The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[sublight_]

This should have been asked at the F-35 roundtable.

Ages ago the F-35 program announced they were fielding a special hand held tool that maintainers can use to check the signature of the aircraft on the ground.

Could you elaborate? None of us have heard about this...

 

[_Del_]

Google "VNA RCS". I don't know if there was a particular gadget developed just for the JSF program, but that wouldn't surprise me either.

 

[SOC]

There's this: http://www.google.com/patents/US5386737

 

[quellish]

Any info on the beast in the public domain?

Yup.

Ages ago the F-35 program announced they were fielding a special hand held tool that maintainers can use to check the signature of the aircraft on the ground.

As part of the LRIP III funding (N00019-08-C-0028) the Naval Air Systems Command exercised an option to procure a single repair verification radar. Later, also as part of LRIP III funding, facilities at Hill AFB were upgraded to support RCS testing. Both of these were to support the development test and evaluation efforts. Perhaps this is what you were referring to?

Always refreshing to read another critique of the F-35 based on ignorance of the project.

How is this particular part of the discussion a critique?

 

[quellish]

Google "VNA RCS". I don't know if there was a particular gadget developed just for the JSF program, but that wouldn't surprise me either.

There's this: http://www.google.com/patents/US5386737

Portable radar signature measurement and imaging diagnostic systems have been around since at least the late 80s. AvWeek ran a number of articles on them in the early 1990s. The physically small units come with some severe limitations, which is why their use has been limited. They are useful for some types of signature problems but not others. If panels aren't closing and aligning properly these will help you spot it, but they are not going to tell you much useful information your RAM/RAS. The B-2 program used a well-named device called the Point Inspection RCS tool. These tools can only look at a small area, and operate in bands that are not very mission relevant.

There are larger flightline diagnostic units that can be set up to surround an aircraft on the ground or are integrated into a shelter (like CLOVerS, which is the DoD standard system today). These have far fewer limitations than the physically smaller units, for a number of reasons. The most important being they can cover more of the relevant frequencies.
CLOVerS can look at large quadrants or zones of an aircraft or the whole thing, and it does so in bands that are mission relevant (or at least, mostly. The B-2 is a special case). This means that it can provide relevant, useful feedback about RAM/RAS condition.

 

[Arjen]

Always refreshing to read another critique of the F-35 based on ignorance of the project.

How is this particular part of the discussion a critique?

Critique:

Critique is a method of disciplined, systematic analysis of a written or oral discourse. Critique is commonly understood as fault finding and negative judgement, but it can also involve merit recognition, and in the philosophical tradition it also means a methodical practice of doubt.

Probably not meant as a compliment, but can be taken as one.

On whose part the ignorance is, is another question. In ignorance, much news can be refreshing.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

As part of the LRIP III funding (N00019-08-C-0028) the Naval Air Systems Command exercised an option to procure a single repair verification radar. Later, also as part of LRIP III funding, facilities at Hill AFB were upgraded to support RCS testing. Both of these were to support the development test and evaluation efforts. Perhaps this is what you were referring to?

Nope. I think that system is a field deployable RCS imaging measurement facility for use in repair work. What I was referring to is a hand held tool that maintainers use to check a specific part of the LO treatment after maintenance.

How is this particular part of the discussion a critique?

I was referring to the complaints, ie critiques, about how the USN (and other users) should have some sort of RCS measurement tool for the F-35. When of course this is something incorporated into the project.

An interesting thing about the F-35 is the first time design for a LO treatment that can be sustained in operational service. Which includes maintenance and very resilient LO technology and design. It also includes being designed to suffer likely degrading and still have signature meeting the specification.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Always refreshing to read another critique of the F-35 based on ignorance of the project.

How is this particular part of the discussion a critique?

Critique:

Critique is a method of disciplined, systematic analysis of a written or oral discourse. Critique is commonly understood as fault finding and negative judgement, but it can also involve merit recognition, and in the philosophical tradition it also means a methodical practice of doubt.

Probably not meant as a compliment, but can be taken as one.

On whose part the ignorance is, is another question. In ignorance, much news can be refreshing.

That might have won you a point or two in a high school debate but doubt built on ignorance still looks pretty stupid to the informed no matter how philosophical it may have been.

 

[Arjen]

Ignorance finds a better companion in doubt than in unwarranted certainty.

 

[LowObservable]

Arjen - You're right, but probably addressing the wrong audience.


Quellish - I thought CLOVerS was dead and buried:


http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2008/AirForce/stamped/0604762F.pdf


Generally: The goal for F-35 has been to develop coatings/finishes that avoid the need for in-service RCS verification (by radar) between scheduled depot visits - because (see "CLOVerS, demise of") no way has been found to do it that is not burdensome and costly. The RCS is deemed within margins unless there is visible damage, which can then be physically checked against an effects-of-defects database.*


Apparently this doesn't consider external pollutants such as salt. Those have to be washed off.


* Of course we were given a very similar song-and-dance during F-22 development (about how they had sorted the RCS maintenance thing) and it was moonshine. Since the JSFPO hasn't been tracking LO maintenance costs (see DOT&E report) nobody knows if the F-35 approach also has comparable unk-unks driving costs.

 

[sferrin]

Ignorance finds a better companion in doubt than in unwarranted certainty.

Unwarranted certainty (either way) is bad. It's just as flawed to be certain something is a POS with no evidence as to think something is the greatest thing since sliced bread with no evidence. Even worse is trying to portray a thing one way or another when one knows better simply out of self-interest. Let me direct you to Exhibit A:

"Here’s What 60 Minutes Didn’t Tell You About the F-35"

The millions of viewers who tuned into 60 Minutes Sunday may have gotten the impression that, despite being billions over budget and almost a decade behind schedule, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is ultimately necessary to maintain U.S. air superiority. That’s an unsurprising conclusion, given that all of the individuals interviewed in the story work either for the federal government or for Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the F-35. 60 Minutes’ producers broke a basic lesson of Journalism 101 when they failed to interview anyone who would tell the other side of the F-35 story.

Fortunately, a new video from Brave New Films does just that. The Jet that Ate the Pentagon, released along with a new website, explains how the F-35 became a $1.5 trillion burden on American taxpayers.

Winslow Wheeler, the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project On Government Oversight, is featured in the video. He answered a few of our questions about how and why the F-35 program got so out of control."

This is truly LOL-worthy:

"POGO: What are some of the F35’s most shocking failures?

WHEELER: The most stunning failure in the F-35 is the level of complexity and contradiction in the basic design. Starting out as a plan to make a short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft supersonic (two inherently contradictory design characteristics), it only went further downhill after that.

They then made it a multi-role aircraft, piling on the additional contradictory characteristics of an air to air fighter and an air to ground bomber; then they made it “stealth” making even fatter the aerodynamic design and making it all more complex by an order of magnitude."

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/151740/what-60-minutes-didn%E2%80%99t-say-about-the-f_35.html

Winslow Wheeler and POGO - clearly paragons of objectivity. ;D

(I guess I should give them the benefit of a doubt as it's just as likely it's ignorance that's powering their crusade.)

 

[sferrin]

Any info on the beast in the public domain?

Yup.

What was the thing called? (I take it you're referring to something other than ASALM's secondary air-to-air mode?)

 

[AeroFranz]

"Here’s What 60 Minutes Didn’t Tell You About the F-35"

The millions of viewers who tuned into 60 Minutes Sunday may have gotten the impression that, despite being billions over budget and almost a decade behind schedule, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is ultimately necessary to maintain U.S. air superiority. That’s an unsurprising conclusion, given that all of the individuals interviewed in the story work either for the federal government or for Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the F-35. 60 Minutes’ producers broke a basic lesson of Journalism 101 when they failed to interview anyone who would tell the other side of the F-35 story.

I did not watch the piece, but if indeed they only interviewed corporate or government stakeholders, then by definition they did not provide a balanced story. That being said, it's equally hard to say that the F-35 is not "necessary to maintain U.S. air superiority" when there is no equally developed alternative from brand Y that you can procure and that will maintain its effectiveness for the envisioned lifespan of the F-35 (there is a lot that could be rightfully discussed about the conditions under which this effectiveness will persist, but that's another story).

