USAF/US NAVY 6th Generation Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

[Dragon029]

The current engine puts out 43,000lbf, so it's only a 2000-3000lbf (4-7%) difference. The engine thrust pins, etc would certainly be capable of withstanding the additional thrust, but there'd be some small impact on component lifespan. That can just be mitigated by adjusting how often max AB is used, assuming they don't redesign anything.

 

[bring_it_on]

The “4th/5th” generation balance discussion is quickly
becoming a “5th/6th” generation balance discussion and the Fiscal Year (FY) President’s Budget
(PB) 2019 adds $2.7 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to fund the next
generation of air dominance (NGAD) capabilities. Known as NGAD, this program will utilize
an agile acquisition strategy in order to facilitate parallel development and prototyping activities
that puts the Air Force on a timeline needed to close air superiority capability gaps identified in
the Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan. The Air Superiority Family of Systems will provide a
complementary capability to the F-35A and will not impact JSF program objectives.

 

[bring_it_on]

Fighter Roadmap Coming Soon, Along With Air Dominance AOA

An Analysis of Alternatives begun last year to decide the next steps in air superiority is almost finished and “should [be] complete sometime this year,” Holmes said. Despite “new ideas” from the new administration, “we’re convinced the nation will continue to depend on the Air Force to control the air so we can exploit it as a joint force,” he asserted. The AOA will provide “options” for senior leaders as to how best to provide for air superiority, and what form the PCA will take.

However it shapes up, “we know it has to operate as part of a family of systems, we know there are multiple approaches to what we’re talking about,” Holmes reported. The AOA will come with recommendations, “and then we’ll advocate for that.”

 

[marauder2048]

From "FY19 Air Force President’s Budget Request Science and Technology Overview"
Mr. Jeff H. Stanley @ The 19th Annual Science & Engineering Technology Conference

 

[bring_it_on]

I went through the FY19 RDTE budget and came up with these small efforts littered around under various programs to support weapons, and technology development in support of NG weapons for 5th and 6th generation fighters -

• Continue to develop airframe and control technologies that enable innovative air-to-air engagements.
• Initiate software development kit for Open Seeker Architecture to enable rapid technology insertion into software defined, multi-function seekers.
• Continue to explore terminal seeker technologies that enable innovative air-to-air engagements for fifth-generation aircraft and beyond.
• Continue development and early testing of small, air-to-air, self-defense munitions seeker technology including initial captive flight testing and hardware in the loop testing.
• Initiate a weapon demonstration concept and showing an increase of load-out by double.
• Continue ground testing of advanced guidance laws and actuators that enable innovative air-to-air engagements and hyper agility including hit-to-kill.
• Continue conducting flight innovative air-to-air high off-bore sight missile maneuverability and hit-to kill agility.
• Continue conducting ground tests of rocket motor component technologies to evaluate their ability to increase weapon range and
reduce size and weight.
• Initiate small, air-to-air, self-defense munitions research effort.
• Continue to develop air-to-air missile warhead concepts for the air targets in near-peer engagement scenarios.
• Continue to conduct wind-tunnel and limited flight experiments to characterize air-to-air maneuverability, range, and guidance and
control for sixth generation weapon concept. Continue to conduct ground and arena tests of advanced weapons experimental-
carriages for sixth generation weapon concept and prepare for flight worthiness testing.
• Continue to test prototype propulsion systems to demonstrate attributes to meet next-generation air-to-air weapon requirements.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2018/05/17/interview-mitchell-institute-head-has-advice-for-the-future-us-air-force-fighter-fleet/

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force is in the process of laying out a fighter jet road map that will help decide the makeup of its future tactical aircraft fleet. The plan won’t be finalized until later this year, but Dave Deptula, a retired Air Force lieutenant general and current dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, shared with Defense News his thoughts about where the service should go.

One of the big questions regarding the fighter road map is the fate of fourth-generation fighters. What should the Air Force be considering as it makes those decisions?

For far too long, the budgets that have been issued to the Air Force have been what has driven its force size, not strategy. So the national security strategy is what needs to drive our military’s force structure, to include the Air Force. If you look to the new national security strategy … one begins to see a picture where what one needs to be able to do is to fight and win major regional contingencies at the high end of the conflict spectrum, as well as to still be engaged in kind of the proverbial conflicts that have been continuing but that occur inside a permissive airspace.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/farnborough/2018/07/16/whats-going-on-with-americas-next-fighter-designs/

WASHINGTON ― America is developing a pair of two new high-tech fighter aircraft, and you probably haven’t heard much about them.

