USAF/US NAVY 6th Generation Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

[jsport]

EMRGs do have some major advantages in terms of recoil* in the hypervelocity realm.
Not that people haven't proposed recoilless regenerative liquid propellant cannons or
recoilless mechanisms for traveling charge cannons.

* some large, high efficiency muzzle brakes do have the potential to eliminate powder gun
recoil at > 2.4 km/s but it's not clear that the overpressure would be tolerable for an aircraft

Maybe the diameter of gun can be brought down and the rpm brought up. The ARL article mentioned even a HV .50 cal. The RAVEN gun, or advanced micro-valve tech already explored or other various, even electromagnetic fluid based recoil mitigation from the 90s could be re-explored. The original Harvey aluminum recoil compensated for the previous program appeared to be nearly recoilless and large caliber. There is also Hybrid Electro Thermal Light gas gun tech.

 

[kcran567]

How would such a gun be employed? Air to ground and air to air?

Would it need to be automatically (computer/AI) aimed at longer ranges and need minimal (one shot) usage to conserve the magazine (as compared to high rate of fire guns on current aircraft)?

Could it supplement or compete with a medium or even long range missile?

 

[jsport]

Basically a more powerful, air-fo-air MALD for intercepting cruise missiles with off-board guidance provided via data-link. I suspect it'd be used just as likely against high-value force-multipliers like AWACS, tankers, etc who are not exactly nimble. But the story is cruise-missiles from everything I've seen.

RAND envisioned a two-stage version with a MALI first stage (JP-10 turbojet) and an AMRAAM-derived second stage.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf

Thank you for attaching the RAND study marauder2048. After a light skimming ..am more convinced that if SK or Taiwan are to be protected someday then the number of threats and targets is so high and difficult and w/ such stand-off issues that this concept from the late Paul Cyzsz et al should certainly be considered.

A renewed program could make great use of current processing and material advances.

a new program could pick up where this one left off.

 

[Basil]

In regards to this gun discussion - in one of Anthony William's books he mentions a proposed liquid propellant gun armarment for interceptors. This USAF (?) project of the early 1950s was to be of the Gatling gun configuration and had a caliber of 53 mm with a high rate of fire. Does anyone have more information about it?

 

[flateric]

Please retain on topic. For liquid propellant gun discussion, if you want to continue, please start a new topic.

 

[jsport]

a new program could pick up where this one left off.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-force-association/2018/09/12/air-force-not-considering-new-f-15-or-hybrid-f-22f-35-top-civilian-says/?utm_campaign=Socialflow+AIR&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com

WASHINGTON — The two biggest manufacturers of military aircraft have been busy marketing new versions of their fighter jets to the U.S. Air Force, but the service’s top official told Defense News in an exclusive interview that it’s not actually interested in purchasing either of them at the current moment.

This summer, Defense One broke two major stories about sales pitches from Boeing, which is proposing an advanced version of the F-15 to the Air Force, and Lockheed Martin, which has been pushing a hybrid version of the F-22 Raptor and F-35 joint strike fighter similar to what it is reportedly offering Japan.

But just because those companies are offering new jets, doesn’t mean that the Air Force wants them.

In an exclusive Sept. 5 interview, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said she believes the service needs to expend its precious financial resources on stealthy, fifth-generation platforms — specifically the F-35 — and thus buying even an advanced fourth generation fighter like the so-called F-15X is not in the cards.

Then go hard with PCA!!

 

[Airplane]

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-force-association/2018/09/12/air-force-not-considering-new-f-15-or-hybrid-f-22f-35-top-civilian-says/?utm_campaign=Socialflow+AIR&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com

WASHINGTON — The two biggest manufacturers of military aircraft have been busy marketing new versions of their fighter jets to the U.S. Air Force, but the service’s top official told Defense News in an exclusive interview that it’s not actually interested in purchasing either of them at the current moment.

This summer, Defense One broke two major stories about sales pitches from Boeing, which is proposing an advanced version of the F-15 to the Air Force, and Lockheed Martin, which has been pushing a hybrid version of the F-22 Raptor and F-35 joint strike fighter similar to what it is reportedly offering Japan.