"POGO: What are some of the F35’s most shocking failures?

WHEELER: The most stunning failure in the F-35 is the level of complexity and contradiction in the basic design. Starting out as a plan to make a short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft supersonic (two inherently contradictory design characteristics), it only went further downhill after that.

They then made it a multi-role aircraft, piling on the additional contradictory characteristics of an air to air fighter and an air to ground bomber; then they made it “stealth” making even fatter the aerodynamic design and making it all more complex by an order of magnitude."

I wouldn't call that a "failure". Strictly speaking, that would imply that it didn't fulfill the mission requirements to a subjective greater or lesser degree. As for complexity, find me a simpler solution than the one implemented. Yes, there are alternatives to how you power the lift fan, but that's in the noise. Given the requirements and challenges, the F-35 seems like a competently engineered vehicle, or at least there are no insurmontable challenges that will make it useless.


However the comment of piling antagonistic requirements and having to pay a dear price in terms of weight, complexity, and compromise in performance, is spot on.
I don't think there is enough appreciation of the type of tradeoffs that were required to arrive at what we have today. Ask yourself, how would an F-35 without VTOL, or LO, or supersonic performance, or a combination of different levels of all of the above perform in the battlespace in the next thirty years to come? That's a pretty tricky question to answer and I think the answer we arrived at [with the F-35] was driven by political and programmatic considerations that did not contribute to the effectiveness of the F-35 as a weapons system - on the contrary.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Here is some LO maintenance related info from 2010

99% of JSF Maintenance Actions Require No LO Restoration

Although a significant aspect of the F-35 program, the LO repair facility has received scant attention in the vast literature commenting on the F-35. In January 2010, SLD sat down with Bill Grant, Lockheed Martin F-35 Supportable Low Observables Integrate Product Team Lead, in Fort Worth, Texas - a joint Lockheed-Martin – Northrop Grumman facility – to discuss the facility itself as well as the F-35 approach to LO maintenance.
…
SLD: So a lot of the LO maintenance will be done by the services and partners in the field?
Bill Grant: Yes indeed: we have no recognized need for any kind of return to depot or return to manufacturer for doing any type of LO maintenance.

Our system requirement was for end of life, which means that throughout the 8,000-hour service life of the jet, it is to remain fully mission-capable. So we anticipated that the amount of maintenance that would be done over the life of the airplane and anticipated that in the design. So when we deliver the jet, it’s delivered with a significant margin of degradation that’s allowed for all of these types of repairs over the life of the airplane, again, without having to return to the depot for refurbishment.

There may be some cosmetic-based reasons why the jet might go back to a facility to get its appearance improved, but from a performance-standpoint we recognize no need to do that. The unit-level maintenance will be adequate for maintaining the full-mission capability of the jet.

SLD: In entering the facility, I noticed you have a “door mat” of stealth that’s been there for some time. Can you comment on this “door mat?”
Bill Grant: Oh, the slab of stealth? That’s our welcome mat. Yes, we actually have one of the test panels that we use for assessing the stealth of the various materials. It represents a stack-up that’s consistent with the upper surface or the outer surface of the jet. It has the exact same structure and the primer and the topcoat system that you’ll find on the operational jets. And that gets walked upon every time somebody comes in or out of our lab area out there, the repair development center.

Occasionally, we take it up to test to see if there’s any electrical or mechanical degradation to the system and with around 25,000 steps across that system we have not seen any degradation whatsoever. So we have a great deal of confidence, however anecdotal that may be, that we have a very robust system.

More at the jump

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-f-35-low-observable-repair-facility-a-unique-asset-for-21st-century-combat-aviation/

 

[sferrin]

However the comment of piling antagonistic requirements and having to pay a dear price in terms of weight, complexity, and compromise in performance, is spot on.
I don't think there is enough appreciation of the type of tradeoffs that were required to arrive at what we have today. Ask yourself, how would an F-35 without VTOL, or LO, or supersonic performance, or a combination of different levels of all of the above perform in the battlespace in the next thirty years to come? That's a pretty tricky question to answer and I think the answer we arrived at [with the F-35] was driven by political and programmatic considerations that did not contribute to the effectiveness of the F-35 as a weapons system - on the contrary.

Except that you can't cherry pick, but instead need to look at the entire problem: replacing the F-16, F/A-18, and AV-8B. That's your task. Now do it in a way that minimizes cost and fills the requirement. Obviously three individual programs will come out with at least two superior designs (optimized CTOL and CV versions) BUT it would be so expensive you'd have to drop something. Most likely that "something" would be the STOVL version in which case the alternative "solution" has failed. In hindsight about the only compromise I can think of would be a fuselage stretch to the CTOL and CV versions to improve the finess ratio, while keeping as much commonality as possible, but then you'd also need a bigger wing and more powerful engine. *shrugs*

 

[LowObservable]

Spud - A noble goal from four years ago. Good on them if they can get there, but to quote the more recent op.cit. in this thread:

Routine aircraft operations and maintenance aboard the carrier will change dramatically when the F-35C joins the fleet, says Burks.

Sferrin - You're talking in circles again. Nobody (I think) has argued that you could meet the JSF requirement c. 1995 in an affordable manner. That's. The. Problem.

The right question starts at a strategic level: "how do I meet basic military needs with the resources available?". The JSF requirement was deeply flawed in that respect because it massively underestimated cost and schedule, so the relationship of needs to resources could not be properly assessed.

Again, hostile, irrelevant or repetitive responses will be ignored.

 

[Mike Pryce]

SpudmanWP: Thanks for the LO maintenance link. The stealth doormat was new to me.


LO: Somebody must have made that argument in order to get the ball rolling. I recall all the promised efficiencies of a 3 in 1 programme. The problem is that someone believed them!

EDIT: "The JAST concept is viable and affordable...the requirements have converged" - US Acquisition Under Secretary Kaminsky:

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1995/1995%20-%203646.html

EDIT 2: That was also the time I started my P.1154 research. I recall seeing the minutes of the first meeting between Hawker and the RN, when it was clear to Ralph Hooper that commonality was not going to work. When I interviewed him I asked what he thought of the JSF concept of commonality. 'Not much' he said after a glance at a picture of the LM proposal, 'they will suffer terrible weight growth...'

I think the real problem is that computer aided design led to a de-skilling of designers. Hence all the trouble with people believing testing was there to validate the CAD.

More along those lines here

 

[AeroFranz]

SFerrin, I agree that you need to look at the subject from a broader perspective. As a matter of fact, I will argue that an even broader perspective should be taken. The problem is not designing one or even more aircraft to replace the F-16, F-18, and AV-8. The problem is providing a weapon system that maximizes the desired effects on the battlespace. This has to be balanced with the effects that other weapons systems can achieve, because developing weapon system X is inevitably going to the detriment of weapon systems Y, Z, W (they are all competing for a finite amount of resources). By the way, the alternative to weapon system X could be something of entirely different nature, all that matters is achieving the desired effects. Who cares if the bomb is dropped from a hypothetical steam-powered blimp or if the target is fried by a cyber attack? it's just as dead.
So let me restate the problem: The problem is providing a combination of weapon(s) system(s) that maximizes the desired effects on the battlespace. Everything else is details.

So the question (in my mind the only question) with regards to the F-35, is: are all the resources that were/will be allocated on the F-35 wisely spent or a different combination of weapon systems could have achieved greater effects (or similar effects at lower cost)?
I am not convinced that a gradually decreasing number of very expensive air vehicles displacing the development of other technologies is the right answer.

EDIT 2: That was also the time I started my P.1154 research. I recall seeing the minutes of the first meeting between Hawker and the RN, when it was clear to Ralph Hooper that commonality was not going to work. When I interviewed him I asked what he thought of the JSF concept of commonality. 'Not much' he said after a glance at a picture of the LM proposal, 'they will suffer terrible weight growth...'

