The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

AeroFranz said:
bobbymike said:
I don't think anyone said 'he misspoke' rather the dispute revolved around the interpretation of his statement with one side saying he meant 'completely invisiable' with other saying he meant cannot be detected at ranges within its combat ability to engage and destroy targets.'

I believe it is obvious he meant the latter but hey you guys 'cling' to a single quote and maximize the tendentiousness of your argument.

Ok, so what weapons is it using 'to engage and destroy targets'? That determines how far it can remain and how stealthy it needs to be. Which leads me to this:

SpudmanWP said:
I said nothing about an ARM version of AMRAAM. The 120D is for A2A and other systems with longer ranges than the AMRAAM will be used vs ground targets (SDB1/2, JSOW, JSOW-ER, JSM, SOM, JASSM, JASSM-ER, etc). Yes, I know JASSM is external, but it's longer stand-off range makes up for greater RCS of the F-35 when it's being carried.

For a well-defended target (and TB's quote mentioned that) these long-range but slow (largely subsonic) weapons seem ill-suited as they are vulnerable themselves. And if you go to the trouble of launching a stealthy cruise missile, then you are far enough that you don't need the F-35 level of RCS reduction (because of the fourth power relationship between RCS and Range).
We are spining away from the orginal intent of the debate on 'invisibility' bringing in issues unrelated to the original point ALTHOUGH quite valid to the overall F-35 debate and good questions to ask AF.

Earlier in the thread the value of LO was discussed in relation to the future threat environment and advances in computing power, etc. Maybe you'll need a stealthy cruise missile to stay undetected even in an F-35.
 
The weapons themselves can be LO and can do NOE attacks which negates many of the countermeasure that will be used against them. Throw in EW (either on-board the F-35, standoff, or decoy/jammers like MALD-J) and the weapons will have a better chance of getting through.

On the issue of JASSM negating the need for an LO launch platform, the ranges involved may require the use of a LO launch platform just to bet within launch range. Besides, the F-35 brings a LOT more to the table besides LO.
 
Triton said:
If the F-35 will not be equipped with the JDRADM aka Next Generation Missile (NGM) what are we to make of these comments? Does the MBDA Meteor provide similar capability to the cancelled NGM?

Abraham Gubler said:
The key thing to understand about the F-35 is it will achieve its air to air capability not by aerodynamics but by digital systems. It will be the first high angle off bore sight (HOBS) fighter and as such will be able to defeat ANY and I mean ANY (F-22 included) preceding fighter in a within visual range (WVR) 'dogfight'. It will do this because its missiles will do the turning enabling it to retain high energy and engage targets at up to 180 degrees off boresight (ie full spherical engagement).

As a beyond visual range (BVR) dogfighter only the F-22 is better but that is without outside input. Because the F-35 will have far superior networking capability (Link 22 vs Link 0) it will be able to fenjoy higher levels of EMCON supported by long range IRST. This may be a difference in many missions. What advantages the F-22 has in WVR would be offset by two F-35s in the air for each F-22, which is a reasonable assumption considering the cost differences.

When the F-35 emerges from 2020 in the Block V and higher configuration carrying at least 8 JDRADMs it will be even more capable.

A good understanding of English would help. Words to the effect of "even more capable" with JDRADM should have some meaning. JDRADM was/might still be/or something else similar a missile customised to the needs of a 5G fighter. However it was not the exclusive holder of many of these capabilities. Current missiles like the AIM-9, ASRAAM and AMRAAM have either already or might be developed with HOBS capability.
 
Looks like IOC of the F-35B will be delayed for another year to July 2016. Does the 18-month delay in the release of the Block 2B software also affect the release date of Block 3I and Block 3F software and the IOC dates of the F-35A and F-35C?

"Exclusive: Pentagon report faults F-35 on software, reliability"
by Andrea Shalal-Esa
WASHINGTON Thu Jan 23, 2014 3:36pm EST

Source:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-usa-lockheed-fighter-idUSBREA0M1L920140123

(Reuters) - A new U.S. Defense Department report warns that ongoing software, maintenance and reliability problems with Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 stealth fighter could delay the Marine Corps' plans to start using its F-35 jets by mid-2015.

The latest report by the Pentagon's chief weapons tester, Michael Gilmore, provides a detailed critique of the F-35's technical challenges, and focuses heavily on what it calls the "unacceptable" performance of the plane's software, according to a 25-page draft obtained by Reuters.

The report forecast a possible 13-month delay in completing testing of the Block 2B software needed for the Marine Corps to clear the jets for initial combat use next year, a priority given the high cost of maintaining current aging warplanes.

Gilmore, director of operational test and evaluation for the U.S. Defense Department, has long been critical of the $392 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon's costliest weapons program, and the latest report is no exception.

The report, due to be sent to Congress this week, said the aircraft is proving less reliable and harder to maintain than expected, and remains vulnerable to propellant fires sparked by missile strikes.

Air Force Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, the Pentagon's F-35 program chief, said in a statement to Reuters that Gilmore's report was factually accurate but did not reflect concerted efforts under way by his office and industry to address software, reliability and maintenance issues.

"The basic design of the F-35 is sound, and test results underscore our confidence in the ultimate performance that the United States and its international partners and allies value so highly," Bogdan said. "Of course, we recognize risks still exist in the program, but they are understood and manageable."

Bogdan said he remained confident that the F-35's initial combat capability would be ready in time for the U.S. Marine Corps next year, and cited a series of successful weapons tests done late last year. He said the program was about halfway through developmental testing after completing 1,153 flights and accomplishing more than 9,000 test objectives in 2013.

Lockheed is developing the F-35 for the Marines, Air Force and Navy, and eight countries that helped fund its development: Britain, Canada, Australia, Norway, Italy, Turkey, Denmark and the Netherlands. Israel and Japan have also ordered the jet.

The program, which began in 2001, is 70 percent over initial cost estimates, and years behind schedule, but top U.S. officials say it is now making progress. They have vowed to safeguard funding for the program to keep it on track.

OTHER CRITIQUES

Earlier this week, the nonprofit Center for International Policy said Lockheed had greatly exaggerated its estimate that the F-35 program sustained 125,000 U.S. jobs to shore up support for the program.

