The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

I would suggest that one reason for unrealistic requirements attracting unexecutable proposals is that the system has lost a few checks and balances that used to be there.

1 - The government side has cut down on its own engineering strength. There was a time when pre-EMD included an RFI stage where the generals and the suits entrusted their engineering leaders to bat ideas back and forth until both sides agreed that the requirement was doable. Sweden has an interesting system where the services, industry and the FMV all play a part in drafting the requirement, with FMV as both the honest broker and the engineering guardian of the national purse.

2 - The dynamic changes completely with one winner-take-all-forever fighter program. In the F-16/F-15 days, while there was little chance that either program would be terminated, the customer could change the mix at will depending on who was performing better, and FMS was always competitive. The SH effort, I think, works quite well because performance determines how long it survives against JSF.

On JSF, the domestic users are not allowed to think about alternatives and the team has the full firepower of the USG behind it for FMS.
 
LowObservable said:
On JSF, the domestic users are not allowed to think about alternatives and.

As you've already admitted, there aren't any that meet ALL requirements.
 
There are no aircraft that meet the F-35's requirements.

Including the F-35, because the overarching requirement was for a timely and affordable replacement for in-service aircraft.
 
LowObservable said:
. Of the major airframe partners, only BAE was truly noted for manufacturing expertise...

Not Northrop Grumman? NG builds the centre fuselage of every F-35, has built the rear fuselage of every Hornet ever, more than 500 complete F-14s, 100+ E-2s, 21 B-2s, >30 Global Hawks... Probably more than BAE has built in the past 40 years anyway.
 
TaiidanTomcat said:
The other interesting little notion is if lockheed fails at what many here already called an impossible program, is their fault the game is rigged and they lost? I would hope the tar and feathers would be reserved for the pentagon and DC decision makers. Always more fun to kill messengers though. How dare they try and make it work! All the aerospace companies should have simply turned their noses up and refused to have anything to do with the JSF. Who needs work in this post-cold war environment anyway?

Yes, Lockheed Martin is a blameless victim in this whole scenario. If you believe that, I have some bridges to sell you. The simple fact is L-M hasn't managed aircraft programs well in many decades. They haven't managed the F-35 program well, they didn't manage the F-22 program well, and don't get me started on the C-5.

Also, don't try throwing in the U-2, SR-71, and the F-117. They were strictly limited number Skunks Works programs, not L-M "Company" programs.
 
Sundog said:
Yes, Lockheed Martin is a blameless victim in this whole scenario. If you believe that, I have some bridges to sell you. The simple fact is L-M hasn't managed aircraft programs well in many decades. They haven't managed the F-35 program well, they didn't manage the F-22 program well, and don't get me started on the C-5.

Also, don't try throwing in the U-2, SR-71, and the F-117. They were strictly limited number Skunks Works programs, not L-M "Company" programs.

So, what military programs have been managed well recently?
 
So, what military programs have been managed well recently?

SH. Gripen. Virginia. Aster. Foxhound. C-17. Wokka. ScanEagle. Heron/Heron TP. Iron Dome. David's Sling.

Shall we continue?
 
Sundog said:
Also, don't try throwing in the U-2, SR-71, and the F-117. They were strictly limited number Skunks Works programs, not L-M "Company" programs.

So just throw in S-3 Viking, C-130, P-3 Orion, P-38 lightning, and I dare say the F-104? B)



If we just use the US examples how many are in there Bill?

C-17?

