed the VC10 to break even at 80 units, then BOAC ordered 25 so Vickers changed production plans to re-use Vanguard jigs and break even at 35 units. In January 1958 BOAC ordered 35 + 20 options, so Vickers decided to not re-use Vanguard jigs.

54 VC.10s sold ITTL which was 26 sales short of the number originally required to break even and about two-thirds of the number required to break even.

According to Gardner.

• Vickers Limited’s loss on the VC.10 was some £20 million
• Her Majesty's Government paid.
  • £10.2 million (for what had hitherto been a private venture) towards the launching cost, which eventually reached £50 million. The Government money was paid between 1961 and 1963.
  • £30.0 million to BOAC as an operating subsidy for the Super VC.10, which it claimed was “too expensive to operate economically” and turned out to be cheaper to fly than the 707 and also to attract more passengers.
• BOAC paid compensation and cancellation charges to the tune of £8 million to Vickers.
  • £600,000 compensation to Vickers, when the number of Standard VC.10s was reduced from 15 to 12 to keep the mounting cost of the whole order within the Treasury's capital authority.
  • £7½ million in cancellation charges in March 1966 when the airline cancelled its “suspended” option for ten aircraft.

How can Vickers sell another 26 aircraft and break even according to the original estimate?

The airframes section on VC10.net contains the construction numbers of 19 aircraft that weren't built.

• 3 are the BOAC Standard VC.10s that were cancelled to keep within the Treasury's capital authority.
• 13 are the BOAC Super VC.10s that BOAC cancelled in 1964.
• 2 are the pair of Standard VC.10s ordered by Nigeria Airways.
  • They weren't built, but the airline leased 3 from BOAC 1964-67 and bought one from BOAC in 1969.
  • It also took delivery of the first of 3 Boeing 707-320Cs in 1971.
  • Therefore, ITTL.
    • The 2 aircraft ordered IOTL were delivered in 1964 instead of 2 of the 3 that were leased 1964-66.
    • It bought a third new aircraft in the late 1960s instead of buying a second-hand aircraft.
    • It bought a 3 aircraft instead of the Boeing 707s for a total of 6 new VC.10s.
• The final aircraft is Constructor's Number 840 (registration 9G-ABU) for Ghana Airways.
  • The Other Operators section said that the airline ordered 3 Standard VC.10s and all 3 were built of which one was sold to BUA before it was delivered.
  • It says nothing about a fourth aircraft. Does anyone out there know what it is? Is it an option that wasn't taken up rather than a firm order for a fourth aircraft? Was it a replacement for the aircraft that was sold to BUA?
  • [EDIT: 02.03.25. It says elsewhere on VC10net that it was a replacement for the aircraft that was sold to BUA.]

The 19 unbuilt aircraft of OTL plus the 4 extra orders from Nigeria Airways increase the total to 77 VC.10s, only 3 aircraft short of the theoretical break even point.

Terry (@Caravellarella) said MEA tried to buy 3 Super VC.10s (not the 10 that I thought they wanted) but BAC wasn't able to provide the financing and instead bought 4 Boeing 707-320Cs. As if by magic, BAC was able to provide the financing ITTL and MEA bought 4 VC.10s instead of the 4 Boeings.

That increases the total to 81 aircraft. One more than the theoretical break-even point. It's a pity that I was wrong about MEA wanting to buy 10 VC.10s as that would have increased the number built to 87 putting the aircraft into a clear profit.

Freddie Laker (who unlike BOAC) was an enthusiastic supporter of the British aircraft industry ordered 2 Standard VC.10s for BUA when he was the managing director and took over the third Standard VC.10 from Ghana Airways. He left BUA in 1965 and formed his own airline (Laker Airways) in 1966. He bought the Standard VC.10 prototype from Vickers for his airline and sold it on to BUA which increased his former airline's fleet to 4 Standard VC.10s.

BUA (which was short for British United Airways) merged with Caledonian Airways in 1970 to create British Caledonian Airways. That Caledonian Airlines bought 2 Boeing 707-320Cs IOTL despite having to pay (IIRC) 14% import duty on the aircraft. If it had bought 2 VC.10s instead that would have increased the number of VC.10 sales to 83 aircraft.

I've already written that British Eagle International Airways ordered 2 Boeing 707-320Cs despite having to pay (IIRC) 14% import duty on them and that BOAC acquired one of them. ITTL the airline orders 2 VC.10s and both are acquired by BOAC. See Message 86 for how that happens.

