USAF/US NAVY 6th Generation Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news
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jsport
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Folks are afraid of leap ahead it appears. Contractors just want to sell something soon. A F-23 size is a start but needs leap ahead for DEW and internal payload. The Pacific is too big for F-22.
Why not just up grade your F-22s until your ready to leap.
Why not just up grade your F-22s until your ready to leap.
DrRansom
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sferrin said:
FB-23 with an EF-23 on the way. I'm sold
jsport said:
Because the F-22 has major range issues. Also, implicit in the Tempest program is that the F-35 doesn't have enough internal space to be flexible.
I don't get why the fighter has to be leap-ahead. A 5th gen fighter which is cheap to buy and flexible is still a big jump ahead over most airplanes. What isn't tenable is waiting >10 years for the next magic plane.
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Lockheed is doing the same thing with the 22 that Boeing is doing with the 15 and trying to capitalize on an existing airframe. Its smart business but a POOR replacement for a new 6th gen airframe. The 22 lacks the range and payload for the next gen.
Also I kind of believe that Lockheed does not want to go head to head with Northrop in a design competition. Northrop won the stealth bomber twice. They should have won the ATF competition. Seeing where air combat has eveloved into, the 23 would have been better suited to today and tomorrow than the 22. I have no idea in hell how Boeing won out over Northrop in then JSF program. Seeing what Lockheed was pitching for the ATF program its a wonder they placed so high and pulled a rabbit out of the hat at the last minute. I think it was the influx of general dynamics engineers that saved Lockheed. Lockheed does not want to go head to head with Northrop. I would have loved to seen a fully developed Northrop TX.
Also I kind of believe that Lockheed does not want to go head to head with Northrop in a design competition. Northrop won the stealth bomber twice. They should have won the ATF competition. Seeing where air combat has eveloved into, the 23 would have been better suited to today and tomorrow than the 22. I have no idea in hell how Boeing won out over Northrop in then JSF program. Seeing what Lockheed was pitching for the ATF program its a wonder they placed so high and pulled a rabbit out of the hat at the last minute. I think it was the influx of general dynamics engineers that saved Lockheed. Lockheed does not want to go head to head with Northrop. I would have loved to seen a fully developed Northrop TX.
marauder2048
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The hybridized F-22/F-35 is really another variant of the "no new fighter needed" alternative in the AoA
to which you would add some of the other ideas that have cropped up.
1. stealthy tankers
2. low-observable conformal fuel tanks for the F-22/F-35
3. AETP retrofits for the F-22/F-35
4. signature reduced MALI with a SACM sprint stage; make it aft-ejectable (a la MCALS) and bomber/arsenal plane compatible
5. loyal wingmen with defensive DEWS
to which you would add some of the other ideas that have cropped up.
1. stealthy tankers
2. low-observable conformal fuel tanks for the F-22/F-35
3. AETP retrofits for the F-22/F-35
4. signature reduced MALI with a SACM sprint stage; make it aft-ejectable (a la MCALS) and bomber/arsenal plane compatible
5. loyal wingmen with defensive DEWS
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A major problem with trying to restart F-22 production in any form is that much of the tooling and material that were supposed to be held in storage against such a contingency was (illegally) used by Lockheed Martin to try and prop up F-35 production.
Thought that the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for the PCA was to have been done by July of this year? Until we see some sort of (redacted) release of that publicly you'll see firms pitching they're best ideas for a F-22 replacement. The other thing that was mentioned was that the AF working on a fighter road map due out this fall although I don't know if that will be released to the public.
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Basically a more powerful, air-fo-air MALD for intercepting cruise missiles with off-board guidance provided via data-link. I suspect it'd be used just as likely against high-value force-multipliers like AWACS, tankers, etc who are not exactly nimble. But the story is cruise-missiles from everything I've seen.
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sferrin said:
That is exactly what the F-35B is/uses: a separate lift engine. Does it matter if the lift engine is powered by fuel or a driveshaft? Seems that a fuel powered lift engine is less risky and mechanically more simple. To arbitrarily say no separate lift engine is a bit myopic.
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The other reason they like the lift fan is it removes the chance of hot gas re-ingestion (hot exhaust gases from the lift engine going into the inlets of the main engine), which would cause a large loss of propulsive lift right when you need it most.
marauder2048
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_Del_ said:
RAND envisioned a two-stage version with a MALI first stage (JP-10 turbojet) and an AMRAAM-derived second stage.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf
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As with any issue relating to this program, the answer starts with "it's complicated".
