The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

The big elephant in the room is that it's now going to cost more than a F-22 for a good bit until enough are produced to bring down the unit cost
The F-35 already costs less than the last produced F-22, try again.

Per the FY 2011 and FY2014 budget docs:

FY2009 F-22 Total Flyaway price (as reported in the FY2011 budget) = $150.4 mil ($166.5 in FY2014 dollars)
FY2014 F-35A Total Flyaway = $152.3 mil.

So, the F-35 is already 8.5% cheaper than the F-22 and is only getting cheaper while the F-22's price will not change.
 
SpudmanWP said:
The F-35 already costs less than the last produced F-22, try again.

Per the FY 2011 and FY2014 budget docs:

FY2009 F-22 Total Flyaway price (as reported in the FY2011 budget) = $150.4 mil ($166.5 in FY2014 dollars)
FY2014 F-35A Total Flyaway = $152.3 mil.

So, the F-35 is already 8.5% cheaper than the F-22 and is only getting cheaper while the F-22's price will not change.

How is 152.3 less than 150.4? The 166.5 is irrelevant as that's not what you paid for an F-22 then, and may not be what you'd actually be paying for one now.
 
SOC said:
SpudmanWP said:
The F-35 already costs less than the last produced F-22, try again.

Per the FY 2011 and FY2014 budget docs:

FY2009 F-22 Total Flyaway price (as reported in the FY2011 budget) = $150.4 mil ($166.5 in FY2014 dollars)
FY2014 F-35A Total Flyaway = $152.3 mil.

So, the F-35 is already 8.5% cheaper than the F-22 and is only getting cheaper while the F-22's price will not change.

How is 152.3 less than 150.4? The 166.5 is irrelevant as that's not what you paid for an F-22 then, and may not be what you'd actually be paying for one now.

Depending the rate you could be paying more than 166.5 now. Much more. And surely you realize a dollar in 2009 was worth more than a dollar is today?
 
SpudmanWP said:
Per the FY 2011 and FY2014 budget docs:

FY2009 F-22 Total Flyaway price (as reported in the FY2011 budget) = $150.4 mil ($166.5 in FY2014 dollars)
FY2014 F-35A Total Flyaway = $152.3 mil.

So, the F-35 is already 8.5% cheaper than the F-22 and is only getting cheaper while the F-22's price will not change.


Um. Thanks for proving my point. That F-22 flyaway price was after the full production run of 195 aircraft; while the F-35A price is after the 100th F-35 rolled off the production line. Shouldn't we be substantially cheaper by now after 100 planes built?
 
Your point was that the F-22 would be cheaper to buy than the F-35 and would be so for many more years. You were wrong on both counts.

Some reasons why the F-35 has not dropped in price quicker are: The F-35 is also more complex than the F-22 (more code, more sensors, more versions, etc); they keep jacking with the build schedule; much more testing is involved at each stage.

Any way you put it, if you bought both an F-22 and an F-35A today, the F-35A is cheaper and getting more so every year.
 
"They keep jacking with the build schedule."


So what do you think is the optimal number of non-operational aircraft on the ramp by 2015? 100? 200? 300?


The build schedule has reflected the fact that the jet is not ready.
 
LowObservable said:
"They keep jacking with the build schedule."


So what do you think is the optimal number of non-operational aircraft on the ramp by 2015? 100? 200? 300?


The build schedule has reflected the fact that the jet is not ready.

What do you mean "non-operational" specifically? Because the jets they have now aren't just sitting off in a wheat field collecting dust.
 
They "jacked with the schedule" in two distinct ways:

1. When it became apparent that it was going to take more development resources, they decided to primarily stretch out the development time instead of adding more annual resources.

2. Very early in the program, even before serious problems came up, they cut the planned annual F-35A build rate from 110 to 80 planes per year, which is a significant reduction in the planned build rate.