That increases the number of VC.10 sales to 85 which if the original estimate was correct (and it may not have been) makes a small profit for BOAC. However, that's much better than OTL's loss of £20 million.

Gardner claimed that MEA wasn't the only potential customer, but he doesn't say who they were, so I can't make an estimate of the extra sales.

@Rule of cool mentions the Type 1125 for Aerolinias Argentinas who bought 6 Boeing 707s instead. That would increase the total to 91 and would have put the aircraft clearly into profit.

China made its offer for 30 VC.10s in 1972. It couldn't be accepted IOTL. Fortunately, the extra sales meant the VC.10 was still in production and the offer could be accepted ITTL. That increased the total to 121.

The list of airframes includes the military serials for 5 extra VC.10s for the RAF. AFAIK there were never plans to buy more than 14. Earlier in the thread I suggested that the RAF bought 45 VC.10 C.1Ks tanker-transports instead of the 14 VC.10 C.1 aircraft of OTL and converting 31 Victor Mk 1s into tankers. That would increase the number of VC.10s built from 121 to 152.

Doing so would involve spending more money in the second half of the 1960s. However, HMG gets the launch aid back from Vickers ITTL, it doesn't pay the operating subsidy to BOAC ITTL, it's got more money from BAC/Vickers in taxes ITTL because it was making a moderate profit on VC.10 ITTL instead of a huge loss and it's not converting 31 Victor Mk 1 bombers into tankers. In the medium term it doesn't convert 24 Victor Mk 2s to tankers (out of 29 planned) in the second half of the 1970s. However, it will buy all the second-hand VC.10s that it did IOTL as a source of spares and convert some of them to tankers as attrition replacements.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If BOAC got those extra 12 Supers (S200s ITTL) and a few other little orders came in, 8-10 units maybe, would that keep production going just long enough to make it worthwhile to build ~30 for China? 54 OTL + 12 BOAC + ~9 for small buyers + 30 for China would more or less double OTL VC10 production.

You're not the first person to suggest that. It was Gardner. However, it was 13 extra Supers not 12.

 

[Rule of cool]

I can't help but think that these are different planes and as such will generate at least some sales from customers we haven't thought of as well as those that we have.

The 14% import tariff is a factor that I hadn't thought of, presumably other aircraft producing countries would also have an import tariff on airliners? I'd think USA, France and Netherlands but perhaps not Germany and Italy? Even countries without tariffs on planes might have other obstacles or incentives to buy from one country or another.

 

[Rule of cool]

Whatever path BAC gets there if the VC10 is looking like breaking even in about 1967 rather than requiring more government money what happens with Airbus and the BAC 211/311?

IIUC Hawker Siddeley was linked to the emerging Airbus consortium from 1966 and the 260 seat HBN 100 was a proposal from them, Breguet and Nord. The Airbus MoU was signed in Sept 1967 with HS having 37.5% workshare for the emerging A300.

In 1966 BAC proposed a narrow body BAC211, about 200 seats and would need 50 million in Government funding to launch. Apparently, BEA liked it but the Government didn't, which isn't surprising given they were moving toward Airbus at the time with the other British airliner builder HS being a big part of that.

Does a more successful Medway Trident bend the British Government to support the Airbus and HS, or does a more successful VC10 bend the British government to support the BAC 211 or BAC 311?

As a bonus question, what happens with Rolls Royce if it produces another ~200 Conways for ~50 more VC10s and 600+ Medways for 200+ Medway Tridents but 351 less Speys? Do they still go broke in 1971?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Standard VC.10 was designed for BOAC's Eastern and Southern routes which in the Imperial Airways days were known as the Empire routes. This may be part of the reason why East African Airways, Ghana Airways and Nigeria Airways ordered VC.10s. They were at the opposite end of the Empire routes. Therefore, an aircraft designed to meet BOAC's requirements may have met their requirements.

The Southern Route was originally to South Africa via Cairo with a branch from The Sudan to West Africa. The Eastern Route was originally from Cairo to Singapore (via India) where it split into two branches. One to Hong Kong and the other to New Zealand via Australia.

Therefore, more airlines that the other end of these routes might have found the VC.10 suited their requirement, if BOAC hadn't ruined its reputation.

I've gone through my list of Boeing 707s and discovered 45 potential sales.