Limited budgets reduced program funding, requiring a delay of four years. During this time contracts were awarded for preliminary design work and for the completion of engine certification.[6] In December 1985 a full-scale development contract was awarded.[7] At this time, first flight was planned for 1990.[6] The Air Force had formed a requirement for 210 aircraft.[8]

Development problems and limited funding caused delays in the late 1980s.[9] Criticisms were made of the developing aircraft and questions were raised about more cost-effective alternatives during this time.[10][11] In April 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reduced the order from 210 to 120 aircraft.[12] The maiden flight of the C-17 took place on 15 September 1991 from the McDonnell Douglas's plant in Long Beach, California, about a year behind schedule.[13][14] The first aircraft (T-1) and five more production models (P1-P5) participated in extensive flight testing and evaluation at Edwards Air Force Base.[15] Two complete airframes were built for static and repeated load testing.[14]
Development difficulties

A static test of the C-17 wing in October 1992 resulted in the wing failing at 128% of design limit load, which was below the 150% requirement. Both wings buckled rear to the front and failures occurred in stringers, spars and ribs.[16] Some $100 million was spent to redesign the wing structure; the wing failed at 145% during a second test in September 1993.[17] A careful review of the test data however, showed that the wing was not loaded correctly and did indeed meet the requirement.[18] The C-17 received the "Globemaster III" name in early 1993.[5] In late 1993, the Department of Defense gave the contractor two years to solve production and cost overrun problems or face termination of the contract after the delivery of the 40th aircraft.[19] By accepting the 1993 terms, McDonnell Douglas incurred a loss of nearly US$1.5 billion on the development phase of the program.[15]

In April 1994, the C-17 program remained over budget, and did not meet weight, fuel burn, payload and range specifications. It also failed several key criteria during tests to evaluate its airworthiness.[20][21][22] There were technical problems with mission software, landing gear, and so on.[23] In May 1994, a proposal to cut the aircraft's production to as few as 32 aircraft emerged, but was rescinded.[24] A July 1994 GAO document revealed that Air Force and DoD studies from 1986 and 1991 stated the C-17 could use 6,400 more runways outside the U.S. than the C-5; it was later discovered that this study had only considered the runway dimensions, but not their strength or Load Classification Numbers (LCN). The C-5 has a lower LCN, but the USAF classify both in the same broad Load Classification Group (LCG). When considering runway dimensions and their load ratings, the C-17's worldwide runway advantage over the C-5 shrank from 6,400 to 911 airfields.[25] However, the C-17's ability to use lower quality, austere airfields was not considered.[25]

A January 1995 GAO report revealed that while the original C-17 budget was $41.8 billion for 210 aircraft, the 120 aircraft already ordered at that point had already cost $39.5 billion.[26] In March 1994, the U.S. Army had decided it no longer needed the 60,000 lb (27,000 kg) Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) delivery with the C-17, feeling that the 42,000 lb (19,000 kg) capability of the C-130 was sufficient; C-17 testing was limited to this lower weight. Issues with airflow prevented the C-17 from meeting its airdrop requirements. A February 1997 GAO report revealed that a C-17 with a full payload could not land on 3,000 ft (910 m) wet runways; simulations suggested 5,000 ft (1,500 m) was required.[27]

SUCCESS!! I think its a model we should try to replicate more.

Virginia is based off the failed Seawolf design so its not exactly from scratch, and again neither is the super bug for that matter.

Foxhound? as in Mig-31? No problem with the Gripen. Are Wokka's chinooks? ScanEagle is once again an off the shelf military appropriated program. And then a bunch of Israeli stuff.

If your point is to show that the US has bad military appropriations? (yup we know) The international stuff really doesn't prove much, other than Israel knows how to take care of business (yup we know)
 
TT - The C-17 is a good example of a program turned around after a gun was pointed at its head.

Seawolf was not exactly failed. Just too costly. VA, again, was a good recovery from that situation.
 
LowObservable said:
SH. Gripen. Virginia. Aster. Foxhound. C-17. Wokka. ScanEagle. Heron/Heron TP. Iron Dome. David's Sling.
Super Hornet (which was an evolutionary program) and C-17 both had major issues to overcome in development.
 
LowObservable said:
I suspect that the planners in FW, being not very familiar with modern high-rate production, made some very silly assumptions about how high rates, commercial supply-chain practices, automation, computer-aided design and other things would save money, stacked them up and applied them willy-nilly across nearly every part of the airplane.