I think the real problem is that computer aided design led to a de-skilling of designers. Hence all the trouble with people believing testing was there to validate the CAD.

Just because we have better tools does not mean that we can automatically do a better job than in the past, that's just arrogance and wishful thinking. How many VTOL airplanes did the Lockmart engineers design and build before the F-35? Reality tends to pan out regardless of our rosy predictions. At the cost of saying platitudes, there is no substitute for experience.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2014/02/f-35bs-pair-stovl-test/

 

[sferrin]

How many VTOL airplanes did the Lockmart engineers design and build before the F-35? Reality tends to pan out regardless of our rosy predictions. At the cost of saying platitudes, there is no substitute for experience.

The situation would have been the same regardless of which team was selected.

 

[sferrin]

I think the real problem is that computer aided design led to a de-skilling of designers. Hence all the trouble with people believing testing was there to validate the CAD.

I'd modify that sentiment a bit. I think the suits think that if somebody can operate a CAD system they can be a designer. Or that if they can design a washing machine that means they can design airplanes. That leads to people getting dropped into design jobs they really shouldn't be in.

 

[Triton]

"Is the F-35’s Computer R2-D2 or HAL?"
by Brendan McGarry on February 19, 2014

Source:
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/19/is-the-f-35s-computer-r2-d2-or-hal/

A recent “60 Minutes” segment on the Defense Department’s F-35 focused on some of the high-tech features of the future fighter jet.

The Pentagon’s most advanced — and most expensive — acquisition program isn’t just another stealth aircraft with angled lines and sharp contours. It’s a “flying computer,” with 24 million lines of software code and a $500,000-plus helmet-mounted display that lets pilots see through the floor of the cockpit, according to the report.

“The helmet itself is Star Wars,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, said in an interview with David Martin, a national security correspondent for CBS News. “It’s what you see in a Star Wars movie.”

The system, which includes the custom-fitted helmet and a computer that receives data from the plane’s radar, cameras and antennae, will allow pilots to see an enemy aircraft at far greater distances than today’s fighters, officials touted on the program.

But like other parts of the plane, it doesn’t always work. When the news team visited the Marine Corps station in Yuma, Ariz., for instance, “a malfunction caused a scheduled flight to be scrubbed,” according to the report. And even when it does work, some pilots reportedly complain of being bombarded with too much information.

“The new … helmets are a hoot,” Neil Jones of England wrote in a comment on the program’s website. “They made [Royal Air Force] pilots who used them dizzy, due to information overload. The night vision capability is awful, so pilots are flying virtually blind. We have swapped back to the helmet used by pilots who fly the Eurofighter.”

Arguably the most interesting footage came in an extra segment, titled “Can the F-35 be Hacked?” — with another Star Wars reference. The correspondent compared the aircraft’s automated parts-replacement system, known as the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS (pronounced “Alice”), to the film’s beloved robot, R2-D2.

“Think of ALIS as the R2-D2 of the F-35,” Martin said, “because it really does control what the F-35 can do … She looks basically like a laptop computer and the pilot carries it out to the plane and sticks it in a slot right next to him in the cockpit and that contains all the information about the mission he’s going to fly.”

The servers that process the information take up an area the size of a shipping container, Martin said. When it was given to the military, however, the system had incorrect parts numbers in the database and, as a result, has erroneously recommended grounding the aircraft, he said.

“Even though the maintenance person knew what part he needed to put on it, ALIS was telling him, ‘No, you needed this other part,’” said Air Force Col. Rod Cregier, who runs the F-35 test program, during the taping. “ALIS thinks she knows everything about the airplane. She won’t let you do anything counter to herself.”

Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle agreed. “We need to have the ability to override the algorithms that are built into that system to determine whether an aircraft is safe to fly or not,” he said during the interview. “I didn’t design ALIS. I didn’t develop ALIS. I’m trying to do everything I can to make ALIS work for us.”

The rigidity of the system invited comparisons not to the friendly robot R2 of Star Wars, but to the more menacing machine HAL 9000 of the science-fiction flick, “2001: A Space Odyssey.”

In addition, the plane’s reliance on software and information technology makes it a target for hackers, Schmidle said. “It’s kind of like you using your smart phone to do banking,” he told Martin. “You are taking a greater risk than if you walk down to the teller at the bank and say, ‘Hey, this is what I wanted to do.”

While Schmidle said he’s “confident” that the military will be able to protect the aircraft’s data networks, he also acknowledged that “it’s not going to be easy and it’s not going to happen overnight.”

Stephen Welby, the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for systems engineering, is leading a 13-member team or independent experts in reviewing the F-35’s software problems. The work is expected to be completed next month.

 

[sferrin]

Source:
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/19/is-the-f-35s-computer-r2-d2-or-hal/

I made the mistake of reading the comments section. Read like a youtube comments section without the intelligence.

 

[Mike Pryce]

I think the real problem is that computer aided design led to a de-skilling of designers. Hence all the trouble with people believing testing was there to validate the CAD.

I'd modify that sentiment a bit. I think the suits think that if somebody can operate a CAD system they can be a designer. Or that if they can design a washing machine that means they can design airplanes. That leads to people getting dropped into design jobs they really shouldn't be in.

In making key appointments to the project, the JAST office describes the previous generation of programme officials as "...war-fighters and technologists". The new teams are using these concepts to combine the best, and most affordable, technologies, to form the building blocks for future strike systems. "The JAST programme is therefore not a technology-development programme, but rather a technology-transition programme," says the JAST office. To some, however, the distinction between the two may seem vague.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/short-take-off-low-funding-27100/


Maybe that was the problem - people who can't design thinking they weren't doing development. The suits were wrong!

 

[Triton]

I think the real problem is that computer aided design led to a de-skilling of designers. Hence all the trouble with people believing testing was there to validate the CAD.

I'd modify that sentiment a bit. I think the suits think that if somebody can operate a CAD system they can be a designer. Or that if they can design a washing machine that means they can design airplanes. That leads to people getting dropped into design jobs they really shouldn't be in.

I'm confused by these comments. Are we discussing the computer-based testing of the F-35 that was supposed to decrease development time from the 60 Minutes segment? Were they overly optimistic in the capabilities of computer-based testing to uncover problems compared to real-world testing of the F-35? Isn't it more of an issue with problems with the computer simulation models and the assumptions on which they were created rather than the CAD?

 

[AeroFranz]

How many VTOL airplanes did the Lockmart engineers design and build before the F-35? Reality tends to pan out regardless of our rosy predictions. At the cost of saying platitudes, there is no substitute for experience.

The situation would have been the same regardless of which team was selected.

No question there. I was not implying the opposite.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Spud - A noble goal from four years ago. Good on them if they can get there, but to quote the more recent op.cit. in this thread:

Routine aircraft operations and maintenance aboard the carrier will change dramatically when the F-35C joins the fleet, says Burks.

The quote from 2010 and the more recent one are both correct.

The 2010 says basically that F-35s do not have to return to depot for LO maintenance and that the LO is very tough. Obviously any LO operations at sea will be different for an LO aircraft as we know that they will have to be washed more, LO treatments will have to be redone in 1-2% of maintenance ops, LO will have to be re-certified routinely, EM will likely have to be more closely monitored, etc.

 

[Mike Pryce]

All computer based design, modelling and simulation is the problem if you believe it saves real world testing.


Also, if the BAe Harrier team had been able to influence the basic concept of one of the JAST contenders I think it would have led to a better design. Unfortunately all they got to do was tweak the LM design, which they did well.


The MDC/NG/BAe design was not from the Harrier team, but the Warton based competition.

 

[mz]

In hindsight, wouldn't the most obvious thing have been just to drop the STOVL requirement altogether and either set the saved money aside for

A. some Harrier upgrade, or
B. a modest performance (subsonic) completely new aircraft with a F-135 and a lift fan?

Would it have made sense in total?

