Which airliner should have been built?

BOAC's short-sightedness on the VC-10 still baffles me. It does seem to have been popular (quieter cabin) and actually quite economical.
I'm not saying BOAC buying another 30-40 Super VC-10s is going to turn into a 707 killer but it deserved better from the airline that kickstarted the whole project off.

I don't know why BOAC became so infatuated with the 707, perhaps it was down to customer experience with the Stratocruisers? BOAC operated aircraft from Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed so could compare and contrast experiences and crucially compare with product support offered by UK industry.

From the customer perspective Boeing seemed to know what they were doing with large jet bombers and tankers and the USAF was a happy customer, Douglas had no other large jets to brag about (bar Skywarrior). I'd like to think if Douglas had an earlier DC-8 they might have split their order or gone for the DC-8.
 
Part of Post 63.
LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.
For what it's worth my father's business partner took one of those risks with the Family Firm immediately after becoming its Managing Director. Eighteen months later there was no Family Firm. Not that I still feel extremely bitter about it or anything.
 
Parts of Post 81.
BOAC's short-sightedness on the VC-10 still baffles me. It does seem to have been popular (quieter cabin) and actually quite economical.
I'm not saying BOAC buying another 30-40 Super VC-10s is going to turn into a 707 killer but it deserved better from the airline that kickstarted the whole project off.
For what it's worth I think it would have remained in production long enough to accept the Chinese order. That would have increased the number built from 54 to 97. That's the 13 Super VC.10s that BOAC cancelled and the 30 aircraft that CAAC wanted to buy.

Incidentally, if it hadn't been for the CAA order the number of Tridents built would have been reduced from 117 to 82 and the last aircraft would have been delivered well before 1978.
I don't know why BOAC became so infatuated with the 707, perhaps it was down to customer experience with the Stratocruisers? BOAC operated aircraft from Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed so could compare and contrast experiences and crucially compare with product support offered by UK industry.
I think that too. I also think it's what got them "the foot in the door" with Pan Am.
 
Part of Post 76.
In fact, a large part of the business case for SSTs was that they'd take over the high-value First Class market, which was less price sensitive, allowing subsonic jets to become single-class people haulers.
That's what I've read too. Upstairs are a few second-hand copies of "Flying Review International" from the late 1960s & early 1970s. I mention them because one of them is a 1967 issue that includes an article about Concorde saying it would be the airliner equivalent of the ocean liner while the Boeing 747 would be the equivalent of the tramp steamer.

Edit: To be fair. That's what happened. Except there were many fewer high-value First Class passengers than expected.
 
I'm not being sarcastic. I think the benefits that the 707/C-137 received from the 717/C-135 are overrated and I want to know if what I think is correct.
There's some indication online that there was about 22% commonality between the two types. I suspect that the original intent was for this to be higher. Applying that figure suggests that the tanker orders reduced the cost of a 707 by about 3%. Not nothing, but hardly an enormous figure either.

Thinking about it, Boeing benefited hugely from being first in the market for a long-range jet airliner. That got them the USAF tanker contract, and meant that for a couple of years they had total dominance of the civil market. Even ignoring Boeing's experience with the B-47, the development cycles aren't quite right for Douglas or Lockheed to compete with them.

The one opportunity that seems like it might be feasible is for Lockheed to develop the L-193 in place of the L-1649, which would put Lockheed in the market at around the same time as Boeing - if not a little earlier.
 
Part of Post 63.
LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.
For what it's worth my father's business partner took one of those risks with the Family Firm immediately after becoming its Managing Director. Eighteen months later there was no Family Firm. Not that I still feel extremely bitter about it or anything.
Also consider that Boeing was busy developing the American SST at the same time as the 747prototpe. Boeing management took HUGE financial risks that could easily have bankrupted the firm.
Fortunately, the 747 proved a success.
 
Part of Post 63.
LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.
For what it's worth my father's business partner took one of those risks with the Family Firm immediately after becoming its Managing Director. Eighteen months later there was no Family Firm. Not that I still feel extremely bitter about it or anything.
Also consider that Boeing was busy developing the American SST at the same time as the 747prototpe. Boeing management took HUGE financial risks that could easily have bankrupted the firm.
Fortunately, the 747 proved a success.

The 747 however was far from an immediate success. By the mid - 1970's too many airframes languished in Seattle with concrete blocks in place of engines (from memory). The 1970's were a hellish time for Boeing. SST cancellation was a major setback (whether the plane was viable or not, it brought prestige and government money at Boeing field) and the 747 took some years to get out of its early misery. Luckily enough 727s and 737s sold like hot cakes.
 
@Archibald, re Post 87. I'm sure that you wrote elsewhere that Boeing was thinking of terminating the 737 in the 1970s because it wasn't selling enough of them. I think you wrote it in connection with the Dassault Mercure.
 
This thread has a lot of good material.
I submit that large scale civilian aircraft require massive subsidies (Airbus from France and Germany) or propping up from military contract (Boeing).
Britain probably should have got out of the business earlier. BAe divested itself of even small civilian aircraft production because even this is a too risky business in a crowded marketplace Embraer can afford to take risks as a Brazilian company.
 
A bit of fun. Possible VC.7 production. @Hood please don't bite my head off.

