Two weeks ago the annual report of the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation was leaked to the Reuters news agency in advance of its public release. The subsequent dissemination of its contents has afforded critics of the tri-service F-35 fighter program the opportunity for a new round of complaints about the supposed mis-steps of those engaged in developing the plane.
(Disclosure: Many of the companies working on the F-35 program including prime contractor Lockheed Martin LMT -1.78% contribute to my think tank; so do companies building rival planes.)
For example, I read one commentary about the test report posted on the influential RealClearDefense web-site that stated the F-35 “could fly into combat unreliable, confused, defenseless, toothless and vulnerable.” That claim reveals such abysmal ignorance about the status of the program that it discredits anything else the author might choose to say on the subject. It echoes the irresponsible critics of earlier generations who warned that programs like the F-15 fighter, Abrams tank and V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor would be battlefield disasters. In fact, all three went on to become world-class combat systems.
The reality of the F-35 program is that it is making steady progress in retiring risk and reducing costs; that Pentagon officials are increasingly pleased with its performance; and that most of America’s key allies have signed up to buy the plane despite the availability of impressive alternatives (most recently Japan and South Korea). Nonetheless, the fact that program critics level such sweeping denunciations has to have a demoralizing effect on the thousands of workers engaged in building what Senator John McCain has said “may be the greatest combat aircraft in the history of the world.” With that in mind, I would like to offer five reassuring reasons why the F-35 program is going to do just fine.
1. The problems were already known. The test director’s report did not identify any new problems with the fighter. As the head of the F-35 joint program office observed in response to the report’s release, “There were no surprises in the report; all of the issues mentioned are well-known to us, the F-35 international partners and our industry team.” That was predictable because the report relied on information generated by the program office as it conducts a rigorous testing regime that includes over 8,000 flights. With half of flight testing now completed, no show-stoppers have been found and the program is developing fixes for each instance where aircraft performance fails to match goals. Program executive officer Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan states that finding such problems is typical of what happens at this stage in a development program: “This is the time we want to discover issues through testing so we can implement solutions and provide an extremely capable and lethal aircraft to the warfighter.”
2. Program progress has been understated. To read some accounts of what the test chief reported, you would think the F-35 is making little progress. In fact, the very first sentence in the report’s executive summary states, “Flight test teams operating the 18 test aircraft assigned to the developmental flight test centers nearly matched or exceeded flight test sortie goals through October 2013.” During 2013, the program conducted 1,153 flights and completed more than 9,000 separate test points (tasks). Accomplishment of some test points has been delayed due to lagging software development and other issues, but the program executive officer says, “the basic design of the F-35 is sound and test results underscore our confidence in the ultimate performance” of the planes. He says software issues will not slow the operational debut of the Marine Corps variant, scheduled for next year.
3. The severity of problems has been exaggerated. In discussing issues cited by the report, critics have omitted important context and qualifiers. For instance, peeling of stealth coatings on the tail is described without including report language that it was caused by “extended use of the afterburner not expected to be representative of operational use.” Buffeting and “trans-sonic roll off” (wing drop) is noted without mention of the fact that this is common in many fighters and may not impact mission capability. Engine susceptibility to damage is cited without including report language that testing results “were consistent with results from prior legacy engine tests.” Problems with the pilot’s helmet-mounted display are detailed without recounting the various fixes that have improved performance to the point where plans for a backup system could be canceled.
4. The testing chief always finds problems. If you read through the full report of the Director for Operational Test & Evaluation, it becomes clear he has questions of one sort or another about every weapons program the Pentagon is pursuing. For instance, the report complains about radar deficiencies, electronic countermeasure shortfalls and inadequate weapons testing on the Navy’s F/A-18 Super Hornet, even though that plane is generally regarded as the most capable carrier-based aircraft in history. Pentagon officials were downright dismissive of the test chief’s complaints about a new Navy patrol aircraft. Those officials recognize that the testing community is seldom satisfied with the performance of combat systems because it benefits from doing testing. As the joint force’s biggest development program, the F-35 offers an especially lucrative target for bureaucrats who never want to stop testing.
5. Outsiders seldom understand fighter development. Few people have actually read the F-35 chapter in the test director’s annual report, and fewer still have understood it. To grasp the full significance of what it says, you would first need to have some grounding in aeronautical engineering and operational testing. It would also be helpful to have some historical knowledge of how other major weapons systems have fared during development. Most of the reporters who cover the F-35 don’t have those insights, and so they tend to rely on other people to explain to them what documents like the test report indicate. Since the joint program office and contractors seldom are forthcoming on that front, journalists turn to the critics who, shockingly enough, render unduly alarming interpretations of what it all means.
The F-35 program may be the most complicated project in the history of military technology. It entails development of three distinctly different aircraft for domestic military services and a host of foreign allies, along with sophisticated training and sustainment systems. Much of the hardware and software incorporated into the airframes is secret — secret because it is the key to preserving global air dominance through mid-century. It was inevitable there would be challenges in engineering and integrating such systems. The Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation has illuminated some of the challenges that remain to be resolved, but one by one they will be overcome as they must be if America is to retain its role as guarantor of global security
