USN Large Surface Combatant - Delayed

[Conspirator]

Yes, things like GMLRS, which I mentioned. Vastly simpler to pack the rocket into a VLS cell and add a tail control unit (which is what was proposed to turn GMLRS into POLAR) rather than to build a dedicated naval launcher.

Actually no. Vertical launch is energy-inefficient; it would require adding booster to the rocket, which would skyrocket (sorry for the pun) its cost.

View attachment 648640

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km, could use precise guidance rockets.

heeeyyyyyy that's pretty good!

russia is always the one with the missiles
looks like what you posted

 

[Conspirator]

Yes, things like GMLRS, which I mentioned. Vastly simpler to pack the rocket into a VLS cell and add a tail control unit (which is what was proposed to turn GMLRS into POLAR) rather than to build a dedicated naval launcher.

Actually no. Vertical launch is energy-inefficient; it would require adding booster to the rocket, which would skyrocket (sorry for the pun) its cost.

View attachment 648640

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km, could use precise guidance rockets.

heeeyyyyyy that's pretty good!

russia is always the one with the missilesView attachment 648641
looks like what you posted

russia also uses a UKSK VLS system

 

[Conspirator]

Yes, things like GMLRS, which I mentioned. Vastly simpler to pack the rocket into a VLS cell and add a tail control unit (which is what was proposed to turn GMLRS into POLAR) rather than to build a dedicated naval launcher.

Actually no. Vertical launch is energy-inefficient; it would require adding booster to the rocket, which would skyrocket (sorry for the pun) its cost.

View attachment 648640

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km, could use precise guidance rockets.

heeeyyyyyy that's pretty good!

russia is always the one with the missilesView attachment 648641
looks like what you posted

View attachment 648642
russia also uses a UKSK VLS system

south korea uses an anti ship Grad-

 

[Conspirator]

Yes, things like GMLRS, which I mentioned. Vastly simpler to pack the rocket into a VLS cell and add a tail control unit (which is what was proposed to turn GMLRS into POLAR) rather than to build a dedicated naval launcher.

Actually no. Vertical launch is energy-inefficient; it would require adding booster to the rocket, which would skyrocket (sorry for the pun) its cost.

View attachment 648640

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km, could use precise guidance rockets.

heeeyyyyyy that's pretty good!

russia is always the one with the missilesView attachment 648641
looks like what you posted

View attachment 648642
russia also uses a UKSK VLS system

south korea uses an anti ship Grad-View attachment 648643

multiple ways of using it

 

[marauder2048]

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km,

40 km puts your fire support ship within the range of those small canister launched loitering munitions.

And most of the guided, range extension techniques beyond that for naval surface fires end up being boost-glide
where you have near vertical launch angles anyway.

 

[Firefinder]

This is how Russian Navy done this. "Grad-M", for the placement on amphibious ships and small artillery ships. Twenty-tubes, reloadable launcher (for reload it's turned vertically to the deck hatches). Maximum range - 40 km,

40 km puts your fire support ship within the range of those small canister launched loitering munitions.

And most of the guided, range extension techniques beyond that for naval surface fires end up being boost-glide
where you have near vertical launch angles anyway.

Of course that is going to be an issue for the Landing force anyways cause both the AAV and its replacement only has 20km of sea range.

 

[Dilandu]

40 km puts your fire support ship within the range of those small canister launched loitering munitions.

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long? Even now there are a lot of highly-mobile, compact missiles and attack drones, that could hit target over 100 km.

Be reasonable; you could never guarantee that chosen distance would be totally out of enemy range. Even ICBM could be retaliated against.

 

[MihoshiK]

40 km puts your fire support ship within the range of those small canister launched loitering munitions.

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long? Even now there are a lot of highly-mobile, compact missiles and attack drones, that could hit target over 100 km.

Be reasonable; you could never guarantee that chosen distance would be totally out of enemy range. Even ICBM could be retaliated against.

Yeah, but like 40 km is within range of a LOT of things, including simple howitsers and things like GMLRS equivalents. And they don't even need to be guided, because a single spot of where to aim will get you a lot of steel rain, and modern electronics will REALLY not like even a few hits.

 

[sferrin]

 

[marauder2048]

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long?

Because it's very difficult to design a survivable counter battery radar that can see a substantial portion of the
weapon's boost/ascent and midcourse trajectory at that range.

 

[Firefinder]

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long?

Because it's very difficult to design a survivable counter battery radar that can see a substantial portion of the
weapon's boost/ascent and midcourse trajectory at that range.

