The F-35 Discussion Topic (No Holds Barred II)

[Triton]

The "Export Safe" aspects of the F-35 are in relation to it's avionics and not it's materials.


This is the reason why it would cost so much to make the F-22 "Export Safe", it's avionics would need a complete redesign.

[Loren]Thompson of the Lexington Institute said Feb. 14 [2006] that defense and State officials, and lawmakers in Congress, are likely to remain hesitant to export three key F-22A systems: its electronic architecture; "aspects of its low-observable" technologies; and its next-generation data links, such as the Tactical Targeting Networking Technology waveform system.

Source:
http://defence.pk/threads/plan-to-export-f-22.1050/

 

[Triton]

"Back To Basics for F-35"
by Bill Sweetman | ShowNews

Jun 18, 2015

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/paris-air-show-2015/back-basics-f-35

Weapons and upgrades could define the next era for the worldwide fighter market.

As Lockheed Martin (Chalet 316, Static C2) and the Pentagon attempt over the next year or so to assemble a three-year block buy of 400-500 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, potential customers will be looking for firm definition behind the much-redefined Block 4 upgrade process, which will define all the capabilities that the F-35 will have between now and 2027.

This long-range planning is essential for JSF, because the program is large and weapon and system integration issues are unique. From the very start of the project, it has been a given that all aircraft in the worldwide fleet will be upgraded concurrently, so as to avoid having a multiplicity of configurations.

This one-size-fits-all approach will in theory be the result of consensus among the customer community, but in practice will be dominated by the U.S., which will be signing the biggest single check. It presents a dilemma: how can you put as many upgrades and improvements on the schedule as possible to meet today’s national desires, while leaving capacity to change plans as new technologies and threats emerge?

Another delicate balance concerns the timing of improvements. In Wednesday’s ShowNews (p. 46), I wrote about the rapidly improving technology of electro-optical targeting, including hyperspectral systems that fuse midwave infrared (IR), shortwave IR and color video to give the pilot the best available picture. All of this has appeared since the F-35 was designed, so its current midwave-IR-only electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) looks a little dated, and will be even more so when the JSF is ready for export customers.

This issue has been recognized, and an Advanced EOTS is being designed with sharper, multi-spectral sensors and new processors. It should cut into production in Block 4, and according to Lockheed Martin is a top priority for many users. But this does not necessarily help to sell a lot of Block 3 aircraft: if Block 4 is going to include such a significant improvement, why not stretch out the lives of your existing fighters and delay F-35 deliveries?

It is sensors and weapons that make a fighter flexible and give it longevity – the latter not measured by airframe life, but by how long it can remain effective against evolving targets and threats. As well as targeting pods, this year’s show features a new generation of air-to-air missiles (AAMs): MBDA’s formidable (if costly) Meteor, four of which arm the Rafale M in the static display, and Rafael’s I-Derby Extended Range.

The I-Derby ER is worth a few words because it is the opposite of the F-35 upgrade strategy: cheap, fast and easy to integrate. Rafael has updated Derby with its own RF seeker technology – the current Derby has an Israel Aerospace Industries seeker developed in the 1990s – and the multi-pulse motor experience from the Barak 8 naval air defense system and David’s Sling. Rafael has removed the Derby’s electro-optical fuze and built the function into the radar, which frees up 50 cm of length for propellant. Between that and the pulsed motor, this “almost doubles” the range, Rafael says.

If you already have Derby or an aircraft that can fire Derby, integrating the ER is easy – it is exactly the same shape as the earlier version. But if you want a longer-range AAM on the F-35, you have no options today. Sometime in Block 4 you may get Meteor or the AIM-120D version of the Advanced Medium Range AAM. Raytheon (Chalet 296, Static B10) people sometimes talk about AIM-120D in “it’s so good that it’s very secret” terms, but consistent evidence says it still has the AIM-120C7 motor, and there is only so much that you can do with the kinematics at that point.

In the wider competitive picture, France has done a creditable job since the early 2000s of sticking to its timeline for Rafale upgrades, including the deployment of a full range of weapons, and new targeting and reconnaissance pods from Thales (Chalet 263, Static B1, Hall Corcorde 39). Saab has shown an ability to integrate payloads faster and at less cost than its competitors – including U.S. weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb – and after a good deal of foot-dragging, the four Eurofighter nations have recognized that Typhoon needs a full range of weapons and systems and have put some money behind that intention.

The F-16 could be a lesson for Team F-35. Various F-16 customers paid for a series of improvements that the U.S. did not want, or did not want at the time: the F-16D’s expanded dorsal spine, conformal fuel tanks, two-way satcoms and a number of active electronic warfare systems, not to mention almost every weapon in the Western inventory. That seems to have worked out quite well.

 

[Triton]

"Opinion: Time To Define The F-35 Upgrade Plan"
F-35 upgrades need more clarity
by Bill Sweetman

Jun 5, 2015

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-time-define-f-35-upgrade-plan

Two years ago, the Pentagon set initial operational capability (IOC) dates for all three versions of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Those dates may be adhered to, but some capabilities may be missing. Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, director of the Air Force’s F-35 integration office, said in late May that there are hardware and software items—all unspecified and some classified—that are running late, so the IOC requirement may have to be amended.

This is not a disaster, but it is not good news at a point where the JSF team is trying to chivvy international partners into a multiyear, multinational block buy starting in 2018. It highlights concerns with the future of the F-35’s through-life upgrade program.

The first post-IOC upgrade, Block 4, has changed shape twice in less than two years. The original plan was to roll out numbered block upgrades at two-year intervals. Early in 2014, Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, director of the JSF program office, disclosed that Block 4 would be split into Block 4A and 4B, the latter reaching IOC in 2024—so that anything post-Block 4 would have to wait until 2026.

Apparently, some customers had a problem with this. A new plan was unveiled this spring, dividing Block 4 into four segments, 4.1 through 4.4. Block 4.1, mostly software, arrives in late 2019, two years earlier than 4A would have done—but it seems likely that it will include overspill from Block 3F. Block 4.4 is due for IOC in mid-2025.

The idea is to “accelerate incremental capabilities,” according to a program document. The Pentagon and its partners have many requirements and desires between now and 2027, and a process has been put in place to prioritize them. Common items take precedence over customer-unique upgrades unless the program’s Joint Executive Steering Board decrees otherwise. Priorities include anti-surface warfare, with the AGM-154C-1 net-enabled version of the Joint Standoff Weapon, and moving-target attack with the laser-guided version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition. Block 4 also includes the B61-12 nuclear bomb.

There is a long list of other new weapons: cruise missiles from Norway and Turkey, and Britain’s three-phase Selective Precision Effects At Range (Spear) project. The U.K. wants two new MBDA air-to-air missiles (AAM): Meteor and a new version of the Advanced Short-Range AAM.

But the presentation warns that “weapon integration requests are likely to exceed capacity,” even though budget documents show that the Pentagon plans to spend around $700 million annually on JSF research and development as the original development phase winds down. That does not include follow-on development funds from international partners. That makes Block 4 a $5 billion-plus program, which ought to be enough to cover most upgrade needs.

Air Force acquisition chief Bill LaPlante also appears to think the upgrade money could be spent more smartly. He has floated the idea of moving toward open architecture in Block 4, with a view to opening Block 5 to competition. Boeing’s defense boss Chris Chadwick doubts whether that will work. Any incumbent, he believes, should have enough of an advantage to beat challengers in a fair competition.

Consider, too, the history of the F-35’s sibling, the F-22 Raptor. A decade ago, when the F-22 was approaching IOC, the contractor and customer expected that the jet would be modernized quickly. By 2012, the Block 40 Global Strike Enabler was to be in service, with added radar side arrays, powerful electronic attack capabilities and two-way satcoms.

But even with $5 billion in R&D over the last decade, none of this has been done. Operational F-22s still cannot communicate, other than by voice radio, with anything except another F-22, and they are only just moving beyond the obsolescent AIM-9M Sidewinder AAM. Early production F-22s are not due to be brought up to fully operational standards until the 2020s.

The F-22 and F-35 have some strong similarities when it comes to upgrades. Both are stealthy, which makes it more difficult to add or replace a radio-frequency or electro-optical aperture. Both have a systems architecture that leans heavily on a central integrated processor, with the subsystems as peripherals. That has its advantages but means a dedicated development program for each sensor upgrade rather than just porting technology from another aircraft. Above all, both have shown a big appetite for regression testing—the process of making sure that a change or fix to one system has not resulted in a failure in another—which has been the biggest drag on F-22 upgrade efforts.