The shaft-driven fan stream is quite warm (it's not 100% efficient so that energy's gotta go somewhere) and the lift engine would have been a high-bypass fan, although I don't think the ratio was ever disclosed. Both would have done the same important job of keeping the main engine exhaust out of the inlets.
Northrop Grumman was the first contender to propose LPLC, and did so because it was assessed as less risky than shaft or gas drive. RR had done a lot of work on lift fans of various types. Also, it permitted the use of a stock F119 or F120 engine, and may have loosened some constraints on configuration.
The relative merits of LPLC and SDLF were never analyzed formally before the CDA downselect, which doesn't tell us much. The Macs design had other issues, the weight projections were rosily optimistic (for all designs, no doubt) and Boeing's approach to hot-gas ingestion did not work. The Marines were convinced that LPLC would be much harder to maintain, but nobody had any realistic data at the time. DARPA's attitude was that LPLC had been done and was thus not 'DARPA-hard".
It would be brave nonetheless to assert that LPLC would have been a better way to go. The SDLF system is complex but it has the merit of integrating all the jet-borne flight control into the propulsion system, and any design would have been subject to all the other JSF constraints. My opinion FWIW is that on the whole it would have been better to see LPLC-versus-SDLF in the CDA stage.
The shaft-driven fan stream is quite warm (it's not 100% efficient so that energy's gotta go somewhere) and the lift engine would have been a high-bypass fan, although I don't think the ratio was ever disclosed. Both would have done the same important job of keeping the main engine exhaust out of the inlets.
Northrop Grumman was the first contender to propose LPLC, and did so because it was assessed as less risky than shaft or gas drive. RR had done a lot of work on lift fans of various types. Also, it permitted the use of a stock F119 or F120 engine, and may have loosened some constraints on configuration.
The relative merits of LPLC and SDLF were never analyzed formally before the CDA downselect, which doesn't tell us much. The Macs design had other issues, the weight projections were rosily optimistic (for all designs, no doubt) and Boeing's approach to hot-gas ingestion did not work. The Marines were convinced that LPLC would be much harder to maintain, but nobody had any realistic data at the time. DARPA's attitude was that LPLC had been done and was thus not 'DARPA-hard".
It would be brave nonetheless to assert that LPLC would have been a better way to go. The SDLF system is complex but it has the merit of integrating all the jet-borne flight control into the propulsion system, and any design would have been subject to all the other JSF constraints. My opinion FWIW is that on the whole it would have been better to see LPLC-versus-SDLF in the CDA stage.
jsport
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Thank you for attaching the RAND study marauder2048. After a light skimming ..am more convinced that if SK or Taiwan are to be protected someday then the number of threats and targets is so high and difficult and w/ such stand-off issues that this concept from the late Paul Cyzsz et al should certainly be considered.marauder2048 said:
A renewed program could make great use of current processing and material advances.
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marauder2048
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marauder2048 said:
RAND's latest on the air defense of Taiwan is especially grim reading; they argued that Taiwan should largely abandon fighters
(scale down to a small F-35B or, more politically feasible, a smallish retrofitted F-16 force) in favor of a layered IADS.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1051/RAND_RR1051.pdf
There's some especially good analysis of the survivability of a layered IADS against a variety of SEAD weapons/techniques.
Given the above, it strikes me that some of the late Cold War very long range SAM/fighter pairing concepts
might be worth revisiting; INF doesn't say anything about SAMs.
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Dragon029 said:
Unfortunately, those reports quickly proved to not have even a passing resemblance to reality, much to the displeasure of the GAO and various Congressional committees. Even by 2014 the pilferage had gotten so bad that USAF maintainers were having (and continue to have) serious problems in keeping the few F-22s available flying.
sferrin said:
What wasn't buggered to fit (pardon my French) was broken down into components for the repair of existing production line equipment or the creation of new tooling. The loss of aircraft components & raw materials set aside for production of new F-22s (or at least the repair of existing ones) in an emergency was in some ways even more devastating, I should note.
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Grey Havoc said:
I guess I would have to be familiar with specific examples, because this doesn't make a lot of sense. You can't really repurpose things like forgings, layup and trim tools, assembly monuments, etc. For one thing those tools would be owned by the government, not Lockheed, so they'd have had to buy off on any plan, if it was even possible. I could see things like hand tools, bought with F-22 funds, go walking to the F-35 program, but that's another matter.