 

[sferrin]

In hindsight, wouldn't the most obvious thing have been just to drop the STOVL requirement altogether and either set the saved money aside for

A. some Harrier upgrade, or
B. a modest performance (subsonic) completely new aircraft with a F-135 and a lift fan?

Would it have made sense in total?

The Harrier line was GONE. The current Harrier fleet is such that the USMC had to scrounge retired airframes from the UK just to get the by as it is.
How does supersonic speed cost you if you're already going to use the F135 and lift fan?

 

[Mike Pryce]

In hindsight, wouldn't the most obvious thing have been just to drop the STOVL requirement altogether and either set the saved money aside for

A. some Harrier upgrade, or
B. a modest performance (subsonic) completely new aircraft with a F-135 and a lift fan?

Would it have made sense in total?

The Harrier line was GONE. The current Harrier fleet is such that the USMC had to scrounge retired airframes from the UK just to get the by as it is.
How does supersonic speed cost you if you're already going to use the F135 and lift fan?

Until about 2000 it would have been possible. A 'Harrier III' was looked at mid/late 1990s (as well as late 1980s).

A new subsonic aircraft would have been lighter & cheaper but I doubt the lift fan would make sense - just a 'direct lift' system. So maybe an even stumpier X-32, with the bugs eliminated. But still not very cheap if stealthy.

 

[quellish]

Nope. I think that system is a field deployable RCS imaging measurement facility for use in repair work. What I was referring to is a hand held tool that maintainers use to check a specific part of the LO treatment after maintenance.

I believe you have this backwards. The single system that was procured by exercising that LRIP III option appears to be a man-portable unit rather than a facility or flight line unit. I am working to get that confirmed.
Nonetheless, it is only one unit. If additional units are to be procured to support operational use, I have not found language in the procurement plan describing them.

I was referring to the complaints, ie critiques, about how the USN (and other users) should have some sort of RCS measurement tool for the F-35. When of course this is something incorporated into the project.

If this is incorporated into the project, can you point to where it is described? I have seen the plans for changes to naval platforms to support some aspects of LO sustainment such as curing the surface, secure facilities for LO work, etc. but no mention of the verification systems.

An interesting thing about the F-35 is the first time design for a LO treatment that can be sustained in operational service.

I would argue that there are several systems that meet that description that predate the F-35 considerably, but I am not here to argue.

 

[Triton]

"Why The F-35 Is The Wrong Choice for Canada – Part 1"
February 19, 2014

by Kyle Meema
Defence Watch Guest Writer

Source:
http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2014/02/19/why-the-f-35-is-the-wrong-choice-for-canada-part-1/

Intro:

The F-35 is the wrong choice for a sole-sourced replacement for Canada’s aging CF-18 fighters. It is also the wrong choice for any air force using a single plane for all its fighter needs. This is because of one simple fact: it was never designed to be used in such a way.

The F-35 was designed from the very start to be a strike aircraft; to drop bombs on enemy ground targets. It was never designed to be an air-to-air combat powerhouse. Its air-to-air combat abilities, as limited as they are, were designed for limited self-defence purposes. It was never meant to be a front-line air-to-air fighter taking Super Flankers and the T-50 head on; that was always meant to be the task of the vastly superior F-22. Gen. Michael Hostage, head of Air Combat Command and a staunch supporter of the F-35 programme, even admitted that “if I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, then the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant.”

History:

The US’s plan regarding the “stealth family” of aircraft was originally rather sensible, if expensive. The F-22 was to handle the air-to-air missions, F-35 was to handle the light air-to-ground strike missions, and the B-2 Spirit bomber was to handle the heavy air-to-ground missions.

However, this plan was dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow when the number of F-22s significantly scaled back to the point where there are simply not enough F-22s to meet America’s air-to-air needs. Originally, the USAF was to receive 750 F-22s. That number was scaled back to 381 and then later scaled back again due to its high costs. In total, a mere 186 were produced, of which only 123 are immediately available for deployment.

While the F-22 is certainly a very impressive and capable aircraft, the USAF lacks sufficient numbers to adequately meet its air superiority needs and, as a result, has had to bolster its numbers with the vastly inferior F-35.

With the death of the F-22 programme, the USAF was left with a serious problem. It had insufficient numbers of F-22s to meet its air superiority needs. Their solution, as inadequate as it was, was to hastily rebrand the F-35, their former air-to-ground strike aircraft, as an all-in-one air-superiority-capable fighter.

However, the F-35 was never designed with such a role in mind and is grossly inadequate for such use. USAF chief of staff Gen. Mark Welsh stated that air superiority was “not the original intent of the F-35 development.” Rebranding the F-35 as being capable of air-superiority missions is like taking a mid-range SUV, painting flames on the sides, and rebranding it as a Formula 1 race car. That’s not to say that the F-35 will never adequately perform its original role as a strike aircraft dropping bombs on ground targets, but it will never adequately perform its new role as a front-line air-superiority fighter.

In a 2008 RAND simulation, the U.S. was tasked with defending Taiwan from a massive Chinese air and sea attack. While the F-22 performed well, it was not present in sufficient numbers to do anything other than forestall the Chinese assault. That left F-35s to continue the fight, but were “no match for Chinese warplanes” to which they were considered “double-inferior.” In this battle, hundreds of simulated American air crews perished and Taiwan fell to China.”

From a global perspective, the lack of American F-22s and other advanced air superiority aircraft in Western air forces, should widespread F-35 procurement occurs, will be compounded by the U.S. congress banning the F-22′s export and providing the F-35 a near-total monopoly on U.S. fighter exports and acquisitions.

Countries like Japan and South Korea would jump on the chance to buy the F-22, providing additional F-22 fighters to the global “Western Community” against mutual threats such as Russia and China. Instead, such countries are left with only the F-35 if they wish to have a “stealth” fighter in their arsenal. The Western Community’s practically sole-sourced F-35 collective air force presents a global security threat as it means such nations will lack effective air-to-air combat aircraft capable of taking on present and future Russian and Chinese fighters.

However, countries like Japan and South Korea operate mixed fleets, do not intend to rely solely on the F-35, and are also developing their own state-of-the-art fighters. This approach means that such countries will have other fighters to compensate for the F-35′s serious air-to-air deficiencies. Countries like Canada, that insist on operating a single-fighter fleet, do not have that option and are left with no options when the F-35 fails to get the job done.

“The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform,” said Gen. Hostage. “It needs the F-22″ or other air-superiority fighter to deal with airborne threats; the F-35 cannot perform such missions alone.

F-35 Fails Requirements for Air-to-Air Missions:

Air-to-air combat can largely be divided into two types; air-superiority and interceptors. Both are fast and capable of flying at high altitudes, although interceptors tend to favour additional speed over the tight-turning manoeuvrability of traditional air-superiority fighters. In the Western world, dedicated interceptors seem to have fallen out of favour and their mission overlaps with air-superiority and multi-role fighters.

Thus, in Western air forces, a plane used for air-superiority missions must be fast, highly manoeuvrable, capable of flying at high altitudes, and carry a fierce arsenal of air-to-air weaponry; these are the four requirements for an effective air-superiority fighter. The F-35 fails three of these requirements outright with the forth being under question due to testing restrictions.

In this regard, the F-35 is “an inferior combatant, seriously outclassed by even older Russian and Chinese jets that can fly faster and farther and maneuver better.” It is a “dog… overweight and underpowered,” said Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Project on Governmental Oversight in Washington, D.C. It has “inferior acceleration, inferior climb [rate], inferior sustained turn capability [and] lower top speed. Can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run.”

Speed:

It is not fast. This is the chief failing of the F-35; it is slow by fighter jet standards. With a top speed of a mere Mach 1.6. it is inferior to air-superiority fighters and even the fourth generation strike and multi-role fighters it is meant to replace. To make matters worse, the F-35B and F-35C models require complex manoeuvres to accelerate to top speed which burns nearly all of its internally stored fuel, thus making even this meager speed useless.

By comparison, true air-superiority fighters can reach above Mach 2. In a world where speed is life, the F-35 is on life-support.

