Which airliner should have been built?

[Hood]

About 21% of Viscounts were sold to US airlines/corporate owners.
Had Bristol been able to accommodate Hughes' Britannia order for TWA, that might have achieved 26% of sales to US airlines.
It looks likely that 25% would be the upper practical limit of US market penetration in this era, though I suspect the BAe 146 did much better (I've not done the maths).

1st. Contribution Year Govt. £Mn. Recoveries (- 12/69)

Plus there would be the state funds towards the Beagle fiasco that sank a lot of taxpayers' money to fund Masefield's dream of competing with Cessna and Piper.

Makes you wonder if Macmillan wasn't right to resist launch aid 1955-60. But eventually he had to be pragmatic in an attempt to keep the industry alive. Declinist theory historians like Barnett would have been equally unhappy had DH, HP and Vickers shut up shop entirely in 1960-62.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Most of the information for Post 39 came from Charles Gardner's history of the British Aircraft Corporation.

If I'd skimmed through Chapter 8 as well as Chapter 9 I'd have seen that the aircraft did receive the £9.75 million in launch aid. The end of the second paragraph on Page 65 says.

The VC11 had secured a Government contribution (subject to go-ahead) of £9.75 million - half the total estimated launching cost of £1.18 million, the calculated number of aircraft against which all the launching costs would be covered was seventy-two. The VC11 had a customer - Trans-Canada Airlines - which had signed a letter of intent for fourteen aircraft. A number of other airlines were also showing interest, notably Continental Airlines - one of the US Viscount operators. The VC11 was about the right size for the world market but, like the original Trident, was adjudged too big for BEA.

The final paragraph on Page 66 says.

At the same time, discussions, were opened with the Ministry of Aviation to transfer the £9.75 million of launching aid agreed to the new BAC One-Eleven.

And if I'd read the last paragraph of Page 79 properly when I skimmed through Chapter 10 I'd have seen.

Thus the story of BAC's only purely BEC aeroplane lived on after BAC itself was taken over. In all its marks, it received at total of £19 million in Government launching aid (the company contributing the same sum), in return for which the Government had received at nationalisation under £4 million in direct levies, but well over £250 million in export sales, while at the same time providing British equipment for eight British operators, including BEA (later British Airways).

Plus on Page 152 of Chapter 21 it says.

There was also the question of the then proposed One-Eleven 500 for BEA, which, if it went ahead, would require further Government launching cost aid as the 500 Series represented a considerable re-work of the 300/400 model. It would, however stop BEA buying American at considerable dollar cost.

And on Page 158 of the same chapter.

Sir George was soon proved right about the One-Eleven 500: BEA accepted the aeroplane at the end of 1966 and the Government agreed - they had little option - to fund its development costs to the 100 per cent extend of £9 million.

So I was wrong about it being a private venture.

That been said, Gardner seems to think that HMG and the British Taxpayer had a good return on their investment because the last two paragraphs of Chapter 9 on Page 75 say.

By the time BAC was nationalised, 222 One-Elevens, in various marks, had been sold to sixty operator in sixty-three countries, and the value of the sales was £383 million, over two-thirds of it for export. These overseas One-Elevens will long continue to earn money for this country, because, in a lifetime of operations, each aircraft, with spares, financing and servicing, brings in, at the end of the day, at least the value of its original purchase price. When a British civil aeroplane is sold abroad for, say £3 million, this will eventually become at least £6 million, or probably £7 million, this will eventually become at least £6 million, or probably £7 million - not allowing for escalation.

The One-Eleven became, in fact, Britain's biggest-ever export-earning aircraft, and its contribution to the balance of payments is still by no means over. Despite this success - a success that meant so much to BAC's finances in the mid to late 1960s - there were many who, and with good reason, still sigh over what might have been if only the airframe had been matched by a British engine development or an engine availability to enable it to grow in size when the market was rip for the stretched One-Eleven which BAC was never able to offer.

However, as someone once said, "Well he would, wouldn't he?"

 

[alertken]

Ministers are flamed when they do...and when they don't. When he was MinTech, Red firebrand AW Benn dished out (=Launch Aid) widely, inc the notion of a 25% Home Team Weighting for mainframe computers to be bought on Govt. account: a Bid of £125 for a Brit-built machine would beat an import Bid of £100. He thus helped launch ICL...for its brief existence before succumbing as Fujitsu.

UK's current New Medium Heli Tender (vice Puma and 3 small fleets) seizes a BREXIT opportunity - to discriminate against EU Bids (such as PZL S-70M) - by including a Social Value Weighting, said to be 10%, so a Bid of £110 in £-sourced spend will beat a Bid of £100 in $-sourced spend. That (one would think) precisely defuses criticism of excess Defence reliance on imports. But it costs (us, me, you) more.

It's good to procure from an armchair.

 

[riggerrob]

Dear NOMISYRRUC,
Too true.
During the 1950s, the British Treasury was severely short of foreign currency to buy airplanes.
During the 1950s, the Royal Canadian Navy traded butter for guns ... er ... HMCS Warrior and HMCS Bonavaneture along with Seafires, Sea Furies and Fireflies. Meanwhile the Royal Canadian Air Force traded ?????? for a pair of Meteors and a few squadrons of Vampires.

In a similar vein is it true that the Saudis paid for their Tornados in oil?

I also have a very vague recollection of another arms sale being paid for in apples. If that is true I don't remember what arms were sold or the countries that were involved.

Many foreign military sales involve complex trades.
For example, the Canadian gov't traded a batch of Canadair CL-215 water-bombers to France and got a batch of Dassualt Falcon business jets in return. Those Falcons carried Canadian generals and politicians around for a few years before being replaced by new Canadair Challenger business jets. Then the Falcons flew electronic warfare missions for a number of years.

In another rumor, Britain sold some moth-balled submarines to Canada in exchange for renting time on the huge artillery ranges near Suffolk, Alberta.
During the Cold War, deHavilland of Canada sold plenty of DHC-4 Cariboos, DHC-5 Buffalos and DHC-6 Twin Otters to Third World air forces that were neutral, nominally aligned with NATO. These air forces were based in poor countries in Asia (e.g. Nepal) and Africa (Tanganika). We doubt if Tanganika paid full-price for their Cariboos or army uniforms, rather, Canadian manufacturers were probably heavily-subsidized by Ottawa.