Under the leadership of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, the Pentagon has clamped down on talking about cutting-edge capabilities in development, citing concerns about giving potential foes too much information.

Nevertheless, some details have emerged about the ongoing programs, one each from the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. And in light of European plans for new fighter designs, it is worth revisiting what is, and isn’t, known about the American efforts.

In 2016, the U.S. Air Force unveiled its “Air Superiority 2030” study, which posited that although the service would need a new air superiority fighter jet — called Penetrating Counter Air — as soon as the 2030s, it would be just as important that the new plane fit into a "family of systems” of space, cyber, electronic warfare and other enabling technologies.

The service then initiated an analysis of alternatives in 2017 to further drill down on Penetrating Counter Air concepts and to refine its requirements, but the service’s top uniformed officer sounds interested in a disaggregated mission aproach.

 

[TomcatViP]

An interesting read. It will be good to see how various nations and services come to solve the question of the future air warfare. For sure, airframe type could be by the many thanks to the lower cost of design (in overall). Interestingly most nation have the same terminology (although we still don't know how original that is for some).
Interesting time indeed.

 

[bobbymike]

Papers from 2018 ICEAA Professional Development & Training Workshop

Estimating Future Air Dominance
David E. Stem, AFCAA Aircraft & Weapons Division Chief

Proactive estimating: an analysis of sixth generation aircraft
Dale Shermon, QinetiQ

 

[Flyaway]

USAF analyst suggests ways to avoid cost overruns on 6th-gen fighter

The Aircraft and Weapons division chief with the US Air Force Cost Analysis Agency has made a series of suggestions in a research paper for keeping the price of a sixth generation fighter down after analysing a myriad of cost-overruns by the B-2, F-22 and F-35 programmes.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-analyst-suggests-ways-to-avoid-cost-overruns-on-451032/

 

[marauder2048]

Contains earth-shattering suggestions like: use multi-year procurement.

 

[sferrin]

Contains earth-shattering suggestions like: use multi-year procurement.

MYP? Can't do that. Everybody in the GAO and a POGO would have a coronary. IIRC they were against buying an additional SSN ( don't recall which FY it was to be bought it but it would have save money overall) and MYP of the Ford class as well.

 

[Moose]

I don't recall GAO or POGO ever being against all block buys or MYP as tools of procurement. Both have at times been heavily critical of block buys or MYPs that were authorized before the programs in question had reached a level of maturity and cost stability they believed was appropriate to warrant such, and both have pressed the DoD to support its calculated savings with hard data. As watchdogs, that's their job. I doubt either would read that report and say "no block buys!"

 

[fredymac]

Perhaps you can name a program (any major weapon system) where they support MYP? If you think of all the major weapon systems developed and fielded over the past 40 years, which of them did they support let alone advocate MYP? Off hand, whenever I see GAO Report or POGO, I automatically know what to expect. Given who makes up their staff, it would be heresy for them to do otherwise.

 

[LowObservable]

Neither can I recall GAO or POGO (or indeed any actors) being opposed on principle to MYP. They do go along with the maturity criteria for MYP, which are logical.

 

[sferrin]

"Acquisition Insanity: USS Ford Block-Buy Proposal"

http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/defense-budget/2018/acquisition-insanity-uss-ford-block-buy-proposal.html


"F-35 Chief Struggles to Justify Block Buy"

http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/congress/2016/f-35-chief-explains-block-buy.html

and a year later:

http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2017/pogo-statement-f-35-economic-order-quantity-legislative-proposal.html

In both instances POGO is being deliberately deceptive. Both the Ford class and the F-35 are going to be bought. They're not getting cancelled tomorrow. But in both cases POGO gins up a lot of spurious nonsense in an effort to keep the dream of cancellation alive. (Because, you know, if they're only buying year-to-year there's still a chance. . .)

And the F-22

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/verbatim/4/71696/testimony-slams-us-air-force%27s-plans-for-f_22-funding.html

Here's a fine example of POGO's integrity:

"Stable Requirements Over the years, the number of requested F-22 aircraft has plummeted from 750 in 1986 to the most recent plan of only 183 – clearly demonstrating the lack of stability in production rate requirements – in large part because the cost per aircraft has tripled."

Through either stupidity or malice they claim a "tripled" price is the reason for the cut in numbers purchased rather than putting the real blame on the increased unit cost where it belongs - on the cutting of the numbers purchased. Of course this kind of dishonestly is the bread and butter of POGO.