The F-35 program office is busy with the path to IOC. But it is vitally important, after a year of changed definitions and some confusion, to define an efficient plan for post-IOC development.

 

[quellish]

"Export safe" could mean almost anything. Maybe the materials are more difficult to reverse engineer. Maybe it's because, due to the more durable nature of the F-35s materials, a user wouldn't have to have a bunch of sensitive materials, knowledge, facilities, etc. on hand to maintain the RCS. Certainly I wouldn't dismiss the statement of a pilot who has experience in both the F-22 and F-35 out of hand with no actual evidence to support doing so.

The F-22 (and B-2, and F-117) requires a base "silver coat" of conductive material under it's RF and IR absorbing upper coats. All aircraft that have RAM require conductive bottom layer. On the F-22 this has been a major pain point for many reasons, not the least of which is how easily the silver coat has degraded under real world use. This is the layer that typically requires conductive tapes, fillers, and putty to "spot fix". Because it is the lowest or deepest coat this can be labor intensive.


The F-35 employs "Fiber Mat" for this purpose. "Fiber Mat" is a class of composite materials that have conductive elements incorporated into them. The use of "Fiber Mat" is intended to solve the issues of maintaining the silver coat of an aircraft. The aircraft still requires conductive materials for seams and spot fixes, and it still requires additional layers of RF and IR absorbing material to maintain its signature. These layers are basically the same materials and processes that are used on the F-22 today.


The F-35 still requires LO maintence though "Fiber Mat" is intended to address the biggest pain point of maintaining LO signatures. RF and IR absorbing layers still require maintence, curing, troubleshooting, etc. The F-35 requires secure spaces and climate controlled hanger areas - much like some other systems.

To be honest, I don't. On the one hand the F-22 was designed for the lowest RCS they could get and still attempt to meet all the other requirements. On the other hand it's unlikely that RCS reduction technology at LM didn't advance during the time between the F-22's design being frozen and the F-35's.

It would make sense to compare the "RCS" of the YF-22 and YF-23. They were designed to meet the same requirements. Same mission. Same threat frequencies, polarization, etc.


It would not make sense to compare the "RCS" of the F-22 and the F-35. Or the B-2. Or the F-117. "RCS" numbers are meaningless at that point. Pick a random number.

I could see it going either way but I'd prefer numbers by those who actually know rather than speculation to settle it. (Though it's unlikely they'd be so kind as to give us the hard numbers. )

The radar cross section of an object is governed by well known physical law. Anyone with access to a personal computer manufactured in the last ~15 years can calculate the radar cross section of even a complex object with a high degree of fidelity. If the effort expended discussing the "RCS" was directed at calculating the *actual* values.... who knows what may happen.

 

[kcran567]

The "Export Safe" aspects of the F-35 are in relation to it's avionics and not it's materials.


This is the reason why it would cost so much to make the F-22 "Export Safe", it's avionics would need a complete redesign.

Would Japan or Israel be able to improve the f-22 or f-35 avionics perhaps even if they were downgraded?

And is there a plan in place regarding the coating degredation that will occur in real world combat operations.

 

[sferrin]

The radar cross section of an object is governed by well known physical law. Anyone with access to a personal computer manufactured in the last ~15 years can calculate the radar cross section of even a complex object with a high degree of fidelity. If the effort expended discussing the "RCS" was directed at calculating the *actual* values.... who knows what may happen.

Sure, if you're just talking about the physical shape and nothing more. Without knowing the composition and configuration of the RAM/RAS it's just a SWAG though.

 

[quellish]

Sure, if you're just talking about the physical shape and nothing more. Without knowing the composition and configuration of the RAM/RAS it's just a SWAG though.

1. Physical shape is always the dominant factor driving RCS by a VERY wide margin.
2. RAM is applied to mitigate scattering sources.
3. RAM has well known physical limitations. Even ideal RAM can only do so much.
D. Resonant cavities.


So, nope.

 

[Avimimus]

The radar cross section of an object is governed by well known physical law. Anyone with access to a personal computer manufactured in the last ~15 years can calculate the radar cross section of even a complex object with a high degree of fidelity. If the effort expended discussing the "RCS" was directed at calculating the *actual* values.... who knows what may happen.

Sure, if you're just talking about the physical shape and nothing more. Without knowing the composition and configuration of the RAM/RAS it's just a SWAG though.

...and how the internal structure is built.

 

[LowObservable]

Mr Quellish is right. As your shape diverges from the optimum, the mass of RAM required to reach a given RCS goal is larger and eventually becomes unacceptable.

 

[Triton]

From SpudmanWP on F-16.net. AIM-9X Block 3 has been cancelled.

Source:
http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=62&t=25398&sid=4c8c04bd8bfdfeddafd0979b21813f8e&start=30

 

[sferrin]

It was cancelled sometime back unfortunately.

 

[sferrin]

Sure, if you're just talking about the physical shape and nothing more. Without knowing the composition and configuration of the RAM/RAS it's just a SWAG though.

1. Physical shape is always the dominant factor driving RCS by a VERY wide margin.
2. RAM is applied to mitigate scattering sources.
3. RAM has well known physical limitations. Even ideal RAM can only do so much.
D. Resonant cavities.


So, nope.

Assuming you're correct, you still have the issue of not knowing exactly what is RAM/RAS and what is not on a given aircraft type, and what type is used where. For sake of discussion, what order of magnitude difference would you say RAM/RAS would make say, between an F-22 as-is and a bare metal F-22 with the exact same OML? A factor of 100? 10? Less? Supposedly the B-1Bs RCS is smaller than the B-1As by a factor of ten and that's with a bunch of RAM/RAS and hiding the engine faces. I'd think the better the base shape is the bigger difference RAM/RAS (of a given type) would make.

 

[Triton]

I don't see any evidence in the "Proposed Weapon Growth" slide that F-35 software will be dominated by United States requirements. As you can see, the unique weapon requirements of Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are shown on the slide. MBDA Meteor support is scheduled for the Block 4.3 incremental release. I don't understand the point of Bill Sweetman's article "Back To Basics for F-35" as no customer's requirements have been snubbed.

 

[sferrin]

I don't see any evidence in the "Proposed Weapon Growth" slide that F-35 software will be dominated by United States requirements. As you can see, the unique weapon requirements of Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are shown on the slide. MBDA Meteor support is scheduled for the Block 4.3 incremental release. I don't understand the point of Bill Sweetman's article "Back To Basics for F-35" as no customer's requirements have been snubbed.

I'm wondering how it's any different than any other US export aircraft. If other countries want a special ability they pay for it. The US didn't foot the bill to develop the Block 60 F-16 for the UAE for example.

 

[Triton]

I believe that one of his points is that it is not fast, easy, or cheap to integrate new weapons or sensors onto the F-35. That if you had a Rafale you could be using the MDBA Meteor today. Instead you have to wait until 2023 for the Block 4.3 software release to use the MDBA Meteor on the F-35.

 

[SpudmanWP]

It's just cherry-picking or sour grapes, you decide.


Either way, the Rafale is a poor choice of aircraft to hold up as a good example of development, integration, or capability... lest we forget how long it took to self-designate an LGB, still missing it's IR IRST, etc, etc.


Most of these weapon issues will go away in Block 4 with UAI so we will see less & less of these kinds of "Weapons with Blocks" charts as they become irrelevant.

 

[sferrin]

I believe that one of his points is that it is not fast, easy, or cheap to integrate new weapons or sensors onto the F-35. That if you had a Rafale you could be using the MDBA Meteor today. Instead you have to wait until 2023 for the Block 4.3 software release to use the MDBA Meteor on the F-35.

How long did it take to get Meteor into service on the Typhoon or Gripen?

 

[quellish]

Assuming you're correct, you still have the issue of not knowing exactly what is RAM/RAS and what is not on a given aircraft type, and what type is used where.

Obviously there is some kind of miscommunication here.
RAM/RAS is applied to areas where it would be beneficial to do so. Apertures, resonant cavities, certain kinds of abrupt OML changes. The whole aircraft is not covered in 5 layers of absorber - this seems to be a common misconception. There are physical limits to what absorbing materials can do. Absorbing materials also (often) have less and less effect at lower signature levels.


The attached graphic may be helpful in illustrating this. An object with "Really Spiffy" conductivity is evaluated before and after a very typical application of RAM. The RAM itself is a theoretical "ideal" RAM that has the maximum performance physically possible for the tested band.