Thats not much anymore since the new radars can take the track on the downwards phase and backtrack it with reasonable accuracy. Even with guide shells.

 

[sferrin]

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long?

Because it's very difficult to design a survivable counter battery radar that can see a substantial portion of the
weapon's boost/ascent and midcourse trajectory at that range.

Thats not much anymore since the new radars can take the track on the downwards phase and backtrack it with reasonable accuracy. Even with guide shells.

Assuming the target is ballistic. If you have a guided shell it should be trivial to alter the trajectory enough to hide the launch point.

 

[marauder2048]

And why do you think that 100 km would be an efficient standoff range for long?

Because it's very difficult to design a survivable counter battery radar that can see a substantial portion of the
weapon's boost/ascent and midcourse trajectory at that range.

Thats not much anymore since the new radars can take the track on the downwards phase and backtrack it with reasonable accuracy. Even with guide shells.

Practically speaking, even the modern AESAs need to see a portion of the ascent phase to keep the
target location error tolerable; most guided shells are substantially ballistic until apogee.

Even so, target location error is some small percentage of range so
longer range weapons are much harder to geolocate.

And at the ranges we are talking about, if the radar doesn't catch the missile in boost
(max RCS), the round is likely to overfly its detection range or be at a very unfavorable
aspect angle.

 

[Josh_TN]

At a minimum it seems to me you would want to stay out of direct line of site of any high point or structure on the coast line you are assaulting to at least be out of direct observation range. But I still don't see the reason to use a ship for this mission; it is a high casualty event when one is successfully engaged. It also seems like quite a chicken and the egg situation when you have to put a ship at risk to suppress anti shipping weapons. I think drones and aircraft would prove to be a much more economical solution. A CVN could support a lot of drone attrition, particularly if a drone was specifically made to be easily stored. I'm thinking you just stack them the wings removed like they were WWII spare aircraft hanging from the rafters. When you lose contact with one, pull out another and assemble it. There's hardly any shortage of room on a Nimitz with the relatively small size of current CVWs.

 

[marauder2048]

. I think drones and aircraft would prove to be a much more economical solution. A CVN could support a lot of drone attrition, particularly if a drone was specifically made to be easily stored. I'm thinking you just stack them the wings removed like they were WWII spare aircraft hanging from the rafters.

Given that attritables are premised on small payloads of glide weapons I always come back
to: is it just cheaper to give something like Ground-launched SDB a small turbojet?

If an XQ-58 costs $3 million, has a typical time to survival of 10 missions and carries 2 x SDB @ $38k each
you are looking at ~ $4 million for 20 x SDBs on target.

Which in turn, gives the notional GLSDB-ER a budget of ~$200k per round.

 

[sferrin]

. I think drones and aircraft would prove to be a much more economical solution. A CVN could support a lot of drone attrition, particularly if a drone was specifically made to be easily stored. I'm thinking you just stack them the wings removed like they were WWII spare aircraft hanging from the rafters.

Given that attritables are premised on small payloads of glide weapons I always come back
to: is it just cheaper to give something like Ground-launched SDB a small turbojet?

If an XQ-58 costs $3 million, has a typical time to survival of 10 missions and carries 2 x SDB @ $38k each
you are looking at ~ $4 million for 20 x SDBs on target.

Which in turn, gives the notional GLSDB-ER a budget of ~$200k per round.

But it has a lot more range from an aircraft. Kind of apples and oranges as well from a mission perspective.

 

[Josh_TN]

I guess it would come down the UAV attrition rate, but you are going to have to use some platform or other as an ISR/spotter for any fires you put ashore anyway. Additionally, travel time for ordnance to the ground from an armed UAV is going to be a lot shorter than calling it in from well off shore, so you also are losing response time in that equation. If one is going to approach a peer coastline with a ship, I think it better it be lightly or optionally manned and inexpensive. Fit it with something like Harop in bulk and let some forward controller aircraft handle tasking.

 

[shin_getter]

I don't think aircraft and ship mounted weapons have the same mission. The point with ships is that the entire weapons load can be used quickly in high volume time sensitive fires, while for aircraft, preparing a lot of ready rounds on hand over the battlefield for reacting to the enemy all the time is very expensive.

 

[sferrin]

I don't think aircraft and ship mounted weapons have the same mission. The point with ships is that the entire weapons load can be used quickly in high volume time sensitive fires, while for aircraft, preparing a lot of ready rounds on hand over the battlefield for reacting to the enemy all the time is very expensive.

Also MLRS/SDB would be an Army thing.

 

[marauder2048]

But it has a lot more range from an aircraft. Kind of apples and oranges as well from a mission perspective.