But just because those companies are offering new jets, doesn’t mean that the Air Force wants them.

In an exclusive Sept. 5 interview, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said she believes the service needs to expend its precious financial resources on stealthy, fifth-generation platforms — specifically the F-35 — and thus buying even an advanced fourth generation fighter like the so-called F-15X is not in the cards.

Then go hard with PCA!!

We have the oldest fleet in history because every new system was curtailed. What makes anyone think PCA won't suffer the same fate? The USAF had better have a fall back plan, but it sounds like once again its all or nothing on a new airframe.

At least they will have a trainer that can carry some weapons if the going gets tough enough. :-\

 

[LowObservable]

We have the oldest fleet in history because every new system was curtailed.

That is incorrect. We have the oldest fleet in history because the DoD bet the future of the force on one program, which is late in development and over-budget on procurement (so that it has not been and most likely will not be acquired at planned rates). By comparison, the impact of the F-22 cutback (152 aircraft) is small.

It's a simple matter to look at 2001, or even 2010, program plans and see that the force today (and for most of the 2020s) would look very different if the schedule and unit cost/production rate goals had been achieved.

 

[sferrin]

We have the oldest fleet in history because every new system was curtailed.

That is incorrect. We have the oldest fleet in history because the DoD bet the future of the force on one program, which is late in development and over-budget on procurement (so that it has not been and most likely will not be acquired at planned rates). By comparison, the impact of the F-22 cutback (152 aircraft) is small.

It's a simple matter to look at 2001, or even 2010, program plans and see that the force today (and for most of the 2020s) would look very different if the goals had been achieved.

What was the alternative? Keep building F-16s until they aren't worth their weight in dirt? Wait until all the Harriers literally fall out of the sky? The main reason we have "the oldest fleet in history" isn't because of the F-35 boogieman. It's because of the huge peace dividends procurement holidays of the 90s where we bought relatively few jets, ships, missiles, etc.. Pick your poison; surface fleet, bombers, fighters, tankers, submarines, tanks, ICBMs, etc. etc. etc. they're ALL the "oldest fleet in history" for this very reason.

 

[bobbymike]

We have the oldest fleet in history because every new system was curtailed.

That is incorrect. We have the oldest fleet in history because the DoD bet the future of the force on one program, which is late in development and over-budget on procurement (so that it has not been and most likely will not be acquired at planned rates). By comparison, the impact of the F-22 cutback (152 aircraft) is small.

It's a simple matter to look at 2001, or even 2010, program plans and see that the force today (and for most of the 2020s) would look very different if the goals had been achieved.

What was the alternative? Keep building F-16s until they aren't worth their weight in dirt? Wait until all the Harriers literally fall out of the sky? The main reason we have "the oldest fleet in history" isn't because of the F-35 boogieman. It's because of the huge peace dividends procurement holidays of the 90s where we bought relatively few jets, ships, missiles, etc.. Pick your poison; surface fleet, bombers, fighters, tankers, submarines, tanks, ICBMs, etc. etc. etc. they're ALL the "oldest fleet in history" for this very reason.

100% correct, all your eggs in one basket when they only give you money for one egg.

 

[bring_it_on]

We have the oldest fleet in history because every new system was curtailed. What makes anyone think PCA won't suffer the same fate? The USAF had better have a fall back plan, but it sounds like once again its all or nothing on a new airframe.

R&D work on the NGAD is running concurrently to fleet recapitalization. In FY19 alone, the USAF, USMC and USN are buying around 120 fighter aircraft. Modernization is happening and will continue at this or higher pace until next gen. systems are ready.

 

[LowObservable]

I don't think 1990s decisions can be blamed for today's aging force, unless one concedes that the reliance on JSF was a foreseeable mistake.

As long as you believed the projections and predictions of 1995, including the widely accepted forecasts of the world environment, the JSF program made a good deal of sense at its inception. The FSU was a basket case; JSF was projected to be entering service by the time it could re-emerge as a military competitor. Nobody saw China coming.