Items 1 and 2 let to a large increase in LRIP cuts both in US production, but more importantly in Partner nation cuts as the revised LRIP sticker-shock set in. They are still playing these games as they decided to cut a few airframes from the FY2015 budget thereby causing all Partner nations budget plans to change adversely.

How can we be expected to offer the JSF to FMS customers and our Partners if we cannot even stick to our own plans? I would understand if the JSF program were in technical trouble, but it is not.
 
SpudmanWP said:
They "jacked with the schedule" in two distinct ways:

1. When it became apparent that it was going to take more development resources, they decided to primarily stretch out the development time instead of adding more annual resources.

2. Very early in the program, even before serious problems came up, they cut the planned annual F-35A build rate from 110 to 80 planes per year, which is a significant reduction in the planned build rate.

Items 1 and 2 let to a large increase in LRIP cuts both in US production, but more importantly in Partner nation cuts as the revised LRIP sticker-shock set in. They are still playing these games as they decided to cut a few airframes from the FY2015 budget thereby causing all Partner nations budget plans to change adversely.

How can we be expected to offer the JSF to FMS customers and our Partners if we cannot even stick to our own plans? I would understand if the JSF program were in technical trouble, but it is not.

Slowing the build rate or pushing the schedule to the right does indeed have a significant affect on per unit costs, even more so than total numbers (because R&D and overhead costs are more or less fixed, but production costs vary dramatically with the build rate).

Regarding F-35's present technical situation, a good, non-sensational snapshot was done last month by Flight International:

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/f-35-faces-familiar-dogfight-with-competing-facts-395397/
 
When a program suffers delays because of the vagaries of the budget, I can understand that. When it's due to technical reasons deriving from unforeseen complexity of the problem or insufficient resource allocation, it's poor engineering and/or management.
Every time you introduce new, low TRL technologies, you have to perform a risk assessment, formulate recovery plans, and plan a schedule/budget accordingly. You cannot claim that "you did not see that coming".
 
If the F-35A cannot be reduced in price to the "sweet spot" of between $80 to 90 million each that program partners want according to Lt. Gen. Bogdan is the aircraft still considered "unaffordable"? At what price point is the F-35 still considered "unaffordable"?

Is seems that the nations of the Gulf Coalition Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and Israel are very interested in the F-35 to counter the growing influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region. With the arms build-up in Asia and the increasing assertiveness of the People's Republic of China, Japan and South Korea have committed to the F-35. Singapore is expected to order the F-35B. Is there a pressing security need for the aircraft in Australia? I also presume that the appearance of the J-20 and J-31 makes fifth-generation fighter aircraft such as the F-35 much more attractive over fourth-generation or 4.5-generation fighter aircraft. How much are these nations willing to spend before they consider the F-35 to be "unaffordable"?

It seems to me that while Canada and NATO countries can delay deliveries or cancel orders for the F-35, that Gulf Coalition Council states, Israel, and our allies in Asia have pressing security concerns that must be addressed.

It also seems to me that the example of the RAH-66 Comanche is not a very apt allegory to the F-35 when you consider that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the possibility of a tank battle in the Fulda Gap. Could the United States Army really justify the cost of a LO attack/reconnaissance helicopter when rotorcraft were being used for peace keeping operations in places like Somalia?
 
AeroFranz said:
When a program suffers delays because of the vagaries of the budget, I can understand that. When it's due to technical reasons deriving from unforeseen complexity of the problem or insufficient resource allocation, it's poor engineering and/or management.
Every time you introduce new, low TRL technologies, you have to perform a risk assessment, formulate recovery plans, and plan a schedule/budget accordingly. You cannot claim that "you did not see that coming".

At the same time you don't want to fall victim to the all-to-common problem these days - analysis paralysis. Sure, it would be great to have zero unknowns going into a program but that is never going to happen.
 
sferrin said:
AeroFranz said:
When a program suffers delays because of the vagaries of the budget, I can understand that. When it's due to technical reasons deriving from unforeseen complexity of the problem or insufficient resource allocation, it's poor engineering and/or management.
Every time you introduce new, low TRL technologies, you have to perform a risk assessment, formulate recovery plans, and plan a schedule/budget accordingly. You cannot claim that "you did not see that coming".

