Which airliner should have been built?

Is this at the same time that the RAF says "We don't want it because it's too heavy" to Vickers? That's what I remember from reading "On Atlas' Shoulders" that weighty tome by Chris Gibson. (I know it's weighty because I've just taken it out of the "overflow" cupboard.) I also think he wrote that VC.7 failed because it was a military transport that was turned into an airliner and the VC.10 succeeded because it was an airliner that was turned into a military transport.
Well it was the MoS more than the Air Ministry that was very concerned about the weight, though both were concerned. The interesting thing is that the MoS was forced to put out the "we cancelled it due to not enough money for jet transports" cover story (which Maudling even continued in the published version of his diaries) in order to protect Vickers reputation. I still suspect how widely known the weight issue was outside the Weybridge design office and the corridors of Whitehall really was at that time - hence G. Edward's tears "they killed my plane" when he knew full well it needed a lot of work to get right. Arguably that's why they learned and made the VC.10 so good for STOL performance - only for BOAC to be completely disinterested.

Chris' assessment is bob on I'd say.

I've been thinking of a Tyne-Britannia (i.e. CL-44) variant built by Bristol or Short & Harland (the latter as compensation for not building 23 Proteus-Britannias for the RAF) or BEA & TCA buying CL-44s from Canadair as a quid pro quo for TCA buying VC.7s. (The latter would also be a reward for the TCA's input into the Viscount which according to Gardner was the secret of its success.) I suggested as much earlier in the thread.

I think a Tyne-Britannia is a cool idea.
For TCA you wanted a Vanguard replacement and for me the standard CL-44 is too big - 5,100 mile range and far more AUW than you need for intercity hopping (Vanguard was around 1,400 miles, only 20 less passengers). The Vanguard was designed for maximum passenger density. I think it was the right track but the wrong engines, a twin-jet or tri-jet Vanguard would have been the right plane at the right time.

I think its a bit frustrating that all the best airliners are coming from Vickers and they can't do everything at once. I wonder if a path like going for the Bristol 200 (also mooted for Convair licence-production) over Trident is a better move? Then we have a BAC line up of:
Britannia (Proteus and Tyne flavours)
VC.7
Bristol 200
1-11

HSA not got much pickings left without Trident, maybe Avro 761/771 instead of 1-11? Of course they still have 748. Maybe Dobson forks out some money and offers Sir FHP a decent price to let HP into HSA bringing with it HP.124 (ordered for the RAF instead of Andover) and Jetstream? That fits nicely with DH's Jet Dragon and sets up HSA for the business market.
Then come the mid-60s we say "non" to Concorde and instead invest in 2-11 or place all bets on A300.
 
On resources - I had a terrible nagging thought. Does anyone know if Vickers intended to keep using DTD 683 on the V.1000/VC.7 given its Valiant origins?

If so they might have had a fatigue problem in the wings (pun partially intended!).
Two British airliners with fatigue issues within a decade would well have buried the industry.
 
Vickers and Convair in a transatlantic alliance.....quite a AH Scenario!
Bleed over into fighters and a Vickers license.

HP joins HSA.....all sorts of chaos flows. The Minister approves and so bounty flows into HP.....

But equally what about Airco?
 
On resources - I had a terrible nagging thought. Does anyone know if Vickers intended to keep using DTD 683 on the V.1000/VC.7 given its Valiant origins?

If so they might have had a fatigue problem in the wings (pun partially intended!).
Two British airliners with fatigue issues within a decade would well have buried the industry.
For what it's worth my father did his National Service 1956-58 maintaining the electrics of a Valiant in No. 138 Squadron. (I think he joined the squadron not long after the Suez War.) He's told me on several occasions that the cracks were already showing and I think he's said than another group of mechanics was riveting the cracks together. The squadron reformed in January 1955 which means the aircraft would have been less than 3 years old at this point.

Correction: He joined the squadron in late 1956 so the aircraft would have been less than 2 years old at this point, not less than 3 years old.
 
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But equally what about Airco?
Airco was DH, Fairey Aviation and Hunting Aircraft.
So if Airco was a go things would be very different, you could in theory have the Hunting 107 which became the larger 1-11 under BAC would likely stay small and sit beneath the Trident. A Medway Trident and Hunting regional jet sounds a tasty combo.