 

[zen]

Unless there is the dubious creature called 'industrial offset' then pure foreign comes at a hidden cost to economic flow domestically.
This it's not folly or prejudice to ascribe a weighting to a product with domestic content.

In short money spent at home cycles back through taxation but with the benefit of induction.
Like running a current through a wire can induce current in a parallel wire.

Therefore what seems more expensive by domestic sourcing is just that, simplistic appearance rather than complex reality.

All the more important when domestic is priced in domestic currency, rather than foreign currency.

 

[Hood]

Red firebrand AW Benn dished out (=Launch Aid) widely

Yes but was on record on paper and in speeches as widely condemning the aircraft industry and its subsidies. He moaned about high profile projects like Concorde. That is until he was Minister of Tech and his constituents relied on Filton churning out Concordes...
Benn liked high tech stuff and sprinkled money about, but like you pointed out, the aviation industry couldn't do economics and sadly MinTech couldn't do market research either and wasted its efforts.

That (one would think) precisely defuses criticism of excess Defence reliance on imports. But it costs (us, me, you) more.

Unless there is the dubious creature called 'industrial offset' then pure foreign come at hidden cost to economic flow domestically.
This it's not folly or prejudice to ascribe a weighting to a product with domestic content.

Probably most of any UK-built NMH solution will come from overseas from the raw alloys to the avionics. Governments' encouraging globalisation should have realised by now that no industry is solely national (except maybe spud growing). But it is off-the-shelf and with little R&D cost implication at least.

Although once you factor in the associated multi-year contracts for maintenance and support and provision of training aids etc. the industry will have a fair deal of profit out of the deal. While the manufacturers of the 50s and 60s were costing the nation large sums in R&D, today manufacturers are probably making equal, if not more, money from product support contracts.

 

[Archibald]

Didn't knew France traded Falcons for Canadairs, in the early 70's. The 215s had stellar service until 1996 when the present 415s replaced them.

 

[alertken]

Hood #46. Hence the finance markets' discovery of "MRO" as a desirable play. They have not yet discovered that it is more like a minefield.

So, for example, when RR discovered the aftermarket in 1990s, doing JVs with Customers, constructing by-the-flight-hour Plans, they brandished each new deal as Sales of £XBn, so boosting their share price...that day. But...the OEM has most MRO material as sole-source (very few generics in Aero, none load-bearing). So at one time RR chose to claim more shop visits of (either Pratt or GE engines, can't remember) than the OEM had. They presented this as good. It was very bad, merely giving (the OEM) revenue security (from RR's Pay-as-U-Go Purchase Orders), and relieving the OEM of any risk of labour/sub-contract overrun if they had committed to a flight hour price.

MRO specialists must pay more to have and hold parts than the OEM charges itself, yet the world is full of successful MRO businesses. Because, out-of-Warranty, no sentient User gives his kit to the OEM for repair. The OEM replaces material, MRO-ers reclaim it. So, next time DE&S publish a £XMn./Y years Support deal, pity the proud "winner", who must endure in-house labour risk and sub-contract pain with his vendors, simply to bank parts sales, which are his already by monopoly.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 42 about the costs and benefits BAC One-Eleven for HMG and the British taxpayer.

Following on from the above these are the relevant paragraphs from Chapter 23 "One-Eleven - Two-Eleven - Airbus" of Charles Gardner's history of the British Aircraft Corporation.

Page 166

On 27 January 1967, Sir George and Sir Anthony Milward, Chairman of BEA, signed the £32 million order for eighteen One-Eleven 500 aircraft. The BEA 500 had seating for ninety-nine passengers on 950-mile stages (sixty passengers for over 1,650 miles), and had 15 per cent lower seat-mile costs than the earlier One-Elevens, and a cheaper aircraft-mile costs than the earlier One-Elevens, and a cheaper aircraft-mile cost than its competitors in the USA. The larger aircraft (13½ feet longer fuselage, extended wing tips, and maximum take-off weight up to 91,000lb from 87,000lb), had been made possible by up-rating of the Spey from 11,400lb static thrust to 12,000lb. The aircraft was to be used by BEA on its German network and some of its UK domestics, and, for this purpose, had an enlarged freight hold.

Page 167

Unfortunately, BAC's financial position in 1966/67 was such that it had nearly all the civil money it was capable of investing tied up in the earlier One-Eleven; to build the 500 Series and/or the Two-Eleven, the Government would have to meet most of the launching costs - not just the maximum of 50 per cent. In the case of the One-Eleven 500, the Government agreed to pay the development to the extent of £9 million. The Two-Eleven, was however, not a development of an existing aircraft, but a new aeroplane using a new engine, running the risks it has to be admitted, of the green airframe and green engine combination which Sir George had disliked in Vanguard. The launching costs were around £50 million for the airframe and the same for the engine, which was a lot of money, although the 30,000lb engine and developments of it would have other very important markets, and the Two-Eleven also could expect substantial sales abroad.

Page 170

Sir George discussed the 200-seater situation direct with the Prime Minister as early as July 1967 when he found himself opposite Mr Wilson at the National Gas Turbine Establishment luncheon. Sir George, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, forecast a total one One-Eleven sales of 200 if there was no further Spey development and of 400 if there was. He also told him that the Airbus would be competing head on with US projects, but BAC could sell a lot of Two-Elevens. If money was available for only one project it should be the Two-Eleven. The Prime Minister was, Sir George later noted, fully aware of the Two-Eleven position, and he also indicated to Sir George that he Cabinet attitude to industry was very anti. They thought the UK was just no good at aircraft (!).