Both reports could provide fresh fodder for critics of the F-35 program, including backers of Boeing Co, which is hoping to sell the U.S. Navy more of its F/A-18 fighter jets.

But Lockheed Chief Executive Marillyn Hewson told reporters on Thursday that she saw continued support for the F-35 from the U.S. government, Congress and foreign allies.

"There's no question ... that we need the F-35. It brings a very important, unique capability for our nation," she said.

Lockheed spokesman Michael Rein said Gilmore's report confirmed the F-35 was meeting or exceeding flight test goals, and the company would continue to tackle issues as they arose.

"The challenges identified are known items and the normal discoveries found in a test program of this size and complexity," he said.

Gilmore's report acknowledged the F-35's progress in 2013 on flight testing, despite government furloughs and two fleet-wide groundings. But it said the program was still struggling to integrate the plane's "mission systems," or sensors, weapons and other equipment needed for use in military operations.

The current software generated too many nuisance warnings and resulted in poor sensor performance. Further work on software had been slowed by testing required to validate earlier fixes, the report said.

It said Lockheed had delivered F-35 jets with 50 percent or less of the software capabilities required by its production contracts with the Pentagon.

The computer-based logistics system known as ALIS was fielded with "serious deficiencies" and remained behind schedule, which affected servicing of existing jets needed for flight testing, the report said. It said the ALIS diagnostic system failed to meet even basic requirements.

But the most immediate concern involved the Block 2B version of the software that must be completed in order for the Marines to start using the jets from July 2015.

"Initial results with the new increment of Block 2B software indicate deficiencies still exist in fusion, radar, electronic warfare, navigation, electro-optical target system, distributed aperture system, helmet-mounted display system, and datalink," the report said, noting the problems could delay efforts to complete Block 2B development and flight test.

The report cited projections that the 2B software would not be completed until November 2015, 13 months later than planned. This would delay release to the F-35 fleet until July 2016, a year after the Marines want to start using the jets.

It said there is also little margin for any weight growth, and the airplane's increased use of electrical systems makes it vulnerable to lightning and missile strikes.

Bogdan said extensive studies had showed the plane's radar-evading capabilities, advanced sensors, ability to fuse data, advanced countermeasures and electronic attack equipment greatly reduced the chance that it would be hit by enemy fire.
 
Will the United States purchase the MBDA Meteor with the cancellation of the JDRADM/NGM?


"Air-to-air missiles – expanding the no-escape zone"
11 April 2012 Dr Gareth Evans

Source:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featureair-to-air-missiles-expanding-the-no-escape-zone/

Aerial dogfights are rare in modern times - the statistics speak for themselves. More than 16,000 Hughes / Raytheon AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missiles have been purchased by the US Government during the two decades since they first entered service, yet pilots have reportedly only fired around a dozen of them against hostile enemies. By contrast, the US Air Force used more than 3,500 weapons against ground targets in Afghanistan during the opening nine months of 2011 alone.

The demands of this conflict, along with other recent operations in Iraq and Libya, may have dictated that close air support has concentrated on air-to-ground engagements, but while air-to-air combat currently remains uncommon, the threat of it has not entirely disappeared.

In some respects, the potential danger to today's fighter aircraft could even be said to have grown, as unmanned drones and technologically advanced surface-to-air missiles increasingly feature alongside enemy pilots in modern aerial warfare. Unsurprisingly, despite their infrequent use of late, air-to-air missiles (AAMs) remain an essential combat element for fifth-generation jet fighters.

High-tech capabilities of fifth-generation AAMs

Fifth-generation AAMs are every bit as high-tech as their fifth-generation launch platforms. Like the fourth-generation before them, this latest crop of missiles has largely arisen out of a range of developments and improvements in seeker technology.

Resistance to infrared countermeasures, increased off-bore sighting capabilities and high in-flight agility features from the previous generation remain, but they are now further enhanced by electro-optical imaging technologies and advanced digital processing.

The combination allows fifth-generation missiles to discern more detailed images, improving their ability to distinguish between enemy aircraft and any flare countermeasures they may deploy, enabling vulnerable points to be specifically targeted, rather than just locking on to the brightest heat source, as well as allowing much smaller targets, such as drones, to be engaged.

Expanding the 'no-escape zone'

In addition, the enhanced performance of next-generation beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs) in particular will significantly expand the 'no-escape zone' and increase the range over which air-to-air engagements in future can be fought, enabling pilots to exploit the capabilities of their new aircraft to the full.

The Eurofighter Typhoon, for instance, is ultimately destined to have the Meteor - a state-of-the-art BVRAAM from European manufacturer MBDA - as its principal air-to-air weapon system. Said to offer world-beating air superiority, Meteor is a fast and agile missile, with what is claimed to be the largest 'no-escape zone' of any air-to-air weapon. Equipped with both proximity and impact fuses, it can engage targets ranging from fast-jets to UAVs or cruise missiles, autonomously in all weathers, during day or night, in full electronic countermeasure environments. It also highlights two other key developments in AAM design - improved kinematic performance and a high degree of network-centric readiness.

Kinematic and network-centric - the missiles of the future

According to the manufacturers, Meteor has between three and six times the kinematic performance of current similar types of air-to-air weapons - something made possible by its unique solid fuel, variable-flow, ducted ramjet propulsion system.

Although rocket motors have the edge in terms of overall speed, they experience a characteristic energy drop-off towards the limit of their range. Ramjets, by contrast, maintain their peak energy state for longer, delivering power throughout the flight, providing a high - though slightly slower - average speed and long ranges over a wide operational envelope, from sea level to high altitude.

Their effectiveness is further enhanced with the inclusion of two-way data link communication, in response to the growing trend towards increasingly networked warfare. It allows the missile to receive mid-course targeting updates, or to be re-targeted if necessary, either via the launch aircraft itself or by a remotely-located third party, bringing unprecedented levels of flexibility to the weapons system.