In the case of RLO/LO/VLO/ULO/XLO aircraft theoretical magical SUPER RAM is still only contributing a small amount to the signature reduction. The exception is when the primary scattering source is a resonant cavity - which would not be the case in for any VLO/ULO/XLO aircraft.

For sake of discussion, what order of magnitude difference would you say RAM/RAS would make say, between an F-22 as-is and a bare metal F-22 with the exact same OML?

About 10.
Depending on frequency.
And aspect.
And... how close to the ocean it is.
Is it raining?
And this is the "stock" material, not a special narrowband material, right? Narrow band material would increase the difference, but not significantly on the F-22.

Supposedly the B-1Bs RCS is smaller than the B-1As by a factor of ten and that's with a bunch of RAM/RAS and hiding the engine faces. I'd think the better the base shape is the bigger difference RAM/RAS (of a given type) would make.

Neat! A "factor of 10" would be how many dBsm?

 

[sferrin]

I think the class is well aware that things like frequency, aspect angle, yada yada yada, make a difference. Common sense would suggest that the question being asked is "all else being equal, what order of magnitude difference does RAM/RAS typically make". No need to be an ass about it.

 

[jeffb]

Obviously there is some kind of miscommunication here.
RAM/RAS is applied to areas where it would be beneficial to do so. Apertures, resonant cavities, certain kinds of abrupt OML changes. The whole aircraft is not covered in 5 layers of absorber - this seems to be a common misconception. There are physical limits to what absorbing materials can do. Absorbing materials also (often) have less and less effect at lower signature levels.

This is one of the reasons that the statements of Hostage et al puzzled me so much. Shaping supposedly plays an enormous part in how "stealthy" the final aircraft is ie HAVEBLUE, F117, F22, B2. The F35's shaping does not seem to be optimised for stealth, except in the forward quarter. The others are that: the F22 is too stealthy for export, but now the export stealthy F35 is stealthier than the F22 (??? Has anyone told Congress?); and that the F35 has always been advertised as having a lower level of stealth than the F22 (or B2).

That said, it does look like most of the forward panels in this picture have some sort of coating. The rear panels seem to be showing rivet marks but I'm not sure what point in the testing program this is. It may be a temporary fix while they were having trouble with the tail surfaces melting or it may just be indicative of differences inherent to the B model with the panel doors that open to allow the nozzle to swing down. At any rate you can see why it isn't stealthy with pylons on.

I initially wondered if Hostage and Co. were, when they said the F35 was stealthier than the F22, alluding to the ability of the AGP-82 to further mask the aircraft's radio returns in the X-band through some signal jiggery-pokery. They make the point though of actually stating that the RCS figure for the F35 is lower. Is an aircraft's official RCS figure a combined score? Being comprised of both passive and active elements?

Should we doubt them? After all they could tell us the damn things run on banana skins if they want to, it'd be difficult to prove them wrong!

 

[Dragon029]

Note that in that image the EOTS isn't installed, so it's either somewhat old, or part of the test fleet.

 

[Jeb]

Just in regards to stealth, there has been more than one claim:

During a flight debriefing, Col. Chris Niemi and Maj. Nash Vickers both said a comparison of the radar-absorbing F-35 to its nimble but less stealthy twin-engine F-22 cousin might not reveal the whole story.

Niemi has eight years in the cockpit of an F-22 and is one of the few Air Force pilots who is qualified in both the Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. He said he wanted to set the record straight on the Lightning II, once and for all. “Many have compared the F-22 to the F-35 but that comparison is unfair. With the F-35 Lightning, this fighter sees better, has more range, and is stealthier than any of its predecessors. This airplane, with its fly by wire technology, is super easy to fly and it has a very linear response.”

www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/August/06/F35-Lightning-public-debut-shows-the-right-stuff

"I would say that General Hostage … is accurate in his statement about the simple stealthiness of the F-35 [with regard] to other airplanes," Bogdan said in the interview. The statement was accurate for radar cross section, as measured in decibels, and range of detectability, he said, and he scoffed at the notion that anyone can tell how stealthy an aircraft is just by looking at it.

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/December%202014/The-F-35-on-Final-Approach.aspx

Ok, thanks for that. I'm going to have to process that one for a bit.

What stuck out to me was the term "predecessors." I'm not sure I'd call the F-22 a predecessor to the F-35; the F-35 isn't replacing the F-22. Same applies to "other airplanes"...it's just vague enough.

You should probably loosen the straps on your tinfoil hat.

“Many have compared the F-22 to the F-35 but that comparison is unfair. With the F-35 Lightning, this fighter sees better, has more range, and is stealthier than any of its predecessors."

He's clearly including the F-22 in his statement.

Ha ha ha. One of the great traits developed in the process of becoming a media-facing spokesman for defense programs is the ability to appear to say something definitive without leaving anything solid to actually grab onto. I had more than one conversation about this with my old neighbor, David Fulghum from Aviation Week. Learned a lot about how to ask questions and parse answers. Niemi's answer is very slick and non-confirming.

 

[LowObservable]

"No need to be an ass about it".

See what you've done, Quellish - failed to live up to Sferrin's lofty standards of courtesy and respect.


Seriously, there is no case to answer. RAM/RAS is mainly there to make a real vehicle conform to the optical-scattering ideal - suppressing creeping waves, compensating for edges that are not ideally sharp, and dealing with gaps and cavities that real vehicles need. If RAM/RAS had the potential to grossly change RCS vs. an untreated shape, it would be much more heavily used and a Rafale might approach the signatures of an F-35.

 

[sferrin]

Ha ha ha. One of the great traits developed in the process of becoming a media-facing spokesman for defense programs is the ability to appear to say something definitive without leaving anything solid to actually grab onto. I had more than one conversation about this with my old neighbor, David Fulghum from Aviation Week. Learned a lot about how to ask questions and parse answers. Niemi's answer is very slick and non-confirming.

What's more likely, that the guy has so little integrity that he intentionally set out to deceive, or that he meant what he said? (You know, Occam's Razor.)

 

[sferrin]

"No need to be an ass about it".

See what you've done, Quellish - failed to live up to Sferrin's lofty standards of courtesy and respect.

Touche'.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

“Many have compared the F-22 to the F-35 but that comparison is unfair. With the F-35 Lightning, this fighter sees better, has more range, and is stealthier than any of its predecessors."

Sorry, but to me that statement doesn't necessarily include F-22 in the RCS comparison.

Option 1:

"Sees better" [than F-22] - well, EOTS etc.
"more range" [than F-22] - could be - F-22 isn't overburdened with fuel
"stealthier than any of its predecessors" - F-22 is not really a predecessor to F-35. Therefore this means very little unless you include F-117, for example. In which case, it may be true.

Option 2:
"that comparison is unfair" - comparing F-22 to F-35 is unfair, so we won't do that.
"Sees better" [than predecessors excluding F-22]
"more range" [than predecessors excluding F-22]
"stealthier than any of its predecessors" [ excluding F-22]

Not to mention option 3: spokesman made (honest/dishonest) mistake ; option 4: it is stealthier in e.g. IR bands but not radar; option 5: it has lower RCS in a specific threat band or direction.

Move on please people.

 

[Triton]

It's just cherry-picking or sour grapes, you decide.


Either way, the Rafale is a poor choice of aircraft to hold up as a good example of development, integration, or capability... lest we forget how long it took to self-designate an LGB, still missing it's IR IRST, etc, etc.


Most of these weapon issues will go away in Block 4 with UAI so we will see less & less of these kinds of "Weapons with Blocks" charts as they become irrelevant.

Thanks for the response, SpudmanWP. I wasn't previously aware of Universal Armament Interface. So UAI allows device drivers to be written to support weapon systems without having to upgrade the Block software. I also understand that UAI will also support sensors in the future.

 

[SpudmanWP]

That is a perfect way of putting it. UAI = Device drivers for weapons. Sensors & other pods are a future upgrade but given the "plug-n-play" nature of the Israeli avionics upgrades they may have brought some of that to 3F?

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.f35.com/news/detail/tests-show-f-35s-can-share-data-with-older-aircraft?sf12647284=1

 

[jeffb]

Ha ha ha. One of the great traits developed in the process of becoming a media-facing spokesman for defense programs is the ability to appear to say something definitive without leaving anything solid to actually grab onto. I had more than one conversation about this with my old neighbor, David Fulghum from Aviation Week. Learned a lot about how to ask questions and parse answers. Niemi's answer is very slick and non-confirming.

What's more likely, that the guy has so little integrity that he intentionally set out to deceive, or that he meant what he said? (You know, Occam's Razor.)