Yes, I suppose all that F-16 production, 4000+ so far, much of it at Fort Worth, didn't really teach Lockheed Martin much... ::)
 
LowObservable said:
TT - The C-17 is a good example of a program turned around after a gun was pointed at its head.

Seawolf was not exactly failed. Just too costly. VA, again, was a good recovery from that situation.


So, what is acceptable for one program is not acceptable or even possible for another program? That's right I keep forgetting, it's that dirty "F-35" word that prevents it... ::)
 
LowObservable said:
And Oz and Canada and the Noggies and the Cloggies are all now low-priority subs for FW, because the ROKs (and any other FMS) have LMT by the short and curlies.


But Bill, why would any FMS customers even be a concern? After all isn't the F-35 a piece of over priced crap? Why would FMS customers be wanting that? ::)
 
LowObservable said:
Remember the "factory of the future" ideas of the 1980s, full of 6DOF robots? There is a lot of cool automation out there in aircraft manufacture - particularly high-speed machining and automated drilling and fastening, but the big differentiators are how efficiently the people are allowed to work, and how well you manage your parts and supply chain.


Now who is showing their ignorance? Really, have you ever taken one step inside any sort of modern manufacturing facility? Comments such as this indicate that you have no concept of what goes into making aircraft or more importantly the many, many sub component and part manufacturers who supply items to them.
 
LowObservable said:
Reference to the global financial crisis would be relevant if the program had not been fully funded. But it has.


Talk about missing the point. So you really think the GFC is not relevant to the aerospace industry, or the manufacturing industry...or for that matter, just about any industry? Really, are you that ignorant?


Here let me explain it a bit. Companies all over the world have included the manufacture/support of parts/systems etc into their future business cases/business plans. One of the most important of applications these are for are those for the F-35. If you suddenly remove that line of future income, many of these companies will suddenly have a lot of future orders evaporate. What's worse, many of them have invested in technologies, equipment, people, training etc. for this program. Now, normally this sort of risk is always an issue in business. However, compound that by the hard economic times the GFC has caused (surely you will have seen something about that on the news these last few years) and you find that companies' ability to weather such cancelations becomes very much less.. Now what do you think will happen to these companies (and the people they employ) if you all of a sudden get your way and the F-35 was totally cancelled?


Oh, and btw, none of these companies have been paid in advance...boy, I wish that was the case, but sorry it isn't.
 
GTX -

I don't think (nor did I say) that the GFC is irrelevant to the aerospace industry. (Neither, if you read my posts, have I advocated the total cancellation of the F-35). If you would read more carefully, it would save a lot of time.

However, I am ready to be proved wrong if you can produce evidence that the JSF program has, up to and including the present day, not been funded year by year at or above the levels planned in 2001 (in constant dollars). The only constraint on it today is that it is being told to live on its planned budget, because there is nothing left in AF/Navy acquisition to raid. That's one reason for production cutbacks - LRIP money is being transferred to cover a fraction of the $20 billion-plus SDD overrun.

The delays in the program have therefore not been driven by funding issues, but by technical and management factors: The original proposed design could not be built, the post-SWAT design could not be produced on schedule, flight-test plans were based on flight rates that could not be attained, the software development/test task was underestimated, and so on.

I do accept that this will cause trouble for companies that continued to invest heavily in competing for JSF work, while submitting low-margin bids, in the belief that production rates would be in the triple digits by now (2012 orders, 2014 deliveries) and headed above 200 in the next two years (as predicted in the 2007 PSFD MoU). I have little to no sympathy because there were plenty of warning signs that such an outcome was improbable. In business, Charlie Darwin beats Ms Rosie Scenario any day of the week.

Re F-16 production. In my tours around facilities from Milan to Duluth and Augsburg to Seattle over the past 30+ years, I have seen a quiet revolution take place in aircraft and engine building. It is difficult to describe in a post like this, but the fastest summary I can think of is this: What can be automated, is. (Machining, drilling/fastening. composite layup.) Other tasks are performed by skilled workers, whose workspace now gets a lot of attention in terms of ergonomics and parts supply.

