I don't really buy the escalation threat. Putin just keeps threatening it to protect his presidency and hence himself. And I think if Putin keeps advancing west NATO involvement will happen eventually anyway.
The Kremlin doesn’t unduly worry me. Putin should be well aware that he can’t count on a conventional “flexible response” to any direct attack on NATO. An immediate full on strategic response is more likely now than during the Cold War or any other point in history. Putin isn’t going to be dealing with the slow cognitive decline of Reagan or the relative emotional stability of a Nixon or the comparative “intelligence” of George W. Bush. For Putin, it really doesn’t matter who gets elected or re-elected to the Oval Office. He should fear both of them.
I would generally assume a continuation of the status quo, with no pressing need for direct intervention from NATO territory. The ongoing war has started to mirror the Iran-Iraq War, with the no real existential threat to either side but it continues because of mutual intransigence. There’s nothing left to be won or lost, except the lives of the participants. I don’t see any chance of a Brusilov Offensive or an Operation Bagration. The other side isn’t going on to march on Moscow like Piłsudski or even Denikin.
The difference is that I expect the Russians to realize that their materiel losses at the current level of conflict are unsustainable, and start rolling out the strategic bombers (for their big jammers if nothing else) and significantly more troops.
Like when they said they weren't going to invade Ukraine? Or when they said they didn't have troops in the Donbass from 2014-2022? Or when they said ATACMS was a red line, or fighter jets, or tanks for that matter? Or when they signed a treaty guaranteeing the sovereignty of Ukraine perhaps? It's more a case that one should take their words, invert them, and then listen.
I don’t think either side has the logistics, leadership or ideological motivation to get 2,000 tanks operable and operational at same time, in the same place. Zhukov was working with tremendous organizational advantages in WWII compared to today. The societal decay on both sides isn’t quite so obvious when it comes to operating systems like Patriot missile batteries. However, for something requiring coordination liked massed armor or coherent efforts at SEAD or air superiority, there is no fundamental capability on either side.
The Air Force Chief of Staff who wasn't a good enough pilot to be accepted to fly one...
Really smart move on their part.
Or the 18th-century-style imperial annexation of other countries line of thinking.
www.france24.com
It was a children's hospital and someone has offered an interesting perspective on that.
The only parts of the Patriot system that are still shared with the Desert Storm version are the trailer frames that the missile launchers bolt onto.
Also, the Patriots back then were the earliest models with none of the addon ABM tricks that were envisioned for but never implemented because of the ABM treaty, but all the tidbits were there and just need someone to call up Raytheon (see HAWK which could do grazing hits against the Sergeants and Lance TBMs).
It wasn't 10% and you don't think they've made updates in the last 3 decades? It's like saying an S-500 is an S-300.
Actually the modern PAC-3 PATRIOT is quite a different system from the PAC-1/2 that were used during Desert Storm. The old PAC-1/2 were essentially anti-aircraft missiles, with some additional anti-ballistic capability. They weren't maneuverable enough to reliably hit the warhead, their fragmentation-type charges performed poorly against warheads, and their fuzes were proven to be too slow-acting for the 3+ km/s closing velocities against ballistic targets.
Actually those were PAC-2 (MIM-104C) with improved software and modified warhead to better work on ballistic targets (increased fragments size, new fast-reaction fuze). They performed worse than expected, due to fragmentation warheads limitations and fuze not being fast-reacting enough (as well as software bugs due to rushed deployment).
True, it was possibly even less
The bigger problem was the damage caused by falling wreckage not intercept rate, a lot of analyses confuse falling wreckage with an unsuccessful intercept but actually it's evidence of the opposite. Equally there was confusion about whether deflections were successful intercepts or not. If aimed at a point target, then a deflection is a success. Many SCUD wreckages landed in the sea, making assessment difficult. Some Patriots were aimed at debris, sometimes more than one missile was fired at the same target. 59% were stopped from hitting the cities they were aimed at and the army had high confidence in 25% of the intercepts.