• 5 Air India from May 1964.
  • It bought a total of 11 Boeing 707s.
  • The other 6 were delivered from 1960.
  • The other 6 were Dash-420s with Conway engines.
• 21 Quantas from February 1965.
  • It bought a total of 34 Boeing 707s.
  • The other 13 were delivered from 1959.
• 7 South African Airways from September 1965.
  • It bought a total of 10 Boeing 707s.
  • The other 3 were delivered from 1960.
• 7 Pakistan International Airways from July 1966.
  • These were the only Boeing 707s that this airline bought.
• 3 Malaysia-Singapore Airlines from May 1968.
  • These were the only Boeing 707s that this airline bought.
• 2 Sudan Airways delivered from June 1974.
  • These were the only airlines that this airline bought.

I'll have to do some more work on my list of DC-8 customers before I can write a complementary list on airlines that might have bought the VC-10s instead of it.

Air Ceylon and Air Malawi didn't buy new VC.10s, but both airlines acquired second hand aircraft in the 1970s. Maybe they would have bought new aircraft it the VC.10 was still being built to satisfy the Chinese order.

The 4 Boeing 707s bought by Middle East Airlines instead of the frustrated order for VC.10s were delivered from November 1968 and that made me think, that if MEA was interested, other airlines from that region might have been interested too. This is reinforced by the fact that Gulf Air, the Quatar Government, Sultan of Oman and UAE's Government bought second-hand VC.10s when they could have bought second-hand 707s and DC-8s.

This is a list of 37 Boeing 707s delivered to airlines in the region from 1964.

• 5 El AL from January 1966.
  • This airline bought a total of 10 Boeing 707s.
  • The other 5 were delivered from 1960 and included 3 Dash-420s with Conway engines.
• 7 Saudi Arabian Airlines from January 1968.
  • It bought a total of 9.
  • The other 2 were delivered from 1961.
• 9 Egyptair from September 1968.
  • These were the only Boeing 707s that the airline bought.
• 5 Kuwait Airways from November 1968.
  • They were the only Boeing 707s that this airline bought.
• 3 Iran Air from December 1968.
  • These were the only Boeing 707s that the airline bought.
  • However, the Imperial Iranian Air Force bought 15 Boeing 707s that were delivered from May 1974.
• 2 Royal Jordanian from January 1971.
  • They were the only Boeing 707s that this airline bought.
• 1 Government of Egypt delivered in August 1974.
  • This was the only Boeing 707 that it bought.
• 3 Iraqi Airways from August 1974.
  • They were the only Boeing 707s that this airline bought.
• 1 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in September 1975.
  • The Royal Saudi Air Force would buy 13 military Boeing 707s in the 1980s consisting of 5 AWACS and 8 tanker aircraft.
• 1 Qatar airways in July 1977.
  • This was the only Boeing 707 that it bought.
  • This was the last civil Boeing 707 to be built.
  • The rest were military versions.

The IIAF used some of its 15 Boeing 707s as transport-tankers, which makes me think that they'd be interested in the VC.10 C.1K transport-tanker.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Message 108.

It'll help. It has been said that success breeds success. Unfortunately, OTL British aviation 1945-70-ish was often the opposite, with failure breeding failure.

 

[Rule of cool]

It'll help. It has been said that success breeds success. Unfortunately, OTL British aviation 1945-70-ish was often the opposite, with failure breeding failure.

Virtuous circle! Wooo Hooo!

As for your list of potential buyers, if the Super 200 is on the menu rather than the uneconomical OTL Super then I don't think it's unreasonable to assume some airlines on the list choose it over the 707 or DC8 for both rational commercial and rational political but non-commercial reasons. This thread has already shown how some airlines might have bought OTL VC10s but they fell through on finance or because a regulated airline chose to buy the same as the other regulated airline in the country or other arcane reason. Airline fleet management is complex and often airlines will take what they can get rather than what they'd ideally want.

Something that has been said in this thread is that from 1963 BOAC was mandated to become a profitable company. How many airlines that bought aircraft in the classes we're talking about didn't have such a mandate, or got it at different times than BOAC?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 108.

I'll have to do some more work on my list of DC-8 customers before I can write a complementary list on airlines that might have bought the VC-10s instead of it.

The only airline on the Imperial Air Routes that bought DC-8s was Air New Zealand, which bought 5 new and 3 second-hand aircraft.

• The 5 new aircraft were delivered 1965-68, so they could have bought VC.10s in their place ITTL.
• The 3 second-hand aircraft were ex-United Air Lines aircraft delivered to their original owner in 1961. The first was leased to Air New Zealand 1964-68 and the other two were purchased 1970-71.