I was assuming same munition range (vs. XQ-58 radius). Looks feasible for some powered SDB
if you boost it up to 40,000 ft and then just strictly glide/level flight to range with a small turbojet and
fuel tank that's 50% bigger than MALD's.

If it's just servicing fixed targets or providing suppressive fires on the shoreline then that's fine.
If you want that to evolve into loitering then there's a datalink cost.
The responsive + loiter is, in my view, probably going to be serviced by Vintage Race type weapons
which seem to be mainly surfaced launched.

 

[aonestudio]

ARLINGTON, Va. — A June 4, 2021, ceremony marked the U.S. Navy’s official establishment a program office for the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG(X)), the ship that will follow the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class DDG in Navy service.

The program office, designated PMS 460, is now part of the Program Executive Office (PEO) – Ships. Its stand-up was approved on April 22 through a memo by the acting secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition approving the establishment of the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG(X)) program office, said Alan Baribeau, a spokesman for the PEO.

The DDG(X) program office includes “16 headquarters billets supporting PMS 460, including 11 incumbent billets from PMS 320 focusing on Integrated Power Systems and other Electric Ships initiatives.

Navy Establishes Program Office for Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer - Seapower

ARLINGTON, Va. — A June 4, 2021, ceremony marked the U.S. Navy’s official establishment a program office for the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG(X)), the ship that will follow the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class DDG in Navy service. The program office,...

seapowermagazine.org

Navy Stands Up Next-Generation Destroyer Program Office, Construction Start Planned for FY 28 - USNI News

The Navy has stood up an office to craft the next major surface combatant after more than ten years of starts and stops. On Friday, the service held a small ceremony to open the Guided-Missile Destroyer (DDG(X)) program office, designated as PMS 460 under Program Executive Office Ships, with a...

news.usni.org

US Navy creates DDG(X) program office after years of delays for large combatant replacement

The Navy stood up a program office to manage the acquisition, design and fielding of the new DDG(X) – the most concrete move the service has made in more than a decade of trying to figure out what its next large surface combatant will be.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Bhurki]

Memo reveals US Navy must pick between future destroyer, fighter or sub for FY23 plan

The service may have to pick just one of three major modernization programs on the horizon to fund, and postpone the other two due to budget limitations.

www.defensenews.com

The Navy had planned to upgrade from its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to the future DDG(X); from its Virginia-class submarines into the future SSN(X); and from its F/A-18E/F Super Hornets into a Next Generation Air Dominance platform — with all three projects coming to fruition sometime in the next decade.

 

[Josh_TN]

DDGX IMO. F-35s and Virginia’s are good enough; what the USN needs is more actual ships.

 

[Moose]

USAF's NGAD can help the Navy here, at the very least they can let the Air Force pay for developing things like the engines and sensors. If they're lucky/good enough, they can let the other service carry the ball pretty far to the end zone.

On the sub front, the latest 774s are still very capable and still have growth potential, especially in places like sonar (we should build a block with LVAs). It also makes a lot of sense, at least to me, to let the new boomer get in the water before pressing ahead with an all-new or Columbia-derived SSNX.

While Flight III is an impressive accomplishment, the AB is a platform that's at its limits. Want directed energy, larger weapons, larger and more AESA panels? Then you need a new hull.

 

[bring_it_on]

The Navy has to make an acquisition case for the DDG(X). As in, how can it expect to both develop, and produce a $3+ Billion large surface combatant on budget and schedule and have enough money to both buy it and grow the overall size of the fleet. If they knock it out of the park with the Frigate then that should inspire some confidence with Congress. But we won't know on that till the second half of this decade. In the meantime, they should accelerate production of what they know works really well. Transitioning to 3 SSN's a year (or 4) by 20XX should be a top priority. And perhaps look at a 3 a year buy for the Burke. The Zumwalt is no longer in production and the LCS isn't much of a warship so that means that nothing on paper will hit the water for at least another decade so the #1 priority should be to grow the fleet with what the Navy knows it can build and buy affordably and then continue to chip away at the R&D required for the next gen systems. If NGAD isn't coming and nothing like the X-47B or larger is in the work on the classified side then perhaps one should ask the question on what role the carrier will play in the Indo-Pacific and what sort of lower cost platforms might be needed if the navy can't afford a $50+ Billion Naval NGAD in its medium term.

 

[Grey Havoc]

I'd say DDG(X) is pretty much dead on arrival, since it will be correctly seen as yet another attempt to salvage the decrepit zombie USN dogma that destroyers can replace cruisers, which quite frankly has squandered irreplaceable resources for well over two decades now.