Probable Sales.
  • 60 BOAC (vice 31 B.707 + 12 VC.10 + 17 Super VC.10). 20 of the B.707s had Conway engines.
  • 43 RAF (6 VC.7 ordered for RAF & cancelled + 23 Britannia + 14 VC.10)
  • 11 Other Airlines that bought VC.10 including the prototype that was purchased by Laker.
  • 42 TCA/Air Canada because that airline wanted to buy it according to Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled".
    • It bought 42 DC-8s instead including 11 with Conway engines.
  • 30 CAAC which wanted to buy 30 VC.10s but Vickers was unable to accept the contract because the cost of re-starting production was too high.
Total 186 plus the VC.7 prototype.​
That's better for Vickers than the 43 Vanguards & 54 VC.10s and the combined loss of £38 million it made on those aircraft.​
Possible Sales.
  • 11 Air India (vice 11 B.707 including 6 with Conway Engines).
  • 10 El Al (vice 10 B.707 including 3 with Conway engines).
  • 31 Lufthansa (vice 31 B.707 including 5 with Conway engines).
  • 9 Varig (vice 9 B.707 including 3 with Conway engines).
    • Sub-Total 61 vice-Boeing 707 sales.
    • Including the BOAC orders a total of 37 B.707s had Conway engines.
  • 26 Alitalia (vice 26 DC-8s including 15 with Conway engines).
  • 11 Canadian Pacific (vice 11 DC-8s including 6 with Conway engines).
    • Sub-Total 37 vice-DC-8 sales.
    • Including the Air Canada orders a total of 32 DC-8s had Conway engines.
Total 97 which would increase the number sold to 283.​
Improbable Sales.
  • 30 RAF tankers built in the late 1960s to replace the Valiant instead of the Victor B.1 & B.1A conversions.
  • 31 RCAF/Canadian Forces (vice 12 CL44 + 7 B.707).
    • According to a university thesis I found online called "The Rise and Fall of Canada's Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968" by Bertram C. Frandsen the RCAF wanted 24 CL-44s to replace their North Stars one-to-one.
    • According to the same thesis the RCAF really wanted a jet aircraft (preferably something like the Starlifter) but was made to make do with the Yukon.
    • It thought the RCAF wanted 28 including 4 to replace the Comets. However, when I checked the actual requirement was for 28 North Stars, but only 24 could be purchased and the RCAF wanted to buy 4 Comets instead, but the Service only received permission to buy 2.
    • In the "Real World" the B.707s replaced the Yukons, but here they are replacements for the Comets and to replace attrition.
Total 61 which would increase the number sold to 344.​

Vickers won't be able to build the Vanguard because it's too busy with the VC.7.
  • I thought that Bristol or Short & Harland could build 44 Tyne-powered Britannias, which would make up for the loss of the 23 Proteus-powered Britannias.
  • BEA & TCA could buy CL-44s as a quid pro quo for TCA & the RCAF buying VC.7s which would make up for Candair loosing 12 of the 40 CL-44s it built, which would produce a net increase in production to 72.
  • Comet 4Bs are a possibility. BEA did order 14 and it would increase the number of Comet 4s built from 74 to 118.
  • Or a short-to-medium haul version of the VC.7 equivalent to the Boeing 720 which would increase the number of probable sales from 186 to 229 plus a second prototype. TCA might like it because of standardisation with their "normal" VC.7s.
 
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From the customer perspective Boeing seemed to know what they were doing with large jet bombers and tankers and the USAF was a happy customer, Douglas had no other large jets to brag about (bar Skywarrior). I'd like to think if Douglas had an earlier DC-8 they might have split their order or gone for the DC-8.
Douglas built 262 B-47s. Would that help with the DC-8?
 
A bit of fun. Possible VC.7 production. @Hood please don't bite my head off.

Probable Sales.
  • 60 BOAC (vice 31 B.707 + 12 VC.10 + 17 Super VC.10). 20 of the B.707s had Conway engines.
  • 43 RAF (6 VC.7 ordered for RAF & cancelled + 23 Britannia + 14 VC.10)
  • 11 Other Airlines that bought VC.10 including the prototype that was purchased by Laker.
  • 42 TCA/Air Canada because that airline wanted to buy it according to Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled".
    • It bought 42 DC-8s instead including 11 with Conway engines.
  • 30 CAAC which wanted to buy 30 VC.10s but Vickers was unable to accept the contract because the cost of re-starting production was too high.
Total 186 plus the VC.7 prototype.​
That's better for Vickers than the 43 Vanguards & 54 VC.10s and the combined loss of £38 million it made on those aircraft.​
Possible Sales.
  • 11 Air India (vice 11 B.707 including 6 with Conway Engines).
  • 10 El Al (vice 10 B.707 including 3 with Conway engines).
  • 31 Lufthansa (vice 31 B.707 including 5 with Conway engines).
  • 9 Varig (vice 9 B.707 including 3 with Conway engines).
    • Sub-Total 61 vice-Boeing 707 sales.
    • Including the BOAC orders a total of 37 B.707s had Conway engines.
  • 26 Alitalia (vice 26 DC-8s including 15 with Conway engines).
  • 11 Canadian Pacific (vice 11 DC-8s including 6 with Conway engines).
    • Sub-Total 37 vice-DC-8 sales.
    • Including the Air Canada orders a total of 32 DC-8s had Conway engines.
Total 97 which would increase the number sold to 283.​
Improbable Sales.
  • 30 RAF tankers built in the late 1960s to replace the Valiant instead of the Victor B.1 & B.1A conversions.
  • 31 RCAF/Canadian Forces (vice 12 CL44 + 7 B.707).
    • According to a university thesis I found online called "The Rise and Fall of Canada's Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968" by Bertram C. Frandsen the RCAF wanted 24 CL-44s to replace their North Stars one-to-one.
    • According to the same thesis the RCAF really wanted a jet aircraft (preferably something like the Starlifter) but was made to make do with the Yukon.
    • It thought the RCAF wanted 28 including 4 to replace the Comets. However, when I checked the actual requirement was for 28 North Stars, but only 24 could be purchased and the RCAF wanted to buy 4 Comets instead, but the Service only received permission to buy 2.
    • In the "Real World" the B.707s replaced the Yukons, but here they are replacements for the Comets and to replace attrition.
Total 61 which would increase the number sold to 344.​

A very good read

Maybe you could throw into that lot France 12 C-135FR plus some Air France 707 orders.
 