Currently in pre-production, the first Meteor missiles are on-schedule for delivery during 2012. When the missile enters service with the air forces of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK in 2013-15, it will offer full integration on the Saab Gripen and Dassault Rafale jets, in addition to the Eurofighter, with the potential to also equip a number of other platforms, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Air-to-air supremacy and the new risks of aerial combat

A single aircraft armed with a high-tech BVRAAM system would effectively dominate aerial engagements, targeting even the latest generation of opposing warplanes long before they attain combat range themselves. It is a prospect which has renewed the focus around the globe on air-to-air capabilities in general - both long and short range - and in some quarters, the ramifications of that are already beginning to look significant.

The latest Russian and Chinese challenge to US air supremacy, which began in 2010 with the arrival of the prototype Sukhoi T-50 and Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighters, has also now been boosted by the success of these countries in developing state-of-the-art, long-range AAMs.

The new Russian weapon for the MiG-31BM 'Foxhound' interceptor is currently in the final stages of development, while China's design is also progressing well, passing approval tests in May 2011. Against this backdrop, in February the US announced the cancellation of its own $15bn next generation missile (NGM) programme - formerly known as the joint dual-role air dominance missile - for what General Edward Bolton, the USAF's chief budget officer, called "affordability reasons".

A number of defence analysts have expressed concerns that abandoning the project, which had until just two short months earlier been publically described as a major priority by USAF officials, exposes US forces to unacceptable operational risks.

There has also been speculation that it could even open up the spectre of another AAM-gap, like the one which persisted through most of the 1990s, when analysis suggested the helmet-sighted Vympel R-73 AAM would give Soviet-bloc MiG-29s a decisive 'first shot' advantage in close quarter engagement.

Until 2003 and the USAF's introduction of the AIM-9X, Chinese Su-27SK and Su-30MKK fighters, equipped with the R-73, also shared this same advantage. With the impending arrival of weapons such as the ramjet powered Chinese PL-21 and the Russian rocket-powered RVV-BD missiles, some fear history may be about to repeat itself.

Air-to-air combat remains a very rare event in modern warfare. After more than a decade of action over Iraq and Afghanistan, there has not been a single instance, not even during the initial stages of operations.

Nonetheless, the continued development of increasingly high-tech fighter aircraft, sensors and airborne weapons systems worldwide represent an enduring and quickly evolving potential threat to military pilots and planes. More to the point, it is clearly one that no air force can easily ignore.
 
So if both Russia and China are developing some very effective BVR, and in the case of the T-50, a "stealthy" design that doesn't forget the lessons learned regarding fighter agility and energy maneuverability, are any f-35 supporters getting just a little worried? Even though there hasn't been an f-86 vs. Mig-15 or Mig-21 vs. f-4 scenario recently, it is a possibility in the near future to see an f-35 in contested airspace vs. a T-50 equipped force. And what happens when there are a few blue on blue BVR kills? That will change all this "blips on a screen" fantasizing.
 
kcran567 said:
So if both Russia and China are developing some very effective BVR, and in the case of the T-50, a stealthy design that doesn't forget the lessons learned regarding fighter agility and energy maneuverability, are any f-35 supporters getting just a little worried?

This T-50?

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/d89b9ce721de
 
Bobbymike, It seems as if the Russians are learning a few lessons from Lockheed and the f-35 on how to really drive up the cost of a stealth fighter ;) Make it barely good enough or downright deficient with plenty of bugs that are costly to fix. (Just kidding, but there might be some truth to it)
 
Sounds like the Indian Air Force would rather have Rafale than the FGFA:

On January 15, the IAF renewed the attack in New Delhi, at a MoD meeting to review progress on the FGFA. The IAF's deputy chief of air staff (DCAS), its top procurement official, declared the FGFA's engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate, its stealth features badly engineered, India's work share too low, and that the fighter's price would be exorbitant by the time it enters service.

Top MoD sources suspect the IAF is undermining the FGFA to free up finances for buying 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for an estimated $18 billion, an acquisition that has run into financial headwinds because of budgetary constraints. In October 2012, then IAF boss, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, announced the IAF would buy only 144 FGFAs instead of the 214 that were originally planned. Having cut the numbers, the IAF is now questioning the very benefit of co-developing the FGFA with Russia.

Source:
http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/russia-can-t-deliver-on-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-iaf-114012100059_1.html
 
"Opinion: F-35 Is Not Too Pricey, Performance Is Better"
by Loren Thompson
January 24, 2014

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_01_24_2014_p0-657750.xml&p=1

Loren Thompson is chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, which receives money from companies engaged in both the F-35 and F/A-18 programs.

Over the last several years, the tri-service F-35 fighter program has gradually retired risks and reduced costs, in the process acquiring broader political support. More than 50% of the program’s flight-testing schedule has been completed, and no major problems have been identified. The fighter’s F135 engine has seen similar progress. With 11 allies committed to buying the airplane, the program looks unstoppable.

Although the Pentagon has been deliberately vague about how the stealth, sensor fusion and other features of the F-35 make its performance far superior to that of last-generation fighters, it is rapidly emerging as the gold standard of tactical aviation in global markets. But what will matter in the political debate at home is the airplane’s price tag, because that is the one feature of F-35 that politicians and pundits think they understand. Chances are, though, they do not.

The apparent cost of a military aircraft varies wildly depending on where it is in its production run, what items are included and whether inflation is discounted. If you want to estimate costs, heroic assumptions (also known as guesses) are required to establish values for production rates, learning curves and other parameters essential in calculating cost.

For instance, prime contractor Lockheed Martin estimates that if the program of record for the Air Force variant of F-35 is executed as planned, an airplane ordered in 2018 and delivered in 2020 will cost $85 million in “then-year” dollars ($78 million in today’s dollars). That is in the same ballpark as the latest F-16—the legacy fighter that F-35 will replace in Air Force combat units. But you have to make a lot of assumptions to get to that number.

Whether those assumptions prove valid probably will not matter for the Air Force and Marine variants, because the Air Force version is well on its way to being the global standard for tactical airpower, and the Marines view the vertical-takeoff-and-landing version of the F-35 as their top modernization priority.