 

[shin_getter]

While Flight III is an impressive accomplishment, the AB is a platform that's at its limits. Want directed energy, larger weapons, larger and more AESA panels? Then you need a new hull.

While more capability is nice to have, one should sometimes ask if diminishing returns has been hit and more money is shoveled into marginal concepts.

Some questions that is on my mind:
1. (Hard kill oriented) Directed energy promises low cost defenses against low volume attacks: is this a real issue in either low (economic overmatch default) or high intensity (high volume attacks likely) conflicts?
2. Large anti-air weapons: with increased stand off weapon ranges, "shooting the shooter" with a ship is increasingly unlikely. Is long range SAM capability all that valuable especially given the sensor costs? If you buy the terminal soft+hard kill against ASBM works argument it is not necessary. Can you even midcourse a maneuvering hypersonic?

NGAD and Submarines are both "point of spear" assets whose performance can be utterly decisive. Such assets fight against its counterpart directly and even slightly improved performance can enable very lopsided results. An escort on the other hand is deeply embedded within the formation and have little independent role and whose performance just adds to the system as a generalized whole.

I'd say DDG(X) is pretty much dead on arrival, since it will be correctly seen as yet another attempt to salvage the decrepit zombie USN dogma that destroyers can replace cruisers, which quite frankly has squandered irreplaceable resources for well over two decades now.

Given how those terms have been abused over the years, do they even mean anything?

 

[sferrin]

While Flight III is an impressive accomplishment, the AB is a platform that's at its limits. Want directed energy, larger weapons, larger and more AESA panels? Then you need a new hull.

While more capability is nice to have, one should sometimes ask if diminishing returns has been hit and more money is shoveled into marginal concepts.

Some questions that is on my mind:
1. (Hard kill oriented) Directed energy promises low cost defenses against low volume attacks: is this a real issue in either low (economic overmatch default) or high intensity (high volume attacks likely) conflicts?
2. Large anti-air weapons: with increased stand off weapon ranges, "shooting the shooter" with a ship is increasingly unlikely. Is long range SAM capability all that valuable especially given the sensor costs? If you buy the terminal soft+hard kill against ASBM works argument it is not necessary. Can you even midcourse a maneuvering hypersonic?

NGAD and Submarines are both "point of spear" assets whose performance can be utterly decisive. Such assets fight against its counterpart directly and even slightly improved performance can enable very lopsided results. An escort on the other hand is deeply embedded within the formation and have little independent role and whose performance just adds to the system as a generalized whole.

I'd say DDG(X) is pretty much dead on arrival, since it will be correctly seen as yet another attempt to salvage the decrepit zombie USN dogma that destroyers can replace cruisers, which quite frankly has squandered irreplaceable resources for well over two decades now.

Given how those terms have been abused over the years, do they even mean anything?

Yes. For example when people look at China's Type 055 they think "cruiser" even though it's called a "destroyer". In general "cruiser" means a ship larger and more capable than a destroyer. You can thank the USN for screwing that up by claiming the mission determines whether something is a cruiser or a destroyer.

 

[Bhurki]

Yes. For example when people look at China's Type 055 they think "cruiser" even though it's called a "destroyer". In general "cruiser" means a ship larger and more capable than a destroyer. You can thank the USN for screwing that up by claiming the mission determines whether something is a cruiser or a destroyer.

Could you define the lower limits for operations that a ship will need to perform to be considered a cruiser? Tonnage, Command and control capabilities, defensive systems etc vis-à-vis a destroyer?

 

[Josh_TN]

My understanding is that the main separation between Tico and Burke is flag space, outside modest differences in magazine capacity.

 

[Moose]

There's a little more than that, but it's a lot of little things rather than something simple and big. Regardless of size, 1000s are closer in philosophy to cruisers the ABs are, but it's still possible to make a case that they're not sufficiently there to require the moniker.

 

[Bhurki]

As far as i know, Tico have only one additional feature, besides the deeper magazine, that is supporting the Air Warfare Commander and having space and systems to support his staff (Aegis CIC). Can't that be replicated in an enlarged AB class?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

I'd have to guess that an enlarged AB could replicate that but the question is if an enlarged AB is nough to meet the requirements for air defense our next cruiser should have?

 

[Bhurki]

if an enlarged AB is nough to meet the requirements for air defense our next cruiser should have?

That would be 'no', since AB class is already maxed out, and without significant changes to underlying hull structure, it would be impossible to add any extra space for either personnel or armament, not to forget power.