Still feels a bit weak given DH hasn't anything military in the pipeline, Comet production going (but Jet Dragon in the pipeline), DH Engines fading behind the RR-BS pack, DH Propellers and Fairey could combine in missiles though and Hunting offering Jet Provosts. Now if Sir HP fancied chancing his arm and joining up with DH we could have something tasty by 1960. Still nothing to compete with BAC and HSA. HSA is probably better off as they don't have DH to saddle them leaving Chadderton/Woodford as their civil design HQ and no need to fret about closing Christchurch and paying off redundant workers there.
Gives us a 4-company industry by 1962 (BAC, HSA, Airco (name not usable for legal reasons - lets call it DHHP), Westland).

Damn there are just too many cool designs and too many aircraft companies and not enough airlines!
 
Damn there are just too many cool designs and too many aircraft companies and not enough airlines!
I'd forgotten that I had a copy of "Stuck on the Drawing Board - Unbuilt British Commercial Aircraft Since 1945" which in spite of being a paperback is a heavy book and is over 250 pages long.

Or not enough passengers. This is a "cheat".

I think that the largest armed forces that the UK could have sustained from the late 1960s to the end of the Cold War are the forces as they were before the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75 with 3 CVA.01 size strike carriers instead of 3 through deck cruisers.

This requires the British economy to perform as well as West Germany's from when it overtook the UK's.

One of the side effects of this is a higher standard of living including more people in who can afford air travel. As a made up figure I had the airlines of the British Isles twice as large as the "Real World" from 1950 to the middle 1970s. The result was that BEA, BOAC, BUA et al wanted twice as many of the same airliners or the same number of airliners with twice as many seats.

BOAC buys 66 Britannias, 38 Comet 4s & 58 VC.10s while BEA buys 142 Viscounts, 40 Vanguards, 130 Spey-Tridents & 36 BAC.111-500s.

And that is a fantasy.
 
Still feels a bit weak given DH hasn't anything military in the pipeline,
No nothing like say submissions to
OR.339
F.155 with Fairey
F.177 with Saro
OR.346
Nothing military at all.

And isn't there civil airliner versions of HP's Victor or at least reuse of various bits?
 
Damn there are just too many cool designs and too many aircraft companies and not enough airlines!
Would an earlier rationalisation of the airframe and engine companies have helped? Once again, according to Gardner the Atlee Government planned to do so but the plan was abandoned due to the Korean War and 1951 Rearmament Programme.

Had the "Real World's" reorganisation taken place in the late 1940s instead of around 1960 the following suggestion of yours would me much more plausible.
I think its a bit frustrating that all the best airliners are coming from Vickers and they can't do everything at once. I wonder if a path like going for the Bristol 200 (also mooted for Convair licence-production) over Trident is a better move? Then we have a BAC line up of:

Britannia (Proteus and Tyne flavours)
VC.7
Bristol 200
1-11
I think having one firm build all three competitors to B.707/DC-8, B.727 and B.737/DC-9 would help a lot.

There were also plans for Britannias with Bristol Orion engines. If BAC had been created a dozen years earlier it's likely that the Firm's Board would think developing a variant of the Britannia would be a more sensible investment than the Vanguard. Could the earlier creation of BAC also prevent the Valiant & VC.7 using a certain type of aluminium? It might be a case of "be careful what you wish for" as they might use one that was even less suitable.

A year or more ago I found an article on the internet saying that either Avro Canada or Canadair was a major subcontractor on the DC-9 but I've not been able to find it now. If it was Canadair (a sister company of Convair) then having it be a major subcontractor of BAC.111s built for the North American market would be a "shoe in" if that's the right expression.
 
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I think having one firm build all three competitors to B.707/DC-8, B.727 and B.737/DC-9 would help a lot.
Or instead of BAC do De Havilland/HS Hatfield on steroids.
Comet 5 instead of VC.7 and VC.10.​
Medway-Trident instead of Spey-Trident.​
A twin-Medway airliner derived from the Trident fuselage (a la B.727 & B.737) instead of BAC.111.​
 
I think having one firm build all three competitors to B.707/DC-8, B.727 and B.737/DC-9 would help a lot.
Or instead of BAC do De Havilland/HS Hatfield on steroids.
Comet 5 instead of VC.7 and VC.10.​
Medway-Trident instead of Spey-Trident.​
A twin-Medway airliner derived from the Trident fuselage (a la B.727 & B.737) instead of BAC.111.​
As I explored once DH seems a good fit for a potential success snd was lining up as one. When it all came crashing down.
 