Page 171

So Trident 3 it was, and the Two-Eleven died, to be succeeded in the BAC Project Office by the BAC Three-Eleven. The BEA Claim for "compensation", as promised by Mullery, was not long in coming, and, perhaps more surprisingly, there was also a compensation claim for buying the One-Eleven 500s instead of B737s. The claims were mainly based on delivery dates, it being argued that, had BEA bought American, they would have had 727s and 737s much earlier than One-Eleven 500s (re-named Super One-Eleven) and Trident 3s, and that, because of the delay, they were loosing money on their older equipment. Also, they would get the One-Elevens first - which, in their planning, was the wrong way round; they wanted the bigger aeroplane first.

The Board of Trade eventually gave BEA £25 million by agreeing to write off about a quarter of the airline's capital debt. The announcement to this effect was made by Anthony Crossland, President of the Board of Trade, on 10 July 1968.

The decision was closely parallel to that when BOAC were told by Roy Jenkins that they could not back out of their Super VC10 order in favour of Boeing - the VC10, of course, have been tailor-made to BOAC's own specification. I that instance, in the capital re-structuring, BOAC were given £30 million for operating what later proved to be the most economical aircraft of their fleet.

The One-Eleven 500, having been put into production for BEA, went out to achieve sixty-one further sales by 1977, most of them for export. It is interesting that in the National Industries Report on BEA, Mr L. Williams, Under Secretary (Air) at the Ministry of Technology, is quoted as saying to the Committee that, in return for Government Sterling launching aid for a civil project, the Ministry would expect each £1 to produce between £5 and £10 gain to the balance of payments in actual exports and frustrated imports.

The application of this formula to all marks of the One-Eleven (£19 million total launching costs, minus £3 million direct re-payment = £16 million Government investment) shows a handsome overall national profit - inflation notwithstanding. On Mr William's evidence, a sales value of £160 million for One-Elevens would have been good value to the country on the £16 million launching aid, In fact the total sales of One-Elevens up to nationalisation had produced over £260 million in exports plus the home sales, or frustrated imports, worth another £120 million, to eight UK operators, including BEA, who would otherwise have had to buy American. Even the VC10s with £9 million of unrecovered launching aid, certainly met the £10 for £1 Government criterion, as it produced much more than £90 million across the balance of payments. The engines on the VC10 and the One-Eleven (the Conway and the Spey), practically cleared all their launching-aid money by direct re-payment levies, leaving all sales income as a benefit.

So once again he thought HMG and the British Taxpayer received a good return on their investment. However, to re-quote Mandy Rice-Davies, "Well he would, wouldn't he?"

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 25

If you wanna know, not only Air France got Concordes rammed into its... throat, by the French government (well know story).

These quotes are from "Modern Civil Aircraft: 2 Concorde" by Philip Birtles which was first published in 1984.

Page 13.

The provisional cost up to certification of the aircraft, but not including series production, was estimated at £135.2 million, over the period from 1962 to 1969.

The last paragraph of Page 44 with the relevant sentence emboldened.

Concorde could now start to prove itself in service and hopefully begin to earn some return on the massive investment. The total development cost shared between the two countries was £1,134 million, none of which could be recovered on the modest number of sales. Production costs combined for the two countries reached £654 million, of which £278 million was recovered from the airlines. Meanwhile, the American taxpayers had spent more than $1,035 million on the research, design, development, tests, studies and mock-ups of their abortive supersonic airliner programme. For about the same as Britain's share of Concorde development up to certification, America had failed to produce an aircraft.

That's a gross cost of £1,788 million and a net cost of £1,510 million of which the French taxpayer's shares were £894 million and £755 million respectively.

If Concorde had been abandoned in 1962...

• What do you think the French Government would have done with its share of the money?
• And what do you want the French Government to have done with its share of the money?

I suspect that the money would have been spent on the French nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the first five or six SNLE would have been completed sooner, five squadrons of SSBS would have been deployed instead of two and it's possible that the improved versions of MSBS (M2 et al.) would enter service sooner. I also suspect that any money that was left would have been spent on military aviation projects of which you know far more about than I.

For what it's worth I want the British Government to spend its share of the money on TSR.2. That plus the cancellation charges on F-111K and TSR.2 aught to be enough to pay for its development to be completed and allow for the production of 150-200 aircraft to 1979 which is when the twentieth Concorde made its first flight.

 

[Hood]

Makes the £60mil for 2-11 look like chickenfeed doesn't it?

 

[alertken]

Although some form of military spin-off could be anticipated from an SST, UK Cabinet Approved it as "this profitable modern eccentricity", PM Mac "I am not going to allow (CDG) to do it alone". P.36, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/assets/icbh-witness/concorde.pdf: this K.Owen Seminar, P.23 has c.£.880Mn. as UK "programme cost" and has AF/BA (then both State-owned) "allowed to write-off the capital costs of its 7 a/c". House of Lords was told 24/2/82 UK R&D had been £574Mn., plus intramural (i.e: RAE/NGTE) £76Mn. Actual might truly be unknown - for example, we thought HP.115 and BAC221 were helpful to the Project, but as France offered no comparable, if we had lodged those costs to the Project, some airframe work would have moved from BAC to Sud. So we buried them elsewhere.

But if chopped...no other Project would have been funded. In UK it was on its own "Vote", not on Defence, or Sponsorship of Industry.

 

[zen]

True they had a lot of holes in the budget back then. But without that extra pressure funding Concord, certain decisions might be less pressing.

 

[Archibald]

From the top of my head (1960's dollars)
- Concorde: $2 billion
- Force de Frappe: $11 billion
- Algeria dirty bush war: $11 billion
- Apollo program: $25 billion

Makes one think...

 

[royabulgaf]

From the top of my head (1960's dollars)
- Concorde: $2 billion
- Force de Frappe: $11 billion
- Algeria dirty bush war: $11 billion
- Apollo program: $25 billion

Makes on think...

eleven billion here, eleven billion there. Pretty soon, you are talking real money.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 54...

From the top of my head (1960's dollars)
- Concorde: $2 billion

Another for what it's worth...