At the same time you don't want to fall victim to the all-to-common problem these days - analysis paralysis. Sure, it would be great to have zero unknowns going into a program but that is never going to happen.

I don't believe that anyone has claimed that no mistakes were made during the development of the F-35. Lt. Gen. Bogdan has admitted that "basically the program ran itself off the rails." Bogdan has also characterized the relationship between the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin as: "I’m on record after being in the job for only a month standing up and saying it was the worst relationship I had seen in my acquisition career."

Source:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/f-35-joint-strike-fighter-60-minutes/

Lt. Gen. Bogdan assures us that the program is now under control.
 
Yes, the amount of time required to retire ALL risks tends asymptotically to infinity. Between "paralysis by analysis" and recklessness lies a successful balanced path which takes the least amount of time and is also the least expensive - essentially getting it done quickly but also getting it done right the first time. I'm not sure the delayed aspects of the program came even close to that.
 
AeroFranz said:
Yes, the amount of time required to retire ALL risks tends asymptotically to infinity. Between "paralysis by analysis" and recklessness lies a successful balanced path which takes the least amount of time and is also the least expensive - essentially getting it done quickly but also getting it done right the first time. I'm not sure the delayed aspects of the program came even close to that.

How many modern military aircraft programs have delivered at the same time and budget as was planned? And the further one reaches the less likely it is to happen. I suppose we could have stayed nice and conservative and still be flying F-86s but that probably isn't a wise idea.
 
To argue that there is a simple either-or choice between eight-year slips (at full funding) and $XX-billion overruns on one hand, and stasis on the other, is moronic.


Spud - you can complain all you want about production cutbacks but you should remember that even with lower rates, deliveries did not get on schedule until 2013. Neither is there any evidence that pouring money into a software program that did not know what its problems were would have saved any time.
 
LowObservable said:
To argue that there is a simple either-or choice between eight-year slips (at full funding) and $XX-billion overruns on one hand, and stasis on the other, is moronic.

So where's the line? Let me guess: Eurocanards were just about right? ;D
 
SpudmanWP said:
Your point was that the F-22 would be cheaper to buy than the F-35 and would be so for many more years. You were wrong on both counts.

It's been many years since I last checked the pricing; and congratulations to the F-35 team for finally making a jet eventually cheaper than the F-22 only after building 100 of them.

Some reasons why the F-35 has not dropped in price quicker are: The F-35 is also more complex than the F-22 (more code, more sensors, more versions, etc); they keep jacking with the build schedule; much more testing is involved at each stage.

Or because we're still not out of the "YF-35" phase.

EDIT: In any case, I'm beyond caring about the future of US combat aviation, because it's become quite clear that Big Air Force will do anything necessary to preserve the JSF program, even at the cost of the KC-10/B-1/A-10 fleets.

Contrast this with Big Army -- where programs, no matter how "important" they are to the future of Big Army, are routinely taken behind the woodshed and shot in the back of the head quietly.
 
SpudmanWP said:
They "jacked with the schedule" in two distinct ways:



2. Very early in the program, even before serious problems came up, they cut the planned annual F-35A build rate from 110 to 80 planes per year, which is a significant reduction in the planned build rate.

Items 1 and 2 let to a large increase in LRIP cuts both in US production, but more importantly in Partner nation cuts as the revised LRIP sticker-shock set in. They are still playing these games as they decided to cut a few airframes from the FY2015 budget thereby causing all Partner nations budget plans to change adversely.

How can we be expected to offer the JSF to FMS customers and our Partners if we cannot even stick to our own plans?