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A Spartan size SAM would be great range given where energetics are going.marauder2048 said:
Depending on these various cruise missiles and submunitions suppressing these hardened facilities and w/ these levels of IADS is not a sure plan for success. More like recovering many pilots, w/ few facilities destroyed. Hardened facilities are going to require a more guaranteed hard kill not to mention all the AAA guns needing suppression.
All current FA-XX proposals seem more like a technological/intellectual exercises rather than an effective solution in the Pacific. Maybe a PBW fighter w/ KE like effects from a DE weapon.
marauder2048
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sferrin said:
Yeah. It's hard to reconcile most of the above claims with the data that's in the 2017 F-22A Production Restart Assessment.
The overall concern about raw materials is in the context of a restart given the titanium intensive nature of the F-22 and F-35 (plus other programs).
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For part of my day job, I work in a realm of tools and tooling and i kickoff subsuppliers on cutting tools... and what I hear here is bullshit. The 22 tooling was 100% owned by Uncle Sam, and not Lockheed to do with as they pleased. The DoD bought and paid for those tools and that can’t be disputed. Repurposing the tooling for the 22 into the 35 would be like Repurposing the tooling for a Silverado into a Dodge Challenger. Maybe some literal hand tools could be reused, but that's it. Considering the 35 has zero percent 22 in it, save for nuts and bolts and helicoils nothing about this story adds up. Maybe the USAF refueling receptacle is common, so perhaps there is 1% carry over components.
Just like when dumbass ordered the destruction of the 14s tools, the governemt could do that because it was THEIR tools that THEY owned.
Just like when dumbass ordered the destruction of the 14s tools, the governemt could do that because it was THEIR tools that THEY owned.
jsport
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https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf
" The United States learned during the Cold War the nuclear deterrence needs to be survivable against a first strike: a similar lesson could be applied to conventional deterrence. If conventional deterrence is not survivable, it would be more destabilizing than deterrent. If a force were not survivable, a different approach to deterrence would be
necessary.
This observation also suggests that U.S. forces need to be balanced for offensive power and survivability. In other words, spending on new aircraft does not deliver a credible capability if those aircraft do not have secure locations from which to operate. It is important to realistically consider where new aircraft will be deployed and how to
protect them once there.
The corollary to this observation is that, given the choice between new weapons and defenses, the next marginal dollar should be spent on defenses. The implications of PLAAF sortie generation potential and relative tactical flexibility remind us that better technology does not necessarily lead to air dominance. Singly dominant fighters in low numbers may not be enough to overcome large numbers of less-capable aircraft.
A strategic adversary can devise ways to “pose problems without catching up.” The USAF needs to consider the trade-off between quality and numbers. In the Cold War, this tradeoff motivated the development of the F-16, which was to be available in large numbers at relatively low cost, complementing the higher-capability but more expensive F-15. This was also the initial vision for the F-35, but with unit costs rapidly approaching the unit costs of the F-22, it is uncertain whether affordability will be able to compensate for its admittedly lower air-to-air capability.
Despite the remarkable capabilities of USAF fifth-generation aircraft, pitting relatively few fifth-generation aircraft against very large numbers of fourth generation fighters is, at best, and untested strategy. We also note that the success of USAF fighters is highly dependent on the ability of USAF air-to-air missiles. While this effort does not make an effort to predict the AMRAAM’s Pk Price per kill) precisely, we note that when employed against maneuvering adversaries using decoys and countermeasures, its performance would probably be well under its historical average (tallied largely against non-maneuvering adversaries with inoperable or wholly inadequate avionics).
Large investments in highly capable fifth-generation aircraft must be balanced with investments in air-to-air weapons which complement the platforms’capabilities. Without an air-to-air missile that can reliably hit targets, each USAF aircraft would not be able to destroy enough PLAAF aircraft to overcome their superior numbers. In effect, the USAF would have a large number of largely invulnerable raptors, (sans talons?).
If, indeed, attacks on staging areas combined with a PLAAF raid CONOP could deny U.S. air superiority in a Taiwan conflict, strategies for that conflict would need to include an expectation – or at least a contingency plan – for a lack of U.S. air superiority. This would be a very difficult change, as the U.S. military has never really had to fight without at least some measure of air superiority over the battlefield.