The average Pound Sterling to US Dollar exchange rate in the period 1962-79 was:

£1.00 Sterling = 2.4510 US Dollars.​

Therefore, the Gross Cost would have been:

£1.788 billion x $2.415 = $4.318 billion​

And the Net Cost would have been:

£1.510 billion x $2.415 = $3.646 billion​

According to the same source the average Pound to French Franc exchange rate in the period 1962-79 was:

£1.00 Sterling = 11.832 French Francs (FRF)​

Therefore, the Gross Cost would have been:

£1.788 billion x 11.832 FRF = 21.156 billion FRF​

And the Net Cost would have been:

£1.510 billion x 11.832 FRF = 17.866 billion FRF​

I calculated the average exchange rates from the table:

"PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service https://fx.sauder.ubc.ca - Foreign Currency Units per 1 British Pound, 1950-2020"​

© 2021 by Prof. Werner Antweiler, University of British Columbia. All rights reserved. Source: IMF/IFS.​

NB:

1. This is a rough estimate because most of the money (£1.788 billion, gross) was spent in the 1970s when the Pound was worth less than the average exchange rates. Therefore, the net and gross costs in Dollars and Francs would have been lower than my calculations.
2. The American comedian Stephen Wright is reputed to have said, "43.7 per cent of all statistics are made up on the spot." Source: https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1320910.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Some more quotes from "British Aircraft Corporation - A history by Charles Gardner". These are the first three paragraphs of Chapter 14 "TSR2 - Tenacious Opposition" which are on Page 98.

For the first four year of its life, BAC and its owners, particularly its Vickers parent, not only had an unhealthy over-investment in the notoriously uncertain civil side of the business, but also had growing doubts about the political future of its military centre-piece, TSR2. It also faced, as has just been recounted, severe problems with its Guided Weapons programme, and it had raised its indebtedness to the prudent limit by borrowings from its parents and from the FC1 - the latter load at a relatively high rate of interest.

At the time of the TSR2 cancellation (1965), the VC10 and BAC One-Eleven launching costs were £50 million and £32 million respectively, towards which there was Government aid of £10.2 million and £9.8 million. The ratio of BAC work - not counting the Concorde - was 60 percent civil to 40 per cent military, but the Board was looking to TSR2 to reverse that position, which was potentially a perilous one, the VC10 being a likely looser, and the One-Eleven not yet a clear winner. The American industry ratio was 70 per cent military and 30 per cent civil.

Over-dependence on the civil market was hardly encouraged by the fact that, despite their advantageous ratio of Government work to civil, Boeing had not brought the 707/720 position to one of profit until late 1963, when well over 1,000 had been sold - including the original military tanker version whose development costs had been Government-borne. General Dynamics, by 1961, had lost $143 million on the Convair 880/990, Lockheed had had to write off $50 million development on the Electra, and Douglas, after heavy losses on the DC8, were forecasting $148 million expenditure on the DC9 up to the end of 1965. The great name of Douglas was already heading for disaster and take-over.

I've emboldened part of the last paragraph because it has reinforced some things that I have though for years. Which are...

• Had Boeing sold fewer 707/720s and 727s due to competition from the VC7 and "Big Trident" would it have "launched" 737? One of the 737s launch orders came from Lufthansa. If that airline had ordered BAC One-Elevens instead would that have been the 737s "coup de gras"?
• Had Douglas made an even bigger loss on DC8 due to competition from the VC7 and made less money on the DC9 due to competition from the Medway powered BAC One-Eleven would it have "launched" the DC10 and thus left the field clear for the Lockheed Tristar? However, the loss of some DC9 sales to the One-Eleven might have been more than made up for by the airlines that bought Boeing 737s in the "real world" buying DC9s in "this version of history".
• However, would Boeing have "launched" the 727 and/or Douglas "launched" the DC9 in the first place if Vickers had been able to sell VC7s by the hundred? If so the field would have been clear for the Trident and One-Eleven.

And before anyone tells me that I'm fantasising...

• Boeing sold 56 Stratocruisers in spite of the USAF buying 888 rather similar C-97s & KC-97s.
• Meanwhile...
  • Convair sold circa 1,000 airliners of the CV-240 family.
  • Douglas sold circa 1,000 DC6s & 7s.
  • Lockheed sold circa 620 Super Constellations & Starliners.
  • I admit that Convair, Douglas & Lockheed totals included sales to the USAF & USN, but military sales of these aircraft were nowhere close to the 888 C-97/KC-97 sold to the USAF.
• Yet by the middle of 1984 (according to The New Observer's Book of Airliners by William Green & Gordon Swanborough)...
  • Boeing's sales of jet airliners were approaching the 5,000-mark.
    • 984 Boeing 707s & 720s including 101 military or non-commercial.
    • 1,831 Boeing 727s
    • 1,215 Boeing 737s
    • 609 Boeing 747s
    • 138 Boeing 757s
    • 182 Boeing 767s
    • Grand Total 4,959
  • Convair had only built 102 airliners of the CV880/990 family.
  • Lockheed had sold 170 Electras and 249 Tristars.
  • McDonnell Douglas had sold 555 DC8s (not counting the unsold prototype), 1,274 DC8s (including military variants), 374 DC10s and 60 KC-10s. That's a total of 2,264 (including the DC8 prototype and the 60 KC-10s) which is about 45% of Boeing's total.

I put it to the gainsayers the the rise of Boeing and fall of Convair, Douglas and Lockheed would have been a fantasy to anyone in the early 1950s that had a modicum of knowledge about civil aviation and yet it happened.

To paraphrase Jeff Wayne​

"The chances of anything coming from Seattle​

Are a million to one" he said​

"The chances of anything coming from Seattle​

Are a million to one, but still they come!"​

​

It's Seattle instead of Boeing because I think Seattle fits less badly than Boeing.​

 

[Archibald]

The Air Force first procured 800-something KC-97 tankers from 1951; and then replaced them by an almost equal number of KC-135s. Which mean that at some point or another in the early 1960's, USAF by an large must have had north of 1500 aerial tankers. Which is a completely mind blowing number.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The third paragraph of Page 98 again.