NOM #128: HSGroup jointly managed Avro Canada/Malton and DHC/Downsview, 1962; sold Malton '63 to Douglas who put DC-9/MD80 wings there, so helping TCA/Air Canada to lose interest in anyBrit.
 
NOM #128: HS Group jointly managed Avro Canada/Malton and DHC/Downsview, 1962; sold Malton '63 to Douglas who put DC-9/MD80 wings there, so helping TCA/Air Canada to lose interest in any Brit.
Thank you for the clarification.

Then if we follow the HS route and the Firm doesn't sell it to Douglas it could build parts of the Comet 5, Medway-Trident and Twin-Medway airliners sold on the North American market or even complete aircraft.
 
No nothing like say submissions to
OR.339
F.155 with Fairey
F.177 with Saro
OR.346
Nothing military at all.
Well I was taking the BEA Jetliner/GOR.339 bullying talk at Thames House (amalgamate or die) as the point of departure - so post-Sandys. And when Airco was forming up the Sandys cuts had been and gone - that means F.155 is already dead and so is the F.177.

DH's GOR.339 design was from Christchurch under Tamblin. The MoA was very sceptical about entrusting Christchurch to a project of this magnitude and relying on Hatfield to assist was felt to be a stretch given Hatfield was committed to Comet and Trident. Christchurch's flight test facilities were also graded as lower than Hatfield. Thus the MoA ruled it out both on technical, facilities and expertise grounds.
You have to wonder why, when the MoS/MoA made it clear 339 was do or die, that Hatfield palmed it off onto Christchurch - arguably Hatfield were simply spread too thin.

Fairey too had its canard delta design, though Fairey and Blackburn had a mutual inclusion in each other's project, and Fairey also it seems had some minor input into Christchurch's design via the Airco link. The MoA didn't rate this project highly either.

Arguably in this AU world with Vickers so loaded on airliners its open to bets who the MoA chooses EE to partner with or if 339 doesn't just go to Avro/HSA entirely.

OR.346 is slightly later, 1960-61, so by then Airco as a going partnership would have an entry with the DH.127. Vickers probably be more effort into 346 than anyone else. It couldn't pull off the VG demonstrator while working on VC.10, VC.11 and TSR.2 at the same time. Maybe if BAC doesn't get TSR.2 there would be scope for the Type 583? But OR.346 never really got anywhere.
You can't really deny that post twin-boom generation that DH dropped off the radar as far as military was concerned, they scored low in F.155, didn't figure in NA.39 and never really had any hope of catching up with the other larger companies.

And isn't there civil airliner versions of HP's Victor or at least reuse of various bits?
Yes, the HP.96 was competitor to the V.1000. It was runner up. It was considered second best in terms of direct operating costs with a faster cruising speed and good growth potential, but the cabin was not optimised for airline use and there was a lack of confidence in HP's estimates at that time as the HP.80 hadn't flown.

The wide HP.96 fuselage was a drawback; too wide for 4-abreast seating but could not accommodate 5-abreast in adequate comfort and had excessive cabin headroom. The mid-wing layout cost 4 seats and denied windows to another 16 passengers and a third of the seats were located behind the tailpipes, which caused cabin noise concerns.
In my view the RAF would have been better going for the HP.96 if they really wanted a heavy load lugger and then letting Vickers get on with an optimised VC.7 for BOAC.

If BAC had been created a dozen years earlier it's likely that the Firm's Board would think developing a variant of the Britannia would be a more sensible investment than the Vanguard.
Depends who was running the infant early BAC. I've heard some fairly blunt criticisms of Bristol's management and their effectiveness. The MoS idolised Edwards but once he got into high management he got bogged down in paperwork and red tape and was never as effective as he had been nearer the shop floor.

For my Britannia is too big for the Vanguard market - which in effect wanted a Viscount with more seats. Viscount probably couldn't be stretched any more.