In that environment the forces were oversized, and since downsizing was starting with older aircraft (F-111s and F-4Gs) and the F-15/16 lines had been going full blast at the end of the Cold War, the force was quite youthful. There would be a fleet-age increase, peaking in the late 00s, but afterwards, 110 JSFs per year would reverse it. Moreover, it was predicted to be both the cheapest and most capable solution.

 

[jsport]

A FA-XX must significantly contribute to missile defense, counter-hardened facilities, in addition to air superiority (for instance artillery sized munitions equals more fuel, more range) more than those currently proposed for the status quo to be exceeded.

from the previous rand study
IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING THE STATUS QUO
One possibility, of course, is to not do anything to improve force projection capabilities. This means allowing the status quo in terms of vulnerabilities at Kadena AB especially, but Andersen AFB as well. This approach certainly has inertia on its side, but it entails some very important implications for U.S. power in the Pacific.
If the status quo approach is taken, the United States must recognize its vulnerabilities in the Pacific .... For example, if there is some sort of provocation from China, the United States cannot pursue its normal course of action – which is to deploy aircraft and aircraft carriers to the western Pacific as a deterrent force. While this may have worked in 1950 and again in 1996, the approach would be less deterrent today.
Recall from Cold War era nuclear deterrence studies that in order for deterrent to be credible, it must be survivable against a first strike. However, we have seen that a Chinese first strike on U.S. airbases in Okinawa or the main islands of Japan would be a devastating blow to U.S. airpower. Carrier-based airpower is also vulnerable to PLAN attack submarines and the expected modified CSS-5 anti-ship ballistic missile....

Thus, if the United States pursues its normal course of action, what once may have been a deterrent may become a temptation. If we do nothing to enhance the survivability of our forces, we must manage crisis stability differently.
Further, failing to address the power projection challenges the USAF faces sends strong signals to allies. If the United States is not willing to make the investment to stay preeminent in the western Pacific, it would clearly concern U.S. allies in the region and around the world. Old security commitments would likely be worth less. Allies may begin to hedge. U.S. power would be seen as less credible. The effects of decreased prestige would not be limited to the Pacific. U.S. influence could decrease worldwide. Prestige is the ability of a country to gain favorable conditions from its power without actually having to use it. U.S. prestige would certainly take a blow –
the United States could find itself choosing between having to use force or settling for less. Either option is clearly undesirable. ...

Continuing the status quo therefore would present problems to U.S. power and prestige in the region and globally. In the short-term, until operational problems are fixed, the United States is better off avoiding presenting vulnerable targets (and potentially losing much of its airpower in the process). In the medium- or longer-term, it behooves the United States to consider options to address the access problem or ameliorate its consequences. These options may reduce the vulnerability of close-in airbases, increase the effectiveness of aircraft at standoff airbases, or reduce the air threat by targeting PLA operations.

 

[sferrin]

Moreover, it was predicted to be both the cheapest and most capable solution.

And that is almost certainly still the case. Or do you still believe three separate, completely different, designs would have been cheaper?

 

[LowObservable]

Or do you still believe three separate, completely different, designs would have been cheaper?

Probably not. However, as in all questions of what-if history and adult incontinence, the answer is "it depends".

Given where we were in 1993, there were many possible ways forward. But three separate and completely different designs were not an easy option, because there was no strategic or business case for a USMC/RN supersonic STOVL. The USN did not need or want it as long as it could sustain its CATOBAR infrastructure, and that was not effectively challenged. The theory behind DARPA's CALF was that a ~500 nm radius STOVL could be adapted into a ~700 nm radius CTOL, the USAF at the time being interested in the latter. However, CALF depended on optimistic assumptions and the idea that USAF could be persuaded to accept compromises such as lower max G.

CALF was not initially a three-mode aircraft, although Boeing (not part of the early DARPA studies) had a tri-service vision with its aircraft.

The USN and USAF could certainly have implemented either a two-service program (a bigger Rafale with internal weapons) or a "cousin" program with common avionics architecture, CNI, and LO systems. It would have been less expensive in development because they could have avoided developing two new engines and they would have avoided the 2003 weight crisis and its aftermath. Given the F-35A/C differences, would it have cost much more to procure?