Over-dependence on the civil market was hardly encouraged by the fact that, despite their advantageous ratio of Government work to civil, Boeing had not brought the 707/720 position to one of profit until late 1963, when well over 1,000 had been sold - including the original military tanker version whose development costs had been Government-borne. General Dynamics, by 1961, had lost $143 million on the Convair 880/990, Lockheed had had to write off $50 million development on the Electra, and Douglas, after heavy losses on the DC8, were forecasting $148 million expenditure on the DC9 up to the end of 1965. The great name of Douglas was already heading for disaster and take-over.

I've reposted it to give some perspective to the following.

• According to Gardner (on Page 56) Vickers lost £18 million on the Vanguard which was $50.4 million at the prevailing exchange rate of £1.00 = $2.80.
• According to Gardner (on Page 88) Vickers lost £20 million on the VC10 which was $48 million at the 1970 exchange rate of £1.00 = £2.40.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Air Force first procured 800-something KC-97 tankers from 1951; and then replaced them by an almost equal number of KC-135s. Which mean that at some point or another in the early 1960's, USAF by an large must have had north of 1500 aerial tankers. Which is a completely mind blowing number.

• 811 KC-97s and 77 C-97s for a total of 888.
• 732 KC-135 tankers, 45 C-135 transports, 17 KC-135 airborne command posts & 14 RC-135s, sub-total 808 for the USAF and 12 KC-135s to France for a Grand Total of 820.

That makes a total 1,543 tankers. However, there was nowhere near that number in USAF service at the same time.

 

[Archibald]

The KC-97s were quickly dumped to the AFRES and ANG as KC-135s entered service. The old things hanged out until the mid-1970's. Frack, Spain even bought a handful of them, with Israel they were of the very few military foreign users of those things.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The KC-97s were quickly dumped to the AFRES and ANG as KC-135s entered service. The old things hanged out until the mid-1970's. Frack, Spain even bought a handful of them, with Israel they were of the very few military foreign users of those things.

 

[alertken]

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/lockheed-jet-tanker.1348/

archibald#46: Had Lockheed victory not been upturned, the history of aviation might have been different... imagine a Lockheed competitor to the 707, DC-8 and CV-880 / 990...

Tripping over Booms.

LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.

He had ordered 3, option 7, Comet 3, 10/52, canx, 4/54 after one Comet 1 crash too many. If...no Comet crashes, no LCC tanker exit:
He might not have sought Bids mid-55, to which 25xDC-8/30 and (to be 6x707-120, 17x70-320) were ordered 13/10/55. Not co-incidentally V1000 was chopped 11/11/55. Instead...maybe...a family might have emerged, Comet 3, 4, 5, DH.118, maybe in JV as Bristol tried on Britannia with Convair.

 

[Archibald]

CL-321, yeah. Remember reading about that one cancelled victory 20 years ago in Le Fana, and scratching my head in disbelief. How could Lockheed loose THAT one ? Lockheed KC-135... what might have been. Then again, they made the reverse move with their own airliner: the Electra. Out of that murderous lemon, came the P-3 Orion. Wikipedia tells me they build 757 of them, pretty close from Boeing 800-something KC-135s...

 

[Elan Vital]

From the top of my head (1960's dollars)
- Concorde: $2 billion
- Force de Frappe: $11 billion
- Algeria dirty bush war: $11 billion
- Apollo program: $25 billion

Makes on think...

Yep, I've read a lot on the impact of the Indochina and Algerian wars on French conventional forces for NATO and it was pretty crippling. Not only because it sucked most of the reequipment money until 1964-70 programs but also because a lot of active troops, maintenance crews and officers were busy in the colonies and not in Germany where they were supposed to be.

Nothing to do with airliners though so I will keep it at that.

 

[alertken]

Many suggest the A to OP's Q: which (schemes) should have been built, is various BAC- Elevens. But they were mere kites to curry favour.

Nom # 49, quote, PM Wilson, re BAC 2-11: thought UK was just no good at aircraft. And, 7/67...tenable. Wilson had learned his political Trade in 1947 under Pres.Board of Trade, then Chancellor RS Cripps, wartime Min. of A/c Prodn., who had extracted £ to launch Brabazons: all, bar (DH Dove, probably unknown to Wilson, and) Viscount had failed at market. Now as PM, Wilson had inherited a Civil A/c Prog. where VC10, Trident, Herald, had done the same; Concorde had deflected his intended chop; his BEAC/BOAC appeared to prefer anything from the West Coast, as did some private-finance flyers (Britannia A/W should have been renamed Boeing A/W). Now (1967) the sole successful UK Civil boss, Viscount+1-11 GRE, was pitching for yet more of our money for Product Devt of 1-11 and for Aid for a 2-11, while HS Grp was Studying, with our help, a Big Twin. RR was clawing at our purse for Big-Fans. PM had cause to be grumpy.

What he chose to fund was HS-on-A300 (then, 4/69, not to fund HS-on-A300B); to fund RR-on-A300 (RB207) and on a US Triplet (RB211); not to fund BAC 2-11 (15/12/67). GRE promptly invented 3-11 (which Wilson's successor would decline 2/12/70 to fund). Payne/Drawing Board P.143 has BAC willing to fund half 2-11: of its demise, GRE, C.Gardner,P.182: "tragic & stupid decision, which (UK) will regret for many a year". He was half-remembering his V1000 line: "biggest blunder of all".

BAC had been created to do TSR.2 and would have been dismantled 4/65 if KSA black gold had been lost to Lockheed. But that gush, won 5/5/66, kept the business going until Nationalisation, 4/77. BAC's owners were never in the giving vein, having other things on their mind: for Vickers, RN - CVAs -2/66, then SSBNs; RR (7/10/66), priority on an engine as US design baseline; EE Co, survival: so that's why C.Gardner,P.169 has a 15/8/67 letter, GRE-BEAC, to defuse "any comment that BAC is not...behind (2-11)...prepared to discuss with the Govt the best method by which (it) can proceed" (= we will pay up...a bit). BAC had modest capital capacity. They tried to spread the bill, offering the wing to Sud, who asked for the money from their owner, who judged 2-11 would eat A300 sales. BAC then tried to snout into Shorts Regional Employment trough, as 3-11 risk-partner, but found yet more investment aversion 6,/9/68 when EE Co's 40% fell to GEC. Its MD Sir (later Lord) A.Weinstock would be quoted: 1976: "Vickers' {appointees in BAC} are no--good... useless mngt.” G.James,In the Public Interest,1995,Little Brown,P46 (compounded 12/72 when he owned 50% of BAC).