The guy operates in an environment where the program he is intimately involved in is constantly under attack from journalists and sections of congress. I don't think that he would intentionally deceive but I do believe that he would automatically adjusts his language to ensure his project doesn't get slowed down by continuous sidebars with journalists and members of congress about "why didn't we build more F22s" and "why can't we keep going with the A10". It's easier to just head off that whole discussion by stating at the outset or at least taking the position that the F35 is stealthier than the F22 anyway and that's that.

As pointed out by others, it almost certainly isn't as stealthy as the F22 or B2 in an all aspect x-band sense but probably is more stealthy in the forward sector when you factor in active signals management via the AGP82 in that forward 120 degree cone.

EDIT : By which I of course meant the AN/APG-81 which is fitted to the F35 not the 82 which is a completely different beast.

 

[r16]

will cause a lovely reaction in some fans of the triplane .

http://www.duffelblog.com/2015/08/f-35-loses-dogfight-to-red-baron/

 

[bobbymike]

Hill Gets First F-35s

The first F-35A Lightning IIs assigned to Hill AFB, Utah, touched down at the base this week. Airframes AF-77 and AF-78, assigned to the 388th Fighter Wing and Air Force Reserve Command associate 419th FW, were delivered Sept. 2, Hill officials announced. “The F-35A Lightning II represents the future of tactical aviation for the United States and our allies,” said Col. David Lyons, 388th FW commander, who delivered one of the aircraft. "We’re excited to usher in a new era of combat capability for the Air Force.” Hill is slated to receive a total of 72 F-35As by 2019, becoming the Air Force's first combat coded Lightning II unit when the jets reach initial operational capability, targeted for the latter part of next year. Hill, which is the fifth Air Force and 10th overall base to receive the Joint Strike Fighter, activated the 34th Fighter Squadron as its first dedicated​ F-35A squadron earlier this summer, and plans to have at least 15 aircraft there by next summer. Lorraine Martin, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program general manager, said the F-35 “provides the USAF and international partners a decisive edge over its adversaries," according to a Lockeed Martin release.

F-35 Block 3F Funds Awarded

—Marc V. Schanz 9/3/2015

Lockheed Martin received a $311.4 million contract for the F-35 program’s Block 3F upgrade—the planned all-up configuration—which will be performed on Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and British variants of the Joint Strike Fighter, according to a Sept. 1 contract announcement. The “undefinitized delivery order,” made against another ordering agreement for the four customers, is to purchase “retrofit modification hardware” needed for Block 3F upgrades, and engineering support for kit installations at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, Texas, facility and at a facility in Baltimore, Md. Naval Air Systems Command at NAS Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting authority. Work on the modifications is expected to last until September 2021. The contract is a combination purchase for the four customers, with the largest portions going to USAF (approximately $142.7 million of the contract) and the Marine Corps (approximately $86.2 million). Earlier this year, a senior USAF official noted some capabilities planned for the Block 3F full configuration of the fighter will move to the Block 4 update, which will be fielded between 2019 and 2025. The Marine Corps declared initial operational capability for its F-35B variant in early August with the 2B software configuration, which provides initial combat capability. The Air Force will declare IOC with the 3i software in 2016, which provides the same capabilities as the Marine Corps' Block 2B, but includes an upgraded processor and the "gen 3" helmet, F-35 Executive Vice President Lorraine Martin said in June.

 

[Triton]

An F-35 hit piece from Time magazine:

"The Pentagon’s Dubious Dogfight"
Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DC
Sept. 1, 2015

Source:
http://time.com/4019393/military-planes-a10-f35/

The good news is the Pentagon is finally pitting its tried-and-true A-10 Warthog against its brand-new F-35 Lightning II to see which one is better when it comes to helping out troops on the ground. The bad news is such testing won’t start for another three years, when the military will be too invested in the F-35 to do much about it.

In other words, the test will come too late to make much difference—for either the grunts on the ground, or the taxpayers footing the $400 billion bill for 2,457 of the planes Lockheed Martin is building for the Air Force, Marines and Navy.

“This is the endgame of a premeditated strategy that has led to this totally absurd situation,” says Chuck Spinney, a retired Pentagon warplane analyst. “It brings into sharp relief the whole way we buy our weapons.”

While some are cheering the aerial duel as a necessary sizing up of the two warplanes the Pentagon is counting on to keep American troops safe on 21st century battlefields, that misses a key point by a mile: the tardy testing highlights the second half of a two-act Pentagon play designed to make the F-35 a fait accompli:

• The opening act began with what’s known in the weapons-building trade as “concurrency”—letting something be designed and produced at the same time. Over the past decade, concurrency allowed production contracts to be spread around the country (45 of 50 states are building parts of the F-35) and, indeed, the world (11 nations are helping the U.S. build the plane). That has given it momentum on Capitol Hill.

• In the closing act, concurrency has delayed testing of the aircraft for years—including against the A-10—ensuring its production no matter what the belated testing might uncover.

Or, as they sometimes say at the Pentagon: too early to tell, too late to stop.

Concurrency’s cost could be seen late Tuesday, when the Pentagon announced a $311 million contract award to Lockheed for “retrofit modification hardware,” a common result of trying to build weapons when their blueprints remain in flux.

The A-10, with its single mission of protecting the grunts on the ground with its fierce 30mm cannon, has long been the favorite of soldiers and Marines who find themselves pinned down by enemy forces. But it’s that very attribute—that the heavily-armored A-10 is dedicated to a single mission—that has made the `hog vulnerable in an increasingly tight budgetary environment. Scrapping it, as the Air Force proposes, would save $4 billion over five years, the service estimates.

The F-35, on the other hand, is a Swiss-army-knife kind of warplane. The Air Force, Marines and Navy all had to compromise to come up with a design they could share. Outfitted to perform several missions—it can fly off aircraft carriers, drop bombs and shoot at other airplanes—it can’t excel at any of them. “The idea that we could produce a committee design that is good for everybody is fundamentally wrong,” declares retired general Merrill McPeak, a fighter pilot who served as Air Force chief of staff as the F-35’s development got underway in the early 1990s.

The Pentagon’s operational testing office issued a grim assessment of the most-costly weapons system in history in its latest annual report earlier this year. “Overall suitability continues to be less than desired by the Services, and relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds,” it said, “but has shown some improvement.”

Michael Gilmore, director of the testing office, said last week that his office will send out separate formations of each plane to conduct what the military calls “close air support” missions. Such testing will highlight “capability gaps” between the F-35 and A-10. “It’s really not wise to guess,” he said. “You have to go out and get data and do a thorough and rigorous evaluation.”

That’s the only way, Air Force officials say, to know where to spend more money on the F-35 to make up for any shortcomings it might have compared to the 40-year-old A-10.

 

[Triton]

"Election Will Determine F-35's Future in Canada"
by David Pugliese 2:25 p.m. EDT September 5, 2015
Iraq War Presence, Other Defense Issues in the Balance

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/09/05/election-determine-f-35s-future-canada/71571546/

OTTAWA — How Canada will replace its fighter aircraft fleet and whether it continues its involvement in the Iraq war will be decided by the outcome of the country’s federal election in October.

At issue is whether Canada should move ahead with the purchase of the F-35 joint strike fighter or hold a competition for the multibillion-dollar acquisition for new planes.

Two of the three main political parties in the race — the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party (NDP) — say that if elected, they will hold a competition, inviting international aerospace companies to bid on replacing the existing CF-18 fighter fleet.

The Conservative Party, which has been in power for the last nine years and had originally committed Canada to the purchase of the F-35, hasn’t yet outlined how it would proceed. In December 2012, the Conservative government, under continuing fire over questions about the increasing cost of the F-35 program, announced it would put the procurement on hold. That acquisition process has yet to restart.

Defense analyst Martin Shadwick said despite a potential price-tag of tens of billions of dollars for new fighters, the issue has not been discussed by the candidates for the Oct. 19 election.

“This election will shape how Canada’s next fighter jet is purchased, but defense issues are rarely discussed on the campaign trail and this election is no exception,” said Shadwick, who teaches strategic studies at York University in Toronto.

He noted the Canadian public is more focused on the country’s economy, which is in a recession. Defense issues could emerge later in the election campaign but Shadwick said he doubts they will play a major role.

“The public is not looking for anything radical on defense from the political parties,” he explained. “They want to know there is an adequate defense capability and that it’s affordable.”

The October election will also have an effect on Canada’s mission against the Islamic State group, often called ISIL, he noted.