A bit of fun. Possible VC.7 production. @Hood please don't bite my head off.

I have no intention of biting anyone's head off.
I think what you've offered here as a bit of fun isn't too far off the mark.

I think it's likely that Vickers would have to offer three flavours of VC.7:
- The military V.1000 with cargo floor and door. This could also be sold as a commercial freighter but we're probably a little early for the jet cargoliner market to be a profitable thing. I think the "improbable" RCAF order would be more "possible" - say 4-8 airframes? Would the RAF order a V.1000 tanker to replace the Valiants in 1965? Possibly if the line was still open, although with Polaris coming the temptation to just convert otherwise wasted Victors might still be preferable. I have a crazy notion BAC and HSA go head to head for ASR.381 with VC.7 and Comet variants (though Spey is puny for VC.7).
- standard VC.7. I agree Air France would be interested in this.
- a 'hot & high' VC.7 either with RATO or higher-spec Conways. I'd say Air India, El Al, Varig, East African Airways, Ghana Airways, Gulf Air, Middle East Airlines etc. would want this given the VC.7s likely sluggishness in tropical conditions.

I think the Super VC.10 would be a logical successor, sidestepping the basic Type 1101. Losing Vanguard is no worry either. I think VC.11 would be better than a shorn VC.7, simply because you can't really get a decent turbofan into it (a 'dry' Spey is a tad too puny sadly).
 
Today's Assignment: compare and contrast: Production Interchangeability, UK/European: US products. Ford Mustang: Jaguar; 707:VC10.

For DC-8/50 US vendor Heath Tecna produced a kit to replace open hat racks with (enclosed lockers). Program had modest success because the standard kit did not slot nicely into fuselages of (minutely) varying dimensions. That defeats my thought: that US hire & fire practices de-skill labour, so require Lego/Meccano repeatability; whereas UK/Euro workforces' whole career is with their Prentice Master, so they can cope with oddity. But:

The Mod fix to a 707 structural issue (horizontal stab fell off) was a whole-stab exchange prog. Impossible on, say VC10, whose::
weight would be “30% less if designed (now: builders) appear to have adhered only loosely to the drawings (New) parts must be machined to match the unserviceable part” O/C,VC10 Major Svcg.,St.Athan,P63,3/99,O’haul&Mtce mag.

A correlation must exist between: Empty Weight per Seat, and Operating Cost p.Available Seat Mile? Might Boeing's agricultural structure (simple Chapel, cf VC10 Cathedral) cause 737 to be lighter than BAC 1-11, 727 than Trident? Did Airbus A320 match 737 here? Weight feeds straight into operating economics...and that is what sells commercial aeroplanes. It trumps upfront capital cost p.seat. So, even if RLBH #85 is correct, debunking economy of scale as decisive US advantage...so if upfront price were same as Boeing: no BAC sale. It was weight "growth" that was cited by BOAC when rejecting VC7.​
 
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A bit of fun. Possible VC.7 production. @Hood please don't bite my head off.
I have no intention of biting anyone's head off.
I think what you've offered here as a bit of fun isn't too far off the mark.

I think it's likely that Vickers would have to offer three flavours of VC.7:
- The military V.1000 with cargo floor and door. This could also be sold as a commercial freighter but we're probably a little early for the jet cargoliner market to be a profitable thing. I think the "improbable" RCAF order would be more "possible" - say 4-8 airframes? Would the RAF order a V.1000 tanker to replace the Valiants in 1965? Possibly if the line was still open, although with Polaris coming the temptation to just convert otherwise wasted Victors might still be preferable. I have a crazy notion BAC and HSA go head to head for ASR.381 with VC.7 and Comet variants (though Spey is puny for VC.7).
- standard VC.7. I agree Air France would be interested in this.
- a 'hot & high' VC.7 either with RATO or higher-spec Conways. I'd say Air India, El Al, Varig, East African Airways, Ghana Airways, Gulf Air, Middle East Airlines etc. would want this given the VC.7s likely sluggishness in tropical conditions.

I think the Super VC.10 would be a logical successor, sidestepping the basic Type 1101. Losing Vanguard is no worry either. I think VC.11 would be better than a shorn VC.7, simply because you can't really get a decent turbofan into it (a 'dry' Spey is a tad too puny sadly).
Thank you for you positive comments. They are very much appreciated.

I thought of including the other major Commonwealth flag carriers i.e. Air New Zealand (5 DC-8s), PIA (11 B.707), Quantas (34 B.707) and SAA (10 B.707) as possible customers with sales of up to 60 aircraft (vice 55 B.707 & 5 DC-8). However, I thought that was going to far.