But at this time jets were rapidly overtaking turboprops, Vickers and Lockheed gambled airlines would favour the economy of turboprops but customers wanted quieter cabins and voted with their feet (so the story goes). Perhaps in reality the marketing boys convinced the airline execs that in the White Hot Atomic Techno Space Ace any airline that was "with it" wanted the future - swooshing streamlined jets. 1973 was a long way off and fuel wasn't that expensive compared to the attractions of 'swoosh factor'.

Or instead of BAC do De Havilland/HS Hatfield on steroids.
I like it. If you can save the Medway or save BEA from themselves it could happen.
A military oriented Weybridge might bring us TSR.2 and VG wings and missiles.
HSGroup jointly managed Avro Canada/Malton and DHC/Downsview,
Quite a grouping there.
It still mystifies me why more wasn't made of HSA's Canadian products. It was almost as if they feared competition with their own products.
The only thing they ever pushed was Chipmunk and Caribou for the RAF with some lukewarm interest in CF-105 and a handful of Beavers for the Army Air Corps.
Imagine Avro pitching the C102 to BEA?
 
Or instead of BAC do De Havilland/HS Hatfield on steroids.
I like it. If you can save the Medway or save BEA from themselves it could happen.
A military oriented Weybridge might bring us TSR.2 and VG wings and missiles.
As you do is this going too far?
  • Comet 4 (which entered service in 1959) was sort of Comet 3 (which was to have entered service in 1956) incorporating the improvements required to avoid the metal fatigue.
  • Is there a plausible way for the problems that Comets 1 to 3 had to be avoided?
  • Then DH can go straight to Comet 5 (due to no need to do Comet 4) so it can enter service in 1959 instead of Comet 4.
  • It also has the benefit of being able to sell a few score Comet 2s and 3s.
  • And the success of the Comet might give De Havilland the clout to tell BEA that it's market surveys were wrong.
 
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Ok damned too much hard work to quote that!
If you want to inject a reasonable change have F.177 carry on. Which utterly shifts outcomes for Gyron Junior.
Ideally have Saro get the P.163 supersonic research contract with that developed as a fighter instead. As Gyron, Olympus, Conway, Medway and others are all applicable.
Or Fairey single engined F.155 'interim' chosen instead.

Arguably DH.127 is a very achievable platform in various 'interim' incarnations. As it is that OR.339 ought to have halted in favour OR.346 once advances in avionics showed the way.

HP.96 as transport leaving Vickers with airliner is quite a good idea.
Variants of Victor parts do lend better to transport and would allow a rapid relocation of V-Bombers with a fairly common parts/training relationship.

Additional HP.108 surprisingly attractive. I'm sure it's riddled with flaws.
 
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Prof. Hayward had recently had a 3-part history of the Comet published in Aviation Historian focusing on government support. As you can imagine it was a complicated business! Treasury not wanting to fork out any dosh, BOAC wanting jets but not wanting to wait too long or fly stuff its passengers might think was duff crap, DH wanting dosh to make the Comet 3 a reality, nobody going near the Comet 2 with bargepoles so punting them to the RAF. From that mess Comet 4 seems to pop out. Comet 5 isn't touched on in the article - I always feel Comet 5 is a Comet too far. By then clean sheet designs are coming out which are better and the Comet brand doesn't have a cachet any more.

I'm wary of delving into Comet, DH got its hands burnt and if the government had been solidly behind them I think DH would have folded up honestly - certainly subsumed far quicker. There are a lot of maybes, certainly Comet 3 seems a sound enough design but the 4 had more range. If both could be merged in fantasy UK then I see no bad thing from that.

If you want to inject a reasonable change have F.177 carry on. Which utterly shifts outcomes for Gyron Junior.
Ideally have Saro get the P.163 supersonic research contract with that developed as a fighter instead. As Gyron, Olympus, Conway, Medway and others are all applicable.
Well this thread was focused on civil stuff so not really thought much about military other than the resource implications point of view.

Ultimately I don't see anything that prevents DH Engines from becoming subsumed, there just simply isn't enough momentum because home applications are limited post 1960 and DH Engines have little to offer in face of the broad ranges offered by RR and BS and Napier and Blackburn sowing up the turboshaft/light turboprop markets.

Only 89 Junior Gyrons were ever built (for 40 Bucc S.1 and 1 Type 188). P.177 brought by the RAF and RN (not an entirely likely scenario but I'm being optimistic) it could make that production run reach almost 440. Which is not amazing but better I suppose.
And if HTP proves a nightmare on the P.177 and is ditched then Gyron Junior has to be replaced with a more powerful engine.