New Zealand was the terminus of the South Eastern Branch of the Eastern Route.

Hong Kong was the terminus of the North Eastern Branch of the Eastern Route. Cathay Pacific didn't buy any new 707s or DC-8s.

• It was however one of the few customers for the Convair 880/990. It bought 2 out of the 102 that were built and acquired 7 on the second-hand market for a total of 9.
• The airline also acquired 11 second-hand Boeing 707s in the 1970s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Virtuous circle! Wooo Hooo!

As for your list of potential buyers, if the Super 200 is on the menu rather than the uneconomical OTL Super then I don't think it's unreasonable to assume some airlines on the list choose it over the 707 or DC8 for both rational commercial and rational political but non-commercial reasons. This thread has already shown how some airlines might have bought OTL VC10s but they fell through on finance or because a regulated airline chose to buy the same as the other regulated airline in the country or other arcane reason. Airline fleet management is complex and often airlines will take what they can get rather than what they'd ideally want.

Something that has been said in this thread is that from 1963 BOAC was mandated to become a profitable company. How many airlines that bought aircraft in the classes we're talking about didn't have such a mandate, or got it at different times than BOAC?

Although Charles Gardner is biased, his figures suggest that the VC.10 wasn't as uneconomical as you think and might not have been uneconomical at all.

Furthermore, I remain to be convinced that sticking to the "big-stretch" Super VC.10 would have been the panacea that you think is required. It's not required if the Standard VC.10 and "short-stretch" Super VC.10 were actually economical in the first place. Plus, if you're right, it will only be economical if the airlines that buy it can fill the extra seats with paying passengers.

What I think wrecked the sales prospects of the VC.10 was BOAC's attempt to cancel its entire order for Super VC.10s, it's successful attempt to obtain a £30 million operating subsidy for the 17 Super VC.10s the Government forced it to buy and the anti-VC.10 press campaign that preceded it. Avoid that and you sell more VC.10s.

What the VC.10 needed was a launch customer that wholeheartedly supported it. Someone in the mould of Freddie Laker at British Untied Airways (BUA) needed to be running BOAC in the first half of the 1960s.

It would have helped if the Government hadn't told BOAC to become a profitable company. Instead it could be told that it's job was to support the British economy by reducing the balance of payments. Therefore, it had to earn as much foreign currency as possible by carrying as many passengers as possible (even if it made a loss in the process) and to buy British aircraft whenever possible, which Gardner called "frustrated imports".

Making a profit wasn't part of Imperial Airways remit when HMG created in 1924 by encouraging the existing British airlines to merge. It's primary purpose was to aid British commerce by speeding the mails, which led to the Empire Air Mail Scheme of the 1930s. Being a customer for the products of the British aircraft industry and forming a reserve for the RAF were secondary duties and tertiary duties. This "state aided" airline wasn't intended to make a profit. However, to give Imperial Airways its due the size of the subsidy as a proportion of its revenue declined by the time it and British Airways Mark One were nationalised to form BOAC, also known as the Boa Constrictor.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Virtuous circle! Wooo Hooo!

As for your list of potential buyers, if the Super 200 is on the menu rather than the uneconomical OTL Super then I don't think it's unreasonable to assume some airlines on the list choose it over the 707 or DC8 for both rational commercial and rational political but non-commercial reasons. This thread has already shown how some airlines might have bought OTL VC10s but they fell through on finance or because a regulated airline chose to buy the same as the other regulated airline in the country or other arcane reason. Airline fleet management is complex and often airlines will take what they can get rather than what they'd ideally want.

Something that has been said in this thread is that from 1963 BOAC was mandated to become a profitable company. How many airlines that bought aircraft in the classes we're talking about didn't have such a mandate, or got it at different times than BOAC?

The VC.10 still has the severe handicap of being too far behind the competition. It entered service in 1964, four years behind the Convair 880/990 (1960), five years behind the DC-8 (1959), and six years behind the Boeing 707 (1958).

• The last of 102 Convair 880/990 airliners was delivered in January 1964.
• 358 out of 1,010 Boeing 707s were built to the end of 1963 and 396 to the end of 1964, which are the closest I can get to the numbers delivered before the Standard and Super VC.10 entered service respectively.
• I don't have figures for the DC-8. However, the 556th aircraft was delivered in 1972, so when the Standard and Super VC.10s entered service the DC-8 was a third to half way through its production run.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Whatever path BAC gets there if the VC10 is looking like breaking even in about 1967 rather than requiring more government money what happens with Airbus and the BAC 211/311?