Last October, the Conservative Party government committed a force of 600 Canadian military personnel, fighter jets, refueling tankers and surveillance aircraft to the air campaign against the militant group. It also sent 69 special operations troops to train Kurdish troops in northern Iraq.

New Democratic Party leader Thomas Mulcair said if his party forms the next government he would end Canada’s participation in the bombing campaign and withdraw all military personnel from the mission. The NDP would instead boost humanitarian aid to the region. But Mulcair has suggested that if the United Nations or NATO takes command of the mission, Canada would consider further participation.

Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau has also said if his party forms the next government it would end Canadian participation in the bombing campaign but keep military trainers in Iraq. Canada would also increase humanitarian aid to the region, Trudeau added.

Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper is suggesting that if he is re-elected as prime minister, the mission will be extended.

“The intervention has had the effect of largely stopping the advance [of the Islamic State group], particularly in the north of Iraq and to some degree in other parts of Iraq and Syria — not maybe as much we’d like,” he told a campaign rally on Aug. 31. “To protect our country, we are going to have to have a long and sustained strategy with our international partners.”

The Conservatives have promoted their strong support for the Canadian military. They point out they have increased defense spending from CAN $14.5 billion (US $10.3 billion) in 2006 to $20.1 billion in 2015.

Harper argues that the Conservatives are the natural choice to ensure a strong military. “Others would make very different choices — wrong choices, frankly, irresponsible choices,” Harper said.

Liberal Party defense critic Joyce Murray counters that the Conservatives have developed a number of myths surrounding their strong support of the military. Defense spending, she noted, has dropped below 1 percent of GDP.

A significant number of defense procurement projects, from the building of ships to the acquisition of new fighter jets, are stalled, she added.

The New Democratic Party has also highlighted the Conservative government’s failure to deliver on military acquisition projects, in particular the purchase of new search-and-rescue aircraft.

NDP defense critic Jack Harris has said if his party forms the next government, it would enhance the country’s capabilities in the Arctic as well as improve search and rescue. But as a first step, an NDP government would launch a review to ensure defense policy matches the country’s needs and foreign policy, he added.

Shadwick said the traditionally left-leaning NDP appears to be ready to adopt a more defense-friendly posture as it tries to appeal to a wider range of voters.

The NDP is leading in the polls.

Email: dpugliese@defensenews.com

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/09/05/eyeing-iran-israel-readies-stealth-strike-fighter/71608464/

The F-35 Adir (Awesome in Hebrew) Love it! New meaning to the sentence, "It would be 'Awesome' to bomb Iranian nuke sites"

 

[Triton]

Is the threat of low-frequency radars to LO fighter aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 exaggerated?


"New Radars, IRST Strengthen Stealth-Detection Claims"
Counterstealth technologies near service worldwide
Mar 16, 2015 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/technology/new-radars-irst-strengthen-stealth-detection-claims

Counterstealth technologies, intended to reduce the effectiveness of radar cross-section (RCS) reduction measures, are proliferating worldwide. Since 2013, multiple new programs have been revealed, producers of radar and infrared search and track (IRST) systems have been more ready to claim counterstealth capability, and some operators—notably the U.S. Navy—have openly conceded that stealth technology is being challenged.

These new systems are designed from the outset for sensor fusion—when different sensors detect and track the same target, the track and identification data are merged automatically. This is intended to overcome a critical problem in engaging stealth targets: Even if the target is detected, the “kill chain” by which a target is tracked, identified and engaged by a weapon can still be broken if any sensor in the chain cannot pick the target up.

The fact that some stealth configurations may be much less effective against very-high-frequency (VHF) radars than against higher-frequency systems is a matter of electromagnetic physics. A declassified 1985 CIA report correctly predicted that the Soviet Union’s first major counterstealth effort would be to develop new VHF radars that would reduce the disadvantages of long wavelengths: lack of mobility, poor resolution and susceptibility to clutter. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 55Zh6UE Nebo-U, designed by the Nizhny-Novgorod Research Institute of Radio Engineering (NNIIRT), entered service in the 1990s as the first three-dimensional Russian VHF radar. NNIRT subsequently prototyped the first VHF active electronically scanned array (AESA) systems.

VHF AESA technology has entered production as part of the 55Zh6M Nebo-M multiband radar complex, which passed State tests in 2011 and is in production for Russian air defense forces against a 100-system order. The Nebo-M includes three truck-mounted radar systems, all of them -AESAs: the VHF RLM-M, the RLM-D in L-band (UHF) and the S/X-band RLM-S. (Russian documentation describes them as metric, decimetric and centimetric—that is, each differs from the next by an order of magnitude in frequency.) Each of the radars is equipped with the Orientir location system, comprising three Glonass satellite navigation receivers on a fixed frame, and they are connected via wireless or cable datalink to a ground control vehicle.

One of the classic drawbacks of VHF is slow scan rate. With the RLM-M, electronic scanning is superimposed on mechanical scanning. The radar can scan a 120-deg. sector mechanically, maintaining continuous track through all but the outer 15-deg. sectors. Within the scan area, the scan is virtually instantaneous, allowing energy to be focused on any possible target. It retains the basic advantages of VHF: NNIRT says that the Chinese DF-15 short-range ballistic missile has a 0.002 m2 RCS in X-band, but is 0.6 m2 in VHF.

The principle behind Nebo-M is the fusion of data from the three radars to create a robust kill chain. The VHF system performs initial detection and cues the UHF radar, which in turn can cue the X-band RLM-S. The Orientir system provides accurate azimuth data (which Glonass/GPS on its own does not support), and makes it possible for the three signals to be combined into a single target picture.

The higher-frequency radars are more accurate than VHF, and can concentrate energy on a target to make successful detection and tracking more likely. Using “stop and stare” modes, where the antenna rotation stops and the radar scans electronically over a 90-deg. sector, puts four times as much energy on target as continuous rotation and increases range by 40%.

Saab’s work on its new Giraffe 4A/8A S-band radars points to ways in which AESA technology and advanced processing improve high-band performance against small targets. Module technology is important, maximizing the AESA’s advantages in terms of signal-to-noise ratio. The goal is signal “purity” where most of the energy is concentrated close to the nominal design frequency, which makes it possible to detect very small Doppler shifts in returns from moving targets.

New processing technologies include “multiple hypothesis” tracking in which weak returns are analyzed over time and either declared as tracks or discarded based on their behavior. China is taking a similar approach to Russia, as seen at last November’s Zhuhai air show. Newcomers included the JY-27A Skywatch-V, a large-scale VHF AESA closely comparable to Russia’s RLM-M, developed by East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering (Ecriee), part of the China Electronics Technology Corp. (CTEC). Two alternative UHF AESAs and a YLC-2V S-band passive electronically scanned array radar were also on show.

CETC exhibits indicated a focus on combining active and passive detection systems, including the flight-line display of a large-area directional, wideband passive receiver system identified as YLC-20. It appears to be used as an adjunct to the CETC DWL-002, which is a three-station passive coherent location (PCL) system similar to the Czech ERA Vera series, using time difference of arrival processing to locate and track targets. Also shown on a wall chart was the JY-50 “passive radar,” which operates in the VHF band.

Previous PCL systems, including Vera, are designed to exploit active emissions from the target. However, by teaming PCL and other passive receivers with active radars, the defender creates bistatic and multistatic detection systems, which may reduce the effectiveness of RCS-reduction measures that are primarily monostatic. For instance, highly swept leading edges are designed to deflect radar signals away from the source, but can create spikes detectable by multistatic systems.

Older and smaller VHF radars such as the NNIRTI’s 1970s-era P-18 are being upgraded by at least five teams: Retia in Czech Republic, Arzenal in Hungary, Ukraine’s Aerotechnica, and organizations in Belorussia and Russia. The -Chinese navy has retained VHF radar on its newest air warfare destroyers such as the Type 52C Luyang II and Type 52D Luyang III. The possibility of a more modern VHF radar appearing on the new, larger Type 055 destroyer cannot be ruled out.

The challenge to stealth posed by lower-frequency radars and other detection means has been acknowledged at higher levels since 2013. U.S. chief of naval operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert has publicly expressed doubt as to whether stealth platforms constitute a complete answer to the developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/D2) threat, and a January 2014 paper by the Center for a New American Security noted, “One recent analysis argued that there has been a revolution in detecting aircraft with low RCS, while there have not been commensurate enhancements in stealth.”

