US Army - Lockheed Martin Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF)

Congressional Budget Office 68 page report on "U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives"
Four main conclusions:-

• Technological challenges must still be overcome to field hypersonic missiles
• Both hypersonic and ballistic missiles are well-suited to operate outside potential adversaries’
• Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles encountered highly effective long-range defenses.
• Hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.

 
The separation of ballistic and hypersonic boost glide weapons in the US arsenal I think is more due to political considerations rather than effectiveness.
 
Hypersonic missiles would probably not be more survivable than ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads in a conflict, unless the ballistic missiles encountered highly effective long-range defenses.

Hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads.

sounds like a slight IMHO. Hopefully a rethink of hypers which is way overdue.
 
The separation of ballistic and hypersonic boost glide weapons in the US arsenal I think is more due to political considerations rather than effectiveness.
How so?

For better or worse, the US seems to be trying to make ballistic missiles unambiguously nuclear platforms and hypersonic weapons (and aero ballistic tactical weapons) explicitly conventional. The US boost/gliders are likely too small for a nuclear warhead to be practical; it’s hard to see how the SWERVE style glider could carry even the smallest warhead and the TBG glider depictions to date seem to explicitly rule out anything larger than a bursting charge to scatter glider fragments already with a high amount of KE.

Of course Russia and China subscribe to a more ambiguous deployment scheme.
 
A nuclear warhead can fit in a 155mm shell and smaller (Davy Crockett), so I can't see how it wouldn't fit in these boost-glide warheads unless they'll be smaller than 20kg.

Physically I could see it in the SWERVE glider but I’m not sure if all of the components of a physics package can survive the thermal environment. The TBG glider renderings just don’t look big enough in diameter to me, though we’re not going to ever see its real shape.

Regardless, US policy seems to be ballistic RV = nuke, hypersonic glider = conventional, whether it an explicitly articulated position or not. There were numerous proposals for conventional ICBM RVs that always ended up hitting a wall of escalation risk. China’s MRBM/IRBM force never had such constraints, though AFAIK their ICBMs still do. Russia seems to have gone in the opposite direction as its Avangarde system is explicitly strategic, though it’s TBMs are potentially dual use.
 
Physically I could see it in the SWERVE glider but I’m not sure if all of the components of a physics package can survive the thermal environment. The TBG glider renderings just don’t look big enough in diameter to me, though we’re not going to ever see its real shape.

Regardless, US policy seems to be ballistic RV = nuke, hypersonic glider = conventional, whether it an explicitly articulated position or not. There were numerous proposals for conventional ICBM RVs that always ended up hitting a wall of escalation risk. China’s MRBM/IRBM force never had such constraints, though AFAIK their ICBMs still do. Russia seems to have gone in the opposite direction as its Avangarde system is explicitly strategic, though it’s TBMs are potentially dual use.
I think the reasoning is garbage TBH and nobody else is following it, so why impede oneself with rules that were never set?

I was under the impression that the ARRW warhead will be a few hundred kg. The artists' impressions I wrote off as garbage.
 
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Given the diameter of ARRW I’d be surprised if the glider was ~300kg. As for nuclear weapons, I don’t see any reason to incorporate them into hypersonics at this time seeing as how no one has a particularly useful ABM capability anyway.
 
Given the diameter of ARRW I’d be surprised if the glider was ~300kg. As for nuclear weapons, I don’t see any reason to incorporate them into hypersonics at this time seeing as how no one has a particularly useful ABM capability anyway.
I'm not sure that's true anymore TBH, as regards ABM defences. And the diameter of the AGM-183 is 25.9in (658mm), which is wider than a Tomahawk, and the warhead section is 1.7m long.


An SDB is 250lb at 1.8m long and 7 inches diameter, so if the ARRW warhead is even 21 inches (5 inches thinner than missile body) at the base and roughly cone shaped but flattened a bit, and 1.7m long it will be ~700lbs. If 1.5m long and same width, it will be ~610lbs.
 
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Wait, so an entirely different set of contractors will start making a different version of PrSM? Interesting - I guess that would allow for two separate production lines, which isn't a bad thing...
 