For example: Top speeds of air superiority fighters
- the F-22 can reach Mach 2.25

-the F-15 can reach over Mach 2.5

-the Eurofighter Typhoon can reach Mach 2

The F-35 is even slow by multi-role and strike fighter standards; the very fighters it is meant to replace.

For example: Top speeds of multi-role and strike fighters

-the F-16 can reach Mach 2

-the F-18 C/D can reach Mach 1.8

-the F-18 E/F can reach Mach 1.8

-the Dassault Rafale can reach Mach 1.8

-the Saab Gripen can reach Mach 2

The F-35 also compares very poorly to the fighters trying to shoot it down. For example:

Top Speeds of Russian and Chinese fighters

-the Su-27 and its derivatives between Mach 2 and 2.35 depending on the variant

-the T-50 PAK-FA can reach Mach 2

-the MiG-31 can reach Mach 2.83

-the J-15 can reach Mach 2.4

-J-20 and J-31 top speeds unknown

Acceleration:

Coupled with poor top speeds is the F-35′s downgraded acceleration.

According to the new relaxed requirements, it now takes the F-35A eight additional seconds to go from Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.2. The F-35B and F-35C’s acceleration rates were also reduced, adding sixteen seconds and forty-three seconds respectively.

“Every second counts” and “the longer it takes [to accelerate to supersonic speeds] the more compressed the battle space gets… that is not a good thing.”

Importance of Supercruise:

The F-35 lacks supercruise; the ability to achieve and sustain supersonic flight for long periods of time without using the fuel-consuming afterburner.

This feature is standard in current generation fighters such as the F-22, the Typhoon, the Rafale, and the Gripen. Legacy fighters, such as the F-15, F-16, and F-18 are not supercruise enabled. The F-16XL was able to achieve supercruise, but this particular variant never entered production.

To make matters worse, this feature has been standard on Russia’s fourth generation fighters for some time, such as the MiG-31 and Su-35, as well as its fearsome fifth generation fighter, the T-50 PAK-FA.

The F-35′s lack of supercruise, coupled with its poor top speed, make it inadequate for air-to-air combat. Lockeed Martin claims that the F-35 can supercruise for 150 miles at Mach 1.2.

However, this is not supercruise; this is limited supercruise. 150 miles is nothing by fighter jet standards, particularly when racing to intercept an incoming target or flee from enemy fighters. Supercruise must be sustainable for long periods of time in order to be effective and this something that the F-35 simply cannot do. It has no supercruise capability for practical purposes.

Importance of Speed:

The F-35′s low top speed also puts it at a disadvantage when using Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) missiles. This is because fighter jets rely on high speeds to give their missiles additional energy. Flying at high speeds means that the missile, when fired, is already travelling at the same high speed as the aircraft, therefore requiring less fuel and time to achieve its maximum speed.

The faster the missile is travelling, the less time the enemy has to evade, and the greater the likelihood of a successful kill. Unfortunately, BVR combat is the only area where the F-35 has any chance to successfully engage enemy fighters and even here its capability is limited.

There are only two realistic ways in which the F-35 could be effective in an air-to-air engagement. The first is to detect and fire on the enemy using BVR missiles while the enemy is still beyond visual range before fleeing. However, even this tactic is extremely risky.

Due to its slow top speed, all current and future enemy fighters could easily catch up to and shoot down the an F-35, which would be largely defenceless due to a lack of any internally stored Within-Visual-Range (WVR) missiles. The F-35 would have to rely solely on its internal gun to defend itself, but its poor manoeuvrability, discussed later, puts it at a severe, if not fatal, disadvantage.

The second tactic is for the F-35 to pick off enemy fighters who have decided to flee the battle. An enemy fighter that has spent its missile ordinance is largely defenceless, save for its gun. In such a situation, the F-35 could risk getting closer. But even here the F-35 has three key failings compounded by the fact that enemy fighters carry significantly more missiles. The first failing is that the F-35 cannot carry enough missiles to take on enemy fighters as it has only four internal hardpoints.

By contrast, the Super Flanker has fourteen hardpoints. Such a fighter, brimming with missiles, would not run out of ammunition quickly and could even fire volleys of missiles. The F-35, by contrast, cannot afford to miss its first shot. The second failing is that the F-35 cannot carry any WVR missiles in its internal weapons bay.

Even if the F-35 was in range and had a lock on an enemy fighter, it would not be equipped with any WVR missiles capable of shooting it down and would, again, have to rely solely on its gun, which would be less effective given the F-35′s poor manoeuvrability. The third failing is that all current and future enemy aircraft can simply outrun the F-35 thanks to their superior speed and escape to fight another day

In both these strategies, the F-35′s lack of speed, along with its other failings, which are discussed later, cripples its effectiveness. The significance of this limitation can be illustrated by an incident during the First Gulf War.

A pair of Iraqi MiG25s attacked a group of F-15Cs, but failed to score a kill. The F-15Cs pursued the MiG-25s, but were unable to shoot them down. The MiG-25s, due to their superior speed, simply outran the F-15Cs and the ten missiles they fired.

This illustrates the importance of top speed in terms of survivability. Being able to successfully flee the enemy is just as important as being able to successfully kill the enemy. The F-35 lacks the teeth to kill and lacks the legs to run. This also illustrates the importance of basic performance. Even though the Iraqi MiG-25s were considered technologically inferior, they still survived because of raw speed.

All the technological advantages in the world won’t help a fighter that simply doesn’t perform well at a basic level. Even if the F-35′s sensor arrays, data fusion, helmet mounted display, and other technological tools actually perform as intended, which they have yet to, it lacks this basic performance of high speed, making it, its pilot, and soldiers on the ground extremely vulnerable. It would be like taking laptop into battle against a Colt 45; the Colt 45 will always win.

 

[Triton]

"Why The F-35 Is The Wrong Choice for Canada – Part 2"
February 20, 2014

by Kyle Meema
Defence Watch Guest Writer

Source:
http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2014/02/20/why-the-f-35-is-the-wrong-choice-for-canada-part-2/

Altitude:

A fighter’s maximum altitude is an important capability. The higher an aircraft can fly, the faster it can go due to less air resistance. It also means that the aircraft can achieve faster speeds when going into a dive. When engaging enemy fighters, a higher-flying aircraft can trade altitude for speed. Likewise, a fast-flying aircraft can trade speed for altitude.

Spec-wise, altitude is the only basic requirement that the F-35 does not fail miserably. It should be able to fly up to 60, 000ft, but this has yet to be achieved due to flight-testing restrictions. Thus far, it has been tested up to 43, 000ft. To put this in perspective, the Gripen can fly at 50, 000ft and the Typhoon and F-22 can fly at 65,000ft.

However, while the F-35 should be able to fly at sufficient altitudes, this has yet to be achieved even though it was supposed to be fully operational and combat ready by now. There is no guarantee that the 60, 000ft ceiling will ever be reached. Even if it is reached, altitude alone does not sufficiently compensate for its other deficiencies, such as low top speed, lack of supercruise, and limited payload capacity/compatibility.

Manoeuvrability:

Like the F-35′s other flaws, its lack of manoeuvrability lies in its inherent design and compounded by its lack of thrust. Its small wings results in poor wing-loading and therefore poor manoeuvrability comparable to the level of a 1960s F-105.

Its wide, high-drag design means that it is incapable of generating the excess thrust in order to compensate. Wing loading refers to the weight of the aircraft divided by the area of its wings. The lower the wing loading ratio, the greater manoeuvrability the aircraft possesses

Wing Loading

-F-22: 313.5kg per square metre

-F-35A: 428kg per square metre

-Gripen E: 317kg per square metre

-Typhoon: 311kg per square metre

-Rafale C: 328kg per square metre

-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: 620kg per square metre

From these numbers, it is apparent that dedicated air-superiority fighters and air-superiority-capable multi-role fighters should have a wing loading just over 300kg per square metre.