IIUC Hawker Siddeley was linked to the emerging Airbus consortium from 1966 and the 260 seat HBN 100 was a proposal from them, Breguet and Nord. The Airbus MoU was signed in Sept 1967 with HS having 37.5% workshare for the emerging A300.

In 1966 BAC proposed a narrow body BAC211, about 200 seats and would need 50 million in Government funding to launch. Apparently, BEA liked it but the Government didn't, which isn't surprising given they were moving toward Airbus at the time with the other British airliner builder HS being a big part of that.

Does a more successful Medway Trident bend the British Government to support the Airbus and HS, or does a more successful VC10 bend the British government to support the BAC 211 or BAC 311?

As a bonus question, what happens with Rolls Royce if it produces another ~200 Conways for ~50 more VC10s and 600+ Medways for 200+ Medway Tridents but 351 less Speys? Do they still go broke in 1971?

Don't know, but BAC and HS are making bigger profits/smaller losses from the extra sales so they'll have more money of their own to put into these projects and developing the BAC.111.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I am curious about the apparent inherent stretchability of the basic VC-10, even excluding the later double-deck proposals. The Super 200 wasn't the limit of it, there was a 1959-60 proposal for a developed Super VC-10 stretched by a further 10ft, 38ft in total over the original VC-10 (24% length increase by my rough calculation), taking it to 222 seats. It would have had Conway Stage 7 engines (RCo.42/7) of 24,000lb thrust for take-off and specific fuel consumption of 0.758 lb./hr./lb during cruise. Fuel load would have been 24,000 gallons inclusive of the wingtip tanks that were to hold 750 gallons each.

I wonder if a truly civil VC-7, had such a thing ever been designed, would have had the same stretchability?

Do you know when Rolls Royce intended to get that version into the engine? And do you know if more powerful Conways were feasible?

I ask the question because one of my timelines has Specification C.132 produce a British C-141 analogue (with the cargo bay dimensions of the OTL Belfast) that's built for the RAF instead of the 37 Britannias, Belfasts & VC.10s acquired IOTL plus the 7 V.1000s that were ordered before it was cancelled. The RCAF might buy some too instead of its CL-44s and Boeing 707s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This thread is trying to sell a Ford or GM fleet operator a Rover and a Mini.

If it's the Rover P.6 (the first ever European Car of the Year) or even better the P.6B. What are you complaining about? The Mini out-sold every car Ford of Britain/Ford of Europe built in the Mini's era.

 

[uk 75]

If it's the Rover P.6 (the first ever European Car of the Year) or even better the P.6B. What are you complaining about? The Mini out-sold every car Ford of Britain/Ford of Europe built in the Mini's era.

And Ford still exists today.
To complete your analogy
The Trident and VC10 like the Rover and Mini were beautiful designs and engineering but they were poor businessl leaders.
BMW now owns the Mini Brand and China the Rowey.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And Ford still exists today.
To complete your analogy
The Trident and VC10 like the Rover and Mini were beautiful designs and engineering but they were poor business leaders.
BMW now owns the Mini Brand and China the Rover.

What did for Rover was that they were taken over by Leyland (which already owned Standard-Triumph). So far so good. Then HMG persuaded Leyland to merge with BMH (BMC plus Jaguar). The result was the disaster that was British Leyland.

Rover was developing some excellent cars and due to the merger only the Range Rover went into production. IIRC (1) some of the cars didn't go into production because they competed with some of Jaguars cars. IIRC (2) The rest were cancelled because (the smaller but much more profitable) Leyland spent said profits subsidising the (bigger and much less profitable) British. As a result there was no money to develop new models and put them into production. That wasn't just new cars for Standard-Triumph, it was also new buses & trucks for Leyland itself.

The British half of British Leyland may have been beyond salvation by the end of the 1960s, but the Leyland half was in good shape and there's no reason to suppose why it couldn't have survived until the present day.

Furthermore, I dispute your assertion that British management was as as bad as the likes of Corelli Barnett make it out to be. In particularly in the aviation industry. It wasn't perfect, it made mistakes, some of which were unforced errors and others that were forced errors. However, so does everyone.

And everyone includes the American aerospace industry. They made their fair share of mistakes. In the era we're talking about.