This just in. The Administration's 2015 budget cuts another 24 US F-35s FY15 through 19. It also retires the A-10, U-2, KC-10 and probably the USS George Washington at 50% of her life. CVN-73 is specifically mentioned in the announcement
 
Looks like they have deferred the decision on USS George Washington to 2016's budget leaving to hanging to determine if sequestration cuts will still be in force or not. Given them time to argue the case for or against dipping past the 11 carrier minimal limit.
The F-35's are only deferred back rather than actually cut and it sounded like they were the USN F-35C, so no great loss there as they are quite happy to wait and get fully operational aircraft anyway.
 
RyanCrierie said:
Contrast this with Big Army -- where programs, no matter how "important" they are to the future of Big Army, are routinely taken behind the woodshed and shot in the back of the head quietly.
If they can screw up something as simple as 5.56mm replacement -repeatedly- they really aren't somebody to hold up as a shining example of effectiveness.
 
sferrin said:
AeroFranz said:
Yes, the amount of time required to retire ALL risks tends asymptotically to infinity. Between "paralysis by analysis" and recklessness lies a successful balanced path which takes the least amount of time and is also the least expensive - essentially getting it done quickly but also getting it done right the first time. I'm not sure the delayed aspects of the program came even close to that.

How many modern military aircraft programs have delivered at the same time and budget as was planned? And the further one reaches the less likely it is to happen. I suppose we could have stayed nice and conservative and still be flying F-86s but that probably isn't a wise idea.


What I am saying is that just because acquisition programs have been going steadily south for six decades, it does not mean we have to be content with it. We are currently on our merry way to fulfilling Augustine's prophecies about branches being able to afford only one aircraft and having to take turns flying it.
The F-35 was supposed to be the affordable program that would break the paradigm. You will pardon my disappointment so far.
 
AeroFranz said:
sferrin said:
AeroFranz said:
Yes, the amount of time required to retire ALL risks tends asymptotically to infinity. Between "paralysis by analysis" and recklessness lies a successful balanced path which takes the least amount of time and is also the least expensive - essentially getting it done quickly but also getting it done right the first time. I'm not sure the delayed aspects of the program came even close to that.

How many modern military aircraft programs have delivered at the same time and budget as was planned? And the further one reaches the less likely it is to happen. I suppose we could have stayed nice and conservative and still be flying F-86s but that probably isn't a wise idea.


What I am saying is that just because acquisition programs have been going steadily south for six decades, it does not mean we have to be content with it. We are currently on our merry way to fulfilling Augustine's prophecies about branches being able to afford only one aircraft and having to take turns flying it.
The F-35 was supposed to be the affordable program that would break the paradigm. You will pardon my disappointment so far.
It pretty much comes down to a choice - do you want to remain ahead of the other guy or not? If so then it's gonna cost money. (Cue the "the USSR went broke, blah blah blah" crowd.)
 
My beef is that we need to get more for that money. Just because we've been historically bad at this does not mean that we should resign ourselves. It's not like a thermodynamics law that dictates that effectiveness degrades in the universe with the passing of time.


I mean, back in the day they didn't even have Powerpoint, and look at what they were able to accomplish! Wait...
 
AeroFranz said:
My beef is that we need to get more for that money. Just because we've been historically bad at this does not mean that we should resign ourselves. It's not like a thermodynamics law that dictates that effectiveness degrades in the universe with the passing of time.


I mean, back in the day they didn't even have Powerpoint, and look at what they were able to accomplish! Wait...

Absolutely. When I moved into aerospace (from an admittedly rather less risk averse field) I was staggered by the lack of both innovation in the more traditional areas of design (airframe, manufacturing tech etc.) and 'dynamism'. I fully realise aerospace must be a conservative field but if we are to break out of the current situation (this isn't F35 specific, either...) new ways of doing things must be found (and of course tested, validated and certified).