My question was more along the lines of the general concept rather than AB class specifically, since we're trying to define fundamentals of what makes a CG rather than a DDG.

 

[Moose]

if an enlarged AB is nough to meet the requirements for air defense our next cruiser should have?

That would be 'no', since AB class is already maxed out, and without significant changes to underlying hull structure, it would be impossible to add any extra space for either personnel or armament, not to forget power.

My question was more along the lines of the general concept rather than AB class specifically, since we're trying to define fundamentals of what makes a CG rather than a DDG.

As I said, it's not super clear-cut. If you look at the Zumwalt-derived CG(X) and the Cruiser Baseline study, a cruiser has more C4I space, more AAW weapons (missiles), and greater growth margin for a longer planned service life. If you want to get more granular into things the USN "wants" in a larger-than DDG (but has trouble articulating in a PoR), there's greater redundancy/survivability of key systems, longer endurance, and still more growth margin.

 

[bring_it_on]

The two non negotiables on the DDG(X) are probably growth margin, and power for current and next generation sub-systems. Size, VLS, survivability, etc etc can probably all be part of the trade space that the Navy can play around to keep it within a budget. But again, the problem is that it will be expensive at a time everything else (SSBN, SSNX, NGAD) is also expensive and the pressure to actually grow the Navy (which it isn't really looking to do based on the budgets). I bet many wished they still had access to all the dollars spent on the LCS, and the ones that will be spent to keep the type in service.

 

[bobbymike]

That fact that a nation with a $22 trillion dollar economy and at a time the federal government has never spent more money, we can’t afford to modernize needed weapon systems should be alarming to everyone.

 

[Bhurki]

That fact that a nation with a $22 trillion dollar economy and at a time the federal government has never spent more money, we can’t afford to modernize needed weapon systems should be alarming to everyone.

Its not so much about fiscal capability but confusion as what is actually needed combined with the bad experiences of DDG-1000 and LCS that is making everyone pussyfoot this situation.

 

[Grey Havoc]

My understanding is that the main separation between Tico and Burke is flag space, outside modest differences in magazine capacity.

Other differences include the fact that, while a Tico can easily undertake the tactical ABM role as part of her general Area Air Defence duties, Burkes have to be specifically assigned to that duty, with associated hardware and software changes usually carried out in port and then often in drydock, because of technical limitations (at least some of which were related to increasingly used COTS based systems & components). And an ABM configured Burke can only undertake primarily self-defence anti-air duties while so tasked. The USN have been trying to fix this major shortcoming in recent times, though with mixed success at best to date. Another problem is that the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in general has pretty limited onboard repair and maintenance capabilities compared to the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, making the former very dependent indeed on logistical and other support from shore. In the age of the disastrous offboard / outsourced / contractor based logistics model that the USN has insanely persisted with in the last couple of decades or so and which still hasn't yet been shown the door, this heavy reliance on outside assistance to operate has proven to be even more unfortunate.

 

[bring_it_on]

That fact that a nation with a $22 trillion dollar economy and at a time the federal government has never spent more money, we can’t afford to modernize needed weapon systems should be alarming to everyone.

It really isn't just about not having money (the Navy had the same issues in the previous administration). It is about investing in the wrong things and not in accordance with any set strategy. And poor execution and choices made which has left them with bad choices going forward. You can give them a 20% increase but if they keep screwing things up (like having an entire LCS class that can't deploy in any real capacity) then it is still not going to be enough. And then the need to grow and modernize. You can grow by buying existing ships (fastest and cheapest way to grow) but the LCS (the highest production rate amongst combatants) was and is completely inadequate and FC is not really in a shape to deploy for anything besides drug busts. The Zumwalt as it existed needed to get rid of the guns (or invest in an appropriate projectile that was affordable) but that choice is no longer available. DDG-51, as per the Navy's own admission, is maxed out. The domestic design industry couldn't really provide a mature parent design for a frigate that could survive competition. DDG(X) is not going to deploy before 2035 so any decision around that has no real impact on the size of the Navy for another 15 years.

In principle, I think most would agree that the Navy needs to be prioritized and some force structure cuts to the Army could be the bill payer. But the Navy can't deploy 1/2 of its LCS's at the moment, has yet to deploy the DDG-1000 half a decade after it commissioned it, and hasn't yet done the same on the Ford either. That, in my opinion, is where the friction is. Has the Navy structurally reformed to where similar mistakes won't be repeated? Is it capable of completing more than one of those three priorities in time, on budget, or at least with attributes that matter ? If doubts still remain, I'd much rather pump money into AF B-21, or Army FVL given those teams seem to know what they are doing and are executing well.