Ok, not usually a fan of this particular web site but it has an article that does a good job of splitting out the four increments:

1). basic missile entering production now
2). adding a seeker to engage moving/naval targets - wrapping up R&D in the next year or so
3). adding maneuvering submunitions
4). extending range

It is noted that increment 4 is more of a priority and might be fielded before increment 3.

 
“That is primarily a propulsion problem,” he said. The PrSM increments, along with most missiles, use rocket propulsion. In rocket systems, much of the weight is the oxygen needed for the fuel to burn.

“So, if you can pull the oxygen out of the atmosphere for that propulsion system, you really get a lot better gas mileage on your flight,” he said. “We need to pull a lot of new technologies in to integrate to make sure we're still effective throughout the flight, throughout the missile mission.”

While there are multiple technologies that could provide the air-breathing performance, the most likely candidate is a supersonic ramjet, he said.

“The reason we're looking at that is if you go to something higher speed like a scramjet, two problems happen,” he said. “One it's a little more expensive. That makes it difficult for the Army to do things like mass fires at depth. … And two, that higher speed can push us toward more exotic materials across the rest of the missile.

“So supersonic ramjets for us look like the right technology to have the right balance between speed for responsiveness and survivability, but not so fast that we have to get really exotic and expensive on how we build this,” he said.


sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.
 
sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.

I think the reason why the program got broken out this way is that the INF Treaty originally limited the range to 500km, but subsequently the US pulled out. This created/allowed for intermediate ranges to be considered by the Army after the program had already been started.
 
sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.

I think the reason why the program got broken out this way is that the INF Treaty originally limited the range to 500km, but subsequently the US pulled out. This created/allowed for intermediate ranges to be considered by the Army after the program had already been started.

In service2006–present[1]
 
The way the Russians have been using the SS-26 Stone in Ukraine likely means they don't have many of them left in their inventories.
 
sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.

I think the reason why the program got broken out this way is that the INF Treaty originally limited the range to 500km, but subsequently the US pulled out. This created/allowed for intermediate ranges to be considered by the Army after the program had already been started.

In service2006–present[1]

Iskander K hypothetically also is limited to 500km and I believe actually is pretty much limited to that range, although the 'M' version is a cruise missile that appears to have a range more along the lines of BGM-109.
 


sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.

PrSM had a range requirement of 499 km since this was what the Army could get cleared given INF and the type of weapon being proposed. Subsequently, we exited INF and since then the range of the baseline system has been stated as 500+km with some putting it at 550 km when it enters service. Future increment of this capability addresses longer, up to 2x the range, capability. Baseline capability stands on its own merit and will be very useful when it enters service this Fall. The Army has an objective inventory requirement of about 4,000 increment 1 missiles. 2X increase in range brings in additional capability to the MDTF in the 2030s especially when combined with other LRPF effects being envisioned for it.
 
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sure would seem these issues should have been brought up earlier in development likely even before test firing. the developer wanted to sell something fast rather than spend the time for proper RDTE.

PrSM had a range requirement of 499 km since this was what the Army could get cleared given INF and the type of weapon being proposed. Subsequently, we exited INF and since then the range of the baseline system has been stated as 500+km with some putting it at 550 km when it enters service. Future increment of this capability addresses longer, up to 2x the range, capability. Baseline capability stands on its own merit and will be very useful when it enters service this Fall. The Army has an objective inventory requirement of about 4,000 increment 1 missiles. 2X increase in range brings in additional capability to the MDTF in the 2030s especially when combined with other LRPF effects being envisioned for it.
In March 2016, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon announced they would offer a missile to meet the U.S. Army's Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) requirement to replace the ATACMS.


A decade between Iskander operational and PRsm proposed.
 
Iskander K hypothetically also is limited to 500km and I believe actually is pretty much limited to that range, although the 'M' version is a cruise missile that appears to have a range more along the lines of BGM-109.
The M version (9M723) is a modified version of the original Iskander, it is a quasi-ballistic missile. The K version is the cruise missile. There are two versions of the K, the current 9M728 and the proposed 9M729.