Just mini rant... ;)
 
AeroFranz said:
My beef is that we need to get more for that money. Just because we've been historically bad at this does not mean that we should resign ourselves. It's not like a thermodynamics law that dictates that effectiveness degrades in the universe with the passing of time.
You're right, it isn't. However you can't get something for nothing, and the more complex a thing gets the more it's going to cost. Also the more complex a thing gets the more unknowns there are going to be. And you can't just wave a magic wand and demand simplicity while at the same time expecting cutting edge technology.

AeroFranz said:
I mean, back in the day they didn't even have Powerpoint, and look at what they were able to accomplish! Wait...
No Powerpoint, CAD, CAE, etc. And you're preaching to the choir there. In fact IMO those tools are "enablers". They enable management to twiddle and fiddle generating motion and work without actually accomplishing anything. [/quote]
 
AF - Future historians will observe that the widespread use of PPT dates to the release of Windows 95 in August of that year, which was almost exactly when JAST was completing its morph from technology sandbox to a full-scale acquisition program.
 
LO, before that, there were Viewgraphs (VU Graphs); but those actually took some time to make; in that you needed to draw something and then have them run off at the printer(s) or the art department; so Viewgraphs were inherently self-limiting -- because of the time and effort needed to make them, you had to make them high quality and informationally dense.

PPT, on the other hand....
 
SpudmanWP said:
Just wait till the Pentagon comes up with a PPT Service Medal.

:-X
 

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I'm going to have to put that orange "Powerpoint Ranger" patch on my corporate sig. ;D
 
Geoff_B said:
Looks like they have deferred the decision on USS George Washington to 2016's budget leaving to hanging to determine if sequestration cuts will still be in force or not. Given them time to argue the case for or against dipping past the 11 carrier minimal limit.
The F-35's are only deferred back rather than actually cut and it sounded like they were the USN F-35C, so no great loss there as they are quite happy to wait and get fully operational aircraft anyway.

In reverse order, deferring 24 still raises the unit cost for everyone by slowing the production rate. Deferring buying the 24 doesn't necessarily mean that when the USN gets them they'll be fully operational, they may just be the earlier versions delivered later and there's still a shortfall on the carrier decks as the older planes those 24 were meant to replace at a certain time wear out. And, using past history, "defer" can also mean "canceled because we really won't have the extra money then but we don't want to say that now".

Regarding the Washington, her RCOH is scheduled to begin in FY16 (it slipped when the Administration delayed the Lincoln's RCOH). That fits right into the years they are trying to cut. While there has been no unequivocal statement that she will be retired (you don't mothball a nuke), there's no money identified in FY15 or 16 budgets for the long leadtime items that are part of a RCOH as well as the beginning work (the Feb. 19 announcement in fedbizops was just the required presolicitation inquiry of interest and nothing in it said it would actually occur). If they just delay Washington's RCOH on top of Lincoln's delay, that will impact Stennis' and both will be tied up and out of service for extra years. Plus the cost rises dramatically.

So, unless some billions are restored, it looks like Washington has to take the hit.
 
The funny thing is, you all think I'm kidding

http://www.powerpointranger.com/


The PowerPoint Creed
This is my PowerPoint. There are many like it but mine is 97.

My PowerPoint is my best friend. It is my life. I must master it as I master my life.

My PowerPoint without me is useless. Without my PowerPoint, I am useless.

I must format my slides true. I must brief them better than the other staff sections who are trying to out brief me.

I must brief the impact on the CINC before he asks me. I will.

My PowerPoint and myself know that what counts in this war is not the information. We know that it is the number of slides, the colors of the highlights, and the format of the bullets that counts.

My PowerPoint is human, even as I, because it is my life. Thus I will learn it as a brother. I will learn its weaknesses, its

strengths, its fonts, its accessories, its formats, and its colors.

I will keep my PowerPoint slides current and ready to brief. We will become part of each other. We will…

Before God I swear this creed. My PowerPoint and myself are defenders of my country. We are the masters of our subject. We are the saviors of my career.

So be it, until victory is America’s and there is no enemy, but peace (and the next exercise)!

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