The service that sometimes sounds ambivalent is the Navy. Although its budget will fund development of the carrier-based F-35C through the end of the decade, its leaders say things and do things that make outsiders wonder. Studies have been commissioned to assess whether the Navy could make do with fewer F-35s, and senior leaders have raised doubts about the longevity of low-observables.

So naval aviation has become the main arena in which F-35 costs are still being debated. Boeing, the prime contractor for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and its electronic-warfare cousin, contends that the Navy could save billions by purchasing more of those aircraft rather than moving to the F-35C.


At first, the math seems to add up: Even if we include the electronic defenses and targeting systems not usually subsumed in a Super Hornet price tag, the unit recurring flyaway cost of a single-seat F/A‑18 is about $80 million in today’s dollars. The corresponding cost for an F-35C is $130 million.

The problem with this comparison is that the Super Hornet first flew in 1995 and the F-35C in 2010. The cost of each airplane reflects the fact that they are at very different stages in their life cycles. Only 22 carrier-based versions of the F-35 have been produced compared with hundreds of Super Hornets. But when a similar number of Super Hornets had been produced, their unit recurring flyaway cost in today’s dollars was about what it is today for the F-35C.

This should not come as a surprise because fighters tend to follow the same learning curve over the course of their production. When 100 single-seat Super Hornets had been produced, the unit recurring flyaway cost—with all necessary electronics included—was about $110 million in today’s dollars, which is where F-35C is likely to stand at the 100th airplane. And when F-35C gets to 300 airplanes, its unit recurring flyaway cost will be about $90 million—right where the F/A-18E (the single-seat version) was in today’s dollars.

These numbers can be verified easily by perusing the Pentagon’s Selective Acquisition Reports. What they reveal is that the F/A-18E and F-35C have nearly identical unit production costs at the same stages in their evolutions. Where the airplanes differ markedly is in their operational performance—items like survivability, situational awareness and strike capability. Such differences explain why the Navy needs a new fighter in the first place.
 
"Math is hard"
by Bill Sweetman
Jan 24, 2014

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:e14a3e0c-3267-4c81-a2fd-01dff925bdf3
 
I'll bet with little effort we could get a link to Ares that jumps over to Solomon's blog and back to War Is Boring, wherein they quote Eric Palmer and Winslow Wheeler. Who has to bring the donuts to the Monday morning meetings?
 
"Former USAF Chief of Staff: Move Away From Nuclear F-35"
Jan. 17, 2014 - 03:45AM |
By AARON MEHTA

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140117/DEFREG02/301170028/Former-USAF-Chief-Staff-Move-Away-From-Nuclear-F-35

WASHINGTON — Barring investment from European allies, the Pentagon should abandon the goal of a nuclear-capable F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in favor of spending funds elsewhere, according to former US Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz.

Schwartz, who headed up the Air Force from 2008 to 2012, argued instead that those funds should be put towards the Air Force’s new long-range strike bomber (LRS-B).

“I recognize and fully support the need for nuclear deterrence in America’s defense architecture to include the triad and capabilities on which a number of our alliances depend,” Schwartz said in a speech organized by the Stimson Center, a DC-based think tank. But the Pentagon needs to ask if “pursuing nuclear capability in the F-35 the best use of precious investment dollars, as this is a multiple-hundred million dollar decision, and more if one considers the optimization of the weapon for the F-35.”

“It is my conviction that without financial buy-in by the NATO partners, either the F-35 nuclear integration or through fielding of an independent or equivalent European manufactured aircraft, F-35 investment dollars should realign to the long range strike bomber,” he continued.

Going back to the Cold War, NATO allies have relied on American nuclear assets in Europe as a deterrent from Russian advancement. The US maintains a small number of nuclear weapons in Europe, capable of being mounted on F-15E and F-16 aircraft, a military asset that a Congressional Budget Office report, released in December, estimates will cost $7 billion for the next decade.

That CBO report also estimated the costs for upgrading F-35s to nuclear-capability at $350 million over the next decade, although that number does not include implementation costs.

If the US is going to continue to have nuclear-capable tactical forces defending Europe, “it important for the NATO allies to manifest financial as well as policy commitment to the NATO nuclear posture,” Schwartz said. “Absent financial commitment and burden sharing, I would argue that those resources now allocated for F-35 nuclear integration… should be realigned to expedite long-range bomber nuclear certification.”

The desire for a nuclear-capable F-35 was laid out in the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

“The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,” the report reads. “The United States will also conduct a full scope B-61 (nuclear bomb) Life Extension Program to ensure its functionality with the F-35 and to include making surety – safety, security, and use control – enhancements to maintain confidence in the B-61.”

That life-extension program has been a source of controversy, with program costs having doubled over initial estimates. After the extension program is finished, new tail kits turning the B61 from bombs into weapons capable of integration on the F-35 would be installed.

In the omnibus bill passed by Congress this week, the House and Senate stripped $10 million from the president’s budget that was earmarked for a B61 “Capabilities Development Document” for the F-35. Congress also removed $34.8 million from the president’s request for a B61 life-extension program.

Despite his hesitation for spending on the F-35, Schwartz argued that the B61 extension program must continue.

“B61 life extension is necessary independent of F-35 nuclear integration,” he said. “It must proceed in any case, in my view, focused on modernization and long range strike bomber.”

The LRS-B is the Air Force’s next-generation bomber program. Only general details of the heavily classified program have emerged. The platforms are expected to enter service in the mid-2020s and cost about $550 million each, with a potential buy of up to 100. The program has been largely unaffected by sequestration because the funding streams are relatively small in the coming years, according to Air Force officials.

Schwartz hopes to see the money saved from the F-35 put towards making the LRS-B nuclear capable as early as possible.

“I don’t have access to the exact programmatic, but there is a priority obviously [for] conventional certification of the new aircraft,” he said. “My point is, ideally nuclear certification would follow very shortly thereafter. It is a resource issue, and likely to become more so. So as I prioritize things, absent a NATO burden share, I would prioritize the LRSB to accelerate that nuclear certification to the degree that is possible.”
 