However, the F-35 and the Super Hornet are not designed for air-superiority as their primary mission and thus have very high wing loading numbers. They are, at heart, strike fighters. Strike fighters are designed to carry bombs, not pull tight, fast, high G turns. The aircraft with wing loading numbers of air-superiority fighters such as the Typhoon can manoeuvre significantly better than aircraft with high wing loading numbers, such as strike fighters like the F-35.

Thrust-to-weight ratios also is the amount of thrust divided by the weight of the aircraft. A high thrust to weight ratio means that the aircraft produces a large amount of thrust compared to its weight.

A low thrust to weight ratio means that the aircraft produces little thrust compared to its weights. Air-superiority fighters have high thrust to weight ratios because it means they have extra thrust to maintain speed when making tight manoeuvres.

Thrust-to-weight ratios

-F22: 1,2

-F-35A: 0.83

-Gripen 0.94,

-Typhoon: 1,18

-Rafale: 1,13

-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: 0,93

Again, a pattern emerges. Air-superiority fighters such as the F-22 and Typhoon have high thrust-to-weight ratios whereas strike fighters, such as the F-35A and Super Hornet, have low thrust-to-weight ratios. Air-superiority fighters require large amounts of thrust in order to stay nimble in the air.

The F-35, however, lacks such thrust. The F-35′s deficiencies all compound one another, thus making a fighter that is worse than the sum of its parts.

The F-35 design also lacks the features that other fighters employ. Fighters such as the F-22, Su-35, and T-50 use vectored thrust in order to produce enhanced manoeuvrability. Fighters such as the Gripen, Rafale, and Typhoon all use canards coupled with tail-heavy and inherently unstable designs that greatly increase manoeuvrability and are managed by flight-control computers.

Three-dimensional thrust vectoring as been rumoured to be a feature that will be added to Tranche Three Typhoons, adding to its already impressive manoeuvrability.

Such features can add to the nimbleness of a fighter in the air and can also help compensate for poor wing-loading or thrust-to-weight numbers. The only variant of the F-35 to employ any such features is the F-35B with its thrust vectoring. However, the F-35B uses limited thrust vectoring in order to facilitate its short-take-off-vertical-landing (STOVL) ability and provides no use in combat manoeuvres because thrust can only be vectored 90 degrees straight down.

This need for STOVL in the F-35B also means the F-35 does not and cannot use an inherently unstable design to increase manoeuvrability. Because the F-35 seeks to maintain commonality, all three F-35 models have had their manoeuvrability crippled by the severe design compromises that have been made in order to make the F-35B model achieve STOVL. In terms of its ability to manoeuvre, the F-35 is the worst fighter Canada could opt for. One Typhoon test pilot said there is “no way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat.”

If poor wing-loading and thrust-to-weight numbers were not bad enough, the U.S. Department of Defence has had to consistently lower the F-35′s performance requirements in order to meet the significant limitations of the aircraft. For example, the F-35A’s sustained g’s rating was reduced from 5.3 sustained Gs to 4.6 sustained Gs.

The F-35B was lowered from 5 sustained Gs to 4.5 sustained Gs and the F-35C was reduced from 5.1 sustained Gs to 5 sustained Gs. To put this in perspective, the F-35′s sustained G performance is “the equivalent of an F-4 or F-5… [it is] certainly not anywhere near the performance of most fourth and fifth generation aircraft.”

This limitation has been described as “an embarrassment” with “obvious tactical implications.” At high altitudes, the inability to sustain high Gs reduces survivability of high altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and at low altitude makes the aircraft more vulnerable to short-range SAMS and anti-aircraft fire.

Weapons:

The F-35 lacks the teeth to meet the air-to-air threats or today and tomorrow. The menu of armaments for non-stealth aircraft is quite broad. Virtually anything can be loaded under the wings or on the body provided the aircraft has enough thrust to get it off the ground, including air-launched cruise missiles. However, stealth aircraft suffer from severe size restrictions due to the limited space available in their internal weapons bays.

This limits the size and number of weapons that can be carried internally. While weapons can be mounted externally, this defeats the purpose of having a stealth fighter in the first place. In the world of air-superiority, a pilot needs every edge possible. F-35 pilots will have to sacrifice additional weapons in order to maximise what dubious stealth they have.

There are three significant failings suffered by the F-35 that cripple its air-to-air capability from a weapons standpoint. The first is the limited number of weapons it can carry in its internal weapons bay. The F-35 can only carry four missiles internally. That is a laughably small payload, particularly when compared to the F-22 with its eight internal pylons and the T-50′s ten internal pylons.

Proponents claim that the F-35′s limited internal weapons capacity is redressed by an increase in speed and stealth due to “flying clean;” not carrying weapons under the wings. However, the extra thrust generated by its competitors compensates for the extra drag, making the “flying clean” speed gains minimal; capped by an already inadequate top speed and poor acceleration as discussed above.

The second failing is the limited size of weapons it can carry in its internal weapons bay. For example, it cannot carry the MBDA Meteor BVR missile, the most advanced BVR missile in the Western world, as it simply does not fit in the F-35′s internal weapons bay. Given how heavily the F-35 will have to rely on BVR combat in order to stand a chance against modern and future airborne threats, it will need the best BVR weapons available.

Modifying the Meteor’s tail fins has been proposed, but no action has thus far been taken. As such, the F-35 is only equipped to carry the AMRAAM BVR missile. The Meteor is the best BVR missile on the market and if the F-35 has to do without it will further lower its already small chances of surviving an encounter with fourth or fifth generation enemy fighters.

The third failing is that it cannot carry any WVR missiles internally, such as the Sidewinder stocked by Canada; its standard air-to-air load out being four internal AMRAAM BVR missiles. This means that its only hope so scoring a missile kill against an enemy fighter would be using a BVR weapon. Within visual range, the F-35′s only offensive capability is its gun, but the likelihood of a successful kill using the gun is limited by the F-35′s poor manoeuvrability. Going into a situation without WVR weapons where enemy fighters are present is practically suicidal.

Of particular importance is the IRIS-T infrared WVR missile which is capable of intercepting incoming missiles from all directions, even from behind. The IRIS-T will become essential for modern Western air forces in the future, particularly as a countermeasure for Russia’s new AESA radar-guided missile which cannot be avoided, like most missiles before it, by making a sudden sharp turn at the last second. As such, a fourth generation fighter equipped with the IRIS-T would have a significantly higher rate of survivability due to this missile-interception ability.

The only WVR missile the F-35 is planned to be able to carry internally is the ASRAAM IR.

However, like the Meteor, it has yet to be integrated or tested. Particularly troubling is that only the British RAF are likely to use the ASRAAM IR. Given the F-35′s many unresolved issues, it will likely be a long time, if ever, before the ASRAAM or Meteor are fully compatible with the F-35′s systems. While this may slightly assuage the fears of the unfortunate RAF pilots who are to fly the F-35, it is of little comfort to other pilots and air forces worldwide. Coupled with their better base performance and greater missile compatibility and capacity, the very fourth generation fighters the F-35 is meant to replace would have a better chance against current and future threats than the F-35.

 

[SOC]

...the hell is that guy on?

1. "Within visual range, the F-35′s only offensive capability is its gun"...or not. First off, points deducted for not mentioning that the B and C might not even be carrying the gun, since it's podded for them. To the point, though, AMRAAM can be fired as a WVR weapon, even active right off the rail.

2. "The Meteor is the best BVR missile on the market and if the F-35 has to do without it will further lower its already small chances of surviving an encounter with fourth or fifth generation enemy fighters."...ignorance of first-shot, first-kill, check. Low RCS in FCS-band wavelengths means the F-35 will likely be able to pop an AMRAAM at a non-LO 4th-gen fighter before the target has any clue what's happening. How that amounts to a small chance of survival is beyond me. Furthermore, AMRAAM growth versions may be just as capable as the yet-to-be-operational Meteor.

3. "The F-35 can only carry four missiles internally."...meh, no points deducted for being ignorant of CUDA, since who knows if that thing ever gets funded to service. But points deducted for being ignorant of LockMart's efforts to upgun the internal AMRAAM capacity to six, although that might not be funded either?