 

[NeilChapman]

Contains earth-shattering suggestions like: use multi-year procurement.

MYP? Can't do that. Everybody in the GAO and a POGO would have a coronary. IIRC they were against buying an additional SSN ( don't recall which FY it was to be bought it but it would have save money overall) and MYP of the Ford class as well.

The paper recommends MYP in 'production' systems but it contains a great deal more than that. It's worth the read.

If I've understood the thrust of GAO's objection to MYP it's been because the data shows that MYP doesn't always result in the savings projected in the justification. The myriad reasons usually end with, "so they needed to spend more." There are times when specifications are lowered and the MYP budgets are still fully appropriated. Virginia class, today, seems to be a MYP poster child.

I can't bash the GAO for fulfilling their mandate. They hold programs accountable for what the programs say they're going to deliver. If SpaceX were a government "program" GAO would immolate them having over sold and under delivered. And we would all reply, "and what they've delivered is spectacular so we'll let it slide."

The issue hasn't been scrutiny. It's a Congress that mandates $1 worth of security, allocates the professionals $.47, leaves that funding flat for 25 years while requiring the professionals to prosecute war for 18 years. And the worst of it is they've convinced the professionals that the problem is not lack of funds but funding stability. This wont change until Congress (and those that elect them) appropriate, annually and on time, the base cost to execute the mandated national defense strategy, or change the requirements.

But perhaps there's reason for optimism. Tech maturation, stable requirements, RCO, contract flexibility (e.g KC-46 $4.9B fixed EMD contract), leveraging interoperable open architectures and upgrade ability into new platforms are all positive steps. If we could only guarantee stable funding.

 

[sferrin]

MYP helps alleviate uncertainty. Uncertainty is expensive. If they have to bump price because of "X" they'd have had to do that whether they bought one unit per year or signed up for five units over five years. It's not as though, if they buy one year at a time, that problems magically cease to exist. If a vendor knows they have five years of work coming they're more inclined to invest in equipment that will improve efficiency. If they know they have to hang on year-to-year that's much less likely to happen. No way to calculate amortization / too risky.

 

[jsport]

there most likely will be many "letter designations" variations of the craft and the requiste development time, but internal payload should be fixed over time. Guessing the internal infrastructure for the DEW installation will need to be somewhat modular which would also likely a source of controversy. Dependence on as solid state DEW IMHO would a mistake especially when there are powerful fuel burners already on board and not much volumn and a need for lowest weight. Fuels over batteries.

 

[LowObservable]

The reason not to do MYP is not that the program might be cancelled, but that the DoD or Congress might want to change numbers in any given year. The F-35 is an excellent example if you look at AF plans in the past few years: max rate target cut from 80 to 60, delays in the year when max rate is to be attained, and a lot of other chops and changes because they want to hold down the number of aircraft delivered without the TR3 processor.

 

[DrRansom]

My favorite detail from that report is the F-22 prototype team suffering >80% turnover because they moved from California to Georgia.

Can't say I blamed the engineers who quit.

 

[jsport]

old old news but still no answers

“In the year 2054,” Norman R. Augustine wrote in his book Augustine’s Laws, “the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 1/2 days each week, except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”

 

[gtg947h]

My favorite detail from that report is the F-22 prototype team suffering >80% turnover because they moved from California to Georgia.

Can't say I blamed the engineers who quit.

Most people don't like being forced to move. I'd quit if someone tried to make me move to California from Georgia...

Government procurement is broken, and it will remain so as long as cost and schedule projections are treated as Biblical truth vs. the heresy of actual costs.

 

[marauder2048]

The reason not to do MYP is not that the program might be cancelled, but that the DoD or Congress might want to change numbers in any given year.

Which is why MYPs allow for variation-in-quantity (+/- unit) clauses that let you do just this.

It's how the Navy ended up with fewer Super Hornets in MYP I than authorized without paying
any termination/cancellation penalties.

 

[NeilChapman]

old old news but still no answers

“In the year 2054,” Norman R. Augustine wrote in his book Augustine’s Laws, “the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 1/2 days each week, except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”

That's because it costs a lot to build bad products. :

 

[NeilChapman]

To the extent NGAD benefits from stable funding...
reportedly the first time it was signed before the start of the fiscal year in over 20 years.

https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-earliest-signing-the-ndaa-40-years-giant-step-rebuilding-the-military

 

[jsport]

To the extent NGAD benefits from stable funding...
reportedly the first time it was signed before the start of the fiscal year in over 20 years.

https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-earliest-signing-the-ndaa-40-years-giant-step-rebuilding-the-military

Thank you for posting. The Budget Control Act will likely disturb 2020 NGAD development.