Boeing has promoted the EA-18G Growler’s ability to jam in the VHF band, which is built into the current ALQ-99 low-band pod configuration (the most modern part of the system) and the planned Increment 2 of the Next Generation Jammer system. Increment 2 will likely comprise an upgrade to the current pod—the best solution to emerge from an analysis of alternatives conducted in 2012. A contract should be issued in 2017 with initial operational capability in 2024.

A different kind of radar threat is the very-long-wave over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, typified by Australia’s Jindalee OTH Radar Network (JORN), Russia’s Rezonans-NE, and China’s OTH systems. Again, processing is the key to increasing the accuracy and sensitivity of these systems, typified by the Phase 5 upgrade to JORN.

OTH long-wave radars are inherently “counterstealth” because at very long wavelengths that are close to the physical size of the target, conventional radar cross-section measurement and reduction techniques do not apply. Claims by Jindalee’s original designers that the radar could detect the B-2 were published in the late 1980s and were taken seriously by the U.S. Air Force. At the time, however, the service could argue that OTH’s resolution was so poor that it could not represent the start of a kill chain. Today, however, that low resolution can be mitigated by networking multiple radars, and by using OTH-B to cue high-resolution sensors.

Outside the radio-frequency band, the U.S. Air Force (AW&ST Sept. 22, 2014, p. 42) is the latest convert to the capabilities of IRST. The U.S. Navy’s IRST for the Super Hornet, installed in a modified centerline fuel tank, was approved for low-rate initial production in February, following 2014 tests of an engineering development model system, and the Block I version is due to reach initial operational capability in fiscal 2018. Block I uses the same Lockheed Martin infrared receiver—optics and front end—as is used on F-15Ks in Korea and F-15SGs in Singapore. This subsystem is, in turn, derived from the IRST that was designed in the 1980s for the F-14D.

While the Pentagon’s director of operational test and engineering criticized the Navy system’s track quality, it has clearly impressed the Air Force enough to overcome its long lack of interest in IRST. The Air Force has also gained experience via its F-16 Aggressor units, which have been flying with IRST pods since 2013. The Navy plans to acquire only 60 Block I sensors, followed by 110 Block II systems with a new front end.

The bulk of Western IRST experience is held by Selex-ES, which is the lead contractor on the Typhoon’s Pirate IRST and the supplier of the Skyward-G for Gripen. In the past year, Selex has claimed openly that its IRSTs have been able to detect and track low-RCS targets at subsonic speeds, due to skin friction, heat radiating through the skin from the engine, and the exhaust plume. The U.S. Navy’s Greenert underscored this point in Washington in early February, saying that “if something moves fast through the air, disrupts molecules and puts out heat . . . it’s going to be detectable.”

These detection improvements do not mean the end of stealth, in the view of most industry and government sources, but they do underlie current plans and discussions for the future applications of RCS-reduction and other stealth-related technologies. For example, the long debate over the appropriate level of stealth technology for the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program has revolved around the development of A2/AD threats. The result is the end of a decades-long misapprehension, widely held in professional as well as public circles, that there is no major difference in stealth performance among various low-observable designs.

 

[Triton]

"The U.S. Navy’s Secret Counter-Stealth Weapon Could Be Hiding in Plain Sight"
By: Dave Majumdar
June 9, 2014 9:14 AM

Source:
http://news.usni.org/2014/06/09/u-s-navys-secret-counter-stealth-weapon-hiding-plain-sight

The Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye maybe the U.S. Navy’s secret weapon against the emerging threat of enemy fifth-generation stealth fighters and cruise missiles.

The key to that capability is the aircraft’s powerful UHF-band hybrid mechanical/electronically-scanned AN/APY-9 radar built by Lockheed Martin. Both friend and foe alike have touted UHF radars as an effective countermeasure to stealth technology.

One example of that is a paper prepared by Arend Westra that appeared in the National Defense University’s Joint Forces Quarterly academic journal in the 4th quarter issue of 2009.

“It is the physics of longer wavelength and resonance that enables VHF and UHF radar to detect stealth aircraft,” Westra wrote in his article titled Radar vs. Stealth.

UHF-band radars operate at frequencies between 300MHz and 1GHz, which results in wavelengths that are between 10 centimeters and one meter long.

Typically, due to the physical characteristics of fighter-sized stealth aircraft, they must be optimized to defeat higher frequencies in the Ka, Ku, X, C and parts of the S-bands.

There is a resonance effect that occurs when a feature on an aircraft—such as a tail-fin tip— is less than eight times the size of a particular frequency wavelength. That omni-directional resonance effect produces a “step change” in an aircraft’s radar cross-section.

Effectively what that means is that small stealth aircraft that do not have the size or weight allowances for two feet or more of radar absorbent material coatings on every surface are forced to make trades as to which frequency bands they are optimized for.

That would include aircraft like the Chengdu J-20, Shenyang J-31, Sukhoi PAK-FA and indeed the United States’ own Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and tri-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Only very large stealth aircraft without protruding empennage surfaces — like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit or the forthcoming Long Range Strike-Bomber — can meet the requirement for geometrical optics regime scattering.

“You can’t be everywhere at once on a fighter-sized aircraft,” one source told USNI News earlier in the year.

However, as Westra and many other sources point out, UHF and VHF-band radars have historically had some major drawbacks. “Poor resolution in angle and range, however, has historically prevented these radars from providing accurate targeting and fire control,” Westra wrote.

Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin appear to have overcome the traditional limitations of UHF-band radars in the APY-9 by applying a combination of advanced electronic scanning capability together with enormous digital computing power in the form of space/time adaptive processing.

The Navy would not directly address the issue, but service officials did say the APY-9 provides a massive increase in performance over the E-2C Hawkeye 2000’s radar.

“The E-2D APY-9 radar provides a significantly enhanced airborne early warning and situational awareness capability against all air targets including threat aircraft and cruise missiles,” said Naval Air Systems Command spokesman Rob Koon in an emailed statement to USNI News.

“The modern technology of the APY-9 radar provides a substantial improvement in performance over the E-2C’s APS-145 radar whose heritage dates back to the 1970s.”

But the Navy openly talks about the E-2D’s role as the central node of its Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) (pronounced: nifk-kah) construct to defeat enemy air and missile threats—Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy’s director of air warfare, described the concept in detail to USNI News last December.

Under the NIFC-CA ‘From the Air’ (FTA) construct, the APY-9 radar can act as a sensor to cue Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles for Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets fighters via the Link-16 datalink.

Additionally, the APY-9 also acts as a sensor to guide Standard SM-6 missiles launched from Aegis cruisers and destroyers against targets located beyond the ships’ SPY-1 radars’ horizon via the Cooperative Engagement Capability datalink under the NIFC-CA ‘From the Sea’ (FTS) construct. And thus far, all live-fire NIFC-CA missile shots have been successful.

The first increment of NIFC-CA is set to be fielded later this year when the first E-2D squadron, VAW-125, is set to declare initial operating capability in October 2014. NIFC-CA will be declared operational concurrently with that squadron.

The APY-9 is a unique design in many respects, NAVAIR and Northrop brag that the radar is a “two-generation leap” over the APS-145 in an information booklet the service has been distributing. While externally the radar appears to be no different than the purely mechanically-scanned AN/APS-145—also built by Lockheed Martin–internally it is an another matter entirely.

While the APY-9 does rotate inside the E-2D’s dish-shaped radome to achieve 360-degree coverage, the crew of the aircraft can control the antenna rotation speed to focus on an area of interest according to NAVAIR. Further, the 18-channel passive phased-array ADS-18 antenna has the ability to steer its radar beam electronically. It also incorporates an electronically-scanned identification friend or foe system.

The transmitter and receiver hardware are located inside the aircraft’s fuselage and connect to the antenna via high power radiofrequency transmission lines and a high power radiofrequency rotary coupler. Thus, it is not an active electronically scanned array radar.

The APY-9 has three distinct radar modes, Advanced Airborne Early Warning Surveillance, Enhanced Sector Scan, and Enhanced Tracking Sector.

Advanced Airborne Early Warning Surveillance is the normal operating mode for the radar to provide uniform 360-degree, simultaneous air and surface coverage with long-range detection of low radar cross-section targets. The antenna rotates 360 degrees every ten seconds or so when it is operating in this primarily mechanically scanned mode.

The Enhanced Sector Scan mode merges traditional mechanical scanning with steerable electronic scanning to leverage the benefits of both technologies while simultaneously mitigating the shortcomings of either methodology. The antenna rotates mechanically, but the operator can select a specific sector where the rotation of the antenna is slowed to focus on an area.