If Air France is "in bounds" are the other European flag carriers like KLM (28 DC-8), SAS (26 DC-8) & Swissair (11 DC-8) and further afield JAL (41 DC-8) for a total of 106 DC-8s?

With the RCAF/Canadian Forces. I think it's reasonable to do 12 VC.7s for the Yukons because I've done one-to-one with VC.7s for the RAF's Britannias and 7 VC.7s for the 7 B.707s purchased later. That would make a total of 19 instead of 31 which was wishful thinking because I think the Canadian Government allowing a one-to-one replacement of the North Stars is unreasonable as it didn't happen in the "Real World".

An alternative to the 30 VC.7 tankers instead of the Victor Mk 1 conversions in the second half of the 1960s was 30 VC.7 tankers in the second half of the 1970s instead of the Victor Mk 2 conversions. The VC.7 would be in production that long due to the Chinese order. In that case 12 VC.7 AEW would be purchased instead of the Nimrod AEW. The Victor Mk 2s wouldn't be available for conversion because the RAF decided to keep 3 bombers squadrons because they could carry an extra 14,000lb of conventional bombs. Keeping the Victors instead of the Vulcans was planned for a time. I have copies of the relevant Squadron Patterns.

Do you think Vickers had the resources to get the VC.11 in service in time to be built instead of the Vanguard? I wrote no Vanguard because I thought Vickers wouldn't have the design staff to do it and the VC.7.
  • Plus was VC.11 started early enough to be put into service instead of the Vanguard?
  • Do we have to do Vanguard to get VC.10 & VC.11?
  • What I do like about VC.11 is that according to Gardner TCA wanted to buy it but BAC decided that it didn't have the resources to do VC.11 & BAC.111 and decided to do the latter so it's plausible that they'd buy it instead of their Vanguards.
  • In his Scenario 1957 Wood had a second-generation V.1000 powered by pod-mounted Medways instead of the buried Conways.
  • Could the VC.7 variant that competes with the B.720 have Conways in underwing pods? Or as your proposing the VC.11 in its place rear mounted Conways?
Unfortunately, I think it's Comet 4s or British built CL-44s or Canadian built CL-44s instead of the 44 Vanguards if a B.720 version of VC.7 can't be done. I'll be very happy to be proved wrong though.
 
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A very good read

Maybe you could throw into that lot France 12 C-135FR plus some Air France 707 orders.
Do you think the airline would be interested in 29 Medway-Tridents instead of the 29 B.727s and 35 Medway-BAC.111s instead of the 35 B.737 Classics they bought?

And don't forget Air Inter - the miniature Air France for domestic trafic (inside France if you prefer). They bought 10 Mercures later on. And probably Boeing and Douglas before that.
 
A very good read

Maybe you could throw into that lot France 12 C-135FR plus some Air France 707 orders.
Do you think the airline would be interested in 29 Medway-Tridents instead of the 29 B.727s and 35 Medway-BAC.111s instead of the 35 B.737 Classics they bought?
And don't forget Air Inter - the miniature Air France for domestic trafic (inside France if you prefer). They bought 10 Mercures later on. And probably Boeing and Douglas before that.
Or UTA/UAT (2 DC-8s) and Air Afrique (4 DC-8s).
 
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  • Plus was VC.11 started early enough to be put into service instead of the Vanguard?
  • Do we have to do Vanguard to get VC.10 & VC.11?
  • What I do like about VC.11 is that according to Gardner TCA wanted to buy it but BAC decided that it didn't have the resources to do VC.11 & BAC.111 and decided to do the latter so it's plausible that they'd buy it instead of their Vanguards.
  • In his Scenario 1957 Wood had a second-generation V.1000 powered by pod-mounted Medways instead of the buried Conways.
  • Could the VC.7 variant that competes with the B.720 have Conways in underwing pods? Or as your proposing the VC.11 in its place rear mounted Conways?

Design work on the Type 1400 VC.11 began in October 1959 (two months after BEA ordered the smaller Trident), so by then the VC.7 should be in production. First flight was planned for May 1963.
138-seats 6-abreast in an 11ft 6in diameter cabin (1ft less than VC.7 but same as VC.10), forward door and ventral airstair, 4x 11,000lbf RB.963-1. Boundary layer control and blown flaps. 1,500nm range, 170,000lb AUW.

Costs £19.5M, with £9.75M coming from Macmillan's relaxed purse strings, break even was 72 aircraft and the TCA order of 14 takes us nearly 20% towards that target. Even if we assume BEA (who found the VC.11 too big) remain lost at launch they are bound to find the VC.11 attractive later and buy that instead of 727s.

There doesn't seem to have been a strong direct line with the Vanjet studies, though they probably did feed into the VC.11 along with strong VC.10 DNA.

Gardner had to choose between VC.11 and 1-11 and decided 1-11. Vickers saw the market was already crowded and went with the smaller aircraft. As we know, the 1-11 proved a big success. Its a gamble if the 1-11 would prove equally saleable.


A re-winged VC.7 might prove lighter and solve some of the weight problems. It would be expensive to build a new prototype(s) and recertification and new jigging. But if it entered service around 1963-64 it might pick up some sales - though the BAC salesmen are going to have to be hot to explain to potential customers why the company changed the entire wing without making the original VC.7 looking flawed.
Ideally the civil VC.7 would have underwing engines from the get go, leaving the V.1000 with root engines - but again that's still a double tooling cost and development delay for the VC.7 which is not ideal. Rear Conways would be impossible without a new rear fuselage, new tail empennage and the wing would need moving too for balancing which means effectively as starting over and then you've got a VC.10 anyway....