That would have left ASTOVL out in the cold. The UK would have discovered earlier rather than later that STOVL does not automatically mean a smaller/less costly ship. In fact they realized that in ~2003. The US would have had to assess the strategic value of six jets per deployed MEU and whatever other FARP-like concept could be devised. (Q - Where do you need a multirole LO combat aircraft, but don't need the EA and AEW provided by the CSG?)

So three separate programs including a LO ASTOVL might have cost more. But leaving LO ASTOVL out could have (I believe) reduced the cost of meeting USAF/USN requirements, and allowed a realistic assessment of the cost and benefit of ASTOVL.

 

[FighterJock]

I thought that cost was one of the reasons that the CALF/JAST and ASTOVL were merged into the JSF.

 

[TomcatViP]

So three separate programs including a LO ASTOVL might have cost more. But leaving LO ASTOVL out could have (I believe) reduced the cost of meeting USAF/USN requirements, and allowed a realistic assessment of the cost and benefit of ASTOVL.

Fact is that LO applied to the STOVL is the biggest earnings of the F-35 program.

Moreover there is no room anymore for a non-stealthy STOVL aircraft out there in the real world battlefield (frontline aircraft / IADS / restrictions in the naval warfare resulting from for a non-stealth asset on a diminutive carrier group...).
Think also that the Bee was the long term guardian of the low cost concept in an industry that generally sells airframe by weight. The investment by the pubic all around the partner's nations probably wouldn't have been possible without that.

So no, there was no cost cut to expect if the program have had to be split. The A and C would have looked like something else and probably their program terminated in the low threat years.

Today taxpayers will even see the benefits of JSF promises of mass effect by the induced tactical deterrence brought to their nation and the fact that they can only be difficultly out-budgeted in the air by an opponent as they are positioning themselves today.

 

[LowObservable]

I thought that cost was one of the reasons that the CALF/JAST and ASTOVL were merged into the JSF.

Not quite. The origin of JAST was the cancellation of the USAF's MRF and the Navy's A-X, in favor of a joint solution, which was expected to save money in the near term. CALF, which had risen from the ashes of ASTOVL, was first brought under the JAST umbrella, since JAST was originally envisaged as a group of focused technology demonstrations.

TomcatVIP:

Fact is that LO applied to the STOVL is the biggest earnings of the F-35 program.

Can you quantify that? Because the B is the lowest-performing and most costly member of the family, is planned to be built in far lower numbers than the A and is a smaller player in terms of global interoperability.

Moreover there is no room anymore for a non-stealthy STOVL aircraft out there in the real world battlefield

Every air force still taking delivery of, or actively modernizing non-VLO jets, which is most of them (including the USN, RAF and PLA) believes those aircraft are relevant. But I'm sure you're correct.

Think also that the Bee was the long term guardian of the low cost concept in an industry that generally sells airframe by weight.

Permit me to chuckle at that claim. The gross weapon system unit cost for US B models in FY19, at full rate, is $132m. The idea that the STOVL requirement constrained the weight is also dubious, since even the F-35A OEW is 80 per cent of that of an F-15E. Requirements (primarily internal weapon load, range and 9g) drive weight and cost.

 

[TomcatViP]

Can you quantify that?

I assume you are living in Britain, hence... look around. How much would have been the cost of such a comparable 21st capability based on the old infrastructure (V-Bombers, hundreds of Harrier, dozen of ISR birds, costly satellites and all the cost induced by a higher vulnerability...) ; then add the redundancy needed to cope with of higher attrition rate... et voilà!

 

[LowObservable]

I assume you are living in Britain, hence... look around. How much would have been the cost of such a comparable 21st capability based on the old infrastructure (V-Bombers, hundreds of Harrier, dozen of ISR birds, costly satellites and all the cost induced by having to cope with a higher vulnerability...) ; then add the redundancy of higher attrition rate... et voilà!