We also find that if Guam were rendered unusable by attacks (or the threat of attacks), defending Taiwan directly would become a nearly impossible task. Only long-range options would be feasible, and any plan to that effect would rely heavily on coercion and punishment. A worst-case fallback would be to wait for the PLA to expend its missile magazine before moving forces forward, but it is far from clear that Taiwan could defend itself that long, or that the PLA would not hold a sizeable portion of the missile magazine in reserve, preferring to keep enough of an inventory to hold U.S. forward deployments at risk indefinitely. p-197 "
"Aircraft parked in underground hangars at the handful of superhardened PLA facilities would be very difficult to destroy, and certainly require sorties capable of employing GBU-28 or better penetrating warheads. This would demand putting fixed-wing aviation directly above these targets – and in the air defense environment that China will present, the risk-reward ratio of doing so would just not be worth it.
Less effective (standoff) attacks could pin these aircraft in shelters temporarily, but only until the base mobilized enough labor to clear the rubble and perform rudimentary (if any) runway repairs. Specialized weapons like fuel air explosives could be used to create large overpressures over large areas. This would be useful for damaging ventilation infrastructure: valves, intakes, etc. Such attacks could force certain actions – like running aircraft engines – to occur outside the tunnel shelter. This would further degrade the efficiency of operating out of a tunnel. The extent that electromagnetic weapons could penetrate into underground shelters and the extent that PLA airbases are electromagnetically hardened is unknown...." p 176-7
a high performance craft w/ an HV, recoil compensated, liquid propelled gun firing numbers of guided rds might defeat fighters at distance in larger numbers, and defeat runways w/ just too many, too large craters and or even defeat hardened structures directly from the horizontal at distance, especially given the few USAF & USN sorties even allowed in the Taiwan scenario as specified in the report.
Bombers and Bombs are too few and dangerous to aircraft, missiles are too few both for Air engagements and against IADS including shelters. This situation will only worsen over time. A 6th generation fighter becomes obsolete in range and useful armament before it ever enters service w/o a pretty radical approach also specified in the report.
" The United States learned during the Cold War the nuclear deterrence needs to be survivable against a first strike: a similar lesson could be applied to conventional deterrence. If conventional deterrence is not survivable, it would be more destabilizing than deterrent. If a force were not survivable, a different approach to deterrence would be
necessary.
This observation also suggests that U.S. forces need to be balanced for offensive power and survivability. In other words, spending on new aircraft does not deliver a credible capability if those aircraft do not have secure locations from which to operate. It is important to realistically consider where new aircraft will be deployed and how to
protect them once there.
The corollary to this observation is that, given the choice between new weapons and defenses, the next marginal dollar should be spent on defenses. The implications of PLAAF sortie generation potential and relative tactical flexibility remind us that better technology does not necessarily lead to air dominance. Singly dominant fighters in low numbers may not be enough to overcome large numbers of less-capable aircraft.
A strategic adversary can devise ways to “pose problems without catching up.” The USAF needs to consider the trade-off between quality and numbers. In the Cold War, this tradeoff motivated the development of the F-16, which was to be available in large numbers at relatively low cost, complementing the higher-capability but more expensive F-15. This was also the initial vision for the F-35, but with unit costs rapidly approaching the unit costs of the F-22, it is uncertain whether affordability will be able to compensate for its admittedly lower air-to-air capability.
Despite the remarkable capabilities of USAF fifth-generation aircraft, pitting relatively few fifth-generation aircraft against very large numbers of fourth generation fighters is, at best, and untested strategy. We also note that the success of USAF fighters is highly dependent on the ability of USAF air-to-air missiles. While this effort does not make an effort to predict the AMRAAM’s Pk Price per kill) precisely, we note that when employed against maneuvering adversaries using decoys and countermeasures, its performance would probably be well under its historical average (tallied largely against non-maneuvering adversaries with inoperable or wholly inadequate avionics).
Large investments in highly capable fifth-generation aircraft must be balanced with investments in air-to-air weapons which complement the platforms’capabilities. Without an air-to-air missile that can reliably hit targets, each USAF aircraft would not be able to destroy enough PLAAF aircraft to overcome their superior numbers. In effect, the USAF would have a large number of largely invulnerable raptors, (sans talons?).
If, indeed, attacks on staging areas combined with a PLAAF raid CONOP could deny U.S. air superiority in a Taiwan conflict, strategies for that conflict would need to include an expectation – or at least a contingency plan – for a lack of U.S. air superiority. This would be a very difficult change, as the U.S. military has never really had to fight without at least some measure of air superiority over the battlefield.