My dream airliner VC.7 would have a slimmer 11ft 6in diameter fuselage and underwing podded Conways to cut weight and drag.
 
Costs £19.5M, with £9.75M coming from Macmillan's relaxed purse strings, break even was 72 aircraft and the TCA order of 14 takes us nearly 20% towards that target. Even if we assume BEA (who found the VC.11 too big) remain lost at launch they are bound to find the VC.11 attractive later and buy that instead of 727s.
Air Canada/TCA bought a total of 39 B.727s and 53 DC-9s. Is 92 VC.11s plausible? Although my preference is that the airline bought 39 Medway-Tridents and 53 Medway-powered BAC-111s.
 
Design work on the Type 1400 VC.11 began in October 1959 (two months after BEA ordered the smaller Trident), so by then the VC.7 should be in production. First flight was planned for May 1963.
I'm looking for an aircraft for BEA and TCA to operate instead of the Vanguard because I think Vickers will be too busy designing and building VC.7s to do Vanguard as well. Which is why I suggested a B.720 equivalent of VC.7.

The Vanguard prototype flew in January 1959. Can the VC.11 be brought forward 4 years? However, if it does we still have the problem of design capacity. If I'm correct and Vickers won't have the designers to do VC.7 and Vanguard it won't have the designers to do VC.7 and a VC.11 brought forward 4 years.
 
Never heard of the VC.11 before. Pretty interesting. So it was kind of tweaked & improved VC-10 targeting a different slice of the airliner market ?
And then it lost to the BAC 1-11, better known as the One-Eleven.

Remember what I suggested, related to Aérospatiale & Fokker ? Imagine that the VC-10, Trident and Bac 1.11 were "merged" into a single modular, common fuselage... just shrink or stretch, while varying the number of engine and layouts: two, three, four, under the wings or podded in the rear...

Wait: didn't Boeing used the exact same fuselage diameter for a) 707 b) 727 c) 737 and d) 757 ? This little factoid fascinated me as a kid and young aviation buff in the pre-internet days. It is pretty remarquable, when you think of these four airliners different engine setups and slice of the airliner market.
- 707 had four poded engine underwings, crossed the Atlantic
- 727 & 737 were narrow bodies for domestic trafic, yet one had two engines underwing and the other, three engines in the rear
- 757 was low end to the 767 and partial successor to the 707 yet with only two engines, 737 style

AFAIK Fokker jet airliners from F28 to F100 also shared a lot of elements and fuselage diameters.

France and Great Britain in stark contrast created only standalone, non-modular fuselages. Caravelle was too small, Mercure never got a chance to shrink or stretch.
Comet, VC-10, Trident and 1-11 had nothing in common.

See where this is going ?
 
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The case of France "airliner industrial base".

So, Caravelle, then what ? Concorde ? Mercure ? Airbus ? it is a rather tortured story.

Part 1
SNCA: Société Nationale de Construction d'Avions. In english: public company to build aircraft.
SNCAs were created in 1936, more than half a dozen of them according to geography (facepalm).

Short story: imagine France aircraft industry, 1933 - 20 private companies with plants scattered across the entire country - as a giant pizza, fragmented.

The Front Populaire first savaged the private companies, then sized all their plants - and finally glued them back together, Frankenstein style, into big conglomerates. This according to geography: like a giant pizza melted and then re-sliced into regular parts: north, south, center, west, east. Southern France being very large, it got split between Bordeaux, Toulouse and Cannes. So: North, Center, South-west, South-center, South-east.

All in the name and tortured accronyms
-SNCA-N
-SNCA-C
-SNCA-SO
-SNCA-Midi (center south !)
-SNCA-E

If the name sounds familiar (SNCF !) it is because it was the same people (Front Populaire) doing the same thing (NATIONALIZATION) at the same moment (SNCF was created in 1937) except for railways rather than aviation.

Took until 1959 to shrink SNCAs number to two: Nord Aviation and Sud Aviation (hello, Caravelle: - North & South aviation).
Yet Nord & Sud didn't merged until 1970 creating SNIAS, the "AS" standing for AeroSpatiale... and soon it became the company official name.

So, bottom line: 1936 - 1959 - 1970, that's 34 years to fully integrate France state owned aircraft companies into a single big entity.

And by 1970 they had been thoroughly kicked out of combat aircraft by Dassault - but they also had swept out almost everything else aerospace in exchange. Hence: they had de facto became France airliner industrial base. Except for bizjet, where Dassault had scored gold with their Falcons.

In a sense some kind of statu quo / truce existed, two actually
- Dassault: don't mess with us on combat aircraft and bizjets
- SNCAs: ok, but don't mess with us on helicopters, rockets, missiles, and civilian aircraft larger than a Falcon 20.

This "truce" was soon to implode, with disastrous consequences. Dassault in passing was probably glad to be kicked out of Concorde early on, considering the commercial disaster in the making - they were smart enough to see it coming, unlike the SNCAs and Government...

Part 2
So, see above. From the 1950's Dassault combat aircraft thoroughly flattened the SNCA public companies. Besides Vautour and the peculiar case of Breguet's Jaguar, they wouldn't build anything else than prototypes.

As such, the SNCAs turned to "everything aerospace where Dassault wasn't": airliners, rockets, missiles, helicopters.

In the 1950's this happened by default: Caravelle was a major success for a SNCA.