Variants of Victor parts do lend better to transport and would allow a rapid relocation of V-Bombers with a fairly common parts/training relationship.
It could remove the Belfast saga too as HP.111C is more likely to exist as its largely a refined HP.96 and offers more commonality. 24 HP.96s and 10 HP.111Cs - that's a good transport fleet. Throw in 12-15 HP.96T tankers and you have about 45 more Victor family airframes.
 
24 HP.96s and 10 HP.111Cs - that's a good transport fleet. Throw in 12-15 HP.96T tankers and you have about 45 more Victor family airframes.
This is a good basis. A steady production stream out of HP, and a potential to not loose slots to Avro's Vulcan over Skybolt. So add another 25 at least and possibly more.
Plus incentive to increase overall hours and cut maintenance via stronger airframes for the transport fleet. Feedback to the Bomber potentially during the whole Poffler concept.

Gyron Junior.
150 RAF plus 150 RN for the F.177, plus potential S.2 Buccaneer orders.
Has severe implications for actually getting the engine to perform better. As was projected.
Feeds back into T.188 fixing engines as a necessity.
Potential there for more sales as DH gets Gyron Junior over 10,000lb dry thrust.
Possible MN order instead of Crusader.
Possible FGR order under license to Heinkle....
Possible JSDF order.

DH.
I'll leave Comet to the more knowledgeable on that.
 
Plus incentive to increase overall hours and cut maintenance via stronger airframes for the transport fleet. Feedback to the Bomber potentially during the whole Poffler concept.
Another aside thought - Victor and Skybolt was a bit tight for ground clearance. I wonder if the ground clearance was higher for the HP.111? I can't find any dimensional data to confirm, it looks taller but that could be an optical illusion based on the fact the nose doesn't droop for the radar.
If it is taller, then a HP.111 Poffler would be interesting.

Nothing military at all.
I forgot to add to this section - of course DH Hatfield would be in a position to offer MR Comet and MR Trident (perhaps even an MR Medway Trident) to OR.381.
 
HP.111 won't be higher where it counts because its undercarriage still has to fit in a Victor wing.
 
That was my reasoning too, it looks taller off the ground but I think it isn't, as you say the undercarriage bay limits is one factor against that.
 
I am dubious of we wuz robbed excuses for loss of business caused solely by privilege enjoyed by competitors. Boeing should never have funded the decades-long lawyers' bean-feast of the WTO Case, Large Civil Aircraft. They, Boeing, had first spouted that in 1955, after UK's very brief penetration of US market, with sales of Viscounts, interest in Comet 3 and Britannia.:
G.Schmidt(Ed),History of NATO, 1st.50 Years/V.3, Palgrave,01: J.McGlade,NATO Procurement & Revival of European Defense,1950-60,P.22: US Defense Aid: “MSA (aided) British competitors in developing military prototypes and components (relevant to) airline markets”.
Ha! who was benefiting from cross pollination, KC-135: 707?

707 beat DC-8 (then VC10) at market despite Douglas' proven track record in Product Support, and Vickers' (perceived) engineering excellence, because:
- their own risk-procurement of long-dated materials enabled early delivery dates,
- they spoke the language of business to their businessmen customers, whose sole interest in the sales brochure was such metrics as man-hours of maintenance per flight hour.

The reason such issues never confused the minds of Brit Aeronauts was that no-one in their circles thought like that. So, RR MD Sir D.Huddie's explanation of 1970 RB211 debacle: (we) “promised a bit more than we could (perform) never got cash-flow into our heads.”
P.Pugh The Magic of a Name/II, Icon,2002,P156. Deciding to peddle a civil version of the Dash 80 tanker scheme, despite ah, mixed, experience on B.377, Boeing recognised that US domestic carriers' bosses lived or died in fares' price competition.

European flag carriers could not spell fares competition because theirs was a cosy cartel: so, for awhile on Paris-London, Air France had Caravelle v. BEAC Viscount; awhile earlier BEAC had Viscount v. Air France DC-4. Pax tried to book on the glamorous one, but often could not, because capacity was fixed and equal. So were fares. Cosy. And they all lost money. Taxpayers' money. No-one was hungry.
 

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