4. "At high altitudes, the inability to sustain high Gs reduces survivability of high altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)"...no, it's size makes it a target for strat SAMs, not it's G-loading. If a modern SAM gets to endgame on you, meaning your ECM didn't work, you couldn't notch the radar, etc., you're pretty much toast anyway due to big-ass warheads, directional warheads, HTK warheads, obnoxious maneuverability, and other fun factors.

5. Wing loading, t/w ratios...things are more complex than simply comparing a list of numbers.

6. "In a world where speed is life, the F-35 is on life-support."...or not. How many of those fighters spend a lot of time at anything close to max speed? Here's a hint, two. The Raptor (at least in theory during combat), and the MiG-31. Everybody else, once you stick weapons on them, they become largely subsonic platforms.

7. "Countries like Japan and South Korea would jump on the chance to buy the F-22"...that's nice. Welcome to ten years ago. There is no more Raptor production capability, so such comments are a) made in ignorance of the real situation, and b) useless to the argument and a possible indicator of the bias inherent in the writer.

8. "A fighter’s maximum altitude is an important capability. The higher an aircraft can fly, the faster it can go due to less air resistance. It also means that the aircraft can achieve faster speeds when going into a dive. When engaging enemy fighters, a higher-flying aircraft can trade altitude for speed. Likewise, a fast-flying aircraft can trade speed for altitude."...maximum altitude is something else rarely exploited in actual combat. Plus, higher altitude doesn't always translate to higher speed. Furthermore, the REAL benefit to high speed and high altitude is that you impart far more kE to a BVR AAM, giving it greatly expanded range.

9. "The third failing is that it cannot carry any WVR missiles internally...The only WVR missile the F-35 is planned to be able to carry internally is the ASRAAM."...well, which one is it? No WVR internally, or the ASRAAM?

10. "The first is the limited number of weapons it can carry in its internal weapons bay."...this, combined with stealth, makes it possible to penetrate legacy IADS components, blow up said legacy SAM systems and sensors, and not need a huge supporting cast to do it. Then you can address the next one...

11. "However, stealth aircraft suffer from severe size restrictions due to the limited space available in their internal weapons bays."...and once you don't need the stealth capability, you add the pylons and go to town on what's left with a far greater variety of weapons to mess with.

12. "In a 2008 RAND simulation, the U.S. was tasked with defending Taiwan from a massive Chinese air and sea attack. While the F-22 performed well, it was not present in sufficient numbers to do anything other than forestall the Chinese assault. That left F-35s to continue the fight, but were “no match for Chinese warplanes” to which they were considered “double-inferior.” In this battle, hundreds of simulated American air crews perished and Taiwan fell to China.”"...and all of that is irrelevant given the saturation bombing by conventional ballistic missiles that would be the precursor to such a large-scale conflict. Neither F-35s nor F-22s can fly when scattered in pieces on the ground.

13. "Rebranding the F-35 as being capable of air-superiority missions is like taking a mid-range SUV, painting flames on the sides, and rebranding it as a Formula 1 race car."...or like grabbing the first numbers you find, ignoring half the data, and drawing inaccurate conclusions allows someone to be rebranded an expert instead of a typist.

I've got no use for the thing, personally (unless there's a VTOL SUV version), given that there are systems in mass production that are able to find the idea of mid-scale LO platforms hilarious, and it represents technological overkill given the kinds of places we've actually got the nuts to actively fight, but if you're going to go on a rant about how it's just the worst thing ever, at least maintain some degree of integrity and actually do your damn job. For one, it makes people with actual logic-based arguments sound like morons as the whole anti-F-35 crowd gets lumped together with these jackholes, and secondly, it makes you look like a complete buffoon professionally when something so error-ridden is released with your name on it.

In the "anti-F-35" community, geniuses like this are basically the equivalent of Westboro Baptist or 9/11 truthers.

And guess what? There's a part 3 on Friday! MOAR FUN!!!111!1!1

Also, just to clarify: all of that is directed at the guy who wrote the articles.

 

[quellish]

Quellish - I thought CLOVerS was dead and buried:

For the purposes of the discussion I am using CLOVerS as a representative flight line RCS verification system because it's reasonable to think that readers have some familiarity with it. CLOVerS never truly died though, it lived on in other programs (as stated in the R2 you linked to).

Generally: The goal for F-35 has been to develop coatings/finishes that avoid the need for in-service RCS verification (by radar) between scheduled depot visits - because (see "CLOVerS, demise of") no way has been found to do it that is not burdensome and costly. The RCS is deemed within margins unless there is visible damage, which can then be physically checked against an effects-of-defects database.*
Apparently this doesn't consider external pollutants such as salt. Those have to be washed off.

Right. That makes a washing a LO maintenance task that would have required verification in previous programs, to verify that the washing did actually restore the signature rather than increase it, etc. The "effects of defects database" is the ALIS component for signature estimation that is explicitly not to be used in for mission planning.
After much study, money, and man hours the F-22 program (among other things) increased their signature verification capabilities. They do more on the ground verification in addition to flight test verification. It works, but flight tests are not very scalable because of the ground assets required.

An F-22 and RQ-170 flying in close proximity to that asset does make for a pretty - if fuzzy - picture though.

 

[SOC]

Here's part 3:

"Why The F-35 Is The Wrong Choice for Canada – Part 2"
February 20, 2014

by Kyle Meema
Defence Watch Guest Writer

http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2014/02/21/why-the-f-35-is-the-wrong-choice-for-canada-part-3/

Limitations of Stealth:


However, even its stealth advantage is highly questionable and would likely offer little advantage. Stealth offers reduced detection, not invisibility. Even the F-22, an air-to-air fighter so superior to the F-35 that it defies comparison, has been shot down in exercises by non-stealthy aircraft, such as the Typhoon, Rafale, and F-18G “Growler” Electronic Warfare fighter. The F-117 Nighthawk was shot down over Serbia by a Soviet era SAM system as its stealth did not hide it from RADAR scanning in longer wavelengths. The F-35 itself is not even particularly stealthy by stealth standards, receiving a Low Observable designation instead of the Very Low Observable Designation of its superior cousin , the F-22.

The F-35′s limited stealth is further compromised by advances in detection technology. Infrared and RADAR detection is advancing all the time. In particular, the F-35, as with most stealth aircraft, are designed to be stealthy in X-band RADAR. However, as the Serbians discovered, stealth aircraft are much more easily detected when scanning in other wavelengths. Russia has already integrated this into the T-50, which comes equipped with L-band and X-band radar.

Thus, the F-35′s already questionable stealth advantage is constantly being eroded. As stealth becomes more common, so too will the advances in counter-stealth detection systems specifically designed to hunt them down, such as SMART-L Radar. The F-35 is also incredibly loud, much more so than the F-15. This sharp increase in noise makes the F-35 more susceptible to detection through auditory means. To make matters worse, passive radar threatens to render stealth aircraft entirely obsolete.

Sensors and Data Fusion:

Like altitude, the F-35′s specs are impressive in terms of sensors and data fusion. With Active-Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, helmet mounted display Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOST), and Distributed Aperture System (DAS). However, there are two large caveats that come with this impressive sensor suite. The first is that it assumes that this sensor suite works probably.

Given the F-35′s list of technical troubles this is a very legitimate concern. For example, the software problems with the U.S. Marines F-35B have raised the possibility of a thirteen-month delay of the Block 2B software. The second is that similar, though admittedly not as advanced, systems are standard on other aircraft already in production and have been proven to work properly. The Gripen and Rafale both boast AESA radar and the Typhoon will receive AESA radar in Tranche 3. All three have helmet mounted display systems and Electro-Optical Targeting Systems (EOTS).