In the 1960's, De Gaulle made it a very official policy - SNCA atempts at combat aircraft were nipped in the bud, but Dassault was also encouraged not competing with them.

And so by 1966 the aforementioned "truce" existed, at least on paper.

And then a string of stupid decisions happened in 1963-68 that derailed the above rule for a decade and led to a string of commercial disasters.
- Concorde for a start, fully pumped SNCA airliner industrial base for a decade... and for the worst possible result: a commercial disaster.
- Dassault Falcon versus SNCA Corvette: should not have happened. Falcon won, Corvette was a financial disaster.
- Dassault Mercure vs Airbus: should not have happened. Partly-SNCA Airbus won, Mercure lost and was a commercial disaster
- Jaguar was also an oddity, although Breguet was private like Dassault (not a SNCA)... and Dassault ate them by the late 1960's and then ruined the Jaguar foreign exports for his F1 instead.

Bottom line: the above is the reason why there was such a gap between Caravelle and Mercure... the later a Dassault, done at a time when the SNCA airliner industrial base was busy with Concorde failure and the A300 miseries.

By 1975 France had four civilian jet program commercial disasters in the making
- Corvette bizjet
- Concorde SST
- Mercure narrow body
- A300 (only that one survived to better days)

It was a remarquable shitstorm born of naive enthusiasm: before - "Mai-68 popular riots" & "first oil shock" ... Concorde took both shocks head on.

Meanwhile the usually ultra-efficient and cautious Dassault for once turned full bonehead with the Mercure. Not only did they bit more than they could chew.
Dassault never was a big company, and it is deliberate actually: don't grow too big otherwise hedge funds or... the government (!) will buy your soul. And still, that smallish company - even bolstered with all the Mirage and Falcon sales steady cashflow - tried building a 100-150 seat airliner.Which was and still is actually the graveyard of countless companies from Fokker to Avro to Embraer to Bombardier C-series to Dornier... and many others.
Well, it almost become Dassault graveyard too.

That, and second stupid mistake: it was a declaration of thermonuclear war to the SNCAs. Funny to think they kind of counter-attacked with the Corvette against the Falcons - and both projects ended crashing down in flames: to the French taxpayer great dismay.

Third stupid mistake: range was waaaaaaay too short. Half that of a 737 or 727 or DC-9. That was a very dumbarse and ultimately lethal mistake. Once again, pretty unusual from Dassault: then again they were new on the airliner difficult business.

And thus by 1976 the Mercure ended as a colossal, crippling commercial failure: 11 build, 10 rammed into Air Inter... rear end by the French government, at great taxpayer expense. Dassault had to lobby like crazy. Nice, Concorde was rammed the exact same way at the exact same moment into Air France same... rear end, by the same French Government. My parents freshly married in 1975, probably paid for that with their taxes.

It almost sunk Dassault, the silly thing - they barely saved their sorry ass by 1981 when Mitterrand left almost nationalized them. They resisted and are still there, but it was the closest from bankrupcy Tonton Marcel (uncle Marcel: Dassault) company ever came since their rebirth in 1947.

A pity, because besides the three stupid mistakes the plane was technically excellent. There at least Dassault hadn't lost their mind, intelligence, brains - and touch. Mercure had a HUD like a combat aircraft (pilots loved it !), it was as reliable as a Swiss clock - and not a single one ever crashed - well, with only 10 maintained by a public company, risk was close from zero - but still !
 
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If Vickers Armstrong are so involved with VC.7 variants, then isn't this to the benefit of HSA's Avro and DH?
 
I'm looking for an aircraft for BEA and TCA to operate instead of the Vanguard because I think Vickers will be too busy designing and building VC.7s to do Vanguard as well. Which is why I suggested a B.720 equivalent of VC.7.

The Vanguard prototype flew in January 1959. Can the VC.11 be brought forward 4 years? However, if it does we still have the problem of design capacity. If I'm correct and Vickers won't have the designers to do VC.7 and Vanguard it won't have the designers to do VC.7 and a VC.11 brought forward 4 years.

I have had a left-field thought about the TCA Vanguard replacement. A cut-down CL-44 with a shorter fuselage and less fuel tankage. AUW might still be too high though for optimal economics and runway limits for some routes. But at least its home grown...

I can't see VC.11 being brought forward four years because its engine layout and fancy boundary air and blown flaps were based on VC.10 experience. Now if in 1955 the MoS says "the V1000 sucks in the heat and is too fat" and Vickers says "ok we'll put boundary layer and blowing on the wing" and we get those things of VC.7 then yes in theory it might work out. But the design staff would be too stretched to do both at that time - the MoS was already worried VC.7 was keeping it from more important projects.
 
Wait: didn't Boeing used the exact same fuselage diameter for a) 707 b) 727 c) 737 and d) 757 ? This little factoid fascinated me as a kid and young aviation buff in the pre-internet days. It is pretty remarquable, when you think of these four airliners different engine setups and slice of the airliner market.
- 707 had four poded engine underwings, crossed the Atlantic
- 727 & 737 were narrow bodies for domestic trafic, yet one had two engines underwing and the other, three engines in the rear
- 757 was low end to the 767 and partial successor to the 707 yet with only two engines, 737 style

AFAIK Fokker jet airliners from F28 to F100 also shared a lot of elements and fuselage diameters.
Yes. Boeing reused its fuselage design a bunch of times.