"Pentagon F-35 program says 'laser-focused' on software issues"
by Andrea Shalal-Esa
WASHINGTON Fri Jan 24, 2014 7:52pm EST

Source:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/25/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSBREA0O01A20140125

(Reuters) - The Pentagon's F-35 program office on Friday said it was "laser-focused" on finishing development of the software needed for the U.S. Marine Corps to start using its Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter jets from mid-2015.

The Pentagon's chief weapons tester warned in a report obtained by Reuters and published on Thursday that a possible 13-month delay in F-35 software development, coupled with maintenance and reliability problems, could delay the Marine Corps' plans.

But Air Force Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, who runs the Pentagon's F-35 program office, says he remains confident that Lockheed will complete the Block 2B software that gives the jet its initial combat capability in time.

Bogdan restructured the F-35 program office last year to put a greater emphasis on software, which he considers the No. 1 technical risk to the $392 billion program, said his spokesman Joe DellaVedova.

As part of the changes, he said Bogdan had named a number of people or "czars" to oversee the range of efforts linked to the Block 2B software and later software versions, as well as the drive to reduce the F-35's maintenance and operating costs.

"Lieutenant General Bogdan and the F-35 program are laser- focused on delivering the Block 2B capability to the warfighter," DellaVedova said. "We track and review F-35 software development data religiously and we're confident we'll deliver Block 2B in time to meet the Marine Corps' needs."

Lockheed is developing three models of the new warplane for the U.S. military and eight partners: Britain, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Italy, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. Israel and Japan have also placed orders.

Marine Corps officials had no immediate comment on the new report, but the service has not revised its plans to declare an F-35 "initial operational capability" by July 2015.

The report, which was delivered to Congress on Friday, got a muted reaction from the countries that helped pay for development of the new plane or placed orders.

Britain is expected to announce orders for 14 F-35 jets and the associated infrastructure, training and maintenance services, as early as next week, Reuters reported on Thursday. [ID:nL5N0KX2M4] It is buying the same short takeoff, vertical landing B-model jets that will be operated by the Marines.

The Dutch, who have ordered 37 planes, said they had not received the report, but did not expect any major surprises.

"The problems raised are well known and are being addressed," said Defense Ministry spokeswoman Sacha Louwhoff.

The Dutch are testing two trial planes and expect delivery of their first production plane in 2019. The first Dutch F-35 pilot completed his training at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on Friday, DellaVedova said.

Endre Lunde, spokesman for Norway's defense ministry, said the F-35 program office was already taking steps to fix issues raised by the report, including software development.

"The information presented in this report has been briefed to all international partners at various points over the past year," Lunde said, adding that he did not expect the issues raised to affect Norway's participation in the F-35 program.

At the same time, Lunde said Norway viewed the report as a "very valuable" tool and "an important external reference in our efforts to keep the development of the F-35 on track."

Belgium is also weighing F-35 orders, but will not make a decision until after elections in May, one official said.

In Israel, one defense official said he did not see any problems for his country's order of 19 jets. "There is no delay (for Israel)," said the official, who declined to be named.

An official at South Korea's arms procurement agency said any delays beyond an intended 2018 delivery date would be "problematic". Seoul has said it would buy 40 of the F-35s, although it still has to finalize this order, a move that could come in February, according to two sources familiar with the issue.

A senior Japan Defense Ministry official said: "We can do nothing but ask the JPO (Joint Program Office) to speed up the program." Tokyo plans to buy 42 of the stealth fighters, with the first four due for delivery by March 2017.
 
Including Imperial Russia, is there any known case where appointing a czar was not a recognition that a problem was out of control?
 
"Why The US Will Not Sell Advanced Fighters To Taiwan"
by Shannon Tiezzi
January 11, 2014

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/why-the-us-will-not-sell-advanced-fighters-to-taiwan/

Kent Wang, in an article for The Diplomat, argues that the U.S. should sell F-35 fighters to Taiwan. Wang writes that Taiwan’s air defense capabilities are slipping, and that the possibility of China purchasing Su-35s from Russia makes it even more necessary for the U.S. to provide advanced fighters to Taiwan. This strain of thought, based on military calculations, certainly exists (and has long existed) within the Pentagon. However, the possibility of such a sale happening is very, very small.

No president since George H.W. Bush has approved the sale of advanced fighter jets to Taiwan, and even that approval came under very specific circumstances. When Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 A/B fighters to Taiwan, it was almost entirely a ploy to increase his domestic approval ratings ahead of the 1992 presidential election. Bush had faced severe criticism over his handling of U.S.-China relations in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square violence in 1989. Selling advanced fighters to Taiwan was a way of contradicting Bill Clinton’s accusations that Bush was coddling “the butchers of Beijing.” Further, as James Mann argued in his book About Face, the sale of F-16 A/B fighters was also immensely profitable for General Dynamics (the F-16 manufacturer), and created nearly 6,000 new jobs during an economic downturn. In other words, the last sale of U.S. fighters to Taiwan was dictated by a unique confluence of U.S. domestic politics — a scenario unlikely to be repeated.

It’s not a coincidence that the U.S. hasn’t sold fighters to Taiwan in over 20 years. Instead, presidents have opted for less controversial measures, such as the 2011 agreement to upgrade Taiwan’s existing fleet of F-16 A/B fighters. Taiwan’s military has decried this as inadequate — arguing, for example, that the program will not address the root problem of declining fleet numbers — but their complaints are never enough to sway the U.S. government. Neither is congressional pressure, which also remains a consistent voice in favor of selling fighters to Taiwan. In 2011, Senator Robert Menendez (Chairman of Senate Taiwan Caucus) and 45 other senators wrote a letter urging Obama to expedite the sale of F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan. A few months later, the Obama administration disregarded this advice and chose (yet again) not to approve such a sale. Taiwan’s official request for F-16 C/D aircraft has now been pending for nearly eight years.

Like it or not, China remains an essential part of the United States’ calculus when it comes to arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing has made it clear, time and time again, that this single issue has the most potential to disrupt the U.S.-China relationship. A major policy paper written in 2012 by Cui Tiankai (now the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.) and Pang Hanzhao called Taiwan “the most important and most sensitive issue in the [sic] China-US relations.” Xi Jinping himself reportedly asked the U.S. to cease arms sales to Taiwan during his informal summit with Barack Obama in June 2013.