We also find that if Guam were rendered unusable by attacks (or the threat of attacks), defending Taiwan directly would become a nearly impossible task. Only long-range options would be feasible, and any plan to that effect would rely heavily on coercion and punishment. A worst-case fallback would be to wait for the PLA to expend its missile magazine before moving forces forward, but it is far from clear that Taiwan could defend itself that long, or that the PLA would not hold a sizeable portion of the missile magazine in reserve, preferring to keep enough of an inventory to hold U.S. forward deployments at risk indefinitely. p-197 "
"Aircraft parked in underground hangars at the handful of superhardened PLA facilities would be very difficult to destroy, and certainly require sorties capable of employing GBU-28 or better penetrating warheads. This would demand putting fixed-wing aviation directly above these targets – and in the air defense environment that China will present, the risk-reward ratio of doing so would just not be worth it.
Less effective (standoff) attacks could pin these aircraft in shelters temporarily, but only until the base mobilized enough labor to clear the rubble and perform rudimentary (if any) runway repairs. Specialized weapons like fuel air explosives could be used to create large overpressures over large areas. This would be useful for damaging ventilation infrastructure: valves, intakes, etc. Such attacks could force certain actions – like running aircraft engines – to occur outside the tunnel shelter. This would further degrade the efficiency of operating out of a tunnel. The extent that electromagnetic weapons could penetrate into underground shelters and the extent that PLA airbases are electromagnetically hardened is unknown...." p 176-7
a high performance craft w/ an HV, recoil compensated, liquid propelled gun firing numbers of guided rds might defeat fighters at distance in larger numbers, and defeat runways w/ just too many, too large craters and or even defeat hardened structures directly from the horizontal at distance, especially given the few USAF & USN sorties even allowed in the Taiwan scenario as specified in the report.
Bombers and Bombs are too few and dangerous to aircraft, missiles are too few both for Air engagements and against IADS including shelters. This situation will only worsen over time. A 6th generation fighter becomes obsolete in range and useful armament before it ever enters service w/o a pretty radical approach also specified in the report.
Where is the 22 that cost as much as a brand new 35? Where are the new built 4th gen fleet that cost significantly less than a brand new stealthy F-35 with its unmatched performances in offensive and defensive warfare?
Taiwan also has significant underground parking spots. What about PLAAF loss ratio over those bases?
It's not because you read it in RAND that it makes senses.*
*And by the way, nobody says that this student graduated...
Taiwan also has significant underground parking spots. What about PLAAF loss ratio over those bases?
It's not because you read it in RAND that it makes senses.*
*And by the way, nobody says that this student graduated...
marauder2048
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TomcatViP said:
Very low since the PLA has deep enough SRBM inventories and ISR (for look-shoot-look) to keep the runways
under attack during attempts by the ROCAF to sortie out.
TomcatViP said:
Most doctoral dissertations have that line since there's typically coursework and other
requirements to satisfy; institutions don't tend to publish your dissertation unless you graduate.
jsport
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There is talk and alternatively there are solutions.
EMRGs are too heavy for tactical vehicles let alone aircraft as discussed below.
The paper also speaks to the inability of solid propellant high velocity missiles to fit in the then Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle form factor, a comparison which would apply to even a relatively large projected FA-XX internal payload.
http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/2000/ARL-CR-446.pdf
EMRGs are too heavy for tactical vehicles let alone aircraft as discussed below.
The paper also speaks to the inability of solid propellant high velocity missiles to fit in the then Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle form factor, a comparison which would apply to even a relatively large projected FA-XX internal payload.
http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/2000/ARL-CR-446.pdf
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marauder2048
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EMRGs do have some major advantages in terms of recoil* in the hypervelocity realm.
Not that people haven't proposed recoilless regenerative liquid propellant cannons or
recoilless mechanisms for traveling charge cannons.
* some large, high efficiency muzzle brakes do have the potential to eliminate powder gun
recoil at > 2.4 km/s but it's not clear that the overpressure would be tolerable for an aircraft
Not that people haven't proposed recoilless regenerative liquid propellant cannons or
recoilless mechanisms for traveling charge cannons.
* some large, high efficiency muzzle brakes do have the potential to eliminate powder gun
recoil at > 2.4 km/s but it's not clear that the overpressure would be tolerable for an aircraft
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