The Fokker 100 was an updated F28 with a slightly longer fuselage and a new wing, to keep the design cost down. Fokker studied several other designs (Super F28 with a much longer fuselage, F29 using Boeing 757 fuselage sections, MDF100 with another new fuselage) before settling on the F100.
 
I'm looking for an aircraft for BEA and TCA to operate instead of the Vanguard because I think Vickers will be too busy designing and building VC.7s to do Vanguard as well. Which is why I suggested a B.720 equivalent of VC.7.

The Vanguard prototype flew in January 1959. Can the VC.11 be brought forward 4 years? However, if it does we still have the problem of design capacity. If I'm correct and Vickers won't have the designers to do VC.7 and Vanguard it won't have the designers to do VC.7 and a VC.11 brought forward 4 years.
I have had a left-field thought about the TCA Vanguard replacement. A cut-down CL-44 with a shorter fuselage and less fuel tankage. AUW might still be too high though for optimal economics and runway limits for some routes. But at least its home grown...

I can't see VC.11 being brought forward four years because its engine layout and fancy boundary air and blown flaps were based on VC.10 experience. Now if in 1955 the MoS says "the V1000 sucks in the heat and is too fat" and Vickers says "ok we'll put boundary layer and blowing on the wing" and we get those things of VC.7 then yes in theory it might work out. But the design staff would be too stretched to do both at that time - the MoS was already worried VC.7 was keeping it from more important projects.
Is this at the same time that the RAF says "We don't want it because it's too heavy" to Vickers? That's what I remember from reading "On Atlas' Shoulders" that weighty tome by Chris Gibson. (I know it's weighty because I've just taken it out of the "overflow" cupboard.) I also think he wrote that VC.7 failed because it was a military transport that was turned into an airliner and the VC.10 succeeded because it was an airliner that was turned into a military transport.

I've been thinking of a Tyne-Britannia (i.e. CL-44) variant built by Bristol or Short & Harland (the latter as compensation for not building 23 Proteus-Britannias for the RAF) or BEA & TCA buying CL-44s from Canadair as a quid pro quo for TCA buying VC.7s. (The latter would also be a reward for the TCA's input into the Viscount which according to Gardner was the secret of its success.) I suggested as much earlier in the thread.
 
"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

Lockheed Electra.png

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it bought BAC.111s.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
 
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This is a list of Convair 880 & 990 sales according to Jane's 1964-65
How may of them could be converted into VC.7 sales?

Convair 880 & 990 from Jane's.png

In acknowledgement of @Hood's reservations on how far Britain can penetrate the American market. How about this? Vickers and BAC ask Convair/General Dynamics to build the VC.7 and "Elevens" under licence. That is Convair builds VC.7 under licence instead of the CV880 & CV990 and it's successful enough for the Firm to build "Elevens" under licence too. There is a precedent for this because Fairchild-Hiller had licences on the Fokker F.27 and 28.
 
"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Braniff was the Amercan launch customer of the One-Eleven. American A/L ordered later.
 
"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Braniff was the Amercan launch customer of the One-Eleven. American A/L ordered later.
It doesn't alter my argument though.
 
How significant was Boeing's production of 820 Model 717s (i.e. the C-135 family) to its success in the commercial jetliner sector?

I don't think anyone has specifically mentioned the supply chain. With bombers and tankers, the Pentagon underwrote investment in producing all the specialized parts needed to build large jet aircraft - forgings for large engines, landing gear, hydraulics, turbo-compressors, aluminum plate, machine tools - on a scale that was an order of magnitude bigger than the V-bomber program.

Moreover, the bomber program that delivered >2700 B-52s and B-47s closed down completely over five years (from the last B-47 to the last B-52, 1957-62), so all that supply chain capacity was ready to build DC-8s and 707s. The tankers shut down in 1965 as the 727 and DC-9 were coming on stream, and suppliers were thirsty for business.

In a world where 500 VC.10s were sold, how would they have been built? And even more important, what would it have cost, given the need to expand the supply chain?
 
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A twin jet DC-10 seemingly could have beaten the A300 into a pulp and prevented the rise of Airbus. Wondering if a twin jet Tristar could have been done too.
Both were planned and pitched to airlines but never launched. The global airliner business would likely look a lot different if Mr. McDonnell had accepted defeat in the trijet business and redesigned the DC-10 as a twinjet. Instead, he responded to the L-1011 launch by pulling the trigger on the DC-10 and holding a fire sale to build the order book. The market wasn't big enough for 2 nearly identical airplanes (in terms of performance and economics) and the end result was the failure of both businesses and the creation of an unserved market for a wide-body twin that Airbus moved into.
 
A very good read

Maybe you could throw into that lot France 12 C-135FR plus some Air France 707 orders.
Do you think the airline would be interested in 29 Medway-Tridents instead of the 29 B.727s and 35 Medway-BAC.111s instead of the 35 B.737 Classics they bought?

And don't forget Air Inter - the miniature Air France for domestic trafic (inside France if you prefer). They bought 10 Mercures later on. And probably Boeing and Douglas before that.
No, Air Inter only operated ex-Air France Viscounts, its own new Caravelle IIIs and ex-Air France Caravelle IIIs before the super-spiffy Dassault Mercure entered service,

Terry (Caravellarella)
 
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"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Braniff was the Amercan launch customer of the One-Eleven. American A/L ordered later.
Mohawk Airlines & Bonanza Airlines (cancelled) also ordered the BAC 1-11-200 before American Airlines ordered the BAC 1-11-400...