Ever since Nixon made his overtures to China in the early 1970s, the U.S. has played a balancing act, trying to keep its defense commitments to Taiwan while not scuttling U.S.-China relations. History is full of examples of this tight-rope walk. The announcement of the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979 was closely followed by the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which promised (among other things) “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.” Under President Ronald Reagan, the U.S. issued the 1982 joint communique with China, which famously promised that U.S. arms sale to Taiwan “will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations.” The same year, however, the U.S. government also offered the “six assurances” to Taiwan, promising that the U.S. would not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan and would not consult with China prior to making decisions about arms sales. Each pair of diplomatic decisions seems contradictory, but for better or worse this was the U.S.’s way of maintaining a balance between Taiwan and China.

There is no reason to think the U.S. government is ready to depart from this policy by selling F-35s to Taiwan. Even in the mid-1990s, President Clinton (who came to office partly on an anti-China platform) avoided selling fighters to Taiwan — and at that time, China was far less important to the U.S., both politically and economically, than it is now.

To be clear, the U.S. will not “abandon” Taiwan, and will in fact continue to agree to arms sales. According to a Congressional Research Service report, since 2000, the U.S. has sold Taiwan AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, Kidd-class destroyers, P-3C anti-submarine warfare aircraft, Patriot missiles, and Apache and Black Hawk helicopters — almost everything except fighters. Predictably, each of these sales caused negative Chinese reactions (including, for example, Beijing cutting off U.S.-China military-to-military relations in 2010). However, the U.S. government has also been able to mitigate the damage by pointing to items it did not sell to Taiwan. In 2011, General Chen Bingde (then Chief of the General Staff of the PLA) stated that future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would definitely impact U.S.-China relations, but the extent of the damage “would depend on the nature of the weapons sold to Taiwan.” Fighter jets have long been on the list of items that would provoke the fiercest response from China, and the U.S. has avoided crossing that line.

Arms sales to Taiwan have a symbolic function along with any practical defense uses. Such sales are concrete examples of U.S. support for the island. However, the sales are also deeply symbolic for China, which takes each sale as a sign that the U.S. seeks to contain China and has no respect for China’s “core interests.” Fighter jets are especially imbued with this symbolism, which is why it’s been over 20 years since the U.S. offered any to Taiwan. If F-35s were sold to Taiwan, it would mean a complete shift in U.S. China policy. Such an action would undoubtedly be read on both sides of the Pacific as demonstrating not only a new level of support for Taiwan but also a new level of enmity with China
 
LowObservable said:
Including Imperial Russia, is there any known case where appointing a czar was not a recognition that a problem was out of control?


Is this what you are reduced to now Bill?. Picking up on word choices and playing semantics? Sad... :'(
 
GTX said:
LowObservable said:
Including Imperial Russia, is there any known case where appointing a czar was not a recognition that a problem was out of control?


Is this what you are reduced to now Bill?. Picking up on word choices and playing semantics? Sad... :'(

Isn't every 'program office' invariably run by a single leader or for all intents and purposes, a czar?
 
Cutting corners is about simplifying the decision process, bypassing or changing rules. Changing the rules of the organisation means changing its structure.

I would guess appointing a 'czar', in this context, means either
- appointing someone new, with a better reputation for getting things done than a predecessor, or
- assigning powers not previously assigned to the person in that position
<edit>
- creating a new position in the organisation
Maybe all three.
Maybe both.
</edit>

The multiple 'czars' indicates this is not a case of simply replacing one dysfunctional/overworked individual, but more likely a change in how the software development organisation is structured, with the new 'czars' invested with powers not previously assigned to people in their position.

So much for modern day Kremlin-watching.
 
Literally, "czar" implies authority over multiple domains (e.g. over multiple branches of an org chart) and executive power (fewer stakeholders and overseers).

Bogdan is saying that the "czars" cover not only S/W but also operating cost reduction.

So if it is "fewer people with more accountability and authority" it may equate to a simpler organization.

Wackypedia has an extensive list, which may help illuminate why some people react skeptically to the idea...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._executive_branch_czars
 
LowObservable said:
Literally, "czar" implies authority over multiple domains (e.g. over multiple branches of an org chart) and executive power (fewer stakeholders and overseers).

Bogdan is saying that the "czars" cover not only S/W but also operating cost reduction.

So if it is "fewer people with more accountability and authority" it may equate to a simpler organization.

Wackypedia has an extensive list, which may help illuminate why some people react skeptically to the idea...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._executive_branch_czars

Go get him Bill!
 

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More than 100 tons, mostly blubber, can't fly worth a damn, and communicates in a way that only others of its pod can understand. Nailed it, Mr Ferrin!
 
LowObservable said:
More than 100 tons, mostly blubber, can't fly worth a damn, and communicates in a way that only others of its pod can understand. Nailed it, Mr Ferrin!

Clearly you know something the designers, USAF, USN, USMC, RN, etc. etc. don't know. You must be one smart guy.
 
sferrin said:
LowObservable said:
More than 100 tons, mostly blubber, can't fly worth a damn, and communicates in a way that only others of its pod can understand. Nailed it, Mr Ferrin!

Clearly you know something the designers, USAF, USN, USMC, RN, etc. etc. don't know. You must be one smart guy.

Bill I thought F-35's were submarines, someone made that analogy? In their watery domain quite elegant, very fast and deep diving so what's the problem?

Call me David Axe as I retell the tale of Bill and the great white aircraft :D

Question is will we see Bill strapped to an F-35B being flown out to sea at the end of this 'book'?
 
Some submarines are more elegant than others, BM.
 

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LowObservable said:
Some submarines are more elegant than others, BM.

That must be why everybody is buying Eurocanards instead of F-35s. Oh, wait. . .
 
sferrin said:
That must be why everybody is buying Eurocanards instead of F-35s. Oh, wait. . .