F-16 at its peak was pre-revolutionary (and ran into trouble at one point, where higher rates resulted in increasing unit costs and delays, IIRC). Some "lean" was later applied to it. However, the URFs you quoted for the F-16 (unless they were guesses that you pulled out of your ear and are wrong by a factor of 40-60 per cent) suggest that they have not done as well as others.

Certainly, when I toured the JSF line, I kept being shown things like high-speed machining and auto-drilling of skins and thinking "cool, but I saw this in Augsburg in 2002".

You make the argument that companies are less able to weather the cutbacks in JSF because of the effects of the GFC. If they are taking advice from the likes of you, that may be true. But the commercial business has bounded back, its volumes make the JSF look like small change, they're screaming for parts and services, and any aerospace supplier that collapses today is run by buffoons.
 
LowObservable said:
TT - The C-17 is a good example of a program turned around after a gun was pointed at its head.

Seawolf was not exactly failed. Just too costly. VA, again, was a good recovery from that situation.

In other words, bad examples?
 
LowObservable said:
There are no aircraft that meet the F-35's requirements.

Including the F-35, because the overarching requirement was for a timely and affordable replacement for in-service aircraft.

It comes closer than all the rest. Doesn't matter if you have a plane TODAY if it can't perform the mission now does it?
 
If you're already planning to spend a few billion on converting 350 F-16s into quasi-Block 60s with AESA, new EW and redesigned cockpits, because you can't afford to replace them before 2030 (if all goes well), then the intended replacement has failed on affordability and availability:

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=fc4c6708d386faa09f7254204af4904a&tab=core&_cview=0

You'll have seen the massive LMT media barrage that accompanied this major win.

On the same logic, UltraBug (some would argue) "comes close" to meeting the F-35C performance requirement, with the potential of meeting cost and schedule goals.
 
LowObservable said:
If you're already planning to spend a few billion on converting 350 F-16s into quasi-Block 60s with AESA, new EW and redesigned cockpits, because you can't afford to replace them before 2030 (if all goes well), then the intended replacement has failed on affordability and availability:

Which doesn't change the fact that it doesn't matter if you have a plane that's cheap enough if it can't do the job. The choice is pay more and get something that CAN do the job or quit.



LowObservable said:
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=fc4c6708d386faa09f7254204af4904a&tab=core&_cview=0

You'll have seen the massive LMT media barrage that accompanied this major win.

On the same logic, UltraBug (some would argue) "comes close" to meeting the F-35C performance requirement, with the potential of meeting cost and schedule goals.

"Some" would argue we should still be flying Block 15 F-16s. They wouldn't be right either. [/quote]
 
Yeah, we're not really talking about these extremes. There is however a discrete number of solutions where you can argue that you can trade cost/IOC for capability.

What you believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that nothing short of the full F-35 capability will do, and that for that capability you are willing to wait and pay whatever it ends up taking LM to deliver.
 
GTX said:
BTW, I assume we will be talking about hypersonic fighters with top speeds in the vicinity of Mach 3 - 5. I say this since to be sure to avoid the missiles likely to be used against such a high visibility (IR if nothing else) target.

Actually, something along the lines of the F-108 would work just fine. Technical advancements since 1957 have made Mach 3 to 3.5~ performance more affordable in terms of materials science, avonics etc. Remember that the SR-71 had quite a lot of missiles shot at it, including SA-5 GAMMONS; and never was shot down. Given the increasing predeliction for the world for smaller, more road mobile missiles in the S-300~ class, weighing about 3,200 lbs instead of huge fixed site missiles like SA-5, which was about 15,000 lbs; there's plenty of performance inherent in a Mach 3 cruiser to significantly reduce SAM performance.

Granted, one of the possible counters would be to start implementing solid fuelled ramjet SAMs, but I don't know how TRL ready they are in terms of mass deployment, and re-equipping your forces after you just bought S-300PMU 1 billion would be expensive.
 