Enhanced Tracking Sector is a pure electronically scanned mode, where the antenna is geographically stabilized or following a particular target. This mode provides enhanced detection and tracking in a selected sector by stopping the antenna and scanning purely electronically. This mode is particularly useful against low-observable targets due to its rapid track updates.

The APY-9 has a range of at least 300 nautical miles and seems to be limited only by the performance of the E-2D airframe–which normally operates at 25,000ft.

The Navy ultimately hopes to buy a total of 75 E-2D with the last examples entering the fleet in the 2020s.

 

[Triton]

"Divine Eagle: How much of a threat is China's new high-flying drone to US air superiority?"
by Mark Piesing

August 6, 2015

Source:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/divine-eagle-how-much-of-a-threat-is-chinas-new-highflying-drone-to-us-air-superiority-10441385.html

In May, grainy pictures emerged of a huge new twin-fuselage, high-altitude Chinese drone called the Divine Eagle. Those in the know instantly labelled it the "stealth-hunting drone". Stealth technology is the equivalent of electronic camouflage for planes, making them hard for enemy radar to spot – but the Chinese drone is certainly big enough to carry the special radars developed to detect stealth aircraft. It's able to fly high enough to detect them long before they can reach their targets. Its radar is rumoured to have been able to pick out an American stealth F-22 Raptor off the coast of South Korea almost 500km away.

To some analysts, the Chinese drone represents the death of stealth – for others, merely a serious threat to the future of the technology on which America has based its air superiority.

Stealth, or "low observable technology", is a combination of aircraft design, tactics and electronic countermeasures designed to make planes less visible to radar and other systems, which the US has pioneered. As well as trying to create the lowest possible radar signature by getting rid of the tail, it also tries to reduce things such as infrared emissions from the engine exhaust and electromagnetic emissions from the computers on board. Stealth tactics involve looking for gaps in air-defence systems.

When people think of stealth aircraft, they tend to picture the triangular black F-117 stealth fighter and B-2 bombers that penetrated Saddam Hussein's much-vaunted air defences at the start of both Gulf wars – or perhaps the troubled Lockheed F-35 Lightning stealth fighter programme on which the UK has gambled the future of its aircraft carriers. However, the Horten Ho 229 flying wing developed by the Nazis during the Second World War was probably the first. While the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird spy plane used some basic stealth technology, the great leap forward in stealth really occurred in the 1970s with the Lockheed Have Blue project to develop a stealth fighter. This programme led directly to the F-117 and B-2.

However, success has a downside: your rivals begin to take stealth seriously and start the race to make the invisible visible. For some time the answer was a technology that the West had discarded but the Soviets had continued to develop – and which was responsible for the headline downing of a supposedly invisible F-117 in 1999 during the Kosovan conflict by the supposedly obsolete Serbian air defences.

"In reality, stealth planes are never completely invisible, as they will always generate a radar signature in the end," Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says. "What you are trying to do is hold this moment off for as long as possible. If you are seen five miles from your target, compared to be being spotted 100 miles away, then it will have done its job.

"If there was a window when stealth fighters and bombers were undetectable, then it was when the F-117 had completely free rein with Iraq's poor old air defence; however, rivals such as Russia and China have over the past 25 years started to develop countermeasures, including radar that can pick up stealth planes.

Bill Sweetman, the editor-in-chief of Defense Technology International, part of the Aviation Week Network, argues that these kind of countermeasures are now "proliferating". Whereas most radars operate between 2GHz and 40GHz, a low-band equivalent such as VHF radar operates between 1MHz and 2MHz and is able to pick out most stealth planes that are known to be flying today. That's because the scientists realised that – while it can pick up "noise" such as clouds and rain, which was a reason why the West abandoned it – it does have basic physics on its side: its wavelength is the same magnitude as the prominent features on many stealth planes, so that its signal bounces back. The US military was warned about this then-theoretical vulnerability back in the 1980s.

"The Russians persevered with low-band radar due to their technological conservativism," Dr Igor Sutyagin, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, says. "And in the end they had great success."

"The most visible piece of counter-stealth in the past couple of years has been the public display – by both Russia and China – of VHF-Aesa radars," Sweetman says. Put simply, Aesa radars like those supposedly on the Divine Eagle drone are made up of a large number of solid state, chip-like modules that each emit an individual radio wave; these meet in front of the antenna to form a beam that can be easily aimed at a very specific target – and, combined with VHF, are an effective stealth-hunting tool.

"Big VHF radars were always known to be effective against anything other than a B-2 [which has no tail], but they had very large antennae that made them very cumbersome, with low scan rates," Sweetman says. "On the other hand, if an Aesa gets a hint of a detection, it can use electronic scanning to focus a lot of energy on the target."

The final trick is "to combine together different radars into an integrated air-defence system and a central information-processing centre that can make life very difficult for any stealth fighter or bomber", Sutyagin says. And stealth planes are not always stealthy from every angle (it costs too much money). So if you have radar in front, at the sides and above – with a high-altitude drone such as the Divine Eagle – along with satellite tracking of any target, then it might well be a case of RIP stealth.

However, it might not be game over yet. Not everyone has these capabilities and centralised air defences are also vulnerable to hacking, or even special forces. While one response might be to reduce the profile of the plane – using electronic warfare systems and stand-off weapons to increase survivability instead of stealth – there is, according to Sweetman, another option: develop weapon systems like that of the Dassault nEURon drone, which can be programmed to visually seek out large radar arrays.

Not yet, though, Sweetman says. "You can take stealth to the next level," he says, meaning a large, flat, tailless subsonic flying wing and active stealth technology. "In theory, by transmitting a signal just half a wavelength off the wavelength of the radar, your plane can disappear."

The US might have already reached the next level, even though the decision on its new stealth Long Range Strike Bomber is still some way away. In the end, says Barrie, "The US isn't standing still and we are continuing to spend significant amounts on classified programmes." Whether that is enough to keep stealth alive, only time – and war – will tell.

 

[bobbymike]

"Divine Eagle: How much of a threat is China's new high-flying drone to US air superiority?"
by Mark Piesing

August 6, 2015

Other than the throw away line by the IISS analyst about detection ranges articles like this should always have in the concluding paragraph something like, "Despite improvement in radar technologies stealth aircraft will always have advantages over their non-stealthy predecessors"

 

[Triton]

"Stealth Vs. Electronic Attack"
By: Dave Majumdar
April 21, 2014 6:19 AM • Updated: April 21, 2014 8:25 AM

Source:
http://news.usni.org/2014/04/21/stealth-vs-electronic-attack

The U.S. Navy will need to use a combination of stealth and electronic warfare capabilities to defeat advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats in the future, chief of naval operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert said on April 16 at the U.S. Naval Institute annual meeting in Washington, D.C.

“[Stealth] is needed for what we have in the future for at least ten years out there and there is nothing magic about that decade,” Greenert said. “But I think we need to look beyond that. So to me, I think it’s a combination of having aircraft that have stealth but also aircraft that can suppress other forms of radio frequency electromagnetic emissions so that we can get in.”

Electronic attack by itself will probably not be enough to enable U.S. forces to penetrate enemy air defenses, according to Greenert and multiple U.S. military and industry sources.

“I doubt in the future we can just suppress everything, go rolling in until we do what we need to do and get out,” Greenert said. “But we have the means for—way out in the future—with the Next Generation Jammer and what it’ll bring, to be able to get in when we need to and get out.”

Greenert’s comments largely mirrors a Boeing presentation last week at the Navy League’s Sea, Air and Space exposition where Mike Gibbons, the company’s vice president for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs, had stated that stealth aircraft must be supported by airborne electronic attack capabilities.

“The point is anybody that goes in can’t be good against any one frequency band because you will be seen by others, that’s the key,” Gibbons said. “The Growler is the only aircraft that has that full spectrum sensor and jamming capability to take care of that for strikers.”

The Boeing presentation also reiterated the company’s oft-stated position that low observable technologies are a “perishable” asset—particularly as potential enemies develop advanced low frequency radars and signal processors become ever more capable.

“Stealth is ‘delayed detection’ and that delay is getting shorter. SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) radars are shifting their frequencies into lower frequency bands where U.S. stealth is less effective,” said Mark Gammon, Boeing’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G program manager for advanced capabilities, in an emailed statement. “Early warning radars are in the VHF spectrum where stealth has limited if any capability. These radars are networked into the SAM radars giving the SAM radars cued search. The threat is developing out of spectrum sensors like IRST [infrared search and track] systems on their fighters. Stealth has no capability to delay an IRST detection and track.”