Yes, because everyone knows it's about the aircraft itself and doesn't have anything to do with politics (arm twisting), offsetting economic packages, etc. Though I must say that the U.S. is typically better than most of their competitors when it comes to support (maintenance, spares, etc.). Yes Dassault, I'm looking at you.
 
Sundog said:
sferrin said:
That must be why everybody is buying Eurocanards instead of F-35s. Oh, wait. . .

Yes, because everyone knows it's about the aircraft itself and doesn't have anything to do with politics (arm twisting), offsetting economic packages, etc.
Works both ways.
 
GTX said:
Triton said:
Perhaps these people have authority to cut corners?


Why would you say that? :eek:

It was a question not a statement. I am trying to figure out how the appointment of Department of Defense "czars" by Gen. Bogdan from the JPO will help reduce the delay of a software development project performed by civilian software developers at a civilian defense contractor. The title "czar" might mean that they have dictatorial powers in their area of responsibility which may mean that they can go around layers of management or bureaucracy.
 
"GROUNDED: More F-35 problems delay new jet"
11:10 AM 01/27/2014
Guiseppe Macri

Source:
http://dailycaller.com/2014/01/27/grounded-more-f-35-problems-delay-new-jet/

A new Pentagon report on the progress of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter highlights major concerns about the jet’s reliability and technical deficiency – problems that could delay implementation into the Marine Corp’s fleet that was initially scheduled for mid 2015.

According to the report, Lockheed Martin delivered the jets with only about 50 percent of the software capabilities required under its Pentagon contract, which outlines the largest and most expensive weapons-development program ever undertaken. It has taken more than 10 years.

The jet’s ALIS computer logistics system, the “information infrastructure for the F-35,” according to Lockheed’s website, was given an “unacceptable” performance rating after it failed to meet the most basic of requirements.

“Initial results with the new increment of Block 2B software indicate deficiencies still exist in fusion, radar, electronic warfare, navigation, electro-optical target system, distributed aperture system, helmet-mounted display system, and datalink,” chief Pentagon weapons tester Michael Gilmore wrote in the 25-page report obtained by Reuters and delivered to Congress last week.

F-35s will eventually support a host of capabilities never before implemented in a single fighter model, including supersonic speed, stealth-based radar evasion, and short vertical takeoff and landing abilities. Test pilots are already pushing the F-35′s flight envelope daily at Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland and Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The program, which calls for the development of three different F-35 models and began in 2001, is already 70 percent over budget with a price of $392 billion for 2,457 units. The initial cost estimate of $81 million per jet has since gone up to $161 million. Projections through 2037 estimate the program could cost $12.6 billion yearly, according to the Government Accountability Office.

This latest batch of technical glitches could take until November of 2015 to correct, pushing flight-ready status for Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fleets back to July 2016 at the earliest. Member nations of NATO have also expressed interest in acquiring the F-35.

Lockheed Martin is already in trouble this week after The Center for International Policy published a study saying the company “greatly exaggerated” its claim that the Joint Strike program sustains 125,000 jobs in 46 states — a claim it made to convince Congress to continue funding the program. According to the study, the actual number of jobs created is roughly half that cited by Lockheed.

More than 100 F-35s have been built at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, Texas plant.
 
Bit of hysterical headline there. (Par for the course of course.) Where does it say the F-35 is "grounded"? ::)
 
"Lockheed F-35 Develops Cracks, Pentagon’s Tester Finds"
by Tony Capaccio Jan 28, 2014 10:44 AM PT

Source:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-28/lockheed-f-35-develops-cracks-pentagon-s-tester-finds.html

Lockheed Martin's F-35 jet developed cracks in testing of the fighter’s durability and wasn’t sufficiently reliable in training flights last year, the Pentagon’s chief tester found.

On-ground testing of the Air Force and Marine Corps versions of the fighter revealed “significant findings” of cracks on five occasions in fuselage bulkheads, flanges, stiffeners and engine mounts “that will require mitigation plans and may include redesigning parts and additional weight,” according to an annual report on major weapons by Michael Gilmore, director of operational testing.

Gilmore has repeatedly raised questions about progress of the $391.2 billion F-35 program, the most expensive U.S. weapons system. This year’s report, released today, may draw particular scrutiny because the Pentagon will propose increasing purchases to 42 planes in fiscal 2015 from the 29 Congress authorized this year.

Lockheed, the top U.S. contractor, drew 16 percent of sales from the F-35 last year. “That number will grow in 2014,” Bruce Tanner, chief financial officer for the Bethesda, Maryland-based company told reporters last week.

In a full-page discussion of durability testing and cracking, Gilmore disclosed an incident in late September when a bulkhead “severed.” He said “analysis and corrective actions” were continuing.

Aircraft based in Florida, Arizona, California and Nevada for pilot training missions continue “to be immature” and rely “heavily on contractor support and workarounds unacceptable in combat operations,” Gilmore wrote.

Reliability measures “are all below” target goals for the current stage of development, he said.
Plane’s Weight

The aircraft’s weight stabilized last year, with little margin for growth without exceeding contractually binding limits that would jeopardize meeting combat requirements, Gilmore said.

The Air Force model, which will be the most numerous of the 2,443 F-35s planned, was within 341 pounds (155 kilograms) of its 29,030-pound airframe weight requirement as of October. The Marine Corps version was within 202 pounds of its 32,577-pound goal with several years of development left.

“Managing weight growth with such small margins will continue to be a significant program challenge,” Gilmore said.

The test report also outlined achievements, finding that flight tests performed by 18 jets to evaluate the aircraft’s flying prowess and handling qualities “made the planned progress” and “nearly matched or exceeded” sortie goals through October.
Lockheed’s Comment

Flights designed to evaluate the aircraft’s combat systems and integration of weapons “made little progress and continued to fall behind” its goals, however, Gilmore said.

He also warned of delays in testing and fielding software that the Marine version will use.

Michael Rein, a Lockheed spokesman, said in an e-mailed statement that Gilmore’s report outlined “a tremendous amount of positive information.”

“The F-35 aircraft has flown to every corner of the envelope and is meeting or exceeding expectations in flight performance,” Rein said. “The challenges identified are known items and the normal discoveries found in a test program of this size and complexity.”