IMHO NGAD should be primarily a UAS mothership and DEW bird. Only bombers make sense for carrying bombs and Air superiority and SEAD are UAS problems (no more endangering pilots). Problem is very few UAS (only some large stealth jet powered) are beyond the "Model A' stage of advancement.

 

[Jackonicko]

IMHO NGAD should be primarily a UAS mothership and DEW bird. Only bombers make sense for carrying bombs and Air superiority and SEAD are UAS problems (no more endangering pilots). Problem is very few UAS (only some large stealth jet powered) are beyond the "Model A' stage of advancement.

I think that you're in danger of stating an orthodoxy (UAVs are the future) that has become dated, and is no longer widely accepted. Of course UAVs and UCAVs and RPASs will play an increasingly important role in the future, but serious air power analysts no longer seem to believe that they will replace manned platforms (especially in kinetic roles), only that they will augment manned aircraft.

For some years, there seemed to be a consensus that the era of manned combat aircraft was drawing to a close, and that unmanned aircraft – some remotely piloted, but some autonomous, would take over their roles. The Labour government’s 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy, stated that: “Current plans do not envisage the UK needing to design and build a future generation of manned fast jet aircraft beyond the Typhoon and F-35.” That view is no longer so widely held, with operational experience demonstrating the value of having not only a ‘man in the loop’, but for that man to also be ‘on the scene’. The human pilot can using his eyes to get better situational awareness than is sometimes possible using the imagery gathered by narrow field of view video sensors, and many believe that it would not currently be possible to build a control system to replicate the sensing and processing ability of trained aircrew. Bandwidth limitations can make it difficult to download all of the ‘take’ from an unmanned aircraft’s sensors, while jamming and spoofing can disrupt signals to and from a UAV, including GPS data. The Russian military has already used GPS jamming to effectively block some US UAV operations over Syria.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Steven Hillier, the RAF’s Chief of Air Staff believed that unmanned aircraft will play a greater role in the future, but also thinks that there will be “an increased emphasis on precision and being able to do that at the greatest range you can,” and that “so far no-one has come up with a technical solution that is able to replace the manned combat aircraft” in controlling airspace and providing precision effect. He does not rule out technology eventually allowing UAVs to undertake these roles in “fifty years time,” but says that: “you can’t see it at the moment.”

It is not just the technological limitations of UAVs that have driven the UK towards making a manned platform the central element of FCAS. Sometimes societal factors, including RoE, will drive you towards being manned, not technology.

Michael Christie, BAE Systems Strategy Director for Air said that rules of engagement and social acceptability may be the most important factor, and many legal, moral and ethical issues continue to surround the use of unmanned platforms. The precision available by using manned aircraft can also be a crucial factor. Air Chief Marshal Hillier emphasized the importance of precision in allowing the UK to wage warfare in the way that it does – which he characterized as being highly disciplined and highly responsible, and with a very clear definition of what is the legal use of force. “And most of those who oppose us aren’t. I want to continue to wage warfare in our way, and not theirs,” he observed.

 

[Foo Fighter]

As a what-if scenario, could the B-2 be reasonably reconfigured as tankers? Would that be a cost effective force multiplier?

 

[_Del_]

I doubt it's cost effective to run a 20 aircraft fleet of maintenance heavy aircraft no matter what the role. If it were cost effective, they wouldn't have earmarked them for (relatively) short-term replacement with the Bone. I imagine they'd prefer to keep them for strike if they could keep them cost effective.

But it absolutely could be done. Just seems like a money sink to maintain a fleet of only 20 unique large VLO aircraft.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Thank you.

 

[jsport]

IMHO NGAD should be primarily a UAS mothership and DEW bird. Only bombers make sense for carrying bombs and Air superiority and SEAD are UAS problems (no more endangering pilots). Problem is very few UAS (only some large stealth jet powered) are beyond the "Model A' stage of advancement.

I think that you're in danger of stating an orthodoxy (UAVs are the future) that has become dated, and is no longer widely accepted. Of course UAVs and UCAVs and RPASs will play an increasingly important role in the future, but serious air power analysts no longer seem to believe that they will replace manned platforms (especially in kinetic roles), only that they will augment manned aircraft.