While some military officials consulted by USNI News wholeheartedly concurred with Boeing’s assessment, others dismissed the company’s claims out of hand. Many others offered a more nuanced view.

“Boeing is in full-court press against the [Lockheed Martin] F-35 in this briefing. As such, when they describe the advantages of the Growler–which are accurate–they ignore the tradeoff for that advantage,” said one U.S. Air Force official. “The truth is that the Growler and LO [low observable] platforms complement each other extremely well.”

Lockheed Martin officials, however, maintain that the F-35 is able to operate inside highly contested airspace without any support assets.

“By government contract specification, the airplane is required to be able to go into high threat anti-access environments, autonomously perform its mission and survive,” said Eric Van Camp, Lockheed’s domestic F-35 business development director. “The results of flight test indicate conclusively that the airplane will meet that contract specification.”

While it is an indisputable fact that a tactical fighter-sized stealth aircraft must be optimized to defeat higher-frequency bands such the C, X and Ku bands as a simple matter of physics, in a real world operational setting, there are often other factors involved that make detecting and tracking a stealth aircraft more difficult.

Industry, Air Force and Navy officials agreed that there is a “step change” in an LO aircraft’s signature once the frequency wavelength exceeds a certain threshold and causes a resonant effect.

Typically, that resonance occurs when a feature on an aircraft—such as a tail-fin — is less than eight times the size of a particular frequency wavelength.

Effectively, small stealth aircraft that do not have the size or weight allowances for two feet or more of radar absorbent material coatings on every surface are forced to make trades as to which frequency bands they are optimized for.

“You can’t be everywhere at once on a fighter-sized aircraft,” said another Air Force source.

What that means is that a radar operating at a lower frequency band such as parts of the S or L band—like civilian air traffic control (ATC) radars — might be able to detect and possibly even track certain stealth aircraft to an extent.

However, a larger stealth aircraft like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, which lacks many of the features that cause a resonance effect, is much more effective against low-frequency radars than, for example, an F-35.

But those lower-frequency radars do not provide what Pentagon officials call a “weapons quality” track needed to guide a missile onto a target.

“Even if you can see an LO strike aircraft with ATC radar, you can’t kill it without a fire control system,” an Air Force official said.

Meanwhile, Russia, China and others are developing advanced UHF and VHF band early warning radars that use even longer wavelengths in an effort to cue their other sensors and give their fighters some idea of where an adversary stealth aircraft might be coming from.

But the problem with VHF and UHF band radars, as one U.S. Navy official told USNI News, is that with long wavelengths come large radar resolution cells.

That means that contacts are not tracked with the required level of fidelity to guide a weapon onto a target.

“Does the mission require a cloaking device or is it Ok if the threat sees it but can’t do anything about it?” the Navy official asked rhetorically.

Further, officials from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps agreed that while aircraft like the F-35 or F-22 are not solely relying on low observables for survivability—stealth is an absolute requirement to survive in an A2/AD environment even with airborne electronic attack support.

As one Air Force official explained, stealth and electronic attack always have a synergistic relationship because detection is about the signal to noise ratio. Low observables reduce the signal, while electronic attack increases the noise. “Any big picture plan, looking forward, to deal with emerging A2/AD threats will address both sides of that equation,” he said.

Air Force and Marine Corps officials took exception to Boeing pointing out that the F-35 only has X-band electronic attack coverage from the front. “Aft coverage may or may not be provided onboard any given fighter, but is provided by the package overall — which will likely include EA-18s,” one Air Force official pointed out.

However, Air Force and Marine Corps officials said that the Growler may not be particularly useful against emerging threats and noted that there are electronic warfare upgrades planned for the F-35 in addition to its baseline capability.

“The Growler itself, while a very credible aircraft, has limited suitability in an advanced A2/AD area,” one Air Force official said.
“While it is the state of the art for now, I don’t know if it will be the appropriate jamming platform for the pictured environment.”

Nonetheless, a number of Air Force officials expressed support for the Pentagon potentially increasing the size of its Growler buy. “The Growler is a great asset, we probably need more, and it is an important part of a strike package into an advanced IADS [integrated air defense system],” one official said. “It is not as stand-alone as Boeing will claim.”

However, those same officials pointed out that the Growler is not fully interoperable with joint forces.

“If there is a major enduring shortfall to the Growler, it’s the degree and fidelity between it and other joint suppression platforms. The reasons for which could be as benign as joint interoperability [being seen] as an afterthought,” one Air Force official said.

But “it’s to Boeing’s advantage to propagate a limited interoperability platform, especially one that doesn’t communicate very well with competitor’s platforms in the SEAD/DEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses] mission. But it doesn’t make sense from a warfighter position.”

An industry source agreed that the Growler still faces interoperability problems when operating with Air Force assets, but that is true of many platform across the board. “There are interoperability issues across a lot of the platforms,” the industry source said. For example, Lockheed F-22s are only able to connect with other Raptors using the Intra-Flight Data-Link (IFDL), while the F-35 uses a Joint Strike Fighter-only Multifunction Advanced Data-Link (MADL). “This is one of the bigger issues the Air Sea Battle Office is attempting to resolve,” the industry source said.

Gammon defended the EA-18G’s ability to operate with other Pentagon assets. “Growlers have Link 16 which is compatible with [the] F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-35, E-2D, F-15, F-16, and most of the bombers,” he said. “The good news is the Growlers can stand-off from the threat, build the EM [electromagnetic] picture, and pass weapons quality tracks to the other fighters via Link-16 (and soon TTNT [Tactical Targeting Network Technology]).”

The industry source noted that while the F-35 will be fitted with the Link-16 datalink, it would not be able to use that omni-directional link inside a high threat environment because it could compromise the aircraft’s position. “Aircraft such as the F-35 that might not want to transmit on their Link-16 can always receive Link-16 tracks from Growlers and employ weapons on those tracks,” the industry source said.

Air Force officials conceded that the Pentagon probably needs more EA-18Gs.
“In truth, we never bought enough Growlers in the first place,” one Air Force official said.
“They’re worth their weight in gold, and contribute immensely to the ES [electromagnetic spectrum] situational awareness and EA [electronic attack] communities. But the LIMFAC [limiting factor] is, and always will be, the carrier deck park and cycle times.”

A Navy official said that the carrier deck cycle would be a limiting factor only if the Growler was being used to launch missiles such as the AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) or the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). The official noted that with aerial refueling it is not unheard of for Navy fighters to remain airborne for more than six hours at a time. “If the Growler was kinetic, launching all its HARM and then needing to reload… Yes, the deck cycle time would come into play here,” the official said. “But, it’s more realistic to provide standoff jamming than launch HARMs unless in a self-protect role.” The official also pointed out that the need to land, refuel, swap crews, and perform maintenance at some regulated interval is a requirement for any aircraft.

Boeing also suggested in its presentation that the Growler could be used in the counter-air and strike roles. Gammon elaborated on how Boeing envisions the EA-18G might perform some of those missions—distancing the company’s position somewhat from the diagrams shown in the presentation. “In the counter-air mission, the Growlers will use their ESM [electronic support measures] system to help the fighters detect, and just as important, ID the threat. They can do this from a stand-off position from the fighters and still contribute to the overall SA [situational awareness] and ID,” Gammon said.

Gammon also clarified the company’s position with regard to using the EA-18G in the air-to-ground strike role. “In the strike mission, the Growler is supporting by building that enemy EM order of battle, find, fix, track, and ID those threat emitters and then quarterback the EM fight and determine which of those threat systems we are going to jam, attack, avoid. The Growler can employ weapons such as the AARGM at those emitters as well as handing off that track to a strike fighter to engage.”

Navy officials had said that while the service might consider using the Growler as a battle manager, it is extremely unlikely the service would ever consider using the EA-18G in a direct strike role or the air superiority role where the jet would be the primary shooter.

An industry source conceded that while the Growler would likely never be used as an air superiority fighter or strike aircraft, it could play an important role in those missions. “I do agree that Growlers will not be bringing JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munition] to a target,” the source said. “They will support the strike fighters as they fight their way into the target area.”

Though there is broad support for purchasing additional Growlers, it is not a stand-alone solution for dealing with advanced A2/AD threats.

“Stealth has its flaws, as the brief points out; however, if a new pod on a fourth gen platform was a workable answer against the modern and future IADS, I’m about 100 percent certain that USAF [U.S. Air Force] would be trying to buy a pile of them as well,” an Air Force official said.
“But the juice ain’t worth the squeeze, as they say.”