• The Lockheed Electra.
  • BEA and Vickers weren't the only people to be stung by the jet buying spree.
  • At least Vickers wasn't forced out of the airliner business like Lockheed was.
  • Admittedly, Lockheed re-entered the airliner business with the Tristar, but that was the last hurrah.
• The Convair 880/990.
  • That firm left the airliner business as a result and in GD/Convair's case, permanently.

For what it's worth.

• BMW owns the Mini Brand and the former Morris factory at Cowley that makes it.
• The mighty Ford still exist today and hasn't made a car (or commercial vehicle) in Britain since 2013.
• Therefore, at least Morris is still making cars in the UK, albeit under the ownership of BMW.
• Which is more than can be said for what used to the mighty Ford of Britain.
  • The Southampton factory closed in 2013 when production of the Transit transferred to Turkey.
  • The Dagenham factory still exists and mainly makes diesel engines for the Turkish-built Transit vans.
• The mighty Douglas no longer exists today and depending upon where you draw the line, it hasn't existed for nearly 30 years or nearly 60 years.
  • McDonnell bought Douglas in 1967.
  • Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997
  • And terminated production of the Douglas airliners it inherited.
  • The last MD-11 (really DC-11) was delivered in 2001.
  • The last DC-9 (by then called the Boeing 717) was delivered in 2006.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Parts of Message 65.

• The success story of the Super VC.10 on the North Atlantic was equally dramatic. In its first year, 1965, the Super achieved a load factor nearly 20 per cent higher than the average of fourteen other IATA operators on the North Atlantic.
  • The Figures were:
    • 71.60 per cent - Super VC.10;
    • 60.80 per cent - average BOAC;
    • 52.14 per cent – average of fourteen airlines (excluding BOAC).
• In the next year, the Super VC.10 average passenger load was 69.7 per cent and that of the fourteen other IATA airlines was 53.4 per cent. Each percentage point of passenger load-factor was worth in a year about £1.58 million to BOAC, and this made the much criticised Super VC.10s a bigger profit-earner than the “optimum” Boeing 707.

EDIT 27.02.25.

The paragraph about the Super VC.10s average passenger load being 16.3% higher than the fourteen other IATA airlines in 1966 was added. It should have been in the message to begin with.

• 16.3% multiplied by £1.58 million per percentage point equals £25.75 million.

That wipes out most of the £30 million operating subsidy that HMG paid to BOAC for accepting 17 of the 30 Super VC.10s that were ordered when it wanted to cancel the lot.

And in 1965 the load factor on BOAC's Super VC.10s was 10.8% higher than its Boeing 707s.

• 10.4% multiplied by £1.58 million per percentage point equals £17.06 million.

That wipes out the rest of the £30 million operating subsidy that HMG paid to BOAC for accepting 17 of the 30 Super VC.10s that were ordered when it wanted to cancel the lot - and then some.

That's with the 17 Super VC.10s that BOAC accepted. How much extra money would the airline have made if it had accepted the other 17 of the 30 Super VC.10s ordered instead of acquiring 11 Boeing 707-320s?

Edit: And it converts the options it had for 10 additional Super VC.10s in 1964 instead of cancelling them. That increases the total from 17 built IOTL to 40 Super VC.10s built for BOAC ITTL.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IIUC Vickers originally designed the VC10 to break even at 80 units, then BOAC ordered 25 so Vickers changed production plans to re-use Vanguard jigs and break even at 35 units. In January 1958 BOAC ordered 35 + 20 options, so Vickers decided to not re-use Vanguard jigs.

Link to Message 104 which I wrote in reply to the above.

I'd forgotten that the total of firm orders and options was 55 not 45 with 29 actually being built.

Before it went wrong there were firm orders for 45 VC.10s (15 Standard & 30 Super) plus options for another 10 Supers, making the total of 55.

I wrote in Post 104 that getting the 19 VC.10s that were assigned constructors numbers, but not built IOTL, built ITTL, increases the total built from 54 to 73 and that having Nigeria Airways buy 4 new VC.10s instead of the 3 Boeing 707s & one second-hand VC.10 built ITTL increases the total to 77 - only 3 short of the break even point.

If BOAC turned the options for 10 additional VC.10s into firm orders instead of cancelling them in 1964 that would increase it's total from 13 to 40 Super VC.10s and the total number of VC.10s built from 77 to 87. If the break even point really was 80 aircraft that would turn a small loss into a small profit.

If it sells the aircraft to Aerolineas Argentinas, CAAC, MEA and the tankers to the RAF the grand total is increased from 152 to 162 which happens to be exactly 3 times the 54 VC.10s that were built IOTL.