The range of both the K versions is well over 500km and the M version is probably only reduced to 500km range when flying a quasi-ballistic path, on a minimal energy trajectory it would likely be near twice that.
 
They could repurpose their M-V space launcher as an ICBM or leave the first stage off and use it as an MRBM.
At this point the only way forward for regional deterrence and stability is to create “France & UK East” meaning independent nuclear arsenals in Japan and S. Korea and while on the subject a few dozens SLCM-Ns in those new Aussie SSNs.
 
Japan could probably make breakout nuclear capability in a few years to months. The Epsilon booster is just an MX class missile by another name and they are sitting on a huge amount of unprocessed plutonium, and I believe they were building a reprocessing facility to purity and use it (ostensibly for civilian use). I've no doubt they have a simple single stage fission design ready to implement.
 
and I believe they were building a reprocessing facility to purity and use it (ostensibly for civilian use).

I wonder if they'd take the time and effort to use AVLIS or perhaps MLIS to get pure Pu-239 with the leftover Pu-isotopes being used as reactor-fuel?

I've no doubt they have a simple single stage fission design ready to implement.

That should be quite straight and likely would a hollow-boosted design, the question is could they design and build a two-stage TN warhead?
 
That should be quite straight and likely would a hollow-boosted design, the question is could they design and build a two-stage TN warhead?

I don't know, but I suspect if they ever went nuclear the goal would be to do it as soon as possible to prevent anyone from stopping the process. Were that the case, making more complex warhead types wouldn't be a consideration. Anything simple that went bang, delivered with sufficient accuracy, speed, and range, would fulfill the deterrent role.
 
That should be quite straight and likely would a hollow-boosted design, the question is could they design and build a two-stage TN warhead?

I don't know, but I suspect if they ever went nuclear the goal would be to do it as soon as possible to prevent anyone from stopping the process. Were that the case, making more complex warhead types wouldn't be a consideration. Anything simple that went bang, delivered with sufficient accuracy, speed, and range, would fulfill the deterrent role.
The US partnered with France early in their nuke development and still work closely with the UK - in fact due to congressional budgetary restrictions on new warhead R&D in the US (although this might have been overturned recently) the UK nuke labs host a lot of “partnerships” with LLNL & LANL. We could do the same with our Eastern allies.
 
The US partnered with France early in their nuke development and still work closely with the UK - in fact due to congressional budgetary restrictions on new warhead R&D in the US (although this might have been overturned recently) the UK nuke labs host a lot of “partnerships” with LLNL & LANL. We could do the same with our Eastern allies.

Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
 
The US partnered with France early in their nuke development and still work closely with the UK - in fact due to congressional budgetary restrictions on new warhead R&D in the US (although this might have been overturned recently) the UK nuke labs host a lot of “partnerships” with LLNL & LANL. We could do the same with our Eastern allies.

Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Since both France and the UK were already publicly declared nuclear-powers when the treaty was implemented wouldn't they be able to exchange nuclear-weapons design information with the US and vice-versa?
 
The US partnered with France early in their nuke development and still work closely with the UK - in fact due to congressional budgetary restrictions on new warhead R&D in the US (although this might have been overturned recently) the UK nuke labs host a lot of “partnerships” with LLNL & LANL. We could do the same with our Eastern allies.

Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Since both France and the UK were already publicly declared nuclear-powers when the treaty was implemented wouldn't they be able to exchange nuclear-weapons design information with the US and vice-versa?

Yes, but we can't "do the same" with countries like South Korea, Japan, or Australia (even if they wanted us to) because they were not nuclear weapon states when NPT was signed, and in fact are signatories of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
 
Not without violating our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Pretty sure that was already violated with NK getting nukes. It's just like the monk says on Golden Child, "you must know when to break the rules."

Yes, but we can't "do the same" with countries like South Korea, Japan, or Australia (even if they wanted us to) because they were not nuclear weapon states when NPT was signed, and in fact are signatories of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Australia would be fairly easy to solve politically. They officially have the same head of state as the UK, so declare an official 'United Commonwealth' state, with nothing changing as regards governance and ruling etc., except official political status.
 

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