AeroFranz said:
Yeah, we're not really talking about these extremes. There is however a discrete number of solutions where you can argue that you can trade cost/IOC for capability.

What you believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that nothing short of the full F-35 capability will do, and that for that capability you are willing to wait and pay whatever it ends up taking LM to deliver.

What I believe is that the current batch of F-teens/Eurocanards aren't going to be competitive for the next 30 years no matter how much lipstick you put on them. That leaves the choice of either making the most of sunk costs and pressing forward with the F-35, or cancelling it, exploding your costs and pushing the replacement time out even further.
 
The choice is pay more and get something that CAN do the job or quit.

In that case the answer is "quit" because as the last USAF Chief put it, "there ain't no more money". Not in the USAF budget, not in the Pentagon budget, not in the national budget.

There is no "at any price" in the real world.

In the real world (see my alternative scenario many posts ago) you have to compromise.

Fortunately, scary as the S-400 may seem, it's no more the end of airpower as we know it than SAMs were when the Headless Man wrote his defense white paper in 1957, or over Vietnam, or in the bad days of Yom Kippur, or on the eve of Desert Storm when people were wringing their hands over how many dozens of losses we'd take on the first night.

There is no ultimate weapon, short of a bloody big nuke.
 
[/i]In that case the answer is "quit" because as the last USAF Chief put it, "there ain't no more money". Not in the USAF budget, not in the Pentagon budget, not in the national budget.

Maybe the USAF can feel what its like to penny pinch. Just kidding! Their cable TV, Hotels, and fine dining facilities will always be OK. There is plenty of money they just wish they had more, of course. The US will still be spending around 500 Billion a year for defense. Barely scraping by.

If you think its expensive now, wait until you have whole fleets of obsolete, cracking air frames, that have been almost constantly flying in war or near war state since 1991. That should be cheap and easy to fix! The F-35 is going to happen because they have to buy something new, and that new something has to have cheaper, easier maintenance, on a smaller more effective fleet. So much the better if the expensive elements can be shared amongst the services.

Airplanes go well beyond the original sticker price. Maintaining them for 30 years makes the initial cost look like small potatoes.

In the real world (see my alternative scenario many posts ago) you have to compromise.

Was that the one with the Gripen and as yet undeveloped neo Tomcat? That was priceless. I like how your "real world" scenario would involve the US buying a Swedish aircraft, over a home grown Boeing product. I should have stopped reading there, but fiction is fun.

Don't like the price of the F-35? Have you considered buying the F-35 anyway plus four other types of aircraft? Two of them undeveloped paper projects who's final price we can only guess at?

Can't afford one type of aircraft? How about buying 3 types with no parts commonalty instead? Did I mention one of them needs parts all the way from Sweden? I'm trying to save money here in the real world.


Fortunately, scary as the S-400 may seem, it's no more the end of airpower as we know it than SAMs were when the Headless Man wrote his defense white paper in 1957, or over Vietnam, or in the bad days of Yom Kippur, or on the eve of Desert Storm when people were wringing their hands over how many dozens of losses we'd take on the first night.

Desert Storm? I wonder what revolutionary aviation breakthrough could have lead to so few loses?

300px-F-117_Nighthawk_Front.jpg


SAMs are still dangerous, one of the reasons loses have not been extreme is that billions of dollars and whole aircraft fleets were designed to defeat them (EW, then Stealth) and the respect for SAMs is very high. Casualties in Vietnam were serious, being a POW for years is not pleasant, losing men trying to rescue downed pilots is heartbreaking, and in the end Western militarys are very adverse to casualties. So grinding through SAM belts the hard and dangerous way is a real money saver-- provided you have the people, aircraft, and public support to lose. Typically though, you will run out of airplanes long before they run out of SAMs, if your pilots' morale isn't crushed in the meantime.