While proponents of the F-35 would praise the F-35′s sensor suite, it is not so significant an improvement over existing and working sensor systems already deployed on other fighters to make a serious difference on the battle field. This is of little comfort since these technological improvements do not nearly compensate enough for the F-35′s other glaring deficiencies

Testing Limitations and Problems:

The F-35 operates under a protective testing bubble specifically designed not to push the aircraft to its limits. While the F-35 has flown a good many hours, it is not being pushed to its limits and has failed its original operational requirements. Instead of designing the fighter to operational requirement, the USAF’s solution to this problem is to lower the operational requirements according to the F-35′s limitations.
Despite being seven years overdue, the F-35, as of March 6, 2013, had yet to
-Descend at rates more than 6,000ft per minute
-achieve airspeed above Mach 0.9 (supposed to achieve Mach 1.6)
-Angle-of-attack beyond -5 and +18 degrees (supposed to achieve +50)
-Fly at night
-Fly in weather
-Use simulated weapons
-Use real weapons
-Use rapid stick or rudder movements
-Perform air-to-air tracking manoeuvres
-Perform air-to-ground tracking manoeuvres
-Perform mid-air refuelling
-Fly within 25 miles of lightening
-Use electronic countermeasures
-Use anti-jamming systems
-Use secure communication systems
-Use datalink systems
-Use electro-optical targeting system
-Use distributed aperture system to detect targets or threats
-Use Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system
-Use helmet mounted display as pilot’s primary reference
-Use air-to-air or air-to-ground radar for Electronic Attack Mode, Sea Search Mode, Ground Moving Targets Mode, or Close-In Air Combat Mode

Cost:

The cost of a fighter is a vital piece of information. Regardless of a fighter’s capability, it is useless if it is too expensive to fly. This is a lesson the USAF learned with the F-22 due to its high initial procurement and operating costs, which was the reason for the programme’s untimely demise. RAND has reported that the F-35′s costs are so high that it would have been less expensive to build three separate planes; each tailored to the user’s specific needs.

That would have been highly desirable as it would have meant that a capable and effective fighter could have been produced at all, let alone at a lower price tag. The saddest part of this finding is that it defeats the reason why the F-35 was developed to begin with; to have a low-cost and effective fighter. To make matters worse, the goal of 80% commonality between the three variants was never achieved, with 2008 estimates showing between 27% and 43% commonality.

Initial “Flyaway” Cost
-F22: $218 million per plane
-F-35: as of 2014, $188.5 million per plane
-Gripen E: approximately $50 million per plane
-Typhoon: $199 million per plane
-Rafale C: $94.5 million per plane
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: $65 million per plane

The sticker price of a fighter is the obvious figure to place importance on. However, when it comes to fighter jets, the operating costs are, in fact, far more important.

Operating Costs Per-Flight Hour:

-F22: $61, 000
-F-35A: $21, 000
-Gripen E: below $5000
-Typhoon: $18, 000
-Rafale C: $16, 500
-F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: $11, 000
The Saab Gripen E is the clear winner in terms of costs. About three Gripen Es could be bought for less than one F-35A. Air forces could also operate four Gripen Es for every one F-35A.

F-35′s Fatal Flaw:


The F-35′s fatal flaw lies in the shoehorning of STOVL capability into the F-35B model for the U.S. Marines. The original X-35 design had serious potential to be the fighter the F-35 claims yet completely fails to be. The F-35B is to take off on short runways and land vertically (STOVL). While building a “universal” fighter to meet all needs is incredibly difficult, the addition of the STOVL requirement added even more unreasonable expectations of one design and crippled the F-35.

In order to incorporate STOVL capability onto the F-35 design while still maintaining stealth, internal weapons bays, and supersonic flight, severe design compromises had to be made.

The area behind the pilot was reserved for a lift-fan to work in conjunction with a downward-swivelling rear thrust nozzle. In order to incorporate this system, the airframe had to be very wide; much wider than the “area rule,” which dictates that a narrow fuselage delivers the best aerodynamics, would deem desirable.

This unusual width makes the F-35 experience higher than normal drag which negatively impacts, acceleration, speed, fuel efficiency, and range. To make matters worse, the lift-fan means that the pilot is unable to see behind the aircraft, a severe disadvantage when engaging enemy aircraft and a fatal flaw that can and will get pilots killed.

The F-35 attempts to compensate for this lack of visibility by incorporating a helmet mounted display system that allows the pilot see a virtual image of what is around the aircraft. However, this is inadequate as it is much lower resolution than the human eye and generally inadequate for detecting distant or low-contrast objects. To make matters worse, this helmet mounted display system, as inadequate as it is, is far from being ready for testing, let alone being fully functional and combat-ready.

The lift-fan area takes up so much space that it meant that the plane could only have a single engine, decreasing maximum thrust and therefore speed and payload capacity, which would not necessarily cripple the plane were the F-35 not so overly heavy.

The STOVL requirement also necessitated the F-35 have smaller wings that provide less lift and negatively impact the performance of the aircraft. Worse yet, these elements of the F-35 cannot be altered because it would decrease the commonality among the three variants and thus drive costs even higher.

The F-35A and F-35C cannot make use of the lift-fan space for more/bigger internal weapons bays or another engine; it is used simply as a fuel tank.

However, further compromises had to be made in order to incorporate the STOVL ability desired so much by the U.S. Marines. To keep the aircraft light enough to achieve STOVL, safety equipment was removed and parts of the fuselage were made thinner and less durable, making all three variants much more dangerous to fly. According to the Pentagon, “elimination of 11 pounds’ worth of valves and fuses made the [F-35] 25-percent more likely to be destroyed when struck by enemy fire.”

The decreased durability of the airframe also means that the lifespan of the aircraft will likely be much shorter than its predecessors and contemporaries, which, in the end, may turn out to be ironically desirable.

Conclusion: Failure-35

Any one of the F-35′s failings by itself would not necessarily, by itself, render the aircraft utterly unfit for air-to-air combat. It is the combination of problems that make it unfit; each compounding the limits of the others to the point of total ineffectualness.

If it were significantly faster and had supercruise, then the payload and manoeuvrability limitations would be mitigated. However, the F-35′s deficiencies keep adding up until one incredibly expensive and remarkably un remarkable mess remains. It has “inferior acceleration, inferior climb[rate], inferior sustained turn capacity…[and] lower top speed. Can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run.” said a leaked war game summary by RAND, a think tank with close ties to the USAF.

The only thing 5th Generation about the F-35 is its price tag. Any government purchasing the F-35 as a sole sourced fighter is reckless with its sovereignty and the safety of its soldiers, citizens, and allies and is wilfully blind to its deficiencies.

For such countries, purchasing the F-35 is nothing short of negligent. The F-35 is seven years behind schedule and fifty years behind the rest of the fighter world. It doesn’t matter how much production issues improve or flight testing progresses or costs go down. The F-35 was simply never designed to fill the air-superiority role, the U.S. Air Force said as much. It tries to do too much and consequently fails at just about everything.

 

[sferrin]

Hmmm. . .on "Cost" they neglected to add in all the extra gear any 4th gen jets would require just to survive. Wonder why they did that.

 

[bobbymike]

Hmmm. . .on "Cost" they neglected to add in all the extra gear any 4th gen jets would require just to survive. Wonder why they did that.

I like where he says, 'The area of the lift fan (35A,C) cannot be used for weapons but 'simply' for fuel. Extra fuel who needs it?

I could imagine this from the same author, 'They jammed extra weapons where the F-35B lift fan would be and NOW the F-35A, C range is too short to be an effective fighter'

 

[Triton]

I like where he says, 'The area of the lift fan (35A,C) cannot be used for weapons but 'simply' for fuel. Extra fuel who needs it?

I could imagine this from the same author, 'They jammed extra weapons where the F-35B lift fan would be and NOW the F-35A, C range is too short to be an effective fighter'

I'm surprised that Kyle Meema didn't mention that the F-35A uses boom refueling rather than the probe-and-drogue refueling offered by the five Airbus CC-150 Polaris tranport/tankers in the Royal Canadian Air Force fleet. Though Canadians have probably realized that the F-35A can be ordered with probe-and-drogue refueling.