I'm not sure what I am supposed to be looking at. The UK's F-35 force is located at a former V-force and Tornado base, and I am not aware of plans to exploit STOVL for dispersed operations. Even so, I don't understand "hundreds of Harrier" since there never were hundreds of Harriers - the RAF had just over 100 Harrier IIs, or what ISR or satellites have to do with it.

 

[TomcatViP]

Simply put, you'll need more to reach the same effect on the the same concept. Old story you know...

 

[LowObservable]

Simply put, you'll need more to reach the same effect on the the same concept.

If you're talking about LO in general, and about deep attack, I tend to agree in principle - although for maximum benefit you might want a less compromised design rather than something that tries to be an F-16/F-18. If you're still talking F-35B versus F-35A then I don't agree at all.

 

[sferrin]

Thing is there would be no F-35B without JSF. The USN would be out of the STOVL business once the Harriers ran out of life. And there go 11 ships you can operate fixed wing fighter from at a stroke. (BTW, an F-35 equipped LHA, the Essex, is currently the only aviation ship in range of Syria at the moment. https://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-aircraft-carrier-middle-east-after-russia-threatens-us-forces-syria-2018-9?r=UK&IR=T)

The existence of the F-35C, without JSF, is also debatable. (Especially if you don't want a design that "tries to be an F-16/F-18".)

The best "alternate history" scenario is the Convair Model 200 is chosen over the Rockwell XFV-12 and it goes on to replace the Harrier. Then you could have an F-16/F-18 replacement that isn't "compromised" by the need for a STOVL variant. (Of course that means the USMC gets short-changed as a Convair Model 200 would not come close to replicating the capability of the F-35B. . .)

All things considered (hindsight included) the JSF, as it currently exists, was the best way to go. That there have been hurdles to overcome should come as absolutely no surprise to anybody. It's not as though the Russians and Chinese have had smooth sailing with their T-50 & J-20, and they only have a land-based variant to figure out. And it didn't even destroy European fighter production capability. Hell, Rolls even trotted out a 3-stream engine concept.

 

[TomcatViP]

If you're talking about LO in general, and about deep attack, I tend to agree in principle - although for maximum benefit you might want a less compromised design rather than something that tries to be an F-16/F-18. If you're still talking F-35B versus F-35A then I don't agree at all.

Sea Harrier, although a great success at the end, was a highly compromised design and puts initially a hard bargain on every sailor of the Home fleet. A Bee today can face any competitor and still own the best chances out of the two to succeed. At the age of permanent war, this might be the most quantifiable earning you were looking for

If the Malouines/Falklands war scenario would be reenacted today, there no ways that the Argentinian side would play the same warmonger partition.

 

[LowObservable]

Thing is there would be no F-35B without JSF. The USN would be out of the STOVL business once the Harriers ran out of life.

Well, true. Keeping the USMC in the STOVL business is projected to cost $47 billion in procurement, roughly equal to the projected cost of 80 B-21s. Development? In addition to the direct cost of the lift system, there's the bill for developing the F135 and F136 (two F414s would have done for the A and C, at less cost and lower weight) and some more for the weight overrun and the consequent production chaos.

So my answer would be: if you want more aviation ships, build more aviation ships rather than plugging a very expensive blade into the LHA/LHD Swiss Army knife. Ships that can carry enough air to protect themselves and perform offensive missions at the same time, including AEW, ISR and EA. However, the Rulers of Uncle Sam's Navee have been insistent for the last 50 years that they want nothing to do with anything that dilutes or competes with a numerically small force of CVNs.

The existence of the F-35C, without JSF, is also debatable.

A prospect over which the Big Deck Navy would doubtless weep bitter tears. /sarc

TVIP -

Sea Harrier, although a great success at the end, was a highly compromised design

That's because it was the result of a series of low-cost, quick-turn developments that started with a technology demonstrator.

 

[AeroFranz]

We're getting seriously off-topic here...nonetheless, i wanted to bring up an excellent article by Graham Warwick in this week's AvWeek. It relates some of the discussions that took place at AIAA Aviation in June, at the F-35 panel. Kind of a historical recap / how we got here / lessons learned

behind paywall:
http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/how-f-35-experience-could-reduce-hurdles-developing-fighters

 

[kcran567]

Again, not to get too off topic, but how effective is the F-35 going to be "dispersed."
Does anybody really think that the F-35 is going to be operating in an unprepared location?
There is going to be unbelievable amounts of support requirement for the F-35, and hi levels of preparation that the F-35 will require. Is the fact that it has some STOVL capability a neat gimmick or will it actually be even worse of a compromise than the Harrier.