Also another reason for fewer SAM loses is that when area's with SAMs are found or suspected these days, aircraft are ordered to stay away. So in that way they don't "end airpower" as you say, they just curtail the use of it at all in that area, so it has that same effect. Which is not helpful to western militarys that rely on aircraft for almost everything.
 
The F-35 is going to happen because they have to buy something new, and that new something has to have cheaper, easier maintenance, on a smaller more effective fleet.

Easier than what? If the A-model costs more to run than the F-16, what about the Transformer Jet?

Easier than gluing together ancient aircraft, for sure, but that's not the alternative.
 
TaiidanTomcat said:
Desert Storm? I wonder what revolutionary aviation breakthrough could have lead to so few loses?

Absolutely. The air campaign's success was entirely the product of one aircraft type, rather than the plan or the people executing it. It had nothing at all to do with the mix of different assets and capabilities or how they were employed.
 
Side topic: F-35B hover technical question. How does the pilot move the F-35B in the hover forward and backward? The stick moves it left, right, up, and down. The information available states the F-35B hovers to a "spot" designated by the pilot. If the pilot needs to move the F-35B forward, does he just move the designated spot on the display?

I posted it here because I figured if anyone knew the answer to that question it would be here. Thanks in advance and sorry to interrupt the discussion.
 
The throttle is used as an acceleration control to allow positioning in the hover, along with the rudder pedals. In future it will be replaced by 'Translational Rate Command' (or Control - both terms are used).

See test pilot Graham Tomlinson's talk summary here:

http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/hawkerassociation/hanewsletters/hanewsletter030nvu/testflyingjointstrikefighter.html

and get a look at John Farley's book 'A View From the Hover' (http://www.aviewfromthehover.com/index.php ) as well as Flight articles he wrote flying the VAAC Harrier - http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/single-minded-54853/
 
I continue to find this thread fascinating and informative.

It is worth noting that at this stage in development all the major combat aircraft with high tech capabilities were said to be over budget and not to have delivered on their specs. The F-111 was a case in point, yet by the 70s it was NATO's key theatre nuclear delivery platform. Both the F15 and the F14 were threatened at various points and variants of the latter were cancelled.

I am not a technical person so am always careful to only cite other sources. From what I have read so far the F35 could emerge as another F4 or F15, provided the bugs are ironed out, as they were with those aircraft.

F 35 suffers two major disadvantages over its predecessors:

In the absence of a technically ambitious threat like that posed by the Soviet Union when the F15 and F14 were developed, F35 has to speculate on the kind of threat it will face through its service career. Who knows, in 20 years time Latin America might be dominated by a Brazil determined to face down other countries with its newly developed military might? or China and India may be joined in trying to rectify the world in favour of the countries once colonised by the West?

The watershed between manned and unmanned aircraft. Is the F 35 a Gloster Gladiator or Fairey Battle destined to be consigned to the dustbin by Intelligent adaptive unmanned craft that will be as far ahead as the Spitfire and ME 109 were by 1939? Yet in 1934 if Britain had begun to rearm seriously we would like the US have have to order what Industry could provide-Gloster Gladiators and Fairey Battles.

This thread suggests that the answers to the question are as hard now as they were in 1934 or 1974!

uk 75
 
LowObservable said:
Easier than what? If the A-model costs more to run than the F-16, what about the Transformer Jet?

Ever worked on old aircraft that no longer have parts made for them? plus there will be fewer of them, quality over quantity yet again. How quickly does the F-16 catch up when it has to have parts constantly x rayed for cracks? Or fleet wide groundings after one comes apart like that F-15 in Missouri a few years back? The curves will meet awfully fast. Iraq, Iraq No fly Zones, Kosovo, Afghanistan, more CAPs over the US, Iraq (again), Libya-- The aircraft in our inventory have been flown with combat loads for durations never imagined. It adds up fast.


quellish said:
Absolutely. The air campaign's success was entirely the product of one aircraft type, rather than the plan or the people executing it. It had nothing at all to do with the mix of different assets and capabilities or how they were employed.