For some years, there seemed to be a consensus that the era of manned combat aircraft was drawing to a close, and that unmanned aircraft – some remotely piloted, but some autonomous, would take over their roles. The Labour government’s 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy, stated that: “Current plans do not envisage the UK needing to design and build a future generation of manned fast jet aircraft beyond the Typhoon and F-35.” That view is no longer so widely held, with operational experience demonstrating the value of having not only a ‘man in the loop’, but for that man to also be ‘on the scene’. The human pilot can using his eyes to get better situational awareness than is sometimes possible using the imagery gathered by narrow field of view video sensors, and many believe that it would not currently be possible to build a control system to replicate the sensing and processing ability of trained aircrew. Bandwidth limitations can make it difficult to download all of the ‘take’ from an unmanned aircraft’s sensors, while jamming and spoofing can disrupt signals to and from a UAV, including GPS data. The Russian military has already used GPS jamming to effectively block some US UAV operations over Syria.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Steven Hillier, the RAF’s Chief of Air Staff believed that unmanned aircraft will play a greater role in the future, but also thinks that there will be “an increased emphasis on precision and being able to do that at the greatest range you can,” and that “so far no-one has come up with a technical solution that is able to replace the manned combat aircraft” in controlling airspace and providing precision effect. He does not rule out technology eventually allowing UAVs to undertake these roles in “fifty years time,” but says that: “you can’t see it at the moment.”

It is not just the technological limitations of UAVs that have driven the UK towards making a manned platform the central element of FCAS. Sometimes societal factors, including RoE, will drive you towards being manned, not technology.

Michael Christie, BAE Systems Strategy Director for Air said that rules of engagement and social acceptability may be the most important factor, and many legal, moral and ethical issues continue to surround the use of unmanned platforms. The precision available by using manned aircraft can also be a crucial factor. Air Chief Marshal Hillier emphasized the importance of precision in allowing the UK to wage warfare in the way that it does – which he characterized as being highly disciplined and highly responsible, and with a very clear definition of what is the legal use of force. “And most of those who oppose us aren’t. I want to continue to wage warfare in our way, and not theirs,” he observed.

great find
did say NGAD as a mothership so..

A mothership and daughters would have a very wide band ie Light Freq/Laser comms and difficult to jam so...

for example BAE ARGUS is a very wide field of view sensor and they are a given now.

armed, AI enabled, mini UAS searching for and possibly literally blocking AAMs & SAMs allowing a just far enough standoff NGAD redefines for some what 'on the scene' and 'in the loop' really means.

old and bad argument to say one is going to fight on one's own terms. It is one thing to want "responsible warfare". If your not prepared to counter if not overmatch their worst, you lose. Standoff overmatch is the reason for guns IMHO against such dangerous IADS. Precision effects is a given for the sake of cost/time firstly.


2005 is long time ago...seems they might be a bit dated.

 

[Jackonicko]

The point is that for a decade or more (from 2000-ish to 2015-ish) the orthodoxy was that the Rafale/Gripen/Typhoon would be Europe's last manned fighters and that the F-35 would probably be the last US major manned combat aircraft programme. The 2005 Defence Review typified that thinking.

Those at the cutting edge of air power seem to have rowed back really significantly, and there is a growing realisation of the limitations of unmanned and remotely piloted platforms (technologically, doctrinally, politically and societally speaking).

I don't think that Hillier was saying that he was planning to fight on "one's own terms" on a tactical level, but rather that the UK was not going to back away from a disciplined, responsible approach to the legal use of force. That's always been the UK's general approach - avoiding the use of human shields, reprisals against civilian populations, etc.

 

[jsport]

Those at the cutting edge of air power seem to have rowed back really significantly, and there is a growing realisation of the limitations of unmanned and remotely piloted platforms (technologically, doctrinally, politically and societally speaking).

I don't think that Hillier was saying that he was planning to fight on "one's own terms" on a tactical level, but rather that the UK was not going to back away from a disciplined, responsible approach to the legal use of force. That's always been the UK's general approach - avoiding the use of human shields, reprisals against civilian populations, etc.

UAS capability development has not slowed in anyway as far as I can sense. "Oh we are not developing this aspect of UAS because limitations." Never heard that from a US developer and probably will not ever. As stated, the run for precision effects w/ least colat..damage for efficiency sake alone is never done while "responsible" is an after thought at best. "Lawfare" will never go away but it doesn't impede development.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2018/08/lockheed-pitching-f-22f-35-hybrid-us-air-force/150943/?oref=defenseone_today_nl

Lockheed Martin is quietly pitching the U.S. Air Force a new variant of the F-22 Raptor, equipped with the F-35’s more modern mission avionics and some structural changes, Defense One has learned.