J.Newhouse,The Sporty Game,Knopf,85,P.192 has BAC, 1968 "seeking (Govt) support for a strictly British Airbus" I have a note (where, who?) of BAC pitching for L-1011 workshare. If, into all this, you note 1968 Paris Spring melee, SE Asia quagmire, 18/11/67 £ devaluation...No-Eleven had a chance. For what we did receive - A300B - we are truly grateful.

What should have been built..is every actual Airbus (except A318 and A400M) much sooner, with risk Production Lots for early delivery.

 

[Archibald]

An earlier A320 out of Dassault Mercure - with CFM56 engines. Would have brought together three suffering programs costing the french taxpayer an arm and a leg (and a ball, too)
- Airbus (almost sunk by the A300B before 1977)
- Dassault Mercure
- SNECMA / GE CFM56 (that was only rescued by the colossal KC-135 new engines program)

Shame nothing couldn't be done with the Mercure. Then again, it was Dassault who went chasing Douglas rather than teaming with Airbus or the Europeans, circa 1975-76. Once the Douglas "Plan B" failed miserably and Dassault returned it was too late: by early 1977 very early sketches of the A320 were on the drawing board.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/beyond-the-mercure-avions-marcel-dassault-br%C3%A9guet-aviation-projects.7247/page-2#post-336778

 

[Yellow Palace]

LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.

I don't think it's an exaggeration, given the observations in Post 57 about Boeing's commercial situation, to suggest that the KC-135 orders probably made the company what it is today.

The USAF persisting with the CL-321, for whatever reason, would have colossal implications for the airliner market. Even assuming Boeing's interim orders still happened, that would be ~550 Lockheed tankers to ~200 Boeing ones. That makes the inevitable Lockheed jet airliner look a lot more appealing, and Boeing considerably less so.

 

[Archibald]

LCC CL-321 won USAF Jet Tanker Tender 2/55 but the program soon lapsed (maybe Priority on F-104, more C-130s, son-of-P2V). Interim KC-135s had been ordered 3/8/54 (29), 2/55 (169): Boeing had flown PV Dash 80 15/7/54 and their boom was on KC-97 (drogues on KB-29/KB-50). Douglas had bid (precurser of DC-8). That Boeing loss would prove as valuable as the CX-HLS loss (when C-5A caused 747). Both involved Bet the Co PV risk. Both paid off massively due to one Customer, Juan Trippe, PanAm.

I don't think it's an exaggeration, given the observations in Post 57 about Boeing's commercial situation, to suggest that the KC-135 orders probably made the company what it is today.

The USAF persisting with the CL-321, for whatever reason, would have colossal implications for the airliner market. Even assuming Boeing's interim orders still happened, that would be ~550 Lockheed tankers to ~200 Boeing ones. That makes the inevitable Lockheed jet airliner look a lot more appealing, and Boeing considerably less so.

Excellent post above, but there might be a non negligible risk Lockheed's tanker-turned-airliner pulls a VC-10. That is a very good airliner yet not selling too well because some of its "quirks" (say, engines not on wing pylons) annoys airlines.

From memory, the Lockheed tanker had weird engine layout(s): not like a 707 I mean: four engines hanging to four underwing pylons.

Podded engines can be annoying for safety reasons (if one explodes it takes the other one).

Engines in wing roots or rear-mounted (four at least, VC-10 - DC-9 wasn't bothered) can be tricky for maintenance.

Airlines can be pretty irritating customers at times, even in the 1950's.

Then again, that's just my 2 cts.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

How significant was Boeing's production of 820 Model 717s (i.e. the C-135 family) to its success in the commercial jetliner sector?

I ask the question because as far as I know it and the 707/720 were different aircraft. Hence the different Boeing model numbers (707 & 717) and different USAF service designations (C-137 v C-135). Both shared a common ancestor in the 367-80 but the airliner had a wider fuselage (to allow 6 instead of 5-abreast seating) and was built on a different production line. How may parts did they have in common? It's the same as the Short Empire Flying Boat and the Sunderland, they looked similar, but were different aircraft that had to be built on different production jigs.

Also most of the USAF aircraft had J57 turbojets and most of the 707s had TF33 (JT3D) turbofans so little sharing of costs there. Does a JT3D engine in a pod under the wing of a 707 cost less than a JT8D in a pod under the wing of a DC-8?

If the C-135 and 707 didn't have enough in common to achieve economies of scale through the eventual production of 1,830 airframes then I think it can't be argued that the former reduced the cost of the latter.

I also think it can't be argued that the profit Boeing made on the 820 C-135s built to 1965 subsidised its airliners and therefore gave it an advantage over the Firm's competitors. Because in that case the Electra and Tristar were subsidised by profits from the Galaxy, Hercules, Orion, Starfighter & Starlifter and MD's airliners were subsidised by the Eagle, Phantom & Skyhawk. Also if that argument is used the profits that Boeing made on the 744 B-52s built to 1962 have to be included.

Even if it did reduce the production costs something else must have been going on apart from a lower price. The production economies of scale that must have come from building 888 C-97s for the USAF only helped it to sell 56 civil versions, while its competitors sold more airliners despite smaller orders for the military versions.

That being written it's been suggested up-thread that things would have been somewhat different if Lockheed had been let the contract to build the jet tankers instead of Boeing. I must admit that I'd not heard of the CL-321 until now. My suggestion was to have been what if it was split 410 C-135 family and 410 tanker versions of the DC-8? That's because of the help it would give to Douglas if their tanker could be built on the same production line as the civil version of the DC-8.