Good point, the Harrier helped a lot too. ;D For an airplane that played such a minor role in the conflict it sure hooked the Air Force on stealth... and the point was casualties, think there are more if conventional aircraft try to go to Baghdad the first night like the F-117s?

Well said UK75
 
LowObservable said:
The choice is pay more and get something that CAN do the job or quit.

In that case the answer is "quit" because as the last USAF Chief put it, "there ain't no more money". Not in the USAF budget, not in the Pentagon budget, not in the national budget.

There is no "at any price" in the real world.

In the real world (see my alternative scenario many posts ago) you have to compromise.

The F-35 *is* the compromise. The services need something better than the last generation (F-teens/eurocanards) at the cheapest price. That's why they went the way they did instead of three seperate, optimized, designs. But then you know this already. Again, it doesn't do you any good to buy cheaper jets if they can't perform the mission. And your "real world" scenario doesn't meet the requirement. Obviously. That's why they didn't go that route.
 
UK 75 - Good points.

The F-111 did indeed go on and perform well in its primary mission.

Nearly 11 years after contract award (where JSF is now) a deployed wing of F-111Es had been fully operational at RAF Upper Heyford for more than a year and the long-delayed Cs had been delivered to Australia.

1700-plus F-111s would have been built under the original plan. Of 563 aircraft built, fewer than half (224 C, E and F models) were front-line tactical aircraft after the mid-1970s. (The As were not deployed to Europe and some were converted to EF-111As, the FB-111A was SAC's red-headed stepchild and the single F-111D wing was sent to Cannon AFB and was never seen again.)

The F-111B was cancelled. It did, however, cause at least one major problem for the other variants - in an effort to constrain the length, the designers installed quarter-cone inlets with short ducts under the wing glove, resulting in all manner of problems.

“Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” - Groucho Marx*

* I got that quote from Wikipedia
 
Harrier said:
The throttle is used as an acceleration control to allow positioning in the hover, along with the rudder pedals. In future it will be replaced by 'Translational Rate Command' (or Control - both terms are used).

See test pilot Graham Tomlinson's talk summary here:

http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/hawkerassociation/hanewsletters/hanewsletter030nvu/testflyingjointstrikefighter.html

and get a look at John Farley's book 'A View From the Hover' (http://www.aviewfromthehover.com/index.php ) as well as Flight articles he wrote flying the VAAC Harrier - http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/single-minded-54853/

I've already been through all of those links and none of them state what the throttle for the F-35B does in hover mode. They tell you what it does in flight mode and STO mode and the article on the VAAC has an extra lever that is used in hover for the Unified mode, so none of them actually answer the question.
 
Sundog -

In hover mode:

Forward-aft stick = vertical acceleration

Left-right stick = left-right translate.

Pedals = left-right rotate

Throttle = forward acceleration/deceleration. Mid-setting is speed hold. Idle setting - decelerate to hover or preset speed stop.
 
TaiidanTomcat said:
quellish said:
Absolutely. The air campaign's success was entirely the product of one aircraft type, rather than the plan or the people executing it. It had nothing at all to do with the mix of different assets and capabilities or how they were employed.

Good point, the Harrier helped a lot too. ;D For an airplane that played such a minor role in the conflict it sure hooked the Air Force on stealth... and the point was casualties, think there are more if conventional aircraft try to go to Baghdad the first night like the F-117s?

Yup, DESERT STORM really hooked the Air Force on stealth. Immediately afterward USAF started a new low observable strategic bomber program, a new low observable strategic cruise missile program, and a low observable air superiority fighter program.
 
LowObservable said:
Sundog -

In hover mode:

Forward-aft stick = vertical acceleration

Left-right stick = left-right translate.

Pedals = left-right rotate

Throttle = forward acceleration/deceleration. Mid-setting is speed hold. Idle setting - decelerate to hover or preset speed stop.

Thanks.
 