Joe DellaVedova, spokesman for the Pentagon’s F-35 program, said in an e-mail that “there were no surprises in the report. All of the issues mentioned are well-known to us, the F-35 international partners and our industry team.”

“Although the report is factually accurate, it does not fully highlight the F-35 enterprise’s efforts to address and resolve the known technical and program-related challenges,” he said.
 
Better to find them in development than decades down the road when you have a bunch of longerons go bad that you missed.
 
Oh my, oh my…if only I had a dollar for every time a crack was found in an aircraft part. ::)
 
"After 'transformative' year, F-35 program focuses on software, quantity"
Jan. 14, 2014 - 10:10AM |
By Aaron Mehta
Staff writer

WASHINGTON — In 2013, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter added international partners, trained a record number of pilots, hit a number of milestones, and perhaps most importantly, saw vastly improved relations between the Pentagon and its corporate partners.

There were hiccups along the way — most notably at the start of the year, when two different issues grounded first the F-35B and then the entire fleet over safety concerns — but as the calendar turned, the program looked to be in its strongest position since Lockheed Martin won the contract.

Lorraine Martin, the head of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program, described 2013 as “transformative,” with a focus on maturing the program, not only the aircraft but capabilities and partnerships.

“You can really feel the momentum building on every single dimension of the program,” she said during a Dec. 13 trip paid for by the company.

But through the first three weeks of the year, the program has already seen two negative news stories — although neither can be blamed on the jet’s prime contractor.

On Sunday, news broke that Honeywell, part of the supply chain for the jet, is under investigation over the inclusion of parts produced in China in the F-35. A Honeywell spokesman said the company will cooperate fully with inspectors.

“There was never any risk of technology transfer or other security breach associated with these manufacturing compliance issues,” Joe DellaVedova, spokesman for the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), said in a statement regarding the issue.

This followed news that a 59-year old former resident of Connecticut had been arrested for attempting to ship proprietary information on the F-35 and its engines to Iran.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s top acquisition official is keeping a close eye on software development.

“We’re not done. We’ve still got plenty to do,” Frank Kendall, Pentagon undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, told Defense News in a Dec. 13 interview. “But we’re way, way ahead of where we were a couple of years ago.

“I think the airframe itself is making reasonable progress through its test program,” Kendall said. “I’m concerned about the software, the operational software. I’m concerned about reliability, which is going to be an important driver for future cost and sustainment. And I’m concerned about the ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System], that is another software system, basically that will provide the logistics support to the systems. And making sure that all of those pieces are moving forward together, not just the airframe, but the other things as well.”

Kendall also indicated he wants to make sure Lockheed and its partners maintain a “balanced approach” to developing software builds for the future.

The F-35 is powered by millions of lines of code, and software issues have plagued the plane in the past. Each of the three U.S. services will reach initial operating capability (IOC) with different software packages.

The F-35B will go operational for the Marines in December 2015 with the Block 2B software, while the the Air Force plans on achieving IOC on the F-35A in December 2016 with Block 3I, which is essentially the same software on more powerful hardware. The Navy intends to go operational with the F-35C in February 2019, on the Block 3F software.

Flight tests of the 3I software will begin in first quarter 2014 and continue into 2015, Lockheed confirmed.

The high-tech ALIS is at the core of operations, maintenance and supply-chain management for the F-35, providing a constant stream of data from the plane to supporting staff. According to Lockheed figures, ALIS has supported more than 6,600 sorties.

Right now, Lockheed is focused on making sure ALIS is up and running in time for the Marine Corps IOC in late 2015, according to Mary Ann Horter, vice president for F-35 sustainment at Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training.

In particular, Lockheed is working on a “deployable ALIS,” which will have a smaller physical footprint needed to go into the field with the Marines.

“Deployable ALIS will meet all the services’ requirements from a deployability standpoint,” Horter said. “There are other kinds of capabilities that each of the services, for their own mini [concepts of operation], are interested in, and that’s part of the long term development maturation plan. I would expect ALIS to continue to update as the aircraft software does to meet the user’s needs.”

“We still have to look from an affordability standpoint, what are the right capabilities for the entire weapons system,” Horter said. “So we work that through the JPO to make those sorts of decisions and trades from a cost-effective, as well as capabilities, standpoint.”

Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the head of the JPO, traveled to Lockheed’s facilities in Orlando Nov. 12-13 for a briefing on ALIS development.

DellaVedova said that while software remains the “number one technical challenge” on the program, the Pentagon believes ALIS is on track.

“While minor delays have occurred during the development, the JPO remains confident ALIS will be completed on schedule for the Marine Corps IOC,” DellaVedova said.
Production ramp

Both Martin and Kendall are on the same page about ramping up production.

“Quantity matters. Quantity absolutely matters right now on this program,” Martin said. “The [production] learning curve is still important, and it’s still enabling us to get work content off the line that’s not as efficient as it could be, but you start to learn that stuff. The silly stuff you learn fast and, as you go forward, you start to really refine how you produce the aircraft. Then the big driver to bring cost out is quantity.

“We’re at the point where we need both of them, and soon, quantity will be the biggest driver for us,” Martin continued. “If you buy more, they will be cheaper. There just is no doubt.

“We have been flat for four years, around 30 [to] 36 aircraft. If it doesn’t increase, it will dampen out our ability to get costs out.”

Whether there is an increase in the number of planes ordered for low-rate initial production lot 8 will depend on the U.S. budget situation. That lot is being negotiated with the Pentagon, and Martin said her company submitted pricing options for “variable quantities” of planes to give the Defense Department flexibility based on the budget situation.

“Consistent with what budgets are going to be, we’re going to try to ramp up production,” Kendall said. “I’ve got a budget, I think, to ramp up production. Our allies help us a lot there. There are a lot of foreign sales coming in in the next round. They’ll give us an increase and give us some efficiencies that we’ll all benefit from. What we were able to do on the DoD side is going to depend on budget priorities primarily.”
 
GTX said:
Oh my, oh my…if only I had a dollar for every time a crack was found in an aircraft part. ::)
With very thin weight margins on all variants, remedial strengthening might prove to be tricky.
 

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