There will not be a 6th gen manned short takeoff platform. BUT, it might be workable in future low cost yet capable drones or unmanned strike variants.

 

[jsport]

F/A-XX will not be STOVL but a carrier based plane w/some range and real capability should be discussed. Maybe w/ next generation engines that aren't energy sapped by gears so the plane can have some range, for instance. The politics of cost and schedule might need a separate topic.


The US Navy has never faced such a threat before, the Congressional Research Office warned in a report in May, adding that some analysts consider the missiles "game changing". The "carrier Killers" have been supplemented by the deployment this year of missiles in the south China Sea. The weaponry includes the new Y-12B ant-ship cruise missile, which puts most of the waters between the Philippines and Vietnam in range.
While all out war between China and the United States seems unthinkable the Chinese military is preparing for "a limited military conflict from the sea". according to a 2013 paper in a journal called The Science of Military Strategy.

Lyle Morris an analyst w/ the RAND Corp. said that China's deployment of missiles in the dispersed Parcel, Spratly islands 'will dramatically change how the US military operates' across Asia and the Pacific. The best response, he added , was "to find new and innovative methods" of deploying ships outside their range.[/i]
China's Navy ups its game in the Pacific : Can hold own against the US 16 Sep NYT

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Well, true. Keeping the USMC in the STOVL business is projected to cost $47 billion in procurement, roughly equal to the projected cost of 80 B-21s. Development? In addition to the direct cost of the lift system, there's the bill for developing the F135 and F136 (two F414s would have done for the A and C, at less cost and lower weight) and some more for the weight overrun and the consequent production chaos.

The USAF never wanted two engines and they're the biggest customer by far so two F414s were never going to be the answer.

So my answer would be: if you want more aviation ships, build more aviation ships rather than plugging a very expensive blade into the LHA/LHD Swiss Army knife. Ships that can carry enough air to protect themselves and perform offensive missions at the same time, including AEW, ISR and EA. However, the Rulers of Uncle Sam's Navee have been insistent for the last 50 years that they want nothing to do with anything that dilutes or competes with a numerically small force of CVNs.

What's going to pay for those additional aviation ships if not a reduction in the numbers of CVNs? I believe the last study done on the subject showed an overall drop in the number of aircraft able to operate from smaller CV designs versus current CVNs, even when you factor in the greater number of the smaller CVs that could be afforded. Without STOVL you're going to need CATOBAR capability which is going to necessitate a pretty sizable ship no matter what.

A prospect over which the Big Deck Navy would doubtless weep bitter tears. /sarc

Considering the miserable record of cancellations (A-12, NATF, Super Tomcat, A/F-X, etc.) it seems the Navy should consider itself lucky they're getting anything other than Super Hornets for the foreseeable future.

If there was any mistake in the aims of JSF it wasn't the STOVL variant but tacking on the CV variant. Ideally the Navy would have gotten a VLO fighter that would be a significant improvement over the Super Hornet in terms of performance. As it is the F-35C and Super Hornet seem to overlap in a lot of ways.

 

[jsport]

What is the purpose of a VLO carrier fighter when you might as well take off from Hawaii because you can not effect any change in Pacific. The Pacific will be gone. What is the point of carriers if the carrier fighters do not have range or effect enough to even survive let alone prevail.

 

[LowObservable]

The USAF never wanted two engines

Not at the time of JAST studies, but nobody expected that two F414s would cost less than an F135.

Without STOVL you're going to need CATOBAR capability which is going to necessitate a pretty sizable ship no matter what.