It is one of several options being shopped to the U.S. military and allies as Lockheed explores how it might upgrade its combat jets to counter Russian and Chinese threats anticipated by military officials in the coming decade, according to people with direct knowledge of the plan.

 

[sferrin]

I wonder what they would do for an engine. I don't get the impression the F135 would be a suitable replacement for the F119 as they're optimized for different envelopes. (And of course they'd want to roll the 3-stream engine into the mix. . .)

Not sure what I think of this idea. It would enable them to fill out the F-22 fleet to the numbers they should have bought in the first place, and PCA is likely to be expensive enough that we'll be lucky to get 100 of them. But every dollar into a new F-22 is money that doesn't get spent on the F-35 & PCA.

 

[bobbymike]

I wonder what they would do for an engine. I don't get the impression the F135 would be a suitable replacement for the F119 as they're optimized for different envelopes. (And of course they'd want to roll the 3-stream engine into the mix. . .)

Not sure what I think of this idea. It would enable them to fill out the F-22 fleet to the numbers they should have bought in the first place, and PCA is likely to be expensive enough that we'll be lucky to get 100 of them. But every dollar into a new F-22 is money that doesn't get spent on the F-35 & PCA.

What would be the major differences between an F-22/35 and the prospective PCA? With the latest avionics and three stream engine you'd have to be pretty close to PCA requirements? Could you get to a 90%+ solution with the former?

 

[sferrin]

I wonder what they would do for an engine. I don't get the impression the F135 would be a suitable replacement for the F119 as they're optimized for different envelopes. (And of course they'd want to roll the 3-stream engine into the mix. . .)

Not sure what I think of this idea. It would enable them to fill out the F-22 fleet to the numbers they should have bought in the first place, and PCA is likely to be expensive enough that we'll be lucky to get 100 of them. But every dollar into a new F-22 is money that doesn't get spent on the F-35 & PCA.

What would be the major differences between an F-22/35 and the prospective PCA? With the latest avionics and three stream engine you'd have to be pretty close to PCA requirements? Could you get to a 90%+ solution with the former?

I would think, compared to a new F-22, PCA would be faster, longer ranged, bigger payload, higher altitude, and stealthier, but give up some maneuverability. I don't think a new F-22 would be enough of an improvement in those areas to justify forgoing the PCA in the Pacific theater. A new F-22 would still have the range Achilles' heel compared to PCA.

 

[Moose]

I wonder what they would do for an engine. I don't get the impression the F135 would be a suitable replacement for the F119 as they're optimized for different envelopes. (And of course they'd want to roll the 3-stream engine into the mix. . .)

Not sure what I think of this idea. It would enable them to fill out the F-22 fleet to the numbers they should have bought in the first place, and PCA is likely to be expensive enough that we'll be lucky to get 100 of them. But every dollar into a new F-22 is money that doesn't get spent on the F-35 & PCA.

What would be the major differences between an F-22/35 and the prospective PCA? With the latest avionics and three stream engine you'd have to be pretty close to PCA requirements? Could you get to a 90%+ solution with the former?

Without a lot of classified data, it's not really possibly to give a percentage of how close a Super Raptor gets to PCA. I think the key part of their pitch is reasonably sound:

Deptula argues that buying upgraded F-22s allows the U.S. military to take an incremental step before buying a radically redesigned sixth-generation fighter jet with technologies that have not yet been proven.

“If you take a look just the general areas of aerodynamics, propulsion, low observability, we have not gotten to the point where we can achieve any order of magnitude increases in any one of those areas beyond where we are [with the] F-22 outer moldline,” Deptula said.

Basically, the next big step isn't ready yet and the new airframe will require that big step up to justify itself. But a Super Raptor can leverage a whole lot of existing tech and systems to put it back well in the lead of the pack until PCA is ready. Will be interesting to see if it gets traction.

 

[DrRansom]

So they're going to put off designing another airframe because they can't achieve some arbitrary technological improvement? I agree with sferrin - the F-22 is too range limited and too internal space limited to be useful in the Pacific.

It would be much better to just build a 5+ gen F-23 copycat which has room for development.

This explains a great deal of the Tempest concept - the next aircraft is conceived more as a large and flexible airframe which can be adopted to missions rather than a single leap-ahead move.