Terry (Caravellarella)
 
"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Capital Airlines also ordered (but could not pay for/take delivery of) 5 Lockheed Electras; Capital didn't have the longer-range route network to support either the Comet 4, the Convair 880 or even the Vickers VC.7...

Terry (Caravellarella)
 
"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Braniff was the Amercan launch customer of the One-Eleven. American A/L ordered later.
Mohawk Airlines & Bonanza Airlines (cancelled) also ordered the BAC 1-11-200 before American Airlines ordered the BAC 1-11-400...

Terry (Caravellarella)
I thought that mistake was corrected after I read @avro_ryx's post. However, when I checked after reading your post I discovered that it wasn't. The error has been corrected.
 
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"Build a better Vickers Vanguard and the World will come running to your door!"

This is a list of the Lockheed Electra's sales.

View attachment 691614

I've been speculating that Vickers hadn't the design (and possibly production) resources do the VC.7 and Vanguard. However, here I'm suggesting that it did & was able to put it into service sooner and as a result sold more.

By coincidence Ansett-ANA to Capital are the most plausible customers. Of the American airlines.
  • American because it was the launch customer of the BAC.111 in the USA.
  • Braniff because it bought BAC.111s too.
  • Capital because it bought Viscounts. However, it would help if the Firm didn't get into financial difficulties. That would help De Havilland too because it might not cancel its order for 14 Comet 4s. It also worth noting that Capital ordered 7 Convair 880s which given its track record for buying British are likely to have been VC.7s had it been available.
That would add up to 74 aircraft to the 44 built (including the prototype) increasing the total as many as 118. It might not make it's money back, but Vickers would loose less than £18 million on it. GB Ltd. would benefit from the improvement in the balance of payments. I think Gardner wrote that the Viscount earned GB Ltd. £108 million in exports and what he called "frustrated imports".
Capital Airlines also ordered (but could not pay for/take delivery of) 5 Lockheed Electras; Capital didn't have the longer-range route network to support either the Comet 4, the Convair 880 or even the Vickers VC.7...

Terry (Caravellarella)
Capital's 5 Lockheed Electras are in the list of Electra sales in the post you are quoting and included in the 74 potential Vanguard sales. I also wrote explicitly, that the Firm has to avoid its "Real World" financial difficulties for it to happen. (Please see the section that I've emboldened.) You're not adding anything I didn't know and didn't write in the above.
 
How significant was Boeing's production of 820 Model 717s (i.e. the C-135 family) to its success in the commercial jetliner sector?
I don't think anyone has specifically mentioned the supply chain. With bombers and tankers, the Pentagon underwrote investment in producing all the specialized parts needed to build large jet aircraft - forgings for large engines, landing gear, hydraulics, turbo-compressors, aluminium plate, machine tools - on a scale that was an order of magnitude bigger than the V-bomber program.

Moreover, the bomber program that delivered >2700 B-52s and B-47s closed down completely over five years (from the last B-47 to the last B-52, 1957-62), so all that supply chain capacity was ready to build DC-8s and 707s. The tankers shut down in 1965 as the 727 and DC-9 were coming on stream, and suppliers were thirsty for business.

In a world where 500 VC.10s were sold, how would they have been built? And even more important, what would it have cost, given the need to expand the supply chain?
I acknowledge that the following does not address your reservations well. That being said.

The VC.7 which I'm writing about (not the VC.10) would have gone into production around the time of the 1957 Defence Review and Britain's aircraft & engine manufacturers suddenly found themselves with a lot less military work for their factories. Therefore, the factories & workers existed, but not necessarily with the correct production tooling. E.g. RR might not have been able to make more Conways from the Avon tooling that became surplus to requirements after the RAF reduced its Hunter & Lightning orders.

In the case of Vickers production of the Valiant medium bomber (from which the VC.7 evolved) came to an end in the late 1950s with the last 24 or 128 production aircraft cancelled. The 104 that were built were delivered roughly 1955-57 which is a rate of about 35 a year. (Exact delivery dates for all 104 aircraft can be provided.) One of the reasons for not building the Vanguard was to make more factory space available for building VC.7s.

According to Gardner, Vickers had a reputation for delivering aircraft on time and at cost in the 1950s. Furthermore, it learned a lot about how to make airliners that people wanted to buy with the Viscount. According to him that was due to the input of TCA. TCA also helped Vickers make the Vanguard a better product and I suspect would also have provided valuable advice with the VC.7 which it wanted to buy. However, Gardner and I would say that wouldn't we.

500 VC.7s (not VC.10s) over 10 years is an average of 50 a year. Furthermore, it would be longer than that because it would be from the late 1950s until at least the early 1970s which reduces the yearly average to about 33 a year over 15 years. This is comparable with the average of 37 for Douglas with the DC-8 (556 over 15 years).

In my "bit of fun" (Post 90) I suggested up to 344 (over a period of more than 15 years) but over 15 years it would be an average of 29 a year.

In a later post I suggested that Convair might be interested building VC.7s under licence (which with hindsight would have been much better for it than the CV880 & 990 debacle) or they might be willing to become a full partner in the project with Convair selling to the USA & Latin America and Vickers doing the Rest of the World. It's parent company General Dynamics also owned Canadair which was building modified Britannias under licence as the Argus & CL-44 so I think my proposition has some plausibility.

I appreciate that the above hasn't addressed what you wrote about the supply chain.

Nevertheless, it may be hard, but hard isn't impossible or for that matter implausible.
 

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