Exactly. Which is why it was so important that the 1998-2003 UK studies showed that the mission (self defense + offense = not self licking ice cream cone) drove SGR, which drove numbers, which drive ship size, to the point where CATOBAR was easily accommodated.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

What is the purpose of a VLO carrier fighter when you might as well take off from Hawaii because you can not effect any change in Pacific. The Pacific will be gone. What is the point of carriers if the carrier fighters do not have range or effect enough to even survive let alone prevail.

Well the 5th gen fighter the Navy would have gotten in this ideal scenario would have greater range than the F/A-18E and F-35C. Maybe not as much as what is planned for F/A-XX, but with in-flight refueling provided by a tanker like the MQ-25 it should be enough to keep the CVNs out of the range of most AShMs. The major exception is the DF-21 which is a problem that pushing the carriers further and further away will not be able to solve. They'll be a point someday where they could theoretically hit our carriers at port in the United States with such a conventionally armed precision ballistic missile. Methods to intercept those missiles seem to be the only feasible answer.

Don't misunderstand, I do want to see an F/A-XX with outstanding range and capabilities but the lack of visible progress at this point seems a bit disappointing. I can only hope they've done more in the background. Despite the "6th generation" concept art we see from the major aerospace companies I'm left with the impression the Navy still doesn't know what they want, especially when some officers talk about "Super Super Hornets" or something along those lines.

 

[jsport]

What is the purpose of a VLO carrier fighter when you might as well take off from Hawaii because you can not effect any change in Pacific. The Pacific will be gone. What is the point of carriers if the carrier fighters do not have range or effect enough to even survive let alone prevail.

Don't misunderstand, I do want to see an F/A-XX with outstanding range and capabilities but the lack of visible progress at this point seems a bit disappointing. I can only hope they've done more in the background. Despite the "6th generation" concept art we see from the major aerospace companies I'm left with the impression the Navy still doesn't know what they want, especially when some officers talk about "Super Super Hornets" or something along those lines.

Someone needs to start taking money from contractors that have more of the same as a plan. Too many admirals looking for that "Golden Revolving door". That "miserable record of cancellations (A-12, NATF, Super Tomcat, A/F-X, etc.) wasted time/money is going to end up rendering carriers pointless.

Maybe some new private/ public entity should overpay/recruit engineers out from under the "majors" and place the new employees in a Private/public design corporation so they can bid a design against there former employers (majors). Maybe the majors would get off their a... and bid something worth it. but if the new private/public design corporation wins then bid it back out to the majors to manufacture after the new design company wins. Final production would be overseen by the former "majors" design/engineer employees. Force the majors to streamline the BureauBizBS or else. Unfortunately tariffs and decadence can only be broken w/ genuine threats.

 

[Grey Havoc]

A resurrected navy Bureau of Aeronautics doing design and even some prototyping might be an even better approach there.

 

[jsport]

A resurrected navy Bureau of Aeronautics doing design and even some prototyping might be an even better approach there

And who should the US and UK governments hire to lead this high visibility effort to save Navys and Air Forces.... why Low Observable of course.

The Title page still has Bill Sweetman working for AW&ST thought that wasn't true anymore.

 

[sferrin]

A resurrected navy Bureau of Aeronautics doing design and even some prototyping might be an even better approach there

And who should the US and UK governments hire to lead this high visibility effort to save Navys and Air Forces.... why Low Observable of course.

The Title page still has Bill Sweetman working for AW&ST thought that wasn't true anymore.

This thread started over ten years ago.

 

[jsport]

The first task of such Bureau of Naval Aeronautics head would be to convince the UK they should eventually go back to a long deck carrier(s) as this inefficient STOVL nonsense needs to be put mostly on hold until some yet unknown vertical lift tech (most likely already discovered just ignored) realistically breaks the Vertical Wheel of Shame.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

A resurrected navy Bureau of Aeronautics doing design and even some prototyping might be an even better approach there

And who should the US and UK governments hire to lead this high visibility effort to save Navys and Air Forces.... why Low Observable of course.

The Title page still has Bill Sweetman working for AW&ST thought that wasn't true anymore.

If you mean the page logo, it's a quote from a post Bill made many years ago while he was editor-in-chief of Aviation Week.

 

[jsport]

Why not add "editor in chief" then?