Sundog said:
Harrier said:
The throttle is used as an acceleration control to allow positioning in the hover, along with the rudder pedals. In future it will be replaced by 'Translational Rate Command' (or Control - both terms are used).

See test pilot Graham Tomlinson's talk summary here:

http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/hawkerassociation/hanewsletters/hanewsletter030nvu/testflyingjointstrikefighter.html

and get a look at John Farley's book 'A View From the Hover' (http://www.aviewfromthehover.com/index.php ) as well as Flight articles he wrote flying the VAAC Harrier - http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/single-minded-54853/

I've already been through all of those links and none of them state what the throttle for the F-35B does in hover mode. They tell you what it does in flight mode and STO mode and the article on the VAAC has an extra lever that is used in hover for the Unified mode, so none of them actually answer the question.

The Tomlinson article states "The throttle commands acceleration and deceleration (or thrust on the ground and in the STO mode, and in all conventional modes);" which is pretty clear - hover is implied. The Flight article states that for the Unified control law:

"A throttle-type left hand inceptor, incorporating two detents, commands longitudinal acceleration. Putting the inceptor in the centre detent holds the current speed. Acceleration or deceleration is selected by moving the lever forward or aft of the detent, with full travel demanding maximum available performance.
Decelerating through 35kt starts a blend and below 25kt the aft detent commands zero ground speed. Either side of the aft detent gives the pilot a closed loop control of ground speed up to 30kt forwards or backwards. "

Zero ground speed = hover!

John Farley's book shows a diagram of the VAAC throttle and its functions.

Thanks to Low Observable for putting it succinctly too.
 
There is no denying that the STOVL system is a neat bit of engineering, and that making it work acceptably without major glitches, and deliver what seems to be quite smooth handling (given all the blending and transition of control modes) has been one of the program's achievements.

What we'll never know is whether Macs' LPLC concept would have been better. I have never seen a T/W for the lift fan engine, but one could guess somewhere between the proposed RB.202 (higher BPR, so heavier) at 11:1 and the XJ99 (pure jet) at 20. 15:1 would give you a mass of 1300-some lb for the fan. The lift/cruise engine would be lighter (smaller LPT and lighter shaft). If it had the same T/W as an F110-GE-132 (8:1) it would be about 5000 lb vs. 6500 lb for the F135.

So now we're at 6300 lb vs 10400 lb for the present system. Of course, I still need a main engine thrust deflector and roll control (off the top of my head I can't remember how Macs were going to do that), but are those going to add 4000 lb?

By the way, Macs used a blocker and side nozzles on the lift-cruise engine, which may have added complexity in the engine but avoided cutting a big hole in the bottom of the airplane, with huge doors - and would have left you with a place to put the tailhook.
 
LowObservable said:
There is no denying that the STOVL system is a neat bit of engineering, and that making it work acceptably without major glitches, and deliver what seems to be quite smooth handling (given all the blending and transition of control modes) has been one of the program's achievements.

What we'll never know is whether Macs' LPLC concept would have been better. I have never seen a T/W for the lift fan engine, but one could guess somewhere between the proposed RB.202 (higher BPR, so heavier) at 11:1 and the XJ99 (pure jet) at 20. 15:1 would give you a mass of 1300-some lb for the fan. The lift/cruise engine would be lighter (smaller LPT and lighter shaft). If it had the same T/W as an F110-GE-132 (8:1) it would be about 5000 lb vs. 6500 lb for the F135.

So now we're at 6300 lb vs 10400 lb for the present system. Of course, I still need a main engine thrust deflector and roll control (off the top of my head I can't remember how Macs were going to do that), but are those going to add 4000 lb?

By the way, Macs used a blocker and side nozzles on the lift-cruise engine, which may have added complexity in the engine but avoided cutting a big hole in the bottom of the airplane, with huge doors - and would have left you with a place to put the tailhook.

I don't know the impact off the top of my head, but for completeness the W in T/W should include the weight of the fuel burned and the fuel system required to provide the fuel burned in STOL and VTOL operations.
 

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