It's also would Boeing's dominance have been greater if the 707 & C-135 had the same airframe and therefore were built on the same production line? I.e. the C-135s had the 707 fuselage. Then they would have had the production economies of scale and military sales subsidising the commercial sales. At the very least the USAF and AdA would have the same number of tankers capable of carrying more fuel, passengers and cargo.

 

[Archibald]

DC-8 flew in 1958, four years after the Dash-80. Perhaps a bit too late to go tanker for USAF ? the KC-97s were fine aircraft but too slow for jets, they had to refuel in shallow dives !

 

[Yellow Palace]

Excellent post above, but there might be a non negligible risk Lockheed's tanker-turned-airliner pulls a VC-10. That is a very good airliner yet not selling too well because some of its "quirks" (say, engines not on wing pylons) annoys airlines.

The CL-321 had engines podded under the wings, but in two two-engine pods faired into the wing. The arrangement probably avoids the worst issues of buried engines, but isn't quite as optimal as individual pylons. I believe the CL-321 wing evolved into the C-141 wing, so evolving to an engine-in-pylon configuration isn't totally absurd.

As far as commonality between the 707 and 717 goes - while built on seperate lines, I believe they were conceived of as being basically the same flying surfaces and systems with different fuselages on top. The USAF would then just be one of many operators with its own equipment configuration. Probably didn't quite work that way in practice, but a fair degree of commonality would have carried through.

Scientific guesswork suggests that if the two were 100% common, losing 550 KC-135s would have increased the cost of a 707 by 8%-9%. Losing 620 (i.e. the C-135s and RC-135s as well) would have bumped that up to about 10%.

Combined with Lockheed having a big USAF order for their own jet transport, and the associated prestige, and Boeing losing that status... I'd guess that at least some of OTL's 707 orders go to Lockheed. Some Boeing orders will go to Douglas, and some Douglas will go to Lockheed, so who knows how that works out! Depending on what happens to the 707, the 727 and 737 may be at risk - both had a lot of 707 heritage - and that might give the DC-9 a boost.

Adding British manufacturers into the mix (which I think i
s where we started?) just makes it all very confusing.

That being written it's been suggested up-thread that things would have been somewhat different if Lockheed had been let the contract to build the jet tankers instead of Boeing. I must admit that I'd not heard of the CL-321 until now. My suggestion was to have been what if it was split 410 C-135 family and 410 tanker versions of the DC-8? That's because of the help it would give to Douglas if their tanker could be built on the same production line as the civil version of the DC-8.

Similar guesswork suggests that an additional 311 DC-8s drops the price of that aircraft by 9.9%, while the loss of the same number of 707/717s increases their price by 4.5%.

Why 311? Because of the 'interim' orders of 29 and 169 Boeing tankers. SAC had an urgent requirement for any kind of jet tanker, and Boeing had the 367-80 already flying. That made them the only contender for that interim requirement. Of 820 C-135s built, only 622 might have been affected by the 1954 jet tanker competition. In today's litigious age, Lockheed would probably have sued the USAF over the result. That wasn't how things were done back then, of course.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

DC-8 flew in 1958, four years after the Dash-80. Perhaps a bit too late to go tanker for USAF? The KC-97s were fine aircraft but too slow for jets, they had to refuel in shallow dives!

KC-135 didn't enter service with the USAF until 1957, the 707 entered service with Pan Am in 1958 and the DC-8 entered service as an airliner in 1959 (with Delta & United, service entry with Pan Am wasn't until 1960). So my guess is the DC-8 tanker would enter service in 1959 too, which is 2 years behind the KC-135.

Looking at the Boeing-Douglas battle for sales from a different angle. Pan Am originally ordered 20 B.707s (with 5-abreast seating, later changed to 6) and 25 DC-8s (with 6-abreast seating from the beginning). What if it had been 45 B.707s or 45 DC-8s?

 

[riggerrob]

Also consider the learning curve.
Boeing learned how to build flexible, high-aspect-ratio swept wings during their B-47 and B-52 developments. so they had mastered the basics before launching into designing C-135 and C-137.
Also consider that mistakes made while designing the first batch of KC-13? allowed Boeing to improve the 707 into a profitable airliner. Tanker production also taught Boeing a lot about economies of production, ease of maintenance, wear points, etc. that even the best of engineers can only guess at.

 

[Archibald]

In passing - no room for T56s Super Constellation and DC-7s ? Did Lockheed Electra wiped them out ? I love the last piston engine airliners, but early jets instantly buried them. But how about T56 turboprops ?

Another one: improved Avro Jetliner with better jet engines for Howard Hughes TWA. Build with Convair. Almost happened in 1953, but Convair was told "F-102s first". Well then, why were the CV airliners (580 and all the others before) allowed to exist ? that doesn't make any sense !

Boeing 2707-300. Yes I know, extremely controversial, a ruinous monster for sure. BUT the supreme irony is, the Americans who never build their SST got the economic almost case right - unlike Concorde and Concordski.

130 passengers at Mach 2 can only make two New-York - Europe rotation per day and back - between 6 in the morning and midnight the next day - so 260 passengers total. Why these hours ? because the unfortunate people leaving near airport fought teeth and nails to save six hours of silence ! Even by the 1960's.

Inside the same span of a time a 250 passengers Mach 2.7 airliner can make three crossings, so that 750 transatlantic passengers per day; thrice as much !
It is a matter of
- Concorde: 3 hours crossing plus 1 hour stop, rinse, repeat: 8 hours for a two-way transatlantic cycle. 6-14-22, that's two daily crossings.
- Boeing SST: 2 hours crossing plus 1 hour stop, rinse, repeat: a 6 hours two-way cycle. So: 6-12-18-24: that's three crossings !

So yes, the 2707-300 had it been build had a better economic case on New-York London / Paris and back, than Concorde and his russian counterpart (which was atrocious and lacked the range, so forget it).

 

[Yellow Palace]

In passing - no room for T56s Super Constellation and DC-7s ? Did Lockheed Electra wiped them out ? I love the last piston engine airliners, but early jets instantly buried them. But how about T56 turboprops ?

Another one: improved Avro Jetliner with better jet engines for Howard Hughes TWA. Build with Convair. Almost happened in 1953, but Convair was told "F-102s first". Well then, why were the CV airliners (580 and all the others before) allowed to exist ? that doesn't make any sense !

Boeing 2707-300. Yes I know, extremely controversial, a ruinous monster for sure. BUT the supreme irony is, the Americans who never build their SST got the economic almost case right - unlike Concorde and Concordski.

130 passengers at Mach 2 can only make two New-York - Europe rotation per day and back - between 6 in the morning and midnight the next day - so 260 passengers total. Why these hours ? because the unfortunate people leaving near airport fought teeth and nails to save six hours of silence ! Even by the 1960's.

Inside the same span of a time a 250 passengers Mach 2.7 airliner can make three crossings, so that 750 transatlantic passengers per day; thrice as much !
It is a matter of
- Concorde: 3 hours crossing plus 1 hour stop, rinse, repeat: 8 hours for a two-way transatlantic cycle. 6-14-22, that's two daily crossings.
- Boeing SST: 2 hours crossing plus 1 hour stop, rinse, repeat: a 6 hours two-way cycle. So: 6-12-18-24: that's three crossings !

So yes, the 2707-300 had it been build had a better economic case on New-York London / Paris and back, than Concorde and his russian counterpart (which was atrocious and lacked the range, so forget it).

Crucially, compare that to a 747, with a flight time of ~8 hours. It can only make one cycle, but with about 360 passengers. More in a single-class configuration. Concorde is both more expensive to operate and has lower capacity. The Boeing SST at least offers something (more passengers per day) to offset the greater costs compared to a widebody jet.

In fact, a large part of the business case for SSTs was that they'd take over the high-value First Class market, which was less price sensitive, allowing subsonic jets to become single-class people haulers.

 

[zen]

How does say the Avro Atlantic (derived from the Vulcan bomber) compare?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Also consider the learning curve.
Boeing learned how to build flexible, high-aspect-ratio swept wings during their B-47 and B-52 developments. so they had mastered the basics before launching into designing C-135 and C-137.
Also consider that mistakes made while designing the first batch of KC-13? allowed Boeing to improve the 707 into a profitable airliner. Tanker production also taught Boeing a lot about economies of production, ease of maintenance, wear points, etc. that even the best of engineers can only guess at.

As you've mentioned the B-47. Some of the 2,042 built were made by Douglas and Lockheed. Would that have taught them how to build flexible, high-aspect-ratio swept wings too? I take your points about the learning curve. Though wouldn't the lessons about economies of production et al or at least some of them have been learned from the B-47 and B-52 anyway?

I'm not being sarcastic. I think the benefits that the 707/C-137 received from the 717/C-135 are overrated and I want to know if what I think is correct.

Although I've poo pooed the Stratocruiser I think the lessons learned from that aircraft helped Boeing become the dominant maker of jet airliners if only to teach the Firm "how not do do it". Although they only sold 56 I think it's significant that the biggest customers were Pan Am (29 new aircraft) and BOAC (10 new and 7 second-hand). Had those airlines bought more Douglas and Lockheed airliners instead I think it likely that Pan Am would have bought 45 DC-8s in 1955 (instead of 20 707s & 25 DC-8s) and BOAC would have bought 15 DC-8s or VC.7s (instead of 15 Boeing 707-420s). Those airliners purchased a total of 157 B.707s (126 Pan Am & 31 BOAC including the 2 taken over from British Eagle) which is about 15% of the 1,010 built and would increase the number of DC-8s built from 556 to 713 an increase of 27%. It might also mean the 707 enters service a year or two later.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of the Opening Post.

Sadly it takes a lot of imagination. BOAC hated the VC10 and loved its Boeings.

I thought I'd already included the following in the thread. If Charles Gardner (whose book I've been using for this thread) is to be believed BOAC may have hated it but the Firm's passengers loved it and VC.10 made it more money than the 707. However, a well known quote from Mandy Rice-Davies once again comes to mind.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 78.

Although I've poo pooed the Stratocruiser I think the lessons learned from that aircraft helped Boeing become the dominant maker of jet airliners if only to teach the Firm "how not do do it". Although they only sold 56 I think it's significant that the biggest customers were Pan Am (29 new aircraft) and BOAC (10 new and 7 second-hand). Had those airlines bought more Douglas and Lockheed airliners instead I think it likely that Pan Am would have bought 45 DC-8s in 1955 (instead of 20 707s & 25 DC-8s) and BOAC would have bought 15 DC-8s or VC.7s (instead of 15 Boeing 707-420s). Those airliners purchased a total of 157 B.707s (126 Pan Am & 31 BOAC including the 2 taken over from British Eagle) which is about 15% of the 1,010 built and would increase the number of DC-8s built from 556 to 713 an increase of 27%. It might also mean the 707 enters service a year or two later.

Post 79.

Part of the Opening Post.

Sadly it takes a lot of imagination. BOAC hated the VC10 and loved its Boeings.

I thought I'd already included the following in the thread. If Charles Gardner (whose book I've been using for this thread) is to be believed BOAC may have hated it but the Firm's passengers loved it and VC.10 made it more money than the 707. However, a well known quote from Mandy Rice-Davies once again comes to mind.

The 10 new and 7 second-hand Stratocruisers led to BOAC receiving 325 Boeing jet airliners to 2013 which consisted of 29 B.707 (plus 2 acquired from British Eagle), 71 B.737 Classic, 92 B.747, 50 B.757, 28 B.767 & 55 B.777.

Though the 29 aircraft Pan Am sales "only" resulted in that Firm buying 208 Boeing jet airliners. That is 137 B.707, 37 B.727 & 45 B.747. However, the Pan Am sales were very important if not crucial to the success of the 707 and if it hadn't been for the Pan Am there's a good chance that there wouldn't have been a 747.

I'm surprised that the number of 747s Pan Am bought was so low and that's allowing for the Firm's financial difficulties. The biggest customer was JAL who bought 107, followed by Singapore Air Lines who bought 93 and then British Airways/BOAC who bought 92. The fourth largest